NGO Presentations to theThird PrepCom of the

2005 NPT ReviewConference

April 27, 2004New York

Check Against Delivery

artwork by DimityHawk

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Non-Governmental Organizations The groups participating in this process include: Abolition 2000 British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) For Mother Earth (FME) Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen/International Law Campaign Global Resource Action Center on the Environment (GRACE) International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) Mayors for Peace (MfP) Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards System (NWN & ISS) Peace Depot Japan Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) Physicians for Global Survival (PSG) Project Ploughshares Psychologists for Social Responsibility (PsySR) Reaching Critical Will/Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (RCW/WILPF) Stop Essais/Abolition des Armes Nucleaires Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (WMCND) Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF)

Table of Contents (with tentative list of speakers)

1. Introductory Remarks Delivered by Mayor I. Itoh, City of Nagasaki, Mayors for Peace (MfP) Convened by Aaron Tovish, MfP 2. Overview of NGO PresentationsDelivered by Susi Snyder, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF ) Convened by Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will (RCW/WILPF) Statement by Mordechai Vanunu 3. Vertical ProliferationPresenter to be announced Convened by Martin Butcher, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) 4. A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps Delivered by Sarah Estabrooks, Project Ploughshares Convened by Sarah Estabrooks, Rhianna Tyson, and Justine Wang, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) 5. A Fresh Look at Vertical Proliferation - Ballistic Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization, Presenter to be announced Convened by Regina Hagen, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) 6. Beyond the NPT: Recent Initiatives to Prevent ProliferationDelivered by Rhianna Tyson, RCW Convened by John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and Rhianna Tyson 7. The Human Tragedy of Proliferation and Nuclear RearmamentDelivered by Ron McCoy, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Convened by John Loretz, IPPNW 8. Diplomacy of cities and promoting peace Mayor Olexandr Omelchenko, Kyiv, Mayors for Peace Convened by Aaron Tovish and Steve Leeper, (MfP) 9. Proliferation: Finding the Common Thread Delivered and convened by Alice Slater, Global Resource Action Center on the Environment (GRACE) 10. Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: Issues and Policy Recommendations Delivered and Convened by Elahe Mohtasham, Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation and International Safeguards System (NWN&ISS) 11. Grassroots Initiatives Delivered by Mayors for Peace Convened by Steve Leeper, MfP 12. Recommendations Delivered and convened by John Loretz, IPPNW 13. Concluding Remarks Delivered by Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba, City of Hiroshima Convened by Steve Leeper, MfP

ADDENDUM1

“Indigenous Peoples and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Let us learn from nuclear radiation victims and prevent history from repeating itself” Submitted by Motarilavoa Hilda Lini, Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the world’s main legal instrument that obliges the nuclear weapon states to ban the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieve complete nuclear disarmament. As the Member States of the United Nations come together once again to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Indigenous Peoples wish to emphasize the importance of the international commitment to total nuclear disarmament. We applaud the completion, clean up and closing down of the nerve gas incineration facility on Kalama Atoll by the United States Military. We also applaud the end of nuclear testing in most of the testing sites around the world. We wish to witness the same process applied to eliminate nuclear weapons. 2004 marks 50 years of living with radioactive contamination as a result of nuclear weapons experimentation on the Indigenous Peoples of Marshall Islands, 47 years of British nuclear weapons experiments on the Indigenous Peoples of Kiribati and Fiji and 40 years of French nuclear weapons experimentation in Te Ao Maohi (French Polynesia). Drawing from the tragic lessons of nuclear atrocities experienced by the Indigenous Peoples, we recognize that the testing, development and use of nuclear weapons is a crime against all humanitarian laws because of immeasurable costs of innocent lives and total environment. Let us learn from Indigenous Peoples of Bikini Atoll, Maralinga, Monte Bello and Emu field; Hiroshima and Nakasagi; Malden and Christmas Islands; Sahara Desert; Moruroa and Fangataufa and Nevada, Let us also ban all uranium mining in the first Nations of Canada and the United States, Australia, India and elsewhere that supplies the continuing global nuclear industry. The latest documented evidence of uranium mining radiation vividly portrays the radiation contamination on the tribal people of India. Indigenous Peoples of the world are also concerned about the trade of depleted uranium, the use of nuclear weapons as a threat, nuclear weapons delivery systems and nuclear disposal. The NPT Preparatory Committee, especially leaders of nuclear power states must learn from the 20th Century nuclear atrocities and recognize that the prevention of a nuclear calamity depends on the urgency, more than ever before, to totally ban and eliminate nuclear weapons. Our message to the NPT process is clear: 1 This presentation may not be delivered orally, due to miscommunications between the coordinators of these presentations and our colleagues in the South Pacific. Regardless of whether the indigenous representative will be permitted to read aloud this statement or not, we have included her statement in this compendium to underscore the necessity of an indigenous perspective in all nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts.

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· LET OUR RADIATION HISTORY BE A LIVING EVIDENCE FOR ALL HUMANITY. · BAN THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. · BAN THE TRADE OF DEPLETED URANIUM/USED NUCLEAR FUEL. · IDENTIFY WAYS OF SAFEGUARDING THE DISMANTING OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. · ABOLISH ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS. · ABANDON THE MANUFACTURING OF NEW NUCLER WEAPONS. · STOP THE LABORATORY DEVELEARN OF NEW WEAPONS. · STOP URANIUM MINING.

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1. Introductory Remarks Delivered by Mayor Iccoh Itoh, Mayors for Peace Chairman Sudjadnan and assembled representatives of national governments, I am Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki. As a member of the Mayors for Peace, and representing the citizens of a city that was subjected to an atomic bombing, I have been accorded the privilege of opening this plenary session of NGO Presentations, and am very honored to have this opportunity to address you. On August 9, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on our city of Nagasaki. Unlike the bomb dropped on Hiroshima three days earlier, the weapon used against Nagasaki was a plutonium type bomb. Its explosion resulted in unimaginably intense heat rays, blast winds, and radiation, instantly transforming the city into a wasteland and killing or injuring some 150,000 people, or about two thirds of the population. Many of those who only narrowly escaped death were afflicted by the after-effects of the bombing, and continue to suffer today. Recent studies carried out by the Japanese government show that even people who were over 10 kilometers from the hypocenter at the time of the blast were exposed to cell-destroying radiation. Furthermore, anxiety over the possible development of disease has led to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and we have scientific and medical evidence that the physical health of such survivors was impaired. This, to my knowledge, is the first evidence to reveal this effect. I say this to ensure that this body understands that, even 59 years later, nuclear weapons continue to inflict tragic suffering. The cry of the citizens of Nagasaki for the elimination of nuclear weapons began with our unspeakable experience of 59 years ago, and continues to this day. But we bear no hatred against the United States, the nation that dropped the atomic bomb. In fact, the first sister city relationship between Japan and the United States was established between Nagasaki and St. Paul, Minnesota in 1955, and we are now looking forward to the 50th anniversary of exchange between our citizens. The suffering sustained by Nagasaki must never happen again to anyone. We continue to voice our appeal to the world that the citizens of Nagasaki may be the last victims of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, looking at the state of the world in recent years with respect to nuclear arms, we see a situation that betrays our hope. We see the appearance of nations newly engaged in the development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the United States, the sole remaining nuclear superpower, seeks to resume nuclear testing and to develop tactical weapons. The danger is readily apparent. It is not an overstatement to say that the NPT regime is now facing the threat of collapse. The nuclear weapon states would do well to remember the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996 that the “threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law.” Has the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear

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weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” adopted by the 2000 Review Conference been forgotten? The world’s people risk exposure to the horror of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the cities of the world are superseding the framework of nation-states, and are participating with the World Conference of Mayors for Peace in an urgent effort to abolish nuclear arms. In conjunction with NGOs, this movement will surely become a groundswell. The City of Nagasaki stands at the forefront of this movement, and in November of last year we hosted the 2nd Global Citizens’ Assembly in Nagasaki for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in cooperation with NGOs and citizens. The result of this historic gathering was the Nagasaki Appeal 2003, which has been delivered to the world through the efforts of the participating NGOs. This document is even now being distributed from a booth outside this hall. I urge you to read it, and to reflect on the desire of the world’s citizenry to eradicate nuclear arms. A delegation of nuclear survivors, university students, musicians and other participants from Nagasaki has also come to New York in order to take part in the NGO campaign that is running parallel to the events currently being undertaken by the Preparatory Committee. They have come because next year’s Review Conference must “map the road to a nuclear free world” and they have high expectations for the Preparatory Committee’s essential role in this process. In this context, there can be no doubt that the undying hope of the citizens of Nagasaki is also the resolute will of the citizens of the world. It is now up to you who are gathered here to act decisively. Thank you. 2. Overview of NGO Presentations Delivered by Susi Snyder, WILPF Mr. Chairman, members of the Secretariat, and distinguished delegates, We would first like to thank all of the States Parties for permitting us this small opportunity to address the official plenary of the third Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is important that you are willing to listen to views from the people who you are here to represent. The treaty, as you are all aware, faces perhaps its most daunting crisis to date. Some Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are unabashedly embarking on ambitious vertical proliferation programs while pursuing horizontal nonproliferation programs that are dangerously militaristic. These programs are implemented unilaterally or by “coalitions of the willing” rather than by international institutions accountable to the norms of treaties and international law. In an environment of rampant terrorism, fissile materials and nuclear weapons are not safeguarded adequately in some countries, and a black-market in nuclear technology has been exposed after fifteen years of operation. The practice of double standards generates distrust and hostility among states and encourages the perceived need for these genocidal, suicidal, and ecocidal weapons. It is in this grave context that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will address you today. We are allotted but one, three-hour session to address the States Parties in an official setting.

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Prior to 2000, every NGO prepared its own written statement, culminating in dozens of three minute speeches, hardly enough time to sufficiently share our expertise and analysis. NGOs from around the world then decided that our three hours would best be utilized if we worked collectively on a smaller number of statements. In this manner, we are able to cover a wider range of issues, provide more comprehensive background information, and offer concretized ideas for moving forward. The dozen presentations you are about to hear are the result of six months of intensive consultations. First, ideas for presentations were brainstormed, debated, and finally selected over conference calls, meetings, email listserves, and web-based information. Then, several NGOs volunteered to comprise each presentation’s drafting committee, headed up by one convenor, who was responsible for writing the drafts. Each of the drafts was submitted to the group at large, whereby every NGO was invited to comment, critique, and edit. After months of international conference calls, wrangling on-line and in person, the drafts were finalized and the presenters were chosen from a wide group of experts. This year, we have the privilege of working with Mayors for Peace, a group of mayors from around the world who have committed themselves and their cities to a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. Several of the presentations before you will be delivered from representatives from this important constituency. The final products offer you analysis and recommendations on issues ranging from vertical and horizontal proliferation, plurilateralism and multilateralism, missiles, health effects, nuclear energy and more. They speak of the perspective from North America, East Asia, Europe, the South Pacific, and the Middle East, from indigenous peoples, physicians, psychologists, legal experts, lab watchdogs and policy analysts. Over 20 NGOs struggled together to reach agreement on many texts and a whole series of final recommendations. Disagreements over several substantive points remain, and it is important to note that the recommendations contained herein are not necessarily those advocated by every single one of us. However, we enter this room with a clear sense of purpose and a unified voice. One mutually primary concern overrides any discrepancy in the policies of our individual organizations: our unquenchable desire for nuclear abolition. While the process may be arduous, time-consuming, and indeed frustrating at times, the collaborative efforts behind these presentations represent the collective will of the world to rid the planet of nuclear weapons, verifiably and irreversibly. This collective will is also embodied in the hundreds of young people who are attending the PrepCom this year. They are convening their own Youth Caucus, to strategize and demonstrate that the younger generations will no longer accept their parents' and grandparents' nuclear legacy. It is our hope that the ideas, suggestions, and recommendations that we offer will motivate you to move beyond debate toward action, so that the nuclear arsenals that have plagued our hopes for world peace for decades will finally be eliminated. We have shortened the length of these presentations in order to provide time for a question and answer session immediately following the last presentation. We look forward to engaging in discussions with you today and throughout the rest of the conference.

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Thank you. Statement by Mordechai Vanunu 3. Vertical Proliferation Presented by Jackie Cabasso, WSLF Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the Preparatory Committee today on the topic of vertical proliferation. All too often, when we consider the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we think only of horizontal proliferation – their spread to previously non-nuclear countries. This is of vital importance for global security, but the containment of proliferation depends in large part on the assurance to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that they will be secure from nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail. This requires action by nuclear weapon states (NWS), and for this reason the 1965 United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) called for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as balanced obligations. To this end, the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates not only non-proliferation, but disarmament too. The preamble to the Treaty declares the need to: .. facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery .., Vertical proliferation, the acquisition of more, new or different nuclear weapons and improved means of delivery by existing nuclear weapons states, runs directly counter to the purpose of the Treaty as established in the Preamble, and enshrined in Article VI. This concern for the prevention and reversal of vertical proliferation is not simply a dead letter from 40 years ago. It was, indeed, reinforced at the 2000 Review Conference. The Conclusions of the 6th Review Conference included a Program of Action for Next Steps on Nuclear Disarmament, of which paragraph 15, sub-paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 9 address directly the need for the restriction and prevention of vertical proliferation through disarmament. The NWS all endorsed the Program of Action, and should therefore play an important role in its implementation. We are, therefore, deeply troubled that, far from attempting to the implementation of these steps, we today present to you overwhelming evidence that the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and China are all proceeding with vertically proliferating programs that undermine the Treaty in profound ways. Here we define vertical proliferation as increases in the size of arsenals; the introduction of new weapons and new capabilities to arsenals – including new means of delivery; and changes in the role of nuclear weapons in defense policy. We begin with the lesser transgressors, in alphabetical order. China

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China maintains a declaratory No First Use policy with regard to nuclear weapons, and has sponsored many disarmament resolutions in UN fora. Moreover, China maintains a small, largely stable nuclear arsenal. However, in contradiction of those policies, China is modernizing its arsenal, while increasing its military capabilities. As the NRDC says: China is modernizing its missile force … [including] mobility, solid fuel, improved accuracy, lighter warheads, and a more robust command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system. A new missile, the three-stage, solid fuel, mobile DF-31, is the program’s mainstay. Its range is estimated at 8,000 kilometers. China is also developing a modified version of the DF-31, the DF-31A [with a range up to 12,000km.] The H-6 [bomber] may gain new life as a platform for China’s emerging cruise missile capability… and Flight International reported in 2000 that up to 25 H-6s would be modified to carry four new YJ-63 land-attack cruise missiles. A self-proclaimed disarmer, China is violating its Treaty obligations, and the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. France France is modernizing and upgrading its nuclear arsenal, and has adapted its nuclear doctrine to give a more important role to nuclear forces in military policy. As President Chirac said in 2001: .. our security is now and will be guaranteed above all by our nuclear deterrent. Deterrence must also enable us to face the threats against our vital interests by regional powers equipped with weapons of mass destruction... [this] is the best guarantee against threats born of the proliferation, whatever their means of delivery. New French nuclear missile submarines continue to enter service. The purchase of the first M51 missiles will happen in 2004 They will be equipped with a new warhead, the Tete Nucleaire Oceanique (TNO). Development of the ASMP-A, air launched nuclear missile, continues apace. This missile will carry the Tete Nucleaire Aeroportee (TNA), another new warhead. This increases France’s nuclear weapons capabilities, and, according to the French National Assembly, will assure France’s status as a NWS until 2040. These changes in forces represent vertical proliferation which violates the NPT, and the change in doctrine undermines France’s stated commitment to the Conclusions of the 2000 Review Conference, and to France’s negative security assurances which form part of the Treaty regime. Israel We are conscious that Israel is not a party to this Treaty, and has not openly declared its status as a State possessing nuclear weapons. However, since the goal of States parties is universality as well as non-proliferation and disarmament, a degree of reality with regard to Israel is necessary.

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Israeli nuclear use doctrine, and the size and status of the Israeli arsenal are difficult to assess in the absence of any kind of transparency. There are persistent reports, however, that Israel is diversifying its capabilities, specifically through the development and possibly deployment of submarines carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles. We call on the States parties to address this problem as a matter of urgency. Russian Federation The Russian Federation maintains a considerable nuclear arsenal, despite deep cutbacks since the end of the Cold War. Under START II Russia had agreed to de-MIRV its nuclear missiles, but has now decided to retain SS-18s and SS-19s with multiple warheads until at least 2016. President Putin has said that the SS-19s could be deployed until 2030. Production of the Topol-M (SS-27) continues as a priority. Some analysts believe that it is this missile that President Putin said would be equipped with Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicles (MARV) technology as a direct counter to US ballistic missile defense deployments. Since 1999 Russia has, like other nuclear powers, reserved to itself the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons. These changes in doctrine, and these new missile programs, represent steps in violation of Article Vi, of the treaty as a whole, and of Russia’s negative security assurances. United Kingdom The UK has recently finished a modernization program, and has adapted its Trident missile force for tactical nuclear missions against potential proliferators. This change has expanded the range situations when the UK could use nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Blair refused to rule out their use against Iraq last year. Despite the recent conclusion of the Trident program, the UK is actively upgrading and expanding its facility at Aldermaston to make it possible to design, develop and build a replacement for Trident, a decision on which will be made in the next Parliament. This includes a laser facility to simulate nuclear test explosions. As such, the UK could not be said to be in compliance with Article VI of the Treaty, or with the 2000 Review Conference Conclusions. United States We now turn our attention to the most egregious offender, the United States of America. Current U.S. policy strikes at the heart of the NPT and the wider non-proliferation regime. Recent developments contravene principles adopted here, including irreversibility of disarmament; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in defense policy and the need to take concrete steps to reduce arsenals, to say nothing of the ABM Treaty, the CTBT, negative security assurances.

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The administration is pursuing design work on new nuclear weapons, as well as new capabilities for existing weapons. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a new “bunker-buster” variant of the B83, will move from design to development in the 2005-2006 period. Other advanced concepts include nuclear weapons tailored for specific targets – such as chemical or biological weapons stores. Other arsenal upgrades include improvements to missiles already in service, and a survey of concepts for future missiles. The next generation of land-based nuclear missiles is also under study. Matched to these new warheads and delivery vehicles are planned improvements in the Strategic War Planning System. All these weapons are designed for use, not deterrence, under the policy of counterproliferation, as elaborated in the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Nuclear Posture Review. The administration is also preparing for a future return to nuclear testing – enhancing the staffing, equipment and training in weapons labs and at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The US ability to conduct simulations, tests and research in the laboratory under the name of Stockpile Stewardship is being developed to give the US the capacity to design new nuclear weapons without the need for underground nuclear testing. Nuclear weapons infrastructure is also being upgraded. The administration is planning construction of a new nuclear bomb factory – named the Modern Pit Facility. A bomb plant at Los Alamos National Laboratory is nearing production capacity. The US would have the capacity to build between 200 and 500 new bombs per year when these two facilities are both active. The US is in flagrant breach of the NPT. It has abandoned good faith attempts to end the arms race and to negotiate disarmament. The SORT Treaty is a fraud, requiring no action before midnight on December 31, 2012, and terminating a minute later. Thousands of warheads will remain in storage ready to be reactivated in days, weeks or months. Changes in US nuclear doctrine have dramatically extended the role given to nuclear weapons. The process has reached fulfillment under the Bush administration since the last Review Conference. The US now reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against facilities which it even suspects of containing biological or chemical weapons or their means of production or delivery. This counterproliferation policy is now the main means by which the United States envisages the disarmament of other nations. It does not envisage its own disarmament. As the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear, nuclear weapons will be part of the US arsenal until at least 2070 – the 100th anniversary of the entry-into-force of the NPT. This is unacceptable. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, we submit that recent developments have rendered the threat to this treaty, and to the whole non-proliferation regime, most serious and extreme. The actions of the NWS are not acceptable, and the majority of parties in this forum should have the courage to say so and to name the guilty parties. They should also demand action.

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The time has come for the United Nations to convene a Summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. That Summit must be tasked with the creation of an International Nuclear Disarmament Organization. This body must be given the appropriate political and legal authority, matched with abundant resources, to eliminate all nuclear weapons from the world’s arsenals and to monitor this nuclear-free status for the foreseeable future. As a good faith step, the world’s nuclear weapon states, acknowledged or unacknowledged in this Treaty, must end the design and development of new nuclear weapons and cease deployment programs. If this Treaty is not to collapse, and the spectre of nuclear war rise to haunt us all, nothing less than such dramatic action can be pursued. 4. A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps Delivered by Sarah Estabrooks, Project Ploughshares The gravity of the current state of international disarmament and nonproliferation is not lost on anyone in this room. We heard already about the vertical proliferation undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and about the horizontal proliferation threat that is seeping across the globe. We know all too well about the situation in Geneva, and we see how the stalemate in the CD seems to have infected other disarmament machinery, including the Disarmament Commission here in New York. Often, we hear CD members invoke the achievements of the past – including the CTBT and the CWC – as inspiration for new progress. Just a few weeks ago, the Chair of the UNDC urged that blocked body to seek inspiration from the Commission’s past successes in the field of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and conventional weapons. In the same vein, we urge NPT States Parties to recall your own success, achieved in this very same hall only four years ago. The quasi-miracle of the consensus surrounding the 13 Practical Steps to disarmament should not be easily discarded, especially in such a harrowing time for the international peace and security regime. In this presentation, we will examine the origin of the 13 Steps, to understand how this important agreement was accomplished. Though not legally binding, the 13 Steps remain the best tool for measuring NWS progress in the fulfillment of their Article VI obligation to disarm. As we are but one year away from the next Review Conference, it is a useful, exercise to blow the dust off of the 2000 Final Document and hold it up as a mirror to the NWS, in which their commitment to nuclear disarmament will be reflected. Finally, we will urge States Parties to reaffirm the 13 Steps as a living document, susceptible to evolution and change, to reflect new developments while charting a course to a world free of nuclear weapons Background to the 13 Steps In the lead-up to the 2000 Review Conference, hopes for significant progress on nuclear disarmament were slim. There had not been a consensus-based final document since the 1985 Review. The United States Senate had become the first legislative body in the world to reject ratification of the overdue Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India and Pakistan had conducted

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full-scale nuclear weapon tests, and the 1999 PrepCom dispersed with no consensus recommendations to the Review Conference. Faced with such a grim outlook, many States Parties, as well as the Chair, Ambassador Baali of Algeria, took the bull by the horns, and held intensive consultations throughout the months leading up to the conference. New and old alliances put forth collective calls for a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament, offering concrete, substantive proposals for consideration. The successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference was, hailed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as a "historic consensus" marking "a significant step forward in humanity's pursuit of a more peaceful world". Speaking on behalf of the NAC, Mexico’s Ambassador Antonio de Icaza, heralded the 13 Steps for allowing "what has always been implicit (to) now become explicit and this act both reinforces and revitalizes the Treaty.” It could be argued that the success of the Sixth Review Conference was brought about by the fear held by many – including the NWS – that the Treaty was disintegrating. Arguably, the situation we face today is decidedly worse. Past threats persist, including questions over nonproliferation compliance and a “continuing erosion of multilateralism” (as recognized in GA resolution 58/44). Furthermore, NWS have taken steps to increase the political and military value of nuclear weapons, instead of moving to disarm. If we are to acquire a renewed commitment to disarmament in 2005, it is imperative that states engage in broad consultation once again. We commend Ambassador Sudjadnan for undertaking intensive consultations over the course of the past year, and we hope that the Chairman-designate to the 2005 Review will do the same. We stand ready to assist both Chairs in any way that we can. In this process, we also strongly encourage the NNWS to cooperate through diplomatic alliances, to propose progressive, concrete recommendations as a unified voice. The 13 Steps as a Tool for Measuring Progress In order for the 13 Steps to remain a living document – that is, one with relevance, importance, and utility for the current challenges facing the international security regime – we must continually employ it as a means to assess our progress and plot our future steps. To assess progress since 2000, we will briefly discuss some of the key developments. Nearly a decade after its adoption in the Conference on Disarmament, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not yet in force. Only 32 of the 44 Annex II States’ whose ratifications are required for entry-into-force have done so. The US has continued its affront on the CTBT, refusing to put it forward for Senate ratification a second time, after the rejection in 1999. Its intentions to remain outside the Treaty were made clear at the General Assembly in 2003 when it was the only country to oppose draft resolution L.52 on the CTBT, stating that it “does not support the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and will not become a party to that Treaty.”

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Although the US has pledged to uphold a testing moratorium, its steps to reduce the timeline required for testing to resume at the Nevada Test Site, from 36 to 18 months, are contrary to the spirit of the moratorium and the intention of the CTBT, as is continued underground subcritical testing. Progress towards the Step 3 call for a ban on the production of fissile material has been thwarted by the deadlock of the Conference on Disarmament. While there was unanimous support for the 2003 UNGA draft resolution on the creation of an ad hoc committee within the CD to negotiate the FMCT (L.49), the US submitted an explanation of vote in which it stated: “I wish to point out, however, that the United States is reviewing specific elements of our policy regarding an FMCT, and our joining consensus on this resolution is without prejudice to the outcome of that review.” After the first session of the Conference on Disarmament for 2004, for the sixth consecutive year, a programme of work has not yet been approved by the CD, blocking any progress on the issues up for negotiation. The establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, as called for in Step 4, seems to be nowhere in sight. Even progress on an FMCT, an issue which many refer to “as ripe for negotiations” has not advanced. France and the US are encouraged to endorse the A5 proposal, joining the wide support for this plan of action. The U.S. has rejected irreversible reductions in favor of “flexibility”, as inferred by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his testimony on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [July 2002]. SORT thus represents a repudiation of the Step 5 obligation to uphold the principle of irreversibility. The hard-won “unequivocal undertaking,” as outlined in Step 6, devolved into another empty promise. Not a single NWS has demonstrated this unambiguous duty. The United States quashed Step 7 in June of 2002, when it withdrew from the ABM Treaty, nullifying the START processes the very next day. The three parties to the Trilateral Initiative, which must be implemented under Step 8, announced in 2002 that negotiations of the technical, legal and financial groundwork had ‘fulfilled’ the Initiative’s requirements. However, no legally binding instrument has been established to implement the measures to bring excess weapons-grade nuclear materials – in both the US and Russia – under IAEA verification. That said, bilateral and plurilateral initiatives targeting primarily the Russian stockpiles of excess fissile materials have made important steps, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the G8 Partnership. We would urge states parties, particularly the US and Russia, to incorporate such measures into a broader multilateral verification framework under IAEA controls. Since the last PrepCom there has been little progress on the disarmament measures outlined in Step 9 specifically for NWS, indeed recent trends suggest there has been regression on nuclear disarmament goals. Steps to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the NWS’ national security policies are essential to proceed with disarmament.

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We have also seen little progress under Step 10, requiring placement of excess fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. We encourage those states parties who have yet to do so – and only 39 have – to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. Step 11, which reaffirmed the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, has been grossly jeopardized by rising military budgets, the continued stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament, the lack of a space weapons ban, the collapse of efforts to create a verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the general trend away from multilateral approaches to ‘coalition of the willing’ measures. Despite past progress in the field, including the Landmine Ban, these trends suggest that general and complete disarmament is still a distant goal. In the interest of transparency and accountability, Step 12 obliges all states to provide regular reports on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. Progress on this new measure has been modest, but the scope and content of the reports submitted to date has been encouraging. We urge more states to commit to this important transparency tool. Step 13 calls for the further development of verification capabilities with regard to nuclear disarmament. The UK initiative to research such technologies is a welcome measure and we anticipate the final report on this work at the 2005 conference. The role of the IAEA in verification of peaceful nuclear activities must be supported through both financial and political commitments to the safeguard and verification regime. Conclusion Looking back, our assessment shows few signs of forward movement on the obligations made in 2000, and indeed multiple steps backward. An abject lack of political will to pursue disarmament, paired with an obsession with perceived proliferation threats, has tipped the balance of the NPT agreement away from the real threat to our world: the 30,000 nuclear weapons held by a handful of states, which, until they are eliminated, guarantee continued instability rather than “undiminished security for all." Reneged promises, such as those undertaken at the 2000 Review Conference, must not set the precedent for international arms control and disarmament. As you prepare your recommendations for 2005, we urge you to reconfirm your commitment to the 13 Steps, as a symbol of the world’s unrepentant desire for the permanent elimination of nuclear weapons, and a strategy for the way forward. 5. A Fresh Look at Vertical Proliferation: Ballistic Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization (a shorter version of this presentation will be delivered) Six decades ago, one country envisioned to have the decisive military advantage over the rest of the world by including nuclear weapons into their arsenal. But it didn’t take long before other countries followed their example. The presumed strength turned into the nightmare of nuclear arms races, overkill, and the option of mutual annihilation. To date, trillions have been spent by nuclear weapons states on optimizing the deadly weapons arsenals as well as delivery systems

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and infrastructure required for their use. Today, we are repeating this dangerous example and extending it into space. Only by keeping the full spectrum of weapon systems in mind can disarmament be achieved. Part of this picture is the need to restrict the military use of space. The growing dependence on satellites of high-tech military forces results in a vicious circle of threat (or perceived threat), protection, defense, offense, and counter-offense thinking. Weaponization of space by some states would encourage other, less technologically advanced countries to counter asymmetrically – and nuclear weapons would certainly be one of the options, e.g. to destroy ground stations and thus disable space weapons’ command and control. And even if nuclear weapons were ruled out, other means to offset the space advantage would be found. It is not a coincidence therefore that Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligates the member states to “a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. This was confirmed at the 2000 NPT Review in #11 of the practical steps: “Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.” Missile Defenses – Bound for Proliferation Rather than fulfill their disarmament obligations under the NPT, some countries have directed their energy into building missile defense. Russia still maintains a small protective shield around Moscow, which had been allowed under the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US, however, has higher ambitions. Their goal is global protection from systems deployed on land and on sea, in air and in space. President Bush said a few years ago that “Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.” The opposite is probably true. A recent report shows that, back in the 1960s, construction of the Russian missile defense system provoked the US not only to considerably increase the numbers of their nuclear systems but spurred them to increase the quality of their arsenal by developing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, the so-called MIRVs. MIRVs were poised to be eliminated under START-II, but now we observe their speedy revival. In response to missile defense, China e.g. is said to develop new missiles for MIRVs. It will also increase the number of its missiles and eventually place its nuclear weapons on constant alert. Russia just a few weeks ago tested a hypersonic weapon. The prototype was proven to maneuver quickly in altitude and in direction while in orbit, thereby making “any missile defense useless”, as a senior Russian general commented the test. Furthermore, the US encouraged Russia to maintain the high alert status of its nuclear arsenal to counter Russian missile defense fears, thus increasing the risk of inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear strike. Missile defense is also leading to an arms race with missile defenses. Australia and Japan have already decided to join US missile defense. Canada and the UK are in appropriate negotiations. The US is conducting a survey of where in Europe it could deploy interceptors of its ground-based system. NATO is doing a Feasibility Study for its own system – extending the scope beyond the tactical range. Israel co-operates with the US on its Arrow system. India wants to buy the Israeli system. Russia keeps the Moscow system running and offers SS-300s for sale. Here at international fora, governments speak only of horizontal proliferation, while the US

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itself is actively engaged in serious vertical proliferation of missile defense schemes. The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board defied a defense appropriation ban to examine the use of nuclear weapons in missile defense. The Pentagon also has efforts under way to develop miniature kill vehicles. Up to a dozen could be carried by one interceptor – that means MIRVing missile defense. Space – Field for Future Arms Races? We all are aware of the close link between missile defense and space weaponization, and it has been made even clearer by the latest “US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan.” One example out of many might suffice to make the case: A Ground Based Laser is envisioned for the future. This system “would propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit satellites to provide robust defensive and offensive space control capability.” As if this weren’t enough, an additional component “will significantly extend the range of both the Airborne Laser and Ground-Based Laser by using airborne, terrestrial, or space-based lasers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser powers and frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illumination to destruction.” Further systems described in the Air Force document are: - Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missiles “to intercept satellites in low earth orbit” (thus creating space debris that would then threaten all space assets); - the Counter Satellite Communications System “to deny and disrupt an adversary’s space-based communications and early warning” plus Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System “to deny, disrupt, and degrade adversary space-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems” (both depriving the adversary of its ability to know what is going on and consequently increasing the risk of a full-scale (nuclear) strike); - Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle able to “reach time-critical targets up to 9,000 nautical miles away within two hours with payloads up to 12,000 pounds”; - Hypervelocity Rod Bundles – the so-called “Rods from God” to “provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from space”; and many more. Obviously, under the Bush Jr. administration, the previous restrictions on using space offensively have been thrown overboard at an incredible pace. Or, in the words of Air Force Space Command: “The major question in fielding offensive counterspace systems is the political will to do so.” A recent study found that the use or the possibility of the use of space weapons could trigger a nuclear response from the other side. Morerover, if warfare were extended to outer space, commercial satellite investments would be greatly endangered. Accordingly, the looming weaponization of space must not be simply dismissed as a crazy fantasy of the military “boys with their toys.” If the US continues to work on anti-satellite weapons and eventually deploys them, Russia and China – who have both declared a moratorium on ASAT testing – may do the same. India will not sit by. In such a scenario, I dare say that even the European Union would move to weaponize space. US attempts to prevent such proliferation would give further rise to security tensions. Recently, the statement became popular in some circles that those who control low-earth orbit

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control near-earth space, those who control near-earth space dominate Earth, and those who dominate Earth determine the destiny of mankind. It might be true that who controls space determines the destiny of humankind – but most likely in a very negative way. Rather than enter into a new arms race in space and destabilize the security environment even more, disarmament and a ban on missile defenses and space weapons are the proper solution. Therefore, the current initiatives to negotiate a space weapons ban are of utmost importance. On June 2002, China and Russia introduced a Joint Working Paper with “Possible Elements of a Space Weapons Treaty” to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The paper was sponsored by several other countries and lead to intensive discussion, so that in 2003 China and Russia felt encouraged to follow up by introducing a “Compilation of Comments and Suggestions” to the Working Paper. This initiative deserves our strongest support. We also applaud the latest Canadian efforts to develop a “new comprehensive approach seeking to integrate space security issues with the international community’s need for security and equitable access to space for peaceful purposes”, which has recently been presented at a seminar in Geneva. Over the years, NGOs have also contributed constructively to the debate. Thus e.g. several NGO experts suggested “a comprehensive approach to deal with missiles and [ ] a ‘framework’ agreement to restrict the development, testing and deployment of all ballistic missiles and missile defenses” two years ago. And a scientific “Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space” even dates back to NGO efforts of 1984. Our proposals Last year’s presentation on this issue, “Nuclear Disarmament and Ballistic Missile Elimination Go Hand in Hand,” concluded by lining out specific proposals to help preventing an arms race with missiles, missile defenses, and space weapons. Rather than to repeat them in detail here, let me just list them in short: - “Stop testing missiles and missile defense systems. - Initiate negotiations for an international treaty banning tests of ballistic missiles and of missile defense systems. - Initiate negotiations for a global treaty banning ballistic missiles and missile defense systems. - Any research, development, testing, building, and deployment of weapons for use in space should be prohibited.” The time is ripe for disarmament in all its aspects. I urge you to move on – to move also on beyond missile defense and space weaponization. 6. Beyond the NPT: Recent Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation Delivered by Rhianna Tyson, RCW/WILPF We need not take precious minutes to explain what everybody in this room already knows: that the NPT and entire international disarmament regime is at its greatest crisis in history. In addition to the familiar threats of vertical and horizontal proliferation, the trends of which continue at an alarming rate, the international community is now also faced with the possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. While some NWS are looking at new ways of interpreting Article IV, the majority Non-Nuclear Weapon States

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continue to look doubtfully upon Article VI, the promise made by the NWS some thirty odd years ago that remains unfulfilled even in the new millennium. In its current fragile state, States Parties to this Treaty are looking beyond the NPT, searching for more effective solutions to the growing trend of nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. With so much at stake, an assessment of these recent initiatives must be nuanced. As NGOs have insisted over the years, unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral initiatives can all make vital contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation. Let us walk briefly through some of the developments. Nuclear Suppliers’ Group In his February 11 speech, President Bush proposed that the Nuclear Suppliers Group deny uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing equipment to countries which do not yet possess it. This proposal is remarkable and welcome in one respect: it amounts to an admission that the U.S.-initiated Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s, later built into Article IV of the NPT, was a mistake. However, if executed in a peremptory fashion, it could contribute to slow-motion disintegration of the NPT. A far better proposal to thwart the dangers posed by fissile materials is to create international controls on such technology through a multilateral agreement, as proposed by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. Many are quick to dismiss this approach, citing a lack of incentives for States to enter into such an agreement. But set against the backdrop of a negotiated Fissile Materials Cut Off Treaty, internationally controlled fissile material stockpiles would not only strengthen the role of the IAEA, as most in this room repeatedly call for, but it would also greatly restrict the potential of these dangerous materials falling into the hands of non-state actors, or NNWS looking to renege on their treaty obligations. All States should also implement their disarmament commitments, and work cooperatively on the development of non-nuclear sources of energy, both of which would help to lift the world out of the dilemmas and risks of the nuclear age. Proliferation Security Initiative: Like the proposal regarding the Nuclear Suppliers Group, PSI reflects an evolving and welcome understanding of the NBC-weapon threat. In essence, it regards NBC-weapon related shipments as contraband. The law, however, has yet to catch up with this concept. States parties to the NPT, CWC, and BWC are required, explicitly or implicitly, not to transfer NBC weapons to anyone. But a right of interception does not necessarily follow. The issue of “dual-use materials” is another contentious point raised by the practice of interception. Assuming that a shipment is reasonably suspected to contain NBC-weapon contraband, there are steps which states are entitled to take under existing international law to prevent or intercept it. They can regulate activity in their ports. They can obtain the permission of the flag state to engage in interdiction. And so on. It remains the case, though, that provocative acts, on the high seas, in straits, in international airspace, are possible, and indeed are contemplated, at least abstractly, by some PSI participants. They would not be sanctioned by the Law of the Sea Convention and other law, and indeed could be contrary to such law as well as the UN Charter’s prohibition on use of force and guarantee of state sovereignty.

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It needs to be clearly acknowledged that in some cases, interceptions will require approval of the Security Council or sanction through other legitimate, treaty-based mechanisms. In the larger picture, it is not acceptable to hold that NWS can deploy nuclear-armed submarines in the world’s oceans, or deploy nuclear bombs on other states’ territories, while at the same time claiming the right to interdict other States’ NBC-weapon shipments. Security Council resolution The resolution now under consideration will reinforce and expand obligations under the NPT, CWC, and BWC to prevent non-state actor acquisition of and trafficking in NBC weapons, materials, and means of delivery. It will also apply those obligations to non-state parties. It clearly is responding to a real need, dramatically illustrated by the Pakistan-based nuclear proliferation network involving businesses in several countries and a scientist, A.Q. Khan, allegedly acting without governmental authority. But the resolution also raises profound questions about the future of disarmament/non-proliferation regimes and indeed of international law. It reflects the one-sided emphasis on containing, rather than eliminating, NBC weapons, especially nuclear weapons. The Security Council resolution contains other troubling aspects. First, issues raised by the resolution merit careful scrutiny and deliberation of the kind inherent in multilateral negotiations. The resolution would generally impose obligations upon states with regard to NBC-weapon "related materials", missiles and other “unmanned systems” of delivery, and “non-state actors,” yet provides no full and precise definition of those terms. International oversight of implementation is needed, yet whether the Security Council will create an adequate mechanism for this purpose is in doubt. A rational and legitimate lawmaking process requires in-depth negotiation with the participation of affected states. The resolution is likely to be more effective if subsequent efforts to extend the web of legislation controlling the spread of NBC weapons is achieved through negotiated international agreements in which all states may have their say. Second, a resolution requires political acceptance if it is to be effectively implemented. The highly unrepresentative Security Council, dominated by the nuclear-armed P5, is not the best institution to elicit such acceptance, especially with respect to NBC-weapon measures as to which hypocrisy and double standards will rightly be charged. Third, there is nothing in the UN Charter that confers the authority on the Security Council to adopt global legislation concerning generalized threats. On the contrary, the Charter contemplates multilateral agreements entered into by states as the primary mode of global lawmaking, with the General Assembly promoting this process by making recommendations (Art. 13). The role of the Security Council is to address particular situations threatening peace and security. To address the disarmament deficit, and to avoid future reliance on the Security Council as a global lawmaker, States must work to revitalize the existing NBC-weapon treaty regimes and to create new multilateral agreements – on non-state actors, fissile materials, a biological weapons verification regime, and more.

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Responding to Suspected Proliferation Some cases of horizontal proliferation – Iraq, Libya, the DPRK – have been handled partially or even largely outside the context of the NPT/IAEA and the Security Council. There may be good reason for this in a given case, for example the DPRK. Nonetheless, this approach means that treaty-based mechanisms are not developed and may atrophy, while doctrines of reliance on unilateral and plurilateral measures, even including preventive war, are reinforced. The context and capabilities for addressing vertical proliferation – for promoting disarmament – are not adequately evolving. It is important, therefore, to push, even when inconvenient or time-consuming or otherwise momentarily disadvantageous, for maximum use of the IAEA and the Security Council in responding to suspected proliferation. Additional mechanisms should also be considered: a permanent NPT body, and a UN-based inspectorate, drawing on UNMOVIC capabilities, able to supply expertise regarding biological weapons and missiles, and to supplement as needed the work of the IAEA and the OPCW. One bright spot in recent years is that UNMOVIC proved its efficacy and the value of international cooperation. In the development of any or all of these mechanisms, it must always be kept in mind that the aim of the NPT is the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. Preventive War Let us acknowledge the elephant in the room, the most significant instance of rejection of multilateralism. In the United States, the specter of the Baathist regime someday acquiring nuclear arms was decisive in selling the war on Iraq. Unless the world is to face decades of wars and threats of war in response to suspected or real acquisition of nuclear arms by new states, all states will have to accept, not rhetorically but practically, that preventing proliferation requires the elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. Conclusion The threats posed by NBC weapons continue to mount. And they will continue to mount so long as a few States maintain their false “right” to their possession. Creative thinking and new approaches to combat these threats is welcome and needed, yet these new initiatives demand careful attention. Most importantly, they should not supplant the coordinated and sustained efforts by all actors within the international community to work for the total abolition of NBC weapons. 7. The Human Tragedy of Proliferation and Nuclear Rearmament Delivered by Ron McCoy, IPPNW (a shorter version of this presentation will be delivered) The primary goal of the NPT and of all efforts to rid countries and the world of nuclear weapons is to prevent the human catastrophe that would inevitably result from the use of even a single nuclear weapon. Yet the Treaty today is faced with a daunting array of challenges: national

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security strategies that confer permanent status to nuclear weapons; the testing and development of new generations of nuclear weapons for new and destabilizing missions; their acquisition by non-nuclear States (and non-state actors) no longer willing to accept the prevailing nuclear apartheid. Despite the important agreements reached at the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has increased. When we ask you to consider the human implications of the choice between proliferation and non-proliferation, between disarmament and a perpetual enslavement to nuclear weapons, we are really presenting you with the choice between two futures. Only one of these futures is acceptable or worth pursuing. The NPT will only be an effective tool in that pursuit if the States Parties commit themselves to the urgent task of revitalizing the Treaty as both a non-proliferation and a disarmament agreement. At its heart, this is a choice between hope and hopelessness. We submit to you that we can no longer put off making this choice. We know what almost 60 years under the nuclear shadow have done to the hundreds of thousands of victims, whether they be hibakusha, downwinders, nuclear industry workers, or communities in the Global South and elsewhere who have been deprived of true health and security because of the enormous amount of resources squandered on acquiring, testing, and developing nuclear weapons. In a more general sense, we are all victims of the preparations for nuclear war, because we are all held hostage to the ever present threat of extinction. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastating and cruel. In an instant they created many tens of thousands of fatalities and several hundred thousand surviving victims whose terrible injuries have extended over generations. To achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons, those victims have told their stories of terror and suffering, believing that this is the only way to save human beings from the crisis of extinction. We wish to honor the lives and the voices of the hibakusha here and now. Even more important, we urge the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear States Parties to the NPT to listen to their experiences, to learn from them, and to embrace continued human survival by abandoning nuclear weapons and the ambition to acquire them. Tragically, the world seems to be careening toward disaster. With a dangerous and painfully arrogant US nuclear policy as the model and the driving force, nuclear weapons are seen by far too many countries as conferring a political status contrary to the spirit of the NPT, which has sought their stigmatization. The counter-proliferation strategies championed by the Bush administration and supported by several other governments, while they contain some useful elements, serve in the end to reinforce a nuclear double standard. According to the administration, the weapons themselves are not the threat to our survival, but only their ownership by “evildoers.” The “evildoers” themselves, of course, are defined as such by the sole remaining nuclear superpower and its allies, thus turning nuclear proliferation -- and the need for aggressive counter-proliferation measures -- into a self-fulfilling prophecy. What will happen in a future where nuclear testing resumes in the US and other nuclear weapon states in order to facilitate the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons with battlefield uses? Where additional countries rebel against nuclear apartheid and start testing and developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems of their own? Where national security is ultimately measured by the capacity to destroy, rather than by the willingness to

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resolve the inevitable conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy, without resort to arms? Where investments in the health, education, and development of communities are sacrificed in order to sustain nuclear weapons programs that bankrupt all legitimate paths to global security? We can predict with confidence -- and from experience -- that a resumption of nuclear weapons production and testing will have a direct and destructive impact on the communities surrounding the test sites. IPPNW and IEER documented these health and environmental impacts in a series of studies published in the 1990s, and we have reviewed the damage in previous statements before this body. Rather than go over old ground, we wish to focus here on two sites that have had troubled histories and that could become a source of new health and environmental disasters if the global pursuit of nuclear weapons expands and continues. We are extremely concerned, as other speakers have mentioned, that the decade-long testing moratorium may be broken by the US, which is even now bringing its nuclear weapons manufacturing complex up to speed in preparation for additions to its arsenal. The Savannah River Site (SRS) -- a 310-square-mile complex of closed nuclear weapons facilities and decontamination activities located in South Carolina -- made plutonium and tritium for atomic weapons from 1950 to 1990. SRS is now a leading contender for a new weapons plant that would construct up to 900 new plutonium warhead “pits” annually. This will inevitably increase radiation exposure to the public -- as much as 2.6% above existing radiation levels from all facilities at SRS.2 The environmental and human impacts of this deadly business are tragic, because we are robbing from the future when we damage the environment with nuclear waste. The shallow groundwater at SRS is severely contaminated with tritium, TCE, and other pollutants. While the water in the Savannah River is still within drinking water standards, radioactive tritium has already been found in drinking water more than 100 river miles downstream from SRS at Beaufort, SC. SRS is out of compliance with the federal Clean Air Act.3 Recent evidence indicates that radioactive pollution— cesium 137, strontium 90 and cobalt 60— is between 20 and 100 times background downstream of the old atomic weapons facilities, depending on how one measures natural background relative to fallout from atmospheric testing.4 Cancer, of course, is linked to ionizing radiation. A half century of radioactive contamination is causing an invisible yet real epidemic. The cumulative impact of new plutonium plants and past contamination at SRS would result in more death and disease to the people in this region. While India and Pakistan are not States Parties to the NPT, their role in global proliferation cannot be ignored, especially since the infrastructure for testing and producing nuclear weapons poses grave threats to the Indian and Pakistani people. We cite here the damage caused by uranium mining in India, where a good deal of new information has come to light during the past year or two.

2 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2, NRC Docket No. 070-03098, DOE Contract DE-AC02-99-CH10888 3 Comments re: Part 70 Air Quality Permit No. TV-0080-0041, US Department of Energy, Westinghouse Savannah River Company-Savannah River Site, BREDL, November 21, 2002 4 Under A Cloud: Fallout from the Savannah River Site, The RadioActivist Campaign, October 2003

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Uranium ore has been mined and processed in Jaduguda, in Bihar State, for some 30 years. Local NGOs have surveyed area villages and have reported 70 cases of infants born with congenital deformities, of which 60 were in villages close to the plant operated by the Uranium Corporation of India. Children in the affected areas are sometimes born with polydactyl (extra fingers or toes) and syndactyl (fused or missing fingers and toes) appendages. Dr. Surendra Gadekar, of the Gujarat-based NGO Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalaya Vedchhi, has attributed the unusual increase in birth defects, as well as increased rates of lung cancer and silicosis, to occupational exposures. New mines proposed for the Nalgonda district will only compound the problems. Exposure to radioactive-decay products and heavy metals affects the brain, kidneys, liver, and other organs. Long term environmental damage results from radioactive tailings and the dumping of 99.8% of the mined ore, which seeps into soil and groundwater. The Nagarjunasagar dam is very near one of the new mining sites and is likely to be contaminated with uranium from storm water runoff. Radioactive dust and tailings will probably contaminate a new reservoir that will supply drinking water to Hyderabad, and could affect both human and wildlife health. The public -- not only in the US and in India but in all countries where nuclear materials are processed -- is routinely denied information about health hazards related to plant operations and waste disposal. Such callous disregard is all too typical of official attitudes and behaviors when the acquisition of nuclear weapons, rather than human health and well being, is the object of policy. If the human costs associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons were tabulated in full we would be appalled. But such accountings are almost never made, even in part, and the victims are usually abandoned to suffer in the shadows. In 1997, for example, the US National Cancer Institute NCI projected tens of thousands of additional thyroid cancers as a result of years of atmospheric nuclear testing, yet no funds have been dedicated to identifying, monitoring, or treating the most vulnerable populations. In short, nuclear weapons are instruments of genocide unlike any others. They are weapons not just of mass destruction, but of ultimate destruction. The proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has always been a threat to international peace and security, but this threat has increased since the 2000 NPT Review. The nuclear weapons breakout by India and Pakistan, the recent revelation of A. Q. Khan's black market in nuclear technology, and the nascent weapons programs in North Korea and Libya, are a wake-up call to the international community. Yet in addressing proliferation, there is a parallel need to address and implement disarmament, because disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. The axiom of proliferation is indisputable: the possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other state and non-state actors to acquire them. To physicians, the deliberate use of disease as a weapon of war is particularly repugnant, but even more repugnant is the use of nuclear weapons. In a nuclear war, there can be no meaningful medical response. Long-term radiation effects could blight unborn generations; civilization itself could come to an end. One of the most disturbing justifications being offered by the Bush administration for continued US reliance on nuclear weapons and, indeed, for the development of new types of nuclear weapons with specific battlefield uses, is the intent to provide a nuclear response to chemical and biological weapons threats. (This intent, by the way, was echoed by Israel -- another nuclear

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weapon state that is not a Party to the NPT -- during the weeks preceding the US-led invasion of Iraq.) This has led to a tendency to group nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons together into an amorphous category called “weapons of mass destruction.” We do not wish to minimize the horrors of chemical and biological weapons or to suggest that the threat of their use by terrorist groups or State parties to armed conflict is insubstantial or unworthy of serious response. Nuclear weapons, however, are in a class of their own and the threat they pose must under no circumstances be equated with the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons. Nor should they be linked with chemical and biological weapons as part of an interchangeable strategy of deterrence or retaliation. Chemical warfare agents, such as mustard gas, lewisite, sarin, and tabun, can cause a range of lethal and non-lethal effects from blistering and nausea to respiratory tract damage, seizures, and paralysis. More than 100,000 tons of toxic chemicals used during the First World War caused the deaths of 90,000 soldiers and more than a million casualties. The use of chemical weapons by Iraq during its 1980-88 war with Iran resulted in hundreds of documented deaths and injuries; Iran has claimed as many as 100,000. Iraqi aircraft shelled the Kurdish village of Halabja, in northern Iraq, with chemical weapons on March 16, 1988, killing 5-8,000 people and injuring 7,000. There is also evidence of Iranian use of chemical weapons. In 1932, Japan attacked several Chinese cities with biological agents including anthrax, cholera, shigellosis, salmonella, and plague, killing at least 10,000 people. An anthrax epizootic in 1979 and 1980 during the Zimbabwe civil war took 182 lives and may have been deliberate. About 5,000 people were exposed to inhalation anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 -- the result of an aerosol emission from a military biological facility. About 70 people died. Depending on the biological agent used and the effectiveness of dispersal, a city of 500,000 people might suffer anywhere from a few hundred to several thousand deaths and tens of thousands of injuries. Such effects certainly warrant characterizing chemical and biological weapons as “weapons of mass destruction.” Nevertheless, the consequences of nuclear weapons are exponentially greater. Moreover, there is no medical response to nuclear war–something that is not universally true of chemical and biological attacks. The explosion of a single modern nuclear warhead over a major city could cause hundreds of thousands -- even millions -- of deaths in a matter of moments. Blast, burn, and radiation injuries among the survivors would overwhelm any possible medical response. Long term health consequences, including leukemia and other cancers would affect the survivors and their children throughout entire lifetimes. Other genetic effects would persist across generations. Hospitals and other medical infrastructure would be destroyed in the overall carnage, rendering the kind of medical response that would be available in the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack virtually inconceivable. Vast areas of land stretching out from the epicenter of a nuclear explosion would remain uninhabitable for years, while contamination from radioactive fallout would persist in some places for hundreds, or even thousands of years, causing new illnesses in future generations. An all-out nuclear war involving a significant number of the weapons that are currently held by the nuclear weapon states could initiate a nuclear winter, threatening the extinction of human and countless non-human species.

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To categorize nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons together under the single rubric “weapons of mass destruction,” without making these fundamental distinctions of scale of destructive effect, betrays a lack of understanding. To do so for the political purpose of defining uses for nuclear weapons against chemical and biological threats -- for example, nuclear-armed bunker busters designed to destroy underground chemical or biological weapons facilities -- or to threaten nuclear retaliation against a chemical or biological attack, is a cynical betrayal of the global responsibility to ensure that these weapons are never used again. Paradoxically, the world's largest nuclear power is even now caught up in the tragic aftermath of a war that it sought out on the pretext that Iraq had nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Neither the US nor the UK would rule out the use of their own nuclear weapons in the run up to the war. Moreover, the invading forces fired at least 1,000 tons -- possibly 2,000 tons or more -- of depleted uranium shells during the 2003 war against Iraq, as compared with 350 tons in 1991. While not nuclear weapons, DU munitions contaminate the environment where they are used with a radioactive and toxic chemical stew that has been implicated in childhood cancers and other illnesses reported among troops and civilians. Seen in this context, DU weapons are part of a continuum of radiological, chemical, biological, and, finally, nuclear weapons that flies in the face of NPT goals. We therefore urge NPT Member States to sponsor a General Assembly resolution condemning the use of DU weapons and all uranium-tipped, radiological weapons. The path toward the future in which the shadow of nuclear war is forever lifted requires bold steps that must be taken today. First, the nuclear double standard has to end, and the process of complete global nuclear disarmament has to begin. It is long past time for the nuclear weapon states to concede that the fundamental problem with nuclear weapons is the existence of the weapons themselves, not the intentions of their owners. In plain language, the United States, Russia, China, France, the UK, Israel, India, and Pakistan must stop making excuses for their own nuclear arsenals while pretending, to varying degrees, that proliferation is the only real problem. Second, the CTBT must enter into force, and all forms of nuclear testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. This body should explicitly condemn the creation of new justifications for a new generation of nuclear weapons that will become the excuses for new rounds of nuclear test explosions. Third, the States parties to the NPT and the participants in all disarmament and arms control forums must insist upon the separation of nuclear weapons from chemical and biological weapons in both policy and rhetoric. At the same time, the States Parties to the NPT must recognize that the weakening of verification and enforcement measures related to the treaties prohibiting chemical and biological weapons have a negative impact on prospects for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The reliance on nuclear weapons for security creates insecurity and fuels not only the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the desire for biological and chemical weapons. Wherever possible, those concerned with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements should make common cause with those responsible for implementing the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons

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Convention, in pursuit of effective and mutually reinforcing systems for verification and enforcement. Finally, the NPT itself must be transformed into a true disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, as was the intent of the States Parties in 2000 when they committed themselves to an “unequivocal undertaking” to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on a time-bound framework to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2020 must begin no later than the close of the 2005 NPT Review. 8. Diplomacy of cities and promoting peace Mayor Olexandr Omelchenko, Kyiv, Mayors for Peace (a shorter version of this presentation will be delivered)

Let me first of all extend my gratitude to the Mayor of the City of Hiroshima, due to whose initiative we have gathered today in the Headquarters of the United Nations Organization.

We are here confronting one of major questions of existence of humanity – for the sake of peace! Usually the mayors of cities spend the greater part of their working hours on the decision of more mundane problems of roads, transport, medicine, and meeting the budget in their cities. Being a mayor is a very humane, peaceful profession. But when we speak about the diplomacy of cities, we must acknowledge the important political role of mayors. Although economic problems require the most attention and effort, global questions affecting the survival of humanity are in no way distant from municipalities in all countries.

Peace comes before everything else. The cities of all the countries need clear skies above. And our meeting today, I am convinced, will confirm the unanimity with which societies of cities from different continents defend peaceful, good-neighborly relations.

A nuclear weapon is viewed by us, in the first analysis, as a factor of instability, a threat that carries in itself a frightful, mortal danger for all humanity. To deprive nations and the whole world of nuclear weapons, preventing by this means a human catastrophe, is the primary objective of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the document in support of which we are all here today. Without any exaggeration, the question is a choice for humanity between hope and hopelessness. Unfortunately, despite the historical agreement attained at 2000 NPT Review Conference we find that the threat stemming from nuclear weapons has grown.

Declared in the 1980s to be factor inhibiting global conflicts, on the modern stage a nuclear weapon is more like a genie escaped from a bottle. Numerous shocking facts about nuclear technologies going out of control would stir up the world public if they were known. Irresponsible weapons merchants, research workers lacking in elementary ethical principles driven by pursuit of money, are putting the world on the brink of nuclear conflict. Unprecedented illegal operations are bringing us closer to the arming of terrorist groups and criminal regimes. What if the rumors that Al Qaida already possesses a nuclear weapon are confirmed? Just thinking about the subsequent chain of events is terrifying.

I ask myself, how did all this become possible? Why were international institutions especially created for the control of nuclear potential focusing on a careful search for weapon of mass destruction in Iraq, where none have been found, but missing all the real trade in nuclear materials and technologies? Why was Ukraine repeatedly blamed for illegal trade in weapons,

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though each time the accusations proved to be groundless? And in the meantime, other states shamelessly profiteer through various weapons to sow death on our planet.

Kyiv, as well as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is aware of the consequences of a nuclear explosion at a level more profound than words. Incurable wounds were the heavy consequences of military bombing and gross human error that resulted in massive radiation contamination of large territories.

The whole world will always respect the memory of the victims of the first atomic bombings of these two Japanese cities. And similarly humanity remembers the frightful Chernobyl tragedy that took numerous human victims and rendered 30 square kilometers useless for human inhabitation. The explosion of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant harmed the ecological balance in the region, adversely affecting the health of Kyivers. The negative consequences of this failure are found in other regions of the state and in neighboring countries.

The scale of the disaster would have been considerably greater, but for the courage of Ukrainian firemen, soldiers, rescuers, and builders. Day and night the exhausting fight to tame the blazing nuclear reactor went on.

Chernobyl presented many tests of courage and professionalism for the firemen: Pumping out "heavy" water from beneath the unstable reactor, with hydrogen gases threatening at any moment to explode; overcoming fires in cable tunnels; and decontaminating the plant. What did all those participating in this operation experience in those days? They express this feeling in these few words: “It was like being at war".

The dramatic effect of the Chernobyl catastrophe is beyond comparison. The deeds of the firemen saved millions of people. It is hard even to imagine what the consequences could have been if the heroes of Chernobyl had not controlled the hazards. These events are unequaled in human history.

550 capital fire guards took part in managing the catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant; 121 firemen were awarded with orders and medals for bravery and heroism.

That frightful grief that people experienced in Ukraine and among our Japanese friends was enough to forever imbue us with an intense wish for peace throughout the world. Ukraine proved its sincere aspiration for world peace by becoming the first state to voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons. Professing the principles of peaceful collaboration, Ukraine relied on international guarantees of security and assertions from world society to help in the clean-up of the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy. The USA and our European partners spoke with a single voice at that time, firmly assuring us of all forms of assistance. Unfortunately, the steps required to meet our needs were not taken as decisively as our giving up of the weapons. In this connection, permit me to briefly remind you of the basic facts.

First the Chernobyl question was included in the agenda at the spring session of the 1990 the Economic and Social Council of the UN. As a result, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/190, which called on member States “to mobilize support for extending international cooperation to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster” Since then UN continues to devote much attention to the Chernobyl question.

On May 21, 1999, the Government of Ukraine and the European Commission signed an agreement that stipulates a substantial payment to indemnify the fuel deficit during the period

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between the closing of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the introduction of a new nuclear power station to be financed by EBRD and charged to Euroatom credits.

What was done concretely on implementation of this obligation?

In the year of 2000, the European Union granted from the Program TACIS the first tranche for the delivery of fuel in the amount of 25 million euros. After the first tranche during February-April 2001, the purchase of 374 million cube meters of gas, which was used for the generation of electric power at the Zaporozhian and Vuglegirskiy thermal power stations, was financed. The volume of electric power produced under this grant was 27.5% of the average annual output of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this was not even a third of what we lost.

During his visit to Ukraine in November 2000, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi once again confirmed the obligation of the EU to help Ukraine in the closing of CAPS and promised to make a grant in a sum 65 million euros. But the sum of the first and second grant payments made up only 45 million. In addition to them about 16 million US dollars were granted for debt liquidation for electric power from coal.

Please note that the Program of indemnification of fuel deficit is the biggest non-permanent grant for the necessities of supply, which was given at any time by the EU to one of partner-countries of the TACIS Program. Together the total sum of financial obligation of the EU within the framework of assistance to Ukraine in connection with the closing of the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station amounts to about 1.2 billion euro. That means that we were actually given less than was promised.

At the same time, expenses for the coming 15 years for the removal from service of the remaining three power units of the station and the program of social defense are estimated in 1.5 billion US dollars.

In addition, Ukraine must introduce new power generating capