Power, Politics, and Perception: Neoclassical Realism and Middle East Wars

Matriculation # : 080001779

Word Count: 5,262

2008-12-08

The modern Middle East is an inter-state arena with a long history of conflict and war.

From the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to the current war in Iraq, the modern Middle East appears

to be a region which best epitomizes neorealism’s claim that the anarchy and insecurity of a

state system is the principal determinant of conflict. However, constructivists claim that

realism’s neglect of the incongruence between identity and sovereignty, as well as between

nation and state within the Middle East, proves realism inept to explain the entirety of causes

of conflict in the region.1 In this study, I argue that while both constructivism and neorealism

do contribute much to the debate of what explains conflict in the Middle East, a neoclassical

realist approach does so more thoroughly and accurately due to its inclusion of first, second,

and third image variables.

Understanding Neoclassical Realism

Since Neoclassical Realism’s acceptance as a distinct school of international relations

thought by Gideon Rose in 1998, it has been described by numerous scholars as bridging the

gaps between classical realism, neo-realism, constructivism, liberalism, and foreign policy

analysis.2 Rose offers the subsequent description of the school:

1 ? Constructivist IR theory is most closely associated with the work of Alexander Wendt. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). Neorealist IR theory is most closely associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).2 ? Brian Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism," Security Studies 17 (2008): 294-321; Gideon Rose. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." World Politics 51 (1998): 144-172; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 1-25; Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," Security Studies 15 (2006): 464-495.

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It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables… The scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why [it] is realist. The impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why [it] is neoclassical.3

Neoclassical realism is therefore both an extension and a response to Waltzian

neorealism which—unlike the works of pre-Waltzian realists—makes no claim to explain

foreign policy or specific historical events.4 This response is accomplished by neoclassical

realism’s addition of “domestic politics, internal extraction capacity and processes, state

power and intentions, and leaders’ perceptions of capabilities and relative power” to explain

foreign policies.5 The addition of these variables distinguishes neoclassical realism from

other realist schools of thought and creates a unique four-level model for understanding

international relations.6

Foreign Policy Model of Neoclassical Realism

The starting point and independent variable in the neoclassical realist model is neo-

realism’s anarchic international system. This structural environment of self-help and the

balance-of-power is the primary determinant of state’s interests and behaviors in neoclassical

realist theory.7 Neoclassical realism is predominantly concerned with how relative power

establishes the fundamental parameters of a state’s foreign policy.8 This is where

neoclassical realists diverge between offensive and defensive neoclassical realists. The

offensive variant—the larger contingent—contends that “instead of assuming that states seek

security… states seek to control and shape their external environment” and furthermore,

3 ? Rose, 146.4 ? Schweller, Progressiveness, 317-320.5 ? Ibid, 317.6 ? See Appendix 1.7 ? Sterling-Folker, 1-5.8 ? Here power is broadly defined here as “the capabilities or resources… with which states can influence each other.” See William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4.

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“they are likely to want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to

the extent that they are able to do so.”9 Still, what truly matters to neoclassical realism are

the perceptions of relative power by leaders and elites, because “statesmen, not states, are the

primary actors in international affairs.”10 States do desire to increase their relative power

position, and therefore their security, but to understand their capacity to pursue such policies

one has to look inside the state at its domestic state power and leadership. By incorporating

agency, neoclassical realism contends that “there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt

linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour.”11

The next level in the neoclassical realist foreign policy model is the first intervening

variable; each state’s individual leader or decision-makers who dictate foreign policy. The

foreign policies of states are a product of a leader’s perceptions regarding their place in the

balance of power, likelihood of regime survivability, risk and reward of certain policies, and

ideological beliefs. Also, Rose reminds us, the influence of structural factors are not always

obvious, and given that it is up to each state’s leader or leaders to make sense of its

ambiguous relative power position and respond accordingly, foreign policies do not

necessarily coincide with the systemic environment.12 In similar fashion to Waltzian

neorealism, neoclassical realism argues that when leaders misperceive the international

system, or make foreign policy decisions based on non-systemic factors, “the system will

discipline the state… in the form of foreign policy failure.”13

Neoclassical realism's second intervening variable is domestic state power. 

