Networks and the War on Networks and the War on TerrorTerrorMichael StohlMichael StohlCynthia StohlCynthia Stohl

University of California Santa BarbaraUniversity of California Santa BarbaraDepartment of Communication Department of Communication

ANU TERRORISM WORKSHOPANU TERRORISM WORKSHOP1 April 20051 April 2005

How will we fight and win this war? We will direct How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.“network.“

George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress September 20, 2001

THE IDEA OF TERROR NETWORKS IS NOT NEWTHE IDEA OF TERROR NETWORKS IS NOT NEW

CLAIRE STERLING (1981)CLAIRE STERLING (1981) argued that there existed an argued that there existed an

international network of international network of terrorists within whose terrorists within whose center one found a center one found a Palestinian connection and a Palestinian connection and a Russian patron, with, quite Russian patron, with, quite often, a Cuban cutout often, a Cuban cutout providing the shield for providing the shield for direct Russian participationdirect Russian participation

argued that the Soviet Union argued that the Soviet Union had placed a loaded gun of had placed a loaded gun of the world table and the world table and benefited each time benefited each time someone picked it up and someone picked it up and used it.used it.

ALEXANDER HAIG AND ALEXANDER HAIG AND THE REAGAN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION

went further and suggested went further and suggested that the Russians were behind that the Russians were behind it all. The administration was it all. The administration was unable to convince its own unable to convince its own intelligence agencies (or those intelligence agencies (or those of its allies) to support its of its allies) to support its view of the Soviet role and view of the Soviet role and was not able to provide public was not able to provide public evidence for the existence of evidence for the existence of such an actual networksuch an actual network

William Casey, Director of the CIA, William Casey, Director of the CIA, confronted his analysts when they refused confronted his analysts when they refused to confirm that the Soviets were behind it to confirm that the Soviets were behind it all. "Read Claire Sterling's book and all. "Read Claire Sterling's book and forget this mush. I paid $13.95 for this forget this mush. I paid $13.95 for this and it told me more than you bastards and it told me more than you bastards whom I pay $50,000 a year." whom I pay $50,000 a year."

BUT…IronicallyBUT…Ironically

Bob Woodward reports that Sterling had been Bob Woodward reports that Sterling had been leaked material as part of a CIA propaganda scheme.leaked material as part of a CIA propaganda scheme.(see Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the (see Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, Headline Press, 1987, pp. 125-127).CIA, 1981-1987, Headline Press, 1987, pp. 125-127).

Thus, while there is no doubt that there was Soviet Thus, while there is no doubt that there was Soviet support for the aims of many of the groups that were support for the aims of many of the groups that were under suspicion, and that many members of those under suspicion, and that many members of those groups had passed through either the Soviet Union or groups had passed through either the Soviet Union or one of its client states, there was also no clear one of its client states, there was also no clear network chart that distinguished the types of clear network chart that distinguished the types of clear links, membership and type of network.links, membership and type of network.

People have been talking about terror networks long People have been talking about terror networks long before September 11, 2001before September 11, 2001• Despite the discrediting of some of the claims Despite the discrediting of some of the claims • Despite the new developments in network analysis Despite the new developments in network analysis

and network theoriesand network theories

We still are relying on some outdated, outmoded We still are relying on some outdated, outmoded ways of thinking about and analyzing networks.ways of thinking about and analyzing networks.

Terrorism and NetworksTerrorism and NetworksPurpose of our talkPurpose of our talk

Explore the relationship between what we as scholars Explore the relationship between what we as scholars know about networks and terrorism and our know about networks and terrorism and our

responses to terrorismresponses to terrorism

What can a network approach contribute to

1. our understanding of terrorism, 2. identifying the possible connections among various

terrorist groups and the implications for how they communicate, operate and cooperate

3. what our responses are/should be?

BASIC ASSUMPTIONSBASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Political terrorism needs to be seen as a process of political Political terrorism needs to be seen as a process of political communication and not simply a destructive or “simple” communication and not simply a destructive or “simple” act of violence.act of violence.

To understand terrorist networks, we must take into account To understand terrorist networks, we must take into account that networks are much more than "communication that networks are much more than "communication structures" or "information flow charts." structures" or "information flow charts."

Networks are a tapestry of agents, communicative Networks are a tapestry of agents, communicative relationships, histories, and a complex interwoven relationships, histories, and a complex interwoven symbolic fabric-- all embedded in the larger global symbolic fabric-- all embedded in the larger global system. system.

What should an analysis of “networks What should an analysis of “networks of terror” do?of terror” do?

Should explain how various terrorist groups, and Should explain how various terrorist groups, and other organizations and states are connectedother organizations and states are connected

Describe how they are organized and how they Describe how they are organized and how they operate as a network. operate as a network.

Explicate what we mean by membership in the Explicate what we mean by membership in the network and how the various members are linked. network and how the various members are linked. • How the members are linked alters our understanding of How the members are linked alters our understanding of

what it means to be connected and how important those what it means to be connected and how important those connections are. connections are.

Not all connections are equal Not all connections are equal

What should an analysis of “networks What should an analysis of “networks of terror” do?of terror” do?

Distinguish between the ability “to network,” (i.e., the structural capacity to activate the ubiquitous six degrees of separation) from the ability to mobilize, control, and coordinate members for specific planned acts.

