network rail fire risk auditdata.parliament.uk/depositedpapers/files/dep2013-0502/...head of fire...

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Network Rail

Fire Risk Audit for

Secretary of State

May 2011

Fire Risk Audit Report – May 2011

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DOCUMENT CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION

0.1 Document revision information

Release Date Description of changes 0.1 10 May 2011 First draft for informal comment 0.2 17 May 2011 Second draft for internal stakeholder review 0.3 18 May 2011 Third draft for Executive review 0.4 25 May 2011 Final draft 1.0 26 May 2011 Issue 1

0.2 Author

Name Role National Safety Improvement Manager

0.3 Contributors

Name Role Head of Commercial Estate

Operational Security & Continuity Planning Mgr Head of Fire Safety Policy

Estate Manager Asset Development Manager Insurance Claims Specialist Head of Safety & Assurance (HS1)

Project Manager (Change)


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Table of contents

DOCUMENT CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION ..........................................................2 0.1 Document revision information........................................................................................2 0.2 Author..............................................................................................................................2 0.3 Contributors.....................................................................................................................2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................4

INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................6

CONTEXT .........................................................................................................................7

PREVENTION.................................................................................................................11

MITIGATION ...................................................................................................................23

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................27

RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................................31

APPENDICES.................................................................................................................34


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Following the major fire below the M1 motorway on 15th April 2011, which caused significant disruption to the road network for several days, the Transport Secretary asked the Chief Executives of the Highways Agency and Network Rail to provide a report on potential sources of risk to their networks from property either below roads or railways or on adjacent sites.

2. This report has reviewed Network Rails processes for managing fire risk on infrastructure which it owns and manages. With the exception of HS1 which has been included for completeness of the national rail network, it does not cover infrastructure which is not owned or managed by Network Rail.

3. There have been over 7000 incidents of fires (and reports of smoke) occurring on, or affecting, Network Rail infrastructure in the last 5 years. The vast majority of these cause little or no disruption to operations and significant disruption to train services are relatively rare.

4. Network Rail manages 5,557 lettings within its commercial portfolio of which 3,189 are arches underneath the operating railway. Many of these are not connected with railway operations. It also has a further 1,029 lettings as part of its rail freight portfolio. Together these produce a rental income of around £89m pa of direct benefit to the railway industry.

5. Of the total 521 are currently classified as “high risk” usually as a result of the potential presence of pressurised gas cylinders or flammable substances on the premises. 413 are associated with the motor trades.

6. Fires which involve acetylene cylinders are significant as they can involve the imposition by Fire and Rescue Services of a 200m exclusion zone for up to 24 hours. Network Rail has a concerted policy to reduce the number of properties with the use of acetylene. Acetylene is prohibited in all new lettings. It is also believed that there are now just eighteen sites where acetylene remains - this is often the result of long standing tenancy agreements which are difficult to change. Where acetylene does remain tenants are subject to a robust management regime and failure to comply would result in forfeiture notices.

7. Although not reviewed in detail by the report, fires in neighbouring properties and land also have the potential for a significant impact on the performance of the railway – particularly if they involve a 200m pressurised gas cylinder exclusion zone. In the last 5 years these incidents have resulted in a cost to the rail industry of over £11m under the industry performance regime.

8. The report concludes that there is an effective management process for fire risk which is within Network Rail’s direct control and that lessons arising from investigations and recommendations are reviewed to identify necessary changes to mitigate or prevent recurrence. It makes a number of recommendations for matters which are not directly within Network Rail’s control. The recommendations address three broad areas:


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The risk presented to railway operations from fires where acetylene may be present and the absence of a certification or authorisation mechanism to effectively control the supply and use of acetylene.

The security of tenure afforded to tenants under the Landlord and Tenants Act which makes it extremely difficult to close down those “high risk” businesses that may affect NR operations, without their cooperation. Additional funding of the order £75m may be required to buy out and eliminate all “high risk” uses below Network Rail operational infrastructure.

Recommendations to improve the identification of all “high risk” locations within 200m of the railway infrastructure that are not owned by Network Rail, particularly those that would have the largest impact on the rail network (20 Key Routes). These include some proposals around planning authority powers that could be used to restrict high risk activities adjacent to key railway transport corridors.


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INTRODUCTION

9. At approximately 04.10 on Friday 15th April, the M1 motorway (southern section) was closed between junction 1 at Brent Cross and junction 4 at Elstree in north London, due to a serious fire beneath an elevated section of the motorway at Mill Hill. The site of the fire was a scrapyard situated below the motorway and a number of gas cylinders, including acetylene, were involved and a ‘hazard zone’ was set up by the London Fire Brigade (LFB) due to the risk of explosion.

10. The Midland Main Line railway line, which runs adjacent to the M1 in this area was also affected for a short period of time, with the two lines closest to the M1 (Up and Down Slow lines) being closed initially at 05.20, but reopened again once our personnel arrived on scene and a site conference held. All lines were reopened from 07.20.

11. The northbound section of the M1 was opened with lane closures late afternoon on 16th April, whereas the southbound section was not opened until approximately 16.00 on the 18th April, again with lane closures.

12. Subsequent investigations by LFB have identified the likely cause of the fire to be arson.

13. On Monday 18th April 2011, the Secretary of State requested the Chief Executives of the Highways Agency and Network Rail to provide a report on potential sources of risk to their networks from property either below roads or railways, or on adjacent sites. As well as identifying sources and categories of risk, the report is to include the options currently available for managing these risks, identifying the gaps, and making recommendations about how these risks should be managed.

14. This report has been prepared in response to the Secretary of State’s request for information in relation to the risks of major transport infrastructure as a result of fire. Whilst the report covers general risk areas, the focus is towards the letting and management of properties below railway infrastructure for business use. A further phase of work will be required in order to consider the thousands of businesses that operate adjacent to our infrastructure, where these are not already dealt with under existing legislation, e.g. COMAH, Civil Contingencies Act, etc.

15. The report does not cover infrastructure not owned and managed by Network Rail (e.g. London Underground).


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CONTEXT

16. Network Rail operates, maintains and develops Britain’s national rail network infrastructure, including the railway tracks, signals, tunnels, bridges, level crossings and most stations. Although owning the stations, all except 18 key stations are managed and operated by train operating companies as the stations facility owner (SFO).

