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Raj Jain The Ohio State University 31-1 Network Network Security Security Raj Jain The Ohio State University Columbus, OH 43210 [email protected] http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~jain/

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Page 1: Network Security - Washington University in St. Louis › ~jain › bnr › ftp › f31_sec.pdf · The Ohio State University Raj Jain 31- 21 Proxy Servers Specialized server programs

Raj JainThe Ohio State University

31-1

NetworkNetworkSecuritySecurity

Raj JainThe Ohio State University

Columbus, OH [email protected]

http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~jain/

Raj Jain
Horizontal small
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❑ Security Aspects

❑ Secret Key and Public Key Encryption

❑ Firewalls: Packet Filter, Bastion Host, Perimeter Nets

❑ Variations of firewalls

❑ Proxy servers

Overview

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Security AspectsSecurity Aspects

❑ Data Integrity: Received = sent?

❑ Data Availability: Legal users should be able to use.Ping continuously ⇒ No useful work gets done.

❑ Data Confidentiality and Privacy: No snooping orwiretapping

❑ Authentication: You are who you say you are. Astudent at Dartmouth posing as a professor canceledthe exam.

❑ Authorization = Access Control: Only authorizedusers get to the data

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Security ThreatsSecurity Threats

Normal Flow

Interruption

Interception

Modification Masquerade

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Secret Key EncryptionSecret Key Encryption

❑ Encrypted_Message = Encrypt(Key, Message)

❑ Message = Decrypt(Key, Encrypted_Message)

❑ Example: Encrypt = division

❑ 433 = 48 R 1 (using divisor of 9)

Text Ciphertext

Ciphertext Text

Key

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Public Key EncryptionPublic Key Encryption

❑ Invented in 1975 by Diffie and Hellman

❑ Encrypted_Message = Encrypt(Key1, Message)

❑ Message = Decrypt(Key2, Encrypted_Message)

Text Ciphertext

Ciphertext Text

Key1

Key2

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Public Key Encryption: ExamplePublic Key Encryption: Example

❑ RSA: Encrypted_Message = m3 mod 187

❑ Message = Encrypted_Message107 mod 187

❑ Key1 = <3,187>, Key2 = <107,187>

❑ Message = 5

❑ Encrypted Message = 53 = 125

❑ Message = 125107 mod 187= 125(64+32+8+2+1) mod 187= [(12564 mod 187)(12532 mod 187)...(1252 mod 187)(125)] mod 187 = 5

❑ 1254 mod 187 = (1252 mod 187)2 mod 187

Page 8: Network Security - Washington University in St. Louis › ~jain › bnr › ftp › f31_sec.pdf · The Ohio State University Raj Jain 31- 21 Proxy Servers Specialized server programs

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Public Key (Cont)Public Key (Cont)

❑ One key is private and the other is public

❑ Message = Decrypt(Public_Key,Encrypt(Private_Key, Message))

❑ Message = Decrypt(Private_Key,Encrypt(Public_Key, Message))

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Digital SignatureDigital Signature

❑ Encrypted_Message= Encrypt(Private_Key, Message)

❑ Message = Decrypt(Public_Key, Encrypted_Message)⇒ Authentic

Text Signed text

Signed text Text

Private Key

Public Key

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ConfidentialityConfidentiality

❑ User 1 to User 2:

❑ Encrypted_Message = Encrypt(Public_Key2,Encrypt(Private_Key1, Message))

❑ Message = Decrypt(Public_Key1,Decrypt(Private_Key2, Encrypted_Message)⇒ Authentic and Private

MessageMy PrivateKey

Your PublicKey

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Simple Firewall: Packet FilterSimple Firewall: Packet Filter

❑ Example: Only email gets in/outftp to/from nodes x, y, z, etc.

❑ Problem: Filter is accessible to outside world

Internet Internal net

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Filter Table: ExampleFilter Table: Example

Interface Source Dest Prot. SrcPort

DestPort

2 * * TCP * 212 * * TCP * 231 128.5.*.* * TCP * 252 * * UDP * 432 * * UDP * 692 * * TCP * 79

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Bastion HostBastion Host

❑ Bastions overlook critical areas of defense, usuallyhaving stronger walls

❑ Inside users need a mechanism to get outside services

❑ Inside users log on the Bastion Host and use outsideservices.

❑ Later they pull the results inside.

InternetInternal net

R1R2

BastionHost

BastionHost

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Bastion Host (Cont)Bastion Host (Cont)

❑ Perimeter Network: Outside snoopers cannot seeinternal traffic even if they break in the firewall(Router 2)

❑ Also known as "Stub network"

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Screened Subnet ArchitectureScreened Subnet Architecture

Internet

Exterior RouterBastion

Host

Internal Net

Firewall

Interior RouterPerimeter Network

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Multiple Bastion HostsMultiple Bastion Hosts

Internet

ExteriorRouter

BastionHost

Internal Net

Firewall

BastionHost

FTP SMTP/DNS

Interior RouterPerimeter Network

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Merged Interior and Exterior RoutersMerged Interior and Exterior Routers

Internet

ExteriorRouter

BastionHost

Internal Net

FirewallFTP

Perimeter Network

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Merged Bastion Host and Exterior RouterMerged Bastion Host and Exterior Router

❑ Also known as a dual-homed gateway

Internet

Bastion Host/Exterior Router

Internal Net

Firewall

Interior RouterPerimeter Network

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Dual-Homed Host ArchitectureDual-Homed Host Architecture

Internet

Dual-HomedHost

Internal Net

Firewall

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Merged Bastion Host and InteriorMerged Bastion Host and InteriorRouter (Not Recommended)Router (Not Recommended)

Internet

Exterior Router

Internal Net

Firewall

Bastion Host/Interior Router

Perimeter Network

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Proxy ServersProxy Servers

❑ Specialized server programs on bastion host

❑ Take user's request and forward them to real servers

❑ Take server's responses and forward them to users

❑ Enforce site security policy ⇒ May refuse certainrequests.

❑ Also known as application-level gateways

❑ With special "Proxy client" programs, proxy serversare almost transparent

ProxyClient

ProxyServer

RealServerInternet

Dual-Homed

Host

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What Firewalls Can't DoWhat Firewalls Can't Do

❑ Can't protect against malicious insiders

❑ Can't protect against connections that do not gothrough it, e.g., dial up

❑ Can't protect completely new threats

❑ Can't protect against viruses

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Security Mechanisms on The InternetSecurity Mechanisms on The Internet

❑ Kerberos

❑ Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)

❑ Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

❑ MD5

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Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)❑ A popular version of the RSA algorithm.❑ PGP generates a random “session key” to encrypt

each message using IDEA algorithm❑ Session key is encrypted using public key of the

recipient❑ The encrypted message and the session key are passed

on to the application (e.g., mail)❑ A file called key ring (pubring.pgp) contains public

keys of all correspondents❑ Another file called secret ring (secring.pgp) contains

secret keys of the sender. A pass phrase is required todecrypt the secret keys.

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SummarySummary

❑ Integrity, Availability, Authentication, Confidentiality

❑ Private Key and Public Key encryption

❑ Packet filter, Bastion node, perimeter network,internal and external routers