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NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
EARLY WARNING: A STRATEGY TO PREVENT INJURIES AND LOSS OF LIFE DURING ACTIVE
SHOOTER ATTACKS ON K-12 SCHOOLS
by
Susan M. Graves
March 2018
Thesis Advisor: Glen Woodbury Second Reader: Christopher Bellavita
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE EARLY WARNING: A STRATEGY TO PREVENT INJURIES AND LOSS OF LIFE DURING ACTIVE SHOOTER ATTACKS ON K-12 SCHOOLS
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Susan M. Graves
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number NPS.2017.0064-IR-EM2-A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Active shooter attacks occur quickly. Schools have to take immediate action to protect students and staff. Public address systems do not adequately warn everyone at the first sign of danger.
This thesis asks to what extent the school “fire alarm system” can be a model for a “lockdown notification system” for emergencies involving violence.
The research reviews the history, mechanics, and regulations of fire alarm systems, and uses that information to design a conceptual lockdown notification system. A tool to evaluate school warning system technologies was also developed. Six case studies reviewed schools or districts that use a lockdown warning system modeled after the fire alarm system.
The thesis concluded the school evaluation tool is useful for identifying strengths and weaknesses of school warning systems. The tool showed that reliability is a strength of the conceptual lockdown notification system because it is aligned with National Fire Protection Association codes. The lockdown notification system has the potential to solve the problem of early warning.
The research recommends school decision-makers use this new tool to evaluate and select communication and warning system technologies. It recommends a pilot project to test the implementation of the conceptual lockdown notification system in schools.
14. SUBJECT TERMS active shooter attack, K-12 schools, lockdown, lockdown notification system, warning system, technology, technology evaluation framework tool, case study, school safety, safety and security, school security
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
EARLY WARNING: A STRATEGY TO PREVENT INJURIES AND LOSS OF LIFE DURING ACTIVE SHOOTER ATTACKS ON K-12 SCHOOLS
Susan M. Graves Safety Coordinator, Lincoln County School District, Newport, Oregon
B.A., Northwest University, 1998
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018
Approved by: Glen Woodbury Thesis Advisor
Christopher Bellavita Second Reader
Erik Dahl Associate Chair for Instruction Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
Active shooter attacks occur quickly. Schools have to take immediate action to
protect students and staff. Public address systems do not adequately warn everyone at the
first sign of danger.
This thesis asks to what extent the school “fire alarm system” can be a model for a
“lockdown notification system” for emergencies involving violence.
The research reviews the history, mechanics, and regulations of fire alarm
systems, and uses that information to design a conceptual lockdown notification system.
A tool to evaluate school warning system technologies was also developed. Six case
studies reviewed schools or districts that use a lockdown warning system modeled after
the fire alarm system.
The thesis concluded the school evaluation tool is useful for identifying strengths
and weaknesses of school warning systems. The tool showed that reliability is a strength
of the conceptual lockdown notification system because it is aligned with National Fire
Protection Association codes. The lockdown notification system has the potential to solve
the problem of early warning.
The research recommends school decision-makers use this new tool to evaluate
and select communication and warning system technologies. It recommends a pilot
project to test the implementation of the conceptual lockdown notification system in
schools.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. THESIS STATEMENT .............................................................................1 B. POINT OF VIEW ......................................................................................2 C. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................2
1. Speed of Active Shooter Attacks ...................................................2 2. Lockdown as a Response Strategy................................................4 3. Early Warning Can Save Lives ....................................................5 4. Emerging Warning Systems..........................................................6 5. Gap in the Research .......................................................................6 6. Summary of Problem Statement ..................................................7
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY ...........................7 1. Research Questions ........................................................................8 2. Research Methodology ..................................................................8
E. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................10 1. Addressing Violence in K-12 Schools .........................................10 2. Communication and Warning Technologies .............................14 3. Five Implementation Factors ......................................................17 4. Lack of Guidance for Selecting Technologies ...........................21 5. Technology Evaluation Frameworks .........................................22 6. Summary of Literature Review ..................................................24
F. UPCOMING CHAPTERS ......................................................................25
II. THE FIRE ALARM SYSTEM AS A MODEL FOR A LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ................................................................................27 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................27 B. THE SCHOOL FIRE ALARM SYSTEM .............................................29
1. Fire Alarm System Components.................................................31 2. Characteristics of a Fire Alarm Control Panel .........................31 3. Characteristics of Initiating Appliances ....................................33 4. Characteristics of Notification Appliances ................................37 5. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance .......................................40 6. Financial Feasibility .....................................................................41 7. Summary of the Fire Alarm System...........................................41
C. A CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM .........42 1. Lockdown Notification System Components.............................43 2. Characteristics of a Lockdown Notification Control Panel .....44 3. Characteristics of Initiating Appliances ....................................46
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4. Characteristics of Notification Appliances ................................53 5. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance .......................................61 6. Financial Feasibility .....................................................................61 7. Summary of the Lockdown Notification System.......................62
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................63
III. THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL .................................65 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................65 B. OVERVIEW OF K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION
TOOL ........................................................................................................67 1. Foundation ....................................................................................68 2. Technology ....................................................................................69 3. Human ...........................................................................................70 4. Organization .................................................................................71 5. Net Benefits ...................................................................................72 6. Overview Conclusion ...................................................................73
C. THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL EXPLAINED ............................................................................................73 1. Foundation ....................................................................................73 2. Technology ....................................................................................79 3. Human ...........................................................................................96 4. Organization ...............................................................................104 5. Net Benefits .................................................................................117
D. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................120
IV. K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL APPLIED ......................123 A. THE FIRE ALARM SYSTEM APPLIED TO THE SCHOOL
TOOL ......................................................................................................124 B. THE CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION
SYSTEM APPLIED TO THE SCHOOL TOOL ................................131 C. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................138
V. CASE STUDIES .................................................................................................141 A. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................141 B. CASE STUDY DATA ............................................................................143
1. Foundation ..................................................................................144 2. Technology ..................................................................................145 3. Human .........................................................................................158 4. Organization ...............................................................................163 5. Net Benefits .................................................................................170
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C. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................172 1. Commonalities with Conceptual Lockdown Notification
System .........................................................................................172 2. Solves the Problem of Early Warning ......................................173
D. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION ............................................................175
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................177 A. SUMMARY OF THESIS GOALS AND DESIGN .............................177 B. FINDINGS RELATED TO CASE STUDIES AND THE
CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM ...........182 C. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT
EVALUATION TOOL ..........................................................................186 1. Evaluating Existing Systems .....................................................186 2. Evaluating Proposed Systems ...................................................187
D. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH ...........................................................................................191
E. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................192
APPENDIX A. THREATS AND HAZARDS .............................................................195
APPENDIX B. K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL .........................197
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................203
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................211
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. HOT-Fit Evaluation Framework. ...............................................................24
Figure 2. Conventional Fire Alarm Control Panel. ...................................................32
Figure 3. Fire Alarm Pull-Stations. ...........................................................................34
Figure 4. Audible Notification Appliances. ..............................................................39
Figure 5. Fire Alarm System Process Model. ...........................................................42
Figure 6. Conceptual Lockdown Notification Control Panel. ...................................45
Figure 7. Initiating Appliances. .................................................................................47
Figure 8. Incorrect Appearance of a Lockdown Initiating Appliance. ......................48
Figure 9. Conceptual Blue Lockdown Initiating Appliance. .....................................49
Figure 10. Signage Design for the Lockdown Initiating Appliance............................50
Figure 11. Appearance for Visual Notification Appliances. .......................................57
Figure 12. Appearance for Combination Standalone Strobes. ....................................59
Figure 13. White Speaker Strobe and a Clear Lens. ...................................................60
Figure 14. Combination Horn-strobes and Speaker-strobes. ......................................61
Figure 15. Lockdown Notification System Process Model. ........................................62
Figure 16. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. ....................................................68
Figure 17. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. ..................................................121
Figure 18. Activation Devices. ..................................................................................146
Figure 19. Conceptual Lockdown Initiating Appliance and Speaker-Strobe. ...........179
Figure 20. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. ..................................................181
Figure 21. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool Template. ..................................201
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. School Fires with 10 or More Deaths. .......................................................29
Table 2. Foundation Domain Overview. ..................................................................69
Table 3. Technology Domain Overview. .................................................................70
Table 4. Human Domain Overview. ........................................................................71
Table 5. Organization Domain Overview. ...............................................................72
Table 6. Net Benefits Domain Overview. ................................................................73
Table 7. Foundation Domain Expanded. .................................................................74
Table 8. Technology Domain Expanded..................................................................80
Table 9. Human Domain Expanded. ........................................................................97
Table 10. Organization Domain Expanded. .............................................................105
Table 11. Net Benefits Domain Expanded...............................................................118
Table 12. Foundation Domain. ................................................................................144
Table 13. Technology Domain.................................................................................145
Table 14. Audible Notification Comparison. ...........................................................149
Table 15. Human Domain. .......................................................................................158
Table 16. Organization Domain. ..............................................................................163
Table 17. Net Benefits Domain................................................................................170
Table 18. Examples of Threats and Hazards............................................................195
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
AED automatic external defibrillator
BYO bring your own device
CHDS Center for Homeland Defense and Security DHS Department of Homeland Security
ECS emergency communications systems
EVAC emergency voice alarm communication
FACP fire alarm control panel
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERPA Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
HIPPA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HOT-Fit Human, Organization, and Technology-Fit
HS high school
IBC International Building Code
IDEA Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
IDS intrusion detection systems
IP internet protocol
IRB Institutional Review Board
JHU Johns Hopkins University
K-12 kindergarten through grade twelve
LED light-emitting diode
LNCP lockdown notification control panel
MOU memorandum of understanding
MS middle school
NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
PA public address
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REMS Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
RF radio frequencies
RFID radio frequency identification
STAT Student Threat Assessment Team
TA technical assistance
TAM Technology Acceptance Model
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Schools are susceptible to active shooter attacks. Studies show these attacks occur
quickly, often within minutes of when an intruder enters a school.1 Many strategies to
prevent injuries and loss of life have emerged. One of these, lockdown, is a commonly
accepted practice that shows some success at reducing injuries and loss of life during
active shooter attacks on schools.2 While studies show the importance of rapidly warning
everyone in the school, public address systems are often only accessible from a school’s
main office.3 This lack of access can make it difficult to get a timely warning out when
an intruder is first detected. An assortment of warning system technologies have emerged
to address these problems, including some with lockdown push-buttons or police pull-
stations that are modeled similarly to the fire alarm system. Limited research, however,
has been done about the efficacy of these systems, and minimal guidance is available to
help school leaders make informed decisions when selecting warning system
technologies.4
1 Pete J. Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States
between 2000 and 2013 (San Marcos, TX and Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, 2014), 9, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view.
2 Michael Dorn et al., “7 Lessons Learned from Sandy Hook,” Campus Safety Magazine, December 2, 2013, http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/7lessonslearnedfromsandyhook; Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), 32–33, http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_Report_3-6-2015.pdf.
3 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series, FEMA-428/BIPS-07/January 2012, ed. 2 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 3–49, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/st/bips07_428_schools.pdf.
4 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2016), 13–20, https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250274.pdf.
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A. THESIS QUESTIONS
The thesis asks and answers two questions:
• To what extent can the school “fire alarm system” (for emergencies
involving fire and evacuation) be a model for a “lockdown notification
system” for emergencies involving violence requiring lockdown?
• What factors should kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12) school
decision-makers and their law enforcement partners consider when
evaluating and implementing warning systems that notify both school
occupants and law enforcement of an imminent threat of violence at
school?
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
To answer these questions, first, I designed a conceptual lockdown notification
system using the fire alarm system as a model. I studied the history, regulations, and
basic components of the fire alarm system and found that the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) had established similar codes by regulating emergency
communication systems for situations involving violence as they already exist for fire
alarm systems.5 Some of this guidance is even specific to campuses.6 These and other
research documents helped shape the design of the conceptual lockdown notification
system.7
The system mechanics of my conceptual lockdown notification system are almost
identical to those of the fire alarm system. Its components consist of a lockdown
notification control panel that is hardwired to lockdown push-buttons and speaker-strobes
5 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2016 ed.
(Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2015), 24.2.2–3, Chapter 24 Emergency Communications Systems (ECS).
6 National Fire Protection Association, Annex G, Guidelines for Emergency Communications Strategies for Buildings and Campuses.
7 Erica D. Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency Communication Strategies for Buildings, NIST Technical Note 1779 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce, 2013), 23, http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1779.
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located throughout the school. If students or staff members detect a suspicious person or
hear gunfire, they can quickly activate a lockdown push-button. The control panel then
immediately notifies everyone to lock down through a pre-recorded message. The system
simultaneously notifies the police department, via the alarm company.
Next, I developed an evaluation tool that K-12 school decision-makers can use to
evaluate communication and warning system technologies. To formulate the school tool,
I examined existing technology evaluation frameworks and selected the Human,
Organization, and Technology-Fit Factors (HOT-Fit) model as a structure on which to
build the school tool.8 To customize it to K-12 schools and to communication and
warning systems, I incorporated knowledge gleaned from existing literature and research
associated with the conceptual lockdown notification system. I also drew from my
extensive experience as a school safety professional.
The new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool includes five core domains that
guide the user through a process to assess the suitability of a technology to accomplish
the goals of the school organization. The first domain, Foundation, otherwise known as
the why, is unique to this new tool. The other domains come from the HOT-Fit
framework. These domains involve investigating the Technology itself, assessing the
technological interface with Humans in the school system, examining the impact on the
Organizations, and identifying the Net Benefits to the school, district, and community
partners. Each domain is distinct, but interconnected, and each has unique and
customized variables for evaluating the efficacy of the technology’s use within the K-12
school environment.
To test the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool, I applied it first to the fire
alarm system, and then to my conceptual lockdown notification system. This exercise
helped reveal some of the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual lockdown
notification system and served to demonstrate how to use the school tool.
8 Yusof Maryati Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework for Health Information Systems: Human,
Organization and Technology-Fit Factors (HOT-Fit),” International Journal of Medical Informatics 77, no. 6 (June 2008): 386–398, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2007.08.011.
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Additionally, I conducted case studies and interviewed personnel at six schools or
school districts already using a warning system with lockdown push-buttons or police
pull-stations. By laying out the case study data according to the evaluation criteria in the
new school tool, many of the strengths and vulnerabilities of each system emerged and I
was then able to draw conclusions about the efficacy of the case study warning systems
in comparison to my conceptual lockdown notification system.
C. FINDINGS
The following findings are presented about the various warning and fire alarm
systems evaluated, as well as the results of the case studies. A conceptual lockdown
notification system is also presented.
1. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
Using the new school tool to evaluate the case study schools’ warning systems,
the fire alarm system, and the conceptual lockdown notification system revealed strengths
and vulnerabilities of the systems and helped to identify the net benefits of each system.
2. Case Studies
All the case study subjects’ systems, to some extent, solve the problem of early
warning that can result in quicker lockdowns. However, the evaluation exposed
significant vulnerabilities related to the reliability of these systems; in part because of the
system mechanics (that require the use of the internet, radio frequencies, or cellular
service), and also due to complexities associated with add-on features of each system.
These factors potentially reduce the effectiveness of each system and make them more
susceptible to security breaches. The lack of accessibility of the activation devices also
emerged as a weakness. Moreover, problems associated with information clarity
surfaced, most likely due to a lack of awareness of NFPA guidelines for emergency
communications systems.
3. Conceptual Lockdown Notification System
The fire alarm system is a good model for a lockdown notification system. The
mechanics of the conceptual lockdown notification system align with NFPA codes and
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regulations. Like the fire alarm system, the conceptual lockdown notification system has
highly reliable system mechanics that use a control panel to monitor the flow of
electricity and current through the wire that connects the lockdown push-buttons and
speaker-strobes. It does not require the use of the internet, radio frequencies, or cellular
service. It has a built-in battery backup to provide redundancy for a loss of electricity.
These attributes contribute to system reliability and support a strong system defense.
The conceptual lockdown notification system, however, is not as flexible or
complex as the warning systems in the case studies. It is a basic warning system that only
provides that function to accomplish the intended purpose with no extra bells and
whistles. Thus, the system is simple to use, reliable, and manageable to maintain. The
system is consistent with NFPA emergency communications systems guidance. It is
accessible and instructions for use on the push-buttons and associated signage are clear
and intuitive. The proposed order and configuration of the alert tone and warning
message align with NFPA guidance.
Following the NFPA guidance is judicious because it results in a highly reliable
and effective lockdown notification system that is easy to use and appears to have
minimal impact on the daily operations of the school. Additionally, a serendipitous effect
of positively improving the school climate may result by increasing confidence in the
school’s ability to keep students and staff safe. Finally, it is possible that by using the
lockdown notification system, schools may even reduce or prevent injuries and loss of
life during active shooter attacks by locking down more quickly.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
First, schools’ decision-makers should consider using the new K-12 School HOT-
Fit Evaluation Tool to help them select appropriate communication and warning system
technologies to meet their unique needs. The school tool can also be utilized to evaluate
the efficacy of existing systems, and with minor modifications, it may even be a practical
tool to evaluate the suitability of other school safety and security technologies. It is the
hope that by using the school tool, teams will be able to make better decisions about
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communication and warning systems that result in informed and prudent financial
expenditures.
Second, the lockdown notification system is conceptual; it needs to be tested in
schools. A pilot project should be implemented to validate the mechanics of, and actual
implementation of, the conceptual lockdown notification system. The pilot project should
include a collaborative team of researchers, fire and law enforcement officials, and school
safety personnel who design the pilot, implement the project, and evaluate results. I
recommend a comparative design testing the system in some schools with lockdown
push-buttons primarily in common areas, and in other schools with lockdown push-
buttons also in classrooms.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) experience has been an
extremely challenging and immensely rewarding journey, a journey I was blessed to take
with many caring, supportive, and inspiring people.
I first want to acknowledge my incredible husband, Kevin, who has been behind
me 100% during this entire journey. I cannot imagine doing this thesis without his
unwavering encouragement and support. Kevin relentlessly demonstrated how much he
believed in me. He was always eager to listen as I talked about all the things I was
learning. His insights were invaluable as I processed new concepts with him. He
proofread many papers and challenged me to press on when I was weary. Thank you,
Kevin, I could not have done this without you!
I am grateful for the support of the administration at Lincoln County School
District, especially, Rich Belloni, for giving me his enthusiastic blessing to pursue this
opportunity. Rich, thank you for believing in me.
I would also like to thank my two very dear friends and mentors, Karen Shafer
and Maryann Bozza. Both joined me in the arduous and rigorous application process,
proofreading draft after draft, and helping me think differently to understand how to
translate my practical work experience into concepts related to synthesis, analysis,
application, and evaluation. That process was, for me, the beginning of my master’s
degree work.
Despite the enormity of the demands of this program, life continued to go on
around me. I experienced immense personal loss when my Uncle Steve suffered a major
heart attack, fought through several surgeries, and subsequently died. Uncle Steve
believed in me and never missed an opportunity to tell me how proud of me he was. I
miss him more than words can say. Shortly after, my dear mother-in-law, Vivian, also
passed away unexpectedly; another significant loss for me. All throughout this journey,
my extended family rallied around me, encouraged me, and was gracious and
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understanding as I had to be absent from many important family gatherings and activities.
My family motivated me by believing in me. I hope I have made them proud.
Writing a thesis was a bigger challenge than I ever expected. I am grateful to my
advisors Glen Woodbury and Chris Bellavita for their gracious oversight and valuable
feedback. Thank you for trusting me. I would also like to thank Alison Scharmota at the
Graduate Writing Center. Her indispensable assistance came at just the right time and
helped me get through an intense part of the refining process.
I would like to extend my gratitude to my school safety colleagues around the
nation who so generously agreed to participate in my case study research. You know who
you are, and I am sincerely appreciative of your time and contributions. I believe my
thesis is more robust as a result.
CHDS is a special place. It is marked by brilliant and caring staff and instructors
who collectively created an academically rigorous and invigorating experience centered
on this world we call the homeland security enterprise. I never imagined the extent to
which I would be challenged and stretched during this program. Thank you for believing
in me, for inviting me into this program, and for challenging me to grow and to think
differently. Thank you for recognizing and embracing the significant place that K-12
schools hold in the homeland security enterprise. My colleagues in the 1611 cohort are
incredibly intelligent and talented people, but I am even more struck by what genuinely
impressive human beings they are. They are role models for me and I am deeply grateful
for their friendship.
It is a profound honor and privilege to have been a part of this CHDS program.
My heart is full of thankfulness.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A school teacher notices a strange man charging down the hall with a gun in his
hand. The teacher needs to think about personal safety while discreetly and quickly
notifying the main office to make a warning announcement on the public address system.
Depending on where the teacher is in the school, he or she may have to run to the office
to make notification of the intruder. This takes valuable time when every minute—every
second—may mean the loss of lives.
This fictitious scenario illustrates the challenges of warning school occupants
during real active shooter attacks on schools, such as at Reynolds High School in Oregon.
The after action report records that after “initial shots [were] fired in the boys’ locker
room […the] Gym teacher runs out of the gym towards the front office to initiate school
lockdown and is shot by [the] shooter.”1 Similar scenarios have unfolded in other
shooting attacks on kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12) schools. In the Aztech
High School shooting in New Mexico, it was reported that the custodian screamed “at
teachers that there was an active shooter on site.”2 In this instance, screaming was the
initial method to warn others of danger.
A. THESIS STATEMENT
The goal of this thesis is to propose and attempt to validate the efficacy of a
conceptual lockdown notification system that schools may be able to use to decrease the
time it takes to notify everyone in the school of danger, so that protective measures, such
as lockdown, can occur more quickly.
To achieve this goal, this chapter first provides a problem statement attesting to
the speed of active shooter attacks on K-12 schools. It shows that lockdown is a
1 Multnomah County, Reynolds High School Active Shooter Response: An Analysis of the Response to
the Reynolds High School Shooting on June 10, 2014, After-Action Report, Summer of 2015 (Oregon: Multnomah County, 2015), A–1.
2 Eric Levenson and Laura Diaz-Zuniga, “New Mexico High School Shooter Was Investigated by FBI in 2016,” CNN, December 9, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/us/aztec-high-school-shooting-willi am-atchison/index.html.
2
commonly accepted protective strategy that has shown to be effective in reducing injuries
and loss of life, and demonstrates the criticality of timely warning announcements. Next,
two research questions are identified that evolved in response to this problem and an
overview of the research methodology used to address those questions is provided. Then,
a literature review is conducted to gain awareness of the current research related to school
violence, school communication and warning systems, and the type of assessment tools
that exist to evaluate school warning system technologies. The literature review also
identifies gaps in the research that inform further research in this thesis. Finally, the
remainder of the thesis is presented by providing a brief overview of each upcoming
chapter.
B. POINT OF VIEW
I write as a researcher and as a subject matter expert on school safety since I have
been in this field with 17 years of experience as a full-time school safety professional in
K-12 schools. Ten of those years I also spent consulting—assisting the U.S. Department
of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students—writing publications, contributing
to federal school guidance, developing training materials, presenting at conferences, and
speaking at workshops all over the nation to train school personnel and their community
partners how to develop high-quality school emergency plans. I incorporate my
experience into this thesis as a supplement to the extensive research I have done.
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section presents research that identifies (1) the speed of active shooter
attacks on K-12 schools, (2) that lockdown is a commonly accepted protective strategy,
(3) the criticality of timely warning announcements, (4) the emergence of new warning
systems, (5) gaps in the research, and (6) a plan to address these problems and gaps.
1. Speed of Active Shooter Attacks
Schools are susceptible to a variety of hazards, threats, and dangerous situations,
such as active shooter attacks, all of which require implementing immediate protective
measures. Studies show that these events can occur quickly, often within minutes from
3
when an intruder enters a school.3 In 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
released a report in which it studied 160 active shooter incidents occurring between 2000
and 2013 in a variety of public places, including schools. The FBI’s findings confirm the
speed of these events: “Damage can occur in a matter of minutes. In 64 incidents where
the duration of the incident could be ascertained, 44 (69.0%) of 64 incidents ended in 5
minutes or less, with 23 ending in 2 minutes or less.”4 The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) agrees with this assessment:
A targeted shooting incident typically evolves so rapidly that by the time emergency responders arrive, it is either too late or too dangerous to intervene. It is a painful, but nonetheless true fact, that once an attacker has entered a targeted school building with the intention of shooting someone, there is practically nothing, or very little, that can be done to avert the attack.5
While this statement may be valid based on current research, I contend that this
seemingly hopeless stance is not the case. If schools are equipped with effective
lockdown notification systems, they might have a better chance of averting or at the very
least, minimizing the severity of a violent attack.
Steven Ausdemore, in “Eliminating the Lost Time Interval of Law Enforcement
to Active Shooter Events in Schools,” describes this in-between period of when a shooter
begins an attack and when law enforcement arrive, calling it “the lost time interval.” 6 He
identifies a correlation between rapid response and the reduction of loss of life and
focuses on strategies and tools to counter an attack before police arrive. He draws an
analogy by referring to the benefits of using an automatic external defibrillator (AED) to
3 Pete J. Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (San Marcos, TX and Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, 2014), 9, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view.
4 Blair and Schweit, 9. 5 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection
and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series, FEMA-428/BIPS-07/January 2012, ed. 2 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 3–2, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/st/bips07_428_schools.pdf.
6 Steven E. Ausdemore, “Eliminating the Lost Time Interval of Law Enforcement to Active Shooter Events in School” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/109 45/47227.
4
help someone in cardiac arrest while waiting for the arrival of professional medical
personnel. He argues “just as automatic external defibrillators address the lost time
interval for emergency medical service response, strategies have been developed and
proven successful in reducing the consequence of this [police] delay.”7 A lockdown
notification system may be one of the solutions to this lost time interval, since lockdown
is a commonly accepted response strategy, as shown next.
2. Lockdown as a Response Strategy
Many strategies to prevent an attack have emerged, such as mitigation
approaches, security technologies, counter measures, and response strategies.8 Of these,
lockdown is a commonly accepted and practiced response strategy used for many
emergency situations involving violence at or near school.9 The Final Report of the
Sandy Hook Advisory Commission provides recommendations for schools and states that
all classroom doors should be able to lock from inside the classroom. They reasoned,
“there has never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked classroom
door.”10 School safety experts from Safe Havens International reiterated findings in this
report and wrote:
7 Ausdemore, xv. 8 Federal Emergency Management Agency, How to Prepare for and Respond during and after an
Active Shooter Incident (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1472672897352-d28bb197db5389e4ddedcef335d3d867/ FEMA_ActiveShooter_OnePagerv1d15_508_FINAL.pdf; “Avoid, Deny, Defend,” ALERRT™ Center at Texas State University, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.avoiddenydefend.org; “Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate,” Alice Training Institute, accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.alicetraining. com/; Ken Trump, “ALICE Training Co-Founder Admits ‘Counter’ Tactic of Students Attacking Gunmen Has Never Been Used by an ALICE-Trained School Class,” National School Safety and Security Services, 2015, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/2015/12/alice-training-co-founder-admits-counter-tactic-of-students-attacking-gunmen-unproven/.
9 Lockdown is a strategy used in schools in which students and staff seek protection in lockable rooms, lock the door, turn off the lights, get out of sight of windows, and remain quiet. For further reading on lockdowns, see Susan M. Graves, “Lockdown Terminology in K-12 Schools: Why It Is Okay to Use Codes and Which Codes Are Best” class paper for Introduction to Homeland Security NS3180, Center for Homeland Defense and Security Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, January 19, 2017, https:// www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798734; Susan Graves, “ELVIS and TIGERS and PINK CADILLACS—OH MY! Covert Communications for School Emergencies,” Inside the Yellow Tape, Medium Homeland Security Collection, April 16, 2017, https://medium.com/homeland-security/elvis-and-tigers-and-pink-cadillacs-oh-my-covert-communications-for-school-emergencies-ff7608377745.
10 Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), 32–33, http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_ Final_Report_3-6-2015.pdf.
5
Despite the fact that the locked front entry door [at Sandy Hook Elementary School] was breached, the report indicates that no interior doors were breached by force. Keeping in mind that most of the staff and students in the school survived, this affords additional evidence that lockdown is still one of our most effective tools to prevent death in mass casualty school shootings.11
They went on to discuss the importance of issuing keys to all teachers and substitutes and
training staff to lock doors quickly.
3. Early Warning Can Save Lives
The Sandy Hook Report also reiterates the importance of staff and students
having greater situational awareness and summoning help quickly, explaining “every
second counts between the initiation of a threatening event and the arrival of emergency
responders. Seconds and minutes equate to lives lost or saved.”12 I agree with the Sandy
Hook Report and would go further to assert that it is also critical to reduce the time
between the initial signs of an act of violence and the school-wide notification to take
protective measures, such as lockdown. Delays in this notification may cost lives.
Keeping in mind that according to the Sandy Hook Report, locked classroom doors have
never been defeated in these attacks; the sooner students and staff are alerted to
lockdown, the quicker they may be able to get out of open areas and into lockable
rooms.13
DHS’s Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and
School Shootings spells out the importance of timely emergency alerts and explains,
“mass notification systems are critical for advising faculty, students, and visitors of
impending danger. After the exact nature of a threat is positively identified, unsuspecting
occupants must be immediately alerted of the threat or situation and advised of what
actions should be taken.”14 While speed of notification to all occupants is critical, many
11 Michael Dorn et al., “7 Lessons Learned from Sandy Hook,” Campus Safety Magazine, December
2, 2013, http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/7lessonslearnedfromsandyhook. 12 Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, Final Report of Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 26. 13 Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 32–33. 14 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection
and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects, 3–49.
6
schools are not equipped with reliable and readily available technology to make
notifications at the first sign of danger. Traditional warning systems, such as public
address systems, are often only accessible from a school’s main office, which makes it
difficult to get a timely warning out to the school community when an intruder is first
spotted in another area of the building.
4. Emerging Warning Systems
In response to this problem, various new alert and warning systems are emerging.
Some are wireless, others hardwired; they are located in various areas of a school
building or campus; some connect to an audible alert system, others to a silent alarm;
some use cell phone applications, others are worn as a necklaces; and in some cases, the
systems include different colored warning lights, strobes, or light-emitting diode (LED)
signs.15 Some are modeled similarly to the fire alarm notification system and utilize
different types of emergency push-buttons or pull-stations to send a prerecorded message
automatically to the entire school indicating the need to take protective measures, such as
a lockdown, while simultaneously alerting the alarm company or police department.16
5. Gap in the Research
Limited research, however, is available that describes the purpose, functionality,
or efficacy of these systems, as the literature review of this thesis shows. Findings from
the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) report stipulate:
While application of safety and security technology in schools is not new, headline-generated fears, fiscal issues, and advancements in technology have made the issue increasingly complex. The literature is sparse on how and why technology is selected and employed in schools (assessing need) and its influence on violence and other crimes (evaluation and impact).
15 Heather L. Schwartz et al., The Role of Technology in Improving K–12 School Safety (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1488.html; Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/250274.pdf; Tod Schneider, School Security Technologies (Washington, DC: National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities, National Institute of Building Sciences, 2010), https://files. eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED507917.pdf.
16 Chapter IV of this thesis provides case studies on six school using some iteration of these push-button or pull-station warning systems.
7
There is minimal literature on brands, vendors, or the advantages and disadvantages of specific technologies.17
While technology evaluation tools exist, I did not find any specifically focused on
warning systems applied in the K-12 school environment that school decision-makers can
use to evaluate the efficacy of these emerging warning systems.
6. Summary of Problem Statement
In summary, schools are at risk for active shooter attacks, which often occur
rapidly once an intruder begins an attack. A need exists to decrease the time it takes to
notify everyone in the school to implement a lockdown when a threat of violence is first
discovered. New technologies are emerging to address this problem; however, minimal
guidance is available to help school leaders make decisions about selecting warning
systems.
This thesis does two distinct yet interconnected things. First, it examines the use
of warning systems modeled after the fire alarm system that use lockdown push-buttons
or police pull-stations to initiate a quick warning. These systems can accelerate a school’s
ability to notify students and staff to take immediate protective measures when an
emergency involves violence at school. The goal in locking down more quickly is to
reduce and possibly eliminate the intruder’s access to school occupants during that
critical lost time interval, and thereby, potentially prevent injuries and loss of life.
Second, it identifies key factors that may be helpful for decision-makers to consider when
selecting or implementing warning system technologies to meet the needs of their unique
schools.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This section identifies two research questions and describes how the research is
designed to answer the questions.
17 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 13–20.
8
1. Research Questions
The goal of this thesis is to answer two questions:
• To what extent can the school “fire alarm system” (for emergencies
involving fire and evacuation) be a model for a “lockdown notification
system” for emergencies involving violence and requiring lockdown?
• What factors should K-12 school decision-makers and their law
enforcement partners consider when evaluating and implementing warning
systems that notify both school occupants and law enforcement of an
imminent threat of violence at school?
2. Research Methodology
The research methodology used for this thesis is discussed as follows.
a. Literature Review
After identifying this problem involving the speed of active shooter attacks and
lack of capacity to notify school occupants of danger quickly, the existing literature was
examined to understand these problems more fully and learn about potential solutions.
The literature review is the next section in this chapter.
b. Fire Alarm System and Conceptual Lockdown Notification System
The basic components of the school fire alarm system were studied and a
conceptual lockdown notification system modeled after the fire alarm system developed.
The standards and requirements for the fire alarm system found in the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) regulations, the Life Safety Code Handbook, and other
pertinent literature, were applied to the conceptual lockdown notification system. This
research and proposal is presented in Chapter II of this thesis.
c. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
A variety of existing technology evaluation frameworks were examined, as
identified in the upcoming literature review, for suitability to evaluate warning system
9
technologies in the K-12 school environment. From this research, it was determined that
the core elements of the Human, Organization, and Technology-Fit factors (HOT-Fit)
framework is a feasible structure on which to build a customized evaluation framework
for school decision-makers to use to assess the efficacy of warning technologies for use
in K-12 schools.18 The knowledge gained from the literature review, the study of fire
alarm systems, and the development of the conceptual lockdown notification system,
along with my experience as a school safety professional, informed the design and
customization of this new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
d. Case Studies
Simultaneous to researching and developing the new K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool, I conducted my own case studies on actual schools using a lockdown
notification system with police pull-stations or lockdown push-buttons resembling the
fire alarm system yet designed to address school violence. This approach was necessary
because I was not able to find any academic research or existing case studies on schools
using these systems. Yet, news reports and vendor advertisements revealed that these
systems existed. My research fills this gap.
Robert K. Yin, in Case Study Research Design and Methods, describes a
motivation for this type of research by explaining “you would want to do case study
research because you want to understand a real-world case and assume that such an
understanding is likely to involve important contextual conditions pertinent to your
case.”19 Obtaining this understanding is precisely why I conducted case studies; to
ascertain what I could learn about how these systems work in the K-12 school
environment. I wanted to understand three things: first, what factors influenced the
selection of different applications of these warning systems; next, what conditions limited
or enhanced a school’s ability to implement the systems successfully; and finally, how
18 Yusof Maryati Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework for Health Information Systems: Human,
Organization and Technology-Fit Factors (HOT-fit),” International Journal of Medical Informatics 77, no. 6 (June 2008): 386–398, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2007.08.011.
19 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 16.
10
the warning system solved the problem of timely and early warning for emergencies
involving violence at school.
The case studies consisted of interviewing six subjects, some of whom
represented schools, and others, school districts. Yin validates the use of interviews for
case studies by asserting, “One of the most important sources of case study evidence is
the interview.”20 Chapter V presents these six case studies by first describing the
parameters for participation in the case study research, how the subjects were selected,
and the interview process. Next, the case study data is presented according to the
categories defined in the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. Finally, the
commonalities of the case study’s warning systems are analyzed and compared to the
researcher’s conceptual lockdown notification system.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature includes a myriad of sources, such as federal government research
documents, journal articles, books and reports from non-profit organizations, think tank
publications, and academic literature. The literature review focused on these areas: (1)
works addressing school violence, (2) literature about communication and warning
technologies used in schools, (3) the identification of five implementation factors critical
to the successful application of warning systems in K-12 schools, (4) the lack of guidance
for selecting technologies, and (5) technology evaluation frameworks.
1. Addressing Violence in K-12 Schools
The first part of the literature review features publications that address school
emergency plans, school violence, threat assessments, active shooter attacks on schools,
and terrorism.
20 Yin, 110.
11
School personnel are directly in charge of hundreds and sometimes thousands of
children and act in place of their parents or guardians, which is called in loco parentis.21
Not only do they work to educate students, they must also be prepared to respond to a
wide range of hazards and threats, many of which require making timely warning
announcements and implementing protective actions, such as lockdown or evacuation.22
In 2013, six federal agencies collaborated to produce guidance for schools on how to
develop emergency operations plans. The Guide for Developing High-Quality School
Emergency Operations Plans, hereafter referred as the K-12 EOP Guide, advises schools
to use an all-hazards approach in their emergency planning.23 K-12 EOP Guide includes
instructions for assessing risk and vulnerability related to numerous hazards and threats,
including various forms of school violence, and takes school teams through a process to
develop threat and hazard protocols for their school emergency plan. It also recommends
essential components for school lockdown plans.24
Among the hazards and threats K-12 schools encounter, violence is a consistent
topic addressed by scholars and practitioners. In Indicators of School Crime and Safety:
2016, Musu-Gillette et al. paint a picture of violence and crime at schools and
postsecondary institutions that covers “topics such as victimization, teacher injury,
bullying and cyber-bullying, school conditions, fights, weapons, availability and student
use of drugs and alcohol, student perceptions of personal safety at school.”25 This report
represents their 19th annual publication on school crime. The U.S. Department of Justice
provides an estimation of the frequency of school violence in its Summary of School
21 Legal Dictionary, s.v. “in loco parentis,” http://legaldictionary.net/in-loco-parentis/, accessed March
20, 2018; “How Far Does in Loco Parentis Extend for Schools in America?,” Politics Stack Exchange, accessed March 20, 2018, http://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/700/how-far-does-in-loco-parentis-extend-for-schools-in-america.
22 See Appendix A for a chart showing many of the threats and hazards for which schools must prepare.
23 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (Washington, DC: Department of Education, 2013), 36, https://rems.ed.gov/docs/REMS_K-12_Guide_508.pdf.
24 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 7. 25 Lauren Musu-Gillette et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2016, NCES 2017-064/NCJ
250650 (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, 2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/ 2017064.pdf.
12
Safety Statistics. This publication provides an overview of statistics on school crime rates,
school violence, school shootings, traumatic events, and social media threats.26
Threat assessment is an established discipline and proven mitigation strategy to
help prevent violence at school. Threat assessment experts delineate between two types
of violence, reactive aggression and targeted violence. Fein et al. cites targeted violence
as a threat schools are vulnerable to in Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to
Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates.27 This work,
based on the findings of the Safe School Initiative, promotes the need to create safe
school climates to help prevent targeted violence in schools, such as school shootings. It
also provides a threat assessment process for schools modeled after the threat assessment
process in use by the Secret Service to protect the president. O’Toole also addresses
targeted violence in The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective. This report is
based on a collective work from the 1999 Leesburg Symposium that studied 18 cases of
school shootings, some of which were thwarted, and promotes the use of a threat
assessment system to help prevent targeted school violence.28 In Assessing Student
Threats, John Van Dreal describes the Salem-Keizer School District’s research-based,
multi-disciplinary Student Threat Assessment Team (STAT).29 It includes the process for
school-based teams to conduct a preliminary threat assessment, and for community-based
teams to conduct a more extensive assessment. Van Dreal differentiates between reactive
aggression and targeted violence since most of the active shooter attacks on schools
involve targeted violence.30 The threat assessment process empowers school leaders to
26 Mary Poulin Carlton, Summary of School Safety Statistics (Washington, DC: Office of Justice
Programs, Department of Justice, 2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250610.pdf. 27 Robert Fein et al., Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and
to Creating Safe School Climates (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf; Brian Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf.
28 Mary Ellen O’Toole, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective (Quantico, VA: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, 2000), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-school-shooter-school-shooter/view.
29 John Van Dreal, Assessing Student Threats: A Handbook for Implementing the Salem-Keizer System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2011).
30 Van Dreal.
13
understand risk and develop supportive interventions for the school and for students at
risk of violence that thereby decreases the risk of violent attacks on schools. The Salem-
Keizer STAT is a nationally recognized student threat assessment system.
