network emergency coordinator (nec) exercise wolf report · figure 1: nec industry exercise wolf...

NEC Exercise Wolf (2015) 1

Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC)

Exercise Wolf

ReportDate of issue: 8 March 2016


Executive Summary

To prevent a supply emergency occurring or to minimise the safety risks associated where one develops,

the Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) has established arrangements pursuant to the Gas Safety

(Management) Regulations 1996 for coordinating the actions of duty holders, including transporters,

operating on the affected part of the network. In accordance with the NEC’s safety case obligations these

processes are tested on a periodic basis to ensure that arrangements are robust and duty holders are

cognisant of their responsibilities.

The 2015 NEC emergency exercise, “Exercise Wolf”, was split into four separate exercises to allow more

focus on key areas of the emergency process:

NEC Industry Exercise - Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) exercise National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise leading into the NEC Industry Exercise Individual Distribution Network Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) exercises Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding (FLS) exercises

This report focuses on the main NEC Industry Exercise and includes the high level outputs of the other

exercises.

The NEC Industry exercise gauged the effectiveness of an industry response to a Network Gas Supply

Emergency (NGSE); testing industry communication processes and each party’s internal procedures to

ensure that the emergency arrangements are robust and aligned.

Industry participants taking part in Exercise Wolf included National Grid; Gas Distribution Network

Operators (DNOs); Shippers; Terminals, Interconnectors, Storage Facility Operators, NTS directly

connected loads, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Oil and Gas Authority

(OGA).

Exercise Wolf successfully demonstrated that the industry was able to respond to a Gas Deficit NGSE in

accordance with the emergency arrangements described in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply

Emergency (T/PM/E/1).

The exercises fulfilled all planned major objectives, providing the opportunity for the NEMT to test a

range of updated systems and processes whilst exploring preventative options prior to and during a Gas

Deficit NGSE. Post exercise feedback was generally positive and the suggestions for improvements and

developments have been captured and are being progressed.


Table of ContentsExecutive Summary .........................................................................................................................................2

1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................................4

2. NEC Industry Exercise..............................................................................................................................5

2.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................... 5

2.2. Exercise Overview................................................................................................................. 5

2.3. More detailed observations & results from the exercise ........................................................ 8

2.4. Summary of Recommendations........................................................................................... 11

2.5. Looking forward.................................................................................................................. 11

3. Pre-Emergency Commercial Strategy exercise.................................................................................... 12

3.1. Exercise Objectives ............................................................................................................. 12

3.2. Exercise Scenario ................................................................................................................ 12

3.3. Observations & Results ....................................................................................................... 12


4. Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) Exercises with DNs.............................................................. 14





5. Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Performance Exercise ..................................................... 18





6. Conclusions & Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................. 23

Appendix 1: Exercise Wolf scenario............................................................................................................. 26

Appendix 2: NEC Industry Exercise - further detail & data ......................................................................... 28

A2.1 Documentation........................................................................................................... 28

A2.2 Online survey results .................................................................................................. 28

A2.3 NTS Firm Load shedding results................................................................................... 29

A2.4 Automated mass communication results..................................................................... 31

Appendix 3: Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Exercise - further detail & data ........ 33

Appendix 4: NEC Exercise Viper (2014) Recommendations & Updates ..................................................... 41

Appendix 5: Glossary & References............................................................................................................. 44

Appendix 6: Feedback on Exercise Wolf Report ......................................................................................... 45


1. Introduction

To prevent a supply emergency occurring or to minimise the safety risks associated where one develops,

the Network Emergency Co-ordinator (NEC) has established arrangements pursuant to the Gas Safety

(Management) Regulations 1996 for coordinating the actions of duty holders, including transporters,

operating on the affected part of the network. In accordance with the NEC’s safety case obligations, these

processes are tested on a periodic basis to ensure that the arrangements are robust and that duty holders

are cognisant of their responsibilities.

The 2015 NEC emergency exercise, “Exercise Wolf”, was split into four separate exercises to allow more

focus on key areas of the emergency process:

NEC Industry Exercise - Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) exercise National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise leading into the NEC Industry Exercise Individual Distribution Network Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) exercises Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding (FLS) exercises

This report focuses the main NEC Industry Exercise and includes the high level outputs of the other

exercises. Detailed reporting for the CTC exercises will be shared with participants and the HSE only and

Distribution Networks will also report individually on their own firm load shedding observations directly to

the HSE, the combined results of which can be seen in this report.

Industry participants taking part in Exercise Wolf included:

National Grido Network Emergency Management Team (NEMT)o Representation from Gas National Control Centre (GNCC)o Representation from Electricity National Control Centre (ENCC)

Distribution Network Operators (DNs)o National Grid Gas Distribution (NGD)o Northern Gas Networks (NGN)o Scotia Gas Networks (SGN)o Wales & West Utilities (WWU)

Shippers Terminal Operators including LNG Importation Terminal Operators Interconnector Operators Storage Facility Operators Supplementary Transporters NTS Directly Connected Loads Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) Oil & Gas Authority (OGA)

Observers from the Health and Safety Executive were in attendance at National Grid Gas’ offices in

Warwick during the NEC Industry Exercise.

The National Grid pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise, the NEC Industry Exercise and the DN CTC

exercises were organised on behalf of the NEC by the National Grid Emergency Planning Team (EPT).

Three of the four CTC exercises were undertaken before the NEC Industry Exercise. The fourth CTC

exercise was cancelled by National Grid due to unavailability of key players, and will be incorporated into

the 2016 emergency exercise schedule. Each DN managed its own firm load shedding exercise separately

and provided FLS results to support this report.

The status of the recommendations and actions from the previous NEC exercise (Viper) are in Appendix 4.


2. NEC Industry Exercise

2.1. Exercise Objectives

The principal objective of the NEC Industry Exercise was:

To test the emergency arrangements set out in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency(T/PM/E/1) and the response of all parties to a developing Network Gas Supply Emergency.

This principal objective was exercised primarily in the main NEC Industry Exercise but also in the CriticalTransportation Constraint and Firm Load Shedding exercises. This principal objective was divided into anumber of primary objectives:

1. Confirm that industry emergency arrangements remain aligned to the Procedure for Network GasSupply Emergency (reference T/PM/E/1)

2. Test of the National Grid and Oil and Gas Authority upstream Oil and Gas Crisis managementprocedure, web portal and emergency response communications

3. Test of the NEMT emergency strategy development, industry communication and emergencyprocesses through emergency stages 1-3

4. Test of the Distribution Networks’ Allocation and Isolation plans

5. Test National Grid’s external emergency communications system

6. Test National Grid’s emergency management instruction pro formas are clear, concise andembedded within the industry’s emergency procedures

7. Test that previous NEC exercise recommendations have been included within the emergencystrategy development and emergency procedures

2.2. Exercise Overview

The NEC Industry Exercise took place on 14th and 15th October during normal working hours. The

information from the pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise enabled the Incident Controller to

immediately brief the Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC) on the current situation and forecast for the

Gas Day, highlighting the need to take decisive action by requesting that the NEC declares a Network Gas

Supply Emergency (NGSE). The richness of the “back story” from Commercial Strategy pre-emergency

exercise provided realism in the build up to an emergency declaration to ensure that the NEC could be

effectively briefed and engaged.

Analysis of the overall system balance and Network Analysis of the potential system pressure losses led

the NEMT to develop a strategy to access emergency actions under Stage 1 and 2 of the emergency

procedures. Once an appropriate strategy to mitigate the significant supply losses was developed in line

with National Grid’s emergency procedures, the Incident Controller sought approval from the NEC

(observed by the HSE) to move immediately to declare a Stage 1 & 2 Gas Deficit Emergency. This strategy

was approved by the NEC and the industry notified of the emergency declaration.


Table 1: Gas Deficit Emergency Actions tested in Exercise Wolf

Gas Deficit Emergency

EmergencyStage

ActionTested in

Exercise Wolf?Focus area in exercise

Stage 1(Potential)

Gas conforming to Schedule 3 Part IIof GS(M)R

No

Gather supply & demandinformation

Create emergency responsestrategy

Issue emergency instructionsto the industry

NTS Linepack utilisation Yes

Distribution Network Utilisationo Distribution Network Storageo Emergency Interruption

Yes(Data gathering

only)

Public Appeals No

Stage 2

National Grid Gas plc’s participationin the OCM suspended

Yes

Directing Supplies Yes

Firm Load Shedding Yes

Public Appeals No

Stage 3

Public Appeals No Working with DistributionNetworks who providedAllocation & Isolation plans

Actions by NetworkEmergency ManagementTeam & DECC downstreamEmergency Response Team.

Allocation & Isolation Yes

Stage 4 Restoration No

Following emergency declaration, the NEMT exercised a range of emergency communications with all NTS

Entry and Exit points to direct the emergency actions indicated in the table above. These communications

were undertaken by issuing a range of standard forms and an automated mass fax and SMS system

throughout the exercise.

This main industry exercise enabled the testing of the industry emergency arrangements within E1. All of

the below activities were completed within the timeframes allotted for the exercise. No deviations from

the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency were observed during the exercise. All participants

responded appropriately and in a timely manner to the NEC directions issued by the NEMT.

Table 2: Emergency Stages, processes and actions during the NEC Industry Exercise.

