negotiation in the new strategic environment: lessons from iraq

8/6/2019 Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq

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NEGOTIATION IN THE NEW STRATEGIC

ENVIRONMENT:

LESSONS FROM IRAQ

David M. Tressler

August 2007

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as dened

in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in thepublic domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United StatesCode, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Department

of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This monograph was funded by the Harvard NegotiationResearch Project through a grant from the William and Flora HewlettFoundation. The author would like to thank the U.S. Army and MarineCorps ofcers who discussed their experiences negotiating in Iraqand the following individuals who provided assistance in discussion,advice, debate, and suggestions: Robert C. Bordone, Deputy Director

of the Harvard Negotiation Research Project, and Thaddeus R. BealAssistant Clinical Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Dr. DouglasV. Johnson, Research Professor of National Security Studies, StrategicStudies Institute, the U.S. Army War College; James McCallum,Professor, U.S. Army War College; Major John Clearwater, U.S. Army,National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; Captain JonathanVelishka, U.S. Army, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;Dr. Colonel George J. Woods III, Director of Public Administration,U.S. Army War College; Lieutenant Colonel Nathan P. Freier, Directorof National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.Army War College; Roger Fisher, Samuel Williston Professor of Law,Emeritus, Harvard Law School. This monograph is adapted from apaper to be published in Vol. XIII of the Harvard Negotiation Law Review,forthcoming in Fall 2007.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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ISBN 1-58487-301-9


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CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Part I: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The Importance of Negotiation Training in the

New Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Interviews with U.S. Army and Marine CorpsOfcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Part II: LESSONS FROM NEGOTIATING IN IRAQ:PROVEN NEGOTIATING METHODS, TACTICS,AND TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Consider Context, Prepare Thoroughly,and Be Strategic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Principles of Preparation and Context . . . . . . . . . . . 17Army and Marine Experience in IraqsNegotiating Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Understand, Manage, and Adapt to Cultural

Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24The Effect of Cultural Differences

in Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Army and Marine Experience Negotiating

Across Cultures in Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Exercise Power Effectively by Integrating a Focuson Interests into the Negotiating Strategy . . . . . . . . . 33

Start with an Interest-Based Approach to theNegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Principles of Power in Negotiation Theory . . . . . . .35Army and Marine Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45


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Combine Power Moves with Interest-Based ProblemSolving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Principles of Interests, Rights and Powerin SSTR Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Army and Marine Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

The Role of Relationships in Military-CivilianSSTR Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Principles of Relationships in SSTR Negotiations . .55Army and Marine Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Part III: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARYNEGOTIATION TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Proposed Training Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Day 1: Preparation, Strategy, and Context . . . . . . . .65Day 2: Understanding and Managing Cultural

Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Day 3: Exercising Power Effectively . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

Part IV: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

APPENDIX: THE U.S. ARMY NATIONAL TRAININGCENTER (NTC) AND NTCNEGOTIATION TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

NTC Predeployment Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77NTC Negotiation Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

P r e p a r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9Tracking Promises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80Rehearsal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81Negotiation Techniques and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111


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FOREWORD

The American militarys mission in Iraq requires aset of skills and outcomes that are very different than thetraditional warghting for which soldiers are trained.These include negotiation, a common enough humanactivity that, in the context of military operations inplaces like Iraq, takes on new complexity, importance,and urgency. Negotiation has become for many militaryleaders, particularly the increasingly strategicallyimportant junior leaders, a daily task in their role ofstabilizing, securing, transitioning, and reconstructingIraq. Yet even given the prevalence of negotiation in thecontemporary operating environment, there has beenno systematic effort to study the negotiating experienceof the American military in Iraq or Afghanistan or to

understand negotiations increasingly important rolein accomplishing missions.

This monograph begins to ll the gap by analyzingthe experiences of U.S. Army and Marine Corpsofcers returning from Iraq. It integrates academicresearch on negotiation theory and practice with theirexperience on the ground. The author challenges us tosee the tactical, operational, and strategic importance ofnegotiating in an operating environment characterizedby near-constant interaction between U.S. soldiers andthe civilian and military members of the local populace.The stability, security, transition, reconstruction, andcounterinsurgency operation the United States isconducting in Iraq requires a different understandingof how missions get accomplished and what denes

mission success.The author recommends increased training in

negotiation and offers practical recommendations


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for how ofcers can improve their negotiatingoutcomes and how military trainers can supplement

predeployment training to ensure that military leadersdeploy with the skills and practice they need for whatthe author argues is becoming a mission essentialtask in the 21st century operating environment. Themonograph includes an outline of a suggested programof instruction that trainers can use to prepare leadersfor deployment.

The research behind this monograph was conductedunder the auspices of the Harvard NegotiationResearch Project at the Program on Negotiation of theHarvard Law School. It is an example of the expertiseand insight private research institutions can offer themilitary community through the Strategic StudiesInstitute.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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SUMMARY

U.S. soldiers in Iraqfrom junior to senior leadersconduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaderswhile pursuing tactical and operational objectivesthat affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission inthat country. As long as U.S. troops operate underconditions like the ones they currently face while atthe same time conducting a counterinsurgency andstability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activityand an important part of achieving mission objectives.Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can behelpful in future operations.

This monograph argues that the negotiationsconducted in Iraq have tactical importance, operational

signicance, and strategic implications because ofthe daily role they play in the missions U.S. soldiersconduct while attempting to secure neighborhoods,strengthen political institutions, acquire informationand intelligence, and gain cooperation. The aggregateeffect of so many successful or failed negotiations has animpact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplishits operational mission there efciently and effectivelyas well as meet American strategic goals.

The armed services have centers for lessons learned,combat training centers, and a variety of schools forcontinued training and development of their soldiersand leaders, but there has been no formal study ofthe negotiating experience that U.S. military ofcersand noncommissioned ofcers have gained and the

lessons they have learned over the course of theirtours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broadereld of negotiation theory and its literature to the


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practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting thosenegotiations. This monograph attempts to ll the gap

by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrativeinterviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps ofcersrecently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2)examining the predeployment training currentlyconducted at the U.S. Armys National TrainingCenter.

The author argues that insofar as negotiation is acritical skill, the U.S. militarys improvements in post-conict capabilities have not kept pace with its otherwiseimpressive improvements in warghting. The U.S.military must better prepare itself for the new rolesits soldiersparticularly junior leadershave beenasked to play in Iraq and will undoubtedly continueto play in the new strategic operating environment.Those new roles will continue to demand prociency

in the warghting skills soldiers need when combatingarmed enemies and protecting themselves againstattack. At the same time, SSTR and counterinsurgencyoperations include such constant interaction with localcivilian and military leaders that negotiation may verywell be a mission-essential task. Americas strategicsuccess in the future may depend on an expandedrange of training that includes negotiation skills. Moretime spent preparing the militarys leaders for thenegotiating they will inevitably do while deployedto Iraq is critical for mission success. Failure to adaptcould be costly.

In the worst case, poorly executed negotiationsactually do harm to the U.S. militarys mission byembittering Iraqis and turning previously neutral

civilian leaders into enemies or creating more disputesthan existed before the negotiation, all while failingeven to solve the problems or achieve the objectives that


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were originally the subject of the negotiation. At theirbest, U.S. military negotiators achieve U.S. objectives

while meeting the interests of their Iraqi counterparts,build stronger working relationships with Iraqi leaders,and engender good will among the Iraqi population.

The U.S. Army has integrated negotiation into itspredeployment training. This reects the widespreadrecognition that civil-military relations and nonkineticskills, including negotiation, now play an importantrole in the operating environment and in OperationIRAQI FREEDOMs complex mission of stabilizing,securing, transitioning, and reconstructing a countrymired in conict. While this training is an importantdevelopment, it is not sufcient.