20 Key Routes London Liverpool St – Shenfield

London Liverpool St – Cambridge and Stansted Airport

London Kings Cross – Edinburgh via Peterborough, Doncaster, York and Newcastle

Doncaster – Leeds via Wakefield

Leeds – Manchester Piccadilly

Birmingham – York via derby, Sheffield and Leeds

Birmingham – Plymouth via Bristol

Birmingham – Southampton via Coventry, Oxford, Reading and Basingstoke

Birmingham – Nottingham via Derby

London Euston – Glasgow Central via Preston

Edinburgh Waverly – Glasgow Central via Falkirk

London Euston – Birmingham New St via Coventry and Wolverhampton

Birmingham – Manchester Piccadilly via Stoke on Trent

Crewe – Manchester Piccadilly

London Euston – Liverpool

London St Pancras – Nottingham via Luton and Leicester

London St Pancras – Sheffield

London Paddington – Cardiff Central via Reading and Swindon

Swindon – Bristol via Bath Spa

Bristol Parkway – Bristol Temple Meads

London Paddington – Heathrow Airport

London Waterloo – Weymouth via Woking, Basingstoke, Southampton and Bournemouth

London Bridge – East Croydon

London Victoria – Brighton via East Croydon, Gatwick Airport and Haywards Heath

London Charing Cross – London Bridge

London Victoria – Gillingham via Bromley South

London Bridge – Ashford International via Orpington and Tonbridge


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17. The scope of this review is focussed on the letting, management, and potential fire risk from the portfolio of properties below Network Rail operational infrastructure, let for business use. This includes HS1.

18. Although data is available for the entire Network Rail property portfolio, focus is on the portfolio within the 20 Key Routes as the potential for serious impact from disruption is greatest here.

Key Facts - Operational Network

19. Network Rail is one of the largest landowners in the UK and approximately 7.5m trains operate over our infrastructure per annum (circa 320m train miles) and is responsible for the following operational infrastructure:

20,000 miles of track

40,000 bridges and tunnels

18 major stations that we manage ourselves – more than half of all passenger journeys start or finish at one of them

2,500 other stations – leased to train operating companies

850 signal boxes

7000 level crossings

6000 cuttings and embankments

Property Portfolio

20. The estate broadly comprises the letting of arches, land, and buildings away from station concourse/platform areas (The Commercial Estate). Network Rail also manage an office estate for operational staff; easements (e.g. pipes, wires and cables) over and under the infrastructure; a portfolio of low value lettings (almost exclusively land) e.g. garden extensions, domestic garage sites, etc., and a number of lettings to freight operators and Network Rail contractors (the Freight Portfolio).

21. The Commercial Estate is predominantly industrial and storage by nature and comprises 5,557 lettings of which 3,189 are arches (lettings may incorporate multiple arches), 1,380 buildings and 855 land (see Appendix 1). A detailed breakdown of use is shown in Appendix 2, from which it can be seen broadly that 33% is industrial, 24% storage, 23% retail and leisure, and 7% office (by number of lettings). The remainder is a mix of residential, easements, licences and other miscellaneous lettings.

22. Over and above these numbers, there are 1,843 properties which are currently vacant.

23. The freight portfolio is made up of 1,029 lettings of land and buildings, including lettings to Network Rail contractors.


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24. The Commercial Estate portfolio currently generates an annual rent roll of £84m with a further £5m generated by The Freight Portfolio. This represents a significant income stream for Network Rail which supports the delivery of enhancements to the railway infrastructure.

25. As well as the income stream; the letting strategy on the Property Portfolio is also seen as a key benefit in protecting the railway. The presence of authorised tenants improves site security and prevents unauthorised activities (i.e. fly-tipping, squatters, vandalism, etc) that increase the risk to the operational infrastructure. Such unauthorised activities are commonly targeted at vacant properties rather than business premises that are in active use with their own security systems and insurance cover.

Number of High Risk Properties

26. Whilst the letting of the Property Portfolio brings significant benefits to Network Rail it does import some risk itself. Therefore, the permitted use for lettings is strictly controlled and a schedule is held that shows the categorisation and type of uses regarded as ‘high risk’.

27. There are currently a total of 488 high risk uses on the Commercial Estate and a further 33 on the Freight Portfolio.

Number of Properties with Acetylene Cylinders

28. Since 5th November 2006, a vigorous drive has been undertaken to reduce the number of properties with use of acetylene and the number of tenants having the gas on site has been reduced from over 300 to just 12 in the Commercial Estate sites, and 6 in the freight sites.

29. It should be noted that one of the sites on the Commercial Estate schedule does not use acetylene cylinders, but due to their use as a Waste Transfer Station it is known to be handled at times in waste received at the site. The site is therefore monitored to ensure the standards of handling are maintained and any acetylene found is promptly removed in a controlled manner.

Fire Incidents Affecting Network Rail

30. During the past 5 years there have been over 7000 incidents of fires (and reports of smoke) occurring on, or affecting, Network Rail infrastructure and its operation. This includes those on trains, stations, and third party fires below or adjacent to our network. Although the incidence of fire is not uncommon, this has to be considered in the context of our 24/7, 365 days a year nationwide operation. The vast majority of fire events cause no, or very little disruption to our services, and those incidents causing significant disruption are relatively rare, representing less than 0.3% of overall delays, see table 1.


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Delays Caused by Fire

Total Delays (minutes)

Fire Delays

% of all delays Fire Costs

% of all costs

2006/07 131,283,780 195,158 0.15% £8,812,143 0.57%

2007/08 113,994,050 206,288 0.18% £7,068,598 0.52%

2008/09 75,023,993 82,418 0.11% £2,340,745 0.22%

2009/10 57,338,107 172,699 0.30% £5,114,626 0.53%

2010/11 67,822,501 159,677 0.24% £5,232,227 0.41%

Table 1 – fires as percentage of total delays and cost 31. The causes of fire are many and varied, and under the rail industry ‘performance

regime’ delays to train services and subsequent costs are allocated responsibility depending on where they occur; for example if on a train they are allocated to the train operator, if on the infrastructure they are allocated to Network Rail. Network Rail is also allocated responsibility should a fire occur off our infrastructure, but still affect train services.

Number of Fire Incidents on the Commercial Estate

32. Over the past five years, of the 7000 fire incidents reported on the national rail network, only 29 have been within the Commercial Estate portfolio. Of these, 14 resulted in disruption to the operational railway.

33. The cause and impact of each incident is reviewed to identify any common causes and the robustness of the processes currently in place. Any identified actions are implemented and adopted as part of the business processes.

Fires Involving Acetylene Cylinders

34. Current Fire and Rescue Service procedures for acetylene incidents require the establishment of a ‘hazard zone’ involving a 200 metre safety cordon and observe a ‘soak’ period of 24 hours in order to allow the acetylene cylinders to cool, and therefore pose less risk to any personnel investigating the fire.