NEC Exercise Action

Day 1(14 October 2015)

NEMT mobilisation

Incident Controller briefs NEC and requests NGSE Stage 1 & 2 declaration andstrategy approval

Gas Availability Status Report and Upstream processes

DN demand breakdown requested via NETMAN1 forms

Supply demand balance analysed

Strategy development

Stage 1 and 2 Emergency Actions undertaken

Day 2(15 October 2015)

Maximise Firm Load shedding

Supply demand balance analysed

Incident Controller briefs NEC and requests NGSE Stage 3 declaration

Allocation strategy developed

DNs briefed on allocation strategy and isolation plans requested

DECC Emergency Response Team options

DNs present isolation strategy ready for Stage 3 declaration


In addition, the exercise provided a unique platform for rich, open discussions and debate between

members of the NEMT, the Incident Controller and the Network Emergency Coordinator. These

discussions are invaluable for developing skills and experience. The exercise also enabled a large number

of people from across the industry to participate in the emergency exercise actions developing awareness

and skills more widely – as summarised below:

Figure 1: NEC Industry Exercise Wolf statistics

NEMT Officer shadowing was used as in previous exercises to support the development of future NEMT

officers. This approach was very well received by all those involved in the shadowing and will be

continued in subsequent exercises as it compliments the classroom based training activities.

The feedback from the exercise has shaped the recommendations within this report, and will be used to

refine and improve National Grid’s emergency procedures, processes, training and exercises. Feedback

and observations were collected through a range of methods including:

“Hot wash” sessions at the end of each day within the incident room Individual and group face to face meetings following the exercise; and Email and web feedback surveys

Below is a summary of the survey feedback:

Over 85% of survey responders answered that the Exercise had been beneficial or very beneficial In specific questions about procedures, communications & resources; the vast majority of

responses were within the good and very good categories, with very few stakeholders providingpoor or neutral responses. These quantative responses will also enable us to benchmark ourperformance in future exercises.


2.3. More detailed observations & results from the exercise

This section provides a summary of the more specific outcomes and recommendations from the exercise.

Pre-emergency exercise & exercise set upWhilst the pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise had allowed a prompt start to the NEC industryexercise, feedback was received that additional time for briefing at the start of the NEC Industry Exercisewould have aided understanding of the scenario, situational awareness and strategy development.

Ahead of Exercise Wolf, all participants were issued a brief by National Grid providing an overview of the

exercise objectives and the updated forms to be tested during the exercise. This Exercise Brief was issued

via internal contact lists as well as the Joint Office of Gas Transporters industry mailing lists and included a

full suite of updated emergency forms to be tested in Exercise Wolf. One objective was to ensure the

brief was easy to understand and ensured clarity for all industry participants in terms of roles and

responsibilities during the exercise. Positive feedback was received regarding the improved industry

brief.

The real time network analysis of the NTS within the exercise aided creation of the emergency strategy

and added considerable realism and depth to the exercise. This promoted debate and challenge to create

the most effective emergency strategy, aiding the articulation of risk to enable the NEC to declare an

emergency.

Running the NEMT & NEMT roles

The NEMT Technical Secretary role supports the Incident Controller during all NEMT briefing sessions and

strategy development meetings. During Exercise Wolf, the Technical Secretary supported the wider NEMT

by recording and monitoring actions for circulation within the NEMT in between all NEMT meetings. Some

consideration needs to be given as to whether any incremental developments for this role would help

support the technical secretary in their role. In particular, standard templates could support situational

awareness of the NEMT officers & their teams, perhaps using some simple visual management where

appropriate such as on the walls of the incident room. Simplifiying this role may support other NEMT

roles, such as the Crisis Management Team liaison role and aid consistency of information and

communications.

NEMT training & awareness

E3 Emergency forms and NEMT task cards were issued to participants prior to the exercise for

familiarisation and are designed to drive all formal emergency communications from the NEMT to

industry participants. Whilst feedback from exercise participants was generally positive, there could have

been more reference made to task cards during the exercise. A number of NEMT members provided

feedback that additional familiarisation prior to the exercise would have been beneficial. To aid this,

where appropriate, consideration will be given to where more desktop exercises can be used within our

training to further aid development and learning, taking into account feedback from our NEMT members.

The involvement of a wide range of people within the exercise who may be involved should an event

occur aids the quality and richness of debate during the exercise. The active involvement in emergency

exercises and familiarisation sessions from people from across the industry to within various departments

of National Grid such as Legal and Corporate Affairs aids the effectiveness of the exercise and we intend

to continue these activities. Where opportunities allow, sharing experiences with other teams in

emergency management sector may further help us understand whether we are following best practice


and support our development of training and exercising.

During an emergency exercise, and even more so during a real emergency, the roles of Incident Controller

and the various NEMT Officers require a wide range of competencies, covering technical, personal and

teamwork skills. In addition to the on technical skills and process familiarisation, the exercises give some

further opportunities to experience decision making and situational awareness competencies during

times of stress. We would like to explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured

situations to see if any appropriate tools and techniques may be available to support the NEMT.

NEMT Processes

No deviations from the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency were observed during the exercise.

All participants responded appropriately and in a timely manner to the NEC directions issued by the

NEMT.

The process to get from a strategy to releasing the exercise emergency declaration to industry prompted

some discussions during the exercise. Therefore, there is an opportunity to take another look at this area

to see if any of the steps can be simplified or clarified to expedite decision making and getting

notifications to industry.

During the annual NEC Industry Exercise, the roles of NEC and Incident Controller are undertaken by

different people on each of the two days to enable more people to gain experience of the roles. Feedback

was received that the handover for some roles from one day to the next could be improved to improve

continuity and increase effectiveness.

National Grid and Oil & Gas Authority upstream Oil & Gas Crisis management procedure, web portal

and emergency response communications

Arrangements were developed during 2015 that enabled Terminal Operators including LNG Importation

Terminal Operators to provide their Gas Availability Status (GAS) Report and Situation Reports details via

a new Oil & Gas Authority (OGA) web portal system. The portal is now complete having had two live data

tests: a small scale test with user acceptance testing (UAT) and during Exercise Wolf. The hosting of the

GAS report on the OGA portal worked well. The emergency arrangements in the Upstream Crisis

Management Plan were shown to work well for the management of the information processes in a major

incident and the communications between OGA, National Grid and the upstream industry were effective.

The NEMT Supply Team training will be further updated so that they can gain a better understanding of

how the GAS portal operates.

Industry communications

A key activity in Stage 2 of an NGSE emergency is firm load shedding (FLS). The NEC Industry Exercise

tested the performance of loads directly connected to the NTS when directed to cease taking gas. All NTS

directly connected sites were to be contacted during Exercise Wolf. In total, 54 sites were involved and all

of these sites were contactable and confirmed they would be able to cease gas consumption with a given

lead time.

The task of contacting NTS directly connected sites is managed by the Shipper Team within the NEMT. A

total of 5 people undertook this task and all sites were contacted, issued directions over the phone,

issued a GS(M)R fax notification and all details noted in the curtailment log in a total of 2 hours 8 minutes.

This level of performance is considered satisfactory. Some sites had longer lead times to come off load


than others and so we will be aiming to improve understanding and understand the potential for

improvements with specific sites. For more information, please see Appendix A2.

A range of different communications are sent during an emergency or emergency exercise by fax and

SMS. 91% of SMS messages were successfully delivered during exercise Wolf; this is slightly lower than

the 95% for last year’s exercise, Exercise Viper. Approximately 75% of all faxes were successfully

delivered, which is similar to the levels seen within exercise Viper. We will continue to test and cleanse all

shipper contact details outside of the NEC Exercise on a regular basis to manage this area. For more

information, please see Appendix A2.

Our communications in an emergency would also include government bodies such as DECC. DECC’s

involvement in Exercise Wolf enabled the team to get an understanding of the potential timing, frequency

and depth of requests for information that may occur during an emergency. This experience will enable us

to work together to improve information sharing templates to aid communications. To aid understanding

of each other’s roles, DECC now has a standing invitation to an industry forum to enable appropriate

engagement between DECC and all the gas transporters to continue.

Distribution Networks Allocation and Isolation Plans

Although Stage 3 was never formally declared within the exercise, each of the DNs provided isolation

plans prior to the declaration of Stage 3, based on the gas allocation that the NEMT provided to the DNs.

Feedback was received from the DNs that this was a worthwhile activity within the NEC Industry exercise.

The allocation and isolation teleconference is between the Demand Officer and the Distribution Networks

(i.e. outside of the NEMT incident room and therefore not captured by the Technical Secretary). The way

in which allocation and isolation data is captured could be reviewed to ensure that the forms are fit for

purpose and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategy development and communication

of agreed allocation and isolation plans.

Forms

Ahead of NEC Industry Exercise Wolf, all participants were issued a brief by National Grid providing an

overview of the exercise objectives and the updated forms to be tested during the exercise. Following

feedback, we will review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, stronger articulation of

the emergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to the declaration.

Ofgem’s Gas Security of Supply Significant Code Review was implemented on 1 October 2015. Its

objectives were: to minimise likelihood of a Gas Deficit Emergency (GDE) occurring; to minimise the

duration if a GDE occurs; and to make payments to firm consumers for curtailment. This is achieved

through changes to the Shipper cashout arrangements which apply in an emergency. Cash out charges in

an emergency remain dynamic and now include pricing in of demand reduction actions and isolation of

Non Daily Metered customers. These changes are designed to have an impact on the market, with any

new DN isolation in Stage 3 of an emergency triggering a floor for cash out prices of £14/th for that gas

day. Following feedback received during the exercise, we will develop a pre-prepared message to alert

the market of the implications of any impending emergency Stage 3 declaration.

We will continue to work with all relevant stakeholders through our engagement throughout the year to

aid understanding of the forms and processes and listen to any feedback received.


