new an ecological model for the emergence of institutionalized … · 2020. 10. 6. · 1987; arnold...

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One of the central questions in anthro-pological archaeology is how and why insti-

tutionalized social hierarchies evident in rankedsocieties and chiefdoms developed indepen-dently in multiple locations around the worldduring the Holocene (Feinman and Manzanilla2000; Flannery 1998). Status competition andsocial inequality exist in all human groups, re-gardless of size or mode of production (Fried1967; Boehm 2000; Diehl 2000). However, ar-chaeological evidence for significant and institu-tionalized intragroup differences in status andwealth are confined to the last 13,000 years, wellafter the first evidence for anatomically modernhumans in Africa (ca. 150,000 years ago) andtheir subsequent appearance throughout muchof the Old and New Worlds (Klein 2004). Thepreponderance of archaeological evidence sug-gests that for the majority of human historygroups remained small, occupied relatively largeterritories at low densities, and moved periodi-cally to adapt to spatial and temporal fluctuationsin resources. The record also indicates that groupfissioning, environmental infilling, and emigra-tion to diverse habitats were generally favored

over localized increases in group size and den-sity, or other forms of intensification. Underthese conditions, institutionalized hereditaryleadership and significant differences in statusand wealth rarely emerged or persisted.

Archaeological evidence for ranked societiesis often found in conjunction with clear indi-cations of localized population aggregation,economic intensification, and territorial circum-scription (Blake and Clark 1999; Carneiro 1970;Clark and Blake 1994; Hayden 1981). In some in-stances, this follows heightened commitment toagriculture (Price and Gebauer 1995), but similardevelopments occurred among hunter-gatherersin areas where wild resources are concentrated,such as in marine and other aquatic habitats(Erlandson 2001; Kennett 2005; Pálsson 1988;Yesner 1980). In these contexts, certain groupmembers were able to acquire greater wealth andstatus by (1) manipulating economic, social, andpolitical relationships to their own benefit (Earle1987); (2) controlling the flow of exotic goodsused to signal status (Flannery 1972); (3) monop-olizing the labor of other group members (Earle1987; Arnold 2001); and (4) creating ideologies

twenty

An Ecological Model for the Emergence ofInstitutionalized Social Hierarchies onCalifornia’s Northern Channel Islands

Douglas J. Kennett, Bruce Winterhalder, Jacob Bartruff, and Jon M. Erlandson

Shennan_ch20.qxd 9/29/08 5:43 PM Page 297

that justified the uneven distribution of wealthand power (Earle 1987; 1997). The fundamentalparadox in such developments is why a majorityof group members would cooperate with individ-uals who ultimately wanted to subordinate andexploit them (Boone 1992).

In this chapter, we develop a multivariatemodel for the emergence of institutionalized so-cial hierarchies using the broad framework ofhuman behavioral ecology (HBE; Winterhalderand Smith 1992, 2000; Winterhalder andKennett 2006) and a case study from California’sNorthern Channel Islands.

AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL FOR THEEMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZEDSOCIAL HIERARCHIES

The origin of institutionalized social hierarchiesin ranked societies presents an interesting evo-lutionary question. HBE generally assumes thatdecision-making mechanisms are designed bynatural selection to lead to fitness-maximizingchoices on the part of individuals. In societieswith institutionalized social hierarchies, a smallnumber of people receive more than their shareof tangible social, political, and economic advan-tages at the expense of others in the group whoare relatively disadvantaged. Temporary, local-ized discrepancies in status and wealth mightarise from shifting relative advantage in the con-text of individual and lineage-based competition.Societal agreements to establish these advan-tages in institutions of inequality are the prob-lem. It is relatively easy to understand howpositions of power in a group result from indi-viduals pursuing their own self-interests (Clarkand Blake 1994). Why group members wouldcooperate with people who want to subordinateand exploit them is more difficult to compre-hend from an evolutionary perspective.

The foundations of institutionalized social hi-erarchies are competition-based domination andsubmission behaviors that are evident in allhuman groups, including egalitarian foragers(Boehm 2000; Diehl 2000). These behaviors areshared by the African great apes, a pattern that

strongly suggests that they were present in acommon ancestor (Boehm 2000). As is truewith our closest living ancestors (Wrangham1987; Wrangham and Peterson 1996), these be-haviors are most evident in males but are alsopresent, perhaps with different outward mani-festations, in females (Boehm 2000). In additionto sex- and age-based social hierarchies, positionsof dominance in small-scale egalitarian societiescan result from varied hunting prowess orleadership/decision-making qualities (Hawkes1991). Inherited status or the historical promi-nence of a lineage can also influence dominance(Diehl 2000), but by definition, prominent socialpositions in egalitarian societies are not basedsolely or even primarily on such criteria.