Neoclassical realism argues that a state's internal characteristics influence how that state can

extract internal resources to respond to the anarchical nature of the international system.14

9 ? Rose, 147. 10 ? Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 42.11 ? Rose, 147.12 ? Ibid.13 ? Rathbun, 311.14 ? Fareed Zakaria similarly defined state power as "the portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes, and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends." See Zakaria, 9.

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Therefore foreign policy is not simply a direct product of the will of statesmen, but rather

dependent upon the variables of each country's state apparatus.  Taliafferro and Schweller

have defined these relevant domestic variables which potentially constrain each state's

response ability as: level of state institution formation, use of regime-legitimizing ideology or

nationalism, level of elite consensus and cohesion, and level of social unity.15 Just as states

are expected to be met with foreign policy failure if decision-makers fail to justly account for

the constraints in the international system, they are also to meet problems when they attempt

to subvert any domestic constraints to their foreign policy decisions.16   

Neoclassical Realism and Middle East Wars

In this study I offer a revised version of the neoclassical realist foreign policy model

in order to explain the causes of war in the Middle East.17 Consequently, war will be treated

not simply as a given characteristic of the international system, but rather as a foreign policy

decision by independent states. This model begins with the independent variable, the

international system. In order for war to occur, the distribution of power in the international

system must create an environment where one leader may perceive they have an opportunity

to increase their state’s relative power or security by choosing to instigate a war. The

international system conditions war, but it does not control it. The next two levels, domestic

state power and leader perceptions, mirror the intervening variables of the foreign policy

model, but in this model are interpreted by how they specifically precipitate or impede

decisions to instigate conflict. Therefore, war is a result of the interplaying of first and

second image variables in the environment created by the international system.

15 ? Randall Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." International Security 29 (2004): 169; Taliaferro, 486.16 ? Rathbun, 313.17 ? See Appendix 2.

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The Middle East proves to be a superior candidate to utilize this form of analysis due

to its history of conflict, varied levels of state power, and the existence of highly influential

leaders and decision-makers in the region. For this study, I will be utilizing two cases—the

Six Day War and the Iran-Iraq War—to illustrate that neoclassical realism is the international

relations theory that best explains the causes of Middle East wars, due to its unique inclusion

of first, second and third image variables.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War

Systemic Level

Israeli Security Dilemma Leading up to the June War, Israel’s systemic position remained precarious, due to its

geopolitically vulnerable situation. Israel was a small country, weakened by the reality that

an Arab invasion from the Jordanian-controlled West Bank could easily split the country in

two. In addition to this lack of strategic depth, Israel lacked a sufficient population to field a

substantial active-duty military, thereby making any conflict involving a prolonged

mobilization of reserves potentially crippling to the Israeli economy.18 Lacking any tangible

regional military alliance or agreement, Israel was also reliant solely on itself within the

region. Even the United States—Israel’s great power patron—supported Israel with aid and

trade, but desired no direct involvement in Middle East regional conflict. These factors,

coupled with Israel’s geographical encirclement by rival states which desired its elimination,

led Israel to what Yitzhak Rabin called, “a constant state of dormant war.”19 This pervasive

belief in Israel paved the way for the acceptance of a military doctrine supporting pre-

emption, rooted in Israel’s need to win quick, decisive wars on enemy territory.20

18 ? Hinnebusch, 164.19 ? Rabin’s “dormant war” meant that even during times where no violent hostilities between Israelis and Arabs were occurring, Israel still viewed the controlled use of force as a key component of its survival strategy. See Avner Yaniv, National Security and Democracy in Israel, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 13.20 ? Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Strategic Plan for Peace and Security, (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2005), 17.

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Israel also maintained a material advantage over its Arab neighbors in the realm of

military capabilities. When combined, the Arab armies did have a quantitative advantage

over Israel in regard to raw numbers of weaponry.21 However, as Charles Smith notes, this

quantitative advantage did not translate in to a qualitative advantage.22 Moscow, fearing

direct confrontation with a US client state, provided Egypt and Syria with primarily weapons

which were not sufficient “to allow contemplation of successful first-strike or total victory,”

while the US and France provided Israel with advanced offensive capabilities, such as long-

range attack bombers. 23 Israel’s advanced military was far more prepared for a war which

rewarded first-strike capabilities, subsequently giving Israeli military leadership confidence

in any potential conflict with its neighbours.

