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Otto

Neurath

o nDecember21,1945.

OTTO NEURATH

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPER

1913-1946

Witli

a

Bibliography

oj'Neurath in

English

Edited and

Translated

by

R O B E R T S . C OH N a n d

M A R I E

N E U R A T H

With theeditorial assistanceo/CarolynR.Fawcett

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

AMI-MBER

OFTHE

KLUWERK f& ACADEMIC

PUBLISHERS

GROUP

DORDRECHT

/

BOSTON

/

LANCASTER


2/8

xu

T ABL E OF

C O N T E N T S

CHAPTER

12L AN

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPE DIA OF U NIFIED

SCIENCE

(1936)

139

CHAPTER 13. ENCYCLOPEDIA AS'MODEL*(1936) 145

CHAPTER"l4.

PHYSICALISM AND THE INVESTIGARON OF KNOWL-

EDGE(1936) 159

CHAPTER 15. UNIFIED SCIENCEA ND ITSENCYCLOPEDIA (1937) 172

CHAPTER 16. THE CONCEPT OF TYPE' IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN

LOGIC

(1937)

183

CHAPTER 17.

THE

NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICISM

(1937)

189

CHAPTER 18. THE DEPARTMENTALIZATIONOF UNIFIED SCIENCE -

(1937) 200

CHAPTER 19. COMMENTS ON THE PAPERS BY BLACK,

KOKOSZYSKA, WILLIAMS

(1937)

20 6

CHAPTER 20. THESOCIAL SCIENCESA NDUNIFIED SCIENCE(1939) 209

CHAPTER

21 .

UNIVERSALJARGON

AN D

TERMINOLOGY(1941)

21 3

CHAPTER 22. THE ORCHESTRATION OF THE SCIENCES BY THE

ENCYCLOPEDISM

OFLOGICAL

EMPIRICISM

(1946) 230

CHAPTER

23 .

PREDICTION

AN D

INDUCTION(1946)

24 3

CHAPTER 24. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

A.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED 247

I B. SUPPLEMENTARY LIST OF WORKS BY

OTTO

NEURATH

[see 'List',which

is

Chapter 12

oEmpiricism

and

Sociology,1973]

255

C. NEURATHINENGLISH

.

259

INDEX OF

AMES

265

CHAPTER

1

THE LOS T W A N D E R E R S O F

D E S C A R T E S

A N D

T H E A U X I L I A R Y M O T I V E

(On the Psychology of Decisin)

I want to

take

a remarkable passage in theDiscourse on

Method

of Descartes

as

the starting

point

of my paper. In

this

workthe autho r, in addition to the

rules

of theoretical research,

also

discusses rulesof practica action which are

for

the most part insufficiently appreciated in represeritations of Cartesian

etiiics.

Among

others

Descartes puts

forward

the

following

principie:

My

second maxim was to be as unwavering and as

resolute

inmy actions as

ppssible,

and having once

adopted

opinions to

adhere

to them, however in

themselves

open to

doubt,

no

less steadfastly

tnan if they had been amply

confimed.

In this I am following

the

example

of

travelerswho,

on

nding themselves astray

in

some_forest,

realize th,^

they ouglit

not

toXraciilatie^urnLng

now in one

direction

and now in

another,

a nd

still

lss to

stop

movmg, DUI 10 keept alway In

aS

StraghiTa

lirie

as

possibie, never

for any

minor reason

changing

direction, even

thoughat the

start

it may have

been chance alone

which

determined them

in

their choice

of direction. If, in

thus proceeding, they

do not

advance in the direction they expectedj they wfll at least, in the final outcome, find

tliemselves

better located than in mid-forest. In the same

way,

since often, in actual^

Uvingj_thejequireinents

of

action_allpw

of no

delay,

it is

verycertain that

when it is not

in

ou rpower to"derminewhich opinionsarTest,weought to

follow

those

seemingly

most

likely;a nd tliat in those cases in whichwe

f a

to observea ny

greater

likelihoodin

sonie

thari

in others, we should

nevertheless give

our

adherence

to certain of them, and

thereafter (since this

was our

motive

for

adhering"~t""thern)

consider them,Jn

Jhejr

bearing on action, as no longer

doubtful,

but very true and certain. This decisin was

sufficient

to deliver me

from

all the

repentings

an d

feelings

of

remorse which

are

wont

to disturb the consciences of those Weak,unstablebeings who in a(yacillating manner}

abandon

themselves to the actingout,as if it were good, whatth enext moment they are

preparedto recognize asbeingevil(Descartes1958,pp. 112113).

With these words Descartesformlaleshis resignatioHinJheJieJd.of.practical

action. He

acknowledges,

in principie, the~iiecessity that we must at with

in^ijfjjcjen^t^lnsi^t-

How

does this train

1)1

tnought

fit

into his

wrld-view?

