A scene in central Seoul typifying the extreme destruction of the Korean War, 1950-1953.

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A view of downtown Seoul today, with the area of rubble pictured above behind the high-risebuildings on the left.

A NtrW I{MTORYOF KOR.EA

Ki-baik Lee

,,4

Translated by Edward W. Wagner

withEdward J. Shultz

ILCHOKAK, PUBLISHERSSeoul, Korea

2q, Ch. 15. Development oJ rhe Nafionalist Movement

darkest hour, its very survival in peril. Many Korean writers succumbedto Japanese pressures, publishirrg their work in Japanese or even allowingtheir art to serve Japan's purposes. In this context the words ofthe youngpoet Yrrn Tong-ju (1917-1945),who died in prison in Japan just úeforeKorea's liberation, are especially poignant. In the poem thai, as á statementof the poet's faith, introdr:ces his posthumous work ,.Sky, Wind, Stars.and Poetry," he writes:

The constancy of Heaven is my lodestoneTill the day I die,

So that the slightest ground for shameShall not exist for me.

The alluring rustle of the wind among the leavesBut bestirs me to renewed steadfastness.

In these words Yun Tongl'u gave voice to the agonizing struggle of onesolitary Korean soul to follow the dictates of his conscñoce is*a humanbeing.

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Chapter 76

The Beginnings of DemocracY

1. The Liberation of Korea, August 15, 1945

Liberation

With Italy's surrender in June 1943, the prospects of victory for the

Allied causé in the Second Wortd War gradually became more certaiu.

Tiris meant'that the day of Korea's liberation from Japanese.oppression

also was drawing n.ar. In fact, at a summit conference held this same

year in cairo aniong the leaders of the united states, Great Britain, and

bhiru, the so-calledtairo Declaration was adopted, ou December 1,1943,

in which it was proclaimed that:

..The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people

oiKor"., are determiáed that in due course KorealsháiiSecome free and in-

dependent."

The inclusion of this statement, there can be no doubt, was owing to the

untiring struggle of the Korean national faovement for independence- Ay.u. urt a híli tater, in May of 1945, Germany too surrendered, and when

ihe leaders of the same three Allied nations met again in the Berlin suburb

oi po§§elqlg.Igry 1 945, they reaffi rme d the. princi ples.a gree d upT-:iiL:1at Cíñ.¿.loñffilEiÉ-élthe Soviet Union also subscribed to the Potsdam

convinced that their

'-ffilies. Koráa had been fibárated from thirty-six years under the tyrannical

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rule of Japanese imperialism. Amidst an outpouring of popular re¡olclng

rhe streers ol Korea's towns and vittagqlry-lo¡g¡$9y*$1blol9-rj$Jlnsvrnbol ol the flas of Japan but wlre bedeckg¡! ius!"e-qq-Wl!h !qe- yJUang

uná-i¡jnTán -.-nru- poffilpeople of Korea harbored no

sliÁ¡iteñ. a;;51thár rñ. liúation méant their immediate independence.

But liberation from Japan's harshly oppressive rule had come with

unexpected suddenness, und th. difficulty in obtaining accurate information

from abroad while Japan still controlled all channels of communicationengendered confusion among Korean leaders as to what preparatorymeasures they might appropriately take. Song Chin-u and his tbllowersanticipated that the Allied forces would occupy Korea forthwith and thatthe returning Korean Provisional Government would take over govern-mental authority. Acting on a sharply different premise, those who sharedthe views of Yó Un-hyóng (Lyuh Woon-hyung)ssql, u need to createpopular representative organs in adiánce of the arñ_val o_f the Allied forces.Wh;ile the fo-rmer remained inactive, awairing the return to Korea of theofficials of the Provisional Government, the latter organized a Committeef,or the Preparation of Korean Independence. Although some democraticnatio_n?llst figures participated in the activities of this committee, it was theCoññuñist members who exerted the greater influence. Before long, there-fore, non-Communist leaders such as An Chae-hong, who at flrst had ac-cepted membership on the committee, disassociated themselves from it.At this point the committee's left-wing forces hACLily put together a.kindof administrative mechanism óátletñhá*Korql¡ lgpple's Repubiic (Cho-són [nmin Konghwaguk). thus jn effseúÉrtrng ihemselves in opposirionto the Korean Provisional. Government in Chungking. Whereüfióñ lhe,-*iropponents-óbuntere{Ey