Positions of dominance in a group are notsimply a product of hunting prowess or leader-ship quality; they depend on the social networkssupporting these individuals. Small-scale soci-eties often are composed of subgroup coalitionsof hierarchically organized males and females.The cohesion of these groups is fluid anddepends on degree of kin relatedness and socioe-conomic relationships negotiated among indi-viduals with differing social and politicalagendas. Unequal distributions of resources maybe tolerated by closely related individuals, butmore distant relatives generally require moretangible incentives to remain loyal. These indi-vidual social relationships may provide a meansof distributing resources more evenly within agroup, but they also can create a form of socialdebt susceptible to being appropriated by domi-nant members at critical times. Conversely, thefluid composition of competing coalitions canalso serve to suppress domination by one groupmember (Boehm 2000, 32), a practice evident inmany egalitarian societies (Boehm 1993, 2000;Diehl 2000; Erdal and Whiten 1994).

Reproductive skew models provide a frame-work for tracking the social aspects of groupformation and fissure (Summers 2005). Theyconsider the complex relationships betweendominant and subordinate members in termsof yield to effort within the group and similaropportunities available through emigration

298 e c o l o g i c a l m o d e l f o r s o c i a l h i e r a r c h i e s

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to a new habitat, in short, through the socialrealities of group formation. Competition forresources (economic and reproductive) ultimatelyresults in intragroup hierarchies composed ofdominant and subordinate members. Domi-nants emerge through monopolization ofeconomic opportunities, as argued by Boone(1992); subordinate members, by definition,have fewer reproductive and economic opportu-nities locally and must weigh the costs and ben-efits of remaining in the group or moving intoan adjacent habitat, on their own or as a mem-ber of another group. Under these conditions aseries of transactions occur between membersof the group. Dominant members forcibly ejectsubordinates, allow them to remain with thegroup, or may provide economic or reproduc-tive incentives to retain their membership, forvarious purposes (e.g., economic or defensive).In the same way, subordinates may restrainthemselves from claiming their full reproduc-tive or economic share to avoid conflict oreviction from the group.

The most realistic models see these tran-sactions as a tug of war between group mem-bers that have limited but differential controlover the reproductive and economic resourcesof the group. If groups are highly circumscribedsocially or environmentally (ecological con-straints are high), subordinates are more likelyto stay with the group even if they are disadvan-taged economically or reproductively. The stay-ing incentive for subordinates is proportional tothese ecological constraints and dominantmembers of the group are expected to distributeresources at the minimum level necessary toretain subordinate members.

How might this play out in practice?Archaeological evidence for institutionalizedsocial inequality often parallels evidence forlocalized increases in group size. Populationincrease at the local level, due to immigration, in-herent growth, or environmental change (e.g.,sea level rise), invariably stimulates competitionand differential access to resources. Given the fit-ness maximizing assumption of HBE, the first-order prediction is that the oldest and largest

lineages at any location control the most produc-tive resource patches (e.g., agricultural lands oroak groves). Control of such resources can alsoresult from usurpation due to realignment ofcompetitive factions of subordinate group mem-bers. Regardless, competition for localized andlimited resources will result in differential accessto the best resource patches within a habitat orterritory. As access to resources diminishes forsome group members, increasingly disenfran-chised individuals appraise the costs and benefitsof local group membership relative to alterna-tives as emigrants.

The ideal free distribution (IFD), a modeldrawn from population ecology (Sutherland1996), provides a useful framework for consider-ing the changing set of ecological circumstanceswithin which individual decision making takesplace. In this model, settlement locations or habi-tats are ranked by their suitability, a quality mea-sure related to the overall productivity of theresource habitat and, by extension, the fitness ofthe initial occupants (see Shennan 2007;Winterhalder and Kennett 2006). Habitat suit-ability is density-dependent; it declines with in-creasing population density due to exploitation.The model predicts that colonizing people willlocate first in the best habitats available (fig-ure 20.1A). As population grows, suitability inthis habitat drops due to density-dependent re-source depletion or interference arising fromcompetition. When density-sensitive suitability isdiminished to a level equal to that of the second-ranked resource patch, further population growthwill be divided between them. Individuals relo-cate to their advantage, reaching an equilibriumdistribution of population over habitats when thesuitability of marginal habitats is the same. Whenthis is the case, no individual has an ecological oreconomic incentive to relocate.