IfrTH~secodpart

of the Discourse on Method he puts forward his

well-

known(foUr

rulesjfor theoretical investigatiqn: One^hould assume

as

true

only what

is clearly knwn, dissect all problems

into

seprate questions,

arrange the problems according to their complexity, and attempt to make

a

completesurvey ofthem within aninvestigation.

Translation o fNeurath1913a[ O N 6 2 ] .


3/8

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS

Descartes wa of the opinin

tliat,

in_the field

pf theory,by forming

successive series of statements that one has recognised as defnitely true, oT&donJi/tnct,

couM

reacia

complete

picture ofthe

world.

He

places

gregJpjfi3lEe|vjn

^

ffig

endeavouj

wbich is

injhajp contrast

to

the ^sgnatjorlmru5riaâ^qre.

tî^'^1''fi

"Nohing is so difficult that one could not reacrTTrffime end, nothing so

hidden

that one

could

not discover

it.

But how should the man act who has

not yet attained complete insight? For this purpose Descartes formlales

preliminaryjrules fbrpracticalaction which have to be applied as long as one

'SaT'not reaAedjc_grnpleteJnsight|Tor those~who 'are of ihe opinin thaT^

rornplete insight can neverbereached, these preHminary rules becomey

lefinitive onesThe necessity that actipri must tke place evenif insighti s

complete aiready follows

from

thefact that 'non-actipn'isalsoan

action

-

te reslt of

ajdecision.

It ispreciselythis

that

matters,

that

the course of

events

depends on our

decisin. Descartes does

no t

count

theoretical

thinking

arnong

actions.

This view could be supported if onepointsout that thinking

can,as it were, be suspended for atime,whereaswith actionin the narrower

sense this

is not ppssible,

since also non-action

has to be

considered

as

action,

sTJst

mentioned.

Afflinst

this

the ohiecjjon can bemade

that

there

are a

whofe series of occupationswhich are similar to thinking. For example, we

can interrupt the construction of a house for atime and we can

hesitate

a s

long

as we want about continuing it.

However,

the mostfavourable t imefor

construction may pass and the partly finishedbuildingm ay suffer but the

same

is

certainly

true of thinking. Of thinking it can only be

claimed

that it

belongs

to thoseactivities that are

reatively

independent of the point in time

atwhich they are

begun

and of the speedwith which theya recarried out;

in

any case,{he

differences between

thinking

and

actipnjire pnlyôfje^reejjnot

kindr In the

Principies of Philosophy, Descartes makes

a

sharp separation

Jjerween thinking and action.

.. .

we are to

make

use of this

doubt

only

when

we are engaged in contemplating the

truth.

For, as regards the conduct of our life,we arefrequently

obliged

to

foDow

opin-

ions

which

are merelvjjpfcable. becase the

opportunities

for

action

would in

most

cases pass away before we could

deliver

ourselves

from

our doubts. And when, as

fre-

quently

happens with two courses of action, we do not perceive the probability of

the

one more than the other, wenjjiitj^^ggt^qnEflC

th

SIP (Descartes 1911, pp.

219-220).

"'-,

- - -,.

this

sense three provisional

mora]

rules

are

formulated;

one

should adapt

.

, 1

oneself to the usuallaws, customsand religiousviews;act energetically

even

,,

I if jnsightjsînsufficieiil; and changeoneself rath er than theorderof theworld

',. aview

which

is, on the whole,of a

stoical

character. - *

r~~m

_i - - * .-.-_ --

THE LOST W A N D E R E R SOF DESCARTES

f) ^ _ -

~yC"\?

a

fundamental

errqr_of_Descarts

thathebeh'eved

thatjanlyin

thej

practical

field

could

he, not

.dispense

with'^rovisio^ffliles.

Thinking,

too

needs

preliminary rules in more than one

r^r^t."Thlimited span

o"Uf

already urgesusahead. Thewish

that

in foreseeable timethepicture of th

world could

be

rounded

off

makes provisional

rules a

necessity.

But

ther

are

fundamental objections to the

Cartesian

view.

Whoever

wants to crate

world-view ora scientific systemrrmsj^pejatejvj^^ Eac

attempt to cratea world-picturebystarfing from atabularasaan dmaking

series

of

statements wliich

are

recognised

a s

definitivelytrucisnecessarily ful

jif

trickeries. The

phenomena that

we

encounter

are somuch

interconnecte

that they^cannot be described by a one-dimensional chain of statements

"The

c'rrectness

>o f .each statement is related to

that

of all the others. It i

absolutelyjunpossible to form late a single statement about the world withou

making.^fnTuaât

the same time of countlessothers.Also we cannot expres

. . . . .

