net neutrality and a competitive ott market
TRANSCRIPT
1
Net Neutrality and a Competitive OTT MarketToshiya JITSUZUMI, D.Sc.Kyushu [email protected]
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016)
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 2
Economics 101: Market vs. government
Maximizing corporate
profits
Maximizing consumers’
welfare
Without governmental intervention
3
Economics 101: Market vs. government
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016)
• Perfect/sufficient Information• Inclusiveness: No externality, no public goods• Perfect competition
Preconditions for market dynamism
If these conditions are not met, the market outcome may not be
efficient.
Market failure in efficiency Market failure in fairness
Even if these conditions are met, the market outcome may not be
socially fair.
If the costs of intervention are less than the expected benefits, governmental intervention is economically justifiable and socially desirable.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 4
Some features in OTT/network ecosystem 1/2 Two-sided, multi-sided, market
◦ Network effect
Economies of scale/scope
Conflicts of business models
Carrier
OTT (aggregator)
vs.
OTT(aggregator)
OTT(aggregator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
OTT(creator)
Carrier Carrier
Possibility of monopolizing the ecosystem
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016)
Some features in OTT/network ecosystem 2/2 “Dog-year-ness” in technology, but it takes years before we can see the true potential.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 6
OTTs have become increasingly important in everyday life …
Befo...
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Frequent userOccasional user
Source: Created based on the questionnaire survey conducted by the author in May 2016 (N = 1067).
OTT video in the US OTT voice in Japan
Source: http://go.ooyala.com/rs/447-EQK-225/images/Ooyala-and-Vindicia-MTM-whitepaper.pdf
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 7
… but such a situation began only recently
Source: Translated version of http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/whitepaper/ja/h25/image/n1202850.png
legend
Application portal
EC
OTT video aggregator
SNS
Cloud Sourcing
Acquired by AOL
Acquired by GoogleThe US
Japan
Sales ($US)
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 8
Viewpoint of industrial policy In order to determine whether to introduce additional regulation on OTT players or not, we have to view the situation from a long-term perspective.
From an economic perspective, two scenarios are possible:
1. Pro-competition scenarioKeep the market as competitive as possible by maintaining a strict level playing field.
2. Pro-OTT scenarioProvide a certain privilege for OTT players at the expense of incumbent giants.
The “zero-price rule,” which prevents eyeball ISPs from charging content providers, can work as a subsidy to OTT players (Chettiar & Holladay, 2010; Chettiar et al., 2010), and so do the FCC’s Open Internet rules.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 9
Focal point of discussion Two areas of possible policy intervention:
1. Border control◦ Who can enter the market, and how?
◦ And further, how can they exit the market?◦ Relationship with neighboring market
2. Rules of engagement◦ Efficiency control◦ Fairness management◦ Consumer protection
Photo: Planning by Julian Kücklich
“Do nothing and let the market work” is a possible option.
Low barriers to entry
High barriers to entry
Demand management
Capacity development
Short-term solution
Long-term solution
How to achieve efficient and fair traffic management in the dynamic condition?
How to calculate the optimal capacity and how to finance it?
Congestion control over the Internet backbone facing the exaflood of network demand
Controlled by vertically integrated network providers
Leverage into the neighboring market
How to discipline the behaviors of SMPs in the communication market?
Is it efficient?How to restrain the anti-competitive behaviors?
Control the monopolistic leverage of SMPs
ISPs
Network operators
UsersContent providers
Application providers
Natural monopoly
Unique business practices
Net neutrality = Border control for OTT competition
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 10
Source: Adapted from Fig. 1 in Jitsuzumi (2015)
Rules of engagement In order to design an ecosystem, we have to pursue total, not partial, optimization.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 11
• Anti-trust rules• Net security• Transparency and accountability
Industrial Policy for incubating OTT players
Network Operators
Aggregators/Distributers[OTT platforms]
Internet Service Providers
Contents/Applications[OTT creators]
• Rules for ISP interconnection
• Decency rules
• Freedom of Speech
• Business Domain Control
• Public Utility Regulation• Interconnection rules• SMP control
• Rules for Content/Search Neutrality
• Rules for Network Neutrality
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 12
Three issues in regulating OTTs1. Level playing field
OTTs, particularly communications-based OTTs, provide the
same services as traditional communications service providers,
and therefore, OTTs should be regulated in the same manner.
2. Free-rider problem
OTTs are free riding on operators’ networks and should be
subject to “cost-sharing” obligations in which OTT providers
would pay operators for the use of their networks.
3. Build-out problem (or “free-rider problem 2.0”)
OTT providers have a negative economic impact on operators,
which hampers network build-out and investment.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 13
What is the level playing field? Foundations for telecom regulations are three-fold:
1. Natural monopoly, scarcity of resources◦ In order to attain the second-best outcome, ROR had
become the norm among regulators.◦ Deregulation is a fruit of technological development in
the used-to-be-a-natural-monopoly area.
2. Consumer protection◦ In order to mitigate information asymmetry,
transparency and accountability are required.◦ Burden for dispute settlement must be minimized, too.
3. Societal fairness (and dealing with spillover benefit)◦ Universal service◦ Subsidies for the disadvantaged
Reasons not to apply to OTT players
Reasons to apply to OTT players
This dose not necessarily mean we have to apply to OTT players.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 14
Opinions of European mobile operators (Jul. 7, 2016)
“All players in the digital value chain should operate on a level playing
field, with equivalent and proportionate privacy requirements to
innovate in data-driven markets. There is no justification for imposing
stricter obligations on Electronic Communications providers than on
other providers of digital services. Converging digital services
need converged regulation that is light-touch, future proof and
that facilitates a European single market for services.
Regulation should define principles to protect consumer rights
and competition, focusing on outcomes (e.g. service
characteristics) rather than on means (e.g. how operators
evolve and manage their networks).” (p.5)
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 15
Issues in free-riding When there exists a significant level of externality or spillover effect, it might be optimal to introduce some remedial tools in order to compensate contributing parties and penalize free-riders.
◦ Pigouvian-tax/subsidy, congestion fee, or universal service levy, etc.
But again, from the viewpoint of efficiency, it is better to try the market solution first.
Network Operators
OTTsSpillover benefit by upgrading net capacity
Spillover benefit by upgrading
contents quality
These spillover benefits can explain
the popularity of zero-rating
The “zero-price rule” prohibits compensating the network operators’
efforts
a few words of cautionSafeguard against
anti-competitive behaviors of incumbents is a must.
Spillover effects can work both ways.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 16
A moving target Designing a perfect OTT regulation now is just like aiming at a moving target from a rocking boat.
Something we cannot predict for sure
New player
New business
model
New technology
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 17
Bigger digital economy if we have less regulation This is especially true when technology develops in a dog-year fashion.
Image source: http://www.bitewallpapers.com/3d/3d%20wallpapers/part%203/3d-chain-lock-ballheads_freedom-wallpaper.jpg
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010
2013
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
120,000,000
140,000,000
160,000,000
180,000,000 Number of users in Japan
Fixed voiceMobile+PHSLINE
CAGR = 7.2%
CAGR = 29.4%
CAGR = 38,608.8%
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 18
Conclusions To develop a healthy ecosystem, considering the possibility of governmental failure and the unpredictability of technological development, it is important to utilize market dynamism as much as possible.
When it becomes apparent that market dynamism cannot work well, we should start thinking about the possibility of regulatory intervention.
The purpose is not to substitute the market mechanism, but to complement it. Policy tools include:
◦ Net neutrality “rule” for the border control◦ Transparency and accountability for the rules of
engagement◦ Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer
protection
We have to monitor the OTT market development continuously.
The existence of market failure has to be empirically tested, and so do the expected benefits/cost of interventions.
Since it is important to avoid rough-and-ready decisions; therefore, in the meantime, we should rely on case-by-case judgement.
T. JITSUZUMI@16th Asia Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulatory Forum (Tokyo, Japan, July 12–14, 2016) 19
References Chettiar, I.M. & Holladay, J.S. (2010). Free to invest: The economic benefits of preserving net neutrality. Report No.4, Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law. (http://www.policyintegrity.org/documents/Free_to_Invest.pdf)
Chettiar, I.M., Holladay, J.S., & Rosenberg, J. (2010). The value of open: An update on net neutrality. Policy Brief No.9, Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law. (http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/TheValueofOpen.pdf)
Jitsuzumi, T. (2015). Network neutrality and QoS Transparency: An economic perspective. IEICE Transactions on Communications (Japanese Edition), J98-B(10), pp.1030-1037.