2.4. Summary of Recommendations

The following is a summary of the recommendations & actions from the text above:

Consider further standard templates and simple visual management to aid Technical Secretaryrole, situational awareness and strategy articulation.

Investigate use of standard templates and simple visual management to support situationalawareness of the NEMT officers & their teams

Consider where more desktop exercises can be used within our training to further aiddevelopment and learning.

Where opportunities allow, share experiences with other teams in emergency managementsector to share best practice and support our development of training and exercising.

Explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured situations to see if anyappropriate tools and techniques may be available to support the NEMT.

Review the steps from strategy decision making and getting notifications to industry to see if thisprocess can be simplified or clarified.

Look at handover for NEMT roles to improve continuity and increase effectiveness. The NEMT Supply Team training to be further developed on how to use the (Gas Availability

Status) GAS portal and where feasible consider Summer GAS portal exercises with DECC andterminals.

Hold follow up conversations with specific sites to improve understanding and discuss potentialimprovements to NTS Direct Connect Firm Load Shedding performance.

Work with DECC to improve information sharing templates to aid communications. Review how allocation and isolation data is captured to ensure that the forms are fit for purpose

and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategy development and communicationof agreed allocation and isolation plans.

Review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, stronger articulation of theemergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to the declaration.

Develop a pre-prepared message to alert the market of the implications of any impendingemergency Stage 3 declaration.

2.5. Looking forward

Each emergency exercise enables focus on a number of aspects of processes, communication and strategy

development. This focus enables a more in depth look at those areas so that we can get quality feedback

and recommendations that can be actioned. There are a few areas that we will consider further how we

ensure they get the focus they need whether through smaller exercises and process run throughs,

stakeholder engagement or inclusion in the main industry exercise in the next few years.

Emergency Stage 4 (restoration) Shipper Nomination accuracy and timeliness Potential for a move from faxes when the right assurances are available and systems and

obligations allow


3. Pre-Emergency Commercial Strategy exercise3.1. Exercise Objectives

Test the development of the commercial response to a developing incident, using a commercial

strategy timeline to simulate the timely commercial decisions in a realistic environment

Test the Decision Support Tools available to National Grid and update with the new imbalance

position

Provide the incident team with an environment to further develop detailed understanding of the

tools available

Provide the Incident Controller with a commercial response for NEC emergency actions approval

within the NEC Industry Exercise Wolf

Provide industry with backdrop of issues and actions affecting National Grid for the NEC Industry

Exercise Wolf

3.2. Exercise Scenario

This was a National Grid internal exercise undertaken on the morning of 16th September 2015. The

exercise also provided the opportunity to create a detailed “back story”, showing the timeline of physical

events, system status and commercial actions as the scenario developed, showing the system moving

from a typical healthy supply demand balance to a position of such imbalance that the Incident Controller

requested NEC approval for an emergency declaration.

The NEC Exercise utilised a simulated Gas Day based on the highest demand day seen in winter 2014/15.

The historic day utilised was Monday 2nd February 2015, where actual demand reached 357mcm. The

scenario was designed to:

Ensure that NEC Industry Exercise later in the year would test Emergency Stages 1, 2 and 3

To ensure a sufficiently high supply demand imbalance required the loss of all supplies from two

terminals and a storage facility & for the I(UK) Interconnector to be exporting gas

The exercise also provided an opportunity to test the improved “Emergency Data Support Tool” that was

first trialled in Exercise Viper. The tool facilitates improved situational awareness and decision making by

displaying supply, demand and associated forecast NTS linepack information.

The tools and processes utilised in the constraint management strategy are detailed in National Grid’s

System Management Principles Statement available online.

3.3. Observations & Results

The inclusion of a pre-emergency commercial strategy exercise proved very useful; it enabled the creation

of a detailed timeline and supporting information and data to be used as a back-drop and build up to the

commencement of the NEC Industry Exercise, thereby allowing rapid emergency declaration and

maximising time available to industry to undertake their own emergency procedures following NEC

instruction.

The exercise facilitated the understanding of commercial actions available for consideration as an incident

develops. During this exercise, appropriate options were available to select localised and national

constraint actions. Some of the tools are used infrequently for very specific market and operational


conditions, hence the exercise provided a practical opportunity to develop knowledge and simulate their

use. Many of those participating in the exercise provided positive feedback, stating they found the

experience very useful.

A decision support tool was tested in the exercise. All of the aspects tested worked as expected and it was

fit for purpose. There are some parts of the tool that could not be tested as the tool works with live

market data and bids and offers may not have been posted at the time of the exercise.

The approach of working through a pre-emergency scenario facilitated a timely and information-rich start

to the NEC Industry Exercise, enabling prompt commencement of industry communications and actions

including directing supplies and firm load shedding.

During the exercise real data was used to analyse the available capacity scale back volumes. On the day

analysis showed approximately 9mcm of gas fired power station load could be scaled back with 4 hours

notice. ENCC analysis showed this level and speed of electricity generation reduction may have caused

issues on the electricity network. Though there are restrictions on the information that can be passed

between control rooms, further working together within this framework may contribute to maintaining

security of supply on both the gas and electricity networks within a constraint scenario.



Future NEC Exercise design should consider including some pre-emergency commercial strategywhere appropriate for the scenario being exercised.

Seek to maintain ENCC involvement in exercises where appropriate to help enhanceunderstanding of how the control rooms work together and to further build up our commonunderstanding and experience of the interactions between gas & electricity control rooms &incident management teams prior to emergency declaration.

Consider whether any future pre-emergency workshops or exercises would benefit fromappropriate involvement from industry.


4. Critical Transportation Constraint (CTC) Exercises with DNs

4.1.Exercise Objectives

Focus on Transporter to Transporter strategy development in an emerging Critical Transportation

Constraint

Working together with Distribution Networks to better understand response and timeframes,

promoting open dialogue

Understanding the capability the Distribution Networks have to determine and articulate

downstream constraints and issues

Test network analysis and ability to optimise system capability in constraint scenarios

Develop Incident Controller’s skills, knowledge and experience to manage an escalating incident

Review system optimisation and commercial constraint strategy

Test online network analysis capability of all transporters

Develop the risk articulation in lead up to emergency

DNs to provide minimal critical pressure following any flow swaps and network utilisation prior to

requesting NEC assistance

Distribution Networks to develop risk articulation to enable approval of NEC declaration and

emergency actions


The Critical Transportation Constraint exercises were designed to create a focus for Transporter to

Transporter strategy development in an emerging Critical Transportation Constraint. The exercises were

focused on promoting open dialogue with the requirement for the Distribution Networks to determine

the constraint impact on their network and articulate the level of emergency actions required to minimise

the network impacts. This included identifying and considering all network utilisation and constraint

options to enable a joint transmission – distribution strategy to be articulated to the NEC. A key focus was

on the DN articulation of risk, for example analysis of pressure and associated volume of load and number

and type of consumers affected, to ensure a robust, justifiable and defendable analysis is submitted. This

underpins the strategy taken to the NEC and subsequent emergency declaration and commencement of

associated emergency actions. The approach allowed for closer inspection of a range of real world

network failure scenarios and the transporters ability to quantify the risk associated with diminished exit

pressures.

Although four CTC exercises were originally scheduled for 2015, only three of the four planned exercises

were undertaken: one was cancelled due to unavailability of key players. The cancellation did not have a

material impact on levels of assurance, as the DN affected (WWU) stated that it believes its activities

within the NEC Industry Exercise provided sufficient opportunities for strategy development and risk

articulation. National Grid will discuss and plan for future exercises such as CTC exercises with the DNs at

the E3 alignment group.

The objective of each DN CTC exercise was for DN operators and their incident teams to articulate the risk

associated with reducing offtake pressures which would ultimately lead to a risk assessment appropriate

to take to the NEC to request the declaration of a Critical Transportation Constraint Emergency. The

journey from normal network operation through to constraint management scenarios and ultimately a

CTC emergency is rarely experienced in normal operation and a CTC emergency has never been declared

by the NEC. Therefore exercising these scenarios is important to build the understanding of how


transporters can work together efficiently to forecast and avoid system constraints and therefore a

developing CTC.

Each exercise lasted approximately 3 hours and was led by National Grid’s Emergency Planning Team. The

exercise was based on a historic high demand day and then initiated with a NTS failure scenario which

would trigger a reduction in offtake pressures in a specific area of the NTS and an associated Local

Distribution Zone (LDZ).


Only the high level findings from the CTC exercises are provided in this report with the outputs specific to

each DN shared directly with DNs and HSE only.

Planning for the CTC exercise

The exercise scenarios were built up from discussion with the DNs on the types and locations of issues

would enable a good strategy discussion and enable some great learning opportunities. To aid the

exercise to meet its aims, clear objectives for the exercise should be agreed between National Grid Gas

Transmission and the Distribution Networks with an increased level of joint planning and dialogue at a

range of levels of seniority where possible. This would help get the appropriate people involved in the

exercise and complement the work of the E3 Alignment Group.

Greater value can be gained from the CTC exercises with improved long term planning. CTC exercise dates

agreed as early as possible with CTC objectives, requirements and resources identified would allow the

DN workshops to be used as a platform to prepare for the CTC and to restate those objectives. Following

the exercise, it is important to have in place a structured review process for feedback, to discuss what

went well and identify areas for improvement. Where appropriate this could include replaying aspects of

the exercise step by step, to see events from another party’s perspective and to understand the reasons

why each party acted as they did.