Great Powers In the 1960’s, the great powers which permitted relative stability between the Arabs

and Israelis were beginning to change their interests. While Nasser had managed to

manipulate bi-polarity since his rise to power, his increasing tendency to move in to the

Soviet camp forced the United States to begin viewing Egypt as a Soviet client state, and

against the US effort of Soviet containment.24 Any goodwill Nasser had with the United

States was lost due to his persistent Pan-Arab rhetoric, which changed Egypt’s global image

from the victim during the 1956 Suez War, to the aggressor in the 1960’s. Nasser’s actions

had destroyed any incentive the US previously had to serve as a peace broker between Egypt

and Israel, while simultaneously limiting Soviet involvement due to their fear of

confrontation with the US .25

21 ? Walter Laqueur, The road to war: The origin and aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967/8, (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 82-8422 ? Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2007), 285.23 ? John D. Glasman, Arms for Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War in the Middle East, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975), 36.24 ? Hinnebusch, 169-170.25 ? Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967, (London: Westview Press, 1994), 218-225.

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Domestic Level

Arab’s Lack of Regime Legitimacy The imposition of the Westphalian state system on the Middle East created a region

where sub-state identities cut across the manufactured state boundaries. Therefore the leaders

of these “territorial states” lacked legitimacy, and needed to find alternative means to win

local support and protect the regime from harmful nationalist movements.26 According to

Jack Snyder, when numerous domestic regimes are faced with legitimacy problems coupled

with possible regime-threatening cross-border identities, the leaders have the choice of either

outright repression, or regional competitive nationalist outbidding.27 Arab regimes were still

in the process of consolidating power, and they did not have the choice of authoritarian

repression due to their domestic weakness. Accordingly, Arab states competed in Pan-Arab

nationalist outbidding in hopes of securing legitimacy at home while simultaneously

increasing their regional influence. As the neoclassical realist scholar Jeffrey Taliafferro

notes, regimes which base their legitimacy on supra-state nationalism trade the ability to

extract resources from society for both a loss of autonomy in foreign-policy conduct and an

increased probability of inter-state war.28

Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged as the regional leader of the Pan-

Arab movement following his defiance of Western imperialists during the Suez Crisis of

1956. Ba’thist Syria, seeking to champion its own Pan-Arab credentials, challenged Nasser

over his lack of support for the Palestinian cause, which resulted in nationalist outbidding and

Nasser’s undesired provocation of Israel.29

26 ? Eberhard Kienle, Ba'th Versus Ba'th: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 1-30.27 ? Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000). 21-39.28 ? Taliaferro, 474.29 ? Smith, 271-272.

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With Egypt’s forces tied up in Yemen and the possibility of an Arab-Israeli war

ending his bid for Arab leadership, Nasser’s obvious lack of support for any pro-Palestinian

policy brought about heavy criticism from other Arab regimes. In an attempt to quell

revisionist Syria’s continued provocations of Israel, Nasser organized Arab summits in hopes

of “spread[ing] responsibility for inaction among Arab leaders,” and eventually signed a

defense agreement with Syria.30 Nevertheless, with its new Egyptian security blanket Syria

actually increased its support of Palestinian fedayeen raids from Jordan in to Israel, which

served the tripartite purpose of hurting Israel, shaming Nasser, and weakening Hussein in

Jordan.31 The increased Palestinian raids prompted the claim by the Israeli government that

further attempts by Syria to sabotage Israel would provoke military action aimed at

overthrowing the Syrian regime.32 Nasser had to act or risk losing his Pan-Arab legitimacy.

Nasser ultimately ordered the removal of UNEF troops from the Sinai, closed the Straits of

Tiran signed a defense pact with King Hussein of Jordan who viewed war as inevitable.33

This escalation brought on by a lack of Arab domestic legitimacy, created a situation where

the already insecure Israeli state was now facing encirclement by a newly-aligned and

increasingly aggressive enemy. The systemic factors may have created the strategic

environment, but as neoclassical realism suggests, it was domestic issues which precipitated

the events.

Weak Israeli Institutions While domestic issues in the Arab states instigated conflict, it was the inability of the

Israeli cabinet to resist pressure and coercion from the Israeli military which brought about

the creation of a new pro-war coalition cabinet on June 1st. Elites in Israel were divided

30 ? Hinnebusch, 167.31 ? Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 22.32 ? Laqueur, 85-87.33 ? Smith, 287.

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between the activist hawks who desired an Israeli first strike, the irredentist Gahal coalition

who desired Israeli expansion, and the pragmatic camp—led by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

—who desired a policy of US-brokered diplomacy.34 Nasser’s previously mentioned

provocations forced numerous votes by Eshkol’s cabinet on the desired response, with each

vote ultimately calling for further diplomacy.35 Yoram Peri notes that Eshkol’s hesitation to

call for conflict, mixed with the already close relationship between the Israeli military and

political establishments caused the pervasive penetration of Israeli politics by members of the

Israeli military.36 With the Eshkol cabinet lacking legitimacy, military generals began to

make direct demands to Eshkol to include in his national cabinet members of the hawkish

Rafi party, and the irredentist Gahal coalition. This politicization of the Israeli military

demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli cabinet as an institution, and Eshkol ultimately

succumbed to the pressure on June 1st and appointed Rafi’s Moshe Dayan as Minister of

Defense, and Gahal’s Menachem Begin as a minister without portfolio.37

Leadership

Nasser In the case of Nasser, his misperceptions of the international system, and his personal

desire for regional leadership led to foreign policy choices that brought about the 1967 war.

Nasser wrongly perceived that his removal of UN forces from the Sinai and the closing of the

Straits of Tiran would induce a US-brokered diplomatic agreement, and allow Nasser to

escape with no military defeat and increased Pan-Arab prestige.38 However, Nasser did not

account for the growing disdain for the current Egyptian regime within the Johnson

34 ? Ibid, 287-288.35 ? Yoram, Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 244-247.36 ? Ibid, 244-251.37 ? Ibid, 247-251.38 ? Smith, 287.

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administration, which ultimately led to US acquiescence of Israel’s decision to pre-emptively

strike Egypt.39

Dayan and Begin Eshkol’s creation of a new cabinet, which included the ideologically-driven Moshe

Dayan and Menachem Begin, tipped the balance within the cabinet so that any vote regarding

the initiation of conflict with Egypt would be met with approval. Dayan, a passionate

supporter of the Israeli military, saw the current crisis as a perfect opportunity for Israel to

crush Nasser’s Egypt and display Israel’s military superiority.40 In comparison, Begin’s

ideological beliefs were deeper and more historically-driven than Dayan’s affinity for

military force. Begin viewed the crisis in May of 1967 as an opportunity to realize Eretz

Yisrael, the land promised to the Jews in the Hebrew Bible.41

Summary

The variables which ignited the 1967 Arab-Israeli War support the tenets of the

neoclassical realist model of war decision-making. The mixture of Israel’s insecurity and

military superiority to its Arab rivals, combined with great power interests created an

environment where Israel elites perceived war as simultaneously bringing security and

relative power gains. These structural realities were intensified by the domestic situations in

both the Arab states and Israel. The international system put the option of war on the table,

but the lack of Arab regime legitimacy which influenced Pan-Arab outbidding created a

situation where Nasser provoked Israel so far that if Jerusalem did not choose war, it would

only strengthen Nasser’s prestige in the region. The domestic situation in the legitimacy-

lacking Arab countries increased the feelings of insecurity within Israel which empowered

39 ? Richard B. Parker, The Six-Day War: A Retrospective, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 136-141.40 ? Laqueur, 169-177.41 ? Hinnebusch, 169.

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Israeli hawkish forces, who then infiltrated Israel’s decision-making structure due to the

vulnerability of the Israeli cabinet to coercion. The international system provided the

conflict-permissive environment, and the domestic situations of the states involved served to

encourage and not discourage conflict. However, it is individuals who make the decision to

go to war, and in the case of both Israel and Egypt’s leadership, misperceptions and beliefs

increased the likelihood of conflict. Nasser desired to be the leader of the Pan-Arab

movement, and his perception that he could take Israel to the brink and avoid war did not

coincide with the realities of the international system, and the changing nature of Israel’s

domestic structure. As neoclassical realism suggests, because Nasser’s decisions to

increasingly provoke Israel stemmed from his domestic situation and not from a rational

calculation of Egypt’s relative power, the international system punished Egypt with foreign

policy failure. Finally, the inclusion of Dayan and Begin in the new Israeli cabinet

introduced two voting members who supported war with the Arabs on ideological grounds.

Neither Dayan’s pro-military nor Begin’s Zionist ideology can be directly blamed for Israel’s

choice for war, but they did motivate two individuals who were vital in the war decision-

making process, and therefore indirectly added to the already conflict-permissive

environment. The June War demonstrates how the interplay of domestic politics and leader’s

perceptions, in the environment created by the anarchical international system, can ultimately

activate conflict. While constructivism would fail to take into account the necessary systemic

factors acting on Israel and the Arab states, neorealism would similarly fail to appreciate the

importance of identity in brining about the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Iran-Iraq War

Systemic

Changing Power Balance in Gulf The Iran-Iraq War can not thoroughly be examined without analyzing the relative

power gains of Iraq in comparison to Iran in the years leading up to Iraq’s invasion. From

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1975 to Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September of 1980, Iraq’s relative power situation in the

region vastly improved, thereby creating a perception—held by Saddam Hussein and other

Iraqi elites—that a conflict with Iran would end favourably for the Iraqi state. In 1975, facing

an Iranian-supported Kurdish insurgency, Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement, which

essentially traded territorial concessions to Iran regarding the Shatt al-Arab waterway for the

cessation of Iranian support to Kurdish insurgents.42 While Saddam Hussein personally saw

the Algiers Agreement as a formal acknowledgement of Iranian primacy in Iraq’s internal

affairs, the agreement allowed Iraq to make considerable relative power gains in the region.

By sidelining bilateral tensions with Iran and halting the Kurdish insurgency Iraq was able to

focus on building its military and stabilizing the economy.43 In the late 1970’s, increased

Iraqi oil production coupled with record high oil prices brought a vast influx of wealth to the

Iraqi state. By 1979, Iraq’s new riches allowed for an increase in military spending to 13% of

Iraq’s GDP, or $2 billion USD per year.44 Total military manpower in Iraq jumped from just

over 100,000 in 1973 to a force equal to Iran’s at over 240,000 in 1980.45 Additionally, Iraq

used its new economic clout to leverage between France and the Soviet Union to purchase

arms at increasingly lower prices.46 Economically, Iraq’s financial reserves rocketed to over

$35 billion USD, increasing confidence that Iraq could finance both a war and its domestic

economic and social policies.47

While Iraq’s military and economic expansions drastically altered the regional

balance of power, equally striking is Iran’s relative decline in power due to domestic strife

related to the Islamic Revolution. In 1978, a massive strike by Iranian oil workers protesting

42 ? Efraim Karsh, "Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War," Middle East Journal 44 (1990): 264.43 ? Andrew T. Parasiliti, "The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment." International Political Science Review 24 (2003): 156.44 ? Mike Froelich, and Jack S. Levy, “Causes of the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Regionalization of War, eds. James Brown, and William P. Snyder, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), 137.45 ? International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1979-80. (London: 1980); International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1973-74. (London: 1974).46 ? Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), 140-141.47 ? Froelich and Levy, 137.

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the Shah led to a drastic drop in oil production, creating significant revenue problems for the

Iranian state leading up to the war with Iraq.48 Interestingly, Iranian revolutionary leaders

viewed the Iranian military as a source of prestige for the Shah, while the Revolutionary

Guards were seen as necessary for protecting the revolution domestically.49 Therefore, the

Iranian military was seen as expendable, and became the victim of large cutbacks in order to

deal with Iran’s economic woes. From 1978 to 1980 the Iranian military budget was halved,

arms orders were cancelled, equipment was left unmaintained, and nearly “50% of the

officers between the rank of major and colonel were removed” from their positions.50 Adding

to the military’s already dismal state were large scale desertions, dropping the Iranian

military’s size from 415,000 in 1979 to roughly 240,000 in 1980.51

Great Powers Adding to the conflict-inviting environment was the lack of interest and ability of

either the Soviet Union or the United States to halt Saddam Hussein from attacking Iran. On

November 4th, 1979, Iranian militants seized the American embassy in Tehran, taking 52

American citizens hostage. The Iranian Hostage Crisis induced US President Jimmy Carter

to cancel $300 million USD in arms shipments to Tehran, sever US-Iranian diplomatic

relations, and ultimately impose economic sanctions on Iran.52 This strained relationship

between Iran and the US led to what Chubin and Tripp described as “concealed satisfaction”

within the US regarding the Iraqi invasion.53 While the US did not openly support Iraq in

their war decision, they were not interested in stopping them either. Moreover, the Soviet

Union was equally dissatisfied with Iran, and its policies reflected a neutral stance toward the

48 ? "Another Crisis for the Shah." Time, November 13, 1978. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946149,00.html (accessed November 25, 2008).49 ? Shahram Chubin, and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, (London: Westview Press, 1991), 33.50 ? Ibid.51 ? Greg Cashman, and Leonard C Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 279.52 ? Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 451-454.53 ? Chubin and Tripp, 207.

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conflict. Revolutionaries in Iran openly denounced the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan,

and the call for the exportation of the revolution threatened Soviet stability in its Muslim-

dominated regions and satellite states. The Soviet Union’s decision to not denounce the Iraqi

invasion, but simultaneously offer Tehran jet fuel, arms, and assurances on the joint Iran-

Soviet frontier, demonstrates the Soviet’s attempt to play a neutral role in the conflict.54 The

decision of neutrality stems largely from their shared perception with the Iraqis that the war

would end quickly. Once Iran began to gain ground in 1982, and commenced military

incursions in to Iraqi territory, the Soviet Union increased their direct arms supplies to Iraq.55

Material Gain Opportunities The Iraqi perception that revolutionary Iran was weak and unable to handle an Iraqi

military offensive was exacerbated by the large material gains awaiting a successful Iraqi

invasion. Confident in its relative power position, Iraqi leaders undoubtedly viewed the

opportunity to regain full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and seize the oil-rich and

Arab-dominated region of Khuzestan as a chance to further shift the regional balance of

power in Iraq’s favour.56 Offensive realist scholars would claim that these opportunities

mixed with perceived Iranian weakness, Iraqi strength, and great power indifference were the

main driving factors of Saddam’s choice to attack Iran. Conversely, as Gause notes, Saddam

waited until September of 1980 to launch an attack on Iran, and if he was solely capitalizing

on a permissive environment he would have acted much earlier.57 While these factors created

an environment which allowed Saddam to ultimately choose military action, and were

undoubtedly influential in Saddam’s decisions, one must look at the domestic levels of each

state to further understand what brought about this conflict.

54 ? Ibid 221.55 ? Ibid 222.56 ? Jasim Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 229-236.57 ? F. Gregory Gause III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War," The Middle East Journal 56 (2002): 69.

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Domestic

Iranian Ideology and Elite Fragmentation The new Iranian regime, ushered in by the Iranian Revolution, created new fears of

insecurity for Iraq and added to the already conflict-welcoming environment. In February

1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in Iran espousing a radical doctrine of

Islamic government in direct opposition to the secular policies of Reza Shah. As Walt notes,

regimes which come to power following a revolution lack legitimacy, and often use ideology

as a way to consolidate power and increase stability.58 Therefore, Khomeini and other Iranian

clerics who came to power promoting the universalistic ideology of Islam began to call for

the exportation of the Islamic Revolution to other Muslim-dominated states, primarily as a

way to dually gain legitimacy and increase their influence in the region. In addition, the new

government in Iran was also in the process of a power struggle, as fundamentalist elites and

clerics were being challenged by leftists and autonomy-seeking minorities.59 The easiest way

for these clerics and elites to strengthen the public standing of the fundamentalist camp—and

their position within it—was to compete in ideological outbidding by increasing their calls

for the exportation of the revolution.60 After the resignation of Prime Minister Bazargan and

the subsequent consolidation of power by the more radical forces, Iran began to use state

resources, such as the Revolutionary Guards, the Interior Ministry, and the Intelligence

Ministry to sponsor potential revolutionaries in other states.61 This elite competition and

radical ideology proved influential in Iraq’s war decision due to Iraq’s own domestic

fragmentation.

58 ? Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 22-30.59 ? Homa Omid, Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 143.60 ? Ibid, 144-145.61 ? Hinnebusch, 194.

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Iraqi Social FragmentationIran’s use of a regime-legitimizing ideology brought about an increase in the

likelihood of conflict because of its direct relation to social fragmentation realities within the

Iraqi state. While Shi’a Iran’s call for Muslims to rise up against their secular governments

was aimed at the entirety of the Islamic ummah, it was felt predominantly by Shi’a Muslims

in the region who identified with Iran’s Shi’ism.62 This put Iraq, a state with a 60 per cent

Shi’a majority and a Sunni government, in severely vulnerable position. The aforementioned

use of Iranian state resources to export the revolution is demonstrated in Iranian support to

Iraqi Kurds, underground Iranian Shi’a movements, and the Shi’a Da’wa political party.63

These actions by Iran directly challenged the survivability of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Iran’s provocations of Iraq and their decreased relative power in the region created a situation

where a war with Iran could be rationalized by Saddam as both a war of opportunity and a

war of vulnerability.64

Politicized Iraqi Domestic Institutions The structure of Iraqi domestic politics also assisted in bringing about conflict due to

the centralization of Saddam’s power and a strategic culture that treated diversity of thought

as national disloyalty.65 When Saddam officially took power in July of 1979, he ordered the

execution of all those he deemed suspicious, and created a circle of loyal advisors from his

Tikriti clan.66 Even prior to his ascension to the Iraqi presidency, Saddam ordered the

removal of the Iraqi military’s high command, placing the military essentially under

62 ? Shireen Hunter, “Islamic Iran and the Arab World,” Middle East Insight 5 (1987): 17-25.63 ? Karsh, 266.64 ? Janice Gross-Stein, “The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead,” in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 56-57.65 ? Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, (London: Westview Press, 1984), 658.66 ? Charles Tripp, “The Foreign Policy of Iraq,” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, eds. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 171-174.

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Saddam’s direct control.67 Therefore, any military assessment which did not coincide with

Saddam’s current perception subjected the messenger to be viewed as either simply wrong or

even worse, treacherous. Iraq had ample reason in 1980 to believe the Iranian military,

economy, and government were in disarray, and divided. However, the strategic culture of

the Iraqi government did not allow for a thorough military assessment of Iran before the war.

For example, Saddam’s fear of insecurity drove Iraqi assessments of the Iranian military, and

Iraq misperceived how an Iraqi invasion would unite the fractured Iranian revolution, the

relative weakness of its own military to wage a full-scale inter-state invasion, and the

superiority of the Iranian air force.68 Saddam was not ‘cherry-picking’ intelligence to support

his desired policies, but rather the structure he created did not allow for varied assessments to

be made, much less manipulated. While Saddam may have believed he was making a

decision in harmony with the realities of the international system and his relative power

position, deficiencies in Iraqi domestic institutions actually influenced a policy contrary to

such realities. Anthony Cordesman skilfully portrayed Iraq’s decision to go to war as an

example of a state going up “against an opponent it regarded as crippled by internal politics,

with crippling internal politics of its own.”69

Domestic

Saddam Hussein:The lack of any structure limiting Saddam’s will in pursuing his desired foreign

policy increased the importance of the Iraqi leader’s personal perceptions and beliefs to Iraqi

strategic decision-making. In addition to Saddam’s aforementioned misperceptions of Iraqi’s

relative power position, his individual desires for prestige and regional leadership directly

influenced his decision to invade Iran. Saddam’s lieutenants described the Iraqi leader as

67 ? Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), 13-18.68 ? Cordesman, 648-659.69 ? Cordesman, 658.

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both viewing himself as the natural leader of the Arab world, and as constantly worried about

the security of the Iraqi regime.70 This constant feeling of insecurity amplified the

importance of Iranian attempts to topple Saddam with a revolution from below. With Sadat

relinquishing his role as the Pan-Arab leader, and the perception that Iran was provoking Iraq

from a position of weakness, Saddam was presented with an opportunity to act on his

ambitions.71 Saddam was not a violent megalomaniac, but an insecure opportunist. While

Saddam’s hopes of regional pre-eminence influenced his decision to invade Iran, it is

important to note that without Iraq’s concurrent relative power position, and the domestic

situations in both countries, Saddam’s ambitions alone would not have been enough to start

the conflict.

Ayatollah Khomeini:Misperceptions on the Iranian side also encouraged conflict. Motivated by a radical

Islamic ideology, Ayatollah Khomeini and other Iranian clerics incorrectly believed that the

spreading of the Islamic revolution would be successful in overthrowing vulnerable regimes

like Saddam’s.72 The incessant calls for revolution did not create a completely destabilizing

force in Iraq as Khomeini wished, but instead invited a war which would last nearly eight

years. The counterargument is that Khomeini’s calls for revolution may have eventually

overthrown the Iraqi regime, but this was thwarted by Iraq’s invasion of Iran, which in fact

helped to consolidate the power of the Iranian fundamentalists. Even so, Khomeini’s

ideological beliefs and disdain for Saddam Hussein influenced a conflict which may have

been beneficial to the ruling regime, but detrimental to the Iranian state as a whole.

Summary

70 ? Duelfer, 24, 41.71 ? Froelich and Levy, 131-133.72 ? Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990), 41.

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The Iran-Iraq war is another ideal demonstration of the international system creating

an environment where a state perceives war will bring them considerable utility. Iraq’s

growth, both militarily and economically, together with Iran’s relative demise shifted the

balance-of-power in the Gulf toward Iraq. The lack of US or Soviet interest in stopping Iraq

from invading Iran, and the vast material gains awaiting a successful Iraqi invasion added to

the conflict-inviting environment. Furthering the probability of war was the regime-

legitimizing radical Islamic ideology of the Iranian government, which called for the spread

of the Islamic revolution to other Muslim-dominated states. This directly challenged the

security of socially fragmented Iraq which had a predominantly Shi’a population who

identified with Iran’s Shi’ism. Not only did domestic factors increase threats to Iraq and

therefore the probability of conflict, but Saddam’s centralization of power in the Iraqi

government and military removed any obstructions between Saddam’s desires and Iraqi

foreign policy. Saddam’s perceptions were therefore extremely important in understanding

Iraq’s decision to go to war, and his misperceptions of Iran’s military capabilities, desire for

regional leadership, and fear of regime vulnerability all played in to his final decision to

choose war. While the case of the 1967 war illustrated a state that chose war due to its

correct perceptions of the international system, the Iran-Iraq War is a demonstration of the

opposite. While the balance of power was moving in Iraq’s direction, Saddam overestimated

Iraq’s relative power and was forced to endure a war far different than the quick and easy

victory he envisioned. Just as neoclassical realism contends, the variables of a war-inviting

international system, domestic precipitating factors, and leader misperceptions all contributed

to the origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Once again, constructivism fails to understand the

importance of Iran’s perceived power decline, and neorealism inadequately explains why

Saddam’s fears of domestic subversion to his rule helped to accelerate his call for war.

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Conclusion

By examining the first, second, and third image variables at work during the 1967

War and the Iran-Iraq War, I have shown that the neoclassical realist model of war decision-

making best explains the reasons why leaders eventually choose war. In explaining war

neorealists would solely look to the international system and constructivists would look to

ideational factors, but neither of these theories can explain war in a region like the Middle

East, where the realities of the balance-of-power and issues of identity are dually present.

Contrastingly, neoclassical realism examines how relative power realties of the international

system interplay with the ideational factors present at each state’s domestic and leadership

levels. In a region filled with insecurity, irredentism and authoritarian leadership only a

theory such as neoclassical realism which examines foreign policy at the international and

regional, domestic, and leadership levels can fully grasp what causes wars and conflict.

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Appendix 1

Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy Analysis

21

Anarchical International

System

Leader or Leaders

- Perceptions

- Desires

- Ideology

Domestic State Power

- Level of state institution formation

- Use of regime-legitimizing ideology or nationalism,

- Level of elite consensus and cohesion

- Level of social unity

Independent Variable

Intervening Variable 1 Intervening Variable 2

Dependent Variable

Foreign Policy Choice

Appendix 2

Neoclassical Realist Model of War Decision-Making

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Anarchical International

System

- Creates an environment where one leader may perceive they have an opportunity to increase their state’s relative power, security, or external influence by choosing to instigate a war

Independent VariableDomestic State Power

- Level of state institution formation

- Use of regime-legitimizing ideology or nationalism,

- Level of elite consensus and cohesion

- Level of social unity

Leader or Leaders

- Perceptions

- Desires

- Ideology

Interplaying Intervening Variables

Dependent Variable

Decision to Instigate War

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