The skill and practice of negotiation continues tooccupy a very minor role in predeployment training.It is far from proportional to the amount of time that

soldiers and commanders actually spend negotiatingwith Iraqi civilian and military leaders or proportionalto the tactical, sometimes operational, importanceof those negotiations. Most ofcers interviewed saidthey were not prepared for the negotiating they hadto do to accomplish their missions. As a result, thismonograph offers training recommendations that areconsistent with, and would enhance and complement,the U.S. militarys current predeployment training innegotiation.

The monograph provides an analysis of negotiationsbetween U.S. military ofcers and local civilian andmilitary leaders in Iraqs SSTR operation. Based on theofcers experiences, the monograph identies threekey elements of negotiation that exercise particular

force in SSTR operations. First is the context inwhich negotiations take place and which make thesenegotiations especially unique and demanding. Second,


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cultural difference is an important, but relative, factorin such context; it can signicantly affect the conduct

and outcome of a negotiation, or, more surprisingly,have little effect. Third, the element of power is shapedby a variety of factors unique to military SSTR andcounterinsurgency operations.

Based on these ndings, the author offersrecommendations for U.S. ofcers to considerwhen negotiating with local Iraqi leaders; for U.S.military trainers to consider when reviewing theirpredeployment negotiation training curriculum;and for the armed forces training and doctrinecommands to consider when planning and structuringpredeployment training. These recommendationsintegrate the extensive body of negotiation theory andresearch with the lessons learned from the experience ofthe U.S. Army and Marine Corps ofcers interviewed.

They include (1) negotiation tactics and techniquesthat may enhance the effectiveness of U.S. soldiersnegotiating with local civilian or military leaders inSSTR and counterinsurgency operations; and (2) waysto supplement current U.S. military training for soldierspreparing to deploy to SSTR operations such as thosein Iraq.

The last section of the monograph provides anoutline of a recommended program of instruction fortrainers and ofcers that will provide them the skills tonegotiate more effectively in SSTR operations and trainother leaders to do the same. The program of instructionincorporates proven negotiation principles, techniques,and methods, as well as the specic techniques andapproaches that this monograph identies as being

particularly relevant to U.S. military negotiators inSSTR operations.


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Transformation of the U.S. military requiresadaptation to (1) the types of operations it may

continue to be called upon to perform, and (2) the shiftof strategic responsibility down to the junior leaderson the ground. Negotiation is more likely than ever tobe a signicant part of military operations. As it does,negotiation training, education, and research willbecome more important for the United States ArmedForces. Improvement in military-civilian negotiatingwill promote more tactical and operational, if notstrategic, success in the increasingly complex missionsof the 21st century.


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PART I

INTRODUCTION


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local political institutions or securing information andintelligence.4

They also play a role in kinetic operations. In oneway, there is more at stake in a kinetic operation thanin any one negotiation. Threats to Iraqis, U.S. troops, orstability in general are often more immediate and lethal.Lives are at stake. The U.S. military rightly focuses itstraining efforts on preparing for kinetic operations.Yet, there are many times when negotiations ariseamid operations that often end up turning kinetic,such as cordon and searches, raids, checkpoints, andeven patrols. Negotiations are sometimes the lastchance to prevent some situations from turning lethaland to solve problems in a way that poses less riskof losing American lives or creating more enemiesthan the tactical objective is worth. Even when thereis not a risk of immediate use of force, negotiations

can contribute to accomplishing stated U.S. objectivesin Iraq: supporting Iraqis in creating, establishing,legitimizing, and running their own government andsecurity, as well as reducing the risks to Americansoldiers.

In many cases, negotiation may be one of theprimary tools the U.S. military uses to achieve missionobjectives. As long as U.S. troops operate in Iraq andface an insurgency and sectarian violence, negotiationwill be a common activity. More importantly, thelessons from the militarys experience in Iraq can behelpful in future operations with SSTR character.

The Importance of Negotiation Trainingin the New Strategic Environment.

For this reason, there should be more study of andtraining focused on preparation and strategy at the


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tactical and operational levels for engagements thatmay, in aggregate, take a signicant proportion of a

units time and, more importantly, have substantialtactical value to the unit in achieving objectives in itsarea of responsibility. Over time, success or failure inthese engagements has operational signicance to theU.S. military across Iraq and could even be of strategicimportance.5 The U.S. militarys improvements inpost-conict capabilities have not, however, keptpace with its otherwise impressive improvements inwarghting.6

Nevertheless, the U.S. military is adapting. It hasstarted to train and prepare units for Iraqs SSTRoperation in a variety of new ways. Due to the U.S.militarys increasing awareness of the importanceof nonlethal operations, including negotiations, theArmys combat training centers (CTCs) have adapted

their curriculum to include a greater emphasis on suchcivil-military interactions.7 Combat training centersprovide combat and mission-oriented training toprepare units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.The CTCs primarily rely on simulation exercises thatprovide the unit-in-training with experience facing thesame types of tactical problems and challenges theymight face during their upcoming mission overseas.The training conducted by the U.S. Armys NationalTraining Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California,is representative of the militarys predeploymenttraining.8

Until just 2 years ago, the NTC focused on trainingunits for high-intensity conict using brigade-sizedsimulated tank battles.9 The CTCs began changing their

curriculum in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF-Afghanistan) to respond to the realities that U.S.troops were facing in those two operations. It became


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clear that the nature of the mission had changed frominvasion and quick transition to a long-term security,

stabilization, transition, and reconstruction operationin the midst of insurgency, sectarian violence, andterrorism.10

The U.S. Armys current predeployment trainingin negotiation provided at the NTC is an importantdevelopment reecting the mind-shift within theArmy at the tactical level.11 But the skill and practiceof negotiation continues to occupy a very minor role inpredeployment training, and the time spent training fornegotiations is not proportional to the amount of timethat soldiers and commanders will spend negotiatingwith Iraqi civilian and military leaders or proportionalto the tactical, sometimes operational, importance ofthose negotiations.

For example, at the NTC a company commander

negotiated with the mayor of a village over thecustody of four detainees accused by the ofcer ofparticipating in an insurgent suicide bombing attack.12The commander asked for the mayors cooperation.The mayor and police chief, standing in the doorway,would not allow U.S. soldiers to take custody. At animpasse, the U.S. commander called his battalionheadquarters for permission to take the detainees byforce. He continued to negotiate with the mayor. Anagreement was reached under which the U.S. unit tookonly one of the four prisoners. As the soldiers werepreparing to take the prisoner, the town was shelledwith insurgent mortar re.

This negotiationwhich took place in a simulatedenvironment but was neither staged or scripted

demonstrates the unique, challenging environmentin which the U.S. military negotiates with civilians inoperations like Iraq. Violence and the threat and fear of


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violence often exists in the background of negotiations.The entire event was precipitated by a suicide bomber.

The negotiation was spontaneous but important toachieving a units mission objective and preventing thesituation from turning kinetic.

In this situation, negotiation was the best solutionfor both the Americans and the mayor, and despite theoption of using force, the captain found a way to avoidit through continued negotiation. The unit did notdestroy its vital relationship with the towns civilianleadership, yet it did not really meet its objective. Thiscaptain deployed to Iraq in June 2006 with experiencein trying to negotiate under these circumstances, buthe did not have as much training specic to negotiationskills as he needed to be prepared for the inevitablylarge number of negotiations like this one that hewill conduct with Iraqi civilian, police, and military

leaders.Negotiation training at the NTC focuses primarily

on battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs.It does not include junior leaders. Yet the latter arefrequently engaged in negotiations.13 Expandingnegotiation training to include all leaders who are likelyto conduct a substantial amount of negotiation whiledeployed to an SSTR operation would strengthen eachunits capability while executing its mission.14

The Army and Marine Corps must prepare for themissions they will be called upon to accomplish in thenew strategic environment of the 21st century.15 Thecosts are high of not adapting to the new roles soldiersare being asked to play and will undoubtedly continueto play in future operations.16 Those new roles will

continue to demand prociency at the warghting skillssoldiers need to combat armed enemies and protectthemselves against attack. There will continue to be


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exclusively kinetic operations for which units mustbe prepared. However, many missions inevitably will

include negotiations with civilian or military leaders. Innation-building SSTR operations or counterinsurgencycampaigns, negotiation may very well be a missionessential task.