Sharing data

The CTC exercises highlighted the requirement to ensure communication and information transfer is

clear, concise and understood. LDZ demand breakdown information is provided by DNs to the NEMT via

the NETMAN1 form process which was tested as part of this exercise. This form is also used to inform the

NEMT of the minimum critical offtake pressures required for each LDZ to maintain supply to all users

within an LDZ. The CTC exercises showed that the NETMAN1 pro forma can be improved. Improvements

suggested include increasing the granularity for a CTC at one or more offtake levels, including offtake rate,

profile and DM / NDM load split. The pro forma could also be improved to enable the sharing of best

estimates of likely offtake pressures following the issue, summarising the implications of satisfying current

DN demand and any contingencies they will need assistance in implementing.

Situational awareness & Building a strategy

The CTC exercises focused attention on transporters ability to analyse and understand network risks and

failure points whilst aiding knowledge sharing, continuous improvement and a broader understanding of

constraint management and emergency procedures. All transporters found value in the exercises and

would welcome more in the future.

During each DN CTC Exercise, the NEMT presented scenarios to the DN. The aim of each CTC exercise was


to reach a point where the DN could clearly articulate the downstream risk in response to forecast NTS

pressure losses. This DN risk assessment is important to support the associated NTS forecast information

which would be used to engage the NEC and seek approval to declare a Critical Transportation Constraint

Emergency.

As expected, the constraint scenarios presented to DNs resulted in a range of responses across DNs.

Though the specifics from the scenarios and network topology drove some differences in the responses, a

range of approaches to risk assessment and analysis and the exercise teams involved also contributed to

the differences.

Each of the CTC exercises have proved valuable in testing the communication, interactions,

understanding, skills, behaviours, procedures, tools and processes that would be central to managing a

CTC. The exercises have also highlighted a number of areas for development. Situational awareness and

common understanding of the options available on both transmission and distribution networks could be

improved. This could lead to more proactive approach, where we would see more evidence of seeking

combined solutions, asking probing questions and showing good leadership.

National Grid NTS worked with the DNs to successfully build and develop strategies for each of the

scenarios, but timeliness of responses and ownership could have been improved to reduce the impact

that delays were having on the ability to undertake timely emergency actions. There was a need to create

a stronger sense of situational realism in the exercise such as through urgency in the dialogue, in

particular stressing the urgency and expectations of response times to questions asked. For those

involved, there were occasions where further knowledge of the network, the role of the NEC and how the

commercial and operational regimes interact would have enabled the exercise to run more smoothly. The

knowledge and skills are often seen in day to day activities and in response to real incidents; this could

have been due to resource or availability constraints on the day.

Network analysis

Network analysis continues to be one of the best tools available to understand network capability and the

associated security of supply risks. The ability to quickly replicate a real gas day and understand the

impacts of forecast NTS pressure losses on LDZ operations provides for swift decision making to mitigate a

constraint or emergency scenario. All transporters should aim to regularly test their ability to articulate

these risks with the support of real time analytical techniques. Network analysis was completed in each of

the exercises and enabled newer analysts to gain experience of an emergency exercise.

Communicating information to enable approval of emergency by NEC

In order for an incident to be an emergency, the NEC needs to approve the declaration to go into an

emergency. The NEC needs to have appropriate information on the situation, risks, impacts and strategy

being taken in order to be confident that declaring an emergency is appropriate. The approach taken by

each Distribution Network was different and highlighted that this process could be improved with more

guidelines on the types of information that the NEC may need.

Developing competence, skills & knowledge

In day to day activities and various real emergency incidents involving National Grid Gas Transmission and

the Distribution Networks, we see high levels of situational awareness, collaboration, technical expertise,

proactivity and decision making. At times during the CTC exercises, these attributes were not consistently

reflected in the performance on the day. It is important that the emergency exercise outputs are a true

reflection of actual operational capabilities; this requires the right people to be involved in the exercises


and for them to be fully committed. Where resources allow, shadowing can really help build experience

with newer members of staff whilst keeping the exercise on track with more experienced staff.

All subsequent exercises should include the presence of a network manager/control engineer, to ensure

an understanding of the operational impact of an incident on both NTS and DN networks and the

potential interactions, for example in terms of the impact of pressures on offtakes.

It is imperative that the right conversations are being held between National Grid Gas Transmission and

the Distribution Networks, so that all levels of the organisations are aware and understand the

importance of the emergency planning activities.

These activities reinforce the need for increased DN engagement with respect to emergency

preparedness. There needs to be a greater understanding of the role of NEC, particularly around Local

Gas Supply Emergencies and interdependent networks. We would like to work with the transporters to

ensure best practice is socialised, which could be aided by greater visibility of all transporters assurance

activities, and maximise benefits from training and exercising.



Discuss potential for greater understanding of all transporters emergency assurance activities toenable best practice to be socialised, and maximum benefit achieved from all training andexercising.

To aid the exercise to meet its aims, clear and agreed objectives for the exercise should be agreed

between National Grid Gas Transmission and the Distribution Networks and where possible this

should be complemented by an increased level of joint planning and dialogue at a range of levels

of seniority. Discuss the CTC exercises at NEC Safety Case Forum to agree an approach & level of

involvement.

Consider improvements for the NETMAN1 pro forma such that it covers the appropriate scope of

information for a CTC.

The approach taken by each Distribution Network in articulating the requirement for a CTC to be

called was different and highlighted that this process could be improved with more guidance on

the types of information that the NEC may need.


5. Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Performance Exercise

5.1. Exercise Objectives

Test top 200 emergency contact detail validation per LDZ and conformance to comply to NEC

instruction

Test contact information and understanding of emergency obligations

Test standardised reporting developed for all DNs to drive consistency and deliver assurance to

HSE and NEC of ability to carry out NEC Firm Load Shedding (FLS) instructions


All Distribution Network Operators have Safety Case obligations to maintain the contact details for the

top 200 sites (in terms of offtake size, largest first) so that they can be contacted in an emergency to

cease gas consumption and reduce LDZ demand. In order to assess the Distribution Network Operators

ability to contact the top 200 sites, each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to

undertake an emergency contact validation exercise during September and October 2015 to fully engage

with their top 200 supply point consumers per Local Distribution Zone (LDZ). This exercise validated the

emergency contact numbers whilst ensuring sites understood their legal obligations to comply with

instructions to cease gas consumption during an emergency. In addition the DNs were requested to

engage with the supplementary transporters to test communication and compliance objectives.

Successful emergency management requires prompt contact with large gas consumers and it should be

expected that these consumers have at least a basic understanding of their obligations should a real

emergency occur. Feedback from previous exercises suggested that limited time was provided to DNs

during the NEC exercise to undertake their communications test. Separating out this exercise from the

main NEC exercise allowed DNs more time to undertake this activity, providing for richer conversations

with gas consumers and better information gathering.

Representatives from National Grid Gas Transmission and the DN meet on a quarterly basis at the E3

Alignment Group to ensure emergency procedures are aligned and collaboration at these meetings led to

an agreed set of statistics that would be gathered during these exercises and used going forwards to

benchmark the performance of this activity on an annual basis. National Grid Gas Transmission also

produced a best practice letter that was issued by the DNs to their LDZ’s top 200 sites during September

2015, detailing objectives within an emergency and requesting compliance to instructions to cease taking

gas and to provide emergency contact details prior to the exercise. It is believed that the letter aided the

success of the FLS calls, and should be used in subsequent years.


Each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to carry out their own firm load shedding

exercises separately to the main NEC Industry Exercise. This activity was separated out from the main

exercise to allow operators more time to make contact with sites and produce a full set of contact

statistics for comparison to recent previous attempts to contact the top 200 sites. The NEC requested

specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ and the post exercise reporting focussed on the ability

to shed the requested volume rather than the ability to contact the top 200 sites.


The following analysis focuses on the performance regarding the three key measures of contact success

of:

Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

Number of sites who could not be contacted

Table 3 shows the performance regarding the three key measures for the last five NEC Exercises.

Table 3: Sites contacted during the last five NEC Exercises

No of sitesattempted tobe contacted

No of sites wherecontact was made and

site would stop using gas

No of sites where contactwas made and site would

not stop using gas

No of sites whocould not be

contacted

Wolf 2015 2725 1895 70% 450 17% 380 14%

Viper 2014 2493 1637 66% 282 11% 574 23%

Ulysses 2013 1673 920 55% 250 15% 503 30%

Titan 2012 1229 904 74% 134 11% 191 16%

Saffron 2011 2587 1872 72% 193 7% 522 20%

As can be seen from the above table, from Exercise Viper to Exercise Wolf:

Number of sites attempted to be contacted has increased.

More sites were successfully contacted, though there are still a significant number of sites that

could not be contacted.

There has been a large increase in number of sites that would not stop taking gas when

contacted.

It is positive that the number of sites being successfully contacted is increasing; however, there are still a

substantial number of sites who could not be contacted.

It is concerning that the proportion of sites that would not stop taking gas in line with their obligations has

increased. This increase may reflect the performance of sites that have not been contacted as frequently

in the past given the increase in the number of sites being successfully contacted this year.

In advance of the 2015 DN Firm Load Shedding exercises, the E3 alignment group agreed a common

template for capturing data from the exercise including any reasons given by sites that said they would

not stop taking gas to enable further analysis. The standard template has been used but the data

collected has not unfortunately enabled any meaningful analysis of the reasons why sites would not stop

taking gas.

For further breakdowns of the data, please see Appendix 3; some specific breakdowns of performance by

DN, shipper and in volume terms are shown below.


Analysis by Distribution Network

Further breakdowns of the data can be found in Appendix 3, and a summary of performance by LDZ can

be seen below:

Figure 2: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf

There was some variation across the DNs in the split between the three performance measures, in

particular;

National Grid Distribution contacted more than 200 sites per LDZ as they chose to continue

contacting sites until the scheduled exercise time was exhausted. Their results show a very low

number of sites who could not be contacted, compared to other DNs, but a much higher number

of sites where contact was made and the sites would not stop using gas, which is an increase from

the previous year.

Northern Gas Networks performance for these measures has improved when compared to the

previous year, in particular there was a substantial increase in the percentage of sites where

contact was made and site would stop using gas.

Scotia Gas Networks has virtually no sites where contact was made and the site would not stop

using gas. This performance may well be related to site engagement activities undertaken

throughout the year by SGN and is similar to the previous year’s performance.

Wales and West Utilities’ performance has improved from last year, with a substantial increase in

the proportion of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas.

There is significant variation in performance across the DNs. Discussing and comparing current

procedures and practices, such as call scripts could enable best practices to be identified and

implemented across the DNs. Whilst the number of sites where contact was made and where the site

would stop using gas has increased, the number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop

using gas has increased significantly. Unfortunately the data gathered during the NEC Exercise is not

0 50 100 150 200 250

East AngliaEast MidlandsNorth London

North WestWest Midlands

NorthernYorkshire NE

ScotlandSouth East

SouthernSouth West

Wales NorthWales South

NG

DN

GN

SGN

WW

U

No of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

No of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

No of sites who could not be contacted


sufficiently detailed to enable identification of the underlying causes of sites’ responses.

The E3 Alignment Group provides the ideal platform for developing a robust action plan to ensure the

right data is captured from the most appropriate forms of engagement with sites. This plan should

include steps to improve both the accuracy of emergency contact details and the customers’ compliance

to comply with reduction instructions.

Analysis by shipper

Shippers are obligated to ensure that emergency contact details are up to date for the sites in their

portfolio and are provided to the transporter in line with Section Q of UNC. Further, if the Distribution

Network are unable to contact the sites, the shipper is required to co-operate with and enable the

Distribution Network to take the steps required under its emergency procedures. The below chart shows

the firm load shedding performance from when the DNs contacted the sites aggregated by shipper.

Figure 3: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf split by shipper

The figure above shows that there is significant variation in performance across the sites of different

Shippers, with over 40% of the sites of one Shipper were either uncontactable or said that if instructed

they would not stop taking gas during the exercise.

Analysis by System Offtake Quantity

The table below shows the volume of gas associated with the sites that were successfully contacted and

said that they would stop using gas if directed from the load shedding exercises.

Table 4: System Offtake Quantity associated with calls

Total SystemOfftake

Quantity (SOQ)(kWh)

Total SOQwhere contactmade and site

would stopusing gas

Percentagedifference

Total Wolf 2015 582,324,768 486,047,005 83%

Total Viper 2014 624,159,859 527,284,627 84%

Total Ulysses 2013 486,257,706 363,296,073 75%


Total Titan 2012 597,561,961 509,823,472 88%

Total Saffron 2011 89,353,982 63,982,397 88%

Whilst Table 3 showed that during Exercise Wolf only 70% of all sites were contactable and agreed to

cease gas consumption, Table 4 shows these sites represented 83% of the total offtake volume for all sites

where contact was attempted which provides positive assurance to the NEC that significant volumes of

LDZ demand can be isolated securely.

UNC modification 0428 – Disaggregation of sites, appears to have had little impact of Firm Load Shedding

performance. E3 Alignment Group provides the most appropriate place to discuss any further impacts

from this modification as they arise.



Distribution Networks with support from National Grid Gas Transmission’s Emergency PlanningTeam to identify reasons for differences in performance, highlight best practice and develop anaction plan focused on improving DN firm load shedding performance via the E3 AlignmentGroup.

Discuss how best to capture reasons given by sites that said they would not stop taking gas toenable this key area of performance to be reviewed at future E3 Alignment Group meetings.


6. Conclusions & Summary of Recommendations

Undertaking emergency exercises is central to ensuring that the gas industry remains committed to

continuous improvement of its safety critical emergency processes. The annual NEC Exercise is a

requirement under the NEC Safety Case and GS(M)R and remains a critical annual focal point for all UK gas

industry participants to test their own emergency processes.

This year a number of different exercise elements helped to focus participants on specific areas of the

emergency process and procedures. The main NEC Industry Exercise (Exercise Wolf) was scheduled for

October (to avoid EU gas day change work in September) and the four CTC exercises were scheduled to

take place throughout the year. Only three were completed within 2015, and whilst this has not had a

material impact on levels of assurance, lessons have been learned around the planning, scheduling and

timing of exercises.

The main themes that run through the recommendations for Exercise Wolf are:

Updating and improving standard work templates and practises Industry exercising and engagement Training Continuing to request feedback and actioning this where appropriate

Following feedback from the exercise, there are some specific areas where our standard templates or

processes would benefit from being reviewed to further aid clear communication or prompt decision

making.

To strive for continuous improvement in our assurance from our emergency planning activities will

require us to continue to focus on ensuring our training and exercising activities provide the right people

with the right skills and experience to be able to provide the right answers and equally ask the right

questions. The exercises need to create a realistic emergency environment, to effectively test our abilities

to focus on the key risks and challenges in a timely manner, to articulate and communicate them

succinctly and to be able to develop the appropriate emergency strategies and to understand the scale of

the consequences.

In order to develop the right levels of situational awareness, decision making and strategy development

capabilities requires excellent engagement between all key parties. The main NEC exercise and the

smaller DN exercises (such as the CTCs in 2015) can help develop these areas, and the continuous

improvement of engagement across transporters to better understand each other’s risks and issues will

be a key focus for 2016.

Whilst this year’s success levels for DN emergency contact performance has improved, the increase in the

proportion of sites unwilling to stop taking gas when instructed means there is still further work to

consider how to improve performance. Maintaining correct contact data is an ongoing task for emergency

planning teams, but one that can be supported by all industry participants through regular engagement

and reminding the industry of their legal obligations in this area.

An overview of the 28 key recommendations made throughout this report is provided below:


Table 7: Exercise Wolf – Summary of Recommendations

No. RecommendationTargetDate

Owner

1Consider further standard templates and simple visual management to aidTechnical Secretary role, situational awareness and strategy articulation.

October2017

NGG NTS

2Investigate use of standard templates and simple visual management to supportsituational awareness of the NEMT officers & their teams

October2017

NGG NTS

3Consider where more desktop exercises can be used within our training to furtheraid development and learning.

Ongoing NGG NTS

4

Where opportunities allow, share experiences with other teams in emergencymanagement sector to share best practice and support our development oftraining and exercising.

OngoingNGG NTS &

others

5

Explore further the human behavioural aspects of working in pressured situationsto see if any appropriate tools and techniques may be available to support theNEMT.

October2017

NGG NTS

6Review the steps from strategy decision making and getting notifications toindustry to see if this process can be simplified or clarified.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

7Look at handover for NEMT roles to improve continuity and increaseeffectiveness.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

8

The NEMT Supply Team training to be further developed on how to use the (GasAvailability Status) GAS portal and where feasible consider Summer GAS portalexercises with DECC and terminals.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

& Ongoing

NGG NTS

9 Work with DECC to improve information sharing templates to aid communications

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NG NTS

10

Review how allocation and isolation data is captured to ensure that the forms arefit for purpose and capture all necessary information to aid effective strategydevelopment and communication of agreed allocation and isolation plans.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

11

Review the NEC declaration forms so that they provide a clearer, strongerarticulation of the emergency to aid prompt appropriate responses to thedeclaration.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

12Develop a pre-prepared message to alert the market of the implications of anyimpending emergency Stage 3 declaration.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

13

Hold follow up conversations with specific sites to improve understanding anddiscuss potential improvements to NTS Direct Connect Firm Load Sheddingperformance.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS

14Future NEC Exercise design should consider including some pre-emergencycommercial strategy where appropriate for the scenario being exercised.

Ongoing NGG NTS


15

Seek to maintain ENCC involvement in exercises where appropriate to helpenhance understanding of how the control to further build up our commonunderstanding and experience of the interactions between gas & electricitycontrol rooms & incident management teams prior to emergency declaration.

Ongoing NGG NTS

16Consider whether any future pre-emergency workshops or exercises wouldbenefit from appropriate involvement from industry

Ongoing NGG NTS

17

Discuss potential for greater understanding of all transporters emergencyassurance activities to enable best practice to be socialised, and maximum benefitachieved from all training and exercising.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

& Ongoing

E3 AlignmentGroup

18Discuss the CTC exercises at NEC Safety Case Forum to agree an approach & levelof involvement.

By nextCTC

Exercise

NEC SafetyCase Forum

19Consider improvements for the NETMAN1 pro forma such that it covers theappropriate scope of information for a CTC.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS workwith DNs

(E3 AlignmentGroup)

20

The approach taken by each Distribution Network in articulating the requirementfor a CTC to be called was different and highlighted that this process could beimproved with more guidance on the types of information that the NEC may need.

By nextNEC

IndustryExercise

NGG NTS workwith DNs

(E3 AlignmentGroup)

21

Distribution Networks with support from National Grid Gas Transmission’sEmergency Planning Team to identify reasons for differences in performance,highlight best practice and develop an action plan focused on improving DN firmload shedding performance via the E3 Alignment Group.