.d. K- j... "*-* .

^-3a_^^.^*-K*^-rr^Tnt^r'

- û*

^T:.,-:.-:^^^r-^.'. ..-.

any statement withoutpplyina of our

precedingjponcept forrnatiofri

O

^^ ..?..., . . . . . .

*^fr-.

A

T i

.

. y

"'"

' ~

"*"'

** -&

-::i-Lh_Jr

vn.-^.^

ff

^ -,4 ,...-. ^._.,.,..__,-._.

_..

C|T|

7

the one

hand

we

must state

the

connection

of

each statement

dealing

w it

the world with all the

other

statements that

deal

with it, and on the othe

hand

we must state the connection of each train of

thought

with all ou

- earlier trains ofthought.W e canyary the world ofconceptspresentinus,bu

we

cannot

discard it.

Each attempt

to renew it from the

bottom

up is by it

l

verynature

a child of the

concepts

a t

hand.

' :

What is the situation concerning provisional rules in the field of study o

the world? In order tp make.progress one very

often

finds oneself in th

position

of

having chog^gne

of

several hvrjothgeroFequal prpbability

The necessitypf provisionalrulesin the field ofthinking is usually lessclearl

understood;

this may be related to the

fact that

one can,so to speak,

le a

several

heoretical

lives simultaneously. Serious and bold tho ught experiment

can be risked without

hesitation;

iftheyfail,others can bestarted.However

one

cannot, for example, attempt, in the same way,to train for.more tha

one

career. Starting from

the

same initial point

one can

always develp

different

theories

of

light,

just

as one can underake different. excursions

But

one sliould not overlopk the

fact

that it is certainly_of

cpnsequenc

// /

which.trains

pf_thpug_ht one hasoncehadbefore

acertaiainyestigation.

Th

thinking;pf a.

maji_ûririghis

wh ole lifeforms a psychplpgicaljuriity,an don l

in a very h'mitejl_sense can one speak of trains of thought per se. Thoug

E>escartesspeaks again and again of the prpcess pf thinking, he treats it

like

systejn

of

logical relatipnships, which

as

such,

of

coursejyyyipthing to.d

with the"psychologicaJ progression

tp.which

it owes((us orig^Descarte

seems

to

have

in

mind

the

possibility that

one can

re-sart each train

o


4/8

P H I L O S O P H I C A L P A P E R S

thouggrt again

and again.

However, what should

one do if, in

order

to

think

one hypothessthrough to the end, one needs a wholelife,and therefore one

has to cfaoQse one way which one cannot retrace before the compleion of

ttewioleinvestgation?In the feld of thinking these casesarecertainly not

very

frequent. If one

imagines

how a train of

ideas would have

r un on the

basis

of different premises, thenone has thereby akeady realised this second

possifality;however,

in the feld of action in the narrower sense thisis not the

case:

here

the imagination of

'how

it

might

have been' is far removed

f rom__

-

malang

it become real. The most im portant acts of thinking can be repeated *\t

wffl;

for the most part

ths

is not the case with the most importantactions

;jj

in

human life.Thatan event happens only once is considered characteristic of

it. "One cannot step into the same river twice." Thus, Hebbel's Marianne

calisout in herprayer:

You did what Youhaveneverdone:returned

The wtoel oftimeto thepotionit

Had in the past;picase,le thim not d o as

Hedi dbefore

. ..

(Hebbel 1974,Act 3,Scene6, p. 160).

We saw that there

are events

that happen onlyjpnce,

and

events that

happen

severa times, in both the feld of thinking and the feld of action in

the

narrower sense. That

any

doubt

can

arise

at all

results

from the fact

that

there

are

known

and

unknown premises from which

the

conclusin cannot

be made

unambiguously. Now it can

happen that

onejiast o

choosea definite

course,

either

in the fie

Id

of

thinking

or in the field of

action

in the narrower _^_

sense. Descartes stresses

the

necessity

of being able to make the

required/^

resolution

^uickly

and

withoutweakenirig

the will.

While

he mainly

describes

the

manner

in which

resolution, madejon

the

basis

of

insufficient

insight,

isjojbe^carried

out^here,

with reference to D escartes, I want to

deal

witrthesj

question,

how

such

aresolution

comes_about

empirically.

'

^JWe

have seen

that

in many clises, byconsiderrgdifferent possibilties of

action,

a man

cannot reach

a

result.