In another significant work, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School
Initiative, Vossekuil et al. studied 37 incidents of targeted violence in schools from 1974–
2000.31 They identified 10 key findings about the attacks and attackers, one being, “there
is no accurate or useful ‘profile’ of students who engaged in targeted school violence.”32
The report promotes the need to gather intelligence on the risk of an attack and complete
threat assessments to prevent attacks.33 A key finding in a 2014 report released by the
FBI on 160 active shooter events between 2000 and 2013 showed students were often the
attackers.34 Blair explains: “In a majority of the HS [high school] and MS [middle
school] incidents, the shooter was a student at the school; this was the case in 12 of 14
HS shootings and 5 of 6 MS shootings.”35 These works underscore the value of student
threat assessments.
Terrorism is another form of violence brought forth in the literature as a risk for
schools. The history of terrorism in schools is the focus of Michael and Chris Dorn’s
work, Innocent Targets When Terrorism Comes to School.36 In the book, the Dorns lay
out terrorist’s tendencies, how schools can combat terrorism, and discuss the
psychological effects of terrorism on children.37 The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) also addresses terrorism in its 317-page book, Primer to Design Safe
School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attack. It aims to “provide the design community
and school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school that
is safe from terrorist attacks and at the same time is functional [and] aesthetically
31 Vossekuil et al., The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative. 32 Vossekuil et al., 11. 33 Vossekuil et al. 34 Blair and Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents, 6. 35 Blair and Schweit, 16. 36 Michael Dorn and Chris Dorn, Innocent Targets When Terrorism Comes to School (Macon, GA:
Safe Havens International, 2005). 37 Dorn and Dorn.
14
pleasing.”38 The aspect of functionality is particularly important because school leaders
are more likely to maintain security systems and strategies if they do not hinder the
school’s daily, functional, and practical needs. The report discusses vulnerabilities related
to the physical design of the campus and buildings while also addressing exterior and
interior protective measures, such as access control, fire protection systems, physical
security systems, and communications systems.39
The aforementioned literature represent a variety of publications referencing
different types of school violence, such as active shooter attacks and terrorism, and
mitigation strategies including threat assessment and the development of emergency
plans. Another strategy for responding to school violence involves the use of warning
systems in schools.
2. Communication and Warning Technologies
This section brings forth literature addressing traditional and emerging
communication and warning technologies used in schools. Johns Hopkins University’s A
Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, reports, “Communication is one of
the most vital capabilities for school officials and first responders in the event of an act of
criminal violence or natural disaster.”40 When a suspicious person is seen on campus,
gunshots are heard, or some kind of violent attack occurs, schools need a mechanism to
alert and warn its occupants quickly to take protective measures. The K-12 EOP Guide
identifies several components to include in a school’s communication and warning
protocols.41 These components include identifying how a school’s system will interact
with its local fire and law enforcement agencies, the importance of training staff members
to use the equipment by taking into account barriers related to technology, language, and
38 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection
and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks. 39 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection
and Disaster Management Division, 3–49. 40 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, ES–7. 41 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 7.
15
the needs of individuals with disabilities, and addressing activities occurring outside of
regular school hours.42 The K-12 EOP Guide neither identifies nor provides guidance on
any specific types of communication, alert, or warning technologies or systems available
to or used in K-12 schools.
a. Traditional Systems
Although the U.S. Department of Education does not recommend specific
technologies, many methods exist to notify students, staff, and first responders when an
emergency occurs that include traditional systems, such as landline telephones, fire alarm
systems, public address (PA) or intercom systems, classroom call buttons, and two-way
radios. The NFPA establishes codes and regulations for all aspects of fire alarm warning
systems in schools. The National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code (NFPA 72) “covers the
application, installation, location, performance, inspection, testing, and maintenance of
fire alarm systems, supervision station alarm systems, public emergency alarm reporting
systems, fire warning equipment and emergency communications systems (ECS), and
their components.”43 In The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in
U.S. Schools, Green describes some of the most basic communications as,
“yelling/screaming, sending someone else for help, using the public address (PA) system,
using a telephone, or calling on a two-way radio.”44 Two-way radios allow the user to
communicate with multiple users simultaneously, are easy to use, and require minimal
training. In some cases, mega phones or bullhorns are used. These methods have been
standard fare in most schools for years, and in some cases, decades. FEMA’s Primer to
Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks credits classroom call systems,
such as phones and call buttons, with the ability to “provide a rapid means for staff or
42 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 7. 43 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 2016 ed.
(Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2015), 1.1, Scope, 1.1.1, http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=72.
44 Mary W. Green, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 1999), 114.
16
students to alert the administrators that a serious incident is taking place.”45 In
Schneider’s School Security Technologies, he calls hard-wired phones in classrooms
“sound investments” saying, “teachers and students can rely on finding them in the same
location whenever needed.”46 These traditional approaches have several enduring
benefits affecting their success in K-12 schools, such as rapid notification, reliability, and
sound investments; even so, some weaknesses, particularly with two-way radios,
emerged in the literature review.
Two-way radios are limited in range, and transmissions are sometimes
compromised by certain kinds of construction. These and other weaknesses specific to
two-way radios are spelled out in the “five implementation factors” section of the
literature review. Even so, a two-way radio was used with some success in the Arapahoe
High School shooting to communicate the presence of an intruder and speed up the
lockdown announcement.47
b. Emerging Systems
The literature also identifies several emerging communication and warning
technologies used in some K-12 schools. These technologies include smartphone warning
apps, a variety of silent alarms (such as fixed panic buttons or duress alarms), wearable
pendants or badge alarm devices, and computer software alert systems. Johns Hopkins
University’s A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology describes the
wearable alarms as a device “worn by school staff […with] a button that, when pushed,
will signal an alert to an alarm panel.”48 Smart phone panic button applications work in
much the same manner in that when activated, they send an alert to an alarm panel, a 911
45 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks, 3–49.
46 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 9. 47 In the Arapahoe High School shooting, the custodian used a two-way radio to alert the office to
announce a lockdown. “Though some staff reported having trouble hearing the radio call and the aggressor was able to make it inside of the school before the lockdown was issued, the lockdown communication was very fast in this incident.” Safe Havens International, Post-Incident Review, Arapahoe High School Active-Shooter Incident (Macon, GA: Safe Havens International, 2016), 50.
48 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, 4–27.
17
dispatch center, or to designated personnel in the school. Schneider says that this smart
phone technology enables teachers to “call for help anywhere at any time as long as they
have a charged phone handy and good reception.”49 Fixed panic buttons or duress alarms
are mounted in the school office, and are hidden under a desk or counter. They may also
be located in visible locations so they are accessible by all.50
The RAND report entitled The Role of Technology in Improving K-12 School
Safety describes a computer software alert system in which staff members’ desktop
computers have an icon to press to indicate an emergency.51 As the Johns Hopkins report
indicates, “a silent alarm may not help with deterring or preventing an intruder, but it can
drastically reduce the police response time by triggering a quick alarm.”52 Both the
RAND and JHU literature include case studies on schools using these emerging warning
and alert technologies, but not on schools using warning systems modeled after the fire
alarm system with lockdown push-buttons or police pull-stations.
Along with Schneider’s work, School Security Technologies, the RAND and JHU
literature identified several weaknesses related to the implementation of traditional and
emerging communications systems in K-12 schools, including their inaccessibility,
inability to warn the entire school, reliability shortcomings, expense, and lack of fit.53
3. Five Implementation Factors
These weaknesses reveal five distinct factors that affect the successful
implementation of warning systems in K-12 schools. The system must be readily
accessible, provide an immediate warning to all school occupants, be reliable, have
manageable initial and ongoing costs, and fit the unique needs and characteristics of the
school organization.
49 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 9. 50 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–28. 51 Schwartz et al., The Role of Technology, 41. 52 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–28. 53 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology; Johns Hopkins University, School Safety Technology;
Schneider, School Security Technologies, 9.
18
(1) Accessibility
The RAND report highlights the need for quick and easy access to an alarm. “An
alarm system is thought to be most useful when it is always activated and ready to be
used.”54 Desktop computer alert systems and cell phone apps are most effective if the
device is accessible, turned on, and the software application is readily available and easy
to use. If a staff member has to wait to turn on a computer or cell phone and open the
software, the delay can cost lives. The RAND report also noted a weakness with the
computer software alert system in that those using the school after hours would need
training on the system.55 They also would have difficulty accessing the computers since
they are usually password protected and in locked classrooms during non-school hours.
Many of these emerging warning systems have weaknesses related to accessibility.
(2) Timely Warning to Entire School
None of these silent alarm devices, whether hidden, visibly mounted on the wall,
worn on a body, or on a cell phone app has a mechanism to notify all school occupants
quickly of an emergency. As the JHU report indicates, “Duress alarms cannot prevent
violence. They also cannot actually protect someone from being victimized […] the
effectiveness is critically linked to the ability of an alarm to promptly notify the
appropriate people.”56 Schneider, in School Security Technologies asserts, “Everyone on
campus should be able to call for help, pass along a timely warning, or receive a warning
—any time, anywhere. A teacher shouldn’t have to choose between staying with students
and calling for help.”57 These emerging technologies are usually only set up to notify
designated people, not the entire school. All three reports emphasize the importance of
quickly warning everyone on campus of threats of violence. Yet none of these
technologies emit an immediate audible warning message to everyone at the school.
54 Schwartz et al., 14. 55 Schwartz et al., 42. 56 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–33. 57 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 8.
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(3) Reliability
A major weakness of using a smart phone application as an emergency panic
button revealed by the Schneider, RAND and JHU reports has to do with reliability.
Schneider notes that, “some school construction is so dense that cell phones cannot
function reliably indoors.”58 The JHU report discusses weaknesses like dropped calls,
coverage area limitations, dead batteries, data speed, and the possibility of cell phones
being inaccessible or misplaced. The JHU says that “because cellular signals can be
overwhelmed by demand, this option carries with it a significant risk especially during an
emergency.”59 In interviews cited in the RAND report, “panelists noted that in old
buildings or rural school campuses cell phone reception was spotty […] and also noted
that schools have a disincentive from improving cell coverage within a building, since
they want to discourage students and teachers from spending time on their phones during
school hours.”60 The literature named reliability as a weakness with two-way radios and
computer software alerts. The RAND report cites the “human element” as a liability, such
as “forgetting to charge batteries” and “staff leaving radios in their classrooms.”61 These
vulnerabilities related to reliability were consistent in all three reports.
(4) Cost
Schneider cautions against purchasing low-end radios that are inadequate for
school use and discusses the expenses of purchasing and maintaining radios, and
replacing batteries. He also cautions against using other people’s money saying, “grant
money runs out. Eventually more radios will be needed.”62 RAND’s case study involving
wearable alert badges cited the initial cost as prohibitive and notes, “implementation of
the program […] would have been nearly impossible without a private donation.”63 The
58 Schneider, 10. 59 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 5–25. 60 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 24–25. 61 Schwartz et al., 74 62 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 8. 63 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 37.
20
JHU report agrees that cost is a barrier and states that “the cost of purchasing badge
alarms may limit how many badge alarms a school can purchase.”64 Replacing batteries
and wearable devices that are lost, damaged, worn, or stolen can also be barriers for
schools. Schneider also advises that school decision-makers carefully consider the use of
grant funds since when funding runs out, it may be difficult to afford the costs of
replacing or maintaining equipment.65 The JHU report agrees with Schneider by stating
that “technologies have an expected life cycle, and as equipment ages and technology
advances, equipment and software must be replaced. Grants in response to incidents,
however, almost never account for this, leaving schools with aging systems and no means
to refresh the technology.”66 The report goes on to indicate that sometimes, when a grant
competition with a quick deadline is announced, school decision-makers do not have the
time to investigate technology options fully and can end up making technology decisions
hastily.67 The RAND report indicates that “Complex systems of alerts can cost districts
millions of dollars; the use of existing infrastructure (e.g., telephone lines, local fire
alarms) to send out alarms can eliminate fees and costs while also being reliable.”68
Other challenges cited in these reports by both the schools and their law enforcement
partners indicate that “as time passes, it has become more challenging to garner both
public and financial support to maintain the systems […] as the memory of past events
fades, compliance with school safety policies and procedures […] also tends to
diminish.”69 The barriers associated with initial and ongoing costs of warning
technologies and systems are a consistent theme in all three reports.
64 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–28. 65 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 8. 66 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 15–4. 67 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, ES–4, 12. 68 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 14. 69 Schwartz et al., 42.
21
(5) Organizational Fit
The literature recognizes the importance of considering the unique situation of a
specific school to select a warning technology that fits the school’s needs, yet it does not
provide guidance on how to match a technological solution to a specific school. The K-12
EOP Guide stresses the importance of “customiz[ing] plans to the building level, taking
into consideration the school’s unique circumstances and resources.”70 Schneider urges
school decision-makers to identify the problems to solve before choosing a technology,
consider the school’s specific needs, constraints, and variables, carefully analyze
solutions, and then choose the appropriate technology.71 The RAND report agrees and
stipulates that “technological solutions, if adopted, must be based on a need that is
specific to a school district and school buildings—there is no one-size-fits-all solution.”
The report went on to say that “any technology is only as good as the people running it,
who are the key components of making schools safe.”72 The literature is in agreement
about the need for customization and organizational fit.
4. Lack of Guidance for Selecting Technologies
The JHU report cautioned that “although some of the literature references the
importance of ‘fit’ and meeting the specific needs of each school, there is limited
evidence-based information on how to conduct a technology assessment to address such
fit.”73 The JHU report says that “much of the general information and research on the
effectiveness of school security technology [including communication and warning
technology] is vendor-driven.”74 The RAND report agrees and notes that “despite the
growth in the school safety technology sector, rigorous research about the effectiveness
of these technologies is virtually nonexistent.”75 In an article in the New York Times,
70 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 4. 71 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 1. 72 Schwartz et al., 33. 73 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, ES–3. 74 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 1–6. 75 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, ix.
22
“Threat of Shootings Turns School Security into a Growth Industry,” Tiffany Hsu
interviews Curtis S. Lavarello from the School Safety Advocacy Council following the
Parkland, Florida school shooting. He said, “Right now, there’s going to be a lot of
appropriations dollars being sent to school districts without a lot of oversight. […]There
are no national standards in terms of products for school safety.”76 He also warned,
“Often, schools react reflexively after high-profile school shootings, snapping up
technologies and services as a symbolic gesture.”77 Hsu also interviewed Heather L.
Schwartz, a researcher for RAND, who points out that “There’s not a lot of evidence to
help districts sort through the pile before investing in costly systems.”78 She also
contends that “There’s a lot of hunger for some authoritative third-party source to go out
and review these options.”79 In addition to the need for customization and organizational
fit, the literature is also clear that school decision-makers lack guidance to draw from
when selecting school safety technologies to meet their unique needs.
5. Technology Evaluation Frameworks
Finally, to fill that gap, technology evaluation frameworks were examined to try
to identify a tool applicable for evaluating warning systems for use in the K-12 school
environment. The models scrutinized included the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM), the HOT-Fit framework model, Morton’s IT-Organizational Fit Model, and
Delone’s IS Success Model. From these, a model was identified that could be adapted to
formulate an evaluation tool specifically for K-12 schools.
The TAM, developed by Davis in 1986, is a tool used to evaluate the acceptability
of a new technology introduced into a system.80 The main components of the TAM
76 Tiffany Hsu, “Threat of Shootings Turns School Security into a Growth Industry,” New York Times,
March 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/business/school-security-industry-surges-after-shoot ings.html.
77 Hsu, “Threat of Shootings.” 78 Hsu, “Threat of Shootings.” 79 Hsu, “Threat of Shootings.” 80 Fred Davis, Richard Bagozzi, and Paul R. Warshaw, “User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A
Comparison of Two Theoretical Models,” Management Science 35, no. 8 (August 1989): 982–1003, https:// pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ba06/44aa7569f33194090ade9f8f91fa51968b18.pdf.
23
framework include two primary factors, perceived usefulness and perceived ease-of-use.
These variables are important for evaluating the potential acceptance of warning systems
in K-12 schools, but do not go far enough. The complexity of the K-12 school
environment also requires a framework that takes into account the organizational
structure and environment, the efficacy of the technology in that system, and how the
these elements intersect and interact. The TAM focuses primarily on the individual
person level, rather than the more complex organizational level, and thus, is not a
sufficient model alone for evaluating warning systems for K-12 schools.
These considerations led to the HOT-Fit framework.81 Yusof Maryati Mohd et al.
developed the HOT-Fit framework in 2005 to evaluate the use of health information
systems in hospital settings.82 It builds upon the strengths and limitations of two other
technology evaluative frameworks, that of Morton’s IT-Organization Fit Model and
Delone’s IS Success Model.83 Mohd et al. describe the assimilation of the frameworks:
“Organizational factors, which are lacking in the IS Success Model, are featured in the
IT-Organization Fit. Similarly, specific evaluation dimensions and measures, which are
lacking in the IT-Organization Fit, are featured in the IS Success Model.”84 The basic
framework of the HOT-Fit model emerged from these two, as shown in Figure 1.85
81 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 386–398. 82 Mohd et al., 386–398. 83 Michael Scott Morton, The Corporation of the 1990s: Information, Technology, and Organizational
Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William H. DeLone and Ephraim R. McLean, “Information Systems Success: The Quest for the Dependent Variable,” Information Systems Research 3, no. 1 (1992): 60–95, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a041/45f1ca06c61f5985ab22a2346b788f343392. pdf.
84 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 388–389. 85 Mohd et al., 388–389.
24
Figure 1. HOT-Fit Evaluation Framework.86
According to Mohd et al., the HOT-Fit framework includes three domains with
specific performance measure categories: the Technology domain includes system
quality, information quality, and service quality, the Human domain includes system use
and user satisfaction, and the Organization domain includes structure and environment.87
The Net Benefits are derived from the evaluation of the three domains. This model is
particularly useful for evaluating K-12 school warning technologies and systems because
it goes further than the individual person level in Davis’ TAM by including key elements
of the organization and technology domains. The HOT-Fit model, while originally
designed for use in the hospital setting, is transferrable to the K-12 school setting by
customizing each evaluation variable to school-relevant criteria.
6. Summary of Literature Review
In summary, this literature review reveals many reputable works aimed at
understanding school violence and associated mitigation strategies. It also shows that
several traditional and emerging communication and warning systems are used in
schools, identifies five implementation factors related to the effective or ineffective
implementation of such systems, and reveals a lack of information on how to evaluate
and select warning system technologies for K-12 schools. During the course of the
86 Adapted from Mohd et al., 389. This figure is a simplified rendering of the HOT-fit framework. 87 Mohd et al., 390–391.
25
literature review, several technology evaluation frameworks were found and one was
identified, the HOT-Fit model, which is expanded upon and customized to evaluate
warning system technologies for use in K-12 schools.
Finally, another gap emerged in the literature. It was not possible to locate any
literature about warning systems with lockdown push-buttons or police pull-stations that
imitate the fire alarm system, which, when activated, emit an immediate, audible warning
to all school occupants alerting them to take protective measures, such as lockdown,
when a potentially violent emergency is occurring at school. Internet searches, however,
reveal that vendors have developed such systems and news reports indicate that some
schools are experimenting with various iterations of the systems. Yet, as far as the
researcher could find, other than vendor reports and news articles, the academic literature
fails to acknowledge that these systems exist.
F. UPCOMING CHAPTERS
In review, Chapter I presented the goal of this thesis, which is to identify and
attempt to validate the efficacy of a conceptual lockdown notification system that schools
may be able to use to decrease the time it takes to warn school occupants of danger, so
that protective measures, such as lockdown, can occur more quickly. The upcoming
chapters exhibit how this goal can be achieved.
Chapter II examines the history, components, and requirements governing the
school fire alarm system, and proceeds to use it as a model for a conceptual lockdown
notification system for schools to address acts of violence.
Chapter III lays out a new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool specifically
designed to evaluate communication and warning systems for use within the K-12 school
setting. First, an overview of the new framework is presented, followed by a detailed
description explaining the philosophy behind and justification for each evaluation
variable contained in the tool.
Chapter IV introduces a template for the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
and proceeds to measure the fire alarm system and conceptual lockdown notification
26
system against the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of each warning system as applied in the K-12 school setting. It
also serves as a demonstration on how to use the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation
Tool.
Chapter V focuses on the case study interviews from schools already using an
iteration of a lockdown notification system modeled after the fire alarm system. The
interview data is summarized according to the organization of the new K-12 School
HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the commonalities
between the warning systems used by the case study participants and the conceptual
lockdown notification system.
Finally, Chapter VI provides a summary of the thesis goals and a description of
how those goals were accomplished. Findings related to the case study analysis, the
conceptual lockdown notification system, and the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
are presented. The chapter concludes with recommendations.
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II. THE FIRE ALARM SYSTEM AS A MODEL FOR A LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
This chapter has three sections. The introduction draws a comparison between the
risk of fire at school and the need for a fire alarm system, and the risk of violence at
school, and a similar need for a lockdown notification system. The next section focuses
on the school fire alarm system. Historical information on school fires is provided, and
the components of a school fire alarm system and the codes regulating such a system are
identified. Since the fire alarm system is examined as a potential model for a lockdown
notification system, the focus is on the notification features of the fire alarm system,
rather than the detector and suppression features of the system. The third section focuses
on a lockdown notification system. A conceptual lockdown notification system for
schools modeled after the fundamental components, philosophy, and regulations of the
fire alarm system is proposed. Finally, it is concluded that the school fire alarm system
does in fact represent a potentially viable model for a parallel lockdown notification
system to address the need for speedy notification during active shooter attacks on K-12
schools.
A. INTRODUCTION
Many deadly fires occurred in U.S. schools before the establishment of the fire
alarm system. Whether from a fire in the boiler room, school kitchen, or one intentionally
set, fire can spread rapidly through a school.88 Unsuspecting students and staff must be
quickly alerted to the danger and immediately evacuate the building. Delays in this
notification cost lives. Over time, the fire alarm system was developed and integrated into
U.S. schools.89 The primary goal of a school fire alarm system is a speedy warning to all
school occupants to prevent injuries and loss of life from fire, smoke, and associated
88 Nick Artim, “3.2 An Introduction to Fire Detection, Alarm, and Automatic Fire Sprinklers,”
Emergency Management 3, no. 2 (1999), https://www.nedcc.org/free-resources/preservation-leaflets/3.-emergency-management/3.2-an-introduction-to-fire-detection,-alarm,-and-automatic-fire-sprinklers.
89 Engineering and Technology History Wiki, s.v. “milestones: electric fire alarm system, 1852,” last modified December 31, 2015, http://ethw.org/Milestones:Electric_Fire_Alarm_System,_1852.
28
cascading effects. The success of the fire alarm system is indisputable; while fires still
occur in U.S. K-12 schools, children have not died in school fires for over 50 years.90
Today, the United States experiences many deadly active shooter attacks on K-12
schools. Studies show that these events occur quickly, often within minutes from when an
intruder enters a school.91 Most schools are not equipped with reliable and readily
available warning systems to make timely notifications to their staff and students so that
they may take protective measures, such as lockdown, at the first sign of danger. Delays
in these notification cost lives. The primary goal of a school lockdown notification
system is relaying a speedy warning to all school occupants. While active shooter attacks
on U.S. K-12 schools may still happen, the hope is that a lockdown notification system
will enable school occupants to lockdown quicker and reduce the likelihood that the
aggressor will have access to students and staff and thereby prevent injuries and loss of
life.
Significant parallels can be drawn between these two threats, fire and shootings,
and the need for speedy notification. In “Those Terrible First Few Minutes, Michael and
Geoffrey Buerger illustrate these parallels by explaining:
Notification has two stages: internal notice to effect lockdown procedures and communication of the emergency to police authorities. School-intruder situations have no equivalent of the fire alarm, which initiates both notifications simultaneously. Instead, notice is volitional, with an expected hierarchy of action invested presumptively in a central administrative office. Because not all events begin with the office, however, planning needs to encompass circumstances in which notification is executed by other staff.92
90 Dave Grossman, “How Many Kids Have Been Killed by School Fire?” California Fire News,
January 11, 2013, https://calfire.blogspot.com/2013/01/how-many-kids-have-been-killed-by.html. The original article is from Doug Wyllie, “Active Shooters in Schools: The Enemy is Denial,” PoliceOne, May 5, 2010, https://www.policeone.com/active-shooter/articles/2058168-Active-shooters-in-schools-The-enemy-is-denial/.
91 Blair and Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents, 9. 92 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes Revisiting Active-
Shooter Protocols for Schools,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 1, 2010, https://leb.fbi. gov/articles/featured-articles/those-terrible-first-few-minutes-revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
29
The goal of this chapter is to answer the question: To what extent can the school
“fire alarm system” (for emergencies involving fire and evacuation) be a model for a
“lockdown notification system” for emergencies involving violence and requiring
lockdown?
B. THE SCHOOL FIRE ALARM SYSTEM
In the first half of the 1900s, U.S. K-12 schools had many deadly fires. According
to the NFPA’s historical records, these school fires caused casualties ranging from 15
deaths at Cleveland Hill School in Cheektowaga, NY, to 294 deaths in the New London,
TX, Consolidated School. Table 1 shows school fires in the United States with 10 or
more deaths.93
Table 1. School Fires with 10 or More Deaths.94
U.S. school fires, grades K-12, with 10 or more deaths
Event Date Number of Deaths
Consolidated School, New London, TX March 18, 1937 294
Lakeview School, Collinwood, OH March 4, 1908 175
Our Lady of the Angels School, Chicago, IL December 1, 1958 95
The Cleveland School, Kershaw County, SC May 17, 1923 77
Bath Consolidated School, Bath, MI May 18, 1927 46
Babbs Switch School, Hobart, OK December 24, 1924 32
St. John’s Parochial School, Peabody, MA October 28, 1915 21
Cleveland High School, Cheektowaga, NY March 31, 1954 15
This trend of deadly school fires has dramatically changed over the last 50 years
since no children have died in school fires during that timeframe.95 A study of school
93 “School Fires with 10 or More Deaths,” National Fire Protection Association, updated January 2013, http://www.nfpa.org/news-and-research/fire-statistics-and-reports/fire-statistics/fires-by-property-type/educational/school-fires-with-10-or-more-deaths.
94 Source: National Fire Protection Association.
30
fires from 2007–2011 showed an average of 4,060 structure fires per year in K-12
schools, and while these school fires did cause injuries, no deaths were reported.96
Michael Dorn, in his book, Innocent Targets, When Terrorism Comes to School,
describes the risk of death at school by fire versus by acts of violence in this way:
Consider the way we approach fire safety in schools. The probability of a student being killed or seriously injured by violence is significantly greater than the probability of being killed or seriously injured by fire. No child has been killed by school fire in North America in over a quarter of a century. Compare this to the fact that, in any given year in our schools, dozens of students and employees are killed by acts of violence.97
Over the years, the NFPA has worked to reduce and even eliminate school fire-
related deaths by implementing an extensive, multi-layered, and research-based fire life-
safety system in schools. The purpose of a school fire alarm and signaling system, as
recorded in the national fire code, is “to provide notification of alarm, supervisory, and
trouble conditions; to alert the occupants; to summon aid; and to control emergency
control functions.”98 This system’s successful implementation in United States’ schools
has demonstrably saved lives. Fires still occur in K-12 schools in the United States, yet it
appears rare that students and staff die in these school fires.
The overarching goal of the fire alarm system is to reduce the amount of time it
takes to notify school occupants of the need to evacuate the building to prevent injuries
and loss of life when a fire is imminent. The primary objective is to empower anyone in
the building to alert the entire school population quickly and easily of a need to evacuate,
and to be able to do so from multiple places on the school campus. The secondary
objective is that the system automatically alerts the fire department, so it can initiate its
response to the school. The fire alarm system accomplishes these very objectives.
95 Grossman, “How Many Kids Have Been Killed by School Fire?” 96 Richard Campbell, Structure Fires in Educational Properties Fact Sheet (Quincy, MA: National
Fire Protection Association and Fire Analysis & Research Division, 2013). 97 Dorn and Dorn, Innocent Targets When Terrorism Comes to School, xviii. 98 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 1.1
Chapter 10.2, 72–68.
31
1. Fire Alarm System Components
A school fire alarm system has many components: The first is a fire alarm control
panel (FACP), which is the main hub of operation for all aspects of the system. It has a
communication panel to notify an alarm company, 911 dispatch center, or fire
department. It also has associated wiring, relays, and circuits. Next, are initiating
appliances, such as fire alarm pull-stations and various detectors, as well as notification
appliances, such as horns, strobes, and speakers. Also, emergency control functions
operate sprinklers, heating, ventilation and air conditioning shut offs, automatic door
closure mechanisms, and elevator return functions. Other components of the larger fire
life-safety system strategy include fire extinguishers, fire blankets, lighted exit signage,
required inspections, and training and drills.
The NFPA establishes codes and regulations for every aspect of these systems,
identified in the NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code as, “the application,
installation, location, performance, inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire alarm
systems, supervision station alarm systems, public emergency alarm reporting systems,
fire warning equipment and emergency communications systems (ECS), and their
components.”99 Since this document is so carefully researched, frequently updated,
regulated, and enforced, the fire alarm system has become a distinguished and exemplary
school warning system.
2. Characteristics of a Fire Alarm Control Panel
FACPs are made up of two types, conventional and addressable. Conventional
FACPs are older and work off the zone system that monitors a group of initiating
appliances (pull-station, smoke detector, etc.), within a given zone. The result is that if an
initiating appliance is activated, the FACP will indicate only the zone in which that
appliance resides. With an addressable (sometimes called intelligent) FACP, each
individual initiating appliance has its own address, so if it is activated, the FACP will
identify the exact initiating device causing the alarm or trouble. For the purposes of this
99 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 1.1 Scope,
1.1.1.
32
paper, the researcher is focused on the more basic and reliable type, the conventional
FACP, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Conventional Fire Alarm Control Panel.100
A conventional FACP is the main hub of operations for the system. It has a fixed
power supply and back up batteries in case of an electrical outage. The Life Safety Code
Handbook says that “primary power must come through a dedicated branch circuit […]
Secondary power is intended to operate all functions of the system in the event that
primary power is lost.”101 The fire code requires that the secondary power source provide
24 hours of operation of the entire system, with at least five minutes of alarm sounding
capability.102 This redundancy represents a key component of the reliability of this
system. It is even effective during power outages, internet disruptions, and with cell
service limitations and outages.
The FACP has “zones” that monitor the flow of electricity and current to the
“initiating appliances,” such as fire alarm pull-stations and various smoke and heat
100 Susan M. Graves created this basic rendering of a FACP. 101 Robert P. Schifiliti, Supplement 2 Fire Alarm Systems for Life Safety Code Users, Life Safety Code
Handbook (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2006), 1129, https://www.nfpa.org/~/media/ Files/forms%20and%20premiums/101%20handbook/101hbchs2.pdf.
102 Schifiliti, 1129.
33
detectors. An “alarm” and “trouble” indicator identifies when an “alarm” has actually
been activated by a detector or a pull-station, or if a problem (trouble) exists with the
wiring or other part of the system. The FACP has a sounder circuit that activates the
“notification appliances,” such as bells, strobes, or horns.103 Wire runs from the FACP
throughout the school building to all the individual components of the fire alarm system.
The NFPA regulates every aspect of the pathway wiring, cables, circuits, and associated
equipment necessary for the fire alarm system.104 The system also includes a
“communication panel” that connects the FACP to two dedicated landline phone lines
that automatically notify the alarm company when an initiating appliance is activated.
These two dedicated phone lines represent an additional layer of redundancy and
reliability essential for school warning systems.
3. Characteristics of Initiating Appliances
Initiating appliances are devices designed to activate and set the fire alarm system
in motion. They include fire alarm pull-stations and various detection devices, such as
heat and smoke detectors. For the purposes of replicating the fire alarm system into a
similar viable lockdown notification system model, the fire alarm pull-station initiating
appliance is focused upon rather than the detection devices.
a. Appearance
The fire code has specific requirements regulating the appearance of fire alarm
pull-stations, as shown in Figure 3. They are red and have a contrasting background.105
They always display the word FIRE and include other instructive words, such as PULL,
PUSH IN and PULL DOWN, etc., depending on how the device functions. The NFPA
103 Sounder circuits are sometimes called notification appliance circuits. 104 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Chapter
12 Circuits and Pathways states that “Fire alarm system wiring and equipment, including all circuits controlled and powered by the fire alarm system, shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of this Code and of NFPA 70 Article 760.”
105 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.8.3 states that “Unless installed in an environment that precludes the use of red paint or red plastic, manual fire alarm boxes shall be red in color.” National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.4 states that “Manually actuated alarm-initiating devices shall be mounted on a background of contrasting color.”
34
code states, “Manual fire alarm boxes shall be used only for fire alarm initiating
purpose.” The word “FIRE” serves a dual purpose; it indicates that the device is for fire
emergencies and it insinuates that the fire department is alerted when the device is
activated.
Figure 3. Fire Alarm Pull-Stations.106
b. Placement and Accessibility
The initiating appliances are about the same size, look similar, and must be easily
recognizable and readily available. The NFPA requires that they are “securely mounted
[…] conspicuous, unobstructed, and accessible.”107 Some appliances have corresponding
signage to assist users. The red pull-stations are permanently located throughout the
school. They are available when school is in session and during non-school hours for
patrons using the school in the evening, on weekends, and during school breaks. Pull-
stations are securely mounted between 3-1/2 and 4-1/2 feet high, and are located within
five feet of designated exit doors so they can quickly be activated as people exit the
building. They are also mounted in other areas so that they are at least within 200 feet of
106 These pictures of pull-stations were taken by Susan M. Graves. 107 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,
17.14.8.2, 17.14.3.
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each other.108 Schifiliti noted that “some locally adopted codes for the disabled might
limit the height to no more than 4 ft (1.2 m).”109 Wiring runs throughout the building
connecting the FACP to each fire pull-station in the school. This hardwire feature
provides another source of redundancy for the warning system.
c. Ease-of-Use
The fire code allows for fire alarm pull-stations to be activated by a single or
double-motion; for instance, pushing in and pulling down would be a double-motion.110
This activation is significant because fine motor skills can be compromised during
emergencies. In other words, the more operations people have to perform when under
extreme stress, the less likely they will be able to do them. In fact, when individuals are
under extreme stress, diminished capacity to process complex information or accomplish
straightforward tasks is experienced. Silver explains, “it becomes very difficult to think
clearly, make rational decisions and communicate civilly and effectively.”111 The fire
alarm pull-stations are intuitive and easy to operate and require little to no training. This
ease-of-use helps to reduce confusion during emergencies and empowers students, staff,
and visitors to activate the system despite those natural stress responses. Pull-stations do
not require any keys, special codes, or knowledge to access or activate. These important
criteria contribute to their ease-of-use and accessibility, which are critical factors in
emergencies. Once activated, they automatically sound the alarm in the school and alert
the fire department via the school’s alarm company. The person activating the system
108 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.5
states that “The operable part of a manually actuated alarm-initiating device shall be not less than 42 in. (1.07 m) and not more than 48 in. (1.22 m) from the finished floor.” National Fire Protection Association, , 17.14.8.4 states that “Manual fire alarm boxes shall be located within 5 ft. (1.5 m) of each exit doorway on each floor.” National Fire Protection Association, 17.14.8.5 states that “Additional manual fire alarm boxes shall be provided so that the travel distance to the nearest manual fire alarm box will not exceed 200 ft (61 m), measured horizontally on the same floor.”
109 Schifiliti, Supplement 2 Fire Alarm Systems, 1117. 110 National Fire Protection Association, 17.14.4, 6, 8.3 states that “Manually actuated alarm-initiating
devices shall be permitted to be single action or double action.” 111 Val Silver, “How the Stress Response Affects Body and Mind,” Holistic Mindbody Healing,
accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.holistic-mindbody-healing.com/stress-response.html.
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does not have to follow up with additional actions or notifications for the immediate
warning to go out.
d. Protective Covers
Some pull-stations have protective covers that require lifting up to access the
device.112 This cover helps to avoid accidental activation and keeps out dust and
moisture. Some have deterrent alarms “with an internal battery-operated buzzer” that
emits directly from the pull-station when the protective cover is lifted.113 It is much
quieter than a fire alarm and simply acts as a deterrent for times when someone seeks to
set off the alarm as a prank. According to the Life Safety Code Handbook, “This feature
has been shown to greatly reduce nuisance alarms in schools […since] someone is likely
to see or catch a vandal before the station is operated.”114 Some pull-stations in high-risk
areas, such as gymnasiums, have protective guards to prevent accidental activation from
errant balls, etc. The fire code does not require the use of protective covers or deterrent
alarms, and leaves the decision up to the schools and their local fire jurisdiction partners.
In summary, initiating appliances, such as red fire alarm pull-stations, are
strategically located in many places throughout the school, accessible to anyone using the
school, at any time of the day or night. Since they are (a) permanently secured to the wall,
(b) always where you think they will be, (c) red, which makes them easy to see, and (d)
printed with the word FIRE on the devices, which makes their purpose intuitive for users,
they are easy to use and require minimal to zero training. Once activated, they
automatically send a signal to the FACP. The FACP simultaneously directs the
communication panel to notify the alarm company to alert the fire department and
activates the notification appliances so students and staff hear the alarm, see the strobe,
and evacuate the building.
112 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.7
states that “Listed protective covers shall be permitted to be installed over single-or double-action manually actuated alarm initiating devices.”
113 Schifiliti, Supplement 2 Fire Alarm Systems, 1116. 114 Schifiliti, 1116.
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4. Characteristics of Notification Appliances
Like initiating appliances, notification appliances are also highly regulated by the
NFPA. The purpose of notification appliances, according to NFPA 72, is to “provide
stimuli for initiating emergency actions and provide information to users, emergency
response personnel, and occupants.”115 The notification appliances notify school staff
and students to evacuate while simultaneously notifying the alarm company. The
notification appliances use both audible and visual notification stimuli.
The NFPA 72, Chapter 18, regulations provide detailed specifications for the
notification appliances themselves and includes guidance related to electrical
requirements, the physical construction of the appliances, mechanical protections,
mounting requirements, and detailed audible and visual characteristics.116 It also provides
regulation for the specific relationship of the notification appliances components to the
overall fire alarm system. “The requirements […] apply to the interconnection of
notification appliances, the control configurations, the power supplies, and the use of the
information provided by notification appliances.”117 The guidance is detailed,
comprehensive, and specific.
School fire alarm systems have audible and visible notification appliances. The
NFPA fire code dictates the visual appearance of these appliances, the color of the light,
wording and text, the decibels, length of time the alarm sounds, the strobe light features,
and detailed specifications regarding the placement of the appliances.118 They can be
located in indoor or outdoor environments, based on the specific needs of the facility.119
115 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 18.2
Purpose. 116 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 18, Notification Appliances. 117 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 18, Notification Appliances, 18.1.6. 118 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 18, Notification Appliances. 119 National Fire Protection Association, 18.1.7 states that “Notification appliances shall be permitted
to be used within buildings or outdoors and to target the general building, area, or space, or only specific parts of a building, area, or space designated in specific zones and sub-zones”; National Fire Protection Association, 18.3.3.1 states that “Appliances intended for use in special environments, such as outdoors versus indoors, high or low temperatures, high humidity, dusty conditions, and hazardous locations, or where subject to tampering, shall be listed for the intended purpose.”
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a. Audible Notification Appliances
Audible notification appliances, such as horns, bells, and chimes, work to get
everyone’s attention and signal the evacuation, as seen in Figure 4. The Life Safety Code
Handbook indicates, “it must be distinct and clearly audible in all occupiable spaces.”120
The sound it emits cannot be the same tone, bell, horn or other sound schools use for
earthquake or any other notification. “For instance, in a school, bells should not be used
on a fire alarm system if bells are also used to signal class changes and recess. Similarly,
in buildings equipped with earthquake warning systems, the fire signal needs to be
distinct from an earthquake signal and recognizable by the occupants.”121 Actions to take
for changing classes, as well as responding to an earthquake and a fire are very different.
Too many similar tones, horns, or sounds can cause confusion. Confusion in the midst of
emergencies can cause students or staff to hesitate or respond incorrectly. Either
hesitation or an incorrect response can cause injuries or loss of life. If more than one
warning sound is incorporated into the school’s emergency procedures without a
corresponding voice message, it must be distinct, and students and staff must be trained
accordingly.