• Connections do not equal coordination, temporary exchange relationships do not equal control and identification of an agreed enemy does not equal the emergence of an organization

To study terrorist networks we need To study terrorist networks we need to knowto know

1. What is a/the network?

2. Who is in the network? What are its boundaries?

3. What relations are encompassed in the network? How are nodes connected?

4. What are the relevant structural properties?

5. What types of ties exist?

6. How are networks embedded within society?

7. What network processes are associated with structure?

1. What is a network?1. What is a network? Networks consist of interconnected nodes linked by

patterned flows of information, influence, coordination, support, functionality, affect, and message interpretation.• Nodes: Who/what comprises the networks• Attributes: Qualities of the nodes• Links: connections between nodes• Relations: What comprises the network links• Roles: Positions within network• Network Concepts and Measures:

Strength of tie Centrality of link/network Reciprocity of link Density

What is a network: Organizational What is a network: Organizational Structures matterStructures matter

Is the organization composed of thousands of members, hundreds of cells and located in 60 or more countries or is it a much smaller organization which coalesces with other existing organizations when it needs to move people, money or material around the world.

Is Al Qaeda a loose confederation of organizations?

• If so, then we find linkages based upon resource dependency and exchange a hierarchical organization with a cell structure?

• If so, then we have a bureaucratic chain of command a horizontal modern “networked organization?”

• If so, the absence of an overarching bureaucracy necessitates that group cohesion is maintained through shared norms and values.

IS THIS A TERRORIST NETWORK?

OR is Al Qaeda an example of Lewis Beam’s “leaderless resistance” which is comprised of• “Organs of information distribution, such as newspapers,

leaflets, computers, etc. which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events allowing for a planned response that will take many variations. NO one need issue an order to anyone.”

2. Who is in the network? What are its 2. Who is in the network? What are its boundaries? boundaries?

Depending upon how we define link, the membership and configuration of networks change and our understanding of organizing processes is somewhat altered

Network Specification: A long Network Specification: A long recognized problemrecognized problem

“In view of the potential consequences of an incorrect specification of system boundaries in network analysis , it is somewhat surprising that the published literature reporting studies of social networks shows little concern for the problem of specifying the inclusion rules in defining the membership of actors in particular networks and in identifying the types of social relationships to be analyzed (Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1983:19).”

Al QaedaAl Qaeda

It is neither a single group or a coalition of groups: it It is neither a single group or a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of Al as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda’s high command, which is run via a vertical Qaeda’s high command, which is run via a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations compartmentalized cells and associate organizations (Gunaratna, 2002, 54).(Gunaratna, 2002, 54).

Al-Qaeda SpecificationAl-Qaeda Specification

Early stages:Early stages: U.S. government made the network as large as U.S. government made the network as large as

it could it could Loose identification rules and unspecified Loose identification rules and unspecified

linkage rules enabled law enforcement agencies linkage rules enabled law enforcement agencies throughout the world (both because they were throughout the world (both because they were interested in “combating terrorism” and because by interested in “combating terrorism” and because by doing so they could obtain U.S. financial assistance doing so they could obtain U.S. financial assistance and gratitude) to count anyone they sought and/or and gratitude) to count anyone they sought and/or arrested as “members” of al-Qaeda. arrested as “members” of al-Qaeda.

By 2002, pressure for success brought incentives By 2002, pressure for success brought incentives to limit scale and scope of al-Qaedato limit scale and scope of al-Qaeda

At the same time, reporters also noted that some of the same At the same time, reporters also noted that some of the same officials were indicating that the threat of terror itself had not officials were indicating that the threat of terror itself had not diminished because a new organization or a new organizational diminished because a new organization or a new organizational form was emerging. “Officials emphasized that it was no longer form was emerging. “Officials emphasized that it was no longer possible simply to label all post- Sept. 11 plots as al-Qaeda possible simply to label all post- Sept. 11 plots as al-Qaeda inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the old bin Laden network” (Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002, old bin Laden network” (Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002, p.10). p.10).

Assuming that the administration was not simply engaging in Assuming that the administration was not simply engaging in

Orwellian doublespeak when it both announced the elimination of Orwellian doublespeak when it both announced the elimination of much of the al-Qaeda central command structure and support much of the al-Qaeda central command structure and support infrastructure and also indicated that it would no longer count all infrastructure and also indicated that it would no longer count all terror attacks as linked to al-Qaeda, the obvious question is terror attacks as linked to al-Qaeda, the obvious question is whether the new organization was indeed new or if the whether the new organization was indeed new or if the administration did not understand the nature of the network that it administration did not understand the nature of the network that it was confronting at the two points in time. was confronting at the two points in time.

Perhaps most disturbingly, Johnson, Van Natta, and Perhaps most disturbingly, Johnson, Van Natta, and Miller reported on June 19, 2002, “classified Miller reported on June 19, 2002, “classified investigations of the al-Qaeda threat now under way investigations of the al-Qaeda threat now under way at the F.B.I. and C.I.A, have concluded that the war in at the F.B.I. and C.I.A, have concluded that the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States. Some analysts suggest that the war might have States. Some analysts suggest that the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across the globe.”potential attackers across the globe.”

After the Iraq war, analysts worried not only about After the Iraq war, analysts worried not only about dispersal but also the movement of terrorists to post dispersal but also the movement of terrorists to post war Iraqwar Iraq

Implications of mis-specifying the Implications of mis-specifying the NetworkNetwork

If we believe that each of the groups is a constituent unit of Al-Qaeda, action against them may make operational sense.

If they are not part of Al-Qaeda at best the actions divert valuable resources from the efforts against Al-Qaeda.

Further, such actions may inadvertently provide “ammunition” to those groups, by uniting them.