An important variant of this model allows foran Allee effect, in which initial increases in thepopulation cause habitat suitability to improve,as a founding group is able to take advantages ofeconomies of scale (figure 20.1B; see Kennett,Anderson, and Winterhalder 2006). Socialityand communication, a highly developed

e c o l o g i c a l m o d e l f o r s o c i a l h i e r a r c h i e s 299


division of labor, and an ability to implementgroup-dependent technologies such as weirs orirrigation systems suggest that Allee effects willbe common in human settlement.

The ideal despotic distribution (IDD) is avariant of the IFD. It allows for individuals withdifferent competitive abilities, highlightingcompetition and the possibility of differential ac-cess to resources within and among groups. Ifinterference arises among competitors of un-equal abilities, or if by establishing territories su-perior competitors or competing groups canprotect themselves from density-dependenthabitat deterioration by defending better re-source opportunities, then the inferior competi-tors and those without territories are pushed topoorer habitats. Compared to the IFD, a despoticdistribution will equilibrate with disproportion-

ate numbers or densities in the lower-rankedhabitats. This makes intuitive sense: by garner-ing disproportionate resources in the best habi-tats, the better competitors push inferior onesmore rapidly into habitats of lesser suitability. Inmany empirical studies, the IFD serves as a nullhypothesis, against which one can measure theeffects of interference competition and unequalresource access (Sutherland 1996).

Whatever form they take, the IFD and IDDmodels show how an incremental quantitativechange in one variable (e.g., population size) re-sults in other testable quantitative and qualitativebehavioral predictions (e.g., expansion of popula-tions into increasingly less suitable habitats). Aswith most HBE models, there are few limits onwhat kinds of variables one might accommodatein using the IFD to generate hypotheses. For in-stance, climate change might shift the relativesuitability (vertical position, thus relative ranking)of the curves. Habitats or subsistence practiceshighly susceptible to density-dependent degrada-tion will have steep downward slopes; those thatgenerally are not so sensitive to population den-sity will have more shallow slopes. Economies ofscale in subsistence or related practices maycause the slope of the curve to be positive throughsome part of their range.

The decision by an individual or subgroup toleave or fission from their parent communitydepends on the risks of staying, costs of moving,the likely success of relocating, and the relativeadvantages of their alternative settlement loca-tion. Relative advantage is dependent on theavailability and suitability of adjacent habitats andthe behavior of other groups in the area.Localized population increase, from endogenousgrowth or in-migration, followed by communityfission results in environmental infilling and theoccupation of increasingly marginal zones(environmental packing; Binford 1968, 1983).Localized decreases in habitat suitability due todepletion or interference will stimulate groupfission and emigration until most habitable areasare occupied. People may live in large groups,even under severely disadvantaged conditions,if they are circumscribed environmentally,


SU

ITA

BIL

ITY

POPULATION DENSITY

H1

H2

H3

A B0

+-

+

-

ABest Habitat

Worst Habitat

B

SU

ITA

BIL

ITY

POPULATION DENSITY

A

B

0

+

-

+

-

Best Habitat

Worst Habitat

FIGURE 20.1 A, the ideal free distribution 5; B, Allee’sprinciple (after Fretwell and Lucas 1970, 24; Sutherland1996).


demographically, or socially (Carneiro 1970,1978). Circumscription includes social bound-aries maintained by the threat of violence fromadjacent communities, real or perceived.Socialization for fear of others is a common formof coercion used to manipulate subordinatemembers of a group (Kantner 1999; Lekson2002), and it can be used to reduce the attractive-ness of settlement locations. In other words, sub-ordination to members of your own group maybe the best alternative you have. Ideological ma-nipulation can also play an important role in theperception of the costs and benefits of stayingwith the group and being subjugated and ex-ploited by others (Earle 1987).

A CASE STUDY FROM CALIFORNIA’SNORTHERN CHANNEL ISLANDS

As a first test of this general model, we turn to theLate Holocene archaeological and ethnohistoricrecords on California’s Northern Channel Islands(figure 20.2). Erlandson (1997) and Erlandsonand Rick (2002) have argued that populationgrowth, technological innovations, and intensifi-cation during the Early and Middle Holocene setthe stage for the development of cultural complex-

ity during the Late Holocene in the Santa BarbaraChannel region. They believe that technologicaland other cultural changes in the area generallyaccelerated through time, especially after aboutthree thousand to four thousand years ago when,they argue, local populations reached a state ofterritorial circumscription. A variety of data alsosuggests that the Island Chumash and their an-cestors had significant impacts on nearshore ma-rine ecosystems during the Early and MiddleHolocene (Erlandson et al. 2005; Kennett 2005;Rick, Kennett, and Erlandson 2005; Walker et al.2002), leading to measures (intensification, ex-tensification, resource switching, etc.) designedto maintain or increase the yields of localfisheries.

An estimated three thousand people lived onthe Northern Channel Islands at historic con-tact (1542 CE), occupying at least twenty-twovillages varying in size and sociopolitical impor-tance (Johnson 1982, 1993; Kennett 2005). Thelocations of many of these villages were de-scribed by Chumash informants (Johnson1982), and archaeological work substantiatestheir existence (Arnold 1990; Johnson 1993;Kennett 2005; Kennett et al. 2000; Kroeber1925). Ethnohistoric records suggest that the


0 10 20

Kilometers

L'akayamu

Ch'oloshush

L'alale?

Shawa

Mashchal

Kaxas

Lu'upshSwaxil

Nanawani

Liyam

NiwoyomiTugan

Nimikilkil Niaqla

SilimihiHichimin

Qshiwqshiw

He'lewashkuyNilal'uy

Nawani

San Miguel Island

Santa Rosa Island

Santa Cruz Island

Anacapa Island

W

N

E

S

Channel Islands

SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL

FIGURE 20.2 Map of the California’s Northern Channel Islands showing known historic Chumash communities (seeKennett 2005 for details).


Island Chumash were organized primarily atthe village level—economically and politically—and that some of these communities were gov-erned by hereditary leaders or chiefs (Johnson2000; Kennett 2005).

A more limited number of ethnohistoric ac-counts suggest the periodic integration of islandcommunities under one or two influential hered-itary chiefs (Johnson 1988, 2000). On the north-eastern end of Santa Cruz Island at Prisoner’sHarbor, the village of Kaxas was well positionedto be an important economic center, a naturalport of trade between the islands and the main-land. The village of Qshiwqshiw, situated at themouth of Old Ranch Canyon on Santa Rosa, wasalso a natural geographic center for the outer is-lands (Johnson 1993). Mission records suggestthat Kaxas was the second-largest village onSanta Cruz and an important economic and po-litical center (Johnson 1982, 1993). At least onechief lived in this village historically. Likewise,baptismal records suggest that Qshiwqshiw wasone of the larger communities on the outer is-lands of Santa Rosa and San Miguel and that ithad at least four chiefs in residence historically(Johnson 1993). It was also an important centerfor manufacturing plank canoes (Brown 1967,16), watercraft with great economic, social, andpolitical value (Arnold 1995).

When and how ascribed status or institu-tionalized social hierarchies evident at historiccontact first emerged on the islands is open todebate. The evolutionary scenarios put forwardemphasize gradual or punctuated mechanismsto varying degrees (Arnold 1987, 2001;Erlandson and Rick 2002; Kennett and Kennett2000; Kennett 2005; King 1990; Martz 1984;Raab and Larson 1997). At issue are some of themost basic facts, as well as causal mechanisms.We offer the environmental, demographic, andsociopolitical predictions of the IFD/IDD modelas framework to explore potential causal mech-anisms and the existing archaeological data withthe idea of establishing predictions to be testedwith future work.

As a starting point, we employ a GeographicInformation System (GIS) to rank the suitability

of potential coastal village locations on theNorthern Channel Islands based on environ-mental variables that we argue to be good indica-tors of habitat suitability. The variables includewatershed size, coastline type, and kelp forestdistribution. We then compare the character ofLate Holocene demographic expansion againstthe ranked suitability of these habitats as a firsttest of the IFD/IDD model. Of the various possi-ble hypotheses, we provide a qualitative test oftwo predictions: (1) habitats will be initially occu-pied in descending rank order of their measuredsuitability; and (2) social stratification will be co-incident with saturation of viable habitat loca-tions, indicative of heavy exploitation and steepdeclines in suitability across all occupied areas.Saturation of all but the lowest-ranked habitatswill parallel the emergence of institutionalizedsocial hierarchies.

NORTHERN CHANNEL ISLANDS GIS

All of the archaeological and environmentalcoverages were created using ESRI’s ArcMapand integrated with existing geographic datasets for the Northern Channel Islands (seeKennett 1998, 2005). Primary village locationswere identified as sites clearly occupied for ex-tended periods of time, serving as central placesfor a variety of economic and social activities.We estimate the environmental suitability offorty-six potential village locations contingenton (1) area of watershed; (2) length of adjacentcoastline, in three categories—cliffs, sandybeaches, and rocky intertidal; and (3) area ofnearby offshore kelp forest habitat. Examples ofhigh- and low-ranked village locations areshown in figure 20.3; we explain and justifythese suitability measures later.

WATERSHED SIZE One of the essential andmore restricted resources on these islands, par-ticularly on the smaller islands of Anacapa andSan Miguel, is drinking water (Kennett 2005).In the absence of instrumental records for theflow of island streams, we use watershed size asa proxy for the availability of fresh water at eachof the forty-six drainage mouths. Watersheds on



the islands were defined using ArcMap, a digi-tal elevation model for these islands (DEM, 30meters), and ESRI’s grid function for hydrolog-ical analysis. The character and extent of water-sheds was then verified using color digital aerialphotographs (1.5-meter resolution; see Kennett1998). Drainage size is more heavily weighted(50 percent) in our overall assessment of suit-ability than other features, based on the impor-tance of drinking water and the added value andimportance of terrestrial plant foods andtrees—relatively limited resources in these in-sular environments.

SHORELINE TYPE The shoreline surroundingeach of the Northern Channel Islands consistsof rocky sea cliffs, sandy beaches, and rocky in-tertidal habitats.1 Rocky sea cliffs are relativelyinaccessible and had limited economic valuefor prehistoric inhabitants of these islands.

They only figure into our measure of suitabilityby reducing the extent of sandy beach androcky intertidal habitats within two kilometersof the mouths of the forty-six potential villagelocations. We consider the succession of rockyintertidal habitats (upper, middle, and lower)and the associated tide pools to have greatesteconomic potential due to the broad range ofeasily collected marine organisms that occupythem (see de Boer et al. 2002; Kennett 2005;Schoenherr, Feldmeth, and Emerson 1999).We assign this feature a 30 percent contribu-tion to overall suitability. A digital map of theseshoreline types was created using a combina-tion of coastal surveys and aerial photography,and the length of each shoreline type wasrecorded within a two-kilometer stretch oneach side of the mouth of each of the forty-sixranked drainages.


12

4

11

17

1426

3

6

Rocky Headland

Rocky Intertidal

Sandy Beach

Kelp Zones

Hydrology

Watershed

Watershed Size: 18.59 km2

Rocky Headlands: 0 kmRocky Intertidal: 3.82 kmSandy Beach: 0.71 km

Kelp Size: 2.11 km2

2 km buffer

0 21 Kilometers

10

13

40

39

41

38

45

7

16

43

Rocky Headland

Rocky Intertidal

Sandy Beach

Watershed

Hydrology

2 km buffer

0 21 Kilometers

Watershed Size: 2.09 km2

Rocky Headlands: 5.18 kmRocky Intertidal: 0 kmSandy Beach: 0 km

Kelp Size: 0 km2

HIGH RANKING LOW RANKING

FIGURE 20.3 Examples of first- (good) and fourth- (bad) ranked village locations on the Northern Channel Islands.


KELP FORESTS Patches of giant (Macrocystispyrifera) and bull (Nereocystis spp.) kelp forestsfringe each of the Northern Channel Islands,providing a three-dimensional habitat thatsupports a wide range of marine organisms

(Kinlan, Graham, and Erlandson 2005). Thedistribution of kelp is dependent on favoredrocky reef substrates in shallow water habitats(�25–28 meters) and, depending on the charac-ter and depth of the substrate, can be restricted to


San Miguel Island

(CA-SMI-#)

Santa Rosa Island

(CA-SRI-#)

Santa Cruz Island

(CA-SCrI-#)

Anacapa Island

525

503/504 488

1 3

4/17319

41116

84

427432

6228

96

31

195

191/236

127 1

615

240

369

333

SANTA BARBARA HANNC EL

0 10 20

Kilometers

Villages

First

Habitat Rank

Second

Third

Fourth

A

N

San Miguel Island

(CA-SMI-#)

Santa Rosa Island

(CA-SRI-#)

Santa Cruz Island

(CA-SCrI-#)

Anacapa Island

161/163

492510602

528

525

503/504 485470468

15 2

6/165 41 40116

60

16677

888785

84

427432

130/1316228/97/98

31

328/330195

191/236/257

145

474/475192

127 1

495

506504/505

423/507

392306*240

434436

333

SANTA BARBARA ANNEL

0 10 20

Kilometers

Villages

First

Habitat Rank

Second

Third

Fourth

B

N

HC

FIGURE 20.4 Geographic distribution of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-ranked village locations compared with knownsettlements dating to between (A) 3,000 and 1,500 BP and (B) 1,500 and 250 BP.



nearshore or extend well offshore (Engle 1993).This marine plant grows quickly to great lengths(60 meters) and creates a dense canopy on thewater surface that provides food and shelter forfishes, invertebrates, and sea mammals (e.g., seaotters—Enhydra lutris—and harbor seals—Phocavitulina; Schoenherr et al. 1999, 101). We esti-mated the lateral extent of kelp based on forestsurveys (1980–1988 and summer of 1989), bycombining color digital aerial photographs show-ing kelp canopy (1.5 meters), with the 25-meterisobath surrounding each of the islands thoughtto be a good predictor of the maximum aerialextend of kelp forests (Kinlan et al. 2005, 134).The contribution of kelp forest area to overallsuitability of coastal village locations, based onits lateral extent within a two-kilometer radiusof each drainage mouth, was estimated at20 percent.

These environmental quality proxies arelisted in table 20.1 along with the weighted over-all suitability measure for each potential villagelocation. The spatial distribution of first- (1–11),second, (12–22), third- (23–34), and fourth-(35–46) ranked village locations are shown aswatershed outlines in figure 20.4. It is not sur-prising that the larger islands of Santa Rosa andSanta Cruz have a high number of first- and sec-ond-ranked village locations, given the largersize of their drainages, many of which provide aperennial source of drinking water and agreater diversity of edible or utilitarian plantsand trees. Of these two islands, Santa Rosa hasthe largest number of first-ranked village loca-tions. A majority of these occur on its northernside, but first- and second-ranked locations alsooccur along the southern and eastern coasts.The high concentration of first- and second-ranked village locations on Santa Rosa is a prod-uct of big watersheds, long stretches of rockyintertidal habitat, and laterally extensive, off-shore kelp forests. First- and second-ranked vil-lage locations on Santa Cruz occur on thesouthern and western coasts, except for a sec-ond-ranked village location on its northern sideat Prisoner’s Harbor (see CA-SCrI-240). Thehighest-ranked (second-tier) village location on

the smaller island of San Miguel occurs on itsnorthwestern side, with the remaining villagelocations of third and fourth rank. Third-rankedvillage locations also occur on the eastern end ofSanta Cruz, and the highest concentration offourth-ranked locations occurs along the north-ern coast, a product of small drainage size andthe predominance of inaccessible coastal seacliffs along with a lack of substantial kelpforests.

DEMOGRAPHIC EXPANSION AND THEEMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZEDSOCIAL HIERARCHIES

The IFD model predicts that the highest-rankedhabitats will be occupied first and most persis-tently through time, with secondary and tertiaryhabitats settled later in time, and perhaps alsowith lesser permanence. The despotic variant ofthe model (IDD) predicts that as local competi-tion increases and certain individuals hoard ac-cess to resources, other individuals will opt outof the group and settle secondary and tertiary lo-cations as long as the benefits of doing so out-weigh those of remaining in the parental group.Of course, the benefits of staying in a group,even with greater subjugation, increase as sec-ondary and tertiary habitats become saturated.It is under these environmental and social con-ditions that we predict the first evidence for in-stitutionalized social hierarchies. We limit ouranalysis here to villages dating to the LateHolocene (3,000–200 BP), breaking them intotwo periods: those dating to between 3,000 and1,500 BP (figure 20.4A) and to sites dating tobetween 1,500 and 200 BP (figure 20.4B).

The distribution of settlements between3,000 and 1,500 BP is a continuation of demo-graphic trends evident on the NorthernChannel Islands during the Middle Holocene(7,500–3,000 BP; Kennett 2005). The largestvillages were located on the north coast of SantaRosa in the region of the highest-ranked habi-tats. Most of the Middle Holocene village com-plexes on northern Santa Rosa (CA-SRI-1,3, 4 atthe mouth of Arlington Canyon and CA-SRI-41


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at the mouth of Cañada Verde) continued to beoccupied between 3,000 and 1,500 BP. This isalso the case at one known village on westernSanta Cruz Island (CA-SCrI-333; Wilcoxon 1993;King 1990), a community not positioned di-rectly on one of our ranked village locations, butwithin the vicinity of the highest-ranked settle-ment location on that island. Continued use ofcemeteries at all of these villages between 3,000and 1,500 BP indicates a certain degree of settle-ment continuity at these locations (Kennett2005; King 1990).

However, it is between 3,000 and 1,500 BPthat settlements expanded to many of the otherfirst and second ranked habitats along the coastsof Santa Rosa and Santa Cruz. Likewise, the firstdefinitive evidence for a settled village occurs to-ward the west end of San Miguel within or nearthe highest-ranked village location on that island(SMI-488, 503/504). There are also several vil-lage sites in unranked locations (CA-SRI-525,SCrI-195, 333). All of these sites are within thevicinity of high-ranked habitats and may be sea-sonal residences established to exploit specific,nearby resources not accounted for in our model.This is likely the case with CA-SMI-525, a site lo-cated near one of the largest breeding colonies ofsea mammals on the western coast of NorthAmerica (Walker et al. 2002). Despite these ex-ceptions, the available archaeological evidencesuggests that many second- and third-ranked vil-lage locations were not occupied between 3,000and 1,500 BP, and island-wide population levelsappear to be well below what would saturate vi-able habitats. This of course implies quite slowcumulative population growth through the earlyportions of the archaeological sequence, some-thing not yet well explained.

By about 1,500–1,300 BP, primary villageswere evenly distributed around the perimetersof Santa Rosa and Santa Cruz, and along thenorth coast of San Miguel (Munns and Arnold2002; Glassow 1993; Kennett 1998; Kennettand Conlee 2002; figure 20.4B). Many of thefirst-, second-, and third-tier habitats were occu-pied by this interval. There appears to be achange in the character and structure of primary

villages after this time that suggests even greatersettlement stability. These changes are difficultto quantify because the large-scale excavationsneeded to better characterize them are sorelylacking. However, primary villages occupiedduring the latest Holocene (after 1,500–1,300BP) are generally located on promontories orcliff faces close to springs or near the mouths ofperennial streams. Compared with primary vil-lage sites dating to between 3,000 and 1,500 BP,these villages tend to be more compact and notas laterally extensive (Kennett 1998).

Evidence for relative stability after this time in-cludes more substantial domestic features, largerand deeper midden deposits, and greater faunaland artifact diversity (see Kennett 2005; Rick2004). The consolidation of primary villages afterabout 1,500–1,300 BP also corresponds to somenotable changes in the location and structure ofcemeteries (King 1990). These newly establishedcemeteries were often used continuously into theHistoric period; supporting data suggest settle-ment continuity at certain locations between1,300 and 200 BP. Demographic expansion par-allels evidence for decreases in body size in bothmen and women and evidence for poor health, asindicated by increasing incidences of cribra or-bitalia and periosteal lesions in skeletal materialbecomes more prevalent through time (Lambert1994, 1997; figure 20.5).

Several lines of evidence support the ideathat the institutionalized social hierarchies evi-dent at historic contact were well established onthe islands by the beginning of the Late Period(ca. 650 BP; Arnold 2001; Kennett 2005).Varied interpretations of the available mortuarydata suggest that ascribed status differenceshad emerged by at least this time (Arnold 2001;King 1990). Many of the named historic islandcommunities were occupied by the beginningof this interval, suggesting continuity betweenthe Late and Historic periods. Some of these vil-lages are located in more marginal fourth-tierlocations along the north coast of Santa CruzIsland (e.g., CA-SCrI-434, -436).

Institutionalized social hierarchies certainlydeveloped on the Northern Channel Islands




prior to 650 BP, but the exact timing is an openquestion that requires future work. High-statusburials in the Santa Barbara Channel regionoften contain a diverse range of funerary objects,including canoe effigies and plank canoe parts.King (1990) used mortuary data from theNorthern Channel Islands to argue for the devel-opment of ranked societies and ascribed statusby the end of the Early Period (ca. 2,400 BP). Thesame data have been used more recently todemonstrate that hierarchical social organizationdeveloped on these islands later, by about 800BP (Arnold 2001). In both instances, the rawdata needed to evaluate these claims is not pre-sented, and the resolution of this debate awaits acomprehensive analysis of mortuary remainsfrom island contexts, coupled with an ancientDNA study that would allow for the reconstruc-tion of familial relationships and provide the dataneeded to link wealth and status with heredity.

Although the precise timing for the develop-ment of institutionalized social hierarchies on

the Northern Channel Islands is unclear, ourIFD/IDD model predicts that this occurredsometime between 1,500 and 650 BP. Most first-, second-, and third-ranked habitats on these is-lands were occupied by this time. Climaticconditions through this interval were generallydry and unstable with a series of severe droughts(Kennett and Kennett 2000; Kennett 2005; Raaband Larson 1997), periodically reducing the over-all suitability of all habitats. Potable drinkingwater was likely unavailable in all fourth- andsome third-ranked habitats for much of this in-terval. Osteological evidence indicates an in-crease in lethal violence (Lambert 1994), and thisfurther destabilized the social and political mi-lieu. Violence was further exacerbated by the in-troduction of the bow and arrow between 1,500and 1,300 BP (Kennett 2005). It is preciselyunder these conditions—environmental, demo-graphic, and social circumscription—that theIFD/IDD model predicts corporate group for-mation, asymmetrical access to material and

0.20.61.01.41.82.6 2.23.0

AGE (ka)

2

4

6

Vill

ag

es p

er

10

0 y

rs.

380

400

420

440

460

Fe

mu

r L

en

gth

(m

m)

Men

Women

Stature

Village Frequency

10

20

30

40

50

60

Periosteal Lesions

Cribra Orbitalia

Middle Holocene Average (0.13 villages per 100 yrs)%

of P

op

ula

tio

nHealth

A

B

C

FIGURE 20.5 Demographictrends on the Northern ChannelIslands during the last threethousand years. A, Changes inhealth through time (Lambert1994); B, changes in body size(stature) through time based onfemur length (Lambert 1994);C, number of villages per onehundred years.


reproductive resources, and institutionalized so-cial inequality. Additional work on archaeologicalsites dating to this interval is required to test thisprediction.

CONCLUSIONS

Although there is still much to be learned aboutsettlement and demography on the NorthernChannel Islands, our analysis suggest that theIFD and IDD models provide a useful frame-work for predicting when institutionalized so-cial hierarchies would have been favored duringthe Late Holocene. The predicted first-tier set-tlement locations on the northern and easterncoasts of Santa Rosa and the western end ofSanta Cruz supported primary village locationsestablished during the Middle Holocene.Second-tier settlement locations (e.g., southcoasts of Santa Rosa and north coast of SanMiguel) that were used logistically during thistime do not appear to have been occupied per-manently until after 3,000 BP. Under theseecodemographic conditions—favorable habitatsfor expansion and limited equilibrium impacton overall suitability of all habitats—social hier-archies would not have been favored. The ex-pansion of primary villages to most second-tiersettlement locations during the Late Holocenewould have been more favorable for their devel-opment, particularly after 1,500–1,300 BP whenvillages were evenly distributed around thecoast of Santa Rosa and Santa Cruz and alongthe north coast of San Miguel.

Growing populations, intensified resourceuse, and declines in equilibrium habitat suitabil-ity later in the Holocene (after 1,500 BP) wouldhave stimulated competition within and amongcommunities, creating a situation where individ-uals would have differential access to key re-sources. Given unfavorable climatic conditions,we argue that most or all viable habitats wereoccupied by between 1,500 and 1,300 BP, all ofthem experiencing the stress of marginal, den-sity-dependent suitability. Due to the lack ofviable, unoccupied habitats on the islands(fourth-tier sites or lower) after this time, people

were more likely to accept lower-qualitylifestyles—reduced minimal incentives providedby dominants—compared to others in the com-munity, rather than colonizing the most mar-ginal parts of the islands. Of course, this was agradual process; as viable settlement locationswere saturated, continued population growthwould increase pressures for social hierarchieswithin groups. Once intergroup competition andconflict were present, no group could benefitfrom restricting its population size, thus increas-ing its vulnerability.

Population increase and demographic expan-sion were at the core of the cultural changesevident on the islands between 1,500 and650 BP. Palaeoclimatic data for the region sug-gests that this interval was highly unstable cli-matically and that the already dry conditions thatprevailed through this period were interruptedby megadroughts that impacted much of south-ern California (Stine 1994; Kennett and Kennett2000). Dry conditions further circumscribedpopulations, and environmental instability stim-ulated conflict and competition for access toperennial water sources. Larger and more stablesettlements emerged on the islands during thisperiod. It is within this context that social hierar-chies were favored, and certain individuals wereable to control aspects of the political and eco-nomic system for their own benefit. The socialranking and hierarchical political structure likelysolidified in island Chumash society under theseconditions. More detailed study of mortuaryremains will be required to determine the exactantiquity of institutionalized social inequalitybetween 1,500 and 600 BP, but Arnold’s (2001)estimate of 800 BP is consistent with the predic-tions of the IFD/IDD model.

NOTE

1. At least one substantial estuary, and an associ-ated suite of resources, also existed at themouth of Old Ranch Canyon (Eastern SantaRosa) during the Middle Holocene. It appearsto have been largely in-filled in by the LateHolocene (Rick et al. 2005).



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