In the many scenarios that cannot be anticipated,soldiers must call upon the judgment, adaptability,and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that theArmy or Marine Corps has trained them to use. Whenit is inevitable, however, that soldiers will repeatedlyneed to negotiate with civilians, it only makes senseto train them to do it well and to provide negotiation-specic TTPs based on the experience of other soldiersand proven theory from the eld of negotiationresearch.17 Strategic success in the future may dependon such an expanded range of training.

Dedicating more time during predeploymenttraining to preparing these leaders to negotiate willallow for training in techniques, methods, and theorythat are important for lasting effectiveness and missionsuccess. This does not ignore the militarys need toprepare its troops for the challenging and dangeroussecurity situation they face in places like Iraq. Combat-focused training must always be the rst priority.Units preparing to deploy must train on tactics,prepare equipment, and accomplish countless othertasks before arriving in theater. Time constraints makeit difcult to introduce new training. Nevertheless,given the important (and increasing) role in Iraq ofnonkinetic activities such as negotiations, the timespent training soldiers to negotiate with Iraqi civilian

or military leaders should be at least commensuratewith the amount of timerelative to combatthatthey will actually spend negotiating.


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If deploying leaders currently receive anynegotiation training, it is minimal. U.S. ofcers that

train at the NTC currently receive an approximately4-hour-long block of instruction on negotiation. Thereare many ofcers who do not even get the benet ofthis training. The research on which this monographrestsinterviews of U.S. military ofcersshowsthat a relatively minor adjustment needs to be madein predeployment training that would balance theneed for combat readiness with the need for nonlethal,mission-essential skills.

In the worst case, poorly executed negotiationsmay actually do harm to the U.S. militarys missionin Iraq by embittering Iraqis and turning previouslyneutral civilian leaders into enemies, creating moredisputes than existed before the negotiation, as well asfailing to solve the problems that were originally the

subject of the negotiation. At their best, U.S. militarynegotiators achieve their own objectives while meetingthe interests of their Iraqi counterparts, build strongerworking relationships with Iraqi leaders, and engendergood will among the Iraqi population. In between,negotiations may have less extreme effects, but mildlyproductive outcomes and neutral effects on Iraqisentiment are not exactly optimal.

In the current strategic environment, every juniorleader is a strategic corporal and all ofcers, fromlieutenant to general, are expected to be especiallyadaptable, exible leaders who are prepared toovercome obstacles and accomplish their missionsin what is often a confusing, tense, unfamiliarenvironment.18 With thousands of negotiations being

conducted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the aggregate effectof negotiations that damage the reputation of the U.S.military or do not achieve the intended outcomesor,


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alternatively, of those that dohas an impact on theability of the U.S. military to efciently accomplish its

operational mission there. More time spent preparingthe militarys leadersfrom squad leader to eldofcerfor the negotiating they will inevitably andactually do while deployed to Iraq is critical for theU.S. militarys mission success.19

Summary of Findings.

The armed services have centers for lessonslearned, CTCs, and a variety of schools for continuedtraining and development of their soldiers andleaders, but there has been no formal study of thenegotiating experience that U.S. military ofcers andnoncommissioned ofcers (NCOs) have gained andthe lessons they have learned over the course of their

tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broadereld of negotiation theory and its literature to thepractical needs of the U.S. military in conductingthose negotiations.20 This monograph attempts to llthe gap by (1) analyzing the negotiations described innarrative interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 withofcers who had recently returned from deploymentsto Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment trainingcurrently conducted at the U.S. Armys NTC.

Analysis of the interviews identied three keyelements in negotiations between U.S. militaryofcers and local civilian leaders that have particularimportance for their outcomes.21 First is the context inwhich SSTR negotiations take place and which makethese negotiations especially unique and demanding.

Second, culture is an important, but relative, factor insuch context; it can signicantly affect the conduct andoutcome of a negotiation, or, more surprisingly, have


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little effect. Third, the element of power is shaped by avariety of factors unique to military SSTR operations,

particularly the tactical or operational value placedon the relationships at stake in the negotiation. Howmilitary negotiators exercise their negotiating powermakes a difference in how successful they are.

The author offers recommendations for U.S. ofcersto consider when negotiating with local civilianleaders, for U.S. military trainers to consider whenreviewing their predeployment negotiation trainingcurriculum, and for the Army and Marine Corpstraining and doctrine commands to consider whenplanning and structuring predeployment training.These recommendations are based on analysis of theinterviews and on an extensive body of negotiationliterature. They include (1) negotiation tactics andtechniques that may enhance the effectiveness of U.S.

soldiers negotiating with civilian leaders in SSTRoperationsin Iraq and future SSTR operations;22 and(2) ways to supplement current U.S. military trainingfor soldiers preparing to deploy to SSTR operationssuch as those in Iraq.

Adopting the recommendations discussed in thismonograph will require more training, as well as morepractice and evaluation, all of which requires more timethan is currently spent training soldiers to negotiate.Ofcers who are likely to be involved in or conductingnegotiations in SSTR operations should be providednegotiation education and training lasting 2 or moredays. Those at the militarys predeployment trainingcenters who conduct negotiation training shouldthemselves have a solid foundation in negotiation

through a course at one of the militarys schools or acivilian institution, or a 3-5 day course provided by anexperienced negotiation educator or trainer.


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The monograph rst discusses the broad keytechniques or approaches to SSTR negotiations that

were developed from the interview and researchndings in each of the three areas described above.Each section provides particular recommendations formilitary negotiators that integrate negotiation researchand theory in that area with the lessons learned fromthe experience of U.S. ofcers. The last section providesan outline of a recommended program of instructionfor trainers and ofcers that will provide them theskills to negotiate more effectively in SSTR operationsand train other leaders to do the same. The program ofinstruction incorporates proven negotiation principles,techniques, and methods, as well as the specictechniques and approaches that this monographidenties as being particularly relevant to U.S. militarynegotiators in SSTR operations like Iraq.

Interviews with U.S. Army and Marine CorpsOfcers.

This monograph is based on interviews with U.S.military ofcers. Their experience includes thousandsof negotiations in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted withcivilian Iraqi or Afghan leaders, usually local mayors,sheiks, tribal leaders, or town council members. Somewere conducted in formal meetings, some informallyon the street. The issues negotiated reect the entirerange of challenges and priorities that the Americanmilitary has faced and continues to face in its ongoingmission in Iraq. Some negotiations were related tosecurity concerns, information about insurgents or

terrorists, cooperation in supporting elections, orsupport for American and Iraqi military and policeefforts. Many negotiations were over cooperation


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with, or the scope of, reconstruction efforts. Somenegotiations involved the terms of a reconstruction or

supply contract. Others were negotiations with newly-established councils over governance issues in theirtowns or neighborhoods. Still other negotiations wereover detainees or hostages.

The negotiations discussed by the intervieweesreect the experience of the U.S. military throughoutthe entire period of its occupation of Iraq that can becharacterized as an SSTR operationfrom the timethat the U.S. declared victory in the invasion throughthe current efforts to support Iraqi civilian governmentand leadership and stand up Iraqi security forces.23Except for one who spent a year in Afghanistan duringOEF, all of the ofcers served in Iraq during OIF-I,OIF-II, or OIF-III. Of those who deployed to Iraq, theirtime of service spans from the initial invasion in March

2003 to January 2006 and time periods in between. Theofcers were mostly U.S. Army active duty ofcers orformer ofcers but also included one member of theNational Guard and three ofcers or former ofcers ofthe U.S. Marines. They include infantry, eld artillery,civil affairs, transportation, and armor ofcers.24


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PART II

LESSONS FROM NEGOTIATING IN IRAQ:PROVEN NEGOTIATING METHODS,

TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES


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Consider Context, Prepare Thoroughly,and Be Strategic.

PrinciplesofPreparationandContext.U.S. soldiersnegotiating with civilians in SSTR operations shouldprepare for negotiations as they would for any otheroperation. Preparation is an important prerequisite tonegotiating effectively. That preparation should alsobe strategic, which requires a thorough understandingof the context in which the negotiation will take place.Negotiations that take place in SSTR operations likeIraq are dominated by the context within which theyare conducted.

It seems obvious to say that the context willshape the negotiation and should inform an ofcerspreparation. Yet it is worth exploring further, becausethe context distinguishes these negotiations from other

types of negotiations that take place in other settings.The context makes it more difcult to apply standardnegotiation theory to these negotiations, yet thefundamental principles described in the negotiationtheory and research still hold true for negotiations inSSTR operations. At the same time, ofcers negotiatingin Iraq tend to treat negotiations too much like anyother operation, without considering the contextualdifferences between them.

Therefore, when preparing for negotiations, ofcersshould deliberately choose a tactical approach toconducting the interaction that takes into account thecomplex negotiating context. There are many options,but they can be grouped into four general approachesdescribed in the negotiation literature:

1. Focus on power: Alternatively called contending,competition, distributive bargaining, or claimingvalue.25


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2. Focus on interests: Also called problem-solving,collaboration, integrative bargaining, or creating

value.26

3. Accommodate: Also referred to as yielding;relevant to a party who values the relationship with hiscounterpart more than the negotiations outcome.27

4. Avoid: Relevant when the cost of negotiating ishigher than the potential gain from the negotiation,or when a party can achieve the same gain withoutnegotiating.28

There are appropriate situations for each of thesetactical choices. Generally, focusing on interests andaccommodating both offer higher chances of securingagreement thanfocusing on power. On the other hand,focusing on power offers a potentially more favorableoutcome for the stronger party if an agreement isreached, but this approach entails several risks.29

Agreements tend to be more difcult to secure andmore difcult to enforce afterward. Whether soldiersfocus on power or not, their power in the negotiationwill still play a fundamental role in inuencing theoutcome. When deciding on a tactical approach, theyshould be strategic about how they demonstrate andexercise their power.30

Ofcers considering which tactical approach to takeshould consider the advantages and disadvantages ofeach, given the particular context.31 U.S. ofcers shouldconsider the specic methods needed to execute eachapproach and the effects those methods may have on theoutcome. They should also consider the relationship(s)involved and the military units priorities outside ofthe negotiation that may be affected by its outcome or

the tactics used.Analysis of the interviews provides support for one

aspect of the way the Army is now training ofcers prior


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to deployment, namely to prepare for a negotiation byunderstanding the situation in which it takes place.32

The Army places primary emphasis on achievingsituational awareness and a thorough understandingof its area of operations in its negotiation training forunits preparing to deploy. This focus on the contextwithin which military-civilian SSTR negotiations takeplace is appropriate. The experience of the U.S. ofcersinterviewed, as well as a signicant body of negotiationresearch, supports this conclusion.33

Army and Marine Experience in Iraqs Negotiat-ing Context. A signicant majority of the ofcersinterviewedand all of those with the mostexperience negotiatinghighlighted the importanceof understanding the context.34 One Marine ofcer whoserved as the commander of an Iraqi army base near

Tall Afar, Iraq, and negotiated often with a local sheiknoted that, If you didnt have a good understandingof the situation, you were atfooted . . . [and] couldbe easily taken advantage of, manipulated, or maybeunintentionally promise something that you couldntdeliver on . . . 35 It was critical, he said, that he havea thorough understanding of the entire situation, andnot just his own position.36 He believes that his successwas limited in a series of negotiations with a localsheik over the use of equipment needed to enhancesecurity at his base, because the sheik may not havebeen the right person to talk to or may not have beensomeone who could be trusted.37 Other soldiers echoedthis lesson.38

Those who felt unprepared for the task of

negotiating learned the importance of understandingthe context. An armored cavalry ofcer expressedwhat other interviewed ofcers also articulated: that


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in business and contractual negotiations with Iraqis,they felt the most unprepared because they did not yet

have an understanding of the local economy, prices,and the structure of local businesses, among the manyother situational factors.39 An infantry ofcer whoarrived in Iraq with the initial invasion force, and waslater assigned to civil-military tasks and informationoperations, discussedas an example of his lack ofpreparation for negotiating with Iraqi civiliansanegotiation for the use of a building needed by the U.S.Army. As he was negotiating the rent, he realized he didnot know what an Iraqi dinar was worth. He believesthat he appeared unprepared when he had to call hisunit for the exchange rate.40 A eld artillery ofcer whowas also in Iraq in 2003 noted that they didnt havethe landscape in front of us.41 Another eld artilleryofcer serving in Iraq as a civil-military operations

ofcer in 2004 and 2005 noted his inexperience atnegotiating and his lack of knowledge about the Iraqieconomy.42

These simple examples demonstrate the complexrealities that soldiers face when they are deployed aspart of SSTR operations and have to negotiate withcivilians outside their areas of expertise and training.Culture, of course a signicant aspect of the context, isaddressed in detail in the next section.

Other negotiations demonstrate the positiveimpact that an understanding of the context andall of its variable elements can have. For the eldartillery ofcer who started negotiating in Iraq withtoo little knowledge about the context in which hewas dealing, the time he spent negotiating hundreds

of reconstruction agreements provided him with notonly a facility at negotiating with Iraqi contractors,but a reputation as well. That reputation among Iraqis


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reected his improvement; contractors knew his limitsand that they could not take advantage of him.43 In

negotiations over the administration of a local hospital,an armored cavalry ofcer successfully took part innegotiations for which an appreciation of the contextwas critical.44 His U.S. Army unit was responsible foran area several miles outside of Baghdad. It negotiatedwith a hospital administrator to use more hospitalresources to increase hours and services for the generalpublic. The administrator claimed that he did not haveenough resources, but the U.S. ofcers involved knewthe hospital was directing a disproportionate amountof resources to preferential treatment for local sheiks.These soldiers understood the social and politicalcontext in which the hospital operated and the extentto which it had to rely on U.S. Army nancial support.They used that knowledge to apply their own and

third-party pressure to convince the administrator toincrease the hospitals hours and doctors.

Discussion. The examples discussed abovedemonstrate how an understanding of the local area andculture and the individuals involved in a negotiationthe entire contextcan increase ones strength in thenegotiation.45 One ofcer noted the importance whennegotiating in Iraq of letting your counterpart knowthat you understand the dynamics of the situation.46 Ifhe was trying to take advantage of you, it causes him tolose face because the deception is brought out into theopen. All negotiations pose a risk of one party takingadvantage of another poorly informed party. Forsoldiers conducting negotiations in SSTR operations

located in different countries with different cultures,languages, currency, customs, traditions, and norms,the potential is even greater and the need to become


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well-informed even more important. As a U.S. Armytrainer with experience negotiating in Iraq directed,

You have to be fanatical about understanding yourarea of operations. Its what youre going to do for thenext year of your life. You wouldnt move into a newhouse without knowing every nook and cranny of itand getting it inspected. So why dont you move intonegotiation with the same intensity?47

The outcome of a military-civilian SSTR negotiationcannot be understood without understanding thecontext in which the negotiation took place. Effectivenegotiation in such situations turns on the research andpreparation needed to appreciate the many particularelements that make up the entire situation. The contextin SSTR negotiations, as in all negotiations, will havemany variables, including but not limited to differentindividuals, organizations, and structural relationships;

different locations, politics, and history; different issues,priorities, and interests; as well as cultural differences,power dynamics, and relationships. Analysis of theinterviews conducted for this monograph stronglysuggests that these latter three elements dominatethe context of any particular military-civilian SSTRnegotiation, wielding the most inuence on howsoldiers and sheiks conduct negotiations.