35. There have been a number of third party fires involving acetylene cylinders that have required the imposition of an exclusion zone, however it should be noted that recent research has indicated that the time required to allow acetylene cylinders to cool can be reduced significantly; this is currently under consideration by the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA).


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PREVENTION

Legal Responsibilities

36. The principal fire safety legislation is the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in England and Wales, and the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 in Scotland. Additionally, in relation to sub-surface stations, the Fire Precautions (Sub Surface Railway Stations) (England) Regulations 2006 also apply in England and Wales, and the Fire Precautions (Sub Surface Railway Stations) Regulations 1989 apply in Scotland.

37. Network Rail as the employer is the ‘responsible person’ and the Head of Fire Safety Policy as the Professional Head discharges those responsibilities supported by the Network Rail Fire Safety Engineers and local managers appointed as the Person Responsible for Fire Safety (PRFS).

38. The legislation places the following duties on the ‘responsible person’:-

Duty to take general fire precautions

39. The responsible person must take such general fire precautions as will ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of any of his employees.

Risk assessment

40. The responsible person must make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to which relevant persons are exposed for the purpose of identifying the general fire precautions he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed on him by or under this Order. Where a dangerous substance is or is liable to be present in or on the premises, the risk assessment must include consideration of them. The responsible person must record the significant findings of the assessment, including the measures which have been or will be taken by the responsible person

Elimination or reduction of risks from dangerous substances

41. Where a dangerous substance is present in or on the premises, the responsible person must ensure that risk is either eliminated or reduced so far as is reasonably practicable.

Fire-fighting and fire detection

42. The premises are, to the extent that it is appropriate, equipped with appropriate fire-fighting equipment and with fire detectors and alarms.


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Emergency routes and exits

43. Where necessary in order to safeguard the safety of relevant persons, the responsible person must ensure that routes to emergency exits from premises and the exits themselves are kept clear at all times.

Maintenance

44. Where necessary in order to safeguard the safety of relevant persons the responsible person must ensure that the premises and any facilities, equipment and devices are maintained.

Training

45. The responsible person must ensure that his employees are provided with adequate safety training. In addition to the above the following Legislation applies to Sub-surface Railway Stations.

Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations

46. In 1999 the COMAH Regulations were introduced with the aim of preventing major accidents involving dangerous substances and to limit the consequences to people and the environment of any which do occur.

47. There are two thresholds for dangerous substances under COMAH. These thresholds vary for different substances. If the site operator stores or uses more than the lower threshold for a dangerous substance the site is classed as a lower tier site. If the site operator stores or uses more than the higher threshold then the site is designated a top tier site but the threshold varies according to the product involved. COMAH is regulated by the HSE and the Environment Agency. These organisations are jointly referred to as the competent authority (CA).

48. Dangerous substances covered by the COMAH Regulations include:

Ammonium Nitrate.

Oxygen.

Acetylene.

Hydrogen.

Formaldehyde.

Halogens.

Petroleum products.

49. The COMAH Regulations require that the operator of a ‘Top-Tier’ establishment produces two plans:


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On-site Emergency Plan - prepared by the Operator, to specify the response to an emergency which may affect those who work on the site.

Off-site Emergency Plan - prepared by the Local Authority which specifies the co-ordinated response of partner agencies to an emergency which has any off-site effects.

50. There is a requirement upon the operator of a ‘Top-Tier’ establishment to provide specified information to people or other stakeholders liable to be affected by a major accident at that establishment. This includes Network Rail as many COMAH sites are located adjacent to, or near the railway. Many also have active rail connections such as the major oil refineries and nuclear power stations.

Network Rail Health & Safety Management System

51. Network Rail has extensive arrangements in place to manage the risks from fire in accordance with the requirements of fire safety legislation, in order to reduce the risks to its employees and other persons, protect its extensive property portfolio and minimise business disruption.

52. The company Head of Fire Safety Policy is responsible for developing the fire risk policy and loss control strategy directed towards reducing fire risk, and compliance with statutory fire safety legislation.

53. Each Network Rail managed building, depot, vehicle, plant, construction site, signalling facility and lineside area has a nominated line manager with responsibility for general health and safety arrangements, including fire safety. These managers are responsible for arranging fire risk assessment for buildings under their control which take into account the probability of a fire occurring and the potential consequences for safety and business continuity. There are specific Network Rail Standards and Guidance Notes that set out the procedure to be followed. Buildings are inspected by the local line manager to check the adequacy of the fire safety arrangements at a frequency based on the results of the fire risk assessment.

54. Line managers with fire safety responsibilities are supported by the Head of Fire Safety Policy and an out-based team of fire safety engineers who provide fire safety advice, including new / altered buildings design, undertake fire safety audits, and conduct investigations.

55. Line managers arrange for staff under their control to receive appropriate instruction and training in the fire safety arrangements pertinent to their workplace. All Network Rail employees receive instruction and training on company fire safety arrangements within their work location as part of their induction process, and where relevant, enhanced training commensurate with their duties.

56. Route Buildings Engineers specify maintenance regimes, inspection activities, and renewal proposals for buildings to include the planned preventative maintenance (PPM) programmes for all fixed fire systems including fire alarm systems, fire suppression systems and emergency lighting systems such that they are maintained in accordance with the appropriate British Standard(s) by competent


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persons. All new, altered and refurbished premises are vetted for fire safety and any proposed changes are assessed for compliance with the relevant fire safety legislation.

57. Director Network Rail Property is responsible for arrangements by which all property lease agreements correctly address the tenant’s responsibilities for fire safety as part of the conditions of their lease. This is especially important in relation to the lease of railway arches beneath operational infrastructure.

Standards

58. Network Rail has a suite of fire safety standards covering the management of fire safety within the company.

59. The Fire Safety Policy is a Level 1 standard supported by lower level (detailed) standards. A Fire Safety Standards Steering Group (FSSSG) is in place chaired by the Head of Fire Safety Policy, together with key stakeholders from each of the Network Rail functions who are responsible for the development and approval of the suite of standards.

60. The table below defines the standards in place within Network Rail, for the management of fire risk.

Title Scope Purpose

Fire Safety Policy This policy applies to all Network Rail employees, or contractors, and premises occupied or managed by Network Rail, together with the Network Rail Infrastructure. This policy applies to all Network Rail employees, or contractors, and premises occupied or managed by Network Rail, together with the Network Rail Infrastructure.

The Company Fire Safety Policy mandates requirements applicable to the control of risks arising from fire to the safety of Network Rail workforce, contractors, customers, assets and business activity.

Fire Safety - Managed Stations

This standard applies to all Network Rail employees and contractors working in Network Rail Managed Stations.

This standard sets the minimum standard required to meet the requirements of Fire Safety Policy within Network Rail Managed Stations.

Fire Safety - Operational Estate

This standard applies to all Network Rail employees, or contractors, working in Operational Estate.

The duties and responsibilities contained in this standard relate to those premises, which are essential for the operation of the railway, for example, Signal

This standard sets the minimum standard required to meet the requirements of Fire Safety Policy in the Network Rail Operational Estate.


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Boxes, Power Signal Boxes, Integrated Electric Control Centres and Electrical Control Rooms including the outside area between the building and boundary.

Fire Safety - Offices This Standard applies to Network Rail Offices and Training Delivery Centres and those areas occupied by Offices and Training Delivery Centres within premises managed by others and contractors appointed by Network Rail to work within Offices.

This standard sets the minimum standard required to meet the requirements of Fire Safety Policy in Network Rail Offices and Competency and Training Delivery Centres.

Fire Safety – Property, Business Space, Freight & Miscellaneous Property Portfolios

This Standard applies to premises owned by Network Rail including vacant and let properties in the Business Space & Freight Portfolios and buildings in the MAP Portfolio measuring over 50 sq m (excluding Train Operator Companies (TOC’s) Estate Stations and Light Maintenance Depots let to TOC’s).

This standard sets the minimum standard required to meet the requirements of Fire Safety Policy within the Network Rail Property, Business Space, Freight & MAP Portfolios (“the Portfolio”)

Maintenance This standard applies to all Network Rail employees, or contractors, and premises occupied by or managed by Network Rail.

The duties and responsibilities contained in this standard relate to those premises, which are essential for the maintenance of the railway, for example, Maintenance Depots, and to other staffed/or un-staffed premises such Relay Rooms and Traction Supply Buildings including outside areas between the building and any boundary.

This standard sets the minimum standard required to meet the requirements of Fire Safety Policy within the Network Rail Maintenance function.

Fire Risk assessment The duties and responsibilities contained in the standard relates to all those premises which require a fire risk assessment to be undertaken.

This Standard details the procedure to be taken by the Person Responsible for Fire Safety (PRFS) when undertaking fire risk assessments within Network Rail premises.

Fire extinguishers The duties and responsibilities contained in this standard relates to all those premises

This standard provides information on fire extinguishers to all staff with the responsibility for the


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that require portable fire fighting equipment.

management of fire safety. The document sets out requirements for implementation of the fire safety policy contained within the Fire Safety Policy.

Fire Log Book The standard applies to all premises where fire safety equipment is provided and details the required checks, inspections and eminence of fire safety equipment provided in the premises.

The fire logbook is used to record details of fire safety training, inspections, maintenance and incidents etc. as required by fire safety legislation and regulations.

Network Rail Fire Safety Team

61. The Head of Fire Safety Policy is the ‘Professional Head’ of fire safety responsible for policy, standards, and compliance with the legislation. The team consist of 3 Senior Fire Safety Engineers and 5 Fire Safety Engineers.

62. A Person Responsible for Fire Safety (PRFS) is appointed for all premises and they are responsible for the day to day management of fire safety.

63. The Fire Safety Engineers undertake fire risk assessments at business critical operational and maintenance premises such as managed stations, signal boxes, control centres and maintenance delivery units the PRFS undertakes the fire risk assessment at all other staffed locations.

64. Fire safety at un-staffed locations is managed by internal management standards - Trackside Apparatus Case, and Equipment Rooms & Relay Rooms. These define the checks for fire risk around the location(s), and the need to remove or report any possible risks. An additional standard exists regarding the fire risk at Traction Supply Buildings.

65. At leased stations and depots, although Network Rail owns the fire safety systems in the leased premises, the facilities operators are responsible for maintenance and testing and the Station and Depot Facilities Owner is the ‘responsible person’ as defined in the fire safety legislation and they are responsible for compliance with the legislation.

Steering Group Governance

66. A Fire Strategy Steering Group (FSSG) chaired by the Head of Fire Safety Policy is established between the Commercial Property team and the Fire Safety team, and meets every 6 weeks to review the management of fire risk from the commercial estate of tenanted railway arches and industrial estates adjacent to the infrastructure.


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67. A Network Rail standard details the Commercial Property team’s roles and responsibilities under fire safety legislation and how Network Rail manages the imported fire risk from high risk use tenants. The group has produced safety information for tenants on their roles and responsibilities under fire safety legislation, storage and use of acetylene cylinders, and the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002.

68. The purpose of the steering group is to continually monitor compliance with the inspection regime, share best practice, challenge the current processes and the ‘Low’ & ‘High’ Risk categories to ensure the risk to the operational railway is actively managed and minimised as far as is possible given the diversity of the portfolio.

69. The steering group will also ensure that the cause and impact of any incident is reviewed to identify any common causes and the robustness of the processes currently in place. Any identified actions are implemented and adopted as part of the business processes previously outlined.

Briefing and Training

70. Fire safety legislation requires staff to be briefed and trained in the actions to be taken in the event of an outbreak of fire. Network Rail have a bespoke computer based (‘e’ learning) fire safety package which consists of 4 modules

General Fire Safety

Emergency Evacuation Wardens

Fire extinguishers

Fire Safety management.

71. The frequency of training is specified in the Network Rail standards, and varies according to responsibilities in relation to managing fire risk within individual roles.

Fire Service Liaison

72. The Fire Safety Engineers have regular liaison meetings with the Fire and Rescue Services where there are sub-surface railway systems, as recommended by the inquiry into the Kings Cross fire. They also hold liaison meetings for all major redevelopments and projects related works.

73. Network Rail has worked closely with the fire and rescue services to seek improvements to the arrangements for gaining access to Network Rail infrastructure in order to reduce the impact of line side fire incidents.

74. Following any major fire in the tenanted arch estate, Fire Safety Engineers request the Fire Authority to carry out a post fire audit, to learn lessons and reduce the likelihood of further events and mitigate their loss.


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Design

75. The Fire Safety Engineers review all project proposals for compliance with Approved Document B of the Building Regulations, British and European Standards for building design and fire safety systems.

76. Fire strategies, which propose a fire engineering approach to meet the functional requirements of Approved Document B, are submitted by any design and build contractors, and are reviewed and approved by the Fire Safety Engineers.

Landlords Consent

77. A ‘web based’ process is in place to manage any proposed alterations to stations, depots and retail units. The tenant submits an online application, which is subsequently reviewed by the Network Rail asset steward, Fire Safety Engineer and Station Manager (Managed Stations only). Works are not permitted to start until all parties have given their approval. Furthermore, the applicant must submit details of any changes to the structure, electrical installations, surface linings of walls and ceilings and fire safety systems.

Inspections

78. At our 18 Managed Stations, to assist in managing imported risk, the relevant Shift Station Manager (SSM) accompanied by a Fire Safety Engineer inspect 25% of their station every 3 months, so that over an annual period the whole station is inspected. During the inspections, the SSM completes a Fire Log Book which is held locally and subject to audit. The dates for these inspections are agreed in January each year.

79. At other staffed premises, the PRFS carries out 6 monthly, and annual fire safety inspections.

80. The Fire Authorities additionally carry out fire safety audits to check for compliance with relevant legislation. These are carried out at a frequency determined by the appropriate Fire Authority.

Third Party Fires

81. Fires in third party neighbouring properties and land have the potential for very high impact on the performance of the railway. Since 1st April 2006, these incidents have resulted in a cost to the rail industry of over £11m under our industry performance regime.

82. The presence of pressurised gas cylinders involved in a fire can result in the Fire and Rescue Service implementing a 200 metre hazard zone (exclusion zone) and if acetylene cylinders are involved this can be in place for up to 24 hours, to allow for cooling off, and trains cannot be run through the exclusion zone.


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Non-Operational Estate (Commercial Estate and Freight)

83. The following arrangements are those in place for the Non-operational estate and the risk management process can be broadly broken down into 5 key areas:

Property Inspections

84. The risk management process is principally documented within a Network Rail Standard titled ‘Fire Safety – Property, Business Space, Freight & Miscellaneous Property Portfolios (Level 3 Standard).

85. The standard sets out the minimum requirements to be applied in the fire risk management of the portfolio, and compliance is mandatory on Network Rail and its contractors. It also ensures that Network Rail is compliant with The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety Order) 2005, The Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 & The Fire Safety (Scotland) Regulations 2006.

86. The standard incorporates an inspection matrix that clearly sets out the minimum frequency for the inspection of properties dependent upon whether it is let or vacant, and if let, the nature of the actual use.

Let Properties

87. The fire risk imported by tenants (i.e. what potential does the tenants’ undertaking have on disrupting continued train operation) is assessed and risk ranked in accordance with an agreed schedule of uses categorised as ‘low risk’ or ‘high risk’.

88. The risk categorisation is based on the potential consequences to Network Rail and is based on business risk. The business risk aspect considers both the continued normal operation of the core business and the risk of prosecution from a non-compliance viewpoint with respect to fire safety legislation.

89. All new lettings are strictly vetted in terms of the proposed use of the property and the working methods to be employed, and only those tenants considered satisfactory will be considered.

90. The letting for the purposes of high risk ‘Motor Vehicles Uses’ is by exception only and limited to specific locations. In addition, the following uses are strictly prohibited within Network Rail properties:

The Storage of Wooden Pallets (except where ancillary to the main business use)

The Storage of Tyres (excludes Tyre Fitting Centres)

91. Any new lettings falling within the high risk category are inspected by a Network Rail Fire Safety Engineer within 14 days of the tenant taking occupation and having commenced trading from the property.

92. The fire safety inspection focuses on the tenant’s working practices in terms of the risk to operational railway. The tenant is notified of any actions deemed necessary


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to mitigate the risk and the tenant’s compliance with these actions is closely monitored. The failure to address any serious concerns would result in forfeiture action being taken to remove the risk.

93. An audit of new let inspections is monitored centrally and the ongoing inspections conducted on a local basis.

Vacant Properties

94. In accordance with the requirements of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety Order) 2005 and the Fire (Scotland) Act 2005 Network Rail has appointed the Portfolio Manager (the person responsible for the management of each geographic portfolio) as ‘The Person Responsible for Fire Safety’ (PRFS) in respect to vacant properties.

95. The inspection matrix requires all vacant properties to be inspected as a minimum once every twelve months. The inspection again focuses on the potential impact to the railway through illegal occupation or access to vacant property. The security of the properties is checked and any flammable materials / waste cleared to minimise the potential for fires to be started.

96. An audit of the annual inspections is maintained on a central Property Database (Horizon). This allows future inspections to be diarised and an audit of compliance with the inspection matrix requirements.

97. An active letting strategy is in place to reduce the number of Vacant Properties on the portfolio and minimise the risks that such properties represent to the railway infrastructure.

Multi-Occupied Buildings and Shared Fire Escapes

98. Whilst outside of the remit of the report, Network Rail ensures that a PRFS is appointed for all such properties and regular inspections are undertaken to ensure compliance with statutory regulations and the risk of fire is minimised.

99. A Fire Risk Assessment is required for each location and regular inspections are also required in accordance with the adopted inspection matrix.

100. As well the property inspection regime, a Network Rail standard covers the management of the risk imported by Network Rail’s contractors, fire investigation and reporting, design advice to minimise risk from fire, and staff training requirements.

101. On the latter point, all Network Rail staff involved in the management of the portfolio are required to undertake at least two fire safety training modules with refresher training every two years. The completion of training modules is recorded centrally and forms part of a four weekly safety briefing within Network Rail Property. The training is adequate for the purposes of undertaking the duties of a PRFS.

Agreement Covenants


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102. Network Rail has a template suite of Tenancy and Lease documents that are specifically tailored to protect the operational railway.

103. The standard Network Rail Tenancy Agreement forms the majority of the lettings on the portfolio. These documents are produced via a ‘Lease Wizard’ document that prevents the alteration of standard clauses and ensures a consistent approach across the country.

104. The template documents include a series of covenants and regulations that limit the activities of the tenant in terms of types of materials stored on site, the use and storage of gas cylinders (other than Acetylene) and alterations to the property.

105. Additionally, the documents place positive obligations on tenants to undertake Fire Risk Assessments, maintain fire safety equipment on site, ensure electrical wiring is compliant with modern standards and high standards of housekeeping are maintained (i.e. rubbish isn’t allowed to accumulate on site).

106. It is the responsibility of the Portfolio Manager to ensure that tenants comply with the covenants contained within their agreements and forfeiture proceedings will be issued where any significant breaches are identified that could impact on the operational railway.

107. The documents also stipulate that a tenant must generally comply with all necessary statutory regulations which include fire safety and general health & safety requirements.

Prohibition of Acetylene Cylinders

108. In response to the lack of enforcement prohibition on the use of acetylene, a rigid inspection regime was introduced on 5th November 2006. As previously stated this resulted in a significant reduction in the number of sites permitted to have acetylene cylinders.

109. The use of acetylene had been strictly prohibited in all new lettings for a number of years prior to 2006.

110. The remaining sites are occupied by virtue of historic agreements that do not contain the current prohibition and are unable to be altered without the co-operation of the tenant. The option does exist to seek a variation to the lease terms through the courts but the likelihood of success is limited as the presumption is that the terms should remain as originally agreed by the parties to the lease.