One of the “security” arguments against a war with Iraq, we may recall, was that such a war would likely trigger attacks from like minded groups who are not coordinated nor controlled by Al-Qaeda, but would use the opportunity to mobilize populations against the United States for their own organizational purposes (an outcome which appears in some parts of the world to have occurred).

3. What relations constitute the network?3. What relations constitute the network?

What relations constitute the Al Qaeda Network?What relations constitute the Al Qaeda Network?In early 2001 the FBI reportedIn early 2001 the FBI reported: : Although Al-Qaeda functions Although Al-Qaeda functions

independently of other terrorist organizations, it also independently of other terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed - led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a "Abu Yasser al Masri,"), Egyptian Refai Taha, a/k/a "Abu Yasser al Masri,"), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West - against the perceived common enemies in the West - particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an "infidel" state which provides essential support for an "infidel" state which provides essential support for other "infidel" governments (Caruso, 2001).”other "infidel" governments (Caruso, 2001).”

Global Terror Network?Global Terror Network?

11. The Global Terror Network. The Global Terror Network Non-coordinated, ephemeral links of Non-coordinated, ephemeral links of convenienceconvenience

2. 2. Network(s) of Terrorists and Terrorist Network(s) of Terrorists and Terrorist OrganizationsOrganizationsCoordinated, tangible but transitory linksCoordinated, tangible but transitory links

3. 3. The Networked Terror OrganizationThe Networked Terror OrganizationControlled constellation of organizations Controlled constellation of organizations across sectors, locations, and time. across sectors, locations, and time.

“It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden. He represents a key node in the Arab Afghan terror network, but there should be no illusion about the likely effect on the network of actions taken to neutralize him. The networks conducts many operations without his involvement, leadership, or financing – and will continue to be able to do so should he be killed or captured. (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini p.63)

4. What are the relevant structural 4. What are the relevant structural properties? properties?

In reality, terrorist networks obey the rigid laws that In reality, terrorist networks obey the rigid laws that determine their typology, structure and therefore their determine their typology, structure and therefore their ability to function. They exploit all the advantages of ability to function. They exploit all the advantages of self organized networks, including flexibility and self organized networks, including flexibility and tolerance to internal failures. Unfamiliarity with this tolerance to internal failures. Unfamiliarity with this new order and a lack of language for formularizing new order and a lack of language for formularizing our experience are perhaps our most deadly enemies our experience are perhaps our most deadly enemies (Buchanan, 2002,p. 223).(Buchanan, 2002,p. 223).

Structural properties matterStructural properties matter

The New Science of NetworksThe New Science of Networks• Underlying dynamic of interconnectedness, of Underlying dynamic of interconnectedness, of

shared deep structural properties that strongly shared deep structural properties that strongly influence who we are, how we think, how we make influence who we are, how we think, how we make sense of the world, how we interpret messages and sense of the world, how we interpret messages and how we organizehow we organize

• Albert-Laszlo BarabasiAlbert-Laszlo Barabasi• Duncan WattsDuncan Watts

It’s a Small WorldIt’s a Small World

““small world architecture” (first identified by small world architecture” (first identified by Milgram, 1965 and then popularized in John Milgram, 1965 and then popularized in John Guare’s play, Guare’s play, Six Degrees of SeparationSix Degrees of Separation

Watts found the small world architecture in a Watts found the small world architecture in a Malaysian firefly communityMalaysian firefly community

Barabasi found same structure on wwwBarabasi found same structure on www• Highly clustered segments with connectorHighly clustered segments with connector

Relatively minor changes in the connectivity of a network can Relatively minor changes in the connectivity of a network can have dramatic changes on the global structure of a network.have dramatic changes on the global structure of a network.

With their relatively small degree of separation between any With their relatively small degree of separation between any two nodes, small world networks facilitate the efficient two nodes, small world networks facilitate the efficient transmission of information or other resources without having transmission of information or other resources without having to overload the network with too many redundant links.to overload the network with too many redundant links.

More complex networks tend to fluctuate less and are more More complex networks tend to fluctuate less and are more stable than simple networks. Networks which exhibit the small stable than simple networks. Networks which exhibit the small world architecture can have a significant fraction of nodes world architecture can have a significant fraction of nodes removed randomly without breaking apart. In a random removed randomly without breaking apart. In a random network if the number of links removed reaches a critical point, network if the number of links removed reaches a critical point, the system abruptly breaks into isolated tiny unconnected the system abruptly breaks into isolated tiny unconnected islands. Even when 80% of nodes are randomly removed in islands. Even when 80% of nodes are randomly removed in scale free networks, the remaining 20% still hang together. This scale free networks, the remaining 20% still hang together. This robustness, resilience to errors against failures, is a property robustness, resilience to errors against failures, is a property not shared by random networks.not shared by random networks.

The source of topological robustness is the existence The source of topological robustness is the existence of the hubs, the few highly connected nodes that keep of the hubs, the few highly connected nodes that keep the scale free network together. Failures the scale free network together. Failures disproportionately affect small nodes. The accidental disproportionately affect small nodes. The accidental removal of a single hub will not be fatal since the removal of a single hub will not be fatal since the continuous hierarchy of several large hubs will continuous hierarchy of several large hubs will maintain the network’s integrity. maintain the network’s integrity.