"?iáái;á"á pieparáióry-i;Añng to ptan fár the

convening of an "Assembly of the People," the purpose of which wouldbe to support the Provisional Government and consolidate a broad nationalconsensushehindit-

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The Division at the Thirty-Eighth Pírattel and Military Government

Just as the confrontation between the democratic nationalist and Com-munifT6-ñ-éi*wifEinKoiéá Thus wás Áiowiñe shárper, the U.S. and S,o-v-ietarmies of occupation appeared on the scene. Thé Soviets, due to'theiri6ññóii-5érdef rnith Kóréá, were the first to arrive. Having declared war q,lonly on August 9, when it was all but certain that Japan would capitulate, (^\

the Soviet Union crossed the frontier into Korea and, following the -lapanesesurrender, proceeded to occupy P'yóngyang, Hamhúng, and other majorcities in the north. U. S. forces landed at Inch'ón a month later, onSeptember 8, entered Seoul, then gradually stationed troops throughoutthe southern half of the peninsula. The line that divided the u.s. ancl sovietzones of occupation was drawn at the 38th parallel of north latitude.This artificial line of demarcation became the principal external factorthat brought division and tragedy to the Korean people in the years ahead.

The U. S. and Soviet forces adrninistered their respective zones ofoccupation in south and north Korea through radically different instru-mentalities. In the north, the Soviet authorities made use of the so-calledProvisional People's committee for the Five Provinces [of northern Korea],which had been organized around those active in the independence move-ment and included even democratic nationalists like Cho Man-sik, entrusting

l. The LiberotionofKorea, August 15, 1945 .1 /3

to it actual governmental administration under the policy directionol the Sovict military command. But before long the Soviets formed the

so-callcd Provisional Pcople's Committee for North Korea under the

chairmanship o1'Kim ll-sóng (K+tll*§*ung) and, after Cho Man-sik andmany other nationalist figurcs hltl ht'cñ irusTcd from the committee, a policyof Communiz¿rtion was cnlirrccd. Thc number ol Koreans who could notendure life undcr this Cotnrlunist authoritarianism and so crossed overthe 38th parallel into sotrth Korea rose sharply, totaling more than

-q90:-000by the end of l!-41.-On-the-óihéi hand, the U.S. ltrrces that somewhat later took up their

stations in south Korea est¿rblished a military government and opted toconduct the administration of ,the sotrth themselves. Accordingly, the

U.S. Military Government rcfusci.l to rccognize either the so-called People'sRepublic or the Provisional Goverrrlncnt in Chungking as sovereign

governmental organs. The U.S. armctl ftrrces that were entrusted witl.r

governmental authority, howevcr:, had ¡rrac1 ically no advance knowledge

of conditions within Korea, and lhcy wcrc unlblc to meet the expectationsof the-oeoole thev soverned. To mal<c ll.llttcrsi worsc, in contrast to the

situáiion iri north'K;rea. l'ree dom ol'politicrl activity was ¡lerrlitted in the

south and this led to a ch¿rotic prolusion of political parties. Il,lore thanflfty were formed in all, the cl'ricf'arnong thenr be ing Song Cl.rin-u's KoreanDemocratic Party (Han'gul< Min.iudaÍrg), An Chae-liong's NationalistParty (Kungmindang), Yó Un-hyóng's Chosón People's Party (Cllosón

Inmindang), ancl P¿rk Hón-yóng's Korean Communist Party (Chosón

Kongsandang). Uncler this circumstance political unity I'rardly could be

.*p."t.d, and the return of Yi Shng-man (Syngman Rhee) from tlie UnitedStates and Kim Ku and other key figures in the Provisional Governmentlrom China did nothing to calm the political turbulence.