If he

nevertheless singles

out one of them

to put it

into operation,

and in so doing

makes

use of a

principie

of a

more

general kind,wewant to

cali

hejnotive

thus created, whichhas nothing to

dovnthjhe concrete airns in question, the auxiliarymotive,becauseit is jtn

aicTtothe

vacJating,

sotos p e a k . f " -

^ '1

--

:

''''''

:Jt3t

--

::

^~

~"The auxiliary motive

appeare in itS(j[>ujstJfonnJas ajirawing of

lots. If a

ma n

isjio Jongerable

to

decide

on the

basisq insight which

o f

severalactions

to prefer , he

cari draw lots, or ^

equaly

we,~dclare vguely that

he

will just

do 'something or

other' ,

or that he will wait and see which resolution, after

T H E

L O S T W A N D E R E R S OF D E S C A R T E S 5

some hesitation willcomeout ontop,

asjf

leavingthe decisin to exhaustion,

or'at

any

rat^to_an

agent quite outsideth e motivesi nquestion, thatbelongs

to thecategoryof theparrot wh odrawsth e'planets'.1

The frame of

mind just

described is

only found

so

clearly

in those men^

of modern society who are used to making a large part of their actions

dependent

on

individual insight

by the exact weighing and examining of

means and ends in long drawn-out deliberations.But

also

the traditionalma n

L

spmetimes becomes conscious

of

i^ie_diflculIy.,QLchQ|qs,

especially

when

hel^

faces actions that are not adequately

determined

by tradition.

He_also_indsl

-

himself in a painful position if

contradictory

traditions~exerf,their pressureB

niim. One can

think

of al] kinds of men in

sjtuajigjisjnjg^chjio[furtheijy

deliberation_can hek. There is not the

slightest

reason to doubt that a great

rnilitary Teader

like Napolen

is

frequently

incapable of

deciding

by

means

ofreflexin exactly what he should

dok

Nevertheless the methodofmore or

less admitted button counting is an object ofabhorrence or ridicule to most

contemporaries. However, since these contemporaries

arejiot in

possession

of

complete

insight

either,

the

question

is

which substituto

fo r button-counting

do

they

apply.

In many casesfthere isaction of an instinctive kjnd]butthiscan-in no way

achieve

everything. Since

it

frees

one

from doubts,

it is

highly

valued by

many

and its effeciveness isoften

exaggerated. Yes, many wish

for

instinc-

tive action even where the problems concern pur expediency. Some are of

the opinin that to start with one could

reflect,

and then when reflexin fails,

turn to

instinct; this

view

misuses instinct

by

consciously

introducingit as a

mere stop-gap, whereasi tssignifcance is evident wherever it rules from the

start, though it is perhaps replaceable by reflexin. But an instinct in reserve

ma y well

be

psychologically doubtful. Precisely

if one

vales

the

signifcance

of

instinctive action

so

highly should

one not misuse it

like

that.O ne

should

clearly

realise that instinct must fafl with respect to the complex rational

relationships

created

by the

consciously

shaped institutions of the

social

order and modern technology. Certainly, part of the signifcance of instinct

is

that it did not

allow

vacillation to occur in periods when

cool

calculation

playeda minor role, and in this respect it avoided waste of energy. The world

would be in a bad way if we

would have

liad to

wait

until

insight

rules,and

until it

itself systematically eliminates

the damage

which

it

causes,

for exam-

ple,

bythe creation

of

vacillation.

Thus

natuiemother'sdutytakes

and watches that

the

chain

not break

and

thatthe rim not cracketh.

U-'


5/8

6 PHIL OSOPHICAL PAPE RS

ntfl the

whok

of world'sdomain

isnnderphiosophy's

reign

it

keeps

things on themove

by hungerand by love.1

Where instinct recedes we very often

discover

the unconscious tendency

to elimnate

any

bud of weakening vacillation in

some

way or

other.

Here

belongs

the belief in oracles, omens, prophecies and the

like.

I do not want

this

to be unders tood as a claimthatthosewho

follow

omensmight be of the

opinin

that thisjmst in

omens

may be useful to

them

and

therefore

had to

be

preserved.fRather what actually

happens may be

this:

the

view

of the

valu of omens

originales

from other sources and encounters

an

emotional

disposition fo r which the elimination ofdoubt meansarelasefrom a feeling

of displeasure; therefore,

involuntarily,

the respective

mode

of thinking is

eagerly

absorbed. In the sameway Ishould liketo

explain

whygreatmilitary

leaders, politicians an d other men of action so often show ajronounced^y

[tendency towardsuperstitionjlt should beplainlystressed that suchm ena re

often rhuch" more superstitioiis ma n corresponds to the spirit of their age,

an d that

the

forms

of

their superstition sometimes

ar e

strangelyprimitive

or

archaic.This is further proof that this superstitioni s

certainly

not aproduct

of

latter-day

jeflexion

as is

occasionally found

in

spiritualism

and

other

such

movements.jGiven the chance, however,men of thetype described aboveare ]

(of

course

amenabletosubsequent systematisationan drationalisation

of

their-/

original superstitious

tendency.jtf

on e keeps this in mind, it also becornes

understandabe why it is

precisely

in

times

of

political unrest, when further

developments

are very unclear, that spiritualism an d similar currents gain

ground more easily. However, there ar e also other circumstances, which we

cannot discuss here in detail, that have an effect. Fo r example, the wish to

know

the

future plays

a

large part;

as can

often

be observed,

this

is

especially

so with individuis whose weak character does no t allow them to

influence

events energetically.