Random networks, despite their redundancy, fall Random networks, despite their redundancy, fall apart quite quickly in the face of an uncoordinated apart quite quickly in the face of an uncoordinated attack, whereas the small world architecture makes a attack, whereas the small world architecture makes a network resilient against random failure or network resilient against random failure or unsophisticated attack. unsophisticated attack.

The very feature that “makes a small world network The very feature that “makes a small world network safe from random failure could be its Achilles heel in safe from random failure could be its Achilles heel in the face of an intelligent assault” (Buchanan, 2002, p. the face of an intelligent assault” (Buchanan, 2002, p. 132). Under coordinated attack, the random network 132). Under coordinated attack, the random network has the advantage; a small world network is has the advantage; a small world network is extremely vulnerable. “Disable a few of the hubs and extremely vulnerable. “Disable a few of the hubs and a scale free network will fall to pieces” (Barabasi, a scale free network will fall to pieces” (Barabasi, 2002, p. 118).2002, p. 118).

Significant Policy ImplicationsSignificant Policy Implications

““The jihad is resilient to random arrests of its The jihad is resilient to random arrests of its members but fragile in terms of the targeted members but fragile in terms of the targeted attacks on its hubsattacks on its hubs

It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden (Arquilla, network solely with bin Laden (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999)”Ronfeldt, & Zanini, 1999)”• Computational analyses demonstrate that the Computational analyses demonstrate that the

removal of the leader/central agent does not have removal of the leader/central agent does not have anticipated consequences (Carley, Lee, anticipated consequences (Carley, Lee, Krackhardt, 2002).Krackhardt, 2002).

5. What types of ties are there?5. What types of ties are there?

Not all links are equal. They can vary Not all links are equal. They can vary along several dimensions including along several dimensions including orientation, reciprocity, strength, orientation, reciprocity, strength, symmetry and multiplexity (C. Stohl, symmetry and multiplexity (C. Stohl, 1996:39)1996:39)

In the case of the Lebanese Shi’a fundamentalist group, Hizballah, In the case of the Lebanese Shi’a fundamentalist group, Hizballah, …not only are all members from the same Shi’a Islamic …not only are all members from the same Shi’a Islamic confessional community, but the subgroups within Hizballah are confessional community, but the subgroups within Hizballah are often linked through close blood ties as well….Kinship is also a often linked through close blood ties as well….Kinship is also a prominent factor in the composition of Amal, a faction of Hizballah prominent factor in the composition of Amal, a faction of Hizballah led by Husayn al Musawi. Many of the members are from the led by Husayn al Musawi. Many of the members are from the Musawi clan (Lodge, 1990, p. 22). MULTIPLEX STRONG LINKSMusawi clan (Lodge, 1990, p. 22). MULTIPLEX STRONG LINKS

In these terrorist organizations then, we would expect the In these terrorist organizations then, we would expect the communicative structuring mirrors the scale free, small world communicative structuring mirrors the scale free, small world networks uncovered by Milgram, Watts, and Barabasi et al. They networks uncovered by Milgram, Watts, and Barabasi et al. They are “small worlds” with short degrees of separation and composed of are “small worlds” with short degrees of separation and composed of strong ties with powerful hubs. Law enforcement and intelligence strong ties with powerful hubs. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have consistently indicated, and the historical record agencies have consistently indicated, and the historical record demonstrates, that these types of networks are very difficult to demonstrates, that these types of networks are very difficult to identify, even more difficult to penetrate, and almost impossible for identify, even more difficult to penetrate, and almost impossible for intelligence operatives to join, but once identified each cell can more intelligence operatives to join, but once identified each cell can more easily be monitored and destroyed (“rolled up” is the term used) easily be monitored and destroyed (“rolled up” is the term used) than other types of communication structures. than other types of communication structures.

Alternatively, other terrorist networks are not built upon Alternatively, other terrorist networks are not built upon relational homophily (family, friends, identity) but upon relational homophily (family, friends, identity) but upon homophily of a particular value and “like-mindedness.” homophily of a particular value and “like-mindedness.” • UNIPLEX WEAK LINKSUNIPLEX WEAK LINKS

These ideological or doctrinal movements (e.g., the German These ideological or doctrinal movements (e.g., the German Red Army Faction [RAF], the various forms of militia Red Army Faction [RAF], the various forms of militia organization in the United States-- such as the 112th Georgia organization in the United States-- such as the 112th Georgia Militia and Christian identity organizations, such as the 1980s Militia and Christian identity organizations, such as the 1980s Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord or the Aryan Nations) Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord or the Aryan Nations) are much easier to penetrate and join than the precious are much easier to penetrate and join than the precious networks. Growth and preferential attachment are oriented networks. Growth and preferential attachment are oriented outwardly. outwardly.

Significant Policy ImplicationSignificant Policy Implication

As Ross and Gurr (1989) discuss there are As Ross and Gurr (1989) discuss there are four general kinds of conditions which can four general kinds of conditions which can contribute to the decline of political contribute to the decline of political terrorism: terrorism: preemption, deterrence, preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash.burnout, and backlash. “ “Preemption Preemption and and deterrencedeterrence are counterterrorist policies are counterterrorist policies and actions which can reduce or eliminate and actions which can reduce or eliminate the terrorists’ coercive capabilities. the terrorists’ coercive capabilities. Burnout Burnout and and backlashbacklash are general are general conditions which reduce the political conditions which reduce the political capabilities of groups using terrorism” (p. capabilities of groups using terrorism” (p. 408). 408).

Thus, employing network theory, it is not surprising Thus, employing network theory, it is not surprising that the terrorist movements which have shown that the terrorist movements which have shown decline (and in many cases simply disappearance) decline (and in many cases simply disappearance) over the past thirty years have been the ideologically over the past thirty years have been the ideologically based movements such as the Red Army Faction, based movements such as the Red Army Faction, Action Direct and Red Brigades of Germany, France Action Direct and Red Brigades of Germany, France and Italy respectively, while those which have shown and Italy respectively, while those which have shown the greatest resilience have been the ethno nationalist the greatest resilience have been the ethno nationalist movements such as the ETA (Basque Fatherland and movements such as the ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), the Sri Lankan based LTTE (Liberation Liberty), the Sri Lankan based LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the IRA, and the numerous Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the IRA, and the numerous Palestinian groups. Palestinian groups.

Research QuestionsResearch Questions• Are Al Qaeda and the other “new” terrorist Are Al Qaeda and the other “new” terrorist

organizations examples of organizations organizations examples of organizations whose ties are based on relational or value whose ties are based on relational or value homophily? homophily?

• Are their recruitment patterns based on Are their recruitment patterns based on relational or value homophily?relational or value homophily?

• What are the implications of What are the implications of homphily/heterophily?homphily/heterophily?

6. How is a network embedded in the 6. How is a network embedded in the larger system?larger system?

To comprehensively assess the threats, and To comprehensively assess the threats, and thus the corresponding risks, we must thus the corresponding risks, we must know the history, culture, mores, know the history, culture, mores, organization, decision-makingorganization, decision-making processes, processes, leadership and other forces that leadership and other forces that characterize and motivate enemy and characterize and motivate enemy and terrorist networks (Haimes, 2002, p. 35).terrorist networks (Haimes, 2002, p. 35).

Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA and the Basque ETA, for example, can only be understood if they are located as but one organizational part of a larger social movement which is represented by political parties, charitable organizations, neighborhood clinics, schools and other social service organizations. These organizations are further embedded within an ethno nationalist community which, at a minimum, acquiesces to the organization’s existence because the community supports the organization’s goals (even when the community decries the organization’s methods) and at certain, relatively infrequent historical, moments also support the means as well.

7. What network processes are 7. What network processes are associated with structure?associated with structure?

Transitivity of trust

A cohesive network develops when a group of individuals or organizations form reliable, productive communication and decision channels and a more or less permeable boundary to define members (Fountain,2001)

What a communication network perspective tell us about the surprising operational agreement between the PLO and the Red Brigade during the 1970’s

1. Organizational behavior and decisions occur within existing communication structures and ongoing social relations. (Granovetter’s 1985 theory of embeddedness)

2. Most network linkages derive from exchange and dependency relations. Furthermore, proximity is the best predictor of network relations. (Monge & Contractor, 2003)

In this case, Morretti (member of Red Brigade) and Abu Iyyad (member of the PLO) were brought together by the French group Action Directe (Direct Action) who, on behalf of themselves and the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction in Germany), were interested in establishing a militant anti-Israeli front amongst the Western European left wing terrorist groups. The leaders of these groups were not only known to each other but as early as 1969 members of the Red Army Faction had been training in Palestinian camps in Jordan. Thus the mutual interests and possibility of benefits from coordinated action were made concrete by the communicative linkages that were in existence prior to the agreement.

ConclusionConclusion

Move beyond the network metaphor to network analysis to improve our understanding of terrorist organizing1. Boundary specification2. Attributes of nodes3. Qualities of links

4. Relational connections5. Structural properties

Recognize that network analysis does not identify the causes, the context or the socio-political solutions that are possible

Are we winning or losing?Are we winning or losing?How can we tell?How can we tell?

Are we defeating the enemyAre we defeating the enemy What have been the impacts on the What have been the impacts on the

network of terrornetwork of terror• Is the enemy stronger or weakerIs the enemy stronger or weaker• Does it have greater or lesser scope of actionDoes it have greater or lesser scope of action• Is it Bigger or smallerIs it Bigger or smaller• Is it Causing more damageIs it Causing more damage• Is it Creating more fearIs it Creating more fear• Is it Gaining more or less supportIs it Gaining more or less support

Effective Counterterrorism policyEffective Counterterrorism policyWhat a network understanding What a network understanding

providesprovides The formulation of a response must begin The formulation of a response must begin

with an understanding that the two with an understanding that the two primary purposes of a counterterrorism primary purposes of a counterterrorism policy within the United States and in each policy within the United States and in each of its of its counterterrorism network of its of its counterterrorism network partners are partners are • to make the nation(s) more secure to make the nation(s) more secure • to make the public(s) believe that they are to make the public(s) believe that they are

more securemore secure

Global Counterterrorism Policy: Global Counterterrorism Policy: Winning the Communication Battle Winning the Communication Battle

within the global networkwithin the global network PurposePurpose

• Countering fearCountering fear• Communicating trust, security and resolveCommunicating trust, security and resolve

Audiences: Audiences: • U.S. publicU.S. public• Global publicGlobal public

SupportersSupporters AcquiescersAcquiescers AntagonistsAntagonists

CounterterrorismCounterterrorism Fighting terrorism is not as simple as winning Fighting terrorism is not as simple as winning

military battles or destroying a network military battles or destroying a network structure structure • How you fight, with whom you fight, and against How you fight, with whom you fight, and against

whom you fight are equally important because in whom you fight are equally important because in the long run it is necessary to not only eliminate the long run it is necessary to not only eliminate ‘the bad guys” but also much of their support ‘the bad guys” but also much of their support network. network.

