Repeal of Laws (Art. 7)1. Kinds of Repeala. Expressb. Implied (not favored)2. Effects3. Sec. 444, Local Government CodeNavarro vs. Judge Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,respondent.D E C I S I O NROMERO, J.:The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specificacts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge HernandoDomagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency inoffice and ignorance of the law.First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding betweenGaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merelyseparated from his first wife.Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano DadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit TrialCourt of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at therespondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within hisjurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge aversthat the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someoneelse, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judgeand as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No.94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, andAdministrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.Domagtoy," which is still pending.In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his actof having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separatedfrom his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavitissued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.i[1] Withrespect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage betweenSumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Codewhich states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of thejudiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case inquestion.The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadingssubmitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.ii[2]Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant havenot been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of andrespondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed bythemselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, thewedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence ajoint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and swornto before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.iii[3]The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, butmerely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knewGaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983;that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda leftthe conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor beenheard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she isalready dead.In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficientproof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed withthe marriage ceremony. We do not agree.Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriageshall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, theprior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had awell-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearancewhere there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions ofArticles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Codefor the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to theeffect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the lawis clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absentspouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptivedeath is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirementwhich has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequentmarriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or amissing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinentprovisions of law.In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for thedeclaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, heremains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifesterror on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted bythe groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, andtherefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriageshall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling underArticle 41."The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court'sjurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or inopen court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consulor vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriagescontracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing inwhich case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by themin a sworn statement to that effect."Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for hishaving solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosariooutside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can beheld outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) atthe point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) uponrequest of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretensethat either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made byonly one party, Gemma del Rosario.iv[4]More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority ofthe solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriageceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer asprovided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate themarriage.A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, isauthorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entirePhilippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites ofthe law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judgesolemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity inthe formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity ofthe marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.v[5]Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monicaand Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in themunicipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions thereinas grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge againdemonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law.The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary anduncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is dueto a lack of comprehension of the law.The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficientin the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should beskilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that theybe conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.vi[6] It isnot too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.vii[7] Otherwise,the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errorscommitted by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times makemistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibitedignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced thestatus of married persons.The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous andvoid, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, asix-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar actswill be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in questionresulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessaryauthority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent isadvised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeperunderstanding of the law.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy ishereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.Beso vs. Dagunan, 323 SCRA 566[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent. AAED E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Dutyand Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S.Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of hisjurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriagecontract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A.YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) JuanDaguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar;xxxocb. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who actedas our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITADEAN; xxxc. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandonedme without any reason at all;d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog Cityand wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my MarriageContract;e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar ofCalbayog City that my marriage was not registered; xxx- =Lf. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge JuanDaguman, to inquire;g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all thecopies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to myinterest such as: L ==|1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriagebefore the office of the Local Civil Registrar."The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Ymanhad to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside histerritory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the followingand pressing circumstances: - 1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed andunable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of thatdate, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Ymanunexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgentlyrequesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able tofly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties togo to another town for the marriage would be expensive and wouldentail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and anotherpair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former UndersecretaryPacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Deanwere already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get marriedon August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for along period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitateanother publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond theirplans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it wouldcomplicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives asto date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by theparties;1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments(sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent found all inorder. AA 1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attentionunder present Government policy.2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believedin good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of thelaw so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to getmarried.3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registrationof the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failurewas also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control ofrespondent: -1 3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriagecertificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of thedesk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keepthe forth (sic) in his office.3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered allthe papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligentsearch in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of thecertificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoenaxxx Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said hesaw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in herbag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contactcomplainant for a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. U1 -3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she isout of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basisof the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim ofcomplainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr.Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husbandadmitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxxit seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting partiesprobably absconded with the missing copies of the marriagecertificate. 11 AA3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse butto protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recovercustody of the missing documents in some amicable way during theexpected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City ofMarikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with theCivil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copiesof said documents.The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,1998 found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" andrecommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that thecommission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing outthat:"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to thosemunicipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longerwithin his area of jurisdiction. U11Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of theFamily Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside hischamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; L 1=(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer inwriting in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a houseor place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty whenhe failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Codewhich provides: - "It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnisheither of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificatereferred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies ofthe certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the localcivil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx"(underscoring ours)It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondentJudge committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the veryfoundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our societywhose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Grantingthat respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicatecopies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort tolocate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he isexpected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputationthat the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by BernarditoYman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration forbeing devoid of proof."After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluationreport of the OCA well-taken. U=1 LJimenez v. Republic1[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institutionthus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeplyinterested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuityand permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. Itis the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent thebringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to itsdestruction."With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides,among others, that"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: U=1 (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction;xxx" (Italics ours)In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of thejudge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of theconsul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remoteplaces in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both partiesrequest the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may besolemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement tothat effect." (Italics ours) AA *1As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judgeschambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] inremote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties inwriting in a sworn statement to this effect.In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was atthe point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request madeby the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outsidehis chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is thatrespondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Besoand Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realizeddeserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]ebelieved in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the lawso that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to getmarried." U=1= A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also liveand abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearlyuncalled for.2[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;3[3] he must also beconscientious and thorough in doing so.4[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate natureof their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.5[5]If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnizationof the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed bymarriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betrayrespondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposedtowards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.-1 An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order topreserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability ofjudicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judgepause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performanceof his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know theconstitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.6[6] Thus respondentJudge should be reminded thatA priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry thefaithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or placeallowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Courthas jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are compliedwith. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions mayofficiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judgesolemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultantirregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it maynot affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official toadministrative liability.7[7] -- Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority tosolemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.8[8]Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge shouldexercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties inits solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure thatthe event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Codewhich states in no uncertain terms thatART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage tofurnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contractreferred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of thecertificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civilregistrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receiptsshall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officertransmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shallretain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, theoriginal of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of thecontracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a placeother than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) ==In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondentJudge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is chargedwith exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and officialdocuments in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records savefortuitous events.9[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned bycarelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt asystem of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the promptand efficient dispatch of business.10[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise anefficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directlyresponsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.11[11]In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined FiveThousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts willbe dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1Z1 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED FiveThousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same orsimilar infractions will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED. U1 ADavide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concurMecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103928, 11 December 1992G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.CAMPOS, JR., J .:Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decisionof the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement,dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the totalamount of P40,831.00.Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He washospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on accountof which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount ofwhich he is claiming from the COA.On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim(Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on theground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 6991of the RAC, the pertinentprovisions of which read:Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality ormunicipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actualphysical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during anyperiod of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medicalattendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person.Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any therebe.xxx xxx xxxIn case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in theline of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of thenecessary hospital fees.Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretaryof Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI,"recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioners illness to be service-connected, theCommittee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment ofpetitioners claim.However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21,1990, returned petitioners claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of theCOA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon wasrepealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 19912dated April26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "theissuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the RevisedAdministrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter".On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecanos claim to thenUndersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, SecretaryDrilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COAChairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitionersclaim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees CompensationCommission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of theAdministrative Code of 1987.Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to DirectorLim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter tothe Supreme Court if he so desires".On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned OpinionNo. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with theEmployees Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred fromfiling a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of theRevised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioners claim for reimbursement.The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987(Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleanedthat it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions theapplicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COAcontends that employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the EmployeesCompensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under bothlaws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter oflegislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provisionwhich expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended tobe repealed.3A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals.4In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was theintent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of therepealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of theAdministrative Code of 1987 which reads:Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portionsthereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not anexpress repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to berepealed.5Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991.It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must befound in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent wasnot to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms ofthe new and old laws.6This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals anintention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be giveneffect.7Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmakerthat the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clearand manifest;8otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time ofthe first enactment.9There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the samesubject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes animplied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier oneand is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.10Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subjectmatter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled orharmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying theother.11Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entiresubject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found inthe new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, militaryreservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subjectclaim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision onsickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the AdministrativeCode of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restatedin the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintainedthat to allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against theCode itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new AdministrativeCode which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and proceduralprinciples and rules of governance; andxxx xxx xxxIt argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. Thiscontention is untenable.The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not ofitself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulativeor a continuation of the old one.12What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose torepeal.13We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or codifying theformer laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intendedto cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequentstatute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute.14When both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of theprior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.15Furthermore, before there can bean implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be thesubstitute to the prior act.16According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to coveronly those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure,understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since theenactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries inthe determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with theimplementation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule inadministrative law enunciated in the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen17that in the absence of palpableerror or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of theadministrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not holdwater. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upona showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.18It has been held that Opinions ofthe Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.19Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are notfavored.20The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed toknow the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored,and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to bepassed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable toconclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relatingto some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear andconvincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subjectmatter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence,every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can bereconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.22Regarding respondents contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery ofbenefits under the Employees Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentenceof Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), BookIV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensationunder this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the RevisedAdministrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or byother agencies of the government."WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is herebyordered to give due course to petitioners claim for benefits. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.Judicial Decisions form part of the law of the land (Art. 8)Doctrine of stare decisisPeople v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Rami rez for plaintiff-appellee.Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.CASTRO, J .:This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of OccidentalMindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse thejudgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and sworn to by hi m, with themunicipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August13, 1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penaltyranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of OccidentalMindoro.In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of firearm and another case, likewise filedagainst Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person inauthority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra deIlog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a person in authority, butconvicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of theWinchester rifle in favor of the Government.Liceras appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 byGovernor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.Macarandang,1was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. Healleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa2which held that section879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents byprovincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case atbar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961" includesa grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance with thedecision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right tobear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the rule then prevailing,enunciated in Macarandang,3the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenanceof peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the RevisedAdministrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the lawsor the Constitution form part of this jurisdictions legal system. These decisions, although in themselves notlaws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Courtupon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts application orinterpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports tocarry into effect.4At the time of Liceras designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension forpossession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, theMacarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formedpart of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdictions legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandangprecedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine shouldoperate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially thosewho relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application orinterpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperativethat the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.5Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Liceras appointment as secret agent,which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time asof his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding hisnon-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.1wph1.tACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.People v. Jabinal G.R. No. L-30061,February 27, 1974G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,vs.JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.ANTONIO, J .:pAppeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accusedguilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1)year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his convictionbased on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1The complaint filed against the accused reads:That on or about 9:00 oclock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then andthere wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control arevolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shellswithout first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial wasaccordingly held.The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and theammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to beentitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as SecretAgent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PCProvincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possessand carry the firearm in question.Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. Hisappointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be aneffective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in theprovince of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to takeeffect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in thepreservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once ortwice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shallbe considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment andimmediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the SupremeCourt in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear afirearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of yourduties.By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by takingyour oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.Very trulyyours,(Sgd.)FELICIANO LEVISTEProvincialGovernorFIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:Kind: ROHM-RevolverMake: GermanSN: 64Cal:.22On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas asConfidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loosefirearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition inBatangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHMrevolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments asSecret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of theprosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.Macarandang2and People vs. Lucero.3The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence ofrecord the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the ProvincialGovernor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carrythe firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27,1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings ofthe Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs.Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused asSecret Agent and Confidential Agent.Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v.Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial courts judgment of conviction against the accusedbecause it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition withoutlicense or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in themaintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the saidfirearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issueany firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possessfirearms; and Macarandangs appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace andorder and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even toa member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code areexempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, Weheld that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to theaccused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect thecapture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication,that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for anyperson to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or anyinstrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts offirearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, RevisedAdministrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly andlawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipaltreasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in theperformance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is notexempt. ... .It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962,and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter wasthat laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision inPeople v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is:Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should hisconviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? TheSolicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the lawsmean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon alaw by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since thisCourts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construedintends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim"legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent courthas the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question andwhen he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, butwhen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should beapplied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on thefaith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it isnecessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent andConfidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated inMacarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm inspite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant maynot be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs deoficio.Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.Fernando, J., took no part.Duty of Judges (Art. 9)Chuayan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,vs.LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.ARAULLO, J.:On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipalityof Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendantrespectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of thecockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff broughtsuit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking thathis own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that thebout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of FirstInstance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaintand prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and complywith the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager ofP160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being held for safe-keepingby the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both instances againstthe defendant.The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved todismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court ofFirst Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as tocosts. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by thesame court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering theprovincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of thesame province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner, the plaintiffChinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by means of theproper bill of exceptions.The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealedfrom ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiarwith the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does notknow where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no lawwhatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questionsconcerning cockfights.The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to acase submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rulesapplicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided byhim and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons thatcan serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing themwithout deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeingthat a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, inthe second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall beobserved, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, arereversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence theycame for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made withregard to costs. So ordered.Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.Moreland, J., took no partPeople vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 251G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila,HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.KAPUNAN, J .:The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasionof Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner,1involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre anddevoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in asack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding fromit was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only ina light colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, theleft chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report ofthe victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in anInformation dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital JudicialRegion. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,conspiring and confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose truenames, identifies and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, withtreachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and withthe use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into awarehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece ofwood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously havecarnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)years of age, against the latters will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIOLAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the directcause of her death immediately thereafter.CONTRARY TO LAW.Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 SunflowerSt., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St.,Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St.,Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Mani lawere accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 11,1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly committed as follows:That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,the said accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAYAlias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have alreadybeen charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense underCriminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with treachery, takingadvantage of their superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with theuse of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into apedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse,covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece ofwood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA yLAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latters will and consentand on said occasion the said accused together with their confederatesABUNDIO LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the directcause of her death immediately thereafter.CONTRARY TO LAW.The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,presided over by respondent Judge.Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedlyshot by police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidadon August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from theInformation.After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered adecision2on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero yMaristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accusedwith the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law."3Disagreeing with thesentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondentsLagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits ofthe said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denyingthe same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero havecomplied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lackof jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of thePublic Prosecutor of Manila.WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed byboth herein accused is hereby reiterated.The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases,together with the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance withSec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.SO ORDERED.Hence, the instant petition.The trial courts finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial courtsdetermination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time onappeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the instantcase relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the respondent judgeacted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to imposethe mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crimeof Rape with Homicide.We find for petitioner.Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise ofreligious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they arerequired by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government oflaws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fearor favor,"4resist encroachments by governments, political parties,5or even the interference of their ownpersonal beliefs.In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendantat trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since thelaw in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guiltywas Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnalknowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:1. By using force or intimidation.2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or morepersons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penaltyshall be death.When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on theoccasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall bedeath. . . .6Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not ReclusionPerpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion depending on the existence of circumstancesmodifying the offense committed to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the threeinstances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly andunequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, thepenalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trialjudge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.We are aware of the trial judges misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religiousconvictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that acourt of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the lawitself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfortfaced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon whichjudges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. In Peoplevs. Limaco 7 we held that:[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusi on anddetermination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are constrained tostate our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge orwith anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of peoplewho honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as thatpenalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the dutyof judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts arenot concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of theLegislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is tointerpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of thejudiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh,unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its amendment, modification, orrepeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body.8Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the properpenalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused."9This is not a case of a magistrateignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law,refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or inexcess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposingthe penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is herebyREMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon privaterespondents in consonance with respondent judges finding that the private respondents in the instant casehad committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decisionimposing the death penalty.SO ORDERED.Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurCaltez, Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,vs.ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,respondent-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.CASTRO, J.:In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum uppatronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls forparticipants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at eachCaltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate familiesexcepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle ownersand/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration isrequired to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry formsare to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will beprovided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of litersdispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest,the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosenestove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and anEverready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" inseven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each regionwill be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prizewinners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled tomake a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by theirrespective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regionalsecond-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winnerswill be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners atthis final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 asconsolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizingthe contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto,representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to becleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of theRevised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to anyof the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall beimported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried bythe mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer oremployee of the Bureau of Posts:Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any mannerpertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerningany lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part uponlot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money orproperty of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, orpromises."SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person orcompany is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for thedistribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, ordrawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through themails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, theDirector of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of theBureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word"fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mailmatter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or therepresentative or agent of such person or company.SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphictransfer service.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to himthat any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise orscheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting anyscheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind throughthe mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise,forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order ortelegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such personor company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for thereturn to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfersdrawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules andendeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lotteryprovisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opinedthat the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined togrant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex soughta reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved noconsideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controllingauthorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by theSecretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involvesconsideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equallybanned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied theuse of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if thecontest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and allits representatives".Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition fordeclaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment berendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the PostalLaw, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring thecontest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respectivememoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'CaltexHooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under therules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and therespondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.The respondent appealed.The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first,whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second,whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shalltake these up in seriatim.1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was theapplicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief isavailable to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine anyquestion of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration ofhis rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). Inamplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laiddown certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciablecontroversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Boardof Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al.,G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that thepetition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is toassay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, anumber of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a businessenterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit everylegitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulateincreased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority chargedwith the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty tosuppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, underSections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans forthe sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties inthe dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it wasfound expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinentprovisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposedscheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correctconstruction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications inwhich the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. Theconfidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by theobstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed bythe appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted,a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. Theappellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest,and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilegedemanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the disputecannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one sideand a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical questionor issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, theuncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampersor disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of theappellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold andenforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and theappellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders areconfronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless theirdifferences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al.vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to theinsinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merelythe appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripenedinto a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positiveclaim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251,284 Pac. 350).We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question ofconstruction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the lawto a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no roomfor declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from theassumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legalprovisions can be divorced from the matter of th