(a) (b) (c)
120 Schifiliti, Supplement 2 Fire Alarm Systems, 1132. 121 Schifiliti, 1133.
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Figure 4. Audible Notification Appliances.122
The fire alarm signaling code is specific about the pattern of a fire alarm signal,
“The alarm audible signal pattern used to notify building occupants of the need to
evacuate (leave the building) or relocate (from one area to another) shall be the standard
alarm evacuation signal consisting of a three-pulse temporal pattern.”123 The code
provides specific regulations for the length of each pulse, repetition times, as well as
synchronization with other audible alarms in nearby locations.124 Moreover, it even
regulates how loud the alarm can be in different environments in the school building,
including elevators.125 All areas in a school must be evaluated and equipped with an
appropriate audible notification for the environment. The audible notification device must
be secured to ceilings or to walls at least 90 inches from the floor.126
b. Visual Notification Appliances
Visual notification appliances, such as lights, strobes, and text displays augment
the audible devices and work to meet the needs of people with hearing impairments. The
NFPA defers to local jurisdictional regulations and laws regarding any requirements to
utilize visual notification appliances.127 If visual appliances are used, the NFPA regulates
their specifications. The color of the light has to be clear or white, the flash rate has to be
between one and two seconds, and the device must be mounted on the ceiling or at least
122 Source: (a) “System Sensor Spectralert PC2RH Ceiling-Mount Horn-Strobe,” BuyFireAlarmParts,
accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.buyfirealarmparts.com/shop/pc2rh.html; (b) “Fire Alarm Horn/Strobe,” Steinbach Fire Protection, accessed March 21, 2018, https://steinbachfireprotection.com/ product-category/fire_alarms/; (c) Photo by Susan M. Graves.
123 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Distinct Evacuation Signal, 18.4.2.1.
124 National Fire Protection Association, Temporal Pattern Parameters, 18.4.2.1–4. 125 National Fire Protection Association, Public Mode Audible Requirements, 18.4.3, Private Mode
Audible Requirements, 18.4.4. 126 National Fire Protection Association, Location of Audible Notification Appliances for Building or
Structure, 18.4.8. 127 National Fire Protection Association, 18.5.1.2 states that “The coverage area for visible occupant
notification shall be as required by other governing laws, codes, or standards.”
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80 inches above the floor.128 The fire code also regulates the spacing of such appliances
based on room or corridor characteristics.129 Although the light must be clear or white,
the code does not specify the color of the appliance emitting the light.
It is common to combine these audible and visible notification appliances into one
device called a horn-strobe, although they can also be separate. Like the initiating
appliances, each individual horn-strobe is hardwired to the FACP. This hardwire feature
contributes to the reliability of the warning system. The result is that when an initiating
appliance is activated, the horn-strobe automatically comes on and notifies the entire
school, by a loud alarm and by a visual strobe, to evacuate the building.
5. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
School fires are relatively infrequent events, but can have great consequences. A
fire alarm system must be a reliable and operational warning system at all times through
inspection, testing, and maintenance.130 Chapter 14 of the NFPA 72 regulations requires
strict maintenance guidelines, inspections, and system testing to “ensure operational
integrity.”131 These requirements can be performed by a qualified building owner or by
the owner’s designee or contractor. The code dictates that “system deficiencies shall be
corrected.”132 For school fire alarm systems monitored by alarm companies, most of
these tasks are only required annually, or in some cases, semiannually. The control
equipment in the system are inspected and tested annually to “verify a system normal
condition.”133 A visual inspection is also done to “ensure there are no changes that affect
equipment performance. Inspect for building modifications, occupancy changes, changes
in environmental conditions, device location, physical obstructions, device orientation,
128 National Fire Protection Association, Light, Color, and Pulse Characteristics, 18.5.3, Appliance
Location, 18.5.5. 129 National Fire Protection Association, 18.5.5.4–5 Room Spacing and Spacing in Corridors. 130 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 14 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance. 131 National Fire Protection Association, Performance Verification, 14.2.2.1. 132 National Fire Protection Association, 14.2.2.2.2. 133 National Fire Protection Association, Visual Inspection, 14.3.1.
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physical damage, and degree of cleanliness.”134 The requirement for audible and visual
notification appliances is semiannual inspections. Batteries may require more frequent
inspections, either monthly or semiannually, depending on the type of battery.135 The
system is also exercised and tested during regular fire drills, and has a system built in to
detect trouble situations, such as malfunctions. All these measures work together to
ensure the fire alarm system is functional and reliable at all times.
6. Financial Feasibility
The initial expenses involved with a fire alarm system include the FACP
components, initiating appliances, notification appliances, and all the wire that connects
this system together. The hardware, wire, and installation costs represent the bulk of the
cost of the warning system. After installation, ongoing costs for the fire alarm system are
minimal. Other than the annual (and some semi-annual) inspection requirements, and
minimal maintenance, only a small monthly fee is assessed for monitoring paid to the
alarm company. Once installed, it is generally a financially sustainable warning system
for K-12 schools.
7. Summary of the Fire Alarm System
All the fire alarm system components, the FACP, initiating appliances, and
notification appliances work together to provide a standardized, seamless, and reliable
mechanism built into the infrastructure of U.S. schools by which:
• School occupants who detect smoke or fire can quickly activate a fire pull-
station (initiating appliance).
• The FACP immediately notifies (using the notification appliances) the
whole school to evacuate the building.
• It simultaneously notifies the alarm company (through the dedicated
phone lines) to activate the fire department response.
134 National Fire Protection Association, Visual Inspection, 14.3.1. 135 National Fire Protection Association, Visual Inspection, 14.3.1.
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Figure 5. Fire Alarm System Process Model.136
The fire alarm system works well in the unique environment of K-12 schools. It is
easy to use, reliable, affordable, easy to maintain, and effectively fulfills its purpose in
schools: while school fires still occur, no deaths in school fires have been reported in over
50 years.137
C. A CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
Schools all over the nation are susceptible to intruders, kidnappings, threats of
violence, and active shooter attacks. Schools use many strategies to prevent, mitigate,
protect from, respond to, and recover from these threats.138 One commonly accepted
strategy to protect students and staff from these threats is lockdown. Many schools
practice lockdown drills and have lockable classroom doors to secure students and staff
during emergencies involving threats of violence.139 To initiate a lockdown, personnel in
the school’s front office use the public address system to make an announcement over the
136 All images are from Creative Commons, a company that issues public copyright licenses to enable
the free distribution of otherwise copyrighted work. 137 Grossman, “How Many Kids Have Been Killed by School Fire?” 138 “National Preparedness Goal, PPD 8 Five Preparedness Missions,” Federal Emergency
Management Agency, accessed November 11, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal. 139 Graves, “Lockdown Terminology in K-12 Schools.”
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speakers located throughout the school building. As soon as students and staff hear the
lockdown announcement, they immediately implement lockdown procedures.
In many K-12 school districts, the public address system is only accessible from
the main office at each school. If someone notices or learns of a dangerous person or
threat in another area of the school campus, such as the cafeteria, a hallway, or the
gymnasium, it takes critical time to get a message to the main office for them to make a
lockdown announcement. This time gap can cost lives. In “Those Terrible First Few
Minutes,” Michael and Geoffrey Buerger explain that “the most important duty of the
person making first contact is to communicate the potential danger to others.”140 They
continue by pointing out, “If lockdown is ordered swiftly and clearly […] the associated
protective factors take effect almost immediately. If such action is not an automatic
response because of uncertainty, the intruder gains an advantage that expands risk to the
school population.”141 K-12 schools need a mechanism to notify students and staff
immediately when a threat of violence is first recognized anywhere in the school.
The overarching goal of a lockdown notification system is to reduce the amount
of time it takes to lockdown to try to prevent injuries and loss of life when an attack is
imminent or occurring. The primary objective is to empower anyone in the building to
alert the entire school population easily and immediately of a need to lockdown, and to be
able to do so from multiple places on the school campus. The secondary objective is that
the system automatically notifies police, so they can initiate their response to the school.
Since the fire alarm notification system fulfills these very objectives as they relate to
school fires and evacuations, this case study will replicate and modify it as a model to
address the need to lockdown during threats of violence in K-12 schools.
1. Lockdown Notification System Components
A school lockdown notification system modeled after the fire alarm system has
several components. The first is a lockdown notification control panel (LNCP), which is
the main hub of operation for all aspects of the system. The LNCP connects to a shared
140 Buerger and Buerger, Those Terrible First Few Minutes.” 141 Buerger and Buerger.
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communication panel with the fire alarm system to notify an alarm company, 911
dispatch center, or police department. It also has associated wiring, relays, and circuits.
Next are the initiating appliances, such as pull-stations or push-buttons, and associated
signage. Finally, a lockdown notification system uses notification appliances, such as
speakers and strobes to send out the warning message.
Some elements of the lockdown notification system will connect to the fire alarm
system to reduce costs. Other components of the lockdown notification system are
independent yet closely modeled after the fire alarm system. The lockdown notification
system will be compliant with fire code regulations. The same NFPA 72 code that
regulates the fire alarm system will regulate the lockdown notification system.142 Chapter
24 of the NFPA 72, Emergency Communications Systems (ECS) states:
This chapter establishes minimum required levels of performance, reliability, and quality of installation for emergency communications systems […] An emergency communications systems is intended to communicate information about emergencies including, but not limited to fire, human-caused events (accidental or intentional), other dangerous situations, accidents, and natural disasters.143
In addition, further guidance from the NFPA, issued in 2015, addresses alerts and
warning messages as found in Annex G, Guidelines for Emergency Communication
Strategies for Buildings and Campuses.144 These standards will guide decision making
for the actual alert and warning messages used for a lockdown notification system.
2. Characteristics of a Lockdown Notification Control Panel
The LNCP will be a standalone unit, almost identical to the FACP but with a
sounder circuit that includes a recorder device for housing the prerecorded alert and
lockdown message. It will share the main building power supply, but will have its own
backup batteries that meet the same code requirements for secondary power as the fire
142 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. 143 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 24 Emergency Communications Systems (ECS)
24.2.2–3. 144 National Fire Protection Association, Annex G Guidelines for Emergency Communications
Strategies for Buildings and Campuses.
45
alarm system.145 See Figure 6. This redundancy will aid in the critical reliability
component necessary for school warning systems. The LNCP can relay into the same
communications hub as the FACP and share the two phone lines to notify the same alarm
company used for the fire system. The LNCP would have a specific police notification
designation for the alarm company so they would dispatch police rather than fire
personnel when the lockdown notification system is activated. Sharing the alarm
company for both control panels adds a modest yet feasible monthly cost. Since schools
are already accustomed to this regular expenditure, it is likely to be financially
sustainable.
Figure 6. Conceptual Lockdown Notification Control Panel.146
The LNCP will use the same NFPA codes and standards for zones, relays, and
wiring that monitor the flow of electricity and current to the initiating appliances, as the
fire alarm system.147 If possible, the control panels will be in the same location to tie
easily into and share the communications hub. Some schools will have space on the wall
145 Schifiliti, Supplement 2 Fire Alarm Systems, 1129. 146 This is a conceptual diagram created by Susan M. Graves of the basic components of a fire alarm
control panel and a lockdown notification control panel and their shared components. 147 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Chapter
12 Circuits and Pathways states that “Fire alarm system wiring and equipment, including all circuits controlled and powered by the fire alarm system, shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of this Code and of NFPA 70 Article 760.”
46
near the existing FACP to mount a LNCP to make it easier for facilities personnel and
first responders to locate the control panels. Other schools may find it challenging to find
space near the FACP and will have to mount the LNCP in a different room and take
additional steps to connect the LNCP to the communications panel. Regardless, signage
is necessary for both control panels so that fire personnel and law enforcement personnel
can easily distinguish between the two control panels.148 Fire personnel are accustomed
to the presence of FACPs in schools, and have regular experience using them. Law
enforcement officers may not have this regular experience and training advantage. It is
necessary to post operation instructions for each control panel describing how to
determine from where it is activated, and how to test, silence, and reset the control panel.
With clear, intuitive signage and instructions, located at the LNCP, a law enforcement
officer with minimal training should be able to operate the LNCP.
3. Characteristics of Initiating Appliances
The initiating appliance for a lockdown notification system can be modeled
closely after the fire alarm initiating appliances using pull-station or push-button boxes.
In fact, the fire code allows for and regulates such devices, “non-fire emergency manual
actuating boxes shall be installed similarly to manual fire alarm boxes.”149 Even more
important than the type of device are decisions about what happens when the initiating
device is activated. The system should be part of a school’s comprehensive emergency
operations plan. The NFPA code says, “Devices connected to a mass notification system
for the purpose of initiating an automatic response to an emergency shall be evaluated
based on the emergency response plan.”150 School decision-makers should collaborate
with their emergency service partners to determine what the activation of the device
should accomplish. Like the fire alarm system, for this case study, the objectives are
automatic notification to everyone at school and to the police via the alarm company. A
148 Schools may want to consider assessing the current FACPs to see what color they are, and select a
different, but consistent color for all the LNCPs so they are clearly distinguishable from the FACP. 149 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 24.5.9.6. 150 National Fire Protection Association, 24.5.9.1.
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Google search reveals that several of these initiating appliances already exist; however,
none have emerged with a standardized appearance, as shown in Figure 7.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 7. Initiating Appliances.151
a. Appearance
Careful consideration should go into decisions about the appearance of the
initiating appliances to communicate its purpose clearly. The color should be distinctly
different from a fire alarm pull-station to reduce uncertainty and confusion when under
extreme stress. For example, the color red has been associated with fire alarm pull-
stations for decades and is standardized throughout the United States. A red “lockdown”
push-button device may appear too similar to a red “fire” alarm pull-station, which can
cause someone to be confused and either activate the wrong device or delay activation
due to uncertainty over which device to use, as shown in Figure 8.
151 Source: (a) “SS2230LD-EN STI Yellow Indoor/Outdoor Flush Key-to-Reset Stopper Station with
Lockdown Label English,” SafetyProductsWholesale, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www.safetyproducts wholesale.com/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=14850; (b) “My School Has a Police Lockdown Alarm,” REBRN, accessed March 21, 2018, http://rebrn.com/re/my-school-has-a-police-lockdown-alarm-213395/; (c) “LCPS Demonstrates One-Button School Security System,” Las Cruces Public Schools, accessed March 21, 2018, http://lcps.k12.nm.us/2014/05/14/lcps-demonstrates-one-button-school-security-system/?print=1; (d) “Lockdown Wired Panic Button Assembly,” Ultra Secure Direct, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.ultrasecuredirect.com/useful-alarm-accessories/wired-alarm-detectors/lockdown-panic-button-assy-009-1610-p1657.html; (e) “BluePoint Pull Station Alert Rapid Emergency Response System (RERS),” Security Info Watch, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www. securityinfowatch.com/product/12093927/bluepoint-alert-solutions-bluepoint-pull-station-alert-rapid-emergency-response-system-rers; (f) “SS2439LD-EN STI Blue Indoor/Outdoor Flush Turn-to-Reset (Illuminated) Stopper Station with Lockdown Label English,” SafetyProductsWholesale, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www.safetyproductswholesale.com/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=16505.
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(a) (b)
This example shows what a lockdown initiating appliance should not look like due to the potential confusion caused by the similar red devices.
Figure 8. Incorrect Appearance of a Lockdown Initiating Appliance.152
In fact, the fire code requires that a non-fire device “be of a contrasting color to
manual fire alarm boxes […] and not be red. [And also requires that they be] mounted on
a background of contrasting color.”153 This contrasting color can improve the visibility of
the device by reducing the likelihood that it blends in with the background wall.
Just as red is a standardized color for fire alarm initiating appliances, it is ideal
that a standardized color emerge for lockdown notification appliances. Blue is an
intuitive color choice for a lockdown initiating appliance since blue is widely associated
with police and is a distinctly different color than the traditional red fire pull-stations.
Since an existing standardized appearance for initiating appliances for school
lockdowns is not already institutionalized in United States’ school systems, the initiating
appliances will need to display plain language and be intuitive, easy to understand, and
simple to use. The variety of lockdown initiating appliances shown in Figure 7 clearly
identifies how to operate the devices: push here, lift & pull, push, etc., and some even
display arrows to explain the required action. However, most do not clearly communicate
what will occur when activating the device.
152 Source: (a) “SS2032LD-EN STI Red Indoor/Outdoor Flush Key-to-Reset (Illuminated) Stopper
Station with Lockdown Label English,” SafetyProductsWholesale, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www. safetyproductswholesale.com/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=13551; (b) photo taken by Susan M. Graves on March 21, 2018.
153 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.4,1.
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School decision-making teams must carefully select and place the text on the
device to help establish the intent of the device. Since no standards are in place to guide
the exact words on non-fire initiating appliances, other than not using the word “fire,”
simply placing the word “lockdown” or “emergency” or “police” on the device may not
communicate to the user what will happen when the device is activated. Minimal,
carefully chosen words can help communicate the desired message. The text on the
initiating appliance should clearly communicate how to use the device, and convey the
purpose of the device to assist the user in understanding what type of hazard or threat for
which it is to be used. It should also suggest what occurs when the device is activated.
For example, a lockdown announcement will play and the police notified. The text should
be easy to read. The fire code requires the text to be in “all caps.” The word selection on
the initiating appliance should contribute to being intuitive and easy to understand and
use.
This conceptual blue lockdown initiating appliance as shown in Figure 9 provides
an example that demonstrates word choice to match the purpose of the appliance. The
decision-making teams will need to test the word choice and placement of the words to
determine if these examples constitute too many words on the appliance.
Figure 9. Conceptual Blue Lockdown Initiating Appliance.154
154 Adapted from “Egress Devices,” Automation Source, accessed March 21, 2018, http://automa
tionsource.com/c-5005-egress-devices.aspx?pagenum=65. The text on the blue initiating appliance was modified to demonstrate the proposed plain language for a lockdown initiating appliance.
50
The fire code also requires the appliance have markings to accommodate the
visually impaired, “Non-fire emergency manual actuating boxes shall have tactile
markings.”155 Teams can consider strategies, such as raising the lettering on key words
for lockdown, police, and push since there is not room for text in Braille. The tactile
markings may also be placed on associated signage.
The same kind of care is necessary for the appearance and language on any
signage associated with the lockdown initiating appliance. Signage affixed near the
device can help people understand the function of the device, which is especially
important when introducing a non-standardized new warning system. The signage can
help with the ongoing education needs of those who use the school facility on a regular
basis. It can further aid the understanding of the devices for those who use the school
facilities less frequently, such as during non-school hours. It can also be a mechanism for
educating students on the school’s consequences for the nefarious use of the device.
Signage should be placed near the lockdown initiating appliances, as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Signage Design for the Lockdown Initiating Appliance.156
All these factors empower people to use the device with little or no training. This
training is particularly important for infrequent events, such as active shooter
155 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 24.5.9.5. 156 The researcher developed this sign based on the plain language text on the conceptual lockdown
push-button as an example. Schools will need to determine if they want to include specific sanctions for misuse, and if so, determine appropriate sanctions based on the laws, statutes, and policies of their jurisdiction.
51
emergencies since it can be difficult to remember how to use warning systems when not
used often.
b. Placement and Accessibility
Like fire alarm pull-stations, lockdown buttons should be easy to locate and
access. Fire code requires them to be fixed in place, “Manually actuated alarm-initiating
devices shall be securely mounted,” and placed between 42 and 48 inches high for ADA
considerations.157 Securely mounting the devices so they are always where they should
be, never moved or misplaced, speak to the reliability factor. These NFPA regulations
involving “securely mounting the appliances” seem to rule out mobile or portable
initiating appliances, such as pendant necklaces.
The placement of the initiating devices should be consistent with the problem the
school is trying to solve and align with the goals and objectives set forth for the system.
For example, fire alarm pull-stations are typically located near exit doors so that they are
easily accessible to activate as occupants leave (evacuate) the building. They are also
located in high-occupancy areas like gymnasiums and cafeterias; again, usually
positioned near exits. The lockdown initiating appliances need to be easily accessible to
activate as occupants lockdown. At a minimum, the lockdown initiating appliances
should be placed in common areas, such as hallways, cafeterias, gymnasiums, and other
large gathering areas throughout the school. Ideally, they would also be located in every
classroom, so that individuals do not feel compelled to exit their classroom to locate and
activate a lockdown button.
Emergencies involving weapons and violence can happen at any time the school
is being used, day or night. The K-12 EOP Guide instructs schools to “account for
incidents that may occur during and outside the school day.”158 Like the fire alarm pull-
stations, the initiating appliances for a lockdown notification system must be functional
and accessible during and after regular school hours to anyone using the school. The
157 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.3,5.
158 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing, 4.
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strategic placement and ease-of-use of the devices will accommodate access for those
using the facilities during non-school hours.
The lockdown initiating appliances should be placed distinctly away from fire
alarm pull-stations to lessen further confusion in a stressful situation. Johns Hopkins
University’s A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology considers duress
alarms by pointing out, “whether the intent is to create an alert discreetly or overtly, the
school must be strategic about placing these alarms in areas that can be accessed during
routine operations so that staff are not forced to put themselves into additional danger to
activate an alarm.”159 The same devices can be located in school offices as a point of
redundancy for office personnel who normally use the public address system for
emergency announcements. For schools that have exterior walkways between buildings,
additional security measures may be necessary to protect against intentional false alarms
for any devices placed outside, since they may be accessible even when the school is
closed.
c. Ease-of-Use
Similar to the fire alarm pull-stations, lockdown initiating appliances will have a
single or double motion, which makes them easy to use while under stress. They will not
require any keys, special codes, or knowledge to access or activate. These important
criteria contribute to their ease-of-use and accessibility, which are critical factors in
emergencies. With the corresponding signage, they should require little to no training.
Once activated, they automatically activate the pre-recorded tone and warning message in
the school and alert the police department via the school’s alarm company. The person
activating the system does not have to follow up with additional actions or notifications
for the immediate warning to go out.
d. Protective Covers
Clear protective covers are used to help avoid accidental activation and to aid in
keeping out dust and moisture. Guards are used over the lockdown buttons in high
159 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, 4–33.
53
activity areas like gymnasiums to prevent accidental activation. Unlike the fire alarm
pull-stations, a deterrent alarm may not be appropriate for a situation involving violence.
In such instances, it would be necessary to activate the device quietly and not draw
attention to anyone to avoid greater risk.
A key to the successful implementation of a lockdown initiating appliance is how
easy it is to use. The appliances meet the NFPA standard of a single or double action
mechanism.160 Like fire alarm initiating appliances, lockdown push-buttons must not
require any special tools, keys, or knowledge (such as passcodes) to gain access to them
to activate the devices.
4. Characteristics of Notification Appliances
Like the fire alarm system, a network of notification appliances is necessary
throughout the school, both inside and outside, to provide audible and visual warning to
all school occupants of the need to lockdown. It should include speakers that can play a
prerecorded alert tone and voice message along with strobes, all of which interface with
the LNCP. The speakers and strobes can be standalone devices or combination units. The
notification part of the system will simultaneously notify the alarm company. NFPA 72
allows for audible appliances called emergency voice alarm communication (EVAC)
systems that enable a prerecorded message to play over a public address system,
speakers, or other mass notification system when an initiating appliance is activated and
directs that “Emergency communications systems shall be capable of the reproduction of
prerecorded, synthesized, or live…messages with voice intelligibility.”161 These EVAC
systems are also regulated by the NFPA.
a. Audible Notification Appliances
The fire alarm system activates a very loud horn, bell or chimes to get people’s
attention and signal an evacuation. A lockdown notification system would use an
attention getter called an “alert” and then continue with a prerecorded warning message.
160 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 17.14.6. 161 National Fire Protection Association, 24.3.1.1
54
Kuligowski explains, “Alert signals are meant only to grab occupants’ attention and
notify them that a warning message is about to be provided.”162 According to NFPA
guidance, “alerts should be significantly different from ambient sounds.”163 This
difference is particularly important in a school setting, since it is very noisy both inside
and outside schools in gymnasiums, music rooms, wood shops, cafeterias, hallways, and
on playgrounds. The alert must be distinct and loud enough to cause students and staff to
pay attention so they will have ample opportunity to hear the prerecorded warning
announcement. Kuligowski instructs, “a building should use one consistent alert signal to
get people’s attention to a building emergency situation, which should then be followed
by an expertly crafted and tested warning message specific to the emergency.”164 A
distinct alert tone for a lockdown notification system may be the sound of a police siren,
which is congruent with the purpose of the lockdown notification system for incidents
involving violence and the fact that police will be notified. The loud police siren tone can
work to get the attention of school occupants so they can hear the forthcoming warning
message. It may also disorient or interrupt the plans of the aggressors that may also cause
them to pause or even call off the attack. This is unknown.
The NFPA provides guidance for warning messages and explains that “an alert
signal should be accompanied by a clear, consistent, concise, and candid warning
message.”165 It goes on to say that warning messages should be stated in full and then
repeated one or more times in full.166 Warning messages can be replayed in intervals if
desired.
162 Erica D. Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency Communication Strategies for Buildings,
NIST Technical Note 1779 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013), 11, http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1779.
163 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Annex G “Guidelines for Emergency Communication Strategies for Buildings and Campuses,” G.2.1.
164 Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency, 23. 165 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Annex G
“Guidelines for Emergency Communication Strategies for Buildings and Campuses,” G.2.1 Alerts. 166 National Fire Protection Association, Annex G “Guidelines for Emergency Communication
Strategies for Buildings and Campuses,” G.2(11).
55
A very important benefit to using a pre-recorded message is that when people are
under extreme stress, like in emergencies, they can have diminished capacity to process
complex information or accomplish straightforward tasks.167 The NFPA fire code
references this benefit and others by explaining “pre-recorded voice methods provide the
benefits of easily repeating the played messages for longer periods of time and not
relying on the voice announcer training or stress level while delivering the message.”168
However, if a pre-recorded message is activated, trained staff members must be able to
override or suppress that message to provide other instructions as appropriate to the
situation. The content of the warning message is critical to getting the desired response.
The following example shows a lockdown alert and prerecorded message.
Strategies for responding to violence vary depending on the school. School
leaders and their local law enforcement and fire partners will need to collaborate to
determine the appropriate alert sound and precise warning message that aligns with their
unique emergency response plans and philosophies. The alert tone and message must be
tested for effectiveness during drills, and adjusted as needed.
The audible appliances present two options, using the existing school PA system
loudspeakers, or installing dedicated lockdown notification system speakers. Schools
typically have loudspeakers in most interior rooms on campus and in some exterior areas.
The speakers are part of the public address system, and used for daily school
announcements. It may be possible to leverage a school’s existing speakers for the
167 Graves, “Lockdown Terminology in K-12 Schools,” 2. 168 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Annex G
“Guidelines for Emergency Communication Strategies for Buildings and Campuses,” G.2(10)(e).
• Alert Tone: Police Siren • Prerecorded Message: Emergency lockdown! Emergency
lockdown! A lockdown button was pushed and police are notified. Everyone, lockdown now.
• Repeat Message two or more times
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audible part of the notification appliance. The lockdown notification system would need
to be hardwired to the PA system. It would also require a device that would hold the pre-
recorded lockdown message, and a sounder circuit relay that would activate the public
address system to play the message. A benefit to using the existing PA system speakers is
its regular use. If a speaker malfunctions, it will affect the users’ ability to hear the daily
announcement, and repairs can be set in motion. This daily use provides consistent
testing of the speakers.
At first blush, it may seem that using speakers already in place throughout the
school may significantly reduce the initial equipment and installation costs of a lockdown
notification system. This may not be the case due to the extensive NFPA requirements
regarding reliability safeguards. A significant drawback to using the existing PA speaker
system has to do with reliability. Schools are susceptible to power outages due to storms
and other factors. The PA system requires power and many schools do not have backup
generators. For schools that have PA systems associated with internet or WiFi-based
phone systems, reliability is compromised due to the potential for internet disruptions. A
warning system must be dependable. The NFPA regulations mandate a redundant,
reliable warning system and provide guidance for dual purpose speakers.
Loudspeakers used for emergency communications system functions also
providing ancillary functions shall meet the conditions of either 24.3.5.2 (1) or (2):
(1) The fire command center or the emergency command center as applicable shall be constantly attended by trained personnel, and selective paging is permitted by the authority having jurisdiction.
(2) All of the following conditions shall be met: (a) The loudspeakers and associated audio equipment are installed or located with safeguards to resist tampering or misadjustment of those components essential for intended emergency notification. (b) The monitoring integrity requirements of 10.6.9 and Sections 10.18 and 12.6 continue to be met while the system is used for non-emergency purposes.169
Depending on the school’s existing loudspeaker and associated systems, it may be
cost prohibitive for schools to meet these and other referenced NFPA standards for
169 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 24.3.5.2.
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audible voice communication appliances. For these reasons, a school may choose a more
reliable audible notification appliance, independent of the existing PA system
loudspeakers for its lockdown notification system.
Similar to the fire alarm system, a standardized lockdown notification system
could have dedicated speakers, separate from the public address system, hardwired
directly to the LNCP. This independent speaker system would also mirror the NFPA
requirements of one that detects trouble situations and alerts officials when a device is not
working properly. These built in redundancy and reliability factors are essential to the
school’s ongoing confidence in the functionality of the warning system.
(1) Visual Notification Appliances
When a mass notification system is in use, fire code requires visual notification
along with the audible notification, “Where audible notification is provided, mass
notification systems shall also provide visible notification information to serve the
hearing impaired and for high-noise areas…and shall be accomplished using strobes.” 170
This type of notification is particularly important in gymnasiums, band rooms, and
cafeterias where noise volume can make it difficult to hear announcements right away.
As seen in Figure 11, the strobes must have the word “ALERT” printed on the
devices.171
Figure 11. Appearance for Visual Notification Appliances.172
170 National Fire Protection Association, 24.5.16.1–3. 171 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,
24.5.17.7. 172 Source: “SPSWK-CLR-ALERT,” SystemSensor, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.system
sensor.com/en-us/Pages/SPSWK-CLR-ALERT.aspx.
58
The NFPA code also allows for textual or graphic visual notification, but it is not
required. Regardless, the code requires an immediate visual notification. “Transmission
of visible notification and messages shall be simultaneous to audible notification and
messages.”173 Since delays in this notification are not allowed, the system must be set up
so that the audible and visual notifications occur simultaneously upon the activation of
the initiating appliance.
The fire code allows several options to accomplish the visual strobe notification
requirement. These options include standalone strobes or altering the existing fire alarm
strobes to fulfill both the fire and lockdown strobe needs, speaker-strobes, or replacing
the existing fire strobes with a combination fire horn-strobe and lockdown speaker-strobe
appliance.
(2) Standalone Strobes
For some schools, it may be feasible to repurpose their existing fire alarm strobes
to serve as a strobe for both the fire alarm system and the lockdown notification system.
This repurposing is especially important if the school uses a standalone strobe device
rather than a combination horn-strobe. If an existing strobe used for the fire alarm system
is repurposed to include other emergencies, the fire code provides instructions for
removing or covering the word FIRE on the device.174 “Strobes used in combination
systems where the same strobe is used for both mass notification and fire notification
shall…be clear or nominal white, [and] have no marking or be marked with the word
‘ALERT’.”175 The fire code does not mandate the color of the housing of the appliance.
It simply says that the strobe must be clear or white if one strobe is used for both
purposes as seen in Figure 12. For schools that use standalone strobes for their fire alarm
system, this option would save the schools money because they would not have to buy
new strobes and it would eliminate the need to run wire from the LNCP to each
classroom and area in the school building.
173 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,
24.5.16.4. 174 National Fire Protection Association, 24.5.17.3,4. 175 National Fire Protection Association, 24.5.17.3.
59
Figure 12. Appearance for Combination Standalone Strobes.176
(3) Speaker-Strobes
Speaker-strobes can accomplish both the audible and visual notification
requirements of a lockdown notification system. Speaker-strobes are dual purpose
notification appliances regulated by the NFPA. They look almost identical to the fire
alarm system’s horn-strobes but are engineered to play a voice message rather than blow
a horn and simultaneously light up the strobe. The use and purchase of speaker-strobes
would represent a significant upfront expense, including the need to run wire from the
LNCP to all the speaker-strobes around the school. Once installed, they would provide a
reliable and sustainable audible and visible warning notification for the entire campus,
with very little ongoing maintenance. Power outages and internet outages would not
disable the speaker-strobes since they would be connected directly to the LNCP, which
has its own battery backup supply. This option would provide the added flexibility of
making decisions as to the best places to locate the devices when planning the overall
installation of the system. See Figure 13 for an example.
176 Source: Wikipedia, s.v. “fire alarm system,” last edited March 21, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Fire_alarm_system#/media/File:Wheelock_mt2.jpg. The researcher modified the text on the second and third images to demonstrate NFPA guidance.
60
Figure 13. White Speaker Strobe and a Clear Lens.177
(4) Combination Horn-strobes and Speaker-strobes
Another option is to replace the existing fire alarm horn-strobes with new
combination horn-strobe and speaker-strobe appliances to have only one device in each
location. Further investigation is necessary to determine if the existing wiring can be used
for both strobe units to activate the correct unit based on which initiating appliance is
activated. If not a feasible or reliable solution, it may be necessary to run additional
wiring from the LNCP to the speaker-strobe portion of the device to leverage the existing
wiring path and isolate each device to its respective control panel. If the school decides to
use this combination horn and speaker-strobe unit as its notification appliance, careful
assessment is necessary to assure that the voice message on the appliance can be heard
clearly in all areas of the school. Since voice messages do not fill a space in the same way
as a horn or bell, the NFPA regulates the careful and strategic placement of speakers
designed for emergency voice messages. Figure 14 shows two examples.
177 Source: “White Speaker Strobe with Standard CD and a Clear Lens Designed,” SECURX,
accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.securx.in/sounder-strobe/2393-spscw-clr-alert-system-sensor.html.
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(a) (b)
Figure 14. Combination Horn-strobes and Speaker-strobes.178
5. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Active shooter attacks on K-12 schools are infrequent events, but can have great
consequences. A lockdown notification system must be a constantly reliable and
operational warning system. The inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements of the
lockdown notification system should be modeled precisely after the fire alarm system
requirements, as described in the fire alarm system section of this chapter.179 The system
must also be exercised and tested during regular school lockdown drills. All these
measures work together to ensure the lockdown notification system is functional and
reliable at all times.
6. Financial Feasibility
The initial expenses involved with a lockdown notification system include the
LNCP components, initiating appliances, notification appliances, and all the wire that
connects this system. The hardware, wire, and installation costs represent the bulk of the
up-front cost of the warning system. After installation, the ongoing costs for the
lockdown notification system are minimal. Other than the annual (and some semi-annual)
inspection requirements, and minimal maintenance, only a small monthly fee for
178 Source: (a) “Dual Strobe Expander Plates,” System Sensor, accessed March 21, 2018, http://www. systemsensorblog.com/2011/11/dual-strobe-expander-plates; (b) Wikimedia Commons, s.v. “MNEC expander and speaker-strobe,” last edited December 2, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: MNEC_Expander_and_Speaker-strobe.jpg.
179 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Chapter 14 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance.
62
monitoring is paid to the same alarm company used for the fire alarm system monitoring.
Once installed, it will generally be a financially sustainable warning system for K-12
schools.
7. Summary of the Lockdown Notification System
As seen Figure 15, like a fire alarm system, all these components the (LNCP,
initiating appliances, and notification appliances) work together to provide a reliable
mechanism that can be built into the infrastructure of U.S. schools by which:
• School occupants who observe a suspicious person or hear gunfire can
quickly activate a lockdown push-button (initiating appliance).
• The control panel immediately notifies (using the speaker-strobes) the
whole school to lockdown.
• It simultaneously notifies the police department (via the alarm company)
through the dedicated phone lines.
Figure 15. Lockdown Notification System Process Model.180
180 Adapted from Automation Source, “Egress Devices” for the blue initiating appliance; Source:
“SPSWK-CLR-ALERT,” SystemSensor for the white speaker strobe. The blue initiating appliance was adapted to indicate that the text on the blue initiating appliance was modified to demonstrate the proposed plain language for a lockdown initiating appliance.
63
Like the fire alarm system, the conceptual lockdown notification system is
designed to be reliable, easy to use, affordable after initial installation, and easy to
maintain. If it performs like the fire alarm system, the hope is that it will effectively fulfill
its purpose in schools; while school shootings may still occur, a quicker warning can lead
to a quicker lockdown, thereby hopefully, resulting in reduced injuries and loss of life.
D. CONCLUSION
The standardized school fire alarm system has proven to be an effective warning
system that quickly alerts all school occupants of the need to evacuate when in danger of
smoke or fire. It is effective in the K-12 school environment because it accomplishes its
intended purpose, and also because it requires minimal maintenance, is reliable, easy to
use, and is financially sustainable for schools.
A standardized lockdown notification system in schools may also be an effective
warning system to notify all school occupants quickly of the need to lockdown when in
danger of violence at school. It may be effective in the K-12 school environment if it can
accomplish its intended purpose, and also because, like the fire alarm system, once
installed, it will require minimal maintenance, be reliable, easy to use, and is likely to be
financially sustainable for schools.
As shown in this chapter, the school fire alarm system represents a potentially
suitable model for a parallel conceptual lockdown notification system. The next chapter
layouts the development of an evaluation tool that K-12 school decision-making teams
can use to assess communication and warning system technologies, such as this
conceptual lockdown notification system.
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III. THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL
This chapter proposes a new evaluation framework tool designed specifically for
evaluating communication and warning system technologies for use within the K-12
school environment. It begins with an introduction to remind the reader of the findings in
the literature review that validates the need for this new tool. Next, an overview of the
tool is presented, which includes its relationship to the HOT-Fit model, as described in
Chapter I, explains how the tool is organized, and gives an overview of the five domains
that make up the core structure of the tool.181 A big-picture perspective of the tool is
given to contextualize when discussing it in the final section. The bulk of this chapter
provides an in depth description of each of the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation
Tool’s components as they relate to communication and warning system technologies
applied in the K-12 school environment.
A. INTRODUCTION
Schools need the capability to make warning notifications to students, staff, and
visitors to address a variety of hazards, threats, and emergencies. They also need the
ability to communicate with community partners, such as law enforcement, fire fighters,
and 911-dispatch centers, and to disseminate emergency information to parents,
guardians, and other school stakeholders.
A variety of traditional and emerging communication and warning system
technologies are available for schools to consider. Some have been in use in schools for
decades; others have emerged in recent years as technology has advanced in response to
active shooter attacks on schools. Evaluating warning and communication technologies is
complex. School decision-makers have to figure out which technologies are suitable for
their unique schools and district. They also need to consider if the technology is
compatible with their community partners’ systems and response capabilities.
181 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 386–398.
66
As revealed in the literature review, a major gap has emerged in the research in
providing guidance or recommendations to school decision-makers on how to evaluate
and select communication and warning system technologies. The JHU report, A
Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, stipulates, “There is no national
clearinghouse or center serving as an ‘honest broker’ to test or recommend specific
technologies or vendors to schools. As a result, many school officials rely on vendor-
sponsored research, word of mouth, advice from police or security personnel, internal
review, or grant funding criteria for making procurement decisions.”182 Several other
authors note similar gaps.
Even so, while reviewing the literature, many weaknesses related to the
implementation of some of these traditional and emerging communication and warning
system technologies emerged as important factors to consider when evaluating new
technologies. These weaknesses include the accessibility of the warning system, factors
related to timely warning of all school occupants, the reliability of the warning system,
initial and ongoing costs, and the importance of organizational fit. Schneider, in School
Security Technologies, goes further and urges school decision-makers to figure out the
problem to be solved before choosing a technology, consider the school’s specific needs,
constraints, and variables, carefully analyze solutions, and then choose the appropriate
technology.183
The new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool developed and presented in this
chapter fills a gap in the literature. It provides school decision-making teams with a
process to identify their needs for a technology, discover if the technology can meet those
needs, and determine to what extent the technology is feasible and sustainable for the
school and their community partners. Since school communication and warning systems
do not only affect the unique school, but also its community partners, such as law
enforcement, fire departments, and 911 dispatch centers, it is important to work through
this process as a collaborative effort. The K-12 EOP Guide explains, “It is critical that
182 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 13–15. 183 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 1.
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schools work with their district staff and community partners—local emergency
management staff, first responders, and public and mental health officials—during the
planning process […] This collaboration makes more resources available and helps to
ensure the seamless integration of all responders.”184 If school decision-makers work
with their community partners, this will increase the likelihood of selecting effective,
feasible, and sustainable communication and warning system technologies. For these
reasons, great value can be found in forming a joint decision-making team, with both
school and community partner stakeholders.