Negotiation context often encompasses morefactors and variables than traditional situationalanalyses conducted by military ofcers for thepurpose of planning operations. When preparing fornegotiations, ofcers should take a broader view of thesituation than they are typically trained to take.

The military decision making process and steps

to completing a situational analysis or intelligencepreparation of the battleeld are useful startingpoints for ofcers preparing for negotiations. The


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military has developed these sophisticated systems foranalyzing situations and developing plans to achieve

mission success. However, these frameworks preparecommanders to make plans for sometimes very differenttypes of engagements than negotiations. In some cases,they require analysis that is focused on factors that maybe irrelevant to a negotiation, while ignoring factorsthat are critical to effective negotiation preparation.Ofcers must adapt the steps and components of thesedecisionmaking and analytical procedures to t theelements of negotiation.

Some components of the process do not requiremuch modication and can be applied to preparationfor negotiations. Developing courses of action,wargaming them, and deciding on a course of actioncan be utilized as general steps to determine thespecic negotiation techniques needed for a particular

negotiation. Mission analysis, in which an ofcerunderstands his commanders intent for the negotiationor for an operation in which the negotiation takesplace, is as important for negotiation as for any otheroperation. As discussed above, however, commandersand negotiating ofcers must take into account theentire context of the negotiation when developing theirintent, desired endstate, and goals for the negotiation.

In other cases, the planning process needs to besignicantly altered to t the tactical demands ofnegotiation. For instance, the orientation of the analysisneeds to be shifted from that of an operation againstan enemy to a negotiation with a party who may bean ally, potential ally, potential enemy, or enemy,among other possible categories. This complicates

the analysis military ofcers are trained to conduct.Ofcers should continue to analyze their counterpartsmost probable course of action and most dangerous


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course of action. However, in the case of negotiations,this should rarely be within the context of an enemy

analysis. Many questions asked about the enemyin a traditional planning process are not relevant andneed to be reoriented or eliminated for the purposeof negotiation preparation. Instead, U.S. negotiatorsshould think about their counterparts interests andpriorities, constraints, strengths, weaknesses, and therelative difference in information between the parties.

Understand, Manage, and Adaptto Cultural Differences.

The narratives of the U.S. ofcers interviewedfor this monograph provide a basis for drawingconclusions about the extent to which culture andcultural differences inuence the conduct of military-

civilian negotiations in the unique and sophisticatedcontext of an SSTR operation.48 All of the U.S.ofcers interviewed emphasized the importanceof understanding the cultural differences that existbetween U.S. soldiers and Iraqis.49 The details of theirstories and comments revealed a more complex reality,howeverone in which cultural differences interactedwith other elements of the overall context, particularlythe way in which power was exercised, displayed, orperceived by U.S. military negotiators. Moreover, tosay that culture is important does not explain howcultural differences actually inuence the way in whichU.S. soldiers and their civilian counterparts conductnegotiation, or how the presence of culturally differentvalues or norms affect their strategies.50

This section proposes that:1. The inuence of culture in military-civilian SSTR

negotiations can be signicant.51


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2. The inuence of culture is, however, dependenton (a) the relative inuence that other elements in the

negotiations context exert on the parties, including themany different cultures (e.g., national, organizational,ethnic, tribal, political, regional, professional) at playin a negotiation and the many interacting contextualelements described above,52 and (b) the negotiatorsindividual personalities and negotiation tactics.53

Therefore, even in the cross-cultural negotiationsof SSTR operations, cultural difference is only oneof many factors a U.S. soldier should consider whenpreparing for a negotiation, and he should not allowcultural difference to become a barrier to negotiatedagreement. Nor should cultural differences betweenU.S. military negotiators and Iraqi civilians be anexcuse for a negotiations failure. No negotiation needfail solely because of cultural difference.

TheEffectofCulturalDifferencesinNegotiation.Cultural difference can be a signicant factor affectingmilitary-civilian negotiations in SSTR operations.54Cultural values, norms, institutions, and ideologies thatare not shared between U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civiliansmay cause each to pay different levels of attention tothe issues involved or to each others interests. Theymay dene appropriate behaviors differently andinterpret situations differently.55 Ofcers said thatparticular cultural differences and norms, mostlynational and ethnic, affected their negotiations withIraqi civilian leaders by sometimes inuencing whatstrategies they used while negotiating. While these arenecessarily specic to Iraq, their impact on the conduct

of negotiations can be generalized to provide insightinto the dynamics of military-civilian negotiations inSSTR operations, as well as possible tactics for, andresponses by, U.S. military negotiators.56


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Some scholars suggest that three features of cultureare related to the variability of negotiation strategy

among negotiators from different national cultures:individualism vs. collectivism; egalitarianism vs.hierarchy, and the low- vs. high-context norm incommunication.57 Another framework identies vemodels for understanding the ways in which relationsbetween military ofcers and others can be culturallyinuenced: narrative and verbal styles, context style,thinking and reasoning style, information processing(ambiguity) style, and power style.58 These culturallyvariable features shape the way people understandtheir experiences, but they do not determine them.59Culture is the lens that refracts the issues or disputesto be negotiated.60

Some negotiator biases may be culturally variablebecause the social judgments they reect are likely

to diverge across cultures.61

Culture can inuencethe availability, accessibility, and activation of thesocial knowledge structures or constructs that informa negotiators cognition of the negotiation context.62This means that negotiators may not share the sameunderstanding of an issue or the same framework forthinking about the issues involved in the negotiation.Research shows that three factorsthe social context,the tasks presented to the negotiator by the conict orhis counterparts, and the negotiators state of minddetermine whether or not such culturally determinedknowledge structures are likely to make a differenceat the bargaining table because of their cross-culturalvariation.63 These three factors can help to identifythe sources of various conditions that might affect a

negotiation by predicting conditions under whichcultural differences will be pronounced (and moreinuential) or diminished. This suggests that cultural


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differences may or may not matter, depending on theconditions under which the negotiation takes place.64

Analysis of the interviews in this monographsuggests that negotiation theory should take neither anentirely universalist nor relativist approach to culturein negotiations. A universalist approach suggests thatculture does not matter at all; negotiators everywhereshare the same biases and think about conict anddealmaking in the same ways.65 The relativist approachsuggests that all of the biases and perspectives pertinentto negotiation vary across cultures, preventing entirelythe application of negotiation research from oneculture to the negotiators of another culture.66 Theevidence here, along with a substantial amount of thenegotiation literature, recognizes that neither extremeis realistic. Nevertheless, the study of cross-culturalnegotiations supports a universalistic-leaning notion

that there will often be less cultural variance in cross-cultural military-civilian SSTR negotiations than isoften assumed.67

This means that U.S. ofcers negotiating withIraqis can control and manage the effect that culturehas on the negotiation.68 Several ofcers believed thatpersonality was as likely to have a powerful effect ona negotiation as culture.69 Research arrives at the sameconclusion as analysis of the interviews: culture canhave an important effect on a negotiation but is highlycontextual and can even be manipulated, managed,or diminished by astute and effective negotiators.70 Itmay often be advantageous, for instance, to effectivelyanticipate a cultural norm in order to diminish itseffect or complement it to the advantage of securing

a commitment, instead of mimicking the Iraqicounterparts culture.71

A number of ofcers successfully managedthe conditions of the negotiations and their own


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behavior to neutralize effectively a potential barrier toagreement posed by a cultural difference. Some simply

set the conditions of the negotiation to maximize thepossibility for an optimal outcome, given the likelyinuence of a particular cultural norm of which theofcer was aware. Several of the ofcers demonstrateda cultural competence derived from their extensivestudy of Iraqi national and tribal culture; their astutesituational awareness of the area in which they wereoperating, including the local politics and economy; andtheir own personal skills. They used this to anticipate,manage, and operate effectively in the cross-culturalenvironment, often eliminating cultural difference as afactor or barrier to agreement.

Army andMarineExperienceNegotiatingAcrossCulturesinIraq. Most ofcers said explicitly that it was

essential to understand the local customs and culture.Many claimed it was the most important factor, sayingthat understanding the culture of their counterpartwas the most important variable in negotiatingsuccessfully. U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians exhibitdifferent notions of commitment and degrees ofwillingness to make promises.72 Because of theirdifferent ways of communicating and relating, theyinterpret differently statements made to each other innegotiations and attribute different meanings to them.Iraqis are more likely to understand some statementsmade by U.S. ofcers to be promises when no promisewas intended.73 U.S. ofcers negotiating with Iraqicivilians therefore need a sophisticated understandingof their cultural differences and an ability to utilize that

understanding effectively and productively.A Marine commander stationed near Tall Afar noted

that without appreciating the culture, the nuances of


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cultural difference between Americans and Iraqis, andthe role within Iraqi culture of the sheik and tribe, you

fail at whatever you need to do.74

Cultural differenceshave sometimes created misunderstanding and evendisgust on both sides of U.S.-Iraqi interactions.75 Acivil-military relations ofcer assessing the generalprerequisite of trust in Iraqi culture acknowledged that[t]here is not a lot of trust between men in a place likeIraq. However, the appearance of trust (or the societalobligation to demonstrate trust) is almost as powerfulas trust itself.76

The ofcers descriptions of their experienceconrm that cultural differences exist between U.S.soldiers and civilian leaders in SSTR operations, andthat culture has the potential to inuence the success orfailure of a negotiation from the perspective of the U.S.soldier. The ofcers emphasize that understanding the

relevant cultural styles helped them negotiate.77

Yet their experience also uniformly shows that

cultures inuence on the conduct of any givennegotiation is dependent on many other contextualfactors. The dynamic, variable interaction of factors,such as the parties interests, power, constituencydemands, potential to apply force, history, politics,psychology, personality, not to mention individualskill and experience, means that no negotiation willbe the same. The inuence that culture will have ona negotiation depends on how these factors inuencethe parties and whether they trigger culturally-specicresponses or even override the differences in culturalvalues.78 Culture is not always an important factor.

A particular correlative relationship observed

across the interviewsthat between power and culturaldifferenceillustrates just how highly contextual therole of culture is in negotiations, even between two


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parties as culturally different as American soldiers andIraqi sheiks: Cultural differences may have less effect

in a negotiation when power increases in importance,which happens when the relative power between theparties becomes more imbalanced.

In other words, the greater the asymmetry of powerbetween the parties (or perception of such), the greaterthe chance that the cultural differences between themwill play less of a role in affecting how the partiesnegotiate.79 The stronger party will have the power toignore or violate the cultural norms of the weaker partywith a lower risk of consequences. As will be discussedin the next section, there are substantial reasons tobelieve that this would rarely be a productive use ofones negotiating power in the context of a militarysrelatively long-term SSTR mission.80 It may alsodecrease ones power in the negotiation itself, if the

weaker partys response leads to an increase in hisnegotiating power.81 This relationship demonstratesthat the inuence of cultural difference will be, or canbe, minimal in many military-civilian negotiationsbeyond the cultural niceties of polite negotiators.82

The interviews further suggest that biases,perspectives, and the many other conditions that affectnegotiation are not always different across cultures.Often the general stereotypes of national or ethniccultures do not apply to individual negotiators who aremembers of that national or ethnic group.83 While thereare cultural differences, there are also similarities.84 Inmany cases, the social knowledge structures informedby culture and reecting cultural differences are notactivated in a negotiation and never become a factor.

Some of the interviewed ofcers demonstrated atendency to overemphasize the role of culture in thenegotiations they described, which may explain the


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overwhelming proportion of the ofcers who saidthat culture was the most important factor in their

negotiations.85

The same tendencies may have reectedinformation bias, a widely-studied phenomenon inwhich negotiators interpret information favorably totheir side and exaggerate the other sides position.86Some ofcers understood their negotiations differentlyand put culture into context.87 These latter negotiationsdemonstrate how cultures importance must necessarilybe dependent on the context of the negotiation and itsmany variable factors.

Discussion. One of the major lessons from thismonograph is that U.S. soldiers operating in SSTRenvironments conducting frequent negotiations withcivilian leaders in the local population must operatewith an acute awarenessbased on a thorough

understanding of the cultureof the many contextualfactors that can and might inuence their negotiations,including conditions that are culturally variableand may present cultural barriers to an agreement.The reason for this, however, may strike many ascounterintuitive. Awareness of the situation and athorough understanding of an Iraqis culture can servethe purpose of actually diminishing the importance ofthe cultural differences between the U.S. soldier andthe Iraqi. It allows skilled negotiators to control ormanage some of these contextual factors and culturalconditions in order to maximize the potential for anoptimal outcome.

First, soldier-negotiators operating in an SSTRenvironmentas opposed to an exclusively kinetic

combat operationmust understand the culture oftheir counterparts. The U.S. militarys integration ofcultural awareness into its predeployment training


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suggests its belief that cultural awareness is not onlydiplomatically benecial, but that soldiers can utilize

that knowledge tactically in a negotiation. The soldiershould not only understand the culture in a genericway but should understand what cultural variableswill be potentially in play in a negotiation, giventhe other factors making up the context. He shouldconsider what elements are present in the negotiationscontext that may accentuate or diminish such culturalvariables.

Second, a U.S. military negotiator can use thisunderstanding of the cultural differences betweenhim and his civilian counterpart to manage his ownbehavior and try to prevent activation of certainculturally variable factors that could present anobstacle to the negotiation.88 This requires a thoroughunderstanding of the others culture, an ability to reect

on ones own cultural and cognitive biases, and skill atcontrolling them. In the context of peace operations,failure to pay attention to the changing nature ofnormative expectations can lead to counterproductiveconsequences.89

Third, a U.S. soldier-negotiator can use hisunderstanding and awareness to control conditions thatmay trigger the activation of his counterparts culturalresponses, such as setting the atmosphere, controllingthe pace, or demanding proof.90 The interviews suggestseveral other ways that U.S. military negotiators coulddo this in the particular setting of SSTR operations.

The unique context of SSTR operations meansthat generalized theories of culture and negotiationmay not apply. Cultural norms can themselves

change in response to new social and environmentalconditions, such as the occupation of ones countryand disintegration of political and governmental


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order and institutions.91 The changes that resultedfrom OIF and the ensuing SSTR operation may have

precipitated changes in cultural norms because offractures in traditional attitudes and the normativeorder surrounding social relationships. Some ofcersnoted that Iraqis adapted to the communication stylesof U.S. soldiers, diminishing the importance of certaincultural norms. The very context of the SSTR operationmay alter the cultural skeleton of the negotiation,inuencing culture rather than culture inuencing thenegotiation.92 Context may rule over culture.

A soldiers ability to navigate the cultural dynamicsinherent in these negotiations can have an effect onthe success or failure of the negotiation. The U.S.military is already aware of this and has embraced theneed to better understand the culture with which itinteracts in SSTR operations such as those in Iraq and

Afghanistan.93

Equally important, however, culturewill have the impact on a negotiations outcome thatthe negotiators allow it to have or their level of skillpermits.

Exercise Power Effectively by Integrating a Focuson Interests into the Negotiating Strategy.

The authors interviews support and reect theview of negotiation theory that each partys power ina negotiation is highly context-dependent. Analysisof these military-civilian SSTR negotiations conrmsthat power in negotiations is notoriously slippery.94On the one hand, the obviousness and overwhelmingnature of the U.S. militarys occupation as the legitimate

superior force in Iraq is a commanding factor innegotiations with civilians.95 On the other hand, thispower is far from absolute, a reality that complicates


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the relationships between the U.S. military and Iraqimilitary and civilian leaders. This is why so many

military-civilian interactions in Iraq are negotiations,instead of one-way communications.

There is good reason to explore the particular contoursof power in SSTR negotiations. It has the potentialto provide a number of lessons for the U.S. militaryconducting SSTR operations in the future, whetherin Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere.96 U.S. militarynegotiators will benet tactically from thinking abouthow power affects the conduct of their negotiations.Understanding the relative balance of power betweenthe occupying military and corresponding civilian andmilitary leaders, how power is perceived and exercisedby the parties, and how the relative power of the partiescan change during the course of the negotiation mayhelp soldier-negotiators achieve their objectives.97

This section explores these issues but primarilyfocuses on how military negotiators can be moreeffective by exercising their negotiating power wiselyusing two major techniques that integrate a focus on theparties interests into their overall negotiation strategy.The two techniques are (1) Start with an Interest-BasedApproach to the Negotiation, and (2) Combine PowerMoves with Interest-Based Problem-Solving.

This section discusses the principles behind thesetechniques, drawing on leading research from theeld of negotiation. It then describes the experience ofU.S. military ofcers when they have used or failed touse these techniques. The description focuses on howpower is constituted and actually exercised in military-civilian SSTR negotiations, including how those ofcers

perceived and used their negotiating power. This leadsto discussion of how these techniques will help militarynegotiators in SSTR operations be more effective in thefuture.


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Start with an Interest-Based Approachto the Negotiation.

Principles of Power in Negotiation Theory.Negotiating power, reduced to its most elementaryform, depends on the alternative available to each party,understood as the strength of ones best alternative to anegotiated agreement (BATNA).98 The power that comesfrom having alternatives depends, however, on howthe parties perceive those alternatives and the otherpartys assessment of the alternatives. For this reason,the term estimated alternative to a negotiated agreement(EATNA) is sometimes used because it reects thehuman and cognitive complications of dening onesnegotiating power.99 These structuralist denitions ofpower are limited, however, in their ability to explainnegotiation outcomes.100 The best way to understand

the negotiating power of a party is to dene it as anaction by one party which is intended to producemovement by another.101

Generally, then, power is associated with theability to favorably change the bargaining set.102The bargaining set under which a negotiator operatesis a probability distribution of different potentialoutcomes.103Of course, the bargaining set can potentiallyshift in various directions. Whether a negotiator hasachieved a favorable change in the bargaining setdepends on the negotiators subjective beliefs abouthow the negotiated outcome (that is conditional onusing a new tactic) compares with his subjective beliefsabout the outcome that would result if he did not usethe new tactic.104 This involves a comparison of the

subjective distribution of beliefs about the variouspotential outcomes which are conditional on differenttactical decisions.


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This is similar to development and comparisonof courses of action (COA) and wargaming in the

Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The U.S.Armys negotiation training regime at the U.S. ArmyNTC focuses on a system of preparation that mirrorsthe MDMP, implicitly integrating this analyticalframework into negotiation preparation. As discussedin more detail below, however, what is too oftenmissing from training and pre-negotiation analysesis an adequate understanding of the impact and rolethat power will play in negotiations. Without it, thejudgments and decisions that military negotiators makewhen preparing for or while conducting negotiationstoo often do not lead to optimal outcomes. The correctplanning process does not necessarily always lead tothe optimal plan.

The concept of power in negotiations is complex

because power cannot be identied by just onecharacteristic, and there is no general model forexplaining its role and effect in negotiations.105 Thereare many different ways to dene and understandnegotiation power, and different types can be used indifferent settings and in different ways.106

The most widely understood type of power iscoercive power. It focuses on the ability to win, to getwhat one wants and protect ones interests.107 This isthe ability to convince a party to do something that isnot in the partys interests to do, that is, to bend theopponent to your will.108 Parties with poor BATNAswho cannot otherwise credibly persuade the otherparty that their BATNA is higher than it truly is willnd themselves weaker relative to their negotiating

counterpart.109 Scholars have identied various formsof coercive power.110 Coercive power springs from theability to leave the negotiation table or deprive theopposing party of something it needs.111


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Each type of coercive poweras well as manyother forms of power discussed in the notesexists

in military-civilian SSTR negotiations and can beexercised by the parties. In the experience of the U.S.military interviewees, they are used in negotiations byboth parties to their advantage.

The negotiating strength of a U.S. military ofcer inan SSTR operation is not as simple as his or her BATNAor EATNA. Power is dynamic and situational.112 Itwould also be a mistake to think that a U.S. militarynegotiators power is limited to his ability to applyforce.113 Traditional indicia of powerpolitical power;wealth; prestige; social inuence; governmentalor statutory authority; or, most relevant to thismonograph, military superiority, control, and ability toapply forcemay not necessarily translate into powerat the negotiating table.114 A partys power can come as

much from the making of a credible threat as from theactual capability to carry out the threat.115 Perceptionplays an important role,116 as can patience.117

A skillful negotiator can increase and exercise hispower through communicative processes that enablehim to exercise inuence.118 Even with a weak BATNA,the capacity to use what latent or potential power onedoes have is itself a form of power, because it can affectthe way the other party in a negotiation behaves.119These latter techniques of asserting power in anegotiation are particularly important in the context ofa military-civilian interaction, where coercive poweris more likely (but not always) to be imbalanced. AU.S. soldier negotiating in an SSTR operation shouldbe aware of these forms of powernot only because

he could exercise them when possible but because hisnegotiating counterparts are very likely to attempt toexercise such power.120


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A signicant body of negotiation literaturerecommends integrative, interest-based approaches

to negotiation that have the potential to producemutually benecial outcomes that meet the interests ofboth parties.121 This model focuses on the underlyinginterests and priorities of the parties instead of thepositions they communicate.122

Negotiating with a power-focused stance entailshigher risks of entering into a negative conict spiralthat may prevent achievement of an outcome desirableto the soldier.123 The negotiation literature suggeststhat negotiations dominated by a focus on poweror rights result in a contest between the parties overwho will dominate.124 This literature suggests thatsuch negotiations will have a higher frequency ofarguments, personal attacks, threats, and demands,and the outcome is more likely to be one-sided.125 Most

importantly, a negotiator who focuses on power in anegotiation is more likely to create new disputes andleave open opportunities (and motives) for revenge.126This increases the costs of an agreement and mayprevent the parties from addressing the original issuesof the negotiation. A focus on power has this effectbecause communications concentrating on powersuch as threats and comments about the weaknessof the other partyare often reciprocated during anegotiation.127 A threat prompts a threat. When suchcommunications are reciprocated, the negotiation hasa higher chance of becoming a negative conict spiral,putting a negotiated outcome in jeopardy.128

Army and Marine Experience: How Power inMilitary-Civilian Negotiations is Constituted and

Exercised. It is hard to generalize about the amountand nature of power held by the U.S. military or itsIraqi civilian counterparts, except in two ways: First,


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the U.S. military has and continues to have (thoughin changing forms) overwhelming coercive power of

one kindthe application or threat of direct militaryforce, including lethal force, arrest, detention, raids,and searchesby obvious virtue of the control thatcomes with its military control of Iraq and its superiormilitary capability. One ofcer noted that,

It was unavoidable in the negotiations. It was a fact. Iwalked into the negotiation with a 9mm pistol on my

hip . . . It was an unavoidable fact that my presence therewas justied only by my ability to maintain it throughviolence. And that was accepted. I didnt apologize for itbut I tried not to push people around for it.129

Second, the U.S. military operates under a number ofstructural, political, and organizational constraints thatnecessarily restrain its use of military power.130 These

two exceptions may not be of equal weight, however.The experience of the interviewees suggests that thecoercive power held by the militarywhether exercisedor notis an ever-present fact in negotiations,131 whilethe constraints that mitigate that power are moredependent on the situation and context. Nevertheless,beyond (or in spite of) these two factors, the partiesin military-civilian SSTR negotiations have varyingrelative amounts of power in any given negotiation thatare constituted by a variety of factors and exercised inmany different ways.

Even though the power of the U.S. military ismitigated by various factors in the unique context ofan SSTR operation, some military-civilian negotiationscontinue to take place in an environment characterized

by the overwhelming presence of military force andpower. It is important to remember that application offorce may often remain an option and the threat of force


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may sometimes be used. Therefore, when studying thenegotiating experience of U.S. soldiers, it made sense

to pay particular attention to the role that force plays intheir negotiating power, the perception of their powerin negotiations with civilians, and the tactical decisionsthey made in exercising that power.

Analysis of the interviews shows that ofcersnegotiating in Iraq sometimes conducted negotiationsin which their power was substantially greater than thepower of their Iraqi counterpart. Or that they perceivedtheir power to be signicantly greater. In such cases, theU.S. negotiators often exercised their disproportionatepower by demanding agreement on their terms.132 Thisis consistent with negotiation research suggesting thatparties with more coercive power tend to exercise thatpower.133 However, the negotiations described in theinterviews rarely included the direct use or threat of

military force. Only one included any use or threatof force: a sheiks initial detention during a raid andthe later threat of his arrest during negotiations.134 In alarger sample, there are likely to be more such uses orthreats of force as a way of exercising power.

The interviews suggest instead that it is muchmore common for ofcers to use indicia of forceto demonstrate their ability to exercise force as analternative to negotiation, hoping thereby to increaseor bolster their negotiating power.135 One ofcerarrived at a negotiation with a deliberately over-sizedcontingent of soldiers as a show of force to demonstratehis seriousness.136 Another threatened at the end of anegotiation that if his Iraqi counterparts did not fulllthe commitments made during the negotiation, he

would return the next day with a lot of soldiers, andwe will discuss this again.137 In a negotiation with thedirector of an electric power station that supplied his


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base but had not been providing power consistently,the base commander rst asked for and listened to

the directors reasons why his workers were cuttingoff the bases power. He then responded by trying toguarantee their safety from insurgent threats, but headded that if his safety guarantee was not effective inrestoring power to the base, he would resort to forceand permanently occupy the power station.138

While these negotiations did not include the use ofactual force, they included explicit or implicit threatsof force. In these instances, the ofcers were trying totake tactical advantage of what they perceived to beasymmetric power in their favor by inuencing theperceptions of their counterparts. In many cases, thenegotiations led to successful agreements that satisedthe U.S. military negotiator. This supports relativelynew research ndings that power asymmetry may

actually lead to negotiations that are more efcient andeffective than ones characterized by near-symmetricpower.139 Sometimes the results were not as clear,however.

When a civil-military operations unit of the FourthInfantry Division was attacked just north of Baghdad inAugust 2003 after 2 1/2 months of peaceful operations,the commander called a city council meeting of thelocal sheiks.140 It [relations between the U.S. Armyunit and local Iraqi leaders] didnt really become anegotiation after the attacks started. It was more of anger proverbially in the chest.141 The sheiks were toldthat such attacks were unacceptable, and that they wereexpected to provide information on who had committedthe attacks and to cooperate with the U.S. forces in the

area to prevent future ones. The captain involved had adifcult time calling it a negotiation, because of securityissues it was very much one way.142 The conduct of


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this negotiation, and the series of related negotiationsbetween local sheiks and ofcers from the unit, was

affected by the U.S. soldiers perception of their powerin that particular context. The interview makes clearthat the source of that perception was the obvious factthat the U.S. Army was the legitimate military force inthe area.143 The perception of how this translates intopower in the negotiation is worth exploring.144

According to this perception, the U.S. negotiatorspower was constituted primarily, if not exclusively,by the potential to apply force of some kind, and wasmuch greater than that held by the Iraqis. In fact,because it necessarily assumes that the U.S. militaryhas a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, thesheiks were perceived as being relatively weak.

The parties perceptions play a critical rolein this relationship between military force and

negotiating power.145

The potential for cognitivebias in these perceptions is signicant. Cognitivebiases are psychological effects that cause errors inmemory, information processing, social judgment, andproblem-solving. This monograph does not addressthe substantial body of research on cognitive bias innegotiation or attempt to apply it to the negotiationsdiscussed by the interviewed ofcers, but it is importantto note the likelihood that in at least some cases andpossibly this one, a U.S. soldier may overestimate hisnegotiating power and mistake his ability to applyforce (which he may have) for the power to demandconcessions in a negotiation (which he may nd out hedoes not have).146

In negotiations laced with the kinds of opportunities

for cognitive bias that both cultural differences andmilitary power present in especially tempting ways, anawareness of the existence, challenges, and effects of


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cognitive bias may be especially important to those U.S.military negotiators or trainers interested in improving

their negotiating effectiveness and success.147

The use of military force in an SSTR operation can

be charted on a continuum showing how the natureof operations changes as an SSTR operation matures.148At the beginning of the continuum, the military isprimarily concerned with security and stabilization,which will involve basic reconstruction of essentialinfrastructure and humanitarian aid but will mostly beconcerned with securing the country. There are morekinetic operations and a higher chance that lethal forcewill be used. As the operation progresses, securitycontinues to be a priority, but the mix of activitieschanges from primarily security-focused objectives totransition and reconstruction activities, which includeoperations to construct schools and hospitals; train

new security forces; and establish, supervise, andcoordinate with local civil government. In this context,direct military force is not used or threatened as much,even though any potential force that the military couldapply continues to be an obvious fact.149

SSTR operations are challenging becausestabilization, security, transition, and reconstructionmay take place concurrently. In the context of whatotherwise would be reconstruction, for instance, alegitimate need to use force may arise for security-basedreasons. In some locations, the military may still beperforming a more traditional security operation, andin others, it may be executing primarily a reconstructionand transition mission. Nevertheless, for the purposesof studying negotiations that take place in SSTR

operations, any particular negotiation can be placedon the continuum according to its immediate contextand the particular mix of security, reconstruction, andtransition activities taking place.


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The interviews show that the issue of force is afactor in the balance of power between the parties to a

negotiation to a greater or lesser extent depending onhow close to kinetic operations that negotiation fallson the SSTR continuum. The closer a negotiation is onthe continuum to combat operations, the greater thechance that the soldier will perceive himself to havemore power in the negotiation and the more likelyit is that his Iraqi counterpart will believe the samething.150 The threat will be more credible. But theseperceptions are likely to be different the farther awaythe negotiation is from kinetic operations and the moreclosely involved it is to transition and reconstructionoperations, so that the threat of direct military forcewill have less inuence in constituting the U.S. militarynegotiators power in a negotiation with an Iraqileader.151 In this case, the negotiating power of the U.S.

soldier is more likely to be constituted by fac

negotiation in the new strategic environment: lessons from iraq

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