From the start

this

type tends towardsthemore

com-

plicated forms of prophecy an d

often

crales a highly rationalised structure

of

omens.

An

extensivo

occupation with such things

must

help

to

ful

in the

' emptiness of will. This product of the weak will canalso beused, however,

by energetic individuis to strengthen, their power of resolution, as shown

above. -^

Other kinds_of_auth_ority servea s

wll

to elirnjnate;yacillatiojt,/In difficult

cases, for example, many like to turn to a

father

confessr or some

other

adviserbecause they wantto be

relieved

oftroublesome doubt.Ifthey reflect

on their behaviour vis--vis thes authorities, they understandably do not

3

v

THE LOST

W A N D E R E R S

OF DE SCART E S 7

eaTIstsits

instinctive basis,andtheysubsequentlytryto justify theirprocedure \

mayeven sometimesbe

correct.

Incasesof

doubt,

however,inwhicha

intelligent person is asked for advice, the problem is

only

shifted by

another step;the question

jsjvhat this more

intelligentperson should

do

if, ~j

withall due celiberation,he..cannoLreach_a decisipn.the_tendency_andwishJ

to

come

to a

decisin

is;

also

in the

foregroud

ekewhere;

for

example, this

can be derived from thefac that,in avote,thepresidenthas a casting-vote if

no majority has been reached.

Perhaps

the principie ofmajority itself serves

mainly the purpose of elimnating conlict and

bringing

about some decisin

- whether it s the most intelligent onedoes notmatter. Formanyit may

mean the satisfaction of a longing for rest. Somebody may indeed approve

the majority principie only because it

enhances

the ability to act; it is a

beloved

substitute

for the

unloved drawing

oflots.The umpire too

sometimes

plays

noother role.Andwhenthetaliansof the MiddleAgesand

Renaissance

as amatter ofprincipie often got themayor from another town to endtheir

internal

fights, this wasalso probably the result of their wish for calm, and

*occasionally

it may

have been

of

littleconcern

to the

inhabitants

of a

town

whether

the man called in

from

outside

was

endowed with

special

insight.

Wehave seen that instinct nips^doubtjin

the

bud,

thatt he

belief

in

omens

quickly removes it, and that

somelnstutions

of outwardly quite different

character also have

the parta effect. of

helping

a

resolution, some order

of

things, to break through,

should

insight fail. Also thatjirnpcity, which

does not see more than one

possibility

for action, has of course thesame

effect.

In the large centresof civilisationinstinct hasnowadays lostmuchground^

and

superstition playsa rninor

role.

Mostof ourcontemporariesrelyon their

insight

and

want

to

leave

the

decisin

in allthingsto it

once

and forall.

Their

sltrting-point is the view

that

given

enough

thoughtone could t leastdeter-

miTwhicFmanner ofactionhasthe_greaeôbabJityofbeing successfuLl,

should

certainty

be

impossible.(TTTtEelFarTcaseFrr

wHcTToriT^FsjevâiRh

ôsslbitlies^ôf~iclioTrqu:te"Telplessly,

is

denied

or

declared s

hghjyJm-J

probable thatolensibleman need

give

it anyfurther thought.fMenTthIs

"ype~afemostlyIjFlftTciplon that if diffculties urn up, sKrper thinking

will haveto leadto thegoal;they^completely failJoj_ejtoatjvejr^h5jhag)est

thinker can end up with severa cpn^sjpjisôfêqualj/alu^ if pjremisesare

lacidng.

Whoever adheres to

the

belief

that he can

accomplish

everytiiing*'

wth his insight, anticipates in a way

that-pmplete

knowledgeof the world

that Descartes puts forward asa far-off ajrjn ofscientifc development. This


6/8

8 PHIL OSOPHICAL PAPE RS

pseudorationalism leadspartly to self-deception, partly tohypocrisy. Educap

tkm^and character

support these errors which Descartes, who is usually

considere3~tbnBe"hTTather of rationalism, managed to keep free of in

theV--

feldjrf practica action, as we saw

above.

The pseudorationalists aojrue^l.

lalism

adisserviceiftheypretend to

have

adequate _insight

exactly

where

[ \

rationalism excludesit

on

purelyjogicaljjgunas..

fRationalism sees its chiet

triumph

in the clear recognition

of^thrits

of

actual insight.

I

tend

to

derive

the

widespread tendency towards pseudo-

raionalism

from the

same_unconscious

endeavoursas the tendency towardsj

stiperstition.(With the

progress

of the Enlightenment men were more and

'

;

more deprived of the traditional means which were suited to making un-

ambiguous decisions possible. Therefore one turned to insight in order to

I squeeze an adequate substituto out of it with allpossible forc.In

this

sense

pseudorationalism, a beDef in powers that reglateexistence and foretell the

;

futre, as well as reliance on

omens,

have aSommon rootjT he pseudo-

rationalists always want to act

from

insight ancTareTErefore grateful to \

i anybody

who is

able

to

suggest

to

them that they

ha d

acted from insight

This

disposition

of mind explains sufficiently the striking lack of criticism

with which,

for

example, election speeches

of

parliamentarians

ar e

received.

Thelisteners

are glad, so to

speak,

if

they

c an

make

up

their minds

i n

favour

of

somthingwith

a

goodconscience;this desire

is

mostly

of a

primary nature.

If the speaker

is

aware oLthis fact, hisaction becomesa

farce;

his aim then

is only to^suggest rationality)>Peoplehave already begunpsychologically

to

analyse the suggestive effect of the orator, especially of thepolitician. The'

arguments

with which

he

orator operates

can be put

side

by

side with the

shape

of the

hat

he

chooses

f or

gaining

th e

sympathies

of the

members

of

hisi

his

party.

Th e

question

now is

what w l happen

if

psychological knowledge

becomes

so

widespread that most citizens

see

through

the

apparatus

of

suggestion. Through this psychological enlightenment, suggestion

may

possibly

be paraJlysed, and men are then

incapable

of receiving the suggestion of

Jjlf they do not return to superstition, to instinct or_to

absolute~N

rsimplicity,

nothing remains

bu t

seizing

an

auxiliary

motive where

insight

does

\

[not reach far enough;pitherone is

content

with argumentslike:

"Somthing

mist happen, let us do

this

or that, whatever occurs to us, after having

elirninated what wehave already

recognised

aswrong,"or ,when'the pointis

reached

where insight fails,o nedraws lots in

style,

orleavesth e decisin to

some moment whichhasnothingto dowiththematterinquestion.

Bu twoe to the statesman whobehaved like thispublicly. If, in aconcrete

case,he

carne

to the

insight that

he

could

not

decide between

two

alternatives

' \

THE LOST W A N D E R E R S O F

DE SCART E S

and therefore wanted to decide by

jot,

he wpuld expose hjrnselftpth

reproach

of

frivolity

or

cynicisin/Popular^feeling would

be

deeply

hurt;i

demaBs"

eithei ^~^oltTjton

of od traditions or ratpnally_founde

changes.ln thisrespect one mus keep in mind that^tneTfiodeniTfafFsma i

rrrEIc'rnrTore

conscious of his inadequateinsightthan thestatesman ofthepasl

The

statesmen

of the past often embraced the total knowledge oftheir tim

and

were often

the leading

political economists,

while

today

the

statesmai

must beactiveinfieldswhichare doubtlessly betterknown byothersthanb]

himself. For example, while Colbert and Turgot are numbered among

th outraged

if one

suggests

to

them

to

decide by

lo t

where insight

is at an

end.

Th e

attitude

of

Thomas

Hobbes

in the

matter

of

religin therefore

rarely

finds

approval. Hi s idea that some order is better than none

enr,ages every

pseudorationalist wh o hopes to reach a decisin by an adequatemasure of

thinking.

Hobbes '

intolerance is purely

external,

a means to an

admitted

political end.He simply feels unableto decide whichof thepositive religions

is

preferable.It appears to me that this_behaviour of Hobbes isthejDnlyone

possible

for an

honest rationalist

in

many affairs

of

life; however,whether

rationalism is at all suited to reglate

public

life is another question.fBut

ronce tradition and community feeng are weakened,thereis no choice but

I

that between rationalism,

which

undoubted ly leads to drawing lots, an d

Ijgseudorationalism,.which

falsifes

thinkingand.feefig.

|~"'*"

/

It is an emprica

question

how the

(auxiliary

motive)meets the

test

in

practice.

Its

general acceptance could,

for~"example7"

have

the

effect that

one

alreadjMies_it_at_a_time

when reflexin might still perfectly well make

i Jieadway. This dgerlooms in

other

cases too when thereare substitutos

forj

drawing lots, for example, in the form of religious measures. Already thej

Brelepoetwarns:

"Firstset towork

yourself,

thencali thegods

fo r

help."3


7/8

\L PAPERS

Todayit is already of actual importance for the wise man who is conscious o

theincompletenessof hisinsight,whorefusessuperstition, and who neverthe-

lesswants

to act decisively.

Ordy_the auxiliary mptiye_can strengthen

his

will

without

demanding the

sacrifice

ofhis

honesty.

He

need

not artificially co-

strict ifsfield of visin to be able to be active. The man who hesitates to

theauxiary

motive,

whorefrains

from

its

use, cannot

be

helped.

So it is

with the man whocannotmake up his mindwhetherto start with*yes'or

'no'

when

counting

buttons. Butthis is not an objection to the

auxiliary

motive;

it is not a

generallyaccepted principiethateveryone

can be

helped.

_

TheauxJary__inativeis

well^suited

to bringaboutakindjyfrapproche rneni A

tUILlB^&^^ Whe

formerly

omens

and

lots

had

some

I

inner

significance,

they

have now become purely means.

But_the_procedure;

has remained the same. The adherent of the auxiliary motive will neverregard

the

traditional man,

the man who

follows

his

instinct, with that feeling

of

superiority

that characterisesmany

pseudorationalists.

He may perhaps even

regretthat the period of cpmmunity life,in which tradition andinstinctwere_

^decisivo, has ended and possibly can even treat the auxiliary motive as a

sbstitute that became necessary becauserat ionalism developed.4n_tins sense

instfflLCjt,

tradition and

aux^rxj|jotiye

are in cpmmon opposition against

psudoratipnalsm. Th application of theauxiliary motive needsaprior high

degree of

organisation;

only if the procedure is more or less

common

to all

will

the

collapse

of

human society

be

prevented.

T he

traditional uniformity

'

4 of behaviour has to be replaced by

cpnscipus

cppperation;the readiness of

ahuman group to cpoperateconsciously, depends essentially on the character

pf the

individuis.

Let us go back to the

parable

of Descartes. For the wanderers lost in the

forest, who have no

indication

at all as to which direction to follow, it is most

important

to marchon energetically.One of them isdrivenin some direction

by instinct, another by anornen;the hirdwill carefully consideralleventual-

ities, weigh all arguments and counter-argumentsand, on the basis of inade-

quate premises of whose

deficiencies

he is unaware, he will in the

end,

his

,

head

lifted in

pride,take

one definite

direction which

h e

considers

the

correct

one/The

fourth,

s

finaUy,

will

think as

well

as he

can,

but not

refrain

from

adttingthat

his

insight

is too

weak,

and quietly

allow himself

to

decide

by

Jp_t.

Let us

assume

that the

chances

of getting out of the

forest

are the

same

for

the four

wanderers;

nevertheless there will be people whosejudgment of

K

the behaviour of the four is very different.To the seeker after truthwhose

)

esteem of insight ishighest, the behaviour of the lastwanderer will be most

i congenial,and that of thepseudorationalist thirdwanderer most

repeHent.

THE LOST

V / A N D E R E R S

OF

D ES CA RTES

11

In thesefour

kinds

of behaviour we can perhaps see four stages of develop-

ment of mankind without exactly

claiming

thateach of them has come

fully

into

existence. But

some

tliings

will become

clearer

when

we try to

clarify

the essential featuresof the fourperiods,pf instinct, of au thprity,

ofjjseudp-

rationalism, and of the auxUary__mptiye. Today we

live

in the period of

pseudorationalism; but we can akeady observe clear indications of decay.

Many

believe that they can count on a new

upsurge

of rengln,while

others

expect

a

return

of a

more instinctive life.

But

there

are

alsothose

who

believe

that the collapse.pf

ou r

civilisation is

unavoidable..If.LnowJ:ry

to attribute

afuture;oj:he auxHaryjmo^h^Jjie culminatipn of rationalisniÎ do so on

tie basis of the following

deliberation.

We can construct utopias indifferent

ways; we can either think of a

further

development of the most developed

forms;

or we can

look

for gems of future fpnns. For

example,

one

could

elabratethe view that weare approaching a time in which all national events

would besystematically

precalculated.

It would leadus too far to show

that

it isvery improbable that such conditions would beginsoon.But we canalso

discem new movements that have not yet reached full development though

they

exist, in the way

that rationalism akeady

had

adherents

in the

Middle

Ages though its futurewas not predicted.Sinceit is very

difficult

to have any

idea of

some

new

intellectual trend,

it is certainly

advantageous

to deal

more

seriously with

the possibility

thatperhaps

one day the

auxiliary motive will

strongly

influence

prvatean dpublic life. ______

~^x~-~~

*

a _ T T T I ^ ~~ ~ ~ ~ " 1

jDescartes lived in a period of change. At that time onebegan the all-out'

(f ight against instinct and; tradition

wjôujt reah'sing

the_

funct ions

of these .