The hope is that the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool will be a useful
tool that can help collaborative, decision-making teams make informed choices about the
selection of communication and warning system technologies for their unique schools.
B. OVERVIEW OF K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL
The main construct of this new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool (school
tool) comes from the HOT-Fit framework, originally designed to evaluate information
systems used in the hospital setting.185 The literature review section of Chapter I
describes an overview of the history of HOT-Fit. This new evaluation framework draws
upon many of the established evaluation variables found in the HOT-Fit framework. It
also includes evaluation variables customized to the K-12 school environment and the
specific context of warning system technologies rather than hospital information
systems.186
The school tool includes five core domains that guide the user through a process
to evaluate the suitability of a technology to accomplish the goals of the school
organization. The first domain, Foundation, otherwise known as the why, is unique to this
new school tool. The other domains come from the HOT-Fit framework that include
investigating the Technology itself, assessing the technological interface with Humans in
184 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 5. 185 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 386–398. 186 These new evaluation variables stem from the existing literature and from Susan M. Graves’
unique experience as a school safety professional at the Lincoln County School District since 2001.
68
the school system, examining the impact on the Organization, and identifying the Net
Benefits to the school, district, and community partners. Each domain is distinct but also
interconnected. The domains have corresponding dimensions based on the HOT-Fit
model, as well as unique and customized variables for evaluating the efficacy of the
technology’s use within the K-12 school environment, as seen in Figure 16.
Figure 16. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.187
1. Foundation
The most foundational domain, aptly named Foundation, is the starting point for
the evaluation.188 It helps decision-making teams identify and clarify the reasons for
187 This illustration was created by Susan M. Graves to display the components of the K-12 School
HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
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considering a new warning technology. The K-12 EOP Guide calls this step,
“understanding the situation.”189 It begins by conducting risk and capability assessments
to identify the problem(s) to solve, establishing goals and objectives that articulate
purpose, recognizing and taking into account internal and external motivating factors,
such as psychological safety, risk management, regulations, and opportunities, and
defining the parameters, limitations and priorities of the project. The Foundation domain
is essentially about the why and the scope of the project. It is the starting place because it
informs all other domain evaluations. Table 2 shows an overview of the Foundation
domain.
Table 2. Foundation Domain Overview.
FOUNDATION Dimension Evaluation Variables Problem i. Risk Assessment
ii. Capabilities Assessment Purpose i. Goals
ii. Objectives Motivation i. Internal
ii. External Parameters i. Priorities
ii. Limitations iii. Scope
2. Technology
The next step in the evaluation process involves examining warning technologies
to address the identified problem, goals, and objectives. This domain requires a detailed
analysis of the information quality, system quality, and service quality dimensions of the
technology against the criteria established in the Foundation domain. Each dimension
includes several evaluation variables customized to the K-12 school environment. The
188 The Foundation domain is unique to this school tool. The other four domains come from the HOT-
Fit framework. 189 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 7.
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information quality dimension deals with the attributes of the activation devices,
notification attributes, and information completeness. The system quality dimension
includes evaluating the system mechanics, the reliability of the overall system, security
attributes, and system flexibility. Service quality refers to the total support of the warning
system as provided by either the external or internal service provider or a combination of
the two.190 Variables to evaluate include the expected lifespan of the system, ongoing
technical support, and maintenance requirements. A thorough examination of the
Technology domain in light of the Foundation domain findings will help to rule out some
technologies since it will become evident they do not have the capacity to accomplish the
established goals and objectives. Table 3 shows an overview of the Technology domain.
Table 3. Technology Domain Overview.
TECHNOLOGY Dimension Evaluation Variables Information Quality i. Activation Attributes
ii. Notification Attributes iii. Information Completeness
System Quality i. System Mechanics ii. System Reliability
iii. Security Attributes iv. System Flexibility
Service Quality i. Lifespan ii. Technical Support and Maintenance
3. Human
In the Human domain, teams consider how the warning system technology will
impact the humans in the school and stakeholders outside of the school and is made up of
two dimensions, system use and user satisfaction. Evaluation variables for system use
start with the impact of the technology on the daily routines of the school personnel. It
then moves to variables related to the flexibility of the technology to customize the
parameters of the system’s use. Finally, it concludes with the staff’s perceptions of
support for using the system. The user satisfaction dimension refers to the staff’s
190 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 391.
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anticipated perception of the system’s usefulness, variables related to the ease-of-use of
the system, and to the anticipated acceptability of the system by users and school
stakeholders. Analysis of the Human domain informs the likelihood of favorable
acceptance of the technology by its target users. Table 4 shows an overview of the
Human domain.
Table 4. Human Domain Overview.
HUMAN Dimension Evaluation Variables System Use i. Impact on Daily Routines
ii. Parameters for Use iii. Perceived Support
User Satisfaction i. Perceived Usefulness ii. Ease-of-Use
iii. Perceived Acceptability
4. Organization
The Organization domain assists teams with assessing the interaction with and
impact of the warning system technology on the schools, school districts, and their
community partners’ organizational attributes, systems, and leadership acceptance.
Organizational dimensions are two-fold, structure and environment. Evaluation variables
in the structure dimension include compatibility with the school or district and
community partners’ capabilities, response philosophies, and existing communications
systems. The environment dimension variables consider ownership of the technology, the
financial impact on the organizations, and the technology’s alignment with regulations.
The Organization domain helps determine technological compatibility for the school and
community partners who will use the system. Table 5 shows an overview of the
Organization domain.
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Table 5. Organization Domain Overview.
ORGANIZATION Dimension Evaluation Variables Structure i. School Attributes
ii. Community Partner Attributes Environment i. Management and Ownership
ii. Financial Impact iii. Aligns with Regulations
5. Net Benefits
The Net Benefits domain examines findings from the prior four domains against
the dimensions of effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability. It loops back to the very
beginning of the analysis process and guides users to revisit questions related to the
Foundation domain. Variables in the effective dimension consider if the technology
improves the schools’ capability to solve the identified problem(s) and accomplishes its
purpose as established in its goals and objectives. It draws upon the Technology domain
to determine if it is reliable within the limitations of the organization. It takes into
account the Human and Organizational variables to ascertain if the system is
operationally compatible and financially feasible for the school, district, and their
community partners. Evaluating this domain helps teams weigh the different factors to
make decisions about sustainability. The RAND report contends, “To employ
technologies effectively and ethically, schools need to consider whether and how
particular technologies could feasibly be implemented and used to successfully address
the specific issue related to student safety for which solutions are needed.”191 The Net
Benefits derived from using the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool will uncover to
what extent the technology used within the constraints of the unique school system
effectively and reliably solves the identified problem, meets the established goals and
objectives, and is a feasible and sustainable solution for the school and its community
partners. Table 6 shows an overview of the Net Benefits domain.
191 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, xvi.
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Table 6. Net Benefits Domain Overview.
NET BENEFITS Dimension Evaluation Variables Effective i. Solves Problem
ii. Accomplishes Purpose iii. Reliable
Feasible and Sustainable i. Financially ii. Operationally
6. Overview Conclusion
As described in this overview, the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
provides a five-step structure and process that school decision-making teams can use as a
guide to evaluate communication and warning system technologies.
C. THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL EXPLAINED
The prior section introduced an overview of the five domains in the evaluation
framework. This section provides a more detailed description of each domain, dimension,
and corresponding evaluation variable found in the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation
Tool.
1. Foundation
The foundational step in the technology evaluation process requires gaining a
clear understanding of the reason for considering a new warning system technology. It
includes identifying the problem(s), articulating purpose, recognizing motivating factors,
and defining parameters. Table 7 explains the Foundation domain.
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Table 7. Foundation Domain Expanded.
DOMAIN #1: FOUNDATION
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
#1: F
OU
ND
ATI
ON
A. Problem i. Risk Assessment:
ii. Capabilities Assessment:
B. Purpose i. Goals:
ii. Objectives:
C. Motivation i. Internal Motivations:
ii. External Motivations:
D. Parameters i. Priorities:
ii. Limitations: iii. Scope:
a. Identify the Problem
To identify the problem, teams should conduct two types of assessments, a risk
assessment and a capabilities assessment. A risk assessment will help identify the
hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities the schools face. A capabilities assessment examines
the schools’ and community partners’ existing systems and personnel to identify their
strengths and limitations to address the identified risks. Together, these assessments
connect the problems the schools face with the available systemic resources, and
examines to what extent the schools’ current capabilities address the problems. Schneider
emphasizes, “Don’t start by choosing a technology and looking for a problem it can
solve. The process should be reverse: Identify and prioritize the problems before jumping
to solutions, and analyze solutions carefully before committing funding.”192 Identifying
the problem the schools want to solve will provide important focus to the technology
search.
(1) Risk Assessment
A risk assessment considers factors such as characteristics of the school and
community. The JHU report posits, “The best way to select safety technology is to first
192 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 1.
75
determine what threats need to be mitigated and then determine the best solution.”193 A
risk assessment will help teams determine if their school community is vulnerable to
specific threats or hazards that require mitigation efforts. In fact, the NFPA requires that a
risk analysis be performed when implementing a mass notification system. “Each
application of a mass notification system shall be specific to the nature and anticipated
risks of each facility for which it is designed.”194 These risks could be natural hazards,
such as an earthquake, tornado, winter storm, or other threats, such as an intruder,
kidnapping, or shootings.195 Environmental and structural risks can also be evaluated,
such as if vulnerabilities occur due to the school’s limited access control measures, or if
the classrooms have doors that cannot be locked, or if the school has exterior hallways or
buildings. A risk assessment can also help teams determine if the physical location of the
school (next to a wooded area, in the middle of a city, or next to a hazardous materials
facility) increases specific risks; or if the geographic distance between the school and the
nearest law enforcement or fire protection agency elevates risk. Acknowledging risks and
vulnerabilities helps school teams identify the problems they want to solve.
(2) Capabilities Assessment
A capabilities assessment considers factors related to personnel, equipment, and
systems. The K-12 EOP Guide refers to a capabilities assessment saying it “examines the
capabilities of students and staff as well as the services and material resources of
community partners.”196 Decision-making teams may consider these questions: Do
staffing limitations, such as having no safety or security staff, campus monitors, or school
resource officers, create the need for an enhanced warning system? To what extent are
current communication and warning systems adequate or inadequate to address the
problem? Do infrastructure factors, such as building construction, connectivity
193 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, 13–14.
194 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 24.3.11.1.
195 See Appendix A for a list of threats and hazards schools are susceptible to and must prepare for depending on their unique environment.
196 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing, 10.
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challenges, etc., impact capabilities? A capabilities assessment also involves evaluating
the community partners’ capabilities, strengths, and limitations in relationship to the
risks, hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities the schools face. This evaluation includes
assessing interoperability factors between the schools and law enforcement, fire agencies,
911-dispatch centers, emergency management, and other community partners.
Understanding both risks and capabilities related to the unique school, district,
and their community partners will help decision-makers identify the problem and
available resources.
b. Articulate the Purpose
Identifying the problem positions the teams to figure out what they want to
accomplish, and thereby, articulates the purpose for acquiring a new warning technology.
The K-12 EOP Guide directs school teams to stay focused on the problem to solve by
encouraging them to identify goals and objectives to address the specific problem,
hazard, or threat and explains, “Goals are broad, general statements that indicate the
desired outcome in response to the threat or hazard [problem] identified [...] they are
what personnel and other resources [such as warning systems] are supposed to achieve.
They also help identify when major activities are complete and what defines a successful
outcome.”197 The goal generally answers the basic and foundational question of “why”
someone wants to do something.
The JHU report describes it another way, “One way to consider safety technology
in schools is by taking into account the impact it is intended to have on the incident.
Some technologies help to prevent a crime from happening, some are intended to
minimize the effects of violence by adding a layer of protection, whereas others are
critical during an active incident.”198 With the rapid advancement of technology and the
increasing amount of technological solutions on the market, teams may become
enamored with a particular technology or what may be the latest fad, and lose sight of the
197 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 12. 198 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 13–8.
77
actual problem to be addressed. Setting clear goals and measurable objectives can help
teams avoid this trap and empower them to evaluate potential technological solutions
with wisdom and clarity.
c. Understand Motivation
Gaining a clear understanding of the problem and carefully articulating goals and
objectives are important first steps. The team should also seek to understand the internal
and external motivations behind addressing this problem at this time. Motivations driven
by reactionary responses can become pitfalls and cause teams to make hasty and
uninformed decisions.
(1) International Motivations
Internal motivations include factors related to psychological safety, physical
safety, and risk management. When stakeholders, such as staff, parents, guardians, or
other members of the community are concerned about violent events at schools elsewhere
in the country, psychological safety may be a driving force. The JHU’s report points out,
“the continued focus on mass casualty events is driven by funding (Federal and state
grants), school system mandate, media focus on such events, public sentiment and fear,
and a genuine desire to foster effective prevention and response measures.”199 The same
report indicates that managing risk is a motivator for implementing security technologies.
The “fear of violence and of legal liability” may also be used as justifiable rationale for
the expenses associated with technologies.200
(2) External Motivations
Factors involving external motivations may include regulatory conditions and
available opportunities. The teams can determine if new legislation, regulation, or policy
require establishing a new warning capability, or if funding is available to replace or
upgrade old or failing equipment or systems. New grant opportunities, new technological
advances, or special vendor offers that are driving forces may be available. The JHS
199 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 15–3. 200 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, ES–4.
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report points out, “Prior to selecting and acquiring technology, evaluation is sometimes
ad hoc or extremely limited. In some cases, technology is selected to assuage the anxiety
brought on by recent news stories or in response to a flood of funding.”201 In these cases,
the identified problem should remain the primary focus while the opportunity or
motivation is secondary. Recognizing motivating factors will help teams make informed
decisions about technologies without succumbing to solutions that do not meet
established goals.
d. Establish Parameters
Establishing parameters involves identifying priorities and limitations to
determine the scope of the project. Keeping the goals and objectives in mind while being
aware of the motivating and limiting factors will help teams delineate the essential
components of a warning system from the non-essentials to stay within their scope and
work to solve the identified problem. It may be helpful to identify “tier one,” or non-
negotiable, functions of the technology (those minimum, must-have requirements
essential to accomplishing the stated goals and objectives), “tier two,” or desirable but
non-essential, components of the technology, and “tier 3” or features that might be
considered luxury items. The schools can then break larger projects into implementation
phases and avoid an overly broad scope where they to try to solve so many problems that
the effort becomes overwhelming and unmanageable. Schneider points out, “Beware of
mission drift. Always go back to your originally identified problem and ask yourself, ‘Do
the solutions we chose match the problems we wanted to address?’”202 The parameters
may expand or contract during the processes of setting goals and objectives and
evaluating warning systems.
e. Foundation Domain Summary
As decision-making teams work through the Foundation domain, they will
establish a clear and firm basis for a technology search. In the second domain,
201 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, ES–12. 202 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 13.
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Technology, teams will learn to evaluate the technological solutions to determine if the
technology will effectively solve the identified problems and meet the teams’ stated
goals.
2. Technology
The second domain, Technology, requires a detailed analysis of the information
quality, system quality, and service quality dimensions of the technology against the
criteria established in the Foundation step. Table 8 explains the Technology domain.
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Table 8. Technology Domain Expanded.
DOMAIN #2: TECHNOLOGY Dimensions Evaluation Variables
#2: T
ECH
NO
LOG
Y
A. Information Quality
i. Activation Attributes: • Type of Activation: • Accessibility of Activation: • Times & Locations:
ii. Notification Attributes: • Type of Notification: • Reach of Notification: • Speed of Notification
iii. Information Completeness: • Message Content & Accuracy: • Message Length: • Message Intelligibility
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
B. System Quality i. System Mechanics: • Operating Platform & System Functionality: • Installation Requirements:
ii. System Reliability: • Redundancies: • Points of Failure:
iii. Security Attributes: • System Defense: • Activation Protections:
iv. System Flexibility: • Compatible: • Customizable: • Expandable/Scalable:
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
C. Service Quality i. Lifespan: • Replacement or Upgrade Intervals: • Planned Obsolescence:
ii. Technical Support & Maintenance: • Internal Capacity & Restrictions: • External Capacity & Restrictions:
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a. Information Quality
The information quality dimension focuses on the activation and notification
components of the warning system and is based on the user’s perspective of the quality of
the information produced by the warning system.203 This dimension examines activation
attributes, notification attributes, and the quality and completeness of the information
produced by the system.
(1) Activation Attributes
For the activation attributes evaluation variable, teams examine the types of
activation devices the system provides, the accessibility of those devices for those using
the system, the times it is available, and factors related to where the activation devices are
located. In this discovery phase, teams learn about what the technology has to offer in
terms of activation options.
An initial assessment of the technology helps teams understand the type of
activation devices available, how they work, and what they accomplish. Activation
devices may include technologies such as cell phone or computer applications, two-way
radios or walkie-talkies, push-buttons or pull-stations, pendant necklace devices or
keyfob buttons, mobile or fixed devices, or phone activated systems via special codes.
Activation accessibility looks specifically at the way the system is constructed related to
access and ease-of-use. Teams will need to decide who will use (activate) the system,
when it will be available for use, and from where it can be activated to meet the goals and
objectives established for the warning system.
Depending on the team’s established goals and objectives, the activation devices
may be designated for key school, district, or security personnel; all school staff
members; students; or for everyone in the school. They could also be for coaches, bus
drivers, and people using the school facilities (inside or outside) during non-school hours.
If the system is restricted for use by key personnel, determination is necessary as to the
accessibility requirements to ensure these key personnel are always available to activate
203 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 390.
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the system. It is also helpful to understand if any special keys, codes, or knowledge are
required to activate the system and how that may impact decisions about who will be
allowed to use the system.
It is also necessary to determine when and where the warning system will be
available for activation, such as during school hours only, or non-school hours, or both.
The K-12 EOP Guide instructs schools to “account for incidents that may occur during
and outside the school day.”204 It may be helpful to consider the different activities that
take place at the school, as well as the various timeframes the system could be needed to
address those activities, such as during the school day, for afterschool programs, or when
visitors use the school facilities during summer break. Will it serve incidents occurring on
school grounds, at athletic venues, on school buses, on field trips, or at off-campus school
events? Once these variables are established, the teams can decide where the activation
devices should be located and available for use.
Teams should determine the range of capabilities and limits of the system by
asking questions about requirements pertaining to the use of the internet, a cell phone or a
landline phone, or radio frequencies. Teams can also assess how many activation devices
they will need and if the system supports those requirements. The JHU report advises
readers to make alarms “accessible to people with disabilities. For example, mounted
alarms should be placed within reach of someone in a wheelchair, and badge alarms
should not require fine motor skills or the use of two hands.”205 If off-campus use is
desired, determining if the system can be activated remotely would also be important.
(2) Notification Attributes
Notification attributes have to do with the type of notifications the system is
capable of providing, and the reach and speed of notification to the target recipients.
204 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 4. 205 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–33.
83
When evaluating the types of notification devices the system supports, teams will
need to explore both the audible and visual notification features of the technology. The
JHU report breaks up notification into two categories, one-way and two-way
communications technologies.206 One-way communications technologies include horns,
buzzers, sirens, bullhorns, speakers, digital signs, radios, and public address systems.
Two-way communications technologies include two-way radios, phones, intercom
systems, email, and emergency call boxes. Some of these one- and two-way technologies
are capable of voice messaging, (live voice, pre-recorded voice, text to voice); others use
attention-grabbing sounds, such as horns, sirens, or beeps.
Some warning systems include visual notifications, such as strobes, various lights,
LED signs, marquees, reader boards, deployable digital message boards, text messages,
and email notifications. JHU’s report says, “Digital signs can be integrated with other
mass communication technologies to provide greater probability of reaching a larger
audience. During routine use, digital signs display non-emergency messages, but during
emergencies, the display can be overridden with an alert message.”207 The report went on
to say, “the technology is only effective if its use during an emergency has been well
communicated to students and staff and if they are accustomed to getting information
from the digital signs during normal operations, and they have access to signs during an
event, thus such signs have very limited use during a lockdown situation.”208 Teams will
want to evaluate to what degree the visual notification features of the system align with
their notification goals and objectives.
To evaluate the reach of the notification variable, decision-making teams will
begin by identifying the desired recipients of the warning system notifications. Many
people have a stake in emergency communications when critical incidents affect schools.
Identifying the intended audience includes taking into account the demographics of the
intended audience, such as if the warning system is appropriate for the ages and
development level of the children or youth to be served, and if it can accommodate the
206 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 5–1. 207 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 5–38. 208 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 5–39.
84
languages represented by the schools’ community. A school of the blind or deaf will have
unique warning system requirements, and students or staff with access or functional
needs may require accommodations. Considering the schools’ homeless populations
where parents may not have access to telephones to receive warning messages is also
important. It is also appropriate to ask if the system has the capacity to notify the quantity
or number of students, parents, guardians, and other stakeholders the schools serve, and
within the time required. Examining the technology in light of the unique schools’
stakeholders will help determine compatibility.
An assessment is also necessary to determine the physical and geographical areas
the warning system needs to reach. Interior school areas to consider include classrooms,
halls, common areas, restrooms, locker rooms, offices, high noise areas, such as
gymnasiums, cafeterias, music rooms, industrial arts shops, etc. Exterior school areas to
consider include bus loading areas, student drop-off and pick-up areas, parking areas,
playgrounds, athletic fields, covered walkways, exterior locker halls, etc.. Other locations
to consider include school district support offices, other schools, buses, school activity
trips and athletic events, mobile devices, etc.
Requirements for the speed of notification are critical to determine because
different hazards and threats require a different speed of warning or notification. Some
systems are designed to address a specific hazard, such as a fire alarm system or lightning
warning system. Others provide a variety of weather alerts like the weather alert radio.209
Outdoor warning sirens are used for tornados, hurricanes, tsunamis, and now Hawaii has
repurposed its warning sirens to include the notification of a pending nuclear attack.210
Earthquake early warning systems are also in development. The speed of mass telephone
notification systems may be limited by the number of phone lines an organization is able
to access. Understanding the necessary speed of notification for the purpose of the
209 “Weather Radio All Hazards,” NOAA, accessed December 21, 2017, http://www.nws.noaa.gov/
nwr/. 210 “Hawaii to Resume Cold War-era Nuclear Attack Warning Siren Tests due to the North Korea
Threat,” CNBC, November 28, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/hawaii-to-resume-cold-war-era-nuclear-attack-warning-siren-tests-due-to-the-north-korea-threat.html.
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warning system will help decision-makers determine if the technology performs to the
desired speed and required capacity.
(3) Information Completeness
Information completeness deals with the capacity of the system to deliver the
precise information the audience needs regarding the hazard, threat, or purpose
established in the schools’ goals and objective. The JHU report cautions, “Sending
incomplete or inaccurate information can lead to confusion and unsafe actions or
decisions by recipients.”211 The National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code Handbook
contends, “[…] intelligibility of the voice message is one of the most important aspects of
a well-designed system. But equally important is the development of the messages to be
used during an emergency.”212 Evaluation variables involve message content and
accuracy, length, and intelligibility.
The content of the warning message must provide the appropriate and accurate
information needed to take the desired protective action. This is critical. The system must
be flexible to enable the schools to tailor the content to match the unique situation. If an
intended audience includes an alarm company, dispatch center, or first responder partner,
teams will need to ascertain the content needed and the required capacity of the system to
house and deliver the desired message. If the system features a language translation
application, it is recommended that teams test the translations for accuracy.
To achieve the message content requirements, the system must be capable of
producing an adequate length of warning message. Some technologies limit the length of
a message. For example, Twitter increased message length from 140 to 280 characters in
2017; some mass phone call or text message systems limit the time or length of
211 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, Liability and Safety Concerns, 5–32, 5.3.1.4.4. 212 Wayne D. Moore, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code Handbook (Quincy, MA: National Fire
Protection Association, 2010), 895, Supplement 2 Emergency Communications Systems Design and Application Challenges.
86
messages.213 Some messages require delivery in multiple languages, which increases
length requirements. Information completeness ideally would not be limited by the
system capability of the length of a message or the need for repeat intervals or follow-up
warning messages.
Intelligibility includes considerations such as getting people’s attention, and
delivering the message so users receive the entire message with clarity and adequate
volume. Some systems utilize a distinct alert to command people’s attention effectively.
The warning message or announcement must be intelligible; the volume must be
adjustable so that it is sufficient for high-noise and low noise areas. The alert must be
distinct and loud enough to cause students and staff to pay attention so they will have
ample opportunity to hear the warning announcement. For external stakeholders, an
attention getting mechanism is crucial, such as an alert tone. Directional considerations
include when speakers or sirens oscillate, causing it to be partially cut off to a portion of
the intended audience.
b. System Quality
The system quality dimension refers to system performance.214 It facilitates
teams’ evaluation of four performance quality variables: system mechanics, the reliability
of the overall system, security attributes, and system flexibility.
(1) System Mechanics
System mechanics refers to how the system works behind the scenes, including
the essential functions and components of the technology. It is the first performance
variable in the system quality dimension. The system mechanics along with the schools
other systems and limitations (power, internet, cell service) can affect the reliability of
the warning system. Its examination helps teams become familiar with the operating
213 The Lincoln County School District uses a mass phone call system that limits the length of the
recorded message to 60 seconds. This length is adequate for some messages. Other messages require more detailed information than the system length limitations allow.
214 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 390.
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platform, installation requirements, and the underlying mechanics of the activation and
notification functions.
To evaluate the system mechanics, it is necessary to understand the specifics of
the control panel or operating system functions related to cellular requirements, WiFi, or
radio frequencies (RF) to understand any limiting factors associated with the schools’
capabilities assessment. If it is RF-based, it is important to learn how it interacts with
other RF-based systems. If the system is software-based, it may require installing
software on one master computer console or on hundreds or thousands of devices
throughout a school district. Software compatibility with different devices may also be a
barrier. Other considerations might be how the bandwidth requirement of the software
affects other processes, the costs of time and money to install software on new machines,
training new staff, and retraining existing staff, etc.
Teams must also consider the physical space requirements of the technological
components, and the complexity of the installation process. Hardwiring a system within a
school, installing antennas, affixing components to walls, desks, or ceilings may present
challenges. Teams can ask if the school or district have the capacity to do components of
the installation versus hiring contractors or licensed technicians. They can also
investigate potential unexpected challenges, opportunities, or expenses associated with
the installation.
This part of the assessment identifies how system users activate and operate the
system to convey the emergency message desired. It also looks at how the consumers of
the information receive the intended notification. Gaining a clear understanding of the
basic system mechanics will help teams rule out some systems as it becomes evident they
do not have the capacity to accomplish the established goals and objectives. The RAND
report stresses, “Understanding the nature of these technologies and how they function
[…] would help stakeholders decide which technologies to invest in and use.”215 For
systems that do match the teams’ goals, understanding these factors will help answer
many of the questions in the rest of the evaluative process.
215 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, xvi.
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(2) System Reliability
System reliability, the second system quality variable, measures the overall
reliable performance of the system under normal and abnormal circumstances. The
evaluation considers potential points of failure, built in redundancies, and takes into
account the strengths and weaknesses of the warning system, as well as those of the
schools themselves.
This part of the evaluation loops back to the capabilities assessment conducted in
the first Foundation domain. The teams will need to understand to what extent the
schools are vulnerable to power outages, internet disruptions, or repeater deficiencies.
Some schools are subject to cell service limitations due to tower inefficiencies, service
provider voids, or dense building construction. Some schools have backup generators to
provide redundancy to a warning system; others do not. In one of the JHU case studies,
several reliability concerns were noted, “overtaxed cellular networks and Internet outages
[as well as] uninterrupted power supply.”216 The report continued, “The school district
experiences frequent storms and power outages, potentially resulting in safety systems
that may be interrupted, reset, or power surged, requiring additional maintenance and
resulting in lost coverage.”217 Schneider went further and noted frequent communication
system weakness as “Dysfunctional equipment that works inconsistently, due to bad
weather, leaky roofs, or deferred maintenance [and] reliance on towers or systems that
predictably overload in genuine emergencies.”218 Understanding the schools’
capabilities, risks and limitations will help the team evaluate the warning system’s
performance strengths and weaknesses with regard to those limitations.
Warning systems function on a variety of platforms, such as software, analog or
digital, electrical currents, cellular, microwave, or landline phone connections. Some use
a combination of these platforms. Some systems are hard wired, others wireless; some
have built in redundancies like battery backups, while others use cloud storage. Some
216 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 11–17—11–18. 217 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 11–18. 218 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 8.
89
have to be taken offline during updates, or turned off while recharging. Teams will need
to determine if the technology is vulnerable to signal interference, if the service provider
has adequately functioning satellites, or if it has a propensity to malfunction due to the
quality or sensitivity of the technology. For example, some fire alarm initiating
appliances, such as smoke or heat detectors, are often inadvertently activated due to
construction dust or materials, bursts of wind when doors are opened, or fog machines.
Some systems require 24-hour monitoring, call centers, or customer service. It can be
valuable to check with other organizations using the system to learn if they have
experienced any unexpected malfunctions or discovered vulnerabilities to its reliability.
It is important to anticipate the warning system’s potential points of failure and
the schools’ ability to compensate for those vulnerabilities, which is done by looking for
built in redundancies and examining the feasibility of adding more redundancies to shore
up identified weaknesses. Having a reliable system that works as expected and when
needed, can save lives. One that fails can cost lives.
(3) Security Attributes
Security attributes is the third variable to evaluate in the system quality dimension
and looks specifically at system defense and activation protections. System defense
involves the actual configuration of technology and its strength of protections versus
vulnerabilities to defend itself from malicious disabling or modifying the system.
Activation protections include factors related to access to the devices and protections to
prevent intentional (pranks) and unintentional (nuisance) warning system activations.
System defense can be determined by proactively anticipating what circumstances
could lead to the warning system being nefariously or accidentally disabled or
programmatically altered. The JHU report asks, “Are there ways to circumvent the
technology and enable maladaptive behaviors?”219 Internet-based warning systems are
vulnerable to hacking, denial of service attacks, and viruses. Wireless systems have many
points of vulnerabilities that make them ripe for compromise. Marc Weber Tobias, in his
219 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 2–18.
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article “This Popular Wireless Alarm System Can Be Hacked with a Magnet and Scotch
Tape,” explains many of the vulnerabilities of wireless alarm systems: “gateway
receiver[s] can be jammed, just like a denial of service (Dos) attack on network
servers.”220 He discusses the ease with which wireless home security systems can be
disabled. In Brian Rhodes’ paper, “How to Hack an ADT Alarm System,” he explains
that Federal Communications Commission (FCC) frequency license records are public
information. He summarizes a Defcon 22 presentation about hacking alarm systems:
“Find out the frequency the alarm system transmitter uses from publicly available FCC
documentation. Get a software defined radio, set it to that frequency to jam it.”221 Even
the security of a major city’s emergency warning system is vulnerable to this type of
hacking. In April 2017, the emergency sirens in Dallas, Texas were maliciously hacked,
which caused 156 sirens to blare in the middle of the night.222 The same type of
frequency vulnerability was used to exploit the system.
Another point of vulnerability has to do with jamming. “Jamming devices emit
radio frequency signals at specific bands with the intention of overpowering other
signals.”223 The result is “disruption or failure of wireless communications or mapping
equipment—including cellular, LMR or GPS systems.”224 These nefarious activities can
have serious consequences, “Jammers interfere with public safety communications and
may leave responders without vital communications and critical situational awareness,
[…] may delay emergency response times, escalate hazardous situations, facilitate illicit
220 Marc Weber Tobias, “This Popular Wireless Alarm System Can Be Hacked with a Magnet and
Scotch Tape,” Forbes, January 29, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcwebertobias/2015/01/29/this-popular-wireless-alarm-system-can-be-hacked-with-a-magnet-and-scotch-tape/#575d28850de9/.
221 Brian Rhodes, “How to Hack an ADT Alarm System,” IPVM, January 26, 2015, https://ipvm. com/reports/hack-adt-alarm-system.
222 “Hacker Sets off Emergency Alarms, Frightening Dallas Residents, Samira Said,” CNN, April 9, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/08/us/dallas-alarm-hack/index.html.
223 Sridhar Kowdley, Briefing for NPSTC, First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise (Washington, DC: DHS Science and Technology Directorate, 2017), 2, http://www.npstc.org/download. jsp?tableId=37&column=217&id=3990&file=OIC_NPSTC_Briefing_JamX17_OCC_20170906.pdf.
224 Kowdley, 3.
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activities, or result in loss of life.”225 These consequences demonstrate the importance
that warning systems have adequate system defense.
It may also be helpful to learn about potential unintended consequences due to the
presence of the system. For instance, in a school shooting at Westside Middle School in
Jonesboro, Arkansas, the fire alarm system was used to lure students and staff out of the
school and into the line of gunfire.226 It is also possible for the fire alarm system sensors
to react to smoke from gunfire, which can set off the fire alarms, as was the case in the
Las Vegas mass shooting when, in this circumstance, the fire alarm going off actually led
police to the shooters location.227
Activation protections have traditionally been problematic with the fire alarm
system. Fire alarm pull-stations are easily accessible in common areas in schools and are
vulnerable to student pranks. However, unintentional false alarms for the fire alarm
system are a much bigger risk than malicious pranks. A 2013 NFPA study shows that
only 8.2% of false alarm activations in the United States are from student pranks. In
contrast, 78.5% of false alarms were from system malfunctions, sensor activations, such
as carbon monoxide detectors, and accidental activations.228 Schools have worked hard
to implement strategies, policies, and consequences for dealing with and curtailing
intentional and unintentional false alarms.229
225 DHS Science and Technology Directorate, 2017 First Responder Electronic Jamming Exercise
(Washington, DC: DHS Science and Technology Directorate, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ files/publications/JamX17-Fact-Sheet-170125-508.pdf.
226 Jonathan Ford, “Westside School Shooting, The Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture,” The Central Arkansas Library System, last updated August 15, 2017, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas. net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=3717.
227 Cleve R. Wootson Jr., “A Fire Alarm from Gun Smoke Led Police to the Las Vegas Shooter’s Room, Retired Officer Says,” Washington Post, October 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-nation/wp/2017/10/02/a-fire-alarm-from-gun-smoke-led-police-to-the-las-vegas-shooters-room-reti red-officer-says/?utm_term=.c0d83e4f3645.
228 Michael J. Karter, “False Alarm Activity in the U.S. 2012,” National Fire Protection Association, December 2013, http://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/Fire-statistics/The-fire-service/Fire-department-calls/False-alarm-activity-in-the-US.
229 Robin Hattersley-Gray, “7 Steps to Reducing False Fire Alarms,” Campus Safety Magazine, March 1, 2014, https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/safety/7-steps-to-reducing-false-fire-alarms/.
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Some systems have easy access leading to potential misuse. Public address
warning systems accessible from classroom phones can be misused by students gaining
access to the passcode or to an emergency button on the phone. Computer keyboards with
a clearly identifiable panic button can easily be pranked or even accidentally pressed by
students or teachers. A crucial consideration is the impact that these false alarms have on
first responder operations and relationships. While false alarms can affect the confidence
users have in the system, its greatest cost may be the impact on the schools’ community
partners. JHU report says that with duress alarms, “schools must be careful to minimize
the number of false alarms. Schools may be subject to service fees or penalties if
responders are called to excessive false alarms.”230 The report continues, “there is a trust
relationship in which school officials trust in a quick response from law enforcement and
law enforcement trusts the school to minimize or eliminate false alarms. Schools must
find ways to mitigate false alarms to eliminate the possibility of not receiving a response
when the alarm is triggered.”231 Teams need to discover that ideal balance between
access requirements and a system that is overly vulnerable to misuse. Training and
consequences can be mitigating factors for this vulnerability.
(4) System Flexibility
System flexibility is the fourth evaluation variable in system quality and seeks to
ascertain the degree to which the warning system is compatible with and customizable to
a variety of school environments. The flexibility variable also examines to what extent
the warning system is expandable to phase in additional features over time.
Assessing for compatibility and customizability helps teams determine if the
warning system is transferable and adaptable to a variety of school physical layouts,
needs, and philosophies. If teams want to apply the system consistently in all schools in
their district, they will need to discover if it is flexible to modify implementation based
on site-specific configurations. Schools may have different philosophies regarding
230 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–32. 231 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 4–33.
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lockdowns and other protocols. Teams will need to learn if the technology is flexible to
allow teams to construct warning messages based on the type of protective measures the
schools and their community partners deem appropriate. It may be important to determine
if the system allows for messages in multiple languages and if it is flexible enough for
schools to customize visual LED messages if that technology is used. The ability to
override a pre-recorded message to give other instructions as appropriate to an emerging
incident may also be a requirement. Moore says the system should “allow informed
emergency managers to provide live and correct information to the population as a
situation develops.”232 The ability to silence warning systems or cancel an alert or
warning message during known false alarms is also desirable.
Teams will also want to learn to what extent the system is expandable to phase in
additional components over time as funds are available. With limited funds, schools may
prioritize tier-one needs, and thereby choose flexible systems that incorporate existing
infrastructure, technology, and systems. In “Supplement 2 Emergency Communications
Systems Design and Application Challenges,” Moore discusses some of the benefits of
leveraging an existing speaker system:
No one would question that using one speaker system to serve multiple functions offers financial benefits to the owner of the facility. Using one system reduces the costs of design, installation, and maintenance throughout the life cycle of the system. In addition, regular use of the system for normal paging functions provides an end-to-end test of the audible notification components and circuits.233
The JHU report points out, “The benefit of dual-use [communications] technology is
increased attention to training and maintenance, thus making it more likely to be
available and to be used effectively in the event of an emergency.”234 The flexibility to
utilize existing systems may be important to the teams.
232 Moore, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code Handbook, 895. 233 Moore, 890. 234 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, ES–7.
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c. Service Quality
The service quality dimension refers to the total support of the warning system as
provided by either the external or internal service provider or a combination of the
two.235 Variables to examine include the expected lifespan of the system, technical
support, and ongoing maintenance requirements.
(1) Lifespan
Lifespan is the first variable to evaluate in the service quality dimension and
gauges the length of time the warning system is expected to be functional and useful for
the school. It includes factors, such as how often the system as a whole and its individual
components have to be replaced or upgraded. The expected life of the system and its
components can be impacted by the system wearing out or breaking down due to frequent
system use, the age of the equipment (degrading), the construction of the equipment (how
long the technology lasts), and due to changing or outdated technologies no longer
supported. The JHU report cautions, “Technologies have an expected life cycle, and as
equipment ages and technology advances, equipment and software must be replaced.
Grants in response to incidents, however, almost never account for this, leaving schools
with aging systems and no means to refresh the technology.”236 Some components of a
warning system may need to be exercised frequently to stay in good working condition.
Environmental factors, such as weather, dust, corrosion, and extreme conditions, can
affect the life of a system or its components. The JHU report suggests examining if “the
system [can] withstand rain and snow or hot and cold temperatures.”237
Teams will also want to determine if the technology is changing at such a rapid
pace that it will require frequent replacing or updating of the system. Sometimes this
requirement is by design, which is indicated by a business tactic called planned
obsolescence. The Economist defines it as a “strategy in which the obsolescence (the
235 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 391. 236 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 15–4. 237 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2–18.
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process of becoming obsolete—that is, unfashionable or no longer usable) of a product is
planned and built into it from its conception. This is done so that in the future the
consumer feels a need to purchase new products and services that the manufacturer
brings out as replacements for the old ones.”238 This requirement is especially
problematic for schools since financial sustainability is such a huge factor. The frequent
changes in technologies also impact schools’ ability to support a system due to the time
involved in training staff on changing or new systems. The more times a system changes
and the school staff has to learn a new system, the less likely the staff will be to accept
new technology.
(2) Technical Support and Maintenance
Technical support and maintenance requirements involve the internal and external
timely guidance and support necessary to keep the system operational. It is the second
evaluation variable in the system quality dimension. Contracts for technical support can
be costly. Decision-making teams will need to determine who can provide technical
support, diagnose problems, conduct system inspections, perform maintenance, and
repair or replace parts. It can be helpful to understand if any special licenses, knowledge,
or training are required to perform these functions. Teams may check to see if they have
the capacity internally to maintain the system using their own facilities or technology
personnel. Depending on the ownership or set-up of the system, it may require external
support from a vendor or other supplier. If so, asking questions about the vendor’s record
of responsiveness, timeliness, and competence is appropriate. It is also important to learn
the availability of individual system components or parts, and if proprietary limitations or
requirements exist to using certain parts or vendors.