• Even more importantly it is necessary to eliminate Even more importantly it is necessary to eliminate the willingness of the vast majority of people to the willingness of the vast majority of people to acquiesce to terrorists’ presence within their midst. acquiesce to terrorists’ presence within their midst. The context is being produced and reproduced by the The context is being produced and reproduced by the

actions of both terrorists and counterterrorism actors. actions of both terrorists and counterterrorism actors.

Case in point: The French “victory” in the Algerian WarCase in point: The French “victory” in the Algerian War

Lesson of the Battle of AlgiersLesson of the Battle of Algiers

As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon screening declared: ''How to win a battle screening declared: ''How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film.'‘rare showing of this film.'‘

NYTimes September 7, 2003NYTimes September 7, 2003

War as CounterterrorismWar as CounterterrorismInitial Errors: Initial Errors:

Alternative interpretations of messages are likely when the audience is Alternative interpretations of messages are likely when the audience is comprised of multiple cultures and weak and heterogenous linkscomprised of multiple cultures and weak and heterogenous links

While trying to assure the Muslim World that the While trying to assure the Muslim World that the United States recognized the difference between United States recognized the difference between the Al Qaeda terrorists and the followers of Islam, the Al Qaeda terrorists and the followers of Islam, President Bush in announcing that the United President Bush in announcing that the United States would respond with force indicated:States would respond with force indicated:"This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to "This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.“take a while.“

This initial naming of the military response in This initial naming of the military response in Afghanistan as Operation Infinite Justice (which Afghanistan as Operation Infinite Justice (which gave way to Operation Enduring Freedom when it gave way to Operation Enduring Freedom when it was made clear to the White House that the term was made clear to the White House that the term gave offense to Muslim sensibilities),gave offense to Muslim sensibilities),

Ambiguous definition of the Enemy and Ambiguous definition of the Enemy and non-specification of the Scope of actionnon-specification of the Scope of action Mr. Bush (and his administration) did Mr. Bush (and his administration) did

not clearly define the enemy, the not clearly define the enemy, the scope of operations, the theater of war, scope of operations, the theater of war, or provide the metrics by which the or provide the metrics by which the military and public could judge whether military and public could judge whether or not it had won or even was winning.or not it had won or even was winning.

Was Afghanistan the first of many Was Afghanistan the first of many wars?wars?

Will the Iraq War be followed by the Will the Iraq War be followed by the Iran War? Why Not?Iran War? Why Not?

President Bush: Specifying the President Bush: Specifying the NetworkNetwork

"This group and its leader — a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries…(President Bush)”

Does this mean that every time there is a terrorist event Does this mean that every time there is a terrorist event somewhere in any of the sixty countries that Al Qaeda or Bin somewhere in any of the sixty countries that Al Qaeda or Bin Laden are responsibleLaden are responsible

if you argue that all the terrorism that occurs in the world is if you argue that all the terrorism that occurs in the world is connected to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (or in earlier connected to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (or in earlier periods to any of the other devils), each terror attack periods to any of the other devils), each terror attack become an unnecessary victory that you have handed to Bin become an unnecessary victory that you have handed to Bin Laden. Laden.

To connect the successful culmination of the war against To connect the successful culmination of the war against terror to the absence of terrorism will be self defeating and terror to the absence of terrorism will be self defeating and further will increase the damage to the United States and its further will increase the damage to the United States and its allies that any act of future terrorism will bring thus granting allies that any act of future terrorism will bring thus granting to Al Qaeda unnecessary “victories.” to Al Qaeda unnecessary “victories.”

Utilizing a War MetaphorUtilizing a War Metaphor

the war metaphor against “the the war metaphor against “the terrorist network” has undermined terrorist network” has undermined the ability of the United States to the ability of the United States to manage the problem of terrorismmanage the problem of terrorism• Raises the expectations Raises the expectations • Justifies excessesJustifies excesses• Escalates fearEscalates fear• Requires resolution rather than Requires resolution rather than

management of the problemmanagement of the problem

The War Metaphor and WarThe War Metaphor and War Treating the the Afghan theater as the first step and Treating the the Afghan theater as the first step and

the Iraq War as the second major campaign in the the Iraq War as the second major campaign in the “war on terror” allowed the United States to “war on terror” allowed the United States to demonstrate once again that it was able to bring to demonstrate once again that it was able to bring to bear overwhelming force, high tech airpower and a bear overwhelming force, high tech airpower and a capacity to destroy that is second to none. capacity to destroy that is second to none.

However, the power to destroy is not equivalent to However, the power to destroy is not equivalent to countering the threat or the fear of the threat of countering the threat or the fear of the threat of future terrorism nor changing the context in which future terrorism nor changing the context in which terrorist networks emerge and develop. terrorist networks emerge and develop.

How will we know when we have won the war on How will we know when we have won the war on terror?terror?

How do we know when the terrorist network is How do we know when the terrorist network is destroyed?destroyed?

How long do we have to go after the last attack to How long do we have to go after the last attack to declare victory.declare victory.

What could the Administration have What could the Administration have done differently in the early stages?done differently in the early stages? Separated the War against the Taliban for their part Separated the War against the Taliban for their part

in September 11 and Counterterrorism effortsin September 11 and Counterterrorism efforts• Defeating the Taliban was not equivalent to destroying the Defeating the Taliban was not equivalent to destroying the

decentralized terrorist network with multiple hubs—decentralized terrorist network with multiple hubs—structural properties matter!structural properties matter!

Distinguished among the terrorists (Mr. Bush’s “evil Distinguished among the terrorists (Mr. Bush’s “evil doers”) who were targeting the United States in the doers”) who were targeting the United States in the name of an Islamic revivalism from those who target name of an Islamic revivalism from those who target other states and other issues.other states and other issues.• Clarify network boundariesClarify network boundaries

Distinguished among the terrorists and those with Distinguished among the terrorists and those with whom they have been in contact, who have whom they have been in contact, who have supported them, those that have acquiesced to their supported them, those that have acquiesced to their presence.presence.• Recognize the embedded nature of network links and the Recognize the embedded nature of network links and the

existence of uniplex and multiplex links.existence of uniplex and multiplex links.

The long term implications: Is the The long term implications: Is the Bush approach working? Bush approach working?

How can we tell?How can we tell?

Are we winning or losing?Are we winning or losing?How can we tell?How can we tell?

Are we defeating the enemyAre we defeating the enemy What have been the impacts on the What have been the impacts on the

network of terrornetwork of terror• Is the enemy stronger or weakerIs the enemy stronger or weaker• Does it have greater or lesser scope of Does it have greater or lesser scope of

actionaction• Is it Bigger or smallerIs it Bigger or smaller• Is it Causing more damageIs it Causing more damage• Is it Creating more fearIs it Creating more fear• Is it Gaining more or less supportIs it Gaining more or less support

Unpacking the discourseUnpacking the discourseHow big is the network and is it getting How big is the network and is it getting

smaller?smaller? “Senior officials suggest that although sworn members of Al

Qaeda were estimated to number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say that at its peak this broader Qaeda network operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created cells in as many as 60 countries. Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (June 2002 New York Times)

“Two senior FBI officials…Everyone tries to tie everything into 9/11 and al-Qaida," said one of the two officials interviewed Friday on condition of anonymity. "There was a recent report suggesting that al-Qaida is about 5,000 strong. It is nowhere near 5,000 strong…While thousands of Islamic extremists and future terrorists have passed through Mr. bin Laden’s training camps, it does not mean they are actual al Qaeda operatives, the officials said. (Carr Cox News service, July 2002, A10)”

Unpacking the discourse: Is the Unpacking the discourse: Is the network fractured and diffused or a network fractured and diffused or a

new distributed network?new distributed network? The war in Afghanistan has successfully dispersed, killed or

captured al-Qaeda leaders, leaving the terror network fractured and diffused… (Carr Cox News service, July 2002, A10)”

Later in the summer of 2002 it was reported that: “Classified investigations of the Qaeda threat … under way at

the F.B.I. and C.I.A have concluded that the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States

Instead, the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area (and)…

Officials emphasized that it was no longer possible simply to label all post- Sept. 1 plots as Al Qaeda inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the old bin Laden network

(Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002).”

Network ParadoxesNetwork Paradoxes

By the network logic being applied to Al Qaeda and its By the network logic being applied to Al Qaeda and its offspring, the US can never prevail. Whatever is done to offspring, the US can never prevail. Whatever is done to thwart the enemy just seems to make it stronger. thwart the enemy just seems to make it stronger.

Wolff (2002) noted:Wolff (2002) noted: Although we've killed countless members of the enemy Although we've killed countless members of the enemy

group, including much of its leadership, disrupted its group, including much of its leadership, disrupted its infrastructure, captured reams of intelligence on its infrastructure, captured reams of intelligence on its activities, it's suddenly stronger than ever before. activities, it's suddenly stronger than ever before.

Likewise, we ascribe substantial organizational talents to Likewise, we ascribe substantial organizational talents to what we also describe as uniquely disorganized. This new what we also describe as uniquely disorganized. This new group has become, the group has become, the TimesTimes story implies, a threat not story implies, a threat not least of all because it is less a group than the former group, least of all because it is less a group than the former group, which itself was notable for its loose-knitness (although, in which itself was notable for its loose-knitness (although, in comparison with the new group, the former group was comparison with the new group, the former group was apparently a model of central governance). apparently a model of central governance).

Uncle OsamaUncle Osama Go ahead. Saddam will

quickly fall, but that won’t make the world safer or more secure. Your bombs will send me a new generation of recruits and fuel their hatred and desire for revenge. So go ahead. Squander your wealth on war and occupation -- America will be weaker for it. Divide your people, divide the world, isolate yourselves! Perfect! I thrive on chaos. I need an enemy. You give me both.

Tom Ridge July 8, 2004Tom Ridge July 8, 2004

""Credible reporting now indicates that al-Qaeda is moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process," he said.

"Based on the attack in Madrid and recent interdictions in England, Jordan and Italy, we know that they have the capability to succeed and hold the mistaken belief that their attacks will have an impact on America's resolve,"

George Bush at Oak RidgeGeorge Bush at Oak RidgeJuly 13, 2004July 13, 2004

We will confront them overseas so we do not have to confront them here at home."

Today, because America has acted, and because America has led, the forces of terror and tyranny have suffered defeat after defeat, and America and the world are safer.

CounterterrorismCounterterrorismMeasuring SuccessMeasuring Success

MetricsMetrics Revised State Department version of Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 June 04   There were 208 acts of international terrorism in 2003, a slight

increase from the most recently published figure of 198* attacks in 2002, and a 42 percent drop from the level in 2001 of 355 attacks.