111. To minimise the potential risk to the operational railway these tenants are subject to a vigorous management regime and are required to show compliance with a host of requirements (i.e. written evidence from their insurance company that they are covered for its use, staff fully trained to use equipment, documented evidence that regulators changed annually, equipment is stored correctly, signage is displayed, etc.).

112. Tenants that fail to comply with all such requirements are issued with forfeiture notices to arrange compliance or face the loss of their right to remain in the property.


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113. Any tenants found to be using acetylene under a tenancy with an absolute prohibition are immediately issued forfeiture notices to comply with the terms of their agreements and remove the acetylene cylinders from site.


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MITIGATION

National Emergency Plan

114. Network Rail has a standing National Emergency Plan. This covers the responsibilities and procedures for rail personnel responding to an incident on the network. This Plan is reviewed annually, or following any major incident where the Plan is invoked. The Plan supports National and Emergency Services’ procedures and co-ordination frameworks.

115. In addition, Network Rail, through liaison at Civil Contingencies Secretariat and Local Resilience Forum levels, ensures that procedures within the National Emergency Plan interface with Local Authority tasks and procedures frameworks under the Civil Contingencies Act.

Liaison with Fire Services

116. Network Rail has an extensive and robust liaison framework with all Fire and Rescue Services across the UK Mainland. This is structured on several levels as follows:

National – Twice yearly meetings with key Emergency Services personnel under the auspices of the National Emergency Planning & Co-ordination Committee (NEPACC). This body is chaired by Network Rail.

Route level – Route Emergency Planning & Co-ordination Committee (REPACC). These meetings are held on a quarterly basis and involve regional level Emergency Services, Train and Freight Operating Companies and Local Resilience Forum representation.

Renewals & Enhancements Programme

117. In order to maintain and enhance the asset condition of the non-operational estate, Network Rail has an on going maintenance and investment programme. The investment programme is particularly focused on major city centres and the poorer quality stock that is more likely to be vacant or occupied by ‘high risk’ uses such as car repairers. A good example of the way the programme is changing the use profile can be found in the South East area of London where a number of arches occupied by ‘high risk’ uses have been converted into B1 Office space.

118. During the past two years; £7m of renewals, and £32.2m of enhancements have been completed on the non-operational estate. The remaining three years of Network Rail’s current Control Period will see a further £10.5m of renewals and £61.1m of enhancements that will further reduce the current numbers of ‘high risk’ uses through the general upgrade of the asset condition.

119. The investment programme also enables Network Rail to secure vacant possession on arches and properties that would otherwise be problematical due to the security of tenure afforded to tenants by the Landlord & Tenant Acts. The fact that uses


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have been classed as ‘high risk’ by Network Rail wouldn’t itself be a legal ground upon which to seek to remove the tenant from the arch / property.

120. The enhancements to the estate also reduce the risk to the operational railway through improved design, the careful use of sustainable materials and the prohibition of the majority of ‘high risk’ uses in future letting strategy of the estate.

British Transport Police

121. BTP provide a vital deterrent and investigative role in dealing with incidents on or near the infrastructure. Network Rail and BTP maintain an extensive liaison framework (ranging from CEO / Chief Constable level to BTP Sub-Sector commanders and local Network Rail operational management). The main focus for this framework is the understanding of each party’s operational requirements and procedures so as to allow for more effective and efficient incident response and recovery of services.

122. In addition, BTP provide valuable crime reduction advice to assist in the prevention of crime on Network Rail property. This is reinforced with BTP participation in many educational events to communities and schools.

Community Safety Programme

123. An extensive Community Safety programme exists to counter rail safety and crime issues. This is co-ordinated on a national level by the Community Safety Steering Group (CSSG) and is chaired by Network Rail. In addition, nine Community Safety Partnership Groups (CSPGs) exist and broadly mirror the British Transport Police Area Command boundaries. The shared objective of the group is to monitor railway crime and the effectiveness of action plans and facilitating co-ordinated actions where appropriate.

124. The programme covers a wide range of issues including suicides, trespass, vandalism and graffiti, as well theft and arson. Its focus is in those areas and with those groups who are involved or exposed to the aforementioned activities. Many national and Route/Area based programmes focus on educating people on the dangers and impact of crime on the rail infrastructure.

Incident Response Arrangements – Competence

125. The National Emergency Plan is exercised robustly with both live and table-top exercises taking place, for example during 2010 -2011, Network Rail conducted 19 exercises, of which 10 were live and nine were table top. A wide spectrum of incidents is covered in these exercises and Lessons Learned are disseminated to all. All Emergency Services participate in each of these exercises.

126. Network Rail conducts and reviews the training of key appointments in the National Emergency Plan (e.g. Rail Incident Officer (RIO) and Rail Incident Commanders (RIC)). The content of these courses is shared with all Emergency Services in


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order to ensure the training received is what is required from a rail perspective, but also that it is complimentary to the needs of Emergency Services and supports their procedures at an incident.

127. Network Rail has also published several guidance documents that have been issued to Emergency Services. These documents provide basic safety and operating guidelines for personnel who are responding to incidents on or near the rail network. These documents are reviewed annually to ensure that they remain extant with Emergency Services incident response procedures, however, this does not compromise the main objective of the guidance – ensuring that personnel can respond in safety.

Non-Operational Property Inspections

128. The fire risk management of the existing let portfolio and the ongoing management of new lets are also governed by the Fire Inspection Matrix with high risk uses inspected six monthly and low risk uses every eighteen months. It should be noted that this is the minimum requirement and on the majority of the portfolio, particularly in Key Route areas, inspections are undertaken more frequently.

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Joint Asset Contingency Plan

129. Network Rail and The Highways Agency have identified seven locations where both infrastructures meet. In order to ensure that responses to incidents in any of these locations allow for the most efficient return to normal operations, a series of Joint Asset Contingency Plans are being developed. The first plan, covering the Mossband Viaduct (where the M6 motorway travels over the London North West line near Carlisle) has been developed and, at this point, has been table-top exercised. The Plan provides guidance to Strategic, Tactical and Operational managers in the event of structural failure or compromise of the viaduct.

Enhancements in Fire Safety Management

130. All fire incidents on and adjacent to the infrastructure are recorded in our central safety database (SMIS) and the data analysed to identify trends and high risk locations.

131. In response to recent analysis, a working group consisting of the Network Rail Fire Safety Engineers, local Operations Managers, Maintenance and British Transport Police was established last year in our Wessex Route to respond to an increase in the number of infrastructure fires. The locations of the incidents were recorded on an electronic map of the route, and the top 10 locations were identified based on the number of incidents and performance delay and costs. The causes of fire were identified and a bespoke Fire Risk Assessment form has been developed to assist in identifying the risk, and additional control measures required to mitigate the risk. The risk assessment process is currently being evaluated at the top 10 locations


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and if successful will be rolled out across the other routes. Subject to successful completion of trials this will be rolled out during 2012.

132. A further fire safety working group was also established last year, consisting of Network Rail Fire Safety Engineers, National Delivery Service, Maintenance and the Rail Grinding Maintenance contractor, following an increase in the number of infrastructure fires following the passage of train borne rail grinding machines. A number of additional control measures have been identified and engineering change applications are being processed to introduce them.

Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) Contract – Qinetiq

133. Network Rail, the Highways Agency and Transport for London are stakeholders in a contract with Qinetiq Ltd for the provision of an ROV response team to acetylene cylinder related incidents where these impact upon any of their infrastructure. The previous contract started in August 2008 and the current contract is due to finish in January 2013. Thereafter, Fire and Rescue Services will be encouraged to agree contracts.

134. The ROV is a robotic vehicle that can be sent into locations where fires involving acetylene cylinders are taking place – the obvious safety factor of not placing any personnel at risk is evident. The ROV is able to determine the temperature of the cylinders and can also start cooling these in preparation for subsequent action by fire personnel.

135. The major benefit that the ROV brings is that cylinders can be identified quickly and incidents can be reduced significantly both in the area cordoned off and the time in which the cordon remains in effect. Instead of infrastructure being closed for up to 24 hours, this has, on average, been reduced to four hours, thus significantly reducing the disruption to stakeholders’ operations.


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INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Incident Reporting

136. Network Rail has well established arrangements in place for the reporting of accidents and incidents and these are defined in company standards and procedures which meet the requirements of industry standards. Line managers advise employees for whom they are responsible of the requirements of the procedure and employees are required to advise the relevant Operations Control and their line manager as soon as possible whenever they have had an accident, incident or a case of occupational ill health, and complete the appropriate forms. A decision will then be made on the level of investigation required. Some incidents must be reported to the safety regulator (ORR) or the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) in accordance with legislation.

137. An additional arrangement enables the immediate reporting and dissemination of urgent information throughout the industry in relation to serious incidents.

Incident Response

138. Network Rail has extensive written plans and procedures designed to provide an effective response to incidents and other foreseeable emergency situations. These plans have been developed based on risk assessment, local knowledge, and experience, and are designed to bring accident / incident situations under control as quickly as possible.

139. These plans cover the following:

identification of the significant hazards and associated risk, including those arising from occasional or ‘one off’ events

strategies for dealing with potential emergencies, both internal and external

the conditions under which they will be applied and the organisational arrangements needed to implement them

the responsibilities of Network Rail staff and appropriate guidance to protect the safety of themselves, the general public, contractors and train operating and station staff

liaison with external organisations prior to, during and following an emergency

attendance on site of appropriate employees to deal with public and media enquiries

responsibility for informing ORR and RAIB, in appropriate circumstances.

140. For an operation of our size and complexity, there are national generic arrangements in place to provide an effective response to accidents, incidents and


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other emergencies on or affecting Network Rail infrastructure, including core operational security requirements and provision of associated guidance.

141. In the event of a serious incident including a major fire, a three-tier structure is applied to the management of rail response to the incident. This basic structure will apply whatever the severity of the incident, albeit not all of the structure will be implemented for each incident. The detailed response depends on the circumstances, in liaison if appropriate, with the Fire and Rescue Service and other agencies. These tiers are defined as Strategic (Gold) Tactical (Silver) and Operational (Bronze).

Gold (Strategic)

142. The role of the personnel in the Gold location is to be responsible for the strategic management of the incident. Gold is led by the Rail Incident Commander (RIC), and would normally be situated at Network Rail Route Control. Gold provide executive support to the Rail Incident Officer, and focus on operational strategy.

Silver (Strategic)

143. The role of the personnel in the Silver location is to determine the priorities in allocating resources, obtaining other resources as required, planning and co-ordinating the overall response on site from a rail industry perspective. Within Network Rail, this role is performed by the Rail Incident Officer (RIO) who is the lead rail industry responder on site for Route incidents, or the Station Incident Officer (SIO) for incidents that occur at Managed Stations.

Bronze (Operational)

144. Bronze staff are key personnel required to support the RIO (or SIO in the case of incidents occurring at Managed Stations) in providing effective management of the recovery from an incident. Those operating at this level concentrate on undertaking specific tasks within their area of responsibilities. These activities will be co-ordinated by the RIO as far as rail related organisations are concerned. The need for the appointment of Bronze Command personnel will be dictated by the circumstances of the incident. The Emergency Services will establish a command structure based on the same three tiers, i.e. Bronze, Silver and Gold. In the case of fire events, the Fire and Rescue Service have lead responsibility.

145. The National Operations Centre provides a national notification and communications role, whilst emergencies on the network are co-ordinated on the ground by the relevant Route Operations Control, which is responsible for co-ordination of response, rescue and recovery arrangements. National Control Instructions (NCIs) are in place and these instructions provide the standards and the processes for a consistent application of Control Instructions across all Network Rail Control Offices.


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Incident Recovery

146. It is important that the rail industry recovers from incidents quickly but in a planned and coordinated way. For the majority of fire events affecting Network Rail operations, recovery is immediate once the circumstances of the event are understood and the appropriate decisions made.

147. For more serious fire events, some or all of the available infrastructure in the area may be unavailable for the operation of train services. Recovery in these circumstances may be via Route Contingency Plans and where necessary the implementation of emergency timetables.

148. Route Contingency Plans set out in a structured way, the key operational strategy for the re-introduction of train services including numbers of train paths available, diversionary routes and alternative stopping patterns.

Incident Investigation & Learning

149. All incidents occurring on the network, including fire events, are investigated to determine both the basic and underlying causes and identify appropriate corrective action in order to prevent, or reduce, the risk of their recurrence.

150. Investigation requirements are defined in Network Rail standards and provide a consistent, comprehensive and structured process for the investigation of accidents and incidents without apportioning blame or liability. The standard is supported by a practitioners manual which incorporates work instructions and guidance notes for investigating accidents and incidents.

151. A specific accountability is assigned to certain senior managers who act as Designated Competent Person (DCP) for accidents / incidents with responsibility to determine how the accident / incident should be investigated. The level of investigation is based on an assessment of the actual and potential severity of the event. An accident and safety incident matrix is provided which defines the levels of investigation and covers the most common accidents and incidents which occur during the operations on, or maintenance and renewal of the network. It is also used to help determine the lead function for each type of investigation.

152. The lead investigator produces a report that is reviewed, with the involvement of the DCP, to confirm that immediate and underlying causes have been established. Action plans from investigation reports are accepted by the DCP who is responsible for managing their implementation, tracking and sign-off once complete.

153. Reports and recommendations arising from Judicial Inquiries, HSE and RAIB investigations and rail industry led formal investigations are reviewed by a national review body - National Recommendations Review Panel (NRRP). A similar review body exists at local level to deal with lower level incidents.

154. Each review panel allocates a lead manager responsible for the implementation of each recommendation. Following receipt of the recommendations, Lead Managers develop an action plan including timescales for delivery and these are tracked to


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completion using the Safety Management Information System (SMIS) at a national and / or local level.

Non-Operational Events

155. If an incident occurs on Network Rail leased property where the tenant is found to be at fault, there is the option for Network Rail to terminate or forfeit the lease. This is reinforced with stipulated requirements in the terms of the lease, directing all tenants to adhere to current legislative standards/instructions.

Insurance and Legal Redress

156. Network Rail has its own Property Damage (PD) and Business Interruption (BI) insurances to protect against damage to its own property and the consequential losses arising from an insured cause. These insurance policies carry substantial excesses, and in most cases PD/BI claims are self insured by Network Rail.

157. Where an incident arises from the negligence of a party outside the railway industry (e.g. a neighbour starting a fire, or a motorist striking a bridge) then Network Rail will take the necessary legal action to attempt to recover its PD/BI losses from the offending party’s Public Liability (PL) insurers. The PL insurers will only meet the cost of legal liability and so the offending party has to be legally liable as to the cause of loss, e.g. negligence/nuisance. There is no statutory right of recovery, and normally where the incident arises from a deliberate act (e.g. arson), the PL insurance policy of the offending party will not operate because the incident is no longer accidental.

158. If Network Rail sustains losses as a result of the imposition of an exclusion zone due to a fire, there is no right of recovery unless Network Rail’s property has been damaged and the losses arise from that damage. Non damage related disruption due to negligence is termed ‘pure economic loss’ and is not recoverable in the absence of a contractual relationship between Network Rail and the party responsible for the damage. Such would be the situation if the railway was disrupted because of a cylinder related fire on neighbouring land; there would be no physical damage and therefore no right of recovery. The neighbour’s PL policy would therefore not operate because the neighbour would have no legal liability. Should the cylinder subsequently explode, if the fire/explosion did not arise from negligence then Network Rail would be unable to recover its disruption losses.


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RECOMMENDATIONS

159. The review into the fire risk affecting our ability to operate effectively as a major transport infrastructure operator, has provided the opportunity to review the effectiveness of our health and safety management arrangements and drive continuous improvement. This deepens our understanding of fire risk and informs the development of systems and controls based on a philosophy of ‘predict and prevent’.

160. All lessons arising from investigations and recommendations into fire events will continue to be reviewed to decide what changes are necessary to mitigate and/or prevent recurrence, that are within our control.

161. The following recommendations are for matters that are not within our direct control, but will benefit the railway industry and the nation in providing a transport infrastructure less susceptible to the effects of disruption caused by fire.

Recommendation 1

162. It is recommended that the Chief Fire & Rescue Advisor and the Chief Fire Officers Association be directed to identify all ‘high risk’ locations within 200 metres of the railway infrastructure as part of their Integrated Risk Management Planning process and to carry out fire safety audits to establish if occupiers have carried out suitable and sufficient fire risk assessments, and that such risk assessments cover the use and storage of Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres.

Recommendation 2

163. It is recommended that those persons or businesses intending to use acetylene on their premises must be authorised/certified by a ‘professional body’ before use can be made.

Recommendation 3

164. It is recommended that users of acetylene should be subject to mandatory checks by the Fire and Rescue Service in order to review their competence, capability, facilities, safety and operating standards, and fire management systems before acetylene is authorised for use.

Recommendation 4

165. It is recommended that suppliers of acetylene cylinders to businesses may only supply acetylene to authorised users


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Recommendation 5

166. It is recommended that penalties for the un-authorised use of acetylene be established, and then enforced.

Recommendation 6

167. It is recommended that provision of additional funding be made available in order to eliminate all ‘high risk’ uses below Network Rail operational infrastructure. This expenditure (initial indications point to a figure of circa £75m) would be partially off-set by the increase in rental income from the refurbished arches and properties, and reduction in train delay costs.

Recommendation 7

168. It is recommended that a more detailed analysis be undertaken to focus on those ‘high risk’ business uses within 200 metres of operational railway infrastructure in those areas that would have the largest impact on the rail network (20 Key Routes) so that a prioritised programme of risk control measures (elimination, separation, confinement, enhancement, change of use, etc.) can be developed. Note. HSL (Buxton) may have a suitable GSI database suitable for providing this information.

Recommendation 8

169. It is recommended that any action taken by the local Fire Authority for breaches of Fire Regulations by businesses below our infrastructure, or within 200 metres of our operational infrastructure, must be reported to Network Rail in order for Network Rail to review its risk control measures which may include taking its own legal action for breaches of covenant.

Recommendation 9

170. It is recommended that a change be made to the Planning Consent Process to limit the risk that Network Rail’s neighbours import to the railway network, and that local planning authorities be given powers to refuse any new planning or change of use consents for high risk activities adjacent to key railway transport corridors (20 Key Routes). To support this, guidance should be issued by Government (DCLG) on what types of activities should be restricted (such as scrap metal yards, oil and fuel storage facilities etc) as well as the physical extent of the restricted areas.


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Recommendation 10

171. It is recommended that a change be made to the Planning Consent process to limit the risk that Network Rail’s neighbours import to the railway network, and that local planning authorities consult Network Rail on all planning applications, within 200m of the operational boundary and that Network Rail be given the power to direct refusal on any applications that it considers to be high risk.


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APPENDICES

1. Commercial Estate Lettings by Structure Type

2. Commercial Estate Lettings by End Use


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Appendix 1 - Commercial Estate Lettings by Structure Type

Arch 3,189 57% Building 1,380 25% Land 855 15% Other 133 2% Total 5,557 100%


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Appendix 2 - Commercial Estate Lettings by End Use

General 932 17% Workshops 134 2% Metal Processing / Scrap / Waste 160 3% Vehicle Repair 593 11% Industrial 1,819 33% Storage & Distribution 1,316 24% Leisure 408 7% Retail 876 16% Retail & Leisure 1,284 23% Offices 362 7% Other 343 6% Car Parking 296 5% Residential 137 2% Other 776 14% Total 5,557 100%

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