When assessing the reliability of the software, consider factors, such as if it is
housed exclusively in the school district’s IT or if it runs through the vendor’s system.
Schneider emphasizes, “Any network will require continual maintenance, eventual
upgrading, and constantly updated virus protection and intrusion detection systems (IDS)
238 “Planned Obsolescence,” Economist, March 23, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13354332.
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to watch for hackers or unauthorized transfers of data.”239 Ownership and licensing are
also factors. The JHU report points out, “Technology may evolve rapidly (and so does the
software that may accompany it); consideration must be given to replacement,
maintenance, and repair costs. Long-term support for the technology is a key factor;
support from unproven vendors or distributors is unknown.”240 Selecting a warning
system with manageable ongoing maintenance requirements is a significant factor for the
schools to be able to sustain the system financially for the long run.
d. Technology Domain Summary
Working through the evaluative process in the Technology domain will help
decision-making teams narrow down the selection of communication and warning
technologies to those that have the capacity to meet their goals and objectives. In the
Human domain, teams will evaluate how the technology interfaces with the people
designated to use the warning systems.
3. Human
The Human domain comprises an evaluation of system use and user satisfaction
to inform the likelihood of the users’ acceptance of and ongoing implementation of the
considered technology. Table 9 explains the Human domain.
239 Schneider, School Security Technologies, 1. 240 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 2–3.
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Table 9. Human Domain Expanded.
DOMAIN #3: HUMAN
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
#3: H
UM
AN
A. System Use
i. Impact on Daily Routines: • Personnel • School Flow
ii. Parameters for Use: • Type of emergency: • Activation Locations: • Number of Users:
iii. Perceived Support: • Management: • Peers:
B. User Satisfaction
i. Perceived Usefulness: • Need/Problem: • Improves Existing Capability:
ii. Ease-of-Use: • User Interface: • Frequency of Use: • Training:
iii. Perceived Acceptability: • Culture & Climate: • Psychologically & Socially:
a. System Use
The system use dimension examines three human-user variables: the impact on
daily routines, parameters for use, and perceived support. Mohd et al. describe system use
as relating “to the person who uses the system as an operator, their levels of use, training,
knowledge, belief, expectation and acceptance or resistance.”241 The assessment looks
critically at how the technology affects those using the system.
(1) Impact on Daily Routines
The first evaluation variable in the system use dimension focuses on the impact
on daily routines of the school staff. The daily flow of the school day involves a highly
241 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 391.
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orchestrated number of routines, as well as carefully and strategically designed schedules,
timelines, and class changes to move hundreds or thousands of students to various
locations around the school campus. Many activities are staggered due to occupancy
limitations that require the sharing and rotation of spaces to accommodate the number of
students in the schools who need to eat lunch, have recess, visit the library, go to gym
class, etc. If the technology adversely interferes with the school staff’s finely calibrated
routines, causes frustration to staff, or if it disrupts the regular flow of the school day,
adoption of the technology is hampered and sustainability becomes less likely.
Teacher schedules are also highly regulated. Time in the classroom, called
“instructional time” is carefully organized to take advantage of every minute and to
empower students to stay on task. Teachers build important classroom management
strategies and practices into their daily routines to support positive student behavior and
productive class periods. Support staff track attendance, sign in late students, and call
home to verify student absences. They provide medical support when students are ill or
injured. They coordinate the arrival and dismissal of students, as well as constantly
changing, complex transportation arrangements.242 All these tasks, and many others, lend
themselves to a fast-paced school environment in which staff members are often stretched
to their limits.
If the warning system technology requires extra work, responsibilities, or
unjustifiable inconveniences, or if it unreasonably interrupts the daily routine of staff and
students, it will very likely fail. The RAND report explains, “Expert panelists noted that
entry control technologies were often ‘defeated for staff convenience’ by propping open
doors, and others acknowledged that such technologies are hard to implement at schools
with many points of entry, particularly open-air campuses or those with modular
classrooms.”243 When evaluating the warning system, the team must determine to what
242 Daily transportation changes include sorting out of which children ride which bus, which students
will be picked up by parents or guardians in vehicles, which are walking or riding bikes home or being met by a parent walker at the school. Some students stay at the school for various after school programs. Others are picked up early.
243 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 22.
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extent the impacts to the daily routines of staff and the schools are sustainable both
initially and over time.
(2) Parameters for Use
Parameters for use, the second evaluation variable in the system-use dimension,
involve factors related to the flexibility of the system to accommodate the specific
conditions and needs of the humans using the system. The school needs flexibility to
address specific emergencies, hazards, or threats, as defined by school officials and their
community partners, to determine the locations from which the system can be activated,
and to accommodate the number of users necessary to meet their goals and objectives.
School staff must be clear about the kinds of emergencies, hazards, or threats for
which they can use the warning system. If uncertainties about these parameters arise, it
could cause people to hesitate and fail to initiate a timely warning to school occupants.
Personnel also must understand if this system has any limitations on where it can be
activated (school only, buses, field trips, playgrounds, exterior areas, from home, etc.). If
activation from a remote location is required, it is necessary to determine if it creates a
vulnerability to the security of the warning system. Teams can check to see if the system
requires openings in firewalls for IP-based technology or if special permissions or extra
devices are necessary to use the system off school grounds. Further assessment will also
help decision-makers determine if the technology can be inadvertently or nefariously
activated while off campus.
It is also important to determine if the technology will support the number of
users who will need to operate or use the system. For instance, some cellular service
boosters have a limit of 12 phone numbers. Some school safety tip lines have a limit of
three school contact people, and radios often have a limited number of channels or
frequencies. Some mass phone-call systems only allow a certain number of separate
school accounts. Teams will need to quantify users and assess the technology to ensure it
is capable and flexible enough to meet the requirements.
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(3) Perceived support
Perceived support is the final variable in the system use dimension and helps
teams anticipate the users’ sense of support by management and peers in using the
system. Staff should be clear about when it is appropriate to use the warning system,
without the fear of management’s reaction when they do activate the system. Mohd et al.
posit that the success of a system can be impacted by the user’s resistance to or
acceptance of the system “job insecurity and fear are some examples of interaction
resistance.”244 If employees are afraid to activate a warning system out of fear of peer
rejection, being perceived as overreacting, or from concern about employment
consequences, user acceptance might diminish.
System users should understand what type of hazards, threats, or circumstances
necessitate the system’s use, should be confident about how to use the system, and should
believe they will be supported by management and their peers. School leadership will
need to decide if use of the system will be voluntary or mandatory, and if any
confidentiality measures will be instituted to reduce exposure to those using the system.
Users will need assurance that if they are uncertain about the need to activate a warning,
but because time seems to be of the essence due to imminent danger, they will have
immunity if they err on the side of caution and it subsequently turns out to be an
unsubstantiated threat. A user may be more likely to use the system if an unnecessary
activation of the system is reframed as a drill.
b. User Satisfaction
The user satisfaction dimension in the Human domain includes evaluation
variables related to the staff’s perception of the system’s usefulness, the system ease-of-
use, and the user’s perceived acceptability of the system within the school environment.
(1) Perceived Usefulness
Perceived usefulness is the first variable to examine in the user satisfaction
dimension and it reveals the correlation between perception of usefulness and acceptance.
244 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 391.
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In other words, user acceptance increases if stakeholders believe the problem is worth
solving, if the new technology is an improvement on the schools’ existing capability to
solve the problem, and if users perceive that the new technology actually solves the
problem. The RAND report points out, “For technologies to be used effectively, they
need buy-in from the school staff (and sometimes the community) and appropriate
resources to work with the technology, and the technology needs to be seen as effective
so that people continue to use it.”245 If perceived as useful, staff are more likely to
sacrifice their limited time from other responsibilities to embrace and utilize the system.
A similar assessment is necessary if the system is purposed for student use, such as a
school tip line. If students perceive that the proposed technology meets their needs, they
will be more likely to use it.
(2) Ease-of-Use
Ease-of-use is the second element in user satisfaction and considers factors related
to user interface, frequency of use, and training. Evaluating the warning technology to
determine if it is intuitive will help teams understand user interface. Teams can check to
see if it is distinct from other systems, if the nomenclature of the system conflicts with
existing terminology, and if the terminology makes sense. It is also prudent to determine
if the introduction of the new warning system creates confusion or if it clashes with other
systems or competing capabilities. For instance, if teams want to add a new safety tip line
for their students, they will need to consider how other existing tip lines, such as a suicide
hotline, a bullying reporting platform, or local mental health call center, would interact
with the new tip line. Teams may be able to reduce unnecessary redundancy by
eliminating or combining systems.
The ease of the user interface increases if the system does not require special
knowledge, codes to remember, skills or ability to operate the system. If it does, teams
may develop strategies, such as providing users with quick-reference cards with the
required information. If the system requires any special tools, keys, or equipment to
access or activate the system, users will need to know where those things will be stored
245 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 74.
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and how to access them in a timely manner. Examining the instructions for using the
warning system and associated signage to determine if they are intuitive and easy to
follow will also provide valuable data about user interface. When people are under
extreme stress, like during emergencies, they can have physiological and psychological
reactions such as limited fine motor skills, memory challenges, and a diminished capacity
to perform basic functions.246 Thus, prioritizing the ease-of-use of the technology
becomes important to empower the users of the system to overcome these natural stress
responses in emergencies. With warning systems, it is imperative that designated users
are able to access and use the system with ease.
Frequency of use is also a factor to consider when trying to understand how easy
the system will be for people to use. If a communication or warning system is in use
frequently, the users are more likely to develop competency and speed in their ability to
effectively use the system. If the technology is to be used for infrequent events, recall
becomes a limiting factor, which makes it difficult for people to remember how to use a
system. Another consideration may be how overuse of the system can affect the intended
recipients. For example, if a school uses a mass phone call service to send out regular
educational related phone messages to parents or guardians, (i.e., science fair
announcement, fundraiser reminder, open house invitation, attendance notifications,
parent-teacher conference schedule, etc.), target audiences may become desensitized to
the phone messages due to overuse of the system. When the schools need to use the same
system to send an important, time-sensitive emergency message to parents, they may
already be in the habit of ignoring those calls, which can result in missed or delayed
critical notification.
Training gives users experience with the technology, and aids in developing a sort
of muscle memory to help overcome those natural responses to extreme stress. Training
also helps identify problems, so that problems can be resolved or averted. Teams will
need to determine the type and frequency of training necessary to equip the intended
users properly. Identifying who needs the training, how often they need to receive
246 These reactions to extreme stress are sometimes called fight, flight, or freeze responses.
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training, and who will provide the training is also part of the assessment. Another
important variable involves the time involved and the cost of initial and ongoing training,
and how staff turnover affects training requirements. Teams will need to clarify to what
extent the school can maintain this time investment for training; they may even consider
developing simple and sustainable training tools to aid in the ease-of-use of the
technology. Quality training directly affects ease-of-use. Likewise, ease-of-use directly
affects user satisfaction and is a key to the sustainability of a school communication or
warning system.
(3) Perceived Acceptability
Perceived acceptability, the final element in the user satisfaction dimension,
challenges teams to focus on the system’s impact on the schools’ culture and climate. The
K-12 EOP Guide calls school climate “a range of campus conditions, including safety,
relationships and engagement, and the environment, that may influence student learning
and well-being.”247 School climate and culture include factors related to the technology
being psychologically and socially acceptable to the school and community stakeholders,
including parents and guardians. The RAND report points out that school climate is a
possible barrier to the adoption of school safety technologies. Panelists interviewed
expressed worry about making “schools feel too fortified or unwelcoming.”248 If it is
psychologically acceptable, the warning system will foster psychological safety due to
the addition of an enhanced or improved safety capability. The system will promote
confidence in the schools’ ability to protect students and staff. If socially acceptable, it
will be aesthetically neutral or positive, the appearance of the system will decrease fear,
and it will not make schools look like a dangerous place or feel like a jail. The physical
existence of the system will reduce anxiety rather than raise anxiety. The warning system
will support a positive, welcoming, and safe school culture and climate with minimal to
no controversy. The chosen technology will add to a positive school climate rather than
take away from it.
247 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 53. 248 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 30.
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c. Human Domain Summary
The human domain of the evaluation helps teams assess if the technology will be
acceptable to the humans interacting with it, which directly affects feasibility and
sustainability of the technology in the school system. In the Organization domain, teams
will evaluate the technology in light of how compatible it is with both the unique school
system and its community partner organizations.
4. Organization
The dimensions in the Organization domain include structure and environment.
The focus is on the interaction between the warning system technology and the unique
structure and environment of the schools, school districts, and their community partners’
organizational attributes and leadership. The RAND report believes, “To employ
technologies effectively and ethically, schools need to consider whether and how
particular technologies could feasibly be implemented and used to successfully address
the specific issue related to student safety for which solutions are needed.”249 The report
went on to identify a common theme among participants in their research and stated that
school safety technology “solutions must be context specific.”250 The fourth domain,
Organization, considers how the technology works within the unique structure and
environment of the organizations it will serve. Table 10 explains the Organization
domain.
249 Schwartz et al., xvi. 250 Schwartz et al., 32.
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Table 10. Organization Domain Expanded.
DOMAIN #4: ORGANIZATION
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
#4: O
RG
AN
IZA
TIO
N
A. Structure
i. School Attributes: • Characteristics & Demographics: • Physical Configuration: • Personnel Capacity: • Existing Systems: • Acceptable to Leadership:
ii. Community Partner Attributes: • Impact on Daily Operations/Personnel: • Existing Systems: • Response Capabilities & Philosophies: • Acceptable to Leadership:
B. Environment
i. Management and Ownership: • Internal: • External (Proprietary Limitations):
ii. Financial Impact: • Initial Costs: • Ongoing Costs: • Funding Sources:
iii. Aligns with Regulations: • Codes or Licensing: • Polices/Statutes/Laws: • Labor Relations: • Risk Management:
a. Structure
The organizational structure dimension speaks specifically to whether the warning
system is compatible with the various attributes and characteristics of the school and its
community partners.
(1) School Attributes
Examining school attributes is the first half of the structure dimension and helps
teams look at the relationship between the warning system technology and its
compatibility with the schools’ unique characteristics and demographics, physical
106
configuration, and existing school safety systems. A related factor is the extent to which
the schools’ leadership accept and support the warning system.
The characteristics and demographics of schools refer to the type of school and
the population who will interact with the warning system. For example, the warning
system needs of K-12 schools are quite different than higher education environments,
where college students carry cell phones around campus and to classes versus elementary
school students who may not even own cell phones. Likewise, the developmental level of
the students served is also a consideration, since warning messages may require age-
appropriate terminology.
The physical configuration and layout of the campus can reduce or enhance the
efficacy of a given warning technology. The planning teams should consider what factors
reduce or enhance the system’s use in different environments, especially if it is to be
implemented in numerous schools in a district that requires interoperability. Another
consideration is if the technology can be equally effective in self-contained buildings
versus sprawling campuses with unconnected buildings, or in schools with outside locker
halls, corridors, or walkways between buildings. The building construction, utility
services, and geographic terrain can affect communications reliability, connectivity, and
compatibility. If the technology requires cellular service, it is prudent to determine if the
cell carrier actually provides service to all the schools in the district, if coverage is
consistent in all areas inside and outside the school, and if the system requires
stakeholders to subscribe to a particular cell carrier that may only serve a particular
geographic area. If the warning technology is on buses, geographic factors may affect
suitability.
Understanding the schools’ capacity to dedicate personnel for ongoing
implementation of the warning system technology is essential. Some larger school
districts have their own dedicated safety staff, security departments, campus police, or
even dispatch centers. For many small- to medium-size school districts that do not have
any of those resources, safety responsibilities are included in existing school job
descriptions and roles. Schools are fast-paced, dynamic environments. School personnel
are responsible for managing many tasks simultaneously. These factors are important to
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consider because some warning systems require constant, daily, and ongoing monitoring,
management, and operations. Others are self-monitoring. The RAND report discusses
video surveillance technologies used in schools and points out that “rarely is live video
under constant monitoring.”251 It is not common for schools to have the capacity to
dedicate staff to continual monitoring of school safety technologies. If monitoring is
required, the teams will need to learn if it needs internal or external monitoring, or both.
For internal monitoring, a determination is necessary on the number of personnel
required to monitor the system. For some, it may be feasible for dedicated personnel at
the district level to monitor schools for the entire district to cut down on personnel
requirements. If external monitoring is an option, the districts may be able to utilize the
existing alarm company that monitors their fire alarm system, or use an affordable vendor
to handle system monitoring and management. Understanding and being realistic about
these factors will help school teams select the right warning system that is sustainable
over the long run.
The compatibility of the warning system technology with the schools’ existing
safety systems also needs to be considered. Is it compatible with existing radio
frequencies, software platforms, repeaters, antennas, digital versus analog equipment,
etc.? Assessment will help to determine if adding the system brings in necessary or
unnecessary redundancy with existing systems, or if it causes confusion or brings clarity.
For example, if one department in a school uses a different type of two-way radio than
another group of staff members use, interoperability may become an issue. Having two
different channels or frequencies on which to broadcast an emergency announcement is
another step that requires extra time and may be overlooked during a stressful situation. If
one school in a district uses a particular tip line app, and the feeder school uses something
different, this can confuse students as they transfer to new schools, or cause confusion for
parents who have children in more than one school. Mass phone notification systems
used by some schools in a district, and not by others can also create unnecessary
redundancy, confusion, and expense. Teams can evaluate the warning system against
251 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 24.
108
existing safety systems to streamline use, and to ensure consistency, ease-of-use, and
overall compatibility.
Another variable to evaluate is whether the warning system technology is
acceptable to school leadership. For a warning system technology to be feasible and
sustainable in a school, it is imperative that it be embraced by the school principal and
supported by district leadership. School principals are responsible for the daily
implementation of the technology. If they understand and believe in the purpose and
functionality for their school, they are more likely to devote the necessary time and
resources needed for ongoing implementation of the system. If it demands an
unreasonable amount of their time or resources, they are less likely to support its ongoing
implementation. The RAND report found this to be the case for school administrators
with regard to social media monitoring for safety purposes, “Panelists bemoaned the time
required to effectively monitor social media…and were skeptical that school
administrators could realistically add this to their already long list of responsibilities.”252
It is also important for it to be acceptable to and supported by district administrators and
school board members. If the technology aligns with the school district’s safety and
emergency response philosophies, with little to no controversy, it is more likely to be
accepted. If it is perceived as a fad, a band-aid, or temporary solution, or if it is supported
by one-time grant funding that is not sustainable long-term, leadership may be resistant.
If specific school-district people are championing the project and they leave the school’s
employment, support for the system may fizzle out if district leadership does not maintain
interest. If district leadership has a clear vision for the technology, they are more likely to
provide the initial and ongoing support necessary for sustainability.
(2) Community Partner Attributes
Community partner attributes is the second evaluation variable teams will
consider in the structure dimension. When selecting warning system technologies,
schools must consider its potential interaction with local law enforcement, fire, 911
dispatch centers, and other partners. The K-12 EOP Guide says that when developing
252 Schwartz et al., 28.
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emergency plans, “It is critical that schools work with their district staff and community
partners—local emergency management staff, first responders, and public and mental
health officials—during the planning process[…] This collaboration makes more
resources available and helps to ensure the seamless integration of all responders.”253
The JHU report agrees and says, “schools should coordinate with first responders when
making decisions about communications technology to ensure the systems can
interoperate or integrate as needed.”254 Factors to consider include the compatibility with
and impact on community partners’ daily operations and personnel, interaction with
existing communications systems, compatibility with response capabilities and
philosophies, and to what extent the system is acceptable to leadership.
As teams evaluate how a school warning system can impact the daily operations
of its community partners, it would be prudent to learn if the community partners will
need increased capabilities, such as additional staff, equipment, or training for effective
and reliable operation of the proposed warning system. If the system is highly vulnerable
to false alarms, and the emergency response agency uses a significant number of
volunteers who have to leave their day jobs whenever an alarm sounds, it can negatively
impact local business owners. The geographic distance between the first-responder
agency and the school can also affect decision making regarding warning systems,
particularly when response time capabilities are a factor. The RAND study explains what
their stakeholders said about this factor, “a key distinction in thinking about school safety
is police response times—roughly under five minutes (i.e., urban districts) and over five
minutes (i.e., suburban/rural districts)—since response times dictate how self-sufficient
schools need to be in response to crisis situations such as cases of active shooters.”255
The number and availability of first responders may be another factor.
Another consideration involves the impact on 911 centers, how the warning
system may affect their daily operations, and the capacity of their staff to handle
253 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing, 5.
254 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, ES–7.
255 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 19.
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emergency calls. If the warning system is for mass notification to parents or guardians,
the message may result in 911 centers being flooded with unnecessary phone calls.
Differences can result in local versus regional 911 dispatch center capabilities. In a rural
area, a local 911 center may have greater familiarity with the local schools and more
availability for ongoing training on new warning systems but fewer staff. A larger,
regional center may have more personnel and capacity to meet demands created by a new
warning system, but familiarity with local schools may be more limited and may require
additional and ongoing training for dispatchers. Moreover, if the warning system requires
a phone, radio frequency, or alarm company interface with the 911 center, evaluation is
necessary to determine if their existing systems and technologies are compatible to
receive the notification.
The community partners’ existing communication and warning systems are also a
primary consideration. Interoperability challenges or opportunities, necessary or
unnecessary redundancies, or radio frequency incompatibility may occur. Learning if the
new system will cause interference with community partners’ existing warning systems is
another part of the evaluation. If a local jurisdiction uses the same mass notification
system as the school, the system may experience competing demands, and the local
phone company’s capacity to deliver calls may be overloaded if more than one agency
needs to use it at the same time. If sharing radio frequencies, the volume of radio traffic
may overload the system’s capacity during emergencies involving the school and
community partners.
Another part of the evaluation asks if the schools’ new warning systems are
acceptable to the leadership of the emergency response agencies that serve the schools
during emergencies. The schools or districts should involve their community partners in
decisions to adopt a new system, as well as decisions regarding system operations, the
placement of warning devices, wording of emergency messages, and critical response
procedures. The teams should explore if the system creates a need to modify standard
operating procedures for response to school emergencies or if it represents a conflict with
existing response philosophies. They will also need to consider how the new
communication or warning technology will positively or negatively affect the schools’
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relationship with their community partners. It may lead to increased contact, greater
collaboration, joint training or drills, and additional emergency planning, which are all
positive outcomes. On the other hand, it may put a strain on limited personnel resources.
If the schools’ community partners are in support of the increased warning system
capability, and help participate in the evaluation and decision-making process, the
likelihood of effectiveness and sustainability increases.
b. Environment
The organizational environment dimension refers to factors related to who owns
the system, the financial impact on the school and community partners, and if the
warning system aligns with regulations.
(1) Management and Ownership
The first evaluation variable in the environment dimension examines potential
keys to sustainability based on who controls, manages, and holds the ownership of
different aspects of the warning system. Teams will need to look very carefully at factors
involving proprietary limitations that keep ownership of certain components of the
system with a vendor. For example, some warning systems require a combination of
wiring and hardware installed in the school and software installed on school computers.
In this case, teams must determine who owns which components of the system. If
software updates are required for the system to remain operational, the school may be at
the mercy of a vendor’s schedule and rising prices. Several factors need to be explored,
such as if restrictions or limitations exist when desiring to change vendors, if the
hardware is proprietary, or if it can be used with another vendor’s software. It may be
helpful to determine if safeguards are in place in case the vendor discontinues the product
line, goes out of business, or sells the business. The RAND report brings up student
tracking technologies and identifies concerns, such as “cost and the internal IT capacity
to successfully host and maintain such a tracking system.”256 If the schools will manage
256 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 26.
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and control the software, they will need to determine if they have the internal capacity to
maintain and service the software to ensure long-term operational sustainability.
(2) Financial Impact
Financial impact is the second element in the environment dimension. Schools
and their community partners must consider the initial costs and ongoing financial impact
of the warning system technology on their organizations. The JHU lists several cost
considerations, “acquisition, exceptional installation costs (e.g., special wiring),
personnel, training, maintenance, consumables, energy and energy dependency (e.g.,
backup power), software licenses, system integration (e.g., cameras integrated with alarm
systems).” Costs may also be associated with ongoing contracts. The report also suggests
exploring “low-cost alternatives.”257
Teams should also consider the financial impact on the community partner
agencies and their ability or willingness to contribute to initial or ongoing expenses of the
proposed warning system. There may be a potential for a shared financial investment in
the system through grant funding opportunities that are available to fire or law
enforcement agencies. The RAND report notes a potential barrier to the adoption of
school safety technologies as, “Cost to adopt reduces funds for more important safety
initiatives.” The report continues, “Almost half of the stakeholders interviewed cited cost
issues and specifically how investing in [school safety] technology reduced other
resources that they felt were more important.”258
Ways to mitigate the financial impact may arise. The RAND report asserts,
“Complex systems of alerts can cost districts millions of dollars; the use of existing
infrastructure (e.g., telephone lines, local fire alarms) to send out alarms can eliminate
fees and costs while also being reliable.”259 If necessary, schools can consider the
feasibility of starting with just the minimum, basic system features necessary to
257 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 2–18. 258 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 30. 259 Schwartz et al., 14.
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accomplish the primary goal, and work to utilize existing systems and resources where
applicable. They may consider making a plan to phase in enhanced capabilities over time
as additional funding is allocated or available.
Schools can consider a variety of funding sources, such as grants, bonds,
partnerships with community partners, insurance companies, teachers’ unions, booster
clubs, and parent organizations. Even allocating funds from their own school or district
budget may be possible. When existing school systems, like phone or intercom systems,
are past their useful life, some schools use it as an opportunity to explore new systems
with greater capacity to provide warning. The JHU report indicates that after serious and
horrific school incidents occur, districts often make quick spending decisions, by saying
that funding opportunities often have a “short spending window. This curbs the ability of
districts to conduct even limited evaluation and frequently results in the purchase of
technology to demonstrate a strong commitment to ‘doing something’.”260 Some vendors
provide free or discounted initial use of their systems to try to hook schools into using
their products. Others will look for schools to pilot their products. Many open-source,
free software and cell phone applications are available for pushing out communications.
While some warning systems, like statewide school safety tip lines, may be state funded
and free to all schools in the state, they may still represent costs to the school. These costs
include those associated with the time involved in training personnel, marketing
expenses, system management, and maintenance costs. All these are important
considerations, and teams would be wise to be cautious and have the foresight to
anticipate costs involved in free technologies.
Examining ongoing costs loops back to information identified in the technology
domain section of the evaluation. It includes costs related to equipment, contracts, and
personnel. Ongoing vendor contracts can be a barrier for some schools. Monthly or
annual user or subscription fees can be based on student enrollment, number of schools
participating, amount of phone numbers to which a warning message will be sent, or may
be based on actual frequency or volume of system use. Personnel costs will also need to
260 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, ES–12.
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be factored into the ongoing costs. If the system requires constant monitoring, personnel
costs may be much higher than automated, self-monitoring systems. If monitoring can be
done by an alarm company the school already uses to monitor other systems, the ongoing
fees may become more manageable. Teams will need to understand the costs associated
with annual inspections, replacement of batteries or system components, ongoing
maintenance, software upgrade fees, etc. The anticipated life of the system should also be
taken into account. The RAND report explains:
With respect to specific costs, one issue that was brought up was the up-front cost of acquiring technology. But the more frequently raised concern was about the recurring cost to staff to maintain the technology. A superintendent told us: [I]n the last 6-7 years there’s been a lot of funding to enhance safety technology resources but unfortunately tech changes so quickly and so there’s been no funding to keep those projects updated and funding has actually dropped. There are many districts who’ve placed tech in the buildings they can no longer afford to keep maintained.261
Decision-making teams will need to carefully consider both initial and ongoing
costs and evaluate their ability to fulfill the associated financial commitment over time.
(3) Aligns with Regulations
The final evaluation variable in the environment dimension assists teams in
ascertaining to what extent the technology aligns with a variety of potential regulations.
Teams will need to do research to learn if any codes regulate components of the warning
system. Communication systems that use two-way radios and associated elements, such
as narrowband versus wideband frequency spectrum, and repeater licenses are regulated
by the FCC. The FCC “regulates…communications by radio, television, wire, satellite,
and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. territories.”262 The
International Building Code (IBC), followed by most U.S. jurisdictions, may be a
regulatory body for the technology under consideration. Building codes may affect
decisions about school warning systems, such as fire protection systems, electrical and
mechanical systems, rooftop structures like antennas, as well as earthquake recording
261 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 31. 262 “The FCC’s Mission,” Federal Communications Commission, accessed January 27, 2018, https://
www.fcc.gov/about/overview.
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instrumentation.263 The NFPA is in alignment with building codes and regulates many
aspects of school warning systems.264
Another area of regulation to evaluate is if any local, state, or federal laws,
statutes, or policies govern the use of warning systems in K-12 schools. Some state
education agencies mandate a certain type of warning system used in schools in their
state. Schools also have to consider if the use of the warning system will be compatible
with privacy laws, such as the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and special education laws, such as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).265 The RAND report cites “violation of student
privacy” as a potential “barrier to adoption” when it comes to school safety
technologies.266 The JHU report also cites privacy concerns as a factor to consider, by
warning, “Some badge alarms are being designed using radio frequency identification
(RFID) technology. The built-in RFID tag broadcasts the location of the badge alarm.
With this tracking capability, schools may encounter privacy issues.”267 Schools must
also ascertain if the warning system aligns with local, state, or national school safety or
emergency response guidelines, protocols, or practices.
Labor relations and equity issues may also be factors to consider. Anticipating if
any real or perceived equity issues surround the warning technology is an important
exercise. If the technology is implemented for one school in a district and not another,
263 “2015 International Building Code,” International Code Council, accessed January 27, 2018,
https://codes.iccsafe.org/public/document/toc/542/. 264 “National Fire Protection Association,” accessed January 27, 2018, https://www.nfpa.org/. 265 “FERPA General Guidance for Students,” Department of Education, accessed January 27, 2018,
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/students.html; “Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Apply to an Elementary or Secondary School?,” Department of Health and Human Services, 2008, https://www.hhs. gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/513/does-hipaa-apply-to-an-elementary-school/index.html; “Information and Technical Assistance on the Americans with Disabilities Act,” Americans with Disabilities Act, accessed January 27, 2018, https://www.ada.gov/; “IDEA,” Department of Education, Laws & Guidance/ Special Education & Rehabilitative Services, last modified December 9, 2017, https://www2.ed.gov/pol icy/speced/guid/idea/idea2004.html.
266 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 28. 267 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 4–33.
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staff, parents, or students in other schools may assume that they are at greater risk of
danger by not having the warning system in their schools. If the system includes an opt-in
or opt-out policy, it will be important to evaluate if that negatively or positively affects
labor relations. For instance, a cell phone-based warning system may only be accessible
to staff who own cell phones and may be perceived as inequitable by those staff members
who do not own cell phones. In some cases, staff members may require a financial
reimbursement from the school for using their personal cell phones as part of the school’s
warning system. If staff do use their personal cell phones for a school safety purpose,
they may lose some personal privacy if a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request is
made. The JHU report says, “If the district is using a BYOD [bring your own device]
policy, there must be a means to communicate with users who do not have a smartphone
or cannot use the services provided by the district because of the type of cellphone or
calling plan they use.”268 Teams will need to collaborate with their agencies’ unions to
ensure that they approve of any proposed system.
Risk management is also a consideration. Decision-making teams would be wise
to evaluate in what ways the proposed warning system could decrease or increase risk to
its stakeholders, and determine if it is acceptable to the school district’s insurance
company. Some insurance companies provide discounted premium rates to school
districts that implement certain safety and security technologies that reduce risk.
c. Organization Domain Summary
The organization domain of the evaluation helps teams assess if the technology is
compatible with the school and community partners’ organizational structure and
environmental factors. It places value on the extent to which the leadership of both the
school and community partners accepts the warning system. It also equips teams with
data to help evaluate the net benefits of the system, which is the final domain in this K-12
School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
268 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 5–28.
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5. Net Benefits
Net benefits are the fifth and final domain and are the culmination of the
investigative effort. The Net Benefits domain takes the team through an evaluative
feedback loop by revisiting findings from the prior four domains and analyzing them
against the dimensions of effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability.
This part of the analysis looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the technology
revealed by other domains. In the HOT-Fit model, the net benefits are expected to,
“capture the balance of positive and negative impacts on the user.”269 This part of the
analysis is also an objective with this new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool, but
this school tool goes further by looking less at the balance of positives and negatives, and
more at how they impact the effectiveness of the technology to meet the teams’
established goals and purpose, as identified in the foundational domain of the evaluation
process. Some limitations may still be acceptable if the strengths of the technology allow
the teams to accomplish their established purpose in a way that is feasible and sustainable
for the schools and their community partners.
Working through the Net Benefits domain of the evaluation process equips teams
with accurate, detailed, and realistic data. Teams can use this data to inform their
selection of communication or warning system technologies that meet the needs of their
unique school or district. Table 11 explains the Net Benefits domain.
269 Mohd et al., 391.
118
Table 11. Net Benefits Domain Expanded.
DOMAIN #5: NET BENEFITS
Dimensions Evaluation Variables
#5: N
ET B
ENEF
ITS
A. Effective i. Solves Problem: ii. Accomplishes Purpose:
iii. Reliable:
B. Feasible & Sustainable i. Operationally: ii. Financially:
C. Notes & Findings
a. Effective
The effective dimension examines a review of the previously collected data to
determine if the technology will solve the identified problems, accomplish the stated
purpose, and is a reliable technology.
(1) Solves Problem
The first evaluation variable involves the originally identified problem. It directs
teams to return to the beginning and focus their attention on the problem they set out to
solve in the Foundation domain. Next, by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the
Technology identified in the information quality, system quality, and service quality
portions of the evaluation, teams can determine if the technology can improve the
schools’ capability to solve the identified problems.
(2) Accomplishes Purpose
The second evaluation variable informing the effective dimension also looks back
at the Foundation domain to determine if the technology can fulfill the requirements set
out in the purpose statement the teams established at the advent of the evaluative process.
Examining the findings in the Human and Organizational domains also helps to inform
the extent to which the technology aligns with and can accomplish the teams’ purpose.
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(3) Reliable
Reliability is the third evaluation variable in the effective dimension. It involves
looking critically at the findings in the Technology domain to determine if the technology
is reliable in light of the strengths and limitations of the organization. For example, if the
mechanics of the technology require the use of cellular service, and the schools have
known cell service dead spots, the technology will not be reliable. The organization-
related strengths and limitations are revealed in the risk and capabilities assessment
portion of the Foundation domain. Findings related to the reliability of the technology
itself are most notably found in the system quality and service quality sections of the
Technology domain. Together, these assessments will assist the teams in identifying the
depth of reliability of the warning system technology.
If the technology passes the “effective” test, solving the problem, accomplishing
the purpose, and being reliable, it then requires further evaluation for feasibility and
sustainability.
b. Feasible and Sustainable
To evaluate the feasibility and sustainability dimensions in the Net Benefits
domain, the teams assess the technology for operational and financial compatibility with
the school and its community partners.
(1) Operationally
The first evaluation variable, operational feasibility, leads teams to draw heavily
upon the data collected in the Human and Organizational domains to ascertain if the
system is operationally viable and sustainable for the schools, districts, and their
community partners. Revisiting the Human domain will help to inform the likelihood of
the users’ acceptance of and ongoing implementation of the technology. Findings in the
Organization domain will reveal the technology’s compatibility with the identified
organizational attributes. Together, these variables inform the degree to which the
technology is operationally feasible, which increases its expected sustainability.
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(2) Financially
Financial feasibility is the second evaluation variable and is critically linked to the
ability of the organization to sustain the implementation of the technology over the long
run. The teams can refer to the Technology domain for an evaluation of the technical
support and maintenance requirements. The Organization domain will have findings
related to initial and ongoing costs involved with the technology. The literature review
makes it clear that schools have financial challenges and barriers related to implementing
and sustaining school safety technologies feasibly over time. Decision-making teams
must carefully study and consider the costs involved in maintaining equipment, ongoing
vendor fees, and replacing aging equipment to help teams conduct an honest and realistic
assessment of their ability to sustain the technology financially over the long run.
c. Summary of Net Benefits Domain
The net benefits emerge by uncovering to what extent the technology, used within
the constraints of the unique school system, is effective to solve the identified problem,
accomplish the established purpose, and is reliable both mechanically and operationally.
It also ascertains the degree to which the technology is an operationally and financially
feasible and sustainable solution for the schools and their community partners.
D. CONCLUSION
The literature review in Chapter I exposed a gap in the research in how to
evaluate school communication and warning system technologies. In response, the
researcher designed this new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool using the HOT-Fit
framework as the structural basis for the school tool, yet focused the evaluation variables
on the unique environment of K-12 schools. The next chapter applies the school tool to
two specific warning technologies, the school fire alarm system and the researcher’s
conceptual lockdown notification system. It also serves as a demonstration on how to use
the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
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IV. K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL APPLIED
The previous chapter presented an evaluation tool that K-12 school decision-
making teams can use for assessing communication and warning system technologies.
This chapter tests the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool on a school fire alarm
system and on the researcher’s conceptual lockdown notification system. The goal is to
test the school tool and learn to what extent the new school tool can help answer the two
thesis questions:
• To what extent can the school “fire alarm system” (for emergencies
involving fire and evacuation) be a model for a “lockdown notification
system” for emergencies involving violence and requiring lockdown?
• What factors should K-12 school decision-makers and their law
enforcement partners consider when evaluating and implementing warning
systems that notify both school occupants and law enforcement of an
imminent threat of violence at school?
To accomplish this goal, an attempt is first made to validate the efficacy of the
fire alarm system that already exists in schools by applying it to the new K-12 School
HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool template. Next, the conceptual lockdown notification system is
applied to the school tool to identify its strengths and weaknesses and evaluate its
suitability to address the problem involving the speed of active shooter attacks and the
need for quick notification to lockdown. A template for the K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool can be found in Appendix B.
Applying the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool to the fire alarm system and
conceptual lockdown notification system also serves as an example on how to use the
school tool.
124
A. THE FIRE ALARM SYSTEM APPLIED TO THE SCHOOL TOOL
This assessment of a fire alarm system is based on a fictitious school, and is not
necessarily representative of the conditions at all schools.
K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
To evaluate communication & warning system technologies for use in K-12 schools Name of Technology: _____Fire Alarm System________________ Evaluation Date: 3/9/18
Name of School/District: ________________________________________________________________
Evaluation Team: ______________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Establish an investigative team. Begin with the Foundation domain to establish goals. Proceed to evaluate Technologies to meet the goals. Anticipate the impact on Humans. Determine compatibility with the Organizations. Finally, analyze information in all domains to determine the Net Benefits and select a technology.
Domain #1: FOUNDATION
The foundational step in the technology evaluation process requires gaining a clear understanding of the need, “the why” for a new communication or warning capability. The Foundation domain is the starting place for the evaluation because it provides a focus for the evaluation of the subsequent domains. It includes identifying the problem(s), articulating purpose, recognizing motivating factors, and defining parameters. As decision-making teams work through the Foundation domain they will establish a clear basis and scope for a technology search. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#1: F
OU
ND
AT
ION
A. Problem i. Risk Assessment: School fires, need for quick notification of school occupants, quick evacuation, and quick notification to fire department. Some of our schools have built in sprinkler systems; others do not.
ii. Capabilities Assessment: The school district has reliable landline phone service, but experiences power outages several times a year due to winter storms. Some schools have radio frequency barriers due to dense construction. Most have some cell service dead spots. Schools have established evacuation routes and assembly areas, and practice fire drills once per month. Schools with multiple floors have portable evacuation devices for assisting people with limited mobility down the stairs. Fire departments are located within 5 miles of each school.
B. Purpose i. Goals: Primary goal is to prevent injuries and loss of life due to fire, smoke, and cascading effects. Secondary goal is to prevent building damage.
ii. Objectives: The schools will have an accessible and reliable warning system that automatically and immediately notifies all school occupants to evacuate at the first sign of smoke or fire; and simultaneously notifies the fire department.
C. Motivation i. Internal Motivations: Concern about school fires and the school’s inability to quickly warn everyone in the school to evacuate once fire or smoke is detected.
ii. External Motivations: History of deadly school fires. Fire Chief is unhappy
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with new building codes that do not require the installation of sprinklers. D. Parameters i. Priorities: Non-negotiable: Primary focus is to alert occupants and summon
aid. Desirable: Secondary focus are the emergency control functions such as sprinklers to suppress the fire and door closures to stop the spread of fire.
ii. Limitations: Financial limitations for initial equipment and installation; once installed there are manageable maintenance fees. Staff and parent/guardian buy-in due to perceptions of scaring children when the alarm sounds.
iii. Scope: The scope is limited to alerting occupants and summoning aid. An expanded scope would include features to extinguish a fire, such as sprinkler systems, fire extinguishers, and fire blankets.
Domain #2: TECHNOLOGY
In the next step, teams will evaluate technological solutions to determine if the technology can solve the identified problems and meet the team’s stated goals. The second domain, Technology, requires a detailed analysis of the information quality, system quality, and service quality dimensions of the technology against the criteria established in the Foundation domain. Working through the evaluative process in the Technology domain will help teams narrow the selection of communication and warning system technologies to those that have the capacity to meet their needs. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
EC
HN
OL
OG
Y A. Information
Quality i. Activation Attributes:
• Type of activation: The system is activated through the use of red pull-stations that are mounted on the walls, fixed in place, and hardwired throughout the school. They are always functioning.
• Accessibility: Initiating devices are accessible, easy to locate, and can be activated from many places in the school. A key is not needed to access the areas in which the pull-stations are located. A code is not necessary to activate the pull-stations. There is an adequate number of activation devices to serve the size and layout of each school facility. The setup of the system does not place limits on the number of users. It is available to anyone at any time. It does not depend on a school administrator, staff member or security personnel being on site, available, monitoring anything, or at a certain desk, computer, or office to activate the system.
• Times & Locations: It is accessible to activate when school is in session and during non-school hours for athletics, afterschool programs, and visitors using the facility on weekends. The system is not dependent upon the time of day or night that someone is in the building; it does not favor school being in or out of session. It is constant, 24/7/365.
ii. Notification Attributes: • Type of notification: The system provides notification to all building
occupants through the use of horn-strobes that are hardwired, fixed in place, and mounted on walls and ceilings throughout the school. The horn-strobes provide both a visual strobe-light notification and an audible horn that sounds like an alarm.
• Reach of notification: The horn-strobes are located throughout the school building so that it can be heard and seen in all rooms. They are
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also placed on the exterior of the school buildings to alert those in the immediate vicinity of the school buildings. They are always there and always functioning.
• Speed of notification is instant. When a pull-station is pulled, the system is activated and causes all of the horn-strobes inside and outside the school to instantly light and sound the alarm. Building occupants do not need to access any special device or tool in order to hear and see the warning.
iii. Information Completeness: • Content & Accuracy: The information is always presented as an
alarm/horn sound and a visual strobe-light. There is no verbal or textual content with the basic horn-strobe notification device. It does not depend on any person to make a warning announcement.
• Length: The horn-strobe continues to sound and light indefinitely until the system is silenced at the fire alarm control panel.
• Intelligibility is impacted only by the volume of the horn-strobes. The volume can be adjusted based on the environment in which they are located. A music room, gymnasium, kitchen, or industrial arts classroom may require a higher volume than a traditional classroom or office environment.
Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
EC
HN
OL
OG
Y (c
ontin
ued)
B. System Quality
• System Mechanics: The operating platform consists of a conventional fire alarm control panel mounted to the wall and drawing a minimal amount of electricity. The communications panel is connected to two dedicated landline phone numbers. When a pull-station is activated, it immediately sends a signal to the Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP) which simultaneously activates the notification appliances so students and staff hear the alarm, see the strobe, and evacuate the building. At the same time, the communication panel notifies the alarm company to alert the fire department. Installation is extensive as it requires running wire throughout the building from the control panel to all of the pull-stations and horn-strobes. There are no ongoing installation requirements. The system’s operation does not depend on a school administrator, staff member, or security personnel being on site, or at a certain desk, computer, or office to activate the system or send notification to school occupants. It does require an alarm company that provides 24/7/365 monitoring for the notification to the fire department.
i. System Reliability: The conventional fire alarm control panel has a fixed power supply and battery backup for power redundancy. Every component of the system is hard wired. It includes two designated landline phone lines for alarm company/fire department notification. Points of failure include aging or faulty equipment or compromised wiring, however there are built in notifications for supervisory and trouble conditions to alert the school of such conditions. This system is highly reliable. There are built-in redundancies. Performance is not compromised by power outages, internet outages, WiFi outages or limitations due to service capacity, cell service outages or limitations due to building construction, or radio frequency connectivity. It does not rely on people failing to charge or change batteries, and does not have to be taken off-line for updates.
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ii. Security Attributes: • System Defense is strong. The fire alarm control panel is affixed to the
wall typically in a school office or in a school’s mechanical room. If in a mechanical room, the door to that room is locked and not accessible to the general school population. If in an office, the door to the control panel itself is closed and locked. Locating it in an office area that is staffed by school personnel is also a protective measure. The system is not internet based which precludes it from cyberattacks such as viruses, hacking, and disabling remotely.
• Activation Protections: There is a significant risk of intentional false alarms due to the accessibility of the pull-stations. For intentional false alarms, activation protections include protective covers with deterrent alarms on all pull-stations. For unintentional false alarms, guards are installed over the pull-stations located in high-risk areas such as gymnasiums. For further activation protection, the school can educate staff and students on the appropriate use of pull-stations and consistently implement consequences for intentional false alarms. Schools that have security cameras in the building can use the cameras as a deterrent and for investigative purposes after an intentional false alarm activation. (If smoke and heat detectors are included in the assessment, the risk of false alarms increase and require additional mitigation measures.) Another risk involves the possibility of using the fire pull-stations nefariously to draw unsuspecting students and staff into the line of gunfire during an active shooter attack on schools. Additionally, it is possible that fire alarm sensors could inadvertently set off the fire alarm due to smoke from gunfire during an active shooter attack, causing students and staff to evacuate into the line of gunfire.
iii. System Flexibility: • Compatible: The fire alarm system can be implemented consistently in
all schools. It is compatible with any school construction or configuration. The control panel, pull-stations, and horn-strobes require minimal physical space. The existing phone lines can be leveraged for the alarm company notification.
• Customizable: The school can select different types of control panels (addressable or conventional), different looks of pull-stations and horn-strobes based on their needs. There is also the ability to select the alarm/horn tones, to silence the system, or cancel an alert during known false alarms. Can contact the alarm company in advance of a drill in order to practice response without activating the dispatch of fire personnel.
• Expandable/Scalable: The system is flexible to accommodate a different number of pull-stations based on the size and configuration of the school campus. It can be expanded to include various detectors, and a large variety of emergency control functions.
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Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
EC
HN
OL
OG
Y (c
ontin
ued)
C. Service Quality
i. Lifespan: Age, wear, and planned obsolescence can impact the replacement or upgrade interval for components of a fire alarm system. The basic conventional fire alarm control panels that work on the zone system have a long shelf life. Since they are not internet based, they do not require software updates, and frequent advances in technology do not impact their relevance or shelf-life. Schools that get more advanced fire alarm systems like the IP based addressable fire alarm systems that also use IP for the phone notification components, are at risk for a shorter lifespan due to planned obsolescence, and may require more frequent component replacement or upgrades. Pull-stations in a conventional system are not at risk for wearing out due to frequent use, but may be at risk for component breakdown due to lack of use. This can be mitigated by rotating the use of pull-stations for starting planned fire drills. Horn-strobes are used more often than pull-stations since detectors in the fire alarm system have frequent problems causing false alarms. This use may cause more frequent replacement of horn-strobes. In general, the lifespan of a well-maintained, conventional fire alarm system in a K-12 school is manageable. Conditions at some schools, including the climate, dust, and extreme weather conditions may cause components to corrode or degrade at a faster pace, requiring more frequent inspections, maintenance, and replacement of components. The more complex the system, the more frequent replacement and upgrades.
ii. Technical Support & Maintenance: A basic, conventional fire alarm system does not have proprietary limitations. Parts such as pull-stations, horn-strobes, circuits, relays, wiring, and backup batteries are not patent-protected, and are readily available from a variety of vendors. Some school districts have maintenance personnel on staff who have the expertise to perform the necessary maintenance on most components of a fire alarm system. Others may have to contract with a licensed electrician or other service vendor. Fire alarm systems are low maintenance, serviceable warning systems, generally requiring only an annual and some semi-annual inspection and maintenance.
Domain #3: HUMAN
In the Human domain, teams will assess, and to a certain extent, anticipate, how the technology interfaces with the people designated to use the warning systems. The Human domain comprises an evaluation related to system use and user satisfaction to inform the likelihood of the users’ acceptance of and ongoing implementation of the technology. A realistic assessment of the Human domain will help teams determine if the technology is a feasible and sustainable solution for those designated to use the system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#3: H
UM
AN
A. System Use
i. Impact on Daily Routines: The impact on school personnel is minimal to none. The impact on school flow and schedules is minimal to none. The pull-stations are there if needed and do not require staff intervention or modifications to daily schedules or routines for system functionality. If the school has a high volume of false alarms, the impact on the learning environment will be greater.
ii. Parameters for Use: The fire alarm system is designed for use when there is fire or smoke in the building. Pull-stations are located in common areas and near exits and can be activated by anyone in the school, adult or student. The parameters for use are clear.
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iii. Perceived Support: Because the parameters for use are clear, staff are supported by peers and by management when activating a pull-station to warn school occupants of smoke or fire and initiate an evacuation. Staff are taught to err on the side of caution. If it is a false alarm, it can be counted as the required monthly fire drill. Perceived support is high.
B. User Satisfaction
i. Perceived Usefulness: The fire alarm system solves the problem of quick notification of fire or smoke. It is an improvement to the public address system because anyone can activate it at any time, from many locations throughout the school. Staff perceptions of usefulness is high.
ii. Ease-of-Use: Training needed on how to activate the fire alarm system is minimal to none because the pull-stations are highly intuitive. The red color makes them easy to see and distinguish from other warning system technologies. The plain-language ‘push’ or ‘lift and pull’ text on the pull-stations makes them simple to use, even while under stress. They do not require any tools, keys, or special codes to know or remember in order to activate the warning system. All of these factors are critical since the frequency of use is low. The system is easy to use.
iii. Perceived Acceptability: The fire alarm system supports a positive and welcoming environment. The presence of fire pull-stations do not promote fear or anxiety, but fosters confidence in the school’s ability to protect students from school fires. Perceived acceptability is high.
Domain #4: ORGANIZATION
In the fourth domain, Organization, teams evaluate the technology in light of its compatibility with the organizations it is to serve. The focus is on the interaction between the warning system technology and the unique structure and environment of the school, school district, and their community partners’ organizational attributes. It places value on to what extent the leadership of the school and their community partners accept the warning system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#4: O
RG
AN
IZA
TIO
N A. Structure i. School Attributes: A fire alarm system is compatible with any type of
physical configuration, however, the size and layout of the school will affect the number of initiating and notification appliances required. Since the system is self-monitoring, it does not require dedicated school personnel for daily operations. Since the system has minimal impact on the ongoing operations of the school, it is acceptable to leadership.
ii. Community Partner Attributes: Fire department personnel are supportive of the system since it helps to prevent/reduce injuries, loss of life, and property damage. They are also accepting of it because it meets fire codes and because it reduces risk for their fire fighters. The biggest negative concern involves the frequency of false alarms. It does not conflict with their communications systems. The alarm company notifies the 911 dispatch center, who notifies the fire department.
B. Environment i. Management & Ownership: All hardware, including the fire alarm control panel, initiating appliances, and notification appliances, including all wiring, belong to the school district. There is no vendor ownership associated with the system.
ii. Financial Impact: The fire alarm system is not susceptible to changing software, technologies, vendors, philosophies, or budget constraints. Once
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installed, it is constant. There is a small monthly fee for monitoring by an alarm company, and modest inspection fees.
iii. Aligns with Regulations: The system is set up to comply with all NFPA fire codes and building codes regulations. The school complies with the state’s required fire drills. There are no conflicts between the fire alarm system and FERPA/HIPPA laws or labor relations.
Domain #5: NET BENEFITS
Net Benefits is the fifth and final domain in the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool and embodies the culmination of the investigative effort. The Net Benefits domain creates an evaluative feedback loop by revisiting findings from the prior four domains and analyzing them against the dimensions of effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability. The Net Benefits emerge by uncovering to what extent the technology, used within the constraints of the unique school system, is effective to solve the identified problem, accomplish the established purpose, and is reliable both mechanically and operationally. It also ascertains the degree to which the technology is an operationally and financially feasible and sustainable solution for the school and its community partners. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#5: N
ET
BE
NEF
ITS A. Effective i. Solves Problem: The fire alarm system solves the problem of
early warning for emergencies involving smoke or fire at school.
ii. Accomplishes Purpose: The fire alarm system accomplishes the goal of preventing injuries and loss of life due to fire, smoke, and cascading effects.
iii. Reliable: The fire alarm system has built in redundancies to overcome potential weaknesses in reliability, such as backup battery power and two dedicated landline phone lines.
B. Feasible & Sustainable i. Financially: Once installed, the fire alarm system has minimal and reasonable ongoing maintenance costs and alarm monitoring fees. These fees are feasible for schools and sustainable over time.
ii. Operationally: Because the fire alarm system has such a minimal impact on the daily routine and operations of the school and its community partners, it is operationally feasible and sustainable.
C. Notes & Findings Use this area to record other concerns, limitations, opportunities, benefits, and findings related to the technology.
The most notable limitations or weaknesses include: • The possibility of and impacts of false alarms. Schools
can implement strategies to mitigate these risks. • The initial financial outlay due to system acquisition
and installation. • Another risk involves the possibility of using the fire
pull-stations nefariously to draw unsuspecting students and staff into the line of gunfire during an active shooter attack on schools.
• Additionally, it is possible that fire alarm sensors could inadvertently set off the fire alarm due to smoke from gunfire during an active shooter attack, causing students and staff to evacuate into the line of gunfire.
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B. THE CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM APPLIED TO THE SCHOOL TOOL
This assessment of the conceptual lockdown notification is based on a fictitious
school, and is not necessarily representative of the conditions at all schools.
K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool
To evaluate communication & warning system technologies for use in K-12 schools
Name of Technology: Conceptual Lockdown Notification System_ Evaluation Date: 3/11/18
Evaluation Team: ___________________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Establish an investigative team. Begin with the Foundation domain to establish goals. Proceed to evaluate Technologies to meet the goals. Anticipate the impact on Humans. Determine compatibility with the Organizations. Finally, analyze information in all domains to determine the Net Benefits and select a technology.
Domain #1: FOUNDATION
Overview: The foundational step in the technology evaluation process requires gaining a clear understanding of the need, “the why” for a new communication or warning capability. The Foundation domain is the starting place for the evaluation because it provides a focus for the evaluation of the subsequent domains. It includes identifying the Problem(s), articulating Purpose, recognizing Motivating factors, and defining Parameters. As decision-making teams work through the Foundation domain they will establish a clear basis and scope for a technology search. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#1: F
OU
ND
ATI
ON
A. Problem i. Risk Assessment: We are concerned about active shooter attacks on schools and understand that taking quick action to warn everyone in the school is essential since most attacks end within minutes. A secondary problem is the need to quickly notify law enforcement of actual or imminent violence at school.
ii. Capabilities Assessment: Our public address system is only accessible from the public address system in the front office. This limits our ability to quickly notify school occupants to lockdown when an intruder is first identified in the school. The school district has reliable landline phone service, but experiences power outages several times a year due to winter storms. Some schools have radio frequency barriers due to dense construction. Most have some cell service dead spots.
B. Purpose i. Goals: Our goal is to prevent injuries and loss of life during active shooter attacks on K-12 schools.
ii. Objectives: To obtain an accessible, reliable, and sustainable warning system that automatically and immediately notifies all school occupants to take protective measures at the first sign of danger, and simultaneously notifies local law enforcement.
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C. Motivation i. Internal Motivations: We are concerned about intruders and violence, and have identified a deficiency in our school’s ability to quickly warn students and staff.
ii. External Motivations: For a limited time, a vendor is offering schools to try their cell phone warning app for free for three years. We are receiving pressure from the vendor, local law enforcement, and from a member of the school board to sign up for this technology.
D. Parameters i. Priorities: Priority is on the need for easy access for anyone to quickly warn all school occupants and local law enforcement of violence at the school. Tier one priorities have activation devices in common areas and offices; tier two priorities have activation devices also in classrooms.
ii. Limitations: Financial sustainability is a non-negotiable since we continually face budget shortages. Ease-of-use is also necessary due to our high mobility rate and staff turnover. Staff and parent buy-in are also desirable so that our schools are perceived as safe, welcoming places, rather than dangerous places.
iii. Scope: Our focus is on violence on the school campus, when school is in session and during after school events. It does not include situations involving violence on school buses, during field trips, or at athletic events off school campus.
Domain #2: TECHNOLOGY Overview: In the next step, teams will evaluate technological solutions to determine if the technology can solve the identified problems and meet the team’s stated goals. The second domain, Technology, requires a detailed analysis of the Information Quality, System Quality, and Service Quality dimensions of the technology against the criteria established in the Foundation domain. Working through the evaluative process in the Technology domain will help teams narrow the selection of communication and warning system technologies to those that have the capacity to meet their needs. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
ECH
NO
LOG
Y
A. Information Quality
i. Activation Attributes: • Type of Activation: The system is activated through the use of blue
lockdown push-button devices that are mounted on the walls, fixed in place, and hardwired throughout the school. Once installed, they are always functioning.
• Accessibility of Activation: The lockdown buttons will be accessible, easy to locate, and can be activated from many places in the school. A key is not needed to access the areas in which the lockdown push-buttons will be located, neither are codes necessary to activate the lockdown buttons. There will be an adequate number of activation devices to serve the size and layout of the school facility. The system is scalable to allow for locating activation devices in common areas first, and then classrooms as finances permit. The setup of the system does not place limits on the number of users. It will available to anyone at any time. It does not depend on a school administrator, staff member or security personnel being on site, available, monitoring anything, or at a certain desk, computer, or office to activate the system.
• Times & Locations: The system can be activated when school is in session and during non-school hours for athletics, afterschool programs, and visitors using the facility on weekends. The system is not dependent upon the time
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of day or night that someone is in the building; it does not favor school being in or out of session. It is constant, 24/7/365. A drawback is that people using the school after hours may not have keys to lockable rooms, inhibiting their ability to lockdown if needed.
ii. Notification Attributes: • Type of Notification: The system will provide notification to all building
occupants through the use of speaker-strobes that will be hardwired, fixed in place, and mounted on walls and ceilings throughout the school. The speaker-strobes provide both a visual strobe light notification and an audible alert tone and pre-recorded message that the school can choose.
• Reach of Notification: The speaker-strobes will be located throughout the school building so that the message can be heard and seen in all rooms. They will also be placed on the exterior of the school buildings to alert those in the immediate vicinity of the school buildings. The speaker-strobes will always be there and always functioning.
• Speed of Notification: Speed of notification is instant. When a lockdown button is pushed, the system instantly causes all of the speaker-strobes inside and outside the school to illuminate, and play the pre-recorded alert tone and message. Building occupants will not need to access any special device or tool in order to hear and see the warning.
iii. Information Completeness: • Message Content & Accuracy: Because the alert tone and message is pre-
recorded, it is always consistent and accurate. It does not depend on any person to make a warning announcement when they are under extreme stress. The visual strobe is separate than the fire alarm strobe and only illuminates in conjunction with the lockdown announcement. Schools will need to work with their law enforcement partners to devise a message that is consistent with their specific lockdown terminology and response protocols.
• Message Length: The pre-recorded message can be set to play multiple times in a row. The school will need guidance from law enforcement on whether they want the strobe to turn off when the recording turns off or if they would like the strobe to stay lit until the system is reset. There are pros and cons to consider.
Message Intelligibility: The volume of the speaker-strobes can be adjusted based on the environment in which they are located. A music room, gymnasium, kitchen, or industrial arts classroom may require a higher volume than a traditional classroom or office environment. These will need to be tested during drills for adequate volume.
Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
ECH
NO
LOG
Y
(con
tinue
d)
B. System Quality
i. System Mechanics: The operating platform consists of a conventional Lockdown Notification Control Panel (LNCP) mounted to the wall and drawing a minimal amount of electricity. The system will share a Communications Panel, connected to two dedicated landline phone numbers, with the fire alarm system. When a lockdown button is activated, it immediately sends a signal to the lockdown notification control panel which simultaneously activates the speaker-strobes so students and staff hear the alert tone and recorded message, see the strobe, and lockdown. At the same time, the communication panel notifies the alarm company to alert the police department. Installation is extensive as it requires running wire throughout the building from the control panel to all of the lockdown buttons and
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speaker-strobes. There are no ongoing installation requirements, unless the school phases in additional lockdown buttons in classrooms or other locations. The system’s operation does not depend on a school administrator, staff member, or security personnel being on site, or at a certain desk, computer, or office to activate the system or send notification to school occupants. It does, however, require an alarm company that provides 24/7/365 monitoring for the notification to the police department.
ii. System Reliability: The lockdown notification control panel will have a fixed power supply and battery backup for power redundancy. Every component of the system is hard wired. It includes two designated landline phone lines for alarm company/police department notification. Points of failure include aging or faulty equipment or compromised wiring, however there are built in notifications for supervisory and trouble conditions to alert the school of such conditions. This system is highly reliable. There are built-in redundancies. Performance is not compromised by power outages, internet outages, WiFi outages or limitations due to service capacity, cell service outages or limitations due to building construction, or radio frequency connectivity. It does not rely on people failing to charge or change batteries, and does not have to be taken off-line for updates. Using the system during regularly scheduled drills can also verify the system’s reliability and provide the added benefit of exercising the system.
iii. Security Attributes: • System Defense: System Defense is strong. The Lockdown Notification
Control Panel will be affixed to the wall in either a school office or in a mechanical room in the school. If in a mechanical room, the door to that room will be locked and not accessible to the general school population. If in an office, the door to the control panel itself will be closed and locked. Locating it in an office area that is staffed by school personnel is also a protective measure. Even so, if someone gained access to these protected areas, they could take measures to nefariously disable the system. The system is not internet based which precludes it from cyberattacks such as viruses, hacking, and disabling remotely.
• Activation Protections: There is a significant risk of intentional false alarms due to the accessibility of the lockdown buttons and because of the need to draw attention to the system for training purposes. Strategies for dealing with and curtailing intentional and unintentional false alarms consists of protective covers & guards on lockdown buttons, educating staff and students on the appropriate use of the devices, consistent implementation of consequences, cameras, and signage. Cameras can provide a deterrent and be an investigative asset. Signage will include instructions for use as well as consequences for misuse.
iv. System Flexibility: • Compatible: The lockdown notification system can be implemented
consistently in all schools. It is compatible with any school configuration, although the complexity of installation may be affected by the building construction. The control panel, lockdown buttons, and speaker-strobes require minimal physical space. The existing phone lines can be used for the alarm company notification.
• Customizable: The pre-recorded message can be customized to match the
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school’s lockdown terminology and procedures. This is important because there are a variety of different lockdown terminologies in use around the U.S. The repeat interval and length of time the message plays is also customizable. The system is independent of the school public address system, so the school can provide further instructions using the public address system after the recorded message stops broadcasting. Further investigation is necessary to determine if the public address system can override the lockdown system’s announcement.
• Expandable/Scalable: The system is expandable and scalable. The system is flexible to accommodate a different number of lockdown buttons based on the size and configuration of the school campus. It can be expanded so that lockdown push-buttons are placed in classrooms as funds become available.
Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
ECH
NO
LOG
Y (c
ontin
ued)
C. Service Quality
i. Lifespan: The conventional lockdown notification control panel that works on the zone system (like the fire alarm control panel) has a long shelf life. Since it is not internet based, it does not require software updates, and frequent advances in technology do not impact their relevance or shelf-life. Lockdown buttons in a conventional system are not at risk for wearing out due to frequent use, but may be at risk for component breakdown due to lack of use. This can be mitigated by rotating the use of lockdown buttons for planned lockdown drills.
ii. Technical Support & Maintenance: A conventional lockdown notification control panel is not affected by proprietary limitations, since it will essentially be a repurposed fire alarm control panel. Parts such as lockdown buttons, speaker-strobes, circuits, relays, wiring, and backup batteries are not patent protected, and are readily available from a variety of vendors. The text on the lockdown button will need to be customized, but will not be patented. Some school districts have maintenance personnel on staff who have the expertise to perform the necessary maintenance on most components of a lockdown notification system. Others may have to contract with a licensed electrician. Like fire alarm systems, a lockdown notification system is a low maintenance, serviceable warning system, generally requiring only an annual inspection and maintenance.
Domain #3: HUMAN
Overview: In the Human domain, teams will assess, and to a certain extent, anticipate, how the technology interfaces with the people designated to use the warning systems. The Human domain comprises an evaluation related to System Use and User Satisfaction to inform the likelihood of the users’ acceptance of and ongoing implementation of the technology. A realistic assessment of the Human domain will help teams determine if the technology is a feasible and sustainable solution for those designated to use the system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#3: H
UM
AN
A. System Use i. Impact on Daily Routines: The impact on school personnel is minimal to none. The impact on school flow and schedules is minimal to none. The lockdown buttons are there if needed and do not require staff intervention or modifications to daily schedules or routines for system functionality. If the school has a high volume of false alarms, the impact will be greater.
ii. Parameters for Use: The lockdown notification system is designed for use when there is an intruder in the building, or in emergencies involving imminent or actual violence, such as a shooting or stabbing. Lockdown buttons will be located
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in common areas (away from fire pull-stations) and in designated offices, and potentially in classrooms so they can be used by anyone in the school: staff, students, or visitors. The parameters for use will be taught, and posted on signage near the lockdown buttons.
iii. Perceived Support: Staff will need to be educated on the purpose and function of the lockdown notification system to help understand the type of situations the lockdown notification system will be useful for. The school leadership will have to be clear about the parameters for use, and assure staff that they will be supported for taking the initiative to use the lockdown button to warn school occupants of violence and initiate a lockdown. Staff should be taught the implications of pushing the button and also to err on the side of caution.
B. User Satisfaction
i. Perceived Usefulness: The lockdown notification system has the potential to help solve the problem of quick notification of the threat of violence at school. It is an improvement to the public address system because anyone can activate it at any time, from many locations throughout the school. Once stakeholders are educated about the system and the benefits, the perception of usefulness is likely to be high.
ii. Ease-of-Use: After stakeholders understand the purpose and parameters for use, training on how to activate the lockdown notification system will be minimal because the lockdown buttons are highly intuitive. The blue color makes them easily distinguishable from fire alarm pull-stations. The plain-language ‘push’ text on the lockdown button makes them simple to use, even while under stress. They do not require any tools, keys, or special codes to access or remember in order to activate the warning system. All of these factors are critical since the frequency of use is expected to be extremely low. The system is easy to use.
iii. Perceived Acceptability: The lockdown notification system supports a positive and welcoming environment. If the school is deliberate to communicate the value of this system as improving the school’s capability to make quicker warning announcements, the presence of lockdown buttons should not promote fear or anxiety, rather it is likely to foster confidence in the school’s ability to protect students and staff should an attempted violent attack occur. Anticipated perceived acceptability is high.
Domain #4: ORGANIZATION
Overview: In the fourth domain, Organization, teams evaluate the technology in light of its compatibility with the organizations it is to serve. The focus is on the interaction between the warning system technology and the unique Structure and Environment of the school, school district, and their community partners’ organizational attributes. It places value on to what extent the leadership of the school and their community partners accept the warning system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#4: O
RG
AN
IZA
TIO
N
A. Structure i. School Attributes: A lockdown notification system is compatible with many types of school physical configurations, however, the size and layout will affect the number of lockdown buttons and speaker-strobes required. Since the system is self-monitoring, it does not require dedicated school personnel for daily operations. Since the system is effective and has minimal impact on the ongoing operations of the school, it will likely be acceptable to leadership.
ii. Community Partner Attributes: Law enforcement is likely to be supportive of the system since it helps to prevent/reduce injuries and loss of life, and may possibly even make their response to an emergency involving school violence more manageable, especially if more people are locked down. The biggest
137
negative concern involves the potential for pranks/false alarms. It does not conflict with their communications systems. The alarm company notifies the 911-dispatch center, who notifies the police department. Training for dispatchers on the meaning of the lockdown activation will be necessary so they will know how to dispatch law enforcement.
B. Environment i. Management & Ownership: All hardware, including the lockdown notification control panel, lockdown buttons, and speaker-strobes, including all wiring, will belong to the school district. The blue lockdown buttons are already readily available from many vendors and the text on the devices is customizable. Once parts are purchased by the school district, there will be no vendor ownership associated with the system.
ii. Financial Impact: The biggest financial impact regarding the lockdown notification system will involve the initial expenses associated with equipment purchases and installation costs. Ongoing expenses are minimal and manageable. There is a small monthly fee for monitoring by the alarm company, which can be combined with the fire alarm system monitoring, and modest annual inspection fees.
iii. Aligns with Regulations: The system will be set up to comply with all NFPA fire codes and building codes regulations. The school will comply with the state’s required lockdown drills. There are no conflicts with the lockdown notification system and FERPA/HIPPA laws and no anticipated labor relation issues.
Domain #5: NET BENEFITS
Net Benefits is the fifth and final domain in the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool and embodies the culmination of the investigative effort. The Net Benefits domain creates an evaluative feedback loop by revisiting findings from the prior four domains and analyzing them against the dimensions of effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability. The Net Benefits emerge by uncovering to what extent the technology, used within the constraints of the unique school system, is effective to solve the identified problem, accomplish the established purpose, and is reliable both mechanically and operationally. It also ascertains the degree to which the technology is an operationally and financially feasible and sustainable solution for the school and its community partners. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#5: N
ET B
ENEF
ITS
A. Effective
i. Solves Problem: The lockdown notification system has the potential to help solve the problem of early warning for emergencies involving violence at school, such as active shooter attacks. It may even help to solve the problem to a greater extent if lockdown push-buttons are placed in offices, common areas, and in classrooms. The system will most likely be an improvement on the school’s existing warning capabilities.
ii. Accomplishes Purpose: By obtaining an accessible warning system to automatically and immediately notify all school occupants to take protective measures at the first sign of danger, the school has a better chance of getting staff and students locked down quicker, and potentially even reducing injuries and loss of life.
iii. Reliable: The lockdown notification system has built in redundancies to overcome potential weaknesses in reliability, such as backup battery power and two dedicated landline phone lines. It is not reliant upon cell service, internet,
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radio frequencies, or a human continually monitoring the system. It is a highly reliable warning system.
B. Feasible & Sustainable
i. Operationally: Because the lockdown notification system is intuitive and easy to use, and because it is expected to have such a minimal impact on the daily routines of the people in the school or on the actual operations of the school, it should have a high degree of operational feasibility and sustainability. This could be negatively impacted by pranks/false alarms, causing serious consequences for the school, community, and law enforcement partners.
ii. Financially: If the school is able to procure the funds for the initial purchase and installation of the lockdown notification system, it will be a sustainable warning system. The system requires only minimal and reasonable ongoing maintenance costs and alarm monitoring fees. These fees are feasible for schools and sustainable over time.
C. Notes & Findings
Use this area to record other concerns, limitations, opportunities, benefits, and findings related to the technology.
The most notable limitations, implementation considerations, and possible unintended consequences include: • The initial financial outlay due to system acquisition and installation. • Schools will need to customize the system to match their unique emergency
response protocols and philosophies, such as decisions about the parameters for use, the terminology on the lockdown activation devices, signage, and the prerecorded message.
• The possibility of and impacts of false alarms. Schools can implement strategies to mitigate these risks.
• Keeping the fire alarm pull-stations and the lockdown push-buttons separate is essential. This will help reduce the chance of the wrong alarm activated. Either system accidentally activated for the opposite hazard or threat could increase injuries and loss of life.
• If a lockdown button is activated and an immediate announcement is played, not only will all students and staff be alerted, but the perpetrator will also be alerted. This could cause him/her to cancel the attack, compel him/her to speed up the attack, or it might not change his/her plans at all.
• If a student or staff member sees someone in the school with a gun, and decides to stop and push a lockdown-button in order to notify everyone in the school, that delay may place the student or staff member in greater risk of danger because it will take them longer to get to safety themselves. Clear guidelines, expectations, and associated training can help mitigate this risk.
C. CONCLUSION
By applying the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool first to the fire alarm
system, and then to the conceptual lockdown notification system, it was learned that the
school tool is useful for evaluating both existing and prospective warning system
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technologies. Using the school tool in this manner also helped to identify some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual lockdown notification system.
Furthermore, while the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool’s stated purpose is
for evaluating communication and warning system technologies, with minor
modifications, it may also be useful for evaluating other school safety and security
technologies. In the Foundation domain, all the same dimensions (problem, purpose,
motivation, and parameters) and their corresponding evaluation variables are relevant to
taking the first step in evaluating safety and security technologies.
In the Technology domain, the system quality and service quality dimensions will
also be necessary evaluative categories to help a team determine if the technology meets
their established purpose. The information quality dimension, however, corresponds
specifically to communication and warning system technologies, and therefore, may not
be helpful criteria to use for evaluating other school safety and security technologies.
The dimensions in the Human domain (system use and user satisfaction) and
those in the Organization domain (structure and environment) are very specific to the K-
12 school environment and may also be appropriate for evaluating other safety and
security technologies.
For each of the dimension’s evaluation variables, especially in the Technology
domain, customized criteria will need to be established associated with the problem the
team is trying to solve, the identified purpose, and the proposed technological solution.
Each dimension in the Net Benefits domain (effective, feasible, and sustainable)
along with their corresponding evaluation variables are fitting criteria for the final step of
the evaluative process. Going through the exercise of weighing the positives and
negatives in light of how they affect the effectiveness of the technology will help to
determine to what extent the technology can accomplish the established goals and
purpose. Using this evaluation framework tool can assist school decision-making teams
to make informed decisions when selecting school safety and security technologies for
their unique schools.
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The next chapter presents case study data from six schools or school districts
already using some form of a warning system for violence modeled in some way after the
fire alarm system. The data is presented according to the five domains in the K-12 School
HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
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V. CASE STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter applied the fire alarm system and the conceptual lockdown
notification system to the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. This chapter
focuses on the case study interviews conducted on schools using a warning system with
police pull-stations or lockdown push-buttons that are in some ways similar to the fire
alarm system. First, the need for this research is reviewed and the case study research
design is described. Next, the case study data is exhibited according to the domains in the
new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. Finally, an analysis of the commonalities of
the case study subject’s warning systems with the conceptual lockdown notification
system are presented.
The literature review identified some existing case studies on K-12 schools with
lockdown notification systems using cell phone applications, pendant necklaces, and
computer warning systems. These case studies also exposed many significant
shortcomings of these systems. The literature review revealed a gap in the research since
the researcher was not able to find any case studies on schools using a lockdown
notification system with lockdown push-buttons or police pull-stations similar to the fire
alarm system. This chapter describes data from six explanatory, program implementation
case studies to fill that gap.270
For a school to be included in the case study portion of the research, it had to have
a warning system for violent emergencies that had components modeled similarly after
the fire alarm notification system, specifically, lockdown or police pull-stations or push-
buttons. Although this was the primary focus, some of the case study subjects
incorporated other forms of warning technology, such as cell phone apps and pendant
emergency alert buttons, into their lockdown systems. Moreover, the case studies were
270 Yin describes explanatory case studies as “a case study whose purpose is to explain how or why
some condition came to be.” He describes descriptive case studies as “a case study whose purpose is to describe a phenomenon (the “case”) in its real-world context.” Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 238.
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limited in scope to alert and warning technologies specifically applied in the K-12 school
environment rather than those used in institutions of higher education.
To find schools using these warning systems, the researcher reached out to a
colleague from the National Institute of Justice who pointed to the new RAND and JHU
school safety studies for research on these systems.271 These studies provided great data
for the development of the evaluation framework tool, but did not produce information
that met the case study research criteria. School safety colleagues were also consulted at
the state and national levels, police and fire partners were questioned, the internet was
searched for news articles, and vendors were contacted. These sources proved most
fruitful in identifying subjects who met the case study research criteria.
When schools were found to have this push-button or pull-station technology, an
attempt was made to contact them by phone or email. Some did not respond to requests to
participate. For the six that did, the project was explained and phone appointments set up
with an employee of the school system who had a working knowledge of their warning
system. The six subjects include entire districts and individual schools. In some cases, it
was also possible to speak with someone from the school or district’s corresponding law
enforcement agency who also had experience with the school warning system.272 To
protect the case study participant’s identities, they are identified by the term “subjects”
rather than school names or letter or number identifiers. Subjects are also referred to as
“he/she” or “him/her.” These measures help to minimize the risk of the data revealing the
specific schools participating in the study.
The researcher proceeded to conduct partially structured, qualitative phone
interviews using questions pre-approved by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) to see what could be learned about how these systems work in the
271 Schwartz et al., Role of Technology; Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology.
272 For every person agreeing to participate in the study, a consent form was emailed that described the project and explained that the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) had waived the requirement for a consent form for this research project, but the researcher provides it anyway to help with understanding the process. All interviews were done over the telephone and began by reiterating the confidential and anonymous nature of the interviews as described in the consent form, and explained that a coding system was in use to protect against disclosure of identifying information of school or personnel participating in the research.
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K-12 school environment. The focus was on three items: first, what factors influenced the
selection of different applications of these warning systems, next, what conditions limited
or enhanced a school’s ability to implement the systems successfully, and finally, how
the warning system solved the problem of timely and early warning for emergencies
involving violence at school.
During the phone interviews, the researcher maintained a conversational tone and
exploratory frame of mind. The interviews were not recorded. Careful notes were taken,
impressions documented, and additional questions related to the main topic were asked as
new discoveries or information emerged.273
Some limitations include that some subjects were part of their school or district
when the system was first installed and implemented, and had a greater sense of its
evolution. Others came on after the system was already in use and did not have answers
to several questions. Most had significant time challenges in their busy school schedules.
The interviews lasted approximately 30–60 minutes. Most did not have time to answer all
the questions. Some agreed to a second phone call interview; others did not. All the
interviews provided helpful insight in the quest to understand the use of these systems in
the K-12 school environment.
B. CASE STUDY DATA
This section organizes the case study data according to the five domains in the
new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool: Foundation, Technology, Human,
Organization, and Net Benefits. At the time of the case study interviews, the school tool
was not complete, and some gaps resulted due to the interview questions not addressing
every dimension of the school tool.
273 Yin provides guidance for this method of interviewing. Yin, Case Study Research Design and
Methods, 73–76.
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1. Foundation
The Foundation domain includes four primary dimensions—problem, purpose,
motivation, and parameters—and several corresponding evaluation variables, as shown in
Table 12.
Table 12. Foundation Domain.
FOUNDATION Dimension Evaluation Variables Problem i. Risk Assessment
ii. Capabilities Assessment Purpose i. Goals
ii. Objectives Motivation i. Internal
ii. External Parameters i. Priorities
ii. Limitations iii. Scope
When conducting the case studies, the Foundation domain had not yet been
identified as part of the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool; nonetheless, some
questions posed are germane to this domain, such as What was the impetus to
acquire/implement such a system? What was the problem you were trying to address? A
number of responses were received. Three subjects expressed concern about active
shooter events; one included concern about firearms. One said that early warning gives
them a much better opportunity to save lives. One simply stated, “It does for police what
fire-pulls do for fire.” Another was in the process of upgrading the phone system and
learned of the inability to make a quick lockdown announcement if a threat occurred in
the front office area. He/she followed the lead of the phone vendor who had a warning
system technology to address this gap. One subject discussed the problem of human error
in extreme stress incidents saying, “we had situations where too many human elements
can go awry due to high stress situations […] pushing a button eliminates the human
element in high level stress situations.” He/she also said that prior to this system being
implemented, not everyone was always notified of emergencies, “We wanted to make
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sure everybody, no matter where you are will know.” This school uses the system to
provide warnings for many hazards and threats, not just violent incidents. It was not
evident that any of these schools had gone through any type of assessment or formal
process to identify their risks and capabilities, establish goals and objectives, understand
their motivation, or establish parameters in selecting a warning system for their schools.
Nor did any indicate they had considered systems other than the one they implemented.
However, these topics would have been pertinent questions to explore.
2. Technology
The Technology domain includes three primary dimensions—information quality,
system quality, and service quality—and several corresponding evaluation variables, as
shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Technology Domain.
TECHNOLOGY Dimension Evaluation Variables Information Quality i. Activation Attributes
ii. Notification Attributes iii. Information Completeness
System Quality i. System Mechanics ii. System Reliability
iii. Security Attributes iv. System Flexibility
Service Quality i. Lifespan ii. Technical Support and Maintenance
a. Information Quality
Information quality, the first dimension in the Technology domain involves
learning about the activation devices, system notification features, and the completeness
of the information put forth by the warning system. Subjects were asked: Can you
describe the devices you use to activate your warning system? Can you describe any
signage associated with your warning system? Can you describe where the alert/warning
goes and the rationale behind those decisions?
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(1) Activation Attributes
Case study participants were eager to describe the actual technology. All have
activation devices affixed to the wall, similar in size and function to fire alarm pull-
stations as shown in Figure 18. Three are bright blue with a red push-button, displaying
the term, LOCKDOWN. Two have light blue pull-stations that display the word,
POLICE. One is a yellow device with a red push-button that shows the words,
EMERGENCY LOCK DOWN. None of these devices require any special tools, codes, or
knowledge to activate, although some are located behind locked doors during non-school
hours, so access is only available to people with a key to those offices or locations. All
these lockdown notification systems incorporate additional activation devices with more
features and complexity than the basic fire alarm system pull-stations or the proposed
conceptual lockdown notification system.
Figure 18. Activation Devices.274
Bright Blue LOCKDOWN Devices: The three subjects with the bright blue
LOCKDOWN push-button devices restrict access to the devices by only placing them in
secure locations, such as the main office, principal’s office, security office, custodial
office, counselor office, and for one subject, in the library. Two of the subjects expressed
great concern about false alarms as the reason for the limited locations. The other subject
did not know the reason. None of these devices has associated signage. Two of the three
274 Source: Photo 1: SafetyProductsWholesale, “SS2439LD-EN STI Blue Indoor/Outdoor Flush”;
Photo 2: “System Alerts Users and Emergency Dispatchers with Real-Time Updates,” SDM, accessed March 21, 2018, https://www.sdmmag.com/articles/90720-system-alerts-users-and-emergency-dispatchers-with-real-time-updates; Photo 3: Courtesy Photo.
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subjects indicated the devices have protective covers. When a lockdown push-button is
activated, it produces an immediate emergency announcement to the entire campus and
simultaneously alerts the alarm company or 911-dispatch center. The system is only
accessible for use during school hours since the activation devices are located in locked
and secured areas of the school.
Several other notable features are used by these three subjects’ schools. For two, a
software program enables the system to send text and email messages to designated
people. For a different combination of two subjects, teachers can enter a 4-digit code into
their classroom phone to activate the system, which bypasses the use of the blue
lockdown device. For one, the principal and gym teacher can activate the system from
their cell phones. Two subjects have expanded activation devices in designated offices in
addition to the lockdown button. One has buttons for Shelter-in-Place, Evacuation, and
Reset; the other has buttons for Lockout, Evacuation, Evacuation Alternate, and Reset.
When pressed, these devices play pre-recorded messages that correspond to the purpose
of the button.
Light Blue POLICE Devices: Two subjects have light blue POLICE pull-
stations located in common areas throughout each school and in the office. They do not
have protective covers, except those in the gym. Associated signage is affixed to the wall
above each pull-station. When a police pull-station is activated, it produces an immediate
pre-recorded emergency announcement to the entire campus and simultaneously alerts
the alarm company. The police pull-stations also generate a text message alert, an email
notification, and a phone message to designated people. Since the pull-stations are
located in multiple areas around the school, they are accessible to people using the school
facilities during non-school hours, as well as when school is in session. These two
schools also provide wireless pendant lanyard push-button devices to designated staff,
such as recess supervisors and gym teachers. For one school, the pendants activate a
silent signal; for the other, it activates both audible and silent notifications.
Yellow EMERGENCY LOCK DOWN Device: The yellow EMERGENCY
LOCK DOWN push-buttons have protective plastic covers and are located throughout
the school in common areas and in classrooms. This subject was the only one with the
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initiating appliances affixed to walls in classrooms. Above the designated lockdown
device are two additional buttons, “OFFICE” and “MEDICAL,” with no protective cover.
No signage is associated with the devices. When the emergency lockdown button is
pressed, it does not send an audible warning message to the school, but it provides a
visual notification, and automatically turns on warning lights in all areas of the school
and locks all doors. It simultaneously alerts the office and signals the location of the
activated device on a designated office computer. It causes the camera feed to appear on
the computer screen so the school administration can view the distress area. The
administration can use this information to determine what type of emergency message to
announce manually over the PA system. Sometimes, the administration simply announces
that teachers must check their email for information.
While these activation devices are readily accessible throughout the school, they
are for use only during school hours since the alert generated by the devices require the
office to be open and staffed. If people using the school after hours for an athletic event
activated one of these push-buttons, it would only cause the lights inside the building to
turn on and the doors to be locked. It would not provide any other type of emergency
notification.
When first installed, the system sent an immediate alert to the local law
enforcement office. It also activated the school’s camera feed so law enforcement could
observe it from their emergency operations center to coordinate their emergency
response. The law enforcement notification function has since been discontinued. It
became unmanageable for the law enforcement agency to have someone constantly
stationed at the computer.
(2) Notification Attributes
Five of the six subjects’ systems immediately notify the alarm company or 911-
dispatch center that a lockdown device has been activated. One school simply calls 911
on its own when a lockdown button is pushed.275
275 More details about the interaction of these systems with their 911-dispatch centers and law
enforcement are found in the Organization Domain section of this chapter.
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Audible Notification: Subjects were asked: Can you describe the audible
message used to alert/warn school occupants, where the alert/warning goes, and the
rationale behind those decisions? All five subjects with the audible notification feature
use their existing public address system speakers for the notification appliance. Four
subjects reported that their audible message can be heard both inside and outside the
school building, even as far as the athletic fields. One subject explained how the vendor
came on a non-school day and played music on the intercom throughout the school to
determine areas that needed additional speaker coverage. Five of the six subjects’
warning systems put out an audible pre-recorded message over the public address system
for all students and staff to hear. Two subjects include an alert or attention-getting tone or
sound to either precede or play along with the message. Table 14 shows the alerts,
message content, length of message, and repeat interval for each subject.
Table 14. Audible Notification Comparison.
Alert Content of Message Length and Repeat Intervals Police Siren Code Red Lockdown Siren and message play simultaneously and
repeats indefinitely until system is turned off
None The building is in lockdown. The authorities have been called.
Messages repeats indefinitely until system is turned off
3 Loud Beeps The emergency alert system has been activated. Police have been notified and are on their way. Please follow our lockdown procedures.
The message repeats three times over a 1-1/2 minute period. Then it is silent.
None Attention all students and staff. This is a Lockdown emergency. Locks, Lights, Out of Sight.
The message repeats three times over a 1-1/2 minute period. Then, it is silent.
Unknown Lockdown, Lockdown, Lockdown Repeats three times then goes silent. Audible Buzzer Only to Office
The office is alerted (by a buzzer) to the type of button pushed: lockdown, medical, or office. Camera footage come up on the office computer screen showing the area where the button was pushed.
Unknown
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Visual Notification. Visual notification features vary among subjects. Subjects
were asked: Can you describe your visual alert system, if there is one? For five of the six
subjects, visual communications play a role in warning school occupants, bus drivers, and
arriving parents. One subject has no visual alert associated with their warning system.
Two subjects use blue strobe lights while two use red lights. One uses a variety of
colored lights based on the type of emergency. Two use marquees or reader boards in
addition to strobes that display the term LOCKDOWN when the system is activated. In
one of these schools, the marquees are mainly at the main entrance; in the other, they are
also located in the gym, auditorium, cafeteria, shop classes, and outside at the stadium. In
two schools, strobes are everywhere inside the building. In three, they are sparsely but
strategically placed: in one school, in the main corridors; in the other two, in high-noise
areas, such as gyms, music rooms, and cafeterias.
The reasons for visual notification varied. One subject with a limited number of
strobes inside the school explained, “These don’t play an important role. Once locked
down, they are no longer necessary.” In contrast, for the school where the audible alert
notifies only the front office, the lights throughout the school are essential. They provide
the only initial alert to school occupants that some type of emergency is underway, until
the administration makes a manual announcement over the public address system.
Three subjects referenced factors related to exterior visual notification; two cited
the need to alert bus drivers; the other offered concerns about parents. One of these said,
“We are in process of getting more for the exterior of the building and to help provide
warning to bus drivers.” Another remarked, “Even bus drivers see the strobe light
flashing. Then bus drivers can call their dispatch and receive instructions.” One of the
three explained the ineffectiveness of strobes on the exterior of the building for
communicating with parents, “We used to just have strobes on entrances but parents were
confused. Parents would see the strobe and just look at it and still try to get into the
building. Now they see the lockdown sign and eventually figure out that they cannot get
in.”
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(3) Information Completeness
Intelligibility: Subjects were asked: Does the system provide the type of
information both the school and law enforcement need for the hazard/threat it was
designed for? Responses related to audible intelligibility varied. One subject reported that
because it is a pre-recorded message, it is always consistent and accurate. Two said that
the volume is loud. Another subject indicated that his/her intercom system allows for
volume change. The subject using the police siren along with the pre-recorded message
admitted that during the original pilot he/she only used the siren, but people were
confused as to whether it was a fire alarm or lockdown alarm, so they added the phrase
“Code Red Lockdown.” The subject added that his/her leadership hopes the noise of the
siren is a deterrent to a bad person: “It’s gonna be loud!” However, he/she did express
concern that the loud siren sound could interfere with responding officers’ ability to
communicate with each other. One of the subjects that does not use an alert reported that
his/her leadership thought about using a police siren in the building, but decided against it
since it could conflict with and distract law enforcement officers arriving on the scene.
Speed of Notification: Subjects were asked, How long does it take in seconds or
minutes for the alert/warning to broadcast once the activation device has been triggered?
Four of the six subjects reported that the audible pre-recorded message notification to the
entire campus occurs immediately once a push-button or pull-station is activated. For one
school, a 3-second delay occurs. For the school without audible notification, the lights
come on immediately; the emergency message follows only when the school
administration makes an announcement on the PA system. When a pull-station or push-
button is activated, five of the six systems notify an alarm company or a 911-dispatch
center. Four provide immediate notification; one has a 3-second delay. One subject
contended, “The amount of lives saved is the amount of time the message goes out and
law enforcement comes.” For the two subjects who have the ability to activate the system
by dialing a 4-digit number on classroom telephones, a 5-second delay occurs in sending
out the message to give the staff member a brief window to cancel the activation if done
unintentionally.
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b. System Quality
The system quality dimension includes system mechanics and the reliability of the
overall system, security attributes, and system flexibility. The system mechanics, along
with the school’s other systems and limitations (power, internet, cell service), can impact
the reliability of the warning system. Reliability also includes redundancies and potential
points of failure. Subjects were asked: Can you describe how the system works behind the
scenes? Is there a control panel, computer console, or operating system that makes it all
work? What have you learned about the reliability of the system? What redundancies are
built in? What are the points of failure?
(1) System Mechanics
The way the warning systems work behind-the-scenes at each school or district
varied. For two subjects, each school has a 4 x 6” box, similar to a burglar alarm, that
identifies when and where trouble is occurring with the system. In addition, a software
dashboard is used by the school administration and law enforcement to enter phone
numbers and email addresses for everyone they want to receive phone, text, and email
notifications. The system utilizes WiFi from the vendor’s server; the vendor manages the
software and the system. The school and law enforcement officials manage the data input
and ongoing upkeep of the data. For one of these subjects, the activating pull-stations are
wireless; for the other, they are hardwired. Both have wireless pendants that connect to
the system through WiFi.
For another two subjects, the system incorporates a wireless RF technology that
requires a license from the FCC. These have a software notification platform with a
computer console and the overall system is tied into the school’s phone system. One of
the two subjects reported that the devices communicate over the same radio bands as its
first responders. No wiring is used. The other did not know how the system worked
behind the scenes and simply described it as a “gray box.”
One subject described its system as a vendor-run computer software system,
“basically a closed circuit TV security system.” The cameras, lights, and activating
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devices are hardwired throughout the school and are tied into the server that runs the
software program.
The final subject said that its system uses a combination of internet protocol (IP)
and contact closures. Each lockdown button has three contacts and each is hardwired to
existing systems: (1) a voice dialer holds a recorded message and uses the school’s
landline phone to notify the alarm company and 911 dispatch center, (2) the intercom PA
system plays the recorded lockdown message, and (3) a software program allows the
subject to input contact information to send text messages and emails to designated
people. This subject said that the software system is not necessary and schools can use
just the other two parts of the system if desired.
(2) System Reliability
System reliability includes factors related to the mechanics of the system in
relationship to the infrastructure of the school, and how the school’s essential services,
such as power, internet connectivity, cell service, and RF capacity, affect system
reliability.
Impact of Power Outages: Power is necessary for the operation of all the
systems represented in the case studies. For one subject, the district’s newer schools have
generators and their older schools do not. For the older schools without backup generator
power, the system would not function in a power outage since it utilizes the school’s
public address system to make the warning announcement. For another subject, the
system’s control panel has a battery backup for 1-1/2 hours. Extended power outages
would affect the system’s operability. For two subjects, all their schools have generators
in case of emergencies. Two subjects did not report on the presence of generators or
backup systems.
Impact of Cell Service: Three of the subjects said they have cell service
limitations affecting the system’s reliability. Of these three, one remarked they do not
have cell coverage in many of their buildings, and two reported they experience poor cell
service or cell issues, which reduces their ability to send the pre-recorded message over
the phone to those designated to receive warnings on their cell phones. However, one
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subject underscored that even with these cell coverage limitations, the text message
notifications still work and reported, “We have some old buildings with solid thick brick
walls and have not had problems with the [text message] system working under these
conditions.” Of the five subjects with systems that make a pre-recorded warning
announcement, none reported that cell service limitations negatively affected the
functionality of their pull-stations or push-buttons to make the pre-recorded warning
announcement. The cell service limitations only affect the auxiliary functions such as
phone notifications. For one subject, principals can activate the system, including the
intercom announcement from their cell phones, as well as gym teachers meeting outside.
Cell service outages, however, would affect the reliability of these activation devices.
Impact of Internet Connectivity: All six subjects are reliant upon the internet for
some components of the system’s functionality. All operate using a software platform.
Five subjects have software systems that depend on an internet connection to the
vendor’s systems. For one subject, the PA system is web-based, so the pre-recorded
message will not broadcast if the internet is down. For another, if its server goes down,
the text message notification will still send to the designated people, but the pre-recorded
message will not broadcast. One subject reported that a catastrophic network failure
would negatively affect the reliability of the system. The email notification components
of these systems will not function if the internet is down. The reliability of WiFi pendant
necklaces and WiFi push-buttons or pull-stations would also be problematic since they
are dependent upon the internet.
RF Limitations: Two of the subjects use hybrid systems that rely on both RF and
software. Disruptions in service due to tower, repeater, or antenna deficiencies, like
during severe storms, could reduce the reliability of the system. One subject reported that
the system at his/her school is RF wireless to the outdoor athletic fields as well.
(3) Security Attributes
Security attributes involve system defense and activation protections. The
placement of the push-buttons and pull-stations directly affect access for intentional or
unintentional activation of the system. Subjects were asked: Can you describe the
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strengths and vulnerabilities of the system in terms of intentional or unintentional
disabling? Have you had any false alarms? How many and in what timeframe? Can you
describe any times you actually used the system for a real emergency?
Three of the six subjects have the activation appliances fixed to the walls in
common areas throughout their schools, which makes them easily accessible to everyone
in the school. One said, “We have never had a student pull the pull-station intentionally.
We train students on the difference between the fire & police pull-stations and explain
that it’s a big deal.” Another subject with pull-stations located throughout their schools
indicated they have had a few false alarms. This subject stated that, “The police take care
of it by having a very firm conversation with the student and parent. This has solved the
problem. There is no disciplinary action.” He/she added that one time a staff member
forgot to notify dispatch in advance of a lockdown drill, and once it was inadvertently
activated due to construction work. Another subject reported that “one student pushed it
nefariously, but it hasn’t really been an issue. We do an investigation and give
consequences. We do the same thing for fire alarms.”
Three subjects limited the placement of the activation appliances to offices and
other locations with restricted access so that only designated staff have access to the
devices. One subject pointed out, however, that, “In nine years, we have never once had
someone pull the fire alarm.” He/she did not know the reasoning behind the decision to
restrict access to the lockdown buttons. In terms of after school activities, the subject
believes that “Most schools don’t address after school areas since principals are not there
to handle a situation.”
Two of the three subjects raised concerns about false alarms, specifically student
pranks. One emphasized that false alarms are a driving force in decisions about the
location of activation devices, and expressed concern that numerous false alarms would
have the effect of people not taking the system seriously. Another subject expressed a
similar fear and reported that she/he decided not to place the devices in common areas
due to the potential for false alarms and concern that false alarms would cause people not
to take the warning seriously. This subject’s district has about 10–15 false fire alarms per
year and he/she claims, “If the lockdown buttons is pushed, there is an immediate and big
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response. They take it very seriously when it does go off—a ‘drop everything’ kind of
event. Everyone goes to the location with lights and sirens. Officers will come very fast
and could cause someone in the community to get hurt.” This same subject also
expressed concern that fire drills are conducted so regularly that the fear is that students
do not take the fire alarm seriously. His/her leadership does not want either of these
things to happen with the lockdown buttons. For this reason, the lockdown buttons are in
limited and protected locations. One subject explained, “These locations are monitored
closely and are not accessible after hours. This restricts unwanted access to the lockdown
button system.” One of these subjects described an actual false alarm at his/her school by
describing an incident involving a staff member who did not know what the lockdown
button was and pushed the button to see what would happen.
Subjects reported that the wireless pendant buttons have a built-in mechanism to
reduce false alarms. They are set up so that users have to press two buttons
simultaneously to activate the system. Even so, one subject had two accidental activations
of the wireless pendant push-buttons. Another had a pendant in a desk drawer
malfunction that activated the system.
Only two subjects reported using the system for a real emergency. One said, “One
time we had something written on a bathroom wall and we put the school in lockdown to
understand it.” The other used the lockdown system during a cougar sighting.
Regarding system defense, one subject believes it would be very difficult to
disable or hack into the system, “the effort would be excessive.” In contrast, another
admitted, “It is a web-based system, and anything can be hacked.” Still another subject
spoke about the WiFi vulnerabilities of his/her system, which would allow people to
break into the system.
(4) System Flexibility
System flexibility has to do with the ability to customize the system to a specific
school environment. Subjects were asked: What factors may reduce or enhance the
system’s use in different school environments? Have you implemented it in the same way
in all of the schools in your district?
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One subject reported consistent implementation in all schools, districtwide.
Another indicated that the number of required pull-stations varies based on building
configuration; some have as few as 20 pull-stations, others as many as 48. In terms of
expansion capabilities, one subject explained that in addition to the pull-stations and
pendant alarms, the system provides access to activate it from desktop and laptop
computers. School personnel can upload all its safety plans into the system, and officers
get access to those plans when the system is activated. The system also can expand to
include video imaging, and cameras can be linked into the system. All five subjects with
the audible notification feature utilize their existing PA system and speakers, some with
minor modifications. One subject’s system even has an added capability that causes all
classroom doors to lock when the lockdown button is pressed, and it activates the
cameras in the school.
c. Service Quality
The service quality dimension involves examining the projected lifespan of the
system, and requirements for technical support and maintenance. Subjects were asked:
Can you describe the quality of service you have received on the warning system?
Five of the six case study subjects have ongoing vendor involvement and
maintenance agreements. One has an existing maintenance contract with a vendor who
does an annual system check on the phones and intercom systems. The subject with the
wired police pull-stations reported that their vendor customer service is outstanding, and
added that “they also help when the principal needs a reminder on how to send out
notifications—this is important because it is easy to forget how to do tasks like this that
are low frequency tasks.” This vendor helps the subject problem-solve false alarms and
assists school staff with downloading employee cell phone information into the system.
The subject with the wireless police pull-stations claims their system requires extremely
low maintenance. The vendor changes the batteries on the pull-stations each year when
they come to perform an annual system test. The school district personnel change the
batteries in the pendants button devices each year. The district also has a contractor come
and test the intercom speakers once per year. Any time during the year that a staff
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member notices an intercom not working properly, he/she puts in a work order and the
district maintenance department handles the repair.
Two subjects use the RF-based system. The subject with a new system has not
needed any maintenance or technical support. The other noted a high level of
involvement with the vendor, over three years, through an annual service contract. The
subject described them as “the best contractors by far we’ve ever had come into our
schools,” and added that the vendor checks the system better than the fire system is
checked. He/she explained that the vendor is constantly checking that the software is up
to date. The vendor tests to ensure all RFs are working properly, checks the multiple
antennas associated with the RFs, and resets things when necessary. The brightness of
their strobes has been an issue and the vendor has replaced the strobes twice.
The subject with the visual notification lights has everything wired throughout the
building. The subject reported, “Nothing can break down unless a wire is severed or a
connection goes bad.” He/she does not have an ongoing vendor relationship or
maintenance plan in place.
3. Human
The Human domain includes two dimensions, system use and user satisfaction, and
several corresponding evaluation variables, as shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Human Domain.
HUMAN Dimension Evaluation Variables System Use i. Impact on Daily Routines
ii. Parameters for Use iii. Perceived Support
User Satisfaction i. Perceived Usefulness ii. Ease-of-Use
iii. Perceived Acceptability
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a. System Use
System use involves evaluating the impact that the technology has on the daily
routines of school staff. It includes the school’s staff’s understanding of how the system
is to be used, and evaluation around their perceptions of support for using the system.
Subjects were asked: Can you describe the impact this system has on the daily operations
of the school and staff? Under what conditions do you allow the use of this system? What
factors impacted those decisions?
(1) Impact on Daily Routines
Five of the six case study subjects incorporate a software system that includes
entering the contact information of personnel who are to receive text, email, or cell phone
notifications when the system is activated. One subject acknowledged difficulty with the
continual data entry requirements due to large turnover of employees and the need to take
out employees no longer working for the district, and entering in the new employees.
She/he noted that law enforcement handles updates for their own staff. Another reported,
“The lockdown push-buttons are just there if needed, and they haven’t been needed yet.”
He/she added that the system requires no extra work for personnel. Other than data entry
requirements, no one cited any negative impact to their daily routines.
(2) Parameters for Use and Perceived Support
The placement of the activation devices impacts the clarity of the parameters for
use of the system. For three of the subjects, anyone can use the system because the
activation devices are in common areas. Two of the schools with activation devices in
common areas of the school utilize signage above the devices to help educate building
occupants on the parameters for using devices. One subject emphasized, “Anyone using
the facility can use the system. Signs are located above the pull-stations to further explain
the purpose.” The signs display these words: “Pull to Dispatch Police.” Another subject
explained that the pull-stations are in hallways by exits, in the library, gym, and in areas
where large numbers of students congregate. He/she even provides a packet of
information about the pull-stations for people using the school during non-school hours
through the school’s building rental process. One subject reported that his/her devices are
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hardwired and fixed in place and said that they cannot be moved or misplaced. He/she
pointed out that they are easy to locate, and always where office staff and administrators
expect they will be.
For the other three subjects who elected to place the activation devices in secured
areas, use is restricted to designated staff at the school. One subject said that office
personnel are taught to “be absolutely sure” before they push the lockdown button, for
instance, if they see someone with a firearm. This school’s leadership teaches to err on
the side of caution. Still, some district personnel are afraid someone will overreact to a
situation and push the button. Another subject conceded, “Teachers want to do things
right. They are worried about making mistakes. We empower our staff to know and
understand they are to use the system—they don’t need permission.” They are instructed
to use the system if they are fearful for their lives. Teachers can activate the system from
their classroom phones.
b. User Satisfaction
User satisfaction depends upon the perceived usefulness and acceptability, and
ease-of-use of the system. Subjects were asked: Can you describe your staff’s perceptions
about the system? Can you describe the training your staff receives to be able to use the
system?
(1) Perceived Usefulness and Acceptability
Three subjects reported minimal negative perceptions about the lockdown system
when first installed. For one, some questions were raised about how the system impacts
existing protocols. Another expressed “a little apprehension.” A third brought up concern
about police having access to cameras and cited “big brother” fears. To address that
concern, they have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that guides use of the
system and requires that law enforcement provide notice to the school district any time
they access the camera system. Some personnel from this school were resistant to using
the system from their classroom phones since it would alert 911. All three subjects
clarified that the concerns were raised by only a small minority, and have since been
resolved.
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Overall, case study subjects reported positive perceptions about the system. One
observed that staff members had expressed some relief for having this added capability.
This subject emphasized that parents like it and are happy they have it, saying, “Wow,
I’m surprised you have this out here.” He/she reported receiving nothing but positive
feedback from parents about the system. Another offered that staff, “love anything that’s
going to make the school safer.” One subject said it provides a sense of security, a better
comfort level, and that staff are positive about it: “they love it.” A fourth subject claimed,
“They feel comfort and feel we are taking measures to ensure their safety at school.” One
simply said they have heard nothing negative. The final subject, one with activation
devices only in secured areas, believes that the system makes front office people and
administration feel secure due to the quick and immediate nature of the system, and noted
that “they don’t have to take the time to dial in and punch in a 3-digit code to activate the
intercom system. The staff love knowing it’s there.” The subject revealed that he/she has
had requests from staff to place lockdown buttons in other locations but have decided not
to because of the belief that they must be very well controlled by staff to avoid the risk of
accidental activation.
(2) Ease-of-Use
Training and drill practices varied among the case study subjects. Two subjects
with restricted access to lockdown buttons conduct some sort of emergency drill every
month. These drills include lockdown, shelter-in-place, evacuation, and fire drills. The
administration and secretarial staff talk about the use of the buttons. When using the
lockdown button system, the subject does not announce drills in advance or tell them it is
a drill. One clarified, “We want them to think it’s real.” Another remarked, “We want to
see how they respond.” These same two subjects provide a 4-digit code to their staff
through email that they can use to activate the lockdown system via their classroom
phones. For one, teacher training was provided at the beginning of the year using a power
point training and actual demonstration of the system. The other subject described that
the principal does a couple of drills each year from the classrooms. The principal will
visit a classroom and say, “can you put the building in lockdown?” Teachers are
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responsible for keeping the 4-digit code easily accessible for responding to a real
emergency or when asked by the principal to initiate a drill.
The two schools with police pull-stations in common areas of the school use the
system to conduct a minimum of two lockdown drills per year. One subject contends,
“What is practiced gets done.” When asked about staff training, one cautioned, “Training
has to occur. Activating the system means you’re calling the SWAT team to your
building.” He/she teaches staff not to use it for medical emergencies. The other said that
his/her school provides an awareness piece only, and teach staff, “What is that thing and
what does it do?” Unlike the previous two subjects, both of these subjects always
announce that it is a drill before activating the system.
One subject stated that his/her staff never push the lockdown button during drills.
Lockdown drills are done by verbal instructions and a description of what to expect. The
subject reasoned, “We want them [school occupants] to take it seriously and are
concerned that they will get complacent if used frequently.” The lockdown buttons are
restricted for use during real emergencies. This practice is applied consistently in all the
schools in his/her district.
The case study subject that uses lockdown buttons to alert the office of a need to
make an emergency announcement conduct scenario-based drills. He/she trains teachers
by announcing a scenario, which gives the teachers time to make a decision and respond,
and then makes another announcement with a slight change of scenario. “It gives them
practice with decision-making based on the scenario they are confronted with.”
Other methods of training students and staff emerged during the phone interviews.
When discussing false alarms, one subject reported that he/she educates students on the
difference between the fire and police pull-stations. Another described using real-life
close calls for training purposes and explained that one time a teacher saw a stranger in
the school and called the main office to make a report. He/she used the incident as a
teaching tool. During the debrief, he/she discussed scenarios with the teacher asking if
she/he would have used the lockdown button system if the person had a weapon.
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4. Organization
The Organization domain includes two primary dimensions, structure and
environment, and several corresponding evaluation variables, as shown in Table 16. The
basic school characteristics and demographics were assessed to see if these factors
affected the implementation of the warning systems. Subjects were asked: In what ways
does the system require the school/district to have a dedicated safety or security
department or staff for ongoing system monitoring, operations, or management?
Table 16. Organization Domain.
ORGANIZATION Dimension Evaluation Variables Structure i. School Attributes
ii. Community Partner Attributes Environment i. Management and Ownership
ii. Financial Impact iii. Aligns with Regulations
a. Structure
The organizational structure dimension refers to the warning system’s
compatibility with the school, district, and their community partner’s attributes, and
assesses its acceptability to the respective leaderships.
(1) School/District Attributes
Case study subjects are located on the East and West Coasts, Midwest, and in the
South. Four subjects represent rural areas, and two suburban. Together, they represent
elementary, middle, and high schools. Four subjects have the lockdown system in all of
their district schools. Two subjects are the only schools in their district with the system.
Some subjects have self-contained buildings, others have multiple buildings on campus,
and others have athletic fields served by the warning system. None of these distinct
attributes emerged as a factor that hindered the implementation of the lockdown systems
in their schools.
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One subject that restricts access to lockdown buttons reported that his/her district
placed additional activation devices in some bigger, spread out schools, in somewhat
protected areas, such as in a classroom that are located up high to deter false alarms but
still give the teacher access. Another described the necessity to change an existing
emergency nomenclature and explained that they used to call medical emergencies “code
blue.” However, since the term means something different in hospitals and since the
subject uses the term “code red lockdown” for their lockdown terminology and their
lockdown activation devices are blue, the subject now refers to a medical emergency as a
“medical lockdown.”
Four of the subjects rely upon the system’s vendor for monitoring the system’s
functionality. One reported that the district does not have a security department to
monitor the control panel and asserted, “It’s there, we pull it, and everything
automatically happens.” She/he added that the vendor who monitors the system is
“flawless.” Another subject has a security office at the main entrance of the school and a
centrally located safety office in the school; however, personnel in these offices do not
monitor the system; monitoring is done by a vendor. One subject has a district-level
safety department with personnel who monitor cameras, the lockdown system, the
electronic lock system, and other systems for all their schools. Personnel in this
department receive automatic notifications when a lockdown button is pressed, and can
remotely initiate a lockdown for any of their schools. For the other subject whose system
no longer notifies law enforcement, his/her system is now entirely in-house no
monitoring is involved. In summary, four rely heavily on vendor relationships for their
systems, one monitors its own system, and the other involves no monitoring.
(2) Community Partner Attributes
Community partners include local law enforcement partners, 911-dispatch
centers, and fire departments. Subjects were asked: Can you describe your local Law
Enforcement agency’s interaction and involvement with the warning system? Can you
describe how the system interacts with 911-dispatch center? What have you learned
about the interaction of this system with the fire alarm system and your fire partners?
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Law Enforcement Partners: Five of the six case study subjects reported positive
law enforcement support and involvement with their systems. One said that law
enforcement has input on and would need to be in agreement on every decision before
they ever put the system into place. He/she pointed out, “Officers like the system and
believe it’s a smart system to use, they feel empowered because it provides a quicker
means of them knowing of a situation.” Another boasted, “Our law enforcement are
involved, they are a driving factor. They don’t mind the false alarms. They are 100%
behind it.” Another subject offered that they have a great relationship with law
enforcement even though law enforcement was not involved in the decision-making
process for the location of activation devices. Another asserted, “Law enforcement
embraces the system 100%. It improves their response time.” One did not describe the
law enforcement’s support, but did report that he/she always invites police, fire, and
dispatch to participate in school drills saying, “It is important for them to understand the
system.” One reported that law enforcement uses the exact same standard operating
procedures for a lockdown whether it is called in by a live person, or activated by the
lockdown push-button system. Another indicated that no standard operating procedures
changed since the addition of the system, and added that “For training, troopers go to
schools, observe, and hear the message to see what it sounds like.”
911-Dispatch Centers: Two subjects reported that their systems send an
immediate alert to their alarm company and 911-dispatch center. One of these subjects
reported collaborating with the 911-center initially to determine what information they
needed and to test that the system worked well. The lockdown system plays a recording
twice (for the 911-center) that indicates the name of the school and that they are in
lockdown. The approximate message is “An emergency event has been activated at X
School.” The other subject described its recorded message to the alarm company and
911-dispatch center as saying something like, “This is X School. We are in a lockdown.
Please send help.” It also activates the school’s camera feed for the police. The subject
reported that training 911-dispatchers is not necessary, and added that the system
provides a big improvement on the speed of notification.
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Another subject said that the signal goes directly to the 911-dispatch center. It
tells them where in the school the button was pushed and the type of button: lockdown,
shelter-in-place, or evacuation.276 This subject does not have an alarm company
intermediary. Police chiefs, supervisors, and any additional designated personnel also get
a text message and email. The system provides access to the school camera feed to police
cars.
Two subjects reported that their signal goes directly to the alarm company, who,
then contacts the associated 911-dispatch center. The signal is supposed to indicate an
active shooter or serious threat of harm. One subject noted the limitations of the
information that goes to law enforcement. The upside is that they can quickly dispatch
police to the school. The downside is they do not have specific information why the
lockdown button was pushed. “The advantage of the caller on the phone line is that the
dispatchers are able to get a lot of information.” Both subjects reported that law
enforcement and 911-dispatch have had some confusion with what the activation means;
it has been misinterpreted as a burglar alarm. One revealed, “We have to train the 911-
dispatchers or else they typically dispatch the signal as a burglar alarm.” For one of these
schools, designated police personnel receive an immediate text message, cell phone call,
and email when a lockdown device is activated. For the other, the system sends an
immediate phone call and text message to the alarm company and the police department.
One of the subject’s systems used to notify local law enforcement automatically
and activate their cameras as it currently does in the school office. Due to law
enforcement budgetary and personnel limitations, it no longer automatically notifies law
enforcement. This school is not financially able to support the system being monitored by
a vendor alarm company, so it is currently configured with no external alert, only an
276 One subject described some confusion with emergency terminology: “Years ago we used the word
lock out, but it sounded too similar to lockdown so the state changed it to shelter-in-place.” The subject reported that the school has had a couple different changes in terminology because the teachers were confused about lockout and lockdown. They changed lockout to shelter-in-place, and reported that it helped to reduce confusion, but after a time, the district decided to change the term back to lockout. This subject reported that his/her law enforcement agency cautioned against using the term lockout due to confusion, yet the school district leadership decided against their advice.
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internal alert to the school. The school leadership calls 911 when the situation warrants it,
and the law enforcement agency visits the school more regularly.
Fire Partners: All six subjects reported that their fire departments are on board
with the system and have not had any confusion between the existing fire alarm system
and the lockdown system. Three of the six reported that it is standard for 911-dispatch to
send fire along with police whenever a school lockdown button is pushed or when a 911
call is made. One of these three subjects stated that the reason was because many of their
fire agencies are doing warm zone training for active shooter attacks.277
b. Environment
The organizational environment dimension refers to factors related to who owns
the system, the financial impact on the school and community partners, and if the
warning system aligns with regulations. Subjects were asked, What can you tell me about
ownership of the warning system? Discuss initial costs verses ongoing costs, and the
concept of sustainability. Can you describe any policy, legal, or union considerations you
encountered?
(1) Ownership
Five of the six case study subjects claim to own the hardware associated with the
lockdown system, such as the lockdown push-buttons, pull-stations, and wiring. One was
unsure of ownership. The software components were a different story. One reported that
ownership of the software had not been defined since it was a component of their phone
system. He/she believes that if the school changed phone vendors, they could still use the
software if the school maintained it. Another subject admitted that the vendor has a patent
protecting their pull-stations, so while the school district owns the hardware, the vendor
owns the software and web-based part of the system. Two subjects with the same
277 Warm zone training involves fire and emergency medical service (EMS) personnel participating in
active shooter training alongside law enforcement personnel to administer life-saving medical care to victims while minimizing risk to rescuers. See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents (Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration, 2013), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/ downloads/pdf/publications/active_shooter_guide.pdf.
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lockdown system and vendor had different understandings of ownership. One said that
the equipment could be supplied by anybody, but that, “the software is different. We
could change the software but we would not do that due to liability, [such as] personal
negligence if the system did not work properly.” The other holds that they own the entire
system and purported that “it’s our software, our infrastructure. We own the system.
Once it’s in, it’s in.” A different subject also claimed owning the entire system, both the
hardware and software. This subject did not indicate any ongoing relationship with the
software vendor.
(2) Financial Impact
One subject with a minimal number of lockdown buttons in secured places in
their school said they utilize the school’s existing intercom and PA system and phone
system. No additional standalone speakers are used, and as a result, no associated costs
are spent for wiring or notification devices. The subject stated further that the lockdown
buttons and wiring represented a one-time purchase, and added that “There are things you
can do that are not very expensive, that improve safety.” The subject did not disclose the
initial equipment and installation costs but did say that his/her system requires no annual
ongoing fees or licensing costs.
A subject with police pull-stations throughout his/her schools explained that
his/her first school did not incur costs upon implementing the system, since it was the
pilot school for this vendor. They were able to utilize the existing intercom system
speakers with some minor modifications. The subject did not know the initial costs for
the other schools in their district but pointed out that the district made a commitment to
safety and budgeted for the system. The district started with a pilot school and then
incrementally rolled it out to the other schools. This implementation process also helped
with affordability. The annual vendor fees were unknown.
The other four subjects disclosed the initial costs for their systems. One subject
with pull-stations located throughout her/his schools said that the initial costs for 12
schools were $430,000. Costs per building vary due to the number of pull-stations
required depending on the size and layout of the school. He/she uses the existing
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intercom for the audible notification piece. The annual vendor fees are just under $8,000
for the 12 schools combined.
A subject representing a single school with a minimal number of lockdown
buttons in secured locations used a grant that paid 40% of the $340,000 cost to upgrade
their phone, PA, and clock systems that included the RF lockdown button system. The
school paid an additional $45–50,000 for the lockdown notification system to serve the
athletic fields. The subject pays an annual vendor fee of $6,000 for the phone and
lockdown system combined.
One subject using the RF lockdown buttons in limited and protected locations
spent $300,000 for the initial costs for two schools. This subject incorporated the existing
phone and public address system but added some speakers. The subject reportedly
convinced the school board of the importance that they would use the money wisely, and
drew money from the capital fund. The subject did not report annual vendor fees.
The school without audible notification reported costs of over $200,000 for the
equipment and installation of the system in every classroom and throughout the
school.278 It also included the creation of a command center in the Sheriff’s office to
monitor the system. The subject explained that the bulk of the money came from drug
forfeiture funds, and said, “local businesses pitched in to help install the system in the
school.” The subject also reported obtaining an estimate from the vendor about three
years ago to outfit other schools in their district and learned that it would cost between
$4,000–$16,000 per classroom depending on the size of the room and number of doors.
Additional fees would be incurred for hardware, software, and network ports that would
total over $55,000. Should the school decide to use the vendor for monitoring, it would
cost approximately $300–$400 per school.
(3) Aligns with Regulations
None of the subjects were aware of any codes, regulations, or policies governing
their systems. One expressed union issues with cameras. One reported that his/her state
278 Equipment includes lockdown buttons, lights, cameras, automatic door locks, and associated wiring.
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requires schools with WiFi video capabilities to grant access to law enforcement. Another
talked about drill requirements. One subject said that a text message is sent to everyone in
the building who provides a personal cell phone number. Another explained that her/his
district does not issue cell phones to staff, but they have an optional notification feature
that delivers a text and phone call to everyone registered in the system and allows those
registered to text information they might have during a lockdown. Subjects with optional
cell phone notifications did not report any known real or perceived equity issues reported
by those who do not own cell phones. One subject’s system automatically locks all
classroom doors when a lockdown button is pushed, and requires people pushing a
separate button to unlock their door to exit. The subject did not know of any issues
related to fire code regulation due to the extra door egress measure.
5. Net Benefits
The Net Benefits domain evaluates three dimensions—effectiveness,
sustainability, and feasibility—and corresponding evaluation variables, as shown in Table
17. These three dimensions were not established by the time the case study interviews
were conducted.
Table 17. Net Benefits Domain.