[forces.|to~the field ofmoral

action Descartes himself has,

as we

saw,

on the

one

hand consciously acknowledged tradition, on the other handâpproved

of the auxiharymotive. In thisa consistent rationalist can follow him. As far

as rationalism has a future at all in themoralfield, theconscious recognition

of its limits and the introduction of the auxiliary motive are unconditional

assumptions.

Bu t whatever the future may be

like,

it is well

worhwhile

to

Hill&

e

5MSon>

11OW

rationalism

and defectivo

insight

can be cprribjBgd

with

the

help_

of the

auxiliary motive.

-

, . NOTES

1

[The expression "parrot who draws the

'planets'"

likely means to drawup a horo-

scope, theplanetssetting the zodiac so as toprophesyortellafortune.Theonly literary

reference of

noteoccurs

in Shakespeare,

Comedy

of

Erorrs (Act

I V,

scene

4,

line 42f)

where

the

phrase

*to

prophesy like

th eparrot'

occurs.Neurath'sallusion

is

p'robably

to


8/8

12

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS . -

be foond in the Germn and Austr ian circuses of the early

twentieth

century, where

parrotsverused by fortune tellers to randomly pick out slips of paper with words

writtenonthem frorn abowL

Ed.]. .

31

[Neurafh

is quotng the

last

strophe(minusthe firsttwo lines) of

Schfller's

poem,

'Die

Wertweiscn'(first

caHed'Die

Tatender

Phaosophen"):

Dochwefl,

was ein

Professorspricht,

Nichtgleich zu

alien

dringet,

So bt

Natur

di e

M utterpfl icht

Und

sorgt,

dass

nie dieKette

bricht,

Un d

dassd er

Reif

n iespringet,

Einstween, bis den Bau derWelt

Philosophiezusammenhalt,

Erhalt sie dasGetriebe

Durch Hunger

und

durchLiebe.]

3

[Neurath isfreely adapting afragment of Eurpides:

Arc

n

vvv

6p,

xoiVw

i-novovvrix> Oeb

(Yonaccomplish somethingnow yurself, and thus

cali

uponthegod;

And trulythe god bringssafety to thosew hotoil.)

Eurpides,

Hippolytus Fragment435 in ragmenta Euripidis

Edited by Friedrich

Wflhdm Wagner.Pars:Didot, 1846.p.722.- Ed.].

>> ?

Mi

CHAPTER

2

ON

TH E

CLASSIFICATION

OF

SYSTEMS

OF

HYPOTHESES

(With Special

Reference to

Optics)

Everyone who takes up theory of science or the history of thesciences

feels

oppressed by the profusin of facts. Early on, a start wasalreadymade with

the classifcation of stones,

plants

and other objects, though at first only

according to rather

superficial

characteristics; but the systems of

human

thought

that engaged

in these things

were

for a long

time

simply

accepted

without

any systematic classification.

Though one

worked

at

history

of

botany, history of

chemistry,

historyof mineralogy, history of

zoology,

one

did so as one still works today at history ofliteratur a. Once the biographical

factor

carne to the

fore,

so again did the

subject

tre ated. Of course groupings

of complexes of

ideas

were formed, but this was not always preceded by

sufficient

analysis. There were

wild

growths

of new classifications when the

traditional ones

were

altogether abandoned. There was no continual coopera-

tiono f

scholars

in the field of thehistory of science.

If, for

example,

we want to

inform

ourselves ab out the views of an age

concerntog

physics

ncluding our own age

t is bad that we are forced to

read

through ten to fifteen books that alwayscontato much to common. It

would be of the greatest valu if there was a presentation that made us aware

of what there is to common, which often ishiddenu nder afl sorts of covers,

so

that the

differences

of the individual theories would stand out more

clearly.

Here

and there a

physicist

undertakes

somethtog

of

thiskind

for educational

purposes;bu t this undertaking rematos isolated, andthereis no continuaron

of

the

work.

The

same

is

truc

to

nearly all

felds of

knowledge.

Especially to

psychology, complatots are

made that

it is

difficult

to take toto

account what

the

different

psychologists

haveincommon.

Of

course,

historical

presentation

suffers

from

this.

What

is the

cause

of

this phenomenon?

So far we

have

no t

developed

a special

technique

for the

analysis of tratos of ideas. By a lucky

thrust,

great historians often gato deep

insight,

but such achievemens can

only

be

insuffciently

utilised

and

above

afl

can hardly be furthered; aE too often knowledge is

buflt

on a basic view of

which the scholar

himself

is not aware. If theunconscious knowledge could

Translationof

Neurath1916

[ON

82J.

13

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