The south Korean people now-,-suffqred not only fi'om the politicaldisarralbTf flrom- grave éóonomic dislocations as well. The contdurs"ofKorea's economy h¿rd taken shape abnormal15" with er¡phasis on war-

relatéá-inclustry tnci a high degree of reliance on Japan. Accordingly, the

severance ol'all ties with .Iapan following libcrltion inevitably dealt a severe

blow to the economy. Moreovcr, the llrrtilion 1{,!l§-§9l$t-qt-tltj§ihparallel separated the predominanlly light industry and agricYltur4-Z--gne

bf tt " .orrtti from t.he'heavÍ- i[dus{r)z ol: the-ñ-oiiIi]§be [otloülng tableJ,

while'production at those facilities in the south that remained operable

often suffered fiom a shortage ol qualilied Korean technicians. Further-more, the huge amount ol currency, 3.6 billion yen (compared. to the

approximately {rve billion yen total of banknotes outstanding at the time

of-liberation), put into circulation in the first weeks following Japan's

surrender-moit of it by Japanese authorities prior to the landing cf U' S'

forces-brought on se]¿exei¡flation. Finally, more than two piLli_o.n Koreans

crossed into the rortñ.tt ^.té-r.o." tlié"tñoith;fHtffiffilffiome fFom

china, .Iapan, and forméi iapánele óóóüpiéd" aieás éi"ieüliéié1fl-Tfie' two

Jt4 Ch. 16. The Begínnings of Democracy

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years or so following liberation. The combined effect of all these adversefactors was to produce economic chaos.

COMPARISON OF'PRODUCTION IN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA(in percentages as of 1945)

CATEGORY SOUTH KOREA NORTI{ I(OREA

2. 'flrc Estublishment of the Republic'of Korea cary

natiunalists from thc intcrim government, leaving it to be organized by theComrnunists alonc. ln rcsponse, the U.S. delegates asserted the principleof freeciom ol'politicul cxprcssion and argued that even those Koreans whowere opposcd to irustccslrrl: ought to take part in the consultative process.Deadlockcd ovcr this issuc, thc lirst round of talks at the Joint Commissionsoon was brokcn oll, irl M:ty 1946.

The deadlock at thc Joint Cornrnission brought further disarray to theKorean political sccnc, ancl in conscc¡uence there were a number of differentapproaches atternptccl to brcrk through the political impasse. The reactionof the Korean Democr¿rtic Party, which now was headed by SyngmanRhee, was to-orgáñ'izc-a-Natiolil I'lcadcluarters for Unif,cation and seek

to establish an autonomous KorclLn govr:rtnent. 's demand was that

SteeiHydroelecric PowerChemicalsCoaiFoodMachineryConsumer goods

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?the agree4qelt"_a_t Yalt¿ and thc Moscow dccisions be nitfiñmfthus:tfoingaway-w][h both the 38th parlllcl rrrrtl llrc lnrstct'sltip concept, and that aninrJépéldent transitional govcrnnrcnt lrc cstablished immediately. Rhee2. The Establishment of the Republic of Korea

The Anti-Trusteeship Movement and the ti.s.-soviet Joint Commission

At a conference inMoscow in December 1945, the foreign ministers ofthe U,.S., GreSt Britai a-trgsjee§lúp.plan_as a means ot'solving f.he Kqleqnproblem. Tlris plan, which would haveplaied Korea under lour power trusteeship (U.s., Brirain. China, Sovietunion) for a period of up to five years, met with the violent opposition ofthe Korean people. To give e1p¡ession ro rhis public outrage, an anri-trusteeship movement was launclFtf ünder the aegis of a committee forTotal National Moblli,zglgn Against Trusteeship, organized around provi-sional Go-vg-¡4gr-e-nt li.a-dpis. in seóul stgres and tusin*esses were closeJanddemonstrations held in the streets, while the emproyees of the u.s. vrifiá.yGovernment went out on strike. Demonstrations then spread throughoutthe whole country. At flrst the communists too joined in the anti-tr;stee-ship movement but then suddenly shifted positron to support rrusteeship,and this created a serious obstacle to a campaign of natlónal unity basedon cooperation between leftist and rightist forces. At this point thé provi-sional Government leadership summoned an "extraordinary people's as-sembly" for the purpose of estabiishing a sovereign governmentál authority,thus to block the implementation of the trusteeship plan.

Such was the political atmosphere when preparatóry talks for conveningthe u.s.-soviet Joint commission, the body that was to irnplement theMoscow Agreement, were heid in January 1946, and in March the meetingsof the Joint commission itself got underway. There the soviet side contend-ed that political parties and social organizations opposed to trusteesiripshould be exciuded from those Korean bodies to be cánsulted with respectto the creation of the provisional goverúment structure that the trusteeshipplan envisaged. This position was designed to exclucle the democratic

personally traveled to the Unitctl Slates in :rn cflirrt to achieve this end.On the other hand the Korcln Inrlcpctttlcncc Plrty, Icd by Kim Ku andothers from the Korcan Provisionlrl Covcnu.ltcttt, lbr¡ned a "nationalassembly" (the successor to thc carlicr "cxtruordinary people's assembly")whose,main activity was to opposc trustccslti¡r but which, at the same time,sought to bring about accord bclwccn lcl't and right, thus to achieve unifi-cation of the peninsula. Thcrc wns ¿lso a moderate right under the leader-ship of I(im Kyu-sik th¿t workccl with the moderate left of Yó Un-hyóngto promote unity of action bctwccn leftists and rightists. These moderateforces came to receive thc backing of the U.S. Military Government andcomprised the membership of the South Korean Interim LegislativeAssembly establislied by the {J.S. in 1947.

Meanwhile the left-wing political parties formed the so-called Demo- ,,'i:l 'clatic National Front and carried on a unified pro-trusteeship campaign, ¿i"'.

urging support of thc Moscow Agreement and the reconvening of the \Joint Comrnission. By giving positive suppqrt-Lo lhe Ygtk oi-lll,9_]1nt i .L),Coqmss¡llq the lelt-wing hopii[t6cnhance its position witlrin thc §ovéin- :-i1-:

meniáiAutliority that was to be created under the trusteeship concept. Atthe same time the leftists employed a variety of means to disrupt the political,economic, and sociai processes in south Korea. But when the policelound evidence of large-scale currency counterfeiting at a press used by

the Korean Communist Party (May 1946), the IJ.S. authorities put outan order for the arrest of its leaders, whereupon the Cominunists we¡tunderground. Even then the Communists cclntinued to foment sedition,'the móst serious suctr instanc. t.i.,g ihe Táegu;¡ii¡ilg f1ñiGléIop6d onthe occasion ol- the railroad strike in early October 1946.

In the meantime the U.S. Military Government had created a legislative

organ with cornpletely Korean membership, the South Korean InterimLegislative Assembiy, and had appointed a Korean chief justice and a

Korean chief civil administrator. Formal administrative authority thus was

378 Ch, 16, The Beginnings of Demotacy

turned over to Koreans, in a structure that was called the South KoreanInterim Government.

The Estabtishment of the Republic of ltorea

fhe I/, §. :§-e_vl9t--Joiot--Gom-misuon*reoonvened-in*L[ay-tr9ffioaeryearafter tlre initiallalks had be For a time, in response to therequest of the Commissíon, suggestions as to the form and political orienta-tion of the prospective provisional government were submitted by Korean

trusteeshi Thisto a stand-

still.

and Soviet troops be .withdrawn from Korea upon the establishment ofa government based upon the outcome of the elections, and that a U.N.Temporary Commission on Korea be created to oversee and facilitate thecarrying out of these provisions. With minor modifications the U.S.resolution was adopted, despite Soviet opposition, by au overwhelming

iustrated the Com-InI

Assembly authorized elections to be held in those areas of Korea open tothe supervision of the Commission and the creation of an independentgovernment based on the outcome of the elections. Thus the way wascleared for Korean independence, although an independent governmentunder U.N. auspices would be established only in the southern half of.thecountry.

The fi¡if*eae¡el-elecrio¡-kL the history of Korea was carried out ontvtay lOrl¿48. Those who la rsoflTffñ-oilffind south bcycotted the elections, and oné hundred seatsallocated to the northern provinces were left unfilled, but 198 representa-tives of the Korean peopie nevertheless were chosen by the voters. Thef,rst National Assembly was convened on May 31 and it immediately setabout its priority task, framing a constituiion. By July 12 a constitutionhad been adopted by the National Assembly and on July 17 it was formallypromulgated. In accordance with its provisions a presidential election was

held on July 20 (at that time the Korean constitution prescribed that the

pi.rl¿."t bá elecied indirectly, by the National Assembly) and Syngman

ilh.. .**rg.d the winner. Al aáministrative structure then was created

uoJ o, Aígust 15, 1948, the establishmeut of the government-of the

Republic oí Kot.u (Taehan Min'guk) was announced to the KoreanpeÉple and to the woild. In Deceniber of the same year the Republie ofi¿"-il;;. aóknowledged by the U'N. General Assembly to-be, i4^ effect'

it " onty lawfully "orrtitotád

govemment in Korea. Soon thereafter the

Repubtíc of Koréa was accordeá recognition by the United States and somq

fifty other nations.

3. The Korean lY'ar 379

3. The Korean War

The Provisional Committee for North

golng

ü;;;f"t*, this'P.ople's Committee laid a firm foundation for a Comi

3'

muuist political system. Then, in February. 1.947, the People's Committee

of Ño.ir, Korea (no longer lábeled "provisionai") was create.d and this

was tantamount to estab"lishing ur, *ritoromous governmental authority

fl

'" ftHlt,ft"ii]ermit tne united Nations Temporary commission on Korea

to "uiry """t

ltr mission in north Korea, the Communist authorities pro-

p.rJli-i."¿ inat direct negotiations be pursued between political leaders

áiin" nortt and south. Theii objectives were to obstruct the Commission's

u",¡iti"*, to effect a simultaneous withdrawat of U'S' and Soviet occupa-

tion forcás, and then to seek an opportunity to extend Communist domin-

loo ou.t uíl of Ko..o by force ot-o.*t' 4"t'4¡.qCly-"+6r1asfl[uln0ilitar]force was orsanized aná trained in no-rth KoJelftqq un -earlv- dtlÜir#-.;ii.r'ffi;=f"ññ;STáblishuqqnt or aa in¿epen-dintsqvernrnent' call.ed-'th-e

Demoqat.r-c-Peóiile3Be.publi-c-oI-I(orea (ChosÓn M injuj uút Inmln Ko-n g-

hiá-guk), in 1948, mititáry preparations were further streogthened' [m-

;;á;"i"Ú prior'tá the o*tbieaL of the Koréan'War on June 25' §54^

North Kárlan military power consisted of as many as ten infantry divisions'

2i2l:rrtks, and2ll plánes. In contrast, despite President Syngman Rhee's

insistent ótu*o, foi unification of Korea ty mltitary force, South Kore4's

army consisted of no more than eight divisions' More seriously than that'

.souitr Korea's uüfary*w¿s-poor1:r-eqgiBppd, lacking even a single tank

biá#ñ-.-f 'ñce

óonsisting oi some'iwlnty training aircraft but nqt

one fighter plane.

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political parties and social organizations. But the Soviets reitaken befl

a

general elections be held in Korea under U.N. supervision, that U.S.

Solidification of Communíst Control in North Rorea

Korea had been formedto function ás an interlm

under the icy control of t

majority of the U.N. General Assembly. The United Nations TemooraryCommission on Korea created by the terrñlof this resolution began its

380 Clt. 16. Titc Beginnings of Democracy

The Korean V[/ar , --

I ,

South Korea's second general elections were held in May, (¡rtd./rf,*result of the election gave 56 seats in the National Assembly to thts-govern-ment party, 26 to members of the l)entocratic Nationalist Party and otheropposition parties, and 128 to independents. This clearly was an expressionof the people's lack cf confidence in the government and in the existingpolitical parties as well. At about this same time the view was being ex-pressed in Washington that Korea lay outside the U.S. defense perin:eterin East Asia. The North Korean Comrnunists, who had been trying tosubvert the Republic of Korea by fomenting armed rebellion (such as thatat Yó¡u and Sunch'ón in 1948), now were led to believe that the time wasripe for an all-out invasion of South Korea.

On June 25. 1950. then. North Korea lsunched a surprise attack acrossthe e-T§eBuUtic-ofKorea alny-*w@trea-t- Is_g ]lne along the Na\lgqgB/ffiñlltsoutheast cornel gf th-cóungy-Jhe Unite d Nati ons, h owever,quickly resolved to give milita§-m@-ort to the Republic of Korea, atwhose birth as an independent nation the U.N. had acted as midwife. AUnited Nations Command was established and troops from some ten coun-tries-including the United States, Britainr France, eanada, Australia, the- .

Phiiippines, and Turkey-arrived in Korea to fight side by side with theSouth Korean army under the flag of the Unled-.]ltations.

Seoul was recaptured on September 28,,195p, \lowing the successfulamphibious landing at Inch'ón. On Septenr,bgr Q0 th$ U. N. forces pouredacross the 38th parallel and continued to pus\górthward, before longreaching Ch'óngjin on the northeast coast, the Yáfu River in the areas ofHyesanjin and Ch'osan in north-central Korea, and Sórrch'ón in thenorthwest. But the f,ghting took a sharp turnabout with the interventionof Communist Chinese armies. In this new war the lJ.N. forces for a timeretreated to positions south of the Han River, brlt then the Communistswere-dn'ven back ahqve the 33th parallel. s-uffeJing JrigaTdBtEÍñ-th-e proc-ess. Ihe fi ghting gradual ly te-ll lnro -¿-stalemaie-faád eventually (on July27, 1953) an armistice agreement was reached between the U.N. andCommunist forces. The bitter warfare thus came to an end.

The Korean War was one of the most tragic such episodes in the nation'shistory. The suffering that it caused was cruel beyond expression. SouthKorean casualties in the fighting alone are estimated at 150,000 dead,200,000 missing, and 250,000 injured, while more than 100,000 civilianswere abducted to North Korea and the number of war refugees reachedseyeral million. North Korean casualties were several times these figures.i

It is difficult to give an accurate account of the material losses .es,rttioqf¡om the, Korean War, but the damage to property has been estimated atsometlring over 3 billion (1953 U.S.) dollars. About 43% of manufacturingfacilities, 4l% of electrical generating capacity, and 50% of the coal mines

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4. The April 19ó0 Revolution 381

ín South Korea were destroyed or damaged. One-third of the nation'shousing was destroyed, and substantial proportions of the country'spublic buildings, roads, bridges, ports, and the like also were reduced tofluns.

PRODUCTION INDICES FOR SOUTH *ONNA IN II{E TIRST TWOYEARS OF THE KOREAN WAR

PRODUCT 1949 1950 1951

7392108647575830

967353

608516

7448

q

GrainsMarine ProductsAnthr¿cite CoalTungsten OreCotton ClothRubber 6hoesCommon BricksCement

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But the damage wrought by the Korean War cannot be measured inmaterial terms alone. This is because the war forced the Korean people,long conscious oftheir ethnic unity, painfully to face the tragic reality thattheir nation had been partitioned and that hope for eventual reuniflcationhad become still more remote. It is not that no attempt at reunificationwas made after the signing of the armistice. The Geneva Conference calledfor in the armistice accord indeed was convened in April 1954. At Genevathe repiesentatives of the Republic of Korea proposed flrst that the author-ity of the United Nations over the Korean problem be acknowledged and,'secondly, that free elections be held under U.N. supervision flor the purposeof creating a united and independent democratic Korea. But the NorthKorean Communists rejected this approach, bringing about the ruptureof the Geneva talks. ln subsequent years, this "Geneva formula" forthe reunif,cation of Korea was reaffirmed annually by the U.N. GeneralAssembly.

4. The April 1960 Revolution

The Growth of Authoritarian Government

In the midst of the national peril occasioned by the Korean War, apolitical crisis took shape within the country as well. This was becauseof a gradually deepening drift toward authoritarian rule" Syngman Rhee'sdictatorial inclinations were apparent from the beginning, when he stub-bornly insisted on a constitution giving disproportionate powers to theoffice of thp president. Moreover, it was due to his opposition that theintent of extraordinary legislation enacted to punish those who had fla-grantly collaborated with Japanese colonial rule was frustrated and

382 Ch. 16. The Béginnings of Democracy

remaine'd -unenforce

d ;-=fi;;;irh-;h;-i¿;;.." War stiil rusins in re52; when syugman Rhee

realiáéilihow' dim.wére his próspects ioireelection by the-Nátional As-sembly to a second term as president, he brazenly resorted to dictatorialtactics to keep himself in power, When his plan to amend the constitutionto provide for direct popular'election ofthe president was rejected by theNational Assembly, he openly took steps to coerce the Assembly intodoing his biddi-ng. First declaring a state of martial law, he then, on May26, imprisoned a large number of Assemblymen who opposed him, anevent known as the Political Turmoil of May 26. This state of politicalsiege continued until the National A§sembly passed the so-called Selec-tive Constitutional Revision Bill, which included provision for di¡ect elec-tion of the president. In the end Rheé had forced the vote to be taken byshow, of hands, and mahy Assembly members were afraid to stand openiyagainst him.

Subsequently Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party (Chayudang), which hadtriumphed in the general elections of May 1954 by means of coercivetactics, proposed a constitutional amendment that wouid exempt the"present incumbent only" from the prohibition against more than twoterms as president, a measure transparently aimed at securing PresidentRhee's indefinife continuanóe'in bffice- Laéking the statutory two-thiidsmajority by a fraction of one vote, the amendment was declared to havebeen defeated, but the next day it was announced that il fact it had passed,on the ground that the number of affirmative votes required for passage,135.3, might reasonably be rounded down to the next whole number.The opposition Democratic Nationalist Party and independent Assembly-men now formed an Association for the Preservation of the Corstitution,and this body eventually fathered the Democratic Party (Minjudang), anamaigam of political opposition forces. This resulted in the victory of thevice-presidential ca+didate of the Democratic Party in the 1956 elections,and in the 1958 elections for the National Assembiy the DemocraticParty was able to prevent the Liberal Party from obtaining the two-thirdsmajority needed for further amendment of the constitution. On this occa-sion the Liberal Party suffered a crushing defeat in the cities, winning onlyin the countryside where it was easily able to obtain votes by employinga variety of highhanded tactics. Facing almost certain defeat in the nextpresidential elections, in December 1958 the Liberal Party sought tostrengthen its hand by amending the National Security Law (to tightengoverrment controls) and the Local .Self-Government Law (to enabie thegovernment to appoint the heads of major units of local administratión).Encountering strong resistance from opposition Assemblymen, the Liberal

" Party members called in police specially trained in the martial arts to ar-' rest their opponents. Then, at a session of the National Assembly attendedonly by the Liberal Party membérs, the controversial revision bill waspassed, an incident known as the Political Turmoil of l)ecember 24 (1958).

'. 4. The April.1960 Reiolution

The Emergence of New Business Tycoons

Accompanying the growth of authoritarian government a new phenom-enon appeared in the economic sphere as well, with the emergence ofmonopolistic business concerns. The severe destruction of the Korean Warhad brought industrial production to a virtual standstill, and the Koreangovernment's printing of money to pay the costs of the war and to meetthe huge requirements of the U.N. forces for Korean currency had fueleda raging inflation. In consequence, in the course of the war, commodityprices came to double every six months, an inflationary spiral that poseda severe threat to the livelihood of the whole of the general populace.Nevertheless, the government gave special treatment in the distributionof imported raw materials and commodities to a f&ored few industrialistsand business houses, enabling them to reap windfall profits. at publicexpense. Similarly, special bank loans, allocations of U.S. dollars atfavorable rates of exchange, and capital sums imported in connectionwith foreign aid programs were made ávailable by thi government to thoseentrepreneurs who supported it. Accordingly, although industrial outputand Korea's infrastructure in general actually had expanded beyoud thepre-war levels within a few years after hostilities ended, due in iarge partto U.S. foreign aid, this redounded to the benefit of a few privilegedbusinessmen rather than to that of the people as a whole. Moreover, as thedesignated recipients of shareholdings in banks formedy vested in thegovernment, these new tycoons were given control of the major organ§of f,nance as weil, thus enabling them to strengthen their grip still furtheron the Korean economy. As the following table shows, the result of all thiswas that large euterprises employing two hundred or more workers ac-counted for a highly disproportionate percentage of total shipments off,nished products.

CONCEIYTRATION OF PRODUCTION IN MAJORINDUSTRIES IN 1962

(unit: million wón)INDUSTRY TOTAL

ENTERPRISESLARGE TOTAL LARGE

ENTERPRISES" SHIPMENTS E].TTERPRISES

3,83

MillineSugarTextilesTires and TubesSoapRubber Shoes

2 3.4% 233 1O.O%3,173 9L.2I,834 88.71,023 92.6

75§ lq )1,437 77 .9

5844

174109848

2,3373,480

1 1,0891;105

5181.B4s

2 4.533 19.02 20.01 1.09 18.8

* 200 or more employees

Thus within the space of a few short years a group of n"* brrin"r,,concerns emerged in close collusion with the government and achieveda dominant position in the production and distribution of many basic com-

rtI{

{'.; i.:'

i. The April 1960 Revolution 385384 Ch. 16. The Beginnings oJ'Democracy

modities. The result was that economic inequities grew ever ülore severe'

For one thing, small and medium size enterprises, unable to obtain adequateflnancing, had no way to halt their siide toward bankruptcy. But the in-equity between urban and rural sectors of the economy was particularlyglaring. The farmers had received land in accordance with the land reformcarrie<l out in 1949, but the bare subsistence pattern of farmholding pre-

vailed as before. With the price of rice arbitrariiy set by the government

even b¡low the cost ofproduction. the poor rural populatiort became even

more impoverished. In such ways as this the dominant economic positionol a fei,v new business tycoons, operating hand in glove with an authoritariangovernment, lostered serious unrest in Korean society.

?Tlrc April Revolution

The social unrest spawned by Syngman Rhee's authoritarian rule reached

a climax in the presidential elections of March 1960. Syngman Rhee and

his Liberal Party mobilized government employees and tl're police inparticular to carry out the most blatant acts of election rigging. A system

éxperimented with earlier requiring open marking of ballots by voters

in groups of three, stuffing of ballot boxes, ballot switciring, obstructioilof opposition party election campaigning, use of terrorist tactics-thegovernment resorted to all these devices aird more. At the same time huge

élection campaign funds were squeezed out of the business lrouses thathad grown fat from their parasitic relationship with the Liberal Partygovernment.

Opposition to these flagrant illegalities manifested itself even before

the election with the student demonstration in Taegu on Febrr:ary 28.

This <lemonstration, however, had the professed objective of plotestingpolitical interference on the campuses. But the student demonstrationheld in Masan on March 15, the day of the election, was aimed squarely

at the election irregularities themselves. The demonstrators were dispersed

when the police fired live ammunition, killing or wounding some one hun-

dred participants. But on April I 1, when the brutality of the police towardthe demonstrators becarne known with the discovery of the body of a

high school boy in Masan harbor, the aroused students and citizenry ofMasan again took to the streets.

The Masan demonstration was tire spark that ignited Seoul. On theirway back to their campus after holding a rally in the center of Seoul on

April 18, the students of Koryó (Korea) University were set upon by

government-l.rired thugs, many of them suffering injuries. The next day,

ón the 19th, students from nearly all of Seoul's colleges and universities, and

lrom many high schoois as well, poured into the city's downtown streets,

shouting such slogans as "We demand new elections!," "Defend democ-

racy to ihe death!," and "The Syngman Rhee government lnust resignl"Alter holding a demonstration in front of the National Asseinbly building

the students headed for the Kyóngmudae, the presidential mansion'

o"lv to tá ,"et by a hail of ptticá buttets when rhey reached its vicinity.

Roúsed to a frenzy by the sight of comrades dying before their eyes, the

students set lire to a numbJr of govcr,m:nt structures and committed

other violent acts of clestruction. Ñarmed by the gravity of the situation

tire government declarecl martial law an«1 called in the army, thus for the

rnoment restoring ordcr in the streets.

But in the walic of ¿r clemonstration by university professors on April

25,culminatinginthereadingofafar-reaclringsetofdemandstoanenihusiastic cráwd in lront oithe National Assernbly building, students

aud citizenry joined in au. all night demonstration tl.rat swelled in numbers

uoa ,t.ia.nóy as the next day w:ore on. The martial law troops reÍlsed to

flre on the demonstrators, giving Presi<1ent Rhee no further hope of main-

taining irimself in power. Jlis lormat resignation on April 26 brought an

immediate end to the demonstrations, and the students tiremselves took

the lead in bringing about a restoration of public order'

The Aprii neiol"ution was the f,rst in the history of Korea whereiu a

p.op1" ".'*.¿ with nothing but their bare flsts. succeeded in overthrowi.g

u.opp.".riregovernment.Theleadingroleinthisrevolutionwasper-¡o.m.o by theitudents. Their loss of iaith in the established generatio[

unJiit p"fi,,.ai order led them to take their position in the vanguard of the

Ápril rboo revolutionary struggle. At the same time, the revolution could

not l-,uu. been won witliout tñá wholehearted support o1' the. people' The

fá*". of tn. people , unite d in their opposition to a dictatorial govcrnment

án¿ ,fr. expioitative cconomic inteieits allied with it' h¿rd been given

ffi.rrioo through thc vigor and elan of the youthful sludcnt demo,stra-

ioit. ffr. April ilcvoltrtion, therefore, held out bright prospects lbr the

<levelopment ol dctl'tocrltcy in Korea'