A total of 625 persons were killed in the attacks of 2003, fewer than the 725 killed during 2002. A total of 3646 persons were wounded in the attacks that occurred in 2003, a sharp increase from 2013 persons wounded the year before. This increase reflects the numerous indiscriminate attacks during 2003 on “soft targets,” such as places of worship, hotels, and commercial districts, intended to produce mass casualties.

Thirty-five U.S. citizens died in international terrorist attacks in 2003:

 

MetricsMetrics Do we count U.S. casualties ?Do we count U.S. casualties ?

• In U.S., globally?In U.S., globally? Do we count casualties in general?Do we count casualties in general?

Or only our “friends”?Or only our “friends”? Do we count number of attacksDo we count number of attacks

• Against Americans, against allies, against Against Americans, against allies, against anyone?anyone?

• In U.S., globallyIn U.S., globally Do we count attacks prevented?Do we count attacks prevented? Do we count arrests, deaths, amnesty’s, or Do we count arrests, deaths, amnesty’s, or

those who have foresworn terrorism in the those who have foresworn terrorism in the future?future?

Damage: The Alienation and Damage: The Alienation and Hostility of FriendsHostility of Friends

September 12 Today September 12 Today We Are All We Are All AmericansAmericans

Jean-Marie Colombani, Jean-Marie Colombani, Le MondeLe Monde (liberal), Paris, France , Sep. 12, 2001(liberal), Paris, France , Sep. 12, 2001

In this tragic moment, when words seem In this tragic moment, when words seem so inadequate to express the shock people so inadequate to express the shock people feel, the first thing that comes to mind is feel, the first thing that comes to mind is this: We are all Americans! this: We are all Americans!

TodayToday• U.S. most feared political actor on the U.S. most feared political actor on the

planetplanet• Hostility of European public towards U.S.Hostility of European public towards U.S.• Coalition members withdrawing from Coalition members withdrawing from

Iraq because they are becoming targets Iraq because they are becoming targets of terror and their publics are furiousof terror and their publics are furious

Alignment with repressive regimes to Alignment with repressive regimes to fight terrorfight terror

The new counter terror coalition The new counter terror coalition membersmembers• PakistanPakistan• UkraineUkraine• KazakstanKazakstan• RussiaRussia

WarWar While the “war” in Afghanistan While the “war” in Afghanistan

successfully eliminated the Taliban successfully eliminated the Taliban government and destroyed the relatively government and destroyed the relatively comfortable safe haven that Afghanistan comfortable safe haven that Afghanistan provided for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, provided for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda,

and while the War in Iraq overthrew and while the War in Iraq overthrew Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein

we did not find Bin Laden and further we did not find Bin Laden and further terrorist attacks attributed to Al Qaeda terrorist attacks attributed to Al Qaeda followed both inside Afghanistan and Iraq followed both inside Afghanistan and Iraq and without, most notably in Bali, Istanbul, and without, most notably in Bali, Istanbul, and Tunisia and in March 2004 in Madrid.and Tunisia and in March 2004 in Madrid.

Bush’s War on TerrorismBush’s War on Terrorism (1) the implications of the ways in which the terms terror (1) the implications of the ways in which the terms terror

and network have been used strategically and and network have been used strategically and inconsistentlyinconsistently

(2) the need to develop a better understanding of the (2) the need to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of terrorism and networks if we are to create an dynamics of terrorism and networks if we are to create an effective response effective response

3) issues related to the importance of our own roles and 3) issues related to the importance of our own roles and reactions in networks of terror reactions in networks of terror

(4) the administration's failure to employ and at times (4) the administration's failure to employ and at times disparage credible tools of network analysis in terms of disparage credible tools of network analysis in terms of intelligence, law enforcement, and financial influence while intelligence, law enforcement, and financial influence while concentrating on the destructive instruments of the military concentrating on the destructive instruments of the military weapon and finally, weapon and finally,

(5) the ways in which describing the U.S. response as war (5) the ways in which describing the U.S. response as war and adopting a "war fighting strategy" were significant and adopting a "war fighting strategy" were significant mistakes that undermine the effort to confront networks of mistakes that undermine the effort to confront networks of terror and terrorism.terror and terrorism.

The Afghan AlumniThe Afghan Alumni As Shay and Schweitzer (2000) have described, today, the As Shay and Schweitzer (2000) have described, today, the

‘Afghan Alumni’ operate in four capacities: ‘Afghan Alumni’ operate in four capacities:

1. As leaders of the radical Islamic organizations in their 1. As leaders of the radical Islamic organizations in their countries of origin (Egypt, the Maghrib countries, Jordan, countries of origin (Egypt, the Maghrib countries, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc.) Saudi Arabia, etc.)

2. As founders of new terrorist organizations, such as 2. As founders of new terrorist organizations, such as Osama bin Laden’s ‘Osama bin Laden’s ‘Al- Qa’idahAl- Qa’idah’ [‘The Vanguard’]. ’ [‘The Vanguard’].

3. As the architects of ‘independent’ terrorist cells which, 3. As the architects of ‘independent’ terrorist cells which, while lacking a specific organizational affiliation, cooperate while lacking a specific organizational affiliation, cooperate with other institutionalized terrorist organizations. with other institutionalized terrorist organizations.

4. As participants in the struggles of Islamic populations in 4. As participants in the struggles of Islamic populations in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Kashmir.Kashmir.

Note- provides links for connections but the connection to Note- provides links for connections but the connection to the local creates dissonance between local needs and the local creates dissonance between local needs and backlash from actions undertaken elsewhere which might backlash from actions undertaken elsewhere which might harm the local political bargainingharm the local political bargaining