OngoingE3 Alignment

Group

22

Discuss how best to capture reasons given by sites that said they would not stoptaking gas to enable this key area of performance to be reviewed at future E3Alignment Group meetings.

By nextDN FLS

Exercise

E3 AlignmentGroup


Appendix 1: Exercise Wolf scenario

Starting Position

The scenario uses base data from 2nd February 2015 which was the highest NTS demand day from the

last two years (357mcm demand). Picking a specific real day for the base data has enabled the network

analysis across all gas transporters involved in the exercise to align. The scenario then overlays a number

of operational events and issues

• The gas day opening linepack: 352mscm with an end of day linepack target of 354mcm

Events in the run up to Exercise Wolf

• Predicted Closing Linepack (PCLP) was initially 44mscm lower than opening linepack following the

previous day’s supply loss at St Fergus Shell (Offshore issue) and St Fergus was not forecasting to

be able to recover beyond a 15mcm rate following the previous day’s issues.

• The last few days have been cold with current demand at a high of 357mcm. The Met Office has

issued weather warnings for much of the UK with potential severe weather warnings for the

South East, with localised freezing fog expected throughout the morning. The problem is being

worsened by Europe’s cold snap with wind-chill from strengthening cold winds coming in from

Scandinavia.

• Pressures forecasts at start of day are achievable, intermittent compressor problems have been

seen over the past few days.

Time Events & Issues Market response NTS actions & status

06:30 A loss of Norwegian supplies toSt Fergus was notified

There was minimal marketand physical response tothe change in supplies.

Localised commercialconstraint and networkreconfiguration actioncompleted.

07:00 St Fergus terminal experienced afire and complete shut downwith the plant expected to be onoutage for a number of days.

07:45 A loss of Easington suppliesresulted in a further supplyreduction and left balance203mcm below target at 09:00,estimated outage time of anumber of days.

Increase market responseand Medium RangeStorage (MRS) balancingfollowing industrynotifications.

National commercialconstraint and networkreconfiguration actioncompleted.

EU prices started to rise aboveUK prices.

I(UK) reporting reversedflow following colderweather in Europe from9mcm supply to 35mcmdemand

NTS Strategy reviewIncident team mobilisedGDW issuedNotifications sent to industryNTS reconfigurationsNational commercialconstraint actions takenNEC approval sought foremergency declaration

09:00 Start of Exercise Wolf Following market response& actions taken, linepackchange was -90mcm lessthan target for the gas day.


Focus areas in Exercise Wolf by day

Exercise Wolf Day 1(14th October)

9am: Declare emergency, based on scenario using details from CommercialStrategy exercise (held on 16th Sept) with a focus on emergency stages 1 & 2 andDECC upstream engagement.Stage 1 (potential): NTS Linepack Usage Distribution Network Co-operation & Storage Usage GS(M)R Gas Specification consideration (not tested in this exercise)

Stage 2 National Grid suspends participation in OCM (not CTC) Maximise NTS Supplies NTS Firm Load Shedding (Note: DN Firm load shedding data from DN exercise in September also

included within scenario)

Exercise Wolf Day 2(15th October)

In order to enable the exercise to cover further stages of an emergency within the2 days of the exercise, for the purposes of the exercise it was assumed some timehad elapsed and storage stocks had reduced.Emergency Stage 3: Distribution Network allocation & isolation Public Appeals (not tested in this exercise)

The aims was to move this more to focus on NGGT & DN interactions withapproximately one third of domestic demand isolated and DECC downstreamengagement.


Appendix 2: NEC Industry Exercise - further detail & data

A2.1 Documentation

Further information on the arrangements available to the NEC during a potential or actual NGSE is

described in the Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency (reference T/PM/E/1). An up to date copy

of this procedure can be obtained from the National Grid Emergency Planning Team (contact details for

the Emergency Planning Team are provided in Section 9 of this report) or via the National Grid website

referenced in Section 10.

The E1 procedure is complimented by National Grid’s own internal emergency procedure. This is the

Management Procedure for Gas National Control Centre Response to Gas Supply Emergencies (Ref

T/PM/GNCC/E/3), often referred to as the “E3” Procedure. This procedure details the Network Emergency

Management Team (NEMT) actions in response to a developing emergency including forms and task cards

for driving efficient management of NTS supply and demand and was tested throughout Exercise Wolf.

A2.2 Online survey results

Every year we seek feedback from stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the NEC Industry Exercise.

This year we sent an on-line survey to all participants to facilitate ease of response. The survey results

provide quantitative and qualitative feedback. Figures 4 and 5 provide a high level summary of the

quantitative results from the survey.

So that we can compare results from year to year, we have taken an average of all of the scores given to

each the questions asked within the survey.

Figure A1 shows stakeholders’ answers to the question: “How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the

Network Gas Supply Emergency procedures?” This provides a useful high level summary of the views of

stakeholders regarding the overall benefit of the NEC Industry Exercise.

Figure A2.1: Online survey response to question: “How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the

Network Gas Supply Emergency procedures?”

The question allowed stakeholders to select one of five answers ranging from “No benefit at all” to

“Extremely beneficial”. Over 85% of responders answered that the Exercise had been beneficial or very

beneficial.

How beneficial was Exercise Wolf in testing the Network

Gas Supply Emergency procedures (as detailed in

T/PM/E/1)?

3.28

1 2 3 4 5


Figure A2.2 Stakeholders’ answers to the other quantitative questions.

The vast majority of responses were within the good and very good categories, with very few

stakeholders providing poor or neutral responses. Quality stakeholder engagement is critical to provide a

platform for delivering continuous improvement with respect to ensuring emergency arrangements are

robust and duty holders are cognisant of their responsibilities. These results provide a useful reference

point to benchmark subsequent exercises and will enable the Emergency Planning Team to track whether

our NEC Exercise is delivering year on year continuous improvement.

A2.3 NTS Firm Load shedding results

A key activity in Stage 2 of an NGSE emergency is firm load shedding (FLS). The NEC Industry Exercise

tested the performance of loads directly connected to the NTS when directed to cease taking gas. All NTS

directly connected sites were to be contacted during Exercise Wolf. In total, 54 sites were involved and all

of these sites were contactable and confirmed they would be able to cease gas consumption with a given

lead time.

The task of contacting NTS directly connected sites is managed by the Shipper Team within the NEMT. A

total of 5 people undertook this task and all sites were contacted, issued directions over the phone,

issued a GS(M)R fax notification and all details noted in the curtailment log in a total of 2 hours 8 minutes.

This level of performance is considered satisfactory.

Adherence to correct procedures during each stage of

the emergency exercise?3.22

Use of correct notification method according to

procedures?2.86

Clarity of actions issued during the exercise? 3.15

Clarity and conciseness of emergency procedures? 3.11

Level of resource available to implement the required

actions?3.17

Suitability of communication methods? 2.9

1 2 3 4


Figure A3: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding call contact times and time to curtailment

The red lines show the time taken between a site being contacted to cease taking gas and the time the

site would actually cease taking gas.

The task strategy adopted was to ensure all sites were contacted and to ascertain whether they would

cease taking gas: a strategy of largest load first or network pressure related was not chosen. Whilst the

overall level of performance is considered satisfactory, Figure A3 shows a significant variation in the time

taken for sites to cease taking gas. The variation can be more clearly seen in Figure A4 below.

Figure A4: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding: time taken from call to curtailment

10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00

1

6

11

16

21

26

31

36

41

46C

um

ula

tive

site

s

time from contact to curtailment

00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00

1

6

11

16

21

26

31

36

41

46

Cu

mu

lati

vesi

tes

time to curtailment


The chart shows that while a small percentage of sites require several hours to cease taking gas, the

average time taken is less than 50 minutes, with over half the sites able to cease taking gas in less than 30

minutes. A more detailed understanding of the underlying reasons for certain sites taking many times

longer than the average would be beneficial, for example is the delay due to safety or process related

factors, and to explore whether there is any opportunity to improve performance by considering partial

load curtailment.

Figure A5: NTS Direct Connect firm load shedding – volume of gas curtailed

Figure A5 shows that over 60 mcm of NTS directly connected load was curtailed.

A2.4 Automated mass communication results

The following table provides an overview of the main mass communications sent to industry using the Fax

and ANS replacement system that was introduced prior to NEC Exercise Viper in 2014.

Table A1: NEMT Communications

Table 2 shows that 91% of SMS messages (shown as ANS (Active Notification System) in the table) were

successfully delivered: this is slightly lower than the 95% for Exercise Viper. This highlights the need to

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

10:00 11:12 12:24 13:36 14:48 16:00 17:12 18:24

Vo

lum

eo

fga

scu

rtai

led

(mcm

)

Time

Communication Time Sent Type Total sent

Emergency declaration 1/2 fax 10:03 FAX 250 73% 27%

Day 1 initial Fax 10:05 FAX 250 73% 27%

Start of exercise ANS 10:09 ANS 121 91% 9%

GS(M)R Shipper notice 10:22 FAX 124 78% 22%

NEC Form with contacts 11:12 FAX 250 72% 28%

Storage flow notification 11:32 FAX 136 76% 24%

Terminal LNG notification 11:43 FAX 154 77% 23%

NEC 1 14:30 FAX 253 73% 27%

NEC End of Day 1 15:48 FAX 253 74% 26%

Start of D2 09:10 FAX 253 76% 24%

Day 2 initial Fax 12:12 FAX 253 77% 23%

NGSE 3 NEC Stage 3 Notification 12:53 FAX 253 77% 23%

NEC Stage 3 Notification 12:56 ANS 121 91% 9%

NEC Declaration End Of Exercise 15:40 FAX 253 77% 23%

NGSE 4 End Of Exercise 15:44 ANS 121 91% 9%

Successful Delivery Unsuccessful Delivery

0% 50% 100% 0% 50% 100%


continue regular testing and cleansing of all shipper contact details outside of the NEC Exercise. Roughly

75% of all faxes were successfully delivered, which is similar to the levels seen within Viper.


Appendix 3: Individual Distribution Network Firm Load Shedding Exercise -

further detail & data

Each of the four Distribution Network Operators was requested to carry out their own firm load shedding

exercises separately to the main NEC Industry Exercise. This activity was separated out from the main

exercise to allow operators more time to make contact with sites and produce a full set of contact

statistics for comparison to recent previous attempts to contact the top 200 sites in 2010 (Exercise

Revive), 2011 (Exercise Saffron) and 2014 (Exercise Viper). During Exercise Titan (2012) and Exercise

Ulysses (2013) the NEC requested specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ and the post

exercise reporting focussed on the ability to shed the requested volume rather than the ability to contact

the top 200 sites.

The following analysis focuses on the performance regarding the three key measures of contact success

of:

Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

Number of sites who could not be contacted

Table A3.1 shows the performance regarding the three key measures for the last five NEC Exercises.

Table A3.1: Sites contacted during the last five NEC Exercises

No of sitesattemptedto becontacted

No of siteswhere contact

was made

No of sites wherecontact was made

and site would stopusing gas

No of sites wherecontact was madeand site would not

stop using gas

No of sites whocould not be

contacted

Wolf 2015 2725 2345 86% 1895 70% 450 17% 380 14%

Viper 2014 2493 1919 77% 1637 66% 282 11% 574 23%

Ulysses 2013 1673 1170 70% 920 55% 250 15% 503 30%

Titan 2012 1229 1038 84% 904 74% 134 11% 191 16%

Saffron 2011 2587 2065 80% 1872 72% 193 7% 522 20%

As can be seen from Table 3, from Exercise Viper to Exercise Wolf:

Number of sites attempted to be contacted increased to 2725 from 2345

Number of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas increased to 1895 from

1637 (and increased as a percentage of sites where contact was made)

Number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas increased to 450 from

282 (and increased as a percentage of sites where contact was made)

Number of sites who could not be contacted reduced to 380 from 574 (and reduced as a

percentage of number of sites contacted)

The following two figures give a visual representation of the data.


Figure A3.1: Firm load shedding contact summary (numeric) for last 5 NEC exercises

Figure 9 clearly shows the reduced number of sites contacted during Exercises Titan (2012) and Ulysses

(2013) as the NEC requested specific demand reduction volumes from each LDZ, resulting in less than 200

sites being contacted for each LDZ. Exercise Wolf results show an increase (in numeric terms) in the

number of sites where contact was made and the sites would stop using gas, compared to Exercise Viper,

and reduced numbers of sites who could not be contacted, but an increase in the number of sites where

contact was made and the site would not stop using gas.

Figure A3.2: Firm load shedding contact summary (percentage) for last 5 NEC exercises

Figure A3.2 shows that Exercise Wolf results show an increase in the percentage of sites where contact

was made and the sites would stop using gas, compared to Exercise Viper, and nearly as high as the levels

seen in Saffron and Titan. The percentage of sites that could not be contacted is the lowest seen across

the five exercises, but there is an increase in the percentage of sites where contact was made and the site

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Saffron 2011

Titan 2012

Ulysses 2013

Viper 2014

Wolf 2015




0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Saffron 2011

Titan 2012

Ulysses 2013

Viper 2014

Wolf 2015

% of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

% of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

% of sites who could not be contacted


would not stop using gas. This is clearly an area that requires further investigation.

The following table breaks the data shown in Table A3.2 by individual LDZ.

Table A3.2: Comparison of LDZ firm load shedding performance

The following two figures give a visual representation of the data shown in Table A3.2 for Exercise Wolf

only.

Figure A3.3: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary (numeric) for Exercise Wolf

There are a number of observations to be drawn from Figure A3.3. National Grid Distribution contacted

more than 200 sites per LDZ: this was intentional as the decision was made to continue contacting sites

until the scheduled exercise time was exhausted. Another observation is the variation across DNs in the

split between the three performance measures. For example National Grid Distribution shows a very low

number of sites who could not be contacted, compared to other DNs, but a much higher number of sites

where contact was made and the sites would not stop using gas. Another observation is that Scotia Gas

Networks has virtually no sites where contact was made and the site would not stop using gas. This

DN LDZ

Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf

East Anglia 184 145 241 68% 88% 66% 8% 5% 26% 23% 8% 9%

East Midlands 200 171 213 69% 81% 77% 7% 4% 20% 25% 16% 4%

North London 200 201 221 61% 82% 62% 6% 5% 29% 33% 13% 8%

North West 200 173 217 69% 79% 76% 6% 1% 22% 26% 20% 2%

West Midlands 200 201 231 66% 76% 71% 3% 0% 27% 31% 23% 3%

Northern 198 201 201 54% 46% 65% 23% 27% 14% 25% 27% 20%

Yorkshire NE 200 201 201 60% 39% 64% 1% 31% 13% 40% 30% 23%

Scotland 200 199 200 86% 85% 67% 7% 0% 3% 7% 15% 30%

South East 200 200 200 81% 62% 75% 11% 0% 0% 9% 39% 25%

Southern 200 201 200 73% 74% 83% 10% 0% 1% 17% 26% 17%

South West 200 200 200 88% 56% 64% 6% 21% 19% 6% 24% 18%

Wales North 200 200 200 84% 45% 68% 7% 29% 21% 10% 27% 11%

Wales South 203 200 200 82% 53% 68% 5% 22% 15% 12% 26% 18%

Total 2585 2493 2725 72% 66% 70% 8% 11% 17% 20% 23% 14%

Percentage of sites who could not

be contacted

Percentage of sites where contact

was made and site would not

stop using gas

NGD

NGN

SGN

WWU

No of sites attempted to be

contacted


was made and site would stop

using gas

0 50 100 150 200 250

East Anglia

East Midlands

North London

North West

West Midlands

Northern

Yorkshire NE

Scotland

South East

Southern

South West

Wales North

Wales South

NG

DN

GN

SGN

WW

U





improved performance may well be related to site engagement activities undertaken throughout the year

by SGN. These observations can also be seen in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary (percentage) for Exercise Wolf

Table A3.3 shows DN performance regarding the three key measures for NEC Exercises Saffron, Viper and

Wolf.

Table A3.3: Comparison of DN firm load shedding performance (percentage)

To aid interpretation, the statistics in Table 5 are shown in the four charts in Figure A3.5.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

East Anglia

East Midlands

North London

North West

West Midlands

Northern

Yorkshire NE

Scotland

South East

Southern

South West

Wales North

Wales South

NG

DN

GN

SGN

WW

U

Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

Percentage of sites who could not be contacted

LDZ

Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf Saffron Viper Wolf

NGD 984 891 1123 67% 81% 70% 6% 3% 25% 28% 16% 5%

NGN 398 402 402 57% 43% 64% 12% 29% 14% 33% 29% 22%

SGN 600 600 600 80% 74% 75% 9% 0% 1% 11% 27% 24%

WWU 603 600 600 85% 51% 67% 6% 24% 18% 9% 26% 15%

Total 2585 2493 2725 72% 66% 70% 8% 11% 17% 20% 23% 14%

Percentage of sites who could not

be contacted

No of sites attempted to be

contacted


was made and site would stop

using gas


was made and site would not

stop using gas


Figure A3.5: Comparison of DN firm load shedding performance

Figure A3.5 shows that there is significant variation from year to year and from Distribution Network to

Distribution Network. Each Distribution Network is covered in turn.

National Grid Distribution

The performance regarding the three key measurements for National Grid Distribution were mixed when

compared to those for Exercise Viper. The number of sites where contact was made and site would stop

using gas reduced, and the number of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

increased significantly. With 25% of sites contacted unable to comply to the instruction to cease gas

consumption, recommendations should be made to improve this by reiterating the emergency obligations

to these sites.

On a positive note, the number of sites who could not be contacted reduced.

Northern Gas Networks

The performance regarding the three key measurements for Northern Gas Networks improved when

compared to those for Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would

stop using gas increased from 43% to 64%, and there were reductions in the percentage of sites where

contact was made and site would not stop using gas, and the percentage of sites who could not be

contacted.

SGN

The performance regarding the three key measurements for SGN were broadly similar to those seen for

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Saffron (2011) Viper (2014) Wolf (2015)

National Grid Distribution

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%


Northern Gas Networks

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%


Scotia Gas Networks

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%


Wales & West Utilities


Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas is the

highest of the four DNs, with the percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop

using gas by far the lowest across the four DNs.

Wales and West Utilities

The performance regarding the three key measurements for Wales and West Utilities improved when

compared to those for Exercise Viper. The percentage of sites where contact was made and site would

stop using gas increased from 51% to 67%, and there were reductions in the percentage of sites where

contact was made and site would not stop using gas, and the percentage of sites who could not be

contacted.

Figure A3.6 shows performance regarding the three key measures of contact success for the last twelve

NEC Exercises.

Figure A3.6: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for the last twelve NEC Exercises

Figure A3.6 shows that Exercise Wolf continues the recent positive trend started with Exercise Viper

following the dip in performance in Exercise Ulysses relative to Exercises Reform/Revive/Saffron/Titan.