NET BENEFITS Dimension Evaluation Variables Effective i. Solves Problem
ii. Accomplishes Purpose iii. Reliable
Feasible and Sustainable i. Financially ii. Operationally
The researcher concluded the interviews by asking subjects general questions
about the benefits of their systems, including what they would tell other school districts
who may be considering such a system. Their responses follow.
One subject with lockdown buttons throughout his/her schools contends, “It’s all
about reducing the response time.” The subject went on to say that it is an improvement
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to their previous system since they formerly used the intercom and PA system to make
lockdown announcements. Schools were limited by the few locations in the school that
have control phones (mostly main office areas), and a staff member who had a 3-digit
code to make an announcement on one of those phones. “The key benefit of the
[lockdown] system is that we lower the response time dramatically.”
A case study subject with lockdown buttons in limited secured locations, such as
offices insisted, “We just eliminated our worst case scenario. Fast notification. When
someone walks into the front office and shoots, who is going to make that notification?
It’s a huge issue if it doesn’t get sent out. With this system, we push it, forget it, and get
out of sight or flee the scene.” The subject explained that adrenaline causes the slowing
of motor skills during emergencies, and contended, “With our prerecorded notification
you’re hearing a calm, cool, collected message to everybody. It is automatic and it is
clear. We are taking reasonable measures to get to school safety.”
One subject simply said there is nothing he/she would change about the system
and added that he/she would do it exactly the same way. Another subject described
his/her system as a comprehensive, multi-layered, web-based system, with hardwired and
wireless features that uses both strobes and fobs. They said it is affordable and
expandable. The case study subject with the visual notification and office notification
emphasized, “The primary benefit of this system is the ability for anyone to quickly push
a button to notify the front office of an emergency. The front office receives quick
notification and then can respond accordingly.” The subject with the new system reported
that they used to make emergency announcements on the intercom system and they
recently completed their first drill using the push-button to initiate the drill.
To those schools that may be considering a lockdown notification system, one
subject recommended, “Do not hesitate to do it, but check with your local law
enforcement first,” and continued by stating that “It works very well, not a lot of issues.”
Another liked the benefit of teachers and staff having the ability to text information about
the emergency, but admitted the drawback of continually having to update staff contact
information so the right people get the information. Another urged, “Don’t wait until it
happens in your area, or your school. This is an effortless task from many locations. You
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don’t want to be that school district that could have done something to save lives, but
didn’t.” A law enforcement officer interviewed asserted, “If you’re going to spend
money, use it on notifying law enforcement and on an alert system. Cameras are good for
barricade situations, but not for immediate response.”
Another subject offered this advice, “Make sure you have good procedures in
place. Practice. And model expectations during emergency drills.” One subject reported
seeing all kinds of cell phone alert apps at conferences, “I would encourage other schools
to do your research. A lot of people have great spiels, but don’t deliver.” Their IT
department developed their own cell phone safety app that teachers can elect to download
on their personal cell phones.
For all the case study subjects, they expressed positivity about the net benefits.
Still, it was evident that had an evaluation framework tool been available and utilized,
they may have been able to articulate more thoughtfully about the evaluation of the
effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability of their systems.
C. ANALYSIS
None of the subjects participating in the case studies had warning systems that
were an exact mirror of the researcher’s conceptual lockdown notification system. Many
commonalities were found from which some important conclusions were drawn.
1. Commonalities with Conceptual Lockdown Notification System
All six subjects have systems with push-buttons or pull-stations, affixed to the
wall, and with a single- or double-action activation mechanism, similar in size to fire
alarm initiating appliances and to those proposed in the conceptual lockdown notification
system, which makes them easy to use.
All subjects’ systems emit an immediate audible or visual notification to the entire
school, with the exception of one with a 3-second delay. Five of these systems use an
audible prerecorded message that announces a customized lockdown message. As lauded
by one subject, “you’re hearing a calm, cool, collected message to everybody. It is
automatic and it is clear.” Another combination of five subjects has systems with a visual
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notification, such as a strobe or a colored light. Four of the overall subjects’ systems used
both an audible and visual notification, similar to the conceptual lockdown notification
system.
Also similar, five of the six case study’s systems send an immediate, automatic
notification to an alarm company and/or 911-dispatch center that results in the speedy
dispatching of law enforcement to the school.
Two subjects make their system accessible at all times and to all school occupants
by placing police pull-stations in common areas throughout the school to allow people
using the school facility, when school is not in session, to benefit from the warning
system.
For all six case study subjects, their school characteristics and demographics did
not appear to limit the effectiveness of the warning system. The size and physical
configuration did, however, influence the number of activation devices required for
schools placing the devices in common areas throughout the school.
Other significant findings are that user satisfaction is high. In addition, subjects
were unanimous that school stakeholders had positive perceptions related to increased
safety. All also reported that their law enforcement partners are overwhelmingly positive
about the systems. All six subjects reported that their fire departments are on board with
the system and have not had any confusion between the existing fire alarm system and
the lockdown notification system. None reported stakeholders being confused about the
difference between the fire alarm system and the lockdown push-buttons or police pull-
station systems.
2. Solves the Problem of Early Warning
The case study subjects were unanimous and enthusiastic that their systems solve
the problem of early warning and result in quicker lockdowns. Even the three subjects
with lockdown push-buttons only in secured locations indicated this timeliness. One of
these three insisted, “We just eliminated our worst case scenario. Fast notification.” A
case study subject with pull-stations in common areas claimed, “The key benefit […] is
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that we lower the response time dramatically.” Although the six subjects’ systems’ were
very different, the researcher agrees that they all solve the problem of timely and early
warning for emergencies involving school violence; some to a greater degree than others.
Of all the case study subjects, the two subjects with the light blue POLICE pull-
stations in the common areas of the school solve the problem of early warning most
comprehensively. The pull-stations are accessible to anyone using the school building
any time of the day or night. Once a pull-station is activated, the system automatically
and immediately emits a prerecorded lockdown message over the public address system,
turns on a strobe light notification feature, and simultaneously alerts the alarm company
or 911-dispatch center. Its limitation lies with the absence of the pull-stations in
classrooms.
The three subjects with the bright blue LOCKDOWN push-button devices in
rooms with restricted access, such as school offices, also solve the problem of early
warning, but to a lesser extent. Like the POLICE pull-stations, when activated, the
LOCKDOWN push-buttons automatically and immediately (except one with a 3-second
delay) trigger a prerecorded lockdown message over the PA system, and immediately
notify an alarm company or 911-dispatch center. Two of these systems also include a
visual notification device. Since they are mostly located in secured rooms, the system
does not provide the added capability of enabling people in common areas of the school
to use it, nor is it accessible for people using the school during non-school hours. Even
so, it is an improvement on the subject’s prior capabilities of making manual lockdown
announcements over the PA system, since those with access to the push-buttons simply
push a button to generate a lockdown announcement.
Even the subject with the yellow EMERGENCY LOCK DOWN push-buttons
that only provide a visual notification to the entire school improves the school’s prior
capabilities when it comes to early warning, particularly for people inside the school. The
buttons are located in common areas and in classrooms throughout the school and
provides many opportunities for staff or students to activate the system at the first sign of
danger. While the system does not generate an audible warning, the lights help to get
people’s attention and signal them to take protective measures; and the doors, if already
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closed, automatically lock. Unfortunately, the system no longer sends an automatic
notification to law enforcement, which is a downside.
While all six case study subjects improved their existing warning capability, all
can further improve their capabilities by phasing in additional initiating or notification
appliances. The subjects with POLICE pull-stations in common areas can improve by
adding pull-stations in classrooms. The subjects with LOCKDOWN push-buttons in
secured offices can improve by adding pull-stations in common areas, and eventually, in
classrooms. The subject with the EMERGENCY LOCK DOWN buttons can improve
their capabilities by adding an audible alert and prerecorded message to their system, as
well as an alert to an alarm company.
D. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION
Why does this matter? Conducting these case studies was important because the
researcher was able to learn from schools already using some form of the conceptual
lockdown notification system. The subjects described the different applications of these
warning systems, and the variety of ways they have been implemented in the different
schools.
Matching up the features of the case study subjects’ systems to the new K-12
School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool helped to inform the refining of the school tool. Laying
out the data according to the school tool domains, dimensions, and evaluation variables
demonstrates that the school tool is useful for identifying many of the strengths and
weaknesses of school warning systems.
The researcher also learned that even though these case study warning systems
were not as robust or comprehensive as the conceptual lockdown notification model, they
all provided value or “net benefits” toward the goal of speed of notification. One of the
biggest takeaways from conducting this case study research is that a school equipped
with one of these systems has a greater possibility of minimizing the damage of an active
shooter attack because of their increased capacity to get a quicker warning out to students
and staff.
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Nevertheless, all the case study subjects have systems with serious shortcomings,
most notably related to the reliability of the technology. The next chapter extracts those
identified weaknesses from the case study data and draws comparisons that will show
how these vulnerabilities may be able to be avoided by using the conceptual lockdown
notification system model.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This final chapter provides a summary of the thesis goals, describes how those
goals were accomplished, presents findings, and concludes with recommendations.
A. SUMMARY OF THESIS GOALS AND DESIGN
Schools are susceptible to active shooter attacks. Studies show these attacks occur
quickly, often within minutes of when an intruder enters a school.279 Many strategies to
prevent injuries and loss of life have emerged. One of these, lockdown, is a commonly
accepted strategy that has shown to have benefits toward protecting students and staff
during active shooter attacks.280 Studies also highlight the criticality of rapidly warning
everyone in the school so they can quickly lockdown, and thus deny access to the
intruder.281 Unfortunately, PA systems are often accessible only from a school’s main
office, which can make it difficult to get a timely warning out when an intruder is first
detected at school.
In response to these problems, an assortment of warning system technologies have
emerged, such as cell phone warning applications, pendant emergency-buttons, and
computer panic-buttons. However, case study research found in the existing literature
exposes many weaknesses with the implementation of these technologies in K-12
schools.282 Vendor advertisements and news reports show that some schools are using
other warning systems that have lockdown push-buttons or police pull-stations, similar to
the fire alarm system, to address timely warning in active shooter attacks. Research is
limited, however, about the efficacy of these systems and minimal guidance is available
279 Blair and Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents, 9. 280 Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, Final Report of Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 32–33. 281 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Infrastructure Protection
and Disaster Management Division, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks, 3–49.
282 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety Technology, 4–27; Schneider, School Security Technologies, 9; Schwartz et al., Role of Technology, 41.
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to help school leaders make informed decisions about selecting warning system
technologies.283 This thesis was written, in part, to address this gap.
Specifically, the goal of this thesis was to answer two questions:
• To what extent can the school “fire alarm system” (for emergencies
involving fire and evacuation) be a model for a “lockdown notification
system” for emergencies involving violence and requiring lockdown?
• What factors should K-12 school decision-makers and their law
enforcement partners consider when evaluating and implementing warning
systems that notify both school occupants and law enforcement of an
imminent threat of violence at school?
Four tasks were undertaken to answer these questions. First, a conceptual
lockdown notification system was developed that used the fire alarm system as a model.
The history, philosophy, regulations, and basic components of the fire alarm system were
studied. This research found that there are similar codes regulating emergency
communications systems for situations involving violence as for fire alarm systems.284
The NFPA identifies the “minimum required levels of performance, reliability, and
quality of installation for emergency communications systems.”285 Further NFPA
guidance is explicit regarding alert and warning messages used specifically on
campuses.286 These and other research documents helped shape the design of the
conceptual lockdown notification system.287
The system mechanics of the conceptual lockdown notification system are almost
identical to the basic structure of the fire alarm system. Its components consist of a
283 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 13–20. 284 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Chapter
24 Emergency Communications Systems (ECS) 24.2.2–3. 285 National Fire Protection Association, Chapter 24 Emergency Communications Systems (ECS)
24.2.2–3. 286 National Fire Protection Association, Annex G Guidelines for Emergency Communications
Strategies for Buildings and Campuses. 287 Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency, 23.
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lockdown notification control panel that is hardwired to lockdown push-buttons and
speaker-strobes located throughout the school building, as shown in Figure 19. If a
student or staff member detects a suspicious person or hears gunfire, they can quickly
activate a lockdown push-button. The control panel immediately notifies the whole
school to lockdown by playing a pre-recorded message over the speaker-strobes. The
system simultaneously notifies the police department (via the alarm company) through
the dedicated phone lines.
Figure 19. Conceptual Lockdown Initiating Appliance and Speaker-Strobe.288
Second, an evaluation tool was developed that K-12 school decision-making
teams can use for assessing communication and warning system technologies. The core
elements of the HOT-Fit model were used as a structure on which to build the school
tool.289 To customize it to K-12 schools and for communication and warning systems,
knowledge gleaned was incorporated from the existing literature, such as the federal
Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans.290 Three key
pieces of literature were also consulted: Johns Hopkins University’s A Comprehensive
Report on School Safety Technology, Tod Schneider’s School Security Technologies, and
288 Photo 1: Adapted from Automation Source, “Egress Devices”; Photo 2: Source: System Sensor,
“SPSWK-CLR-ALERT.” The text on the image on the left of a blue initiating appliance was modified to demonstrate the proposed plain language for a lockdown initiating appliance.
289 Mohd et al., “An Evaluation Framework,” 386–398. 290 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing.
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Heather L. Schwartz’s et al. The Role of Technology in Improving K–12 School Safety.291
After examining the fire alarm system as a model for a conceptual lockdown notification
system, guidance from the NFPA’s National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, and from
Erica D. Kuligowski’s General Guidance on Emergency Communication Strategies for
Buildings was incorporated.292 These and other resources helped inform the evaluation
variable criteria. The researcher also drew from extensive experience as a school safety
professional to help shape and explain the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
The new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool includes five core domains that
guide the user through a process to assess the suitability of a technology to accomplish
the goals of the school organization. The first domain, Foundation, otherwise known as
the why, is unique to this new tool. The other domains come from the HOT-Fit
framework. These include investigating the Technology itself, assessing the technological
interface with Humans in the school system, examining the impact on the Organization,
and identifying the Net Benefits to the school, district, and community partners. Each
domain is distinct, but are all interconnected. The domains have corresponding
dimensions based on the HOT-Fit model, as well as unique and customized variables for
evaluating the efficacy of the technology’s use within the K-12 school environment, as
shown in Figure 20.
291 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology; Schneider, School Security Technologies; Schwartz et al., The Role of Technology. 292 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, Scope.
1.1.1; Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency, 23.
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Figure 20. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool.
Third, to test the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool, it was first applied
to the fire alarm system, and then to the conceptual lockdown notification system. In
doing so, it was learned that the new school tool is useful for evaluating both existing
technologies and prospective technologies. This exercise also helped to reveal the
strengths, weaknesses, and potential unintended consequences of the conceptual
lockdown notification system. Furthermore, it became evident that while the school tool’s
stated purpose is for evaluating communication and warning system technologies, it may
also be useful for evaluating other school safety and security technologies.
Finally, case studies were conducted on six schools or school districts already
using a warning system with lockdown push-buttons or police pull-stations resembling
fire alarm pull-stations yet designed to address school violence. By laying out the case
study data according to the evaluation criteria in the new K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool, it was ascertained that the school tool is useful for identifying many of
the strengths and weaknesses of these existing school warning systems. It was then
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possible to draw conclusions about the efficacy of the case study schools’ warning
systems in comparison to the conceptual lockdown notification system.
B. FINDINGS RELATED TO CASE STUDIES AND THE CONCEPTUAL LOCKDOWN NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
The preceding chapter presented the case study data and examined many of the
commonalities between the case study subjects’ warning systems and the conceptual
lockdown notification system. For example, the case study schools’ systems use push-
buttons or pull-stations affixed to the wall, most emit an immediate audible or visual
notification to the entire school, and most send an immediate alert to the alarm company
for police notification. Another commonality is that all these systems, to some extent,
solve the problem of early warning, which results in quicker lockdowns.
Differences in the systems also represent weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the
case study warning systems. These differences include issues associated with regulations,
information quality, system mechanics and reliability, security attributes, and liabilities
related to system complexity.
First, none of the subjects seemed aware of the NFPA codes regulating the
mechanics of their warning system.293 This lack of awareness resulted in vulnerabilities
related to the quality of information and with system reliability.
Information quality was reduced because of the inaccessibility of the activation
devices and due to problems with information completeness. Four of the six subjects’
systems were deficient in their accessibility to people using the school during after school
hours. Moreover, three of these four did not have lockdown push-buttons in common
areas of the school for when school is in session. These three limited placement mainly to
secured office areas.
The use of one subject’s lockdown push-button proved to be difficult to
understand without training, as reflected in the report that a staff member did not know
what the button was and pushed the button to see what it would do. This school did not
293 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, 1.1.
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use signage near the lockdown buttons, which revealed that the text on the push-button
alone is not intuitive or instructive enough for a staff member to understand its function.
All had incomplete information on their push-buttons or pull-stations and lacked clarity
about what the device would do when activated. Two subjects augment with the use of
signs, but the signs only indicate the police response portion of the system and not the
lockdown function.
Furthermore, the actual notifications produced by the warning systems were
problematic. The NFPA requires the use of an alert tone preceding the prerecorded
message to get people’s attention. Only one subject met this requirement. Another
subject’s system sounds a police siren as an alert tone but it plays simultaneously with the
recorded message (rather than prior to), which causes potential communications
difficulties for law enforcement.
The primary difference between the conceptual lockdown notification system and
the warning systems from the six case studies involves system reliability due to system
mechanics. All the case study systems are dependent upon power, utilize software
operating systems, and rely upon the internet to some extent. Several rely on cellular
service, and two rely on RF. Five of the six systems use the existing PA system speakers,
and while this could certainly be a cost-saving measure, it creates problems due to
dependence upon other systems, and thereby decreases the reliability of the warning
systems. This measure includes the need for electricity, and many of the schools have no
backup generators to support their PA system.
Even though all these systems had significant vulnerabilities related to reliability,
none of the subjects interviewed expressed concern. These vulnerabilities may have
emerged by conducting risk and capability assessments as called for in the new K-12
School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool. Similarly, these conditions could have come to light
when evaluating the technology against the system quality section of the school tool.
The system mechanics and reliability vulnerabilities result in flaws in the
systems’ security attributes. Software and internet-based systems, as well as RF-based
systems bring with them weaknesses in terms of system defense, which makes them
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vulnerable to nefarious actors hacking into the system and creating havoc by
reprogramming the recorded message, disabling the system, or causing a system to
activate when not desired.
Also related to security attributes are false alarms. For some subjects, the fear of
false alarms was the exclusive reason for not placing the lockdown push-buttons in
common areas of the school. However, the subjects with the push-buttons or pull-stations
in common areas throughout the school did not express any concerns about pranks and
false alarms. In fact, these subjects had few false alarms even though the lockdown
devices were in public areas. Research shows that false alarms due to pranks for fire
alarm systems have declined and represent a very small percentage of false alarms.294
While the risk of pranks and false alarms is a real concern, since schools have found
ways to mitigate this risk, this fear may or may not be a well-founded rationale for
decisions against lockdown push-button in common areas. All schools, districts, and their
community partners must decide the level of risk they are willing to assume.
Additionally, it is evident that the complexity of these systems increase
vulnerabilities and produce a false sense of security. Five of the six case study subjects’
systems include additional activation and notification devices than just the lockdown
push-buttons or pull-stations. These devices include wireless emergency pendant buttons,
classroom phone emergency activation codes, and cell phone applications and alerts.
Although these extra features appear to provide a more robust and flexible warning
capability, the literature review identified several vulnerabilities related to the
implementation of these technologies. These vulnerabilities include the potential
inaccessibility of the devices, limitations in their ability to warn the entire school,
significant reliability weaknesses, challenges with initial and ongoing costs, and a lack of
organizational fit. These extra warning features also require greater reliance on and
control by vendors, are more difficult to use while under extreme stress, and require more
frequent upkeep and maintenance. These vulnerabilities related to reliability can increase
risk. If school staff members count on one of these methods during a real emergency, and
294 Karter, “False Alarm Activity in the U.S. 2012.”
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it is not reliable, it could cause a delay in a warning announcement and increase the risk
rather than decreasing it. Using the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool could be
useful in revealing these shortcomings.
Finally, not only does complexity create liabilities but it can also affect the
financial outlay involved. Substantial differences occur in the costs associated for each of
the case study subjects’ warning systems. While the reasons for these vast differences are
unclear, system mechanics and complexity are likely contributing factors.
Thus, the conceptual lockdown notification system may be able to address and
mitigate the weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified in the six case study subjects’
systems. First, the conceptual lockdown notification system aligns with NFPA codes and
regulations. It also follows the guidance for emergency communications systems. Where
guidance is not specific to a “lockdown” system, the system mechanics are configured to
match the requirements of the fire alarm system. Since the NFPA regulations are in place
to support a highly reliable and efficacious fire alarm system, following NFPA codes
should also support a highly reliable and efficacious lockdown notification system.
The information quality aspects of the conceptual lockdown notification system
align with the NFPA emergency communications systems guidance. The system is
accessible, instructions for use on the push-buttons and associated signage are clear and
intuitive, and the proposed order of the alert tone and warning message is based on
research.295 Even so, all these conceptual information quality features will need to be
customized to the unique school or district, and tested for clarity and efficacy once an
actual system is implemented in a school.
Like the fire alarm system, the conceptual lockdown notification system is a
hardwired system. A control panel monitors the flow of electricity and current through
the wire, which connects the lockdown push-buttons to speaker-strobes, and to its control
panel. It does not require the use of the internet, radio frequencies, or cellular service.
The system has a built-in battery backup to provide redundancy if electricity is
interrupted. These attributes contribute to system reliability and support a strong system
295 Kuligowski, General Guidance on Emergency, 11.
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defense. Moreover, since the conceptual lockdown notification system is not RF or
internet based, it is not vulnerable to cyberattacks, such as viruses, hacking, or remote
disabling.
The conceptual lockdown notification system is not as flexible or complex as the
warning systems in the case studies. It is a basic warning system that provides only that
function necessary to accomplish the intended purpose and does not have any extra bells
and whistles. The system, therefore, is simple to use, reliable, and manageable. Due to
these attributes, the service quality variables of lifespan, technical support, and
maintenance, as well as ongoing costs, are more sustainable. Moreover, initial costs for
system acquisition should be consistent, with variance related mostly to the physical size
and layout of the school.
C. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL
The new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool is useful for evaluating existing
and proposed communication and warning systems technologies. It may also be suitable
to evaluate the efficacy of other school safety and security technologies, as established in
Chapter IV.
1. Evaluating Existing Systems
The K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool can be used to evaluate existing
warning systems, as demonstrated with the case studies. The structure of the school tool
was used to organize the warning system data from the six case study subjects’
interviews, as shown in Chapter V that helped to reveal the strengths, weaknesses, and
benefits of the systems. It also showed how using the school tool in advance may have
revealed some significant vulnerabilities, and possibly even influenced the decision
making about the technology selections. Since the school tool was not complete at the
time of the case study interviews, not all dimensions were discussed. Consequently, the
case study data was not entered into the school tool template as for the fire alarm system
and the conceptual lockdown notification system. Findings related to the fire alarm
system are explained next.
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Using the template for the new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool, the
efficacy of the fire alarm system was examined in light of the five evaluative domains
with the following results.
The Net Benefits revealed that the fire alarm system is effective. It solves the
problem of early warning for emergencies involving smoke or fire at school. It
accomplishes the goal of preventing injuries and loss of life in K-12 schools due to fire,
smoke, and cascading effects. Moreover, it has built in redundancies, such as backup
battery power and two dedicated landline phone lines, to overcome potential weaknesses
in reliability.
The Net Benefits also showed that the fire alarm system is a feasible warning
system technology for K-12 schools. Once installed, the fire alarm system has minimal
and reasonable ongoing maintenance costs and alarm monitoring fees, which makes the
system sustainable over time. Since the fire alarm system has such minimal impact on the
daily routine and operations of the school and its community partners, it is operationally
workable. A potential negative impact revolves around the possibility of false alarms.
However, schools have successfully implemented strategies to minimize this risk.
Two possible unintended consequences or risks emerged. One involves the
potential nefarious use of the fire alarm system to draw unsuspecting students and staff
into the line of gunfire during an active shooter attack on schools. Another potential
unintended consequence during active shooter attacks is that the fire alarm sensors may
set off the alarm due to smoke from gunfire that can cause students and staff to evacuate
into harm’s way.
Working through the school tool helped to determine the net benefits of the fire
alarm system, which were mostly positive and outweighed the system’s limitations.
2. Evaluating Proposed Systems
The new K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool was also used to evaluate the
proposed conceptual lockdown notification system. Working through each step of the
school tool helped expose the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual lockdown
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notification system, and ultimately answered the first thesis question: To what extent can
the school “fire alarm system” (for emergencies involving fire and evacuation) be a
model for a “lockdown notification system” for emergencies involving violence and
requiring lockdown? Lessons gained from the case studies and from using the school tool
are revealed as follows.
The Net Benefits showed that with an accessible warning system that can
immediately notify all school occupants to lockdown at the first sign of danger, it is
possible a school can prevent or reduce injuries and loss of life during active shooter
attacks, if the use of the warning system helps them to lockdown more quickly.
Moreover, unlike the warning systems described in the case studies, the
conceptual lockdown notification system is highly reliable. It does not rely upon cell
service, internet, software, or radio frequencies. The mechanics of the conceptual
lockdown notification system, like the fire alarm system, have built in redundancies
(backup battery power, two dedicated landline phone lines, and all components hardwired
together) to overcome potential weaknesses.
The Net Benefits suggest that the initial financial outlay, due to system
acquisition and installation, may be a potential barrier for schools. Even so, once
installed, the lockdown notification system is likely to be a feasible and sustainable
warning system technology for K-12 schools. The lockdown notification system will
require minimal ongoing maintenance costs and alarm monitoring fees. These modest
fees have shown to be feasible for schools over time as demonstrated with the fire alarm
system.
Since the lockdown notification system is carefully designed to be intuitive and
easy to use, and because it appears to have such a minimal impact on the daily routine
and operations of the school and its community partners, it is likely to be operationally
workable. The biggest potential negative impact to operational feasibility has to do with
the possibility of pranks and false alarms. Even though the frequency of fire alarm pranks
has reduced significantly over the years, they are still a valid concern. The implications
are serious. As one of the case study subjects expressed, when law enforcement is
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notified of a possible active shooter, they arrive at the school with weapons drawn.
Someone could accidently get hurt or emotional trauma associated with this type of false
alarm could result. Research shows that pranks for fire alarms can be mitigated, but it
does take work to implement strategies for curtailing intentional and unintentional false
alarms. Some of these strategies consist of protective covers and guards on lockdown
buttons, educating staff and students on the appropriate use of the devices, consistent
implementation of consequences, signage, and cameras. Schools that have cameras may
be able to leverage those as a deterrent and use them as an investigative asset. If schools
include the consequences for misuse on the signage near the activation devices, this could
also be a deterrent.
The evaluation also brought to light several implementation considerations, as
well as possible unintended negative consequences. In terms of implementation, it will be
important to keep the fire alarm pull-stations and the lockdown push-buttons separate to
help reduce the chance of activating the wrong alarm. This separation is essential since
either system accidentally activated for the opposite hazard or threat could actually
increase injuries and loss of life.
While the Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission pointed out the
benefits to lockdown and that locked classroom doors have not been defeated in a school
shooting, some schools do not have lockable rooms, so the protective strategies at these
schools might look very different from schools that have lockable doors.296
Moreover, lockdown is not the only protective strategy schools use to respond to
active shooter attacks. In some cases, students and staff may be in common areas, such as
cafeterias, halls, or playgrounds and may need to try to run to safety. This strategy could
include running out of the school, or to a lockable area within the school, or possibly
even running off-campus. Some schools even teach students and staff to defend
themselves, or teach how to try to disable an aggressor.297 These tactics, however, are
296 Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, Final Report of Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 32–33. 297 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Run, Hide, Fight; ALERRT™ Center at Texas State
University, “Avoid, Deny, Defend”; Alice Training Institute, “Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate.”
190
controversial.298 Schools or districts must collaborate with their law enforcement partners
to customize plans that align with their unique situation, polices, laws, and emergency
response philosophies.299 This collaboration will help decision-making teams determine
how to customize a lockdown notification system to meet their circumstances.
Similarly, customizing the pre-recorded message to match schools’ unique
response philosophies and procedures is also critical. If schools do not want to use the
word “lockdown” because they use other terminology, the conceptual lockdown
notification system provides that kind of flexibility. Schools can customize the message
to correspond with their emergency plans.
Another implementation consideration concerns the activation devices. The
conceptual model proposes a lockdown push-button. This proposal does not preclude a
decision-making team from choosing another color for the device or a different activation
mechanism. There may be merit to the police pull-station concept. Police and fire are
distinct terms representing distinct emergency responders. The terminology for lockdown
may change; however, the terminology for police is not likely to change and may be a
more sustainable term for these devices. If the police pull-station is selected, it might be
prudent to include other descriptive terminology on the devices or on nearby signage, so
school occupants understand the device’s purpose and what will happen if the device is
activated.
The potential for unintended negative consequences exist. For instance, if a
student or staff member sees someone in the school with a gun, and decides to stop and
push a lockdown-button to notify everyone in the school, that extra effort may place the
student or staff member in greater risk of danger because it will take them longer to get to
safety themselves. Clear guidelines, expectations, and associated training can help
mitigate this risk.
298 Trump, “ALICE Training Co-Founder Admits.” 299 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 4.
191
Furthermore, if a lockdown button is activated and an immediate announcement is
played, not only will all students and staff be alerted, but the perpetrators will also be
alerted. While this notification could cause them to cancel the attack, it could also compel
them to alter or speed up the attack, or it might not change their plans at all; all are
unknown variables.
Even though the conceptual lockdown notification system is designed to be a
highly reliable system mechanically, and has strong security attributes, the system could
still experience compromise if someone, with nefarious intent, gained access to the
control panel. School personnel will need to provide access protections to the lockdown
notification control panel, similar to what they do for their fire alarm control panel.
In summary, the evaluative categories in the new K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool proved to be valuable in bringing to light some of the potential strengths,
weaknesses, and unintended consequences of the conceptual lockdown notification
system. Using the school tool to evaluate the fire alarm system, the conceptual lockdown
notification system, and the case study subjects’ warning systems helped to answered the
second thesis question: What factors should K-12 school decision-makers and their law
enforcement partners consider when evaluating and implementing warning systems that
notify both school occupants and law enforcement of an imminent threat of violence at
school?
D. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
These findings lead to two recommendations, use the new K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool and conduct a pilot project on the Conceptual Lockdown Notification
System.
First, schools and their community partners should try using the new K-12 School
HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool when considering communication and warning system
technologies to help them gain a better understanding of their unique needs and select
appropriate technologies to meet those needs. Schools can also use the school tool to
evaluate the efficacy of their existing systems. Moreover, with minor modifications,
school leaders may be able to use the school tool to evaluate the suitability of other safety
192
and security technologies. School decision-making teams can access the new K-12
School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool in the Readiness and Emergency Management for
Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center tool box at https://rems.ed.gov/Tool
Box.aspx.300 It is also provided in Appendix B of this thesis.
Second, a pilot project should be implemented to validate the mechanics and
implementation of the conceptual lockdown notification system in schools. The pilot
project should have a collaborative team of researchers, fire and law enforcement
officials, and school safety personnel that design the proposal, implement the project, and
evaluate results. The pilot could be a comparative design that would test the system in
some schools with lockdown push-buttons primarily in common areas, and in other
schools with lockdown push-buttons also in classrooms. To fund the pilot project, the
research team could initially apply for available grants. This research would fill a specific
gap in the current literature on the efficacy of school safety and security technologies.301
E. CONCLUSION
This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge for K-12 schools
about communication and warning system technologies; specifically, those that address
violence.
The first output is a conceptual lockdown notification system modeled after the
fire alarm system. The thesis shows that the conceptual lockdown notification system can
provide a practical and reliable improvement to schools’ ability to warn students and staff
when in imminent danger of violence. If students and staff can indeed lockdown more
quickly because of the immediate warning announcement, it may be possible to reduce
the intruder’s access to school occupants, and potentially prevent injuries and loss of life.
It is a simple and elegant solution.
300 “Welcome to the Tool Box,” Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS)
Technical Assistance (TA) Center, accessed March 20, 2018, https://rems.ed.gov/ToolBox.aspx. 301 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, A Comprehensive Report on School Safety
Technology, 13–20.
193
The second output is an evaluation framework tool for selecting
communicationand warning system technologies for use in K-12 schools. The new K-12
School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool may be useful in helping school policy makers from
state and local education agencies, and their emergency response partners, understand
some of the factors to consider when making decisions about communication and
warning system technologies for their schools.
The potential positive outcomes of using the new K-12 School HOT-Fit
Evaluation Tool and the Conceptual Lockdown Notification System include three things.
First, teams can make better decisions when selecting communication and warning
systems, with the potential results of more informed and prudent financial expenditures.
Next, a serendipitous effect of positively improving school climate may result by
increasing confidence in the schools’ ability to keep students and staff safe. Finally,
doing so may possibly even reduce or prevent injuries and loss of life during active
shooter attacks on schools.
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APPENDIX A. THREATS AND HAZARDS
This chart, adapted from the K-12 EOP Guide, shows examples of many of the
threats and hazards for which schools may need to prepare. Threats and hazards fall into
these general categories: natural hazards; adversarial, incidental, and human-caused
threats; and technological and biological hazards.302 This list is not exhaustive, nor do all
schools encounter all these threats, hazards, or emergencies.
Table 18. Examples of Threats and Hazards.303
EXAMPLES OF THREATS AND HAZARDS Natural Hazards Adversarial, Incidental &
Human-Caused Threats Technological & Biological
Hazards Cold Weather (severe) Dust Storm Earthquake Flood Heat Wave Hurricane Landslide/Mudslide Lightning Snow/Ice Tornado Tsunami - Distant Tsunami - Local Volcanic Eruption Wildfire Wind (severe)
Animal (aggressive, dangerous) Bomb Threat Bullying Bus Crash Child Abuse Domestic violence/abuse Drowning Explosive Device Found Explosion Fights Fire Gang Violence Gunshots Hostage Situation Kidnapping Medical Emergencies
Missing Student People (aggressive, dangerous, suspicious) Poisoning Riot or Demonstration Sexting Self-harm (cutting) Sexual Assault Shooting or Stabbing Student/pedestrian hit by vehicle Suicide (ideation, threat, attempt or completion) Swarm of Bees Terrorism Threat of Violence Weapons
Cyber Crime/Attack Infectious Diseases Food Contamination Water Failure/Contamination Allergies (food, cold, sun, bees) Poor Air quality Toxic materials present in the school (mold, asbestos, lead) Hazardous Materials Release outside the school (industrial plants, highways, railroads, vessels, aircraft) Hazardous Materials Release inside the school (gas leaks or laboratory spills) Radiological releases from nuclear power stations Dam Failure Power Failure Sewer Failure Structural collapse, roof leaks
302 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing, 36. 303 Adapted from Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy
Students, 36.
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APPENDIX B. K-12 SCHOOL HOT-FIT EVALUATION TOOL
K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool Template To evaluate communication & warning system technologies for use in K-12 schools
Name of Technology: ____________________________________ Evaluation Date: _______________
Evaluation Team: ______________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Establish an investigative team. Begin with the Foundation domain to establish goals. Proceed to evaluate Technologies to meet the goals. Anticipate the impact on Humans. Determine compatibility with the Organizations. Finally, analyze information in all domains to determine the Net Benefits and select a technology.
Domain #1: FOUNDATION
The foundational step in the technology evaluation process requires gaining a clear understanding of the need, the why for a new communication or warning capability. The Foundation domain is the starting place for the evaluation because it provides a focus for the evaluation of the subsequent domains. It includes identifying the Problem(s), articulating Purpose, recognizing Motivating factors, and defining Parameters. As decision-making teams work through the Foundation domain they will establish a clear basis and scope for a technology search. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#1: F
OU
ND
ATI
ON
A. Problem
i. Risk Assessment: ii. Capabilities Assessment:
B. Purpose
i. Goals: ii. Objectives:
C. Motivation
i. Internal Motivations: ii. External Motivations:
D. Parameters
i. Priorities: ii. Limitations:
iii. Scope:
198
Domain #2: TECHNOLOGY In the next step, teams will evaluate technological solutions to determine if the technology can solve the identified problems and meet the team’s stated goals. The second domain, Technology, requires a detailed analysis of the Information Quality, System Quality, and Service Quality dimensions of the technology against the criteria established in the Foundation domain. Working through the evaluative process in the Technology domain will help teams narrow the selection of communication and warning system technologies to those that have the capacity to meet their needs. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#2: T
ECH
NO
LOG
Y
A. Information Quality
i. Activation Attributes: • Type of Activation: • Accessibility of Activation: • Times & Locations:
ii. Notification Attributes: • Type of Notification: • Reach of Notification: • Speed of Notification
iii. Information Completeness: • Message Content & Accuracy: • Message Length: • Message Intelligibility
Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
B. System Quality
i. System Mechanics: • Operating Platform & System Functionality • Installation Requirements
ii. System Reliability: • Redundancies • Points of Failure
iii. Security Attributes: • System Defense: • Activation Protections:
iv. System Flexibility: • Compatible: • Customizable: • Expandable/Scalable:
Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
C. Service Quality
i. Lifespan: • Replacement or Upgrade Intervals: • Planned Obsolescence:
ii. Technical Support & Maintenance: • Internal Capacity & Restrictions: • External Capacity & Restrictions:
199
Domain #3: HUMAN In the Human domain, teams will assess, and to a certain extent, anticipate, how the technology interfaces with the people designated to use the warning systems. The Human domain comprises an evaluation related to System Use and User Satisfaction to inform the likelihood of the users’ acceptance of and ongoing implementation of the technology. A realistic assessment of the Human domain will help teams determine if the technology is a feasible and sustainable solution for those designated to use the system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#3: H
UM
AN
A. System Use
i. Impact on Daily Routines: • Personnel • School Flow
ii. Parameters for Use: • Type of emergency: • Activation Locations: • Number of Users:
iii. Perceived Support: • Management: • Peers:
B. User Satisfaction
i. Perceived Usefulness: • Need/Problem: • Improves Existing Capability:
ii. Ease-of-Use: • User Interface: • Frequency of Use: • Training:
iii. Perceived Acceptability: • Culture & Climate: • Psychologically & Socially:
200
Domain #4: ORGANIZATION In the fourth domain, Organization, teams evaluate the technology in light of its compatibility with the organizations it is to serve. The focus is on the interaction between the warning system technology and the unique Structure and Environment of the school, school district, and their community partners’ organizational attributes. It places value on to what extent the leadership of the school and their community partners accept the warning system. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#4: O
RG
AN
IZA
TIO
N
A. Structure
i. School Attributes: • Characteristics & Demographics: • Physical Configuration: • Personnel Capacity: • Existing Systems: • Acceptable to Leadership:
ii. Community Partner Attributes: • Impact on Daily Operations/Personnel: • Existing Systems: • Response Capabilities & Philosophies: • Acceptable to Leadership:
B. Environment
i. Management & Ownership: • Internal: • External (Proprietary Limitations):
ii. Financial Impact: • Initial Costs: • Ongoing Costs: • Funding Sources:
iii. Aligns with Regulations: • Codes or Licensing: • Polices/Statutes/Laws: • Labor Relations: • Risk Management:
201
Domain #5: NET BENEFITS Net Benefits is the fifth and final domain in the K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool and embodies the culmination of the investigative effort. The Net Benefits domain creates an evaluative feedback loop by revisiting findings from the prior four domains and analyzing them against the dimensions of effectiveness, feasibility, and sustainability. The Net Benefits emerge by uncovering to what extent the technology, used within the constraints of the unique school system, is effective to solve the identified problem, accomplish the established purpose, and is reliable both mechanically and operationally. It also ascertains the degree to which the technology is an operationally and financially feasible and sustainable solution for the school and its community partners. Dimensions Evaluation Variables & Team Assessment Notes
#5: N
ET B
ENEF
ITS
A. Effective
i. Solves Problem: ii. Accomplishes Purpose:
iii. Reliable:
B. Feasible & Sustainable
i. Operationally: ii. Financially:
C. Notes & Findings
Use this area to record other concerns, limitations, opportunities, benefits, and findings related to the technology.
Figure 21. K-12 School HOT-Fit Evaluation Tool Template.
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