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NERC Event Analysis Update WebinarHassan Hamdar
Chair, Event Analysis Subcommittee
October 20, 2016
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• ERO Event Analysis Process Update
• Lesson Learned Presentation from Entity
• ERO Lessons Learned Program Update
Webinar Agenda
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ERO Event Analysis Process Update
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Event Analysis Process Update
• New draft posted for industry comment – Version 3.1
• Three main revisions Category 1g was revised to increase the upper threshold from 1,399 MWs
to 1,999 MWs
Category 2a was revised to align with COM-001-2.1 and use of Interpersonal Communication capability
Category 3a was revised to align all interconnection to a loss of 2,000 MWs or higher
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• Initial request to revise the categories was driven by Texas Regional Entity
• The request was reviewed and discussed by the Event Analysis Subcommittee (EAS) EAS agreed with the revision and the justification proposed by TRE
TRE was asked to document the justification (available on the EA Program webpage)
• EAS received approval from the NERC Operating Committee to post the draft for a 45 day comment period (due by November 14, 2016)
Category 1g and 3a
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• Go to www.NERC.com Program Areas & Departments >
Reliability Risk Management > EA Program
• http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/EA-Program.aspx
How to find the document
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Lesson Learned Presentation from Entity
Maxime Nadeau
Manager, System Control Operations and Scheduling
Hydro Québec TransÉnergie
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NERC Lesson Learned
Published December 29, 2015
Management and monitoring of an SOL and IROL exceedances leading to an unrequired manual load shedding
HQT Main Transmission System
10
United States
New
Bay
300 MW and more
power plants
735 kV
Substations
735 kV Lines
Series
compensation
± 450 kV
DC Lines
• Large generation complex
located in the province
northern area.
• 45,717 MW of installed
capacity including 3,255
MW of wind generation.
• More than 90% is hydro
generation.
• Around 50% of the load is
in the southern part of the
System.
• Winter peak is 175% of the
summer peak.
• Historical peak load is
39,240 MW in 2014.
• 8,224 MW of export
capacity, mostly HVDC
inter-ties.
JAMES BAY(15,000 MW)
CHURCHILL FALLS
(5,600 MW)
MANIC-OUTARDES(8,100 MW)
Event summary
During the morning peak, the Transmission System
Operator ordered the de-energization of a shunt
reactor at La Vérendrye substation (XL9) connected
to a high voltage transmission line (L7016) for voltage
control.
During the operation, a fault occurred in the shunt
reactor breaker causing the trip of the high voltage
transmission line.
Two IROL exceedances resulted.
11
Event Summary
12
Event Summary
13
Emergency Control Actions
The System Operators (Transmission, Balancing, and
Interchange) then took emergency operation control
actions to restore the interface flows below the
IROLs, such as:
• Starting gas turbines (400 MW);
• Curtailment of interchange transactions (1 000
MW);
• Emergency energy imports (1 000 MW);
• Regional (South) voltage reduction;
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Emergency Control Actions
15
What the SO Saw on the Display
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Load Shedding
After 23 minutes, the interface flows was back under the IROL but still above the SOL.
However, the System Operator - Transmission was still thinking he was exceeding the IROL being confused from his interpretation of the displays.
Thus, 28 minutes after the event, the System Operator –Transmission initiated 1 990 MW of manual load shedding to restore system within IROL in 30 minutes or less.
37 minutes after the event, the line 7016 was put back in service and all the load was restored 35 minutes after it was shed.
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Load Shedding
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Similar Event on December 4, 2014
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Corrective Actions
Analyze all the EMS monitoring tools to determine if SOL and IROL are clearly differentiated. Two issues were found:
• The SOL/IROL exceedance timer display was misleading;
• The System Operators were managing emergency situations with a static control actions list in which the operator had to identify by himself the control actions to apply.
Thus, the following corrective actions were put in place:
• Upgrade the current timer display to make it more ergonomic and make sure that IROL and SOL are clearly differentiated;
• Create a new tool for System Operators (Transmission and Balancing) that would help them quickly select the required control actions according to the type of exceedance (SOL or IROL).
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New Control Room Timer Display
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SO Would Now See One Minute After the Line Trip
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What the SO Would Now See After 23 Minutes
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Limit Exceedance Management Tool
Objectives:
• Provide real-time accurate situation awareness
• Centralize required mitigating emergency control actions
• Provide a follow-up on deployed actions
Characteristics:
• Executed every minute by the Reserve Monitor
• Embedded in the EMS
• Dynamic throughout the event management
• Usable in test mode to do contingency analysis
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New Limit Exceedance Management Tool
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New Limit Exceedance Management Tool
Messages that warn if it is an IROL or SOL exceedance
Linear programming model manages multiple exceedances simultaneously
Operator can exclude actions if deployment delay of that action exceeds his need for the current emergency situation
Color coded and blinking to attract attention on important messages
Messages that warn when Emergency Transmission Limits need to be implemented
When Emergency Transmission Limits applied, recalculation of the solution
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What the SO Would See
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Lessons Learned
Adequately differentiate the SOL and IROL limits in the EMS
displays and the control room timer display for SOL/IROL
exceedances.
Improve System Operators simulation type training to add
more stressful conditions in order to enhance their situational
awareness and response during emergency operations.
Review on a regular basis the System Operators
understanding of the SOL and IROL limits and the emergency
operation control actions permitted.
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FYI NERC OC Reliability
Guidelines
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• Draft NERC Operating Committee Reliability Guidelines Posted for Comment Inadvertent Interchange
Integrating Reporting ACE with the NERC Reliability Standards
Situational Awareness for the System Operator
• Comment Period ends November 14, 2016
Draft Reliability Guidelines Posted
• Go to www.NERC.com > Committees > Operating Committee > Reliability Guidelines (on right side)
• http://www.nerc.com/comm/OC/Pages/Reliability-Guidelines.aspx
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• Objective: To provide information on situational awareness and its applicability to real-time operation of the BES
• Provides global recognition of the importance for SOs to maintain situational awareness while operating the BES
• Meant to assist (TOP), Balancing Authorities (BA), Reliability Coordinators (RC), Generator Operators (GOP) to use with the primary goal of supporting BES reliability
Situational Awareness for the SO
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ERO Lessons Learned Program Update
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2015/2016 Event Count
Event Category Count (Total)
Count (2015/2016)
Comments
CAT 1 662 126/115 In 2015/2016: 37/47 Three or more BPS facilities lost (1a);6/0 Islanding (1b); 6/3 BPS SPS/RAS Misoperation (1c);1/0 Volt Red (1d); 7/0 Control Room evacuations (1f); 0/1 Loss of 1000-1399MW gen (ERCOT) (1g);69/64 Partial EMS (1h)
CAT 2 159 21/4 In 2015/2016:16/0- EMS events (2b); 1/1 – LOOP (2d);4/3 – Loss of >300MW Firm Load (2f)
CAT 3 18 1/2 In 2015/2016:1/2 – Loss of > 1400MW of generation (3a)
CAT 4 3 0/0 SW Winter Weather (2011)SW Blackout (2011)Derecho (2012)
CAT 5 2 0/0 Hurricane Sandy (2012)Polar Vortex (2014)
Total CAT 1-5 Events 844 148/121
Non-Qualified Occurrences reported
2457 235/193
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Lessons Learned Metrics
Published Lessons Learned By Year
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• 7 NERC lessons learned published to date in 2016 2 - Relaying and Protection Systems
5 – Communications
• 16 NERC lesson learned published in 2015 4- Relaying and Protection Systems
7- Communications
1- Transmission Facilities
2- Generation Facilities
2- Bulk-Power System Operations
Category of Lessons Learned Published to Date
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• Draft submitted
• Regional EA staff review/cleanup
• NERC EA staff review/cleanup
• NERC EAS initial review and recommendation to pursue or not
• NERC EAS sets small team to review with entity if available and willing
• NERC EAS final review and approval to post
• NERC Technical writing review
Lesson Learned Review Process
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• ERO Event Analysis Process reports
• Major Disturbances
• Minor occurrences (or events that do not qualify for EA)
• Good outcomes that have information worthy of passing along
• Near miss (or near hit)
• Automatic Voltage Regulator Example
• Events not in North America
Lessons Learned – Input Methods
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• NERC’s goal with publishing lessons learned is to provide industry with technical and understandable information that assists them with maintaining the reliability of the bulk power system.
• NERC requests that industry provide input on lessons learned by taking the short survey. A link is provided in the PDF version of each Lesson Learned.
Lessons Learned Feedback
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• Go to www.NERC.com Program Areas & Departments > Reliability Risk Management > Event
Analysis > Lessons Learned
• http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/Pages/Lessons-Learned.aspx
Access Lessons Learned
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Contact Information
Hassan HamdarChair, Event Analysis [email protected]
Jule Tate NERC Associate Director, Event [email protected]
General NERC Event Analysis [email protected]