Exercise Wolf shows increased percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

and reduced percentage of sites who could not be contacted. There is however an increase in the

percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas.

Site contact performance provides one measure of firm load shedding success, but it does not account for

the size of sites and therefore the potential volume of load shedding that could be achieved. Table 6

provides the SOQ (System Offtake Quantity) volume statistics associated for all sites where contact was

attempted during Exercise Wolf and the associated aggregate SOQ for sites where firm load shedding

contact was successful.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would stop using gas

Percentage of sites where contact was made and site would not stop using gas

Percentage of sites who could not be contacted


Table A3.4: System Offtake Quantity

Total SOQ(kWh)

Total SOQwhere contactmade and site

would stopusing gas

Percentagedifference

Total Wolf 2015 582,324,768 486,047,005 83%

Total Viper 2014 624,159,859 527,284,627 84%

Total Ulysses 2013 486,257,706 363,296,073 75%

Total Titan 2012 597,561,961 509,823,472 88%

Total Saffron 2011 89,353,982 63,982,397 88%

Whilst Table A3.1 showed that during Exercise Wolf only 70% of all sites were contactable and able to

cease gas consumption, Table A3.4 shows these sites represented 83% of the total offtake volume for all

sites where contact was attempted which provides positive assurance to the NEC that significant volumes

of LDZ demand can be isolated securely.

Figure A3.7 provides a breakdown for Exercise Wolf by LDZ of the sites where contact was made but the

site would not stop using gas.

Figure A3.7: Exercise Wolf - LDZ split of sites where contact was made but site would not stop using gas

There is significant variation across LDZs in the number of sites where contact was made and the site

would not stop using gas. Figure A3.7 shows the same sites but split by shipper.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

No

.of

site

s



Figure A3.7: LDZ firm load shedding contact summary for Exercise Wolf split by shipper

Figure A3.7 shows that whilst there is significant variation across Shippers in the number of sites where

contact was made and the site would not stop using gas, when viewed as a subset of the number of sites

attempted to be contacted for each Shipper, these sites represent a relatively consistent 10% to 20% of

the total.


Appendix 4: NEC Exercise Viper (2014) Recommendations & Updates

No. ActionTarget

DateOwner Status Comments & Updates

1

Firm Load Shedding statistics developed

via the E3 alignment group should be

gathered annually to enable consistency

when tracking and reporting on the

accuracy of emergency contact details.

By next

NEC

Exercise

E3

Alignm

ent

Group

CompleteFirm Load Shedding statistics were gathered in a

consistent format for NEC Industry Exercise Wolf.

2Desktop NEMT emergency exercises to

be scheduled more frequentlyOngoing EPT Complete Restated in Exercise Wolf Recommendations.

3

NETMAN1 requests should go out same

time as GAS report requests in any

potential GDE scenario.

Ongoing

E3

Alignm

ent

Group

Complete Network Manager Task Card updated.

4Ensure network analysis results utilised

in all future NEC exercises.

By next

NEC

Exercise

EPT Complete

Continue engagement with National Grid Gas

Transmission and Distribution Networks to

ensure that network analysis is central to

exercises (included in Exercise Wolf

Recommendations).

5

Update Technical Secretary task cards to

include internal NEMT situational report

management responsibilities.

April-15 EPT Complete

The Technical Secretary task card includes

guidance maintaining a list of the key actions

agreed within the NEMT meetings, including the

action owner and timescales for delivery. This list

can be distributed to the wider NEMT, making

sure individuals are aware of actions assigned to

each team.

6

Review support team task cards to

include NEMT resource management

and workload distribution

responsibilities.


Support Team Task Card updated to continually

assess resourcing of NEMT teams to avoid staff

fatigue and redistribute the team resources as

required.

7

Predetermined messages for Shippers to

be included in the E3 emergency

procedure to request the most accurate

available nomination information to be

entered into Gemini ahead of

restoration.

April-15 EPT Ongoing

Messages to be created - action ongoing.

Messages will be tested in Restoration Workshop

or Emergency Curtailment Quantity End to End

testing (included in Exercise Wolf

Recommendations).

8

Guidelines to be included in the E3

emergency procedure to specify screens

within Gemini system that can be used

to report shipper balance information.

April-15 EPT Ongoing

Screens to be tested in Restoration Workshop or

Emergency Curtailment Quantity End to End

testing

9

Include Shipper Nomination and balance

elements as objectives in any future

restoration exercises.

Restorat

ion

Exercise

EPT Ongoing To be tested in Restoration Workshop


10

National Grid and DECC to compare

Terminal & Storage contact information

ensure the accuracy of critical

distribution lists

May-15EPT &

DECCComplete

Process forms part of the compliance to NEC

instruction and industry emergency contact

detail validations. EPT have included the DECC

contact emails into their .box contacts

11

National Grid and DECC to look into

possibility of hosting the GAS report on

the DECC online portal.

OngoingEPT &

DECCComplete

The portal is now operational having had two live

data tests: a small scale test with UAT and full

test during Exercise Wolf.

12

DECC to host annual pre-winter

workshops to serve as a refresher for UK

Gas Suppliers with respect to both

upstream and downstream emergency

procedures.

OngoingEPT &

DECCComplete

EPT and DECC to continue to expand engagement

via a range of meetings, workshops and

exercises.

13

Update Shipper Team task card to

provide for a single person to collect

faxes from callers and issue to ensure

callers can issue directions more rapidly.


Shipper Team Task Card updated (Time saving

Tips section) with role specific training providing

the most efficient way of managing the call/fax

communications.

14

Continue development of situational

awareness and decision support tools to

aid the NEMT with a view to embedding

these fully prior to the 2015 NEC

Exercise.

Next

NEC

Exercise

EPT CompleteNew Emergency Data Support Tool, live and

replaces previous system.

15Include NEMT Officer shadowing in all

future NEC ExercisesOngoing EPT Complete

NEMT role shadowing to develop competency is

included in the NEC exercise plan.

16

Review all Terminal emergency fax

contact details uploaded to the new

mass fax communication system.


Process forms part of the compliance to NEC

instruction and industry emergency contact

detail validations.

17

Improvements to LDZ critical offtake

pressure information request process to

be discussed and developed for

implementation via the E3 Alignment

Group

By next

CTC

Exercise

NGGT

& DNsOngoing

Ongoing discussions and review of post NEC

Exercise Viper CTC performance with each

Distribution Network, and further improvements

identified after Exercise Wolf CTCs (included in

Exercise Wolf Recommendations).

18

Up to date network maps and

schematics to be shared between all

transporters on an annual basis.

April-15

All

Transp

orters

CompleteNetwork maps shared on an ad-hoc basis as and

on request.

19Transporters to continue to undertake

CTC exercises on an annual basis.Ongoing

All

Transp

orters

Complete

CTC exercises scheduled with each Distribution

Network throughout summer 2015, and CTC

exercises included within 2016 Exercise Plan.

20

DNs to always ensure all 200 sites

contacted during firm load shedding

exercises every year

By Next

NEC

Exercise

All DNs Complete

Discussed and agreed within the SO Forum and

E3 Alignment Group. Performance to be

monitored on an annual basis post-NEC Exercise

(included in Exercise Wolf Recommendations).


21

Distribution network Operators and the

HSE should seek to set a benchmark for

site contact performance and measure

each LDZ against this benchmark in

future years to drive continuous and/or

stable performance.

Ongoing All DNs Closed

Following discussions with HSE, focus is now on

achieving continuous improvement, with DNs

and EPT to agree an action plan via E3 Alignment

Group (included in Exercise Wolf

Recommendations).


Appendix 5: Glossary & References

CTC Critical Transportation Constraint

DECC Department for Energy and Climate Change

DN Distribution Network

DNCCs Distribution Network Control Centres

DST Decision Support Tool

ENCC Electricity National Control Centre

ERT Emergency Response Team

GDE Gas Deficit Emergency

GNCC Gas National Control Centre

GNCC/E/3 Network Emergency Management Team’s Emergency Procedure

GS(M)R Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996

kWh Kilowatthour

LDZ Local Distribution Zone

LGSE Local Gas Supply Emergency

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

MCM Millions of Cubic Metres

MJ/m³ Megajoules per Cubic Metre

NEC Network Emergency Co-ordinator

NEMT Network Emergency Management Team

NGD National Grid Distribution

NGN Northern Gas Networks

NGSE Network Gas Supply Emergency

NTS National Transmission System

OGA Oil and Gas Authority

T/PM/E/1 Procedure for Network Gas Supply Emergency

SGN Scotia Gas Networks

SOQ System Offtake Quantity

UAT User Acceptance Testing

WWU Wales & West Utilities

National Grid’s Emergency Webpages:

http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Gas-transmission-system-operations/Network-

Gas-Supply-Emergency/

National Grid’s System Management Principles Statement:

http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Business-compliance/Procurement-and-System-

Management-Documents/


Appendix 6: Feedback on Exercise Wolf Report

This report has been produced on behalf of the Network Emergency Coordinator by the National Grid

Emergency Planning Team. The Emergency Planning Team wishes to thank all the organisations who

participated in Exercise Wolf or who supplied information or recommendations for inclusion in this

report.

The Emergency Planning Team welcomes feedback on the NEC report on Exercise Wolf. Please forward

any comments on the report or suggestions for how future NEC exercises could be improved to the

Emergency Planning Team using the following contact details.

Emergency Planning TeamNetwork Capability and Operations, GasSystem OperatorNational GridNational Grid HouseWarwick Technology ParkWarwickCV34 6DA

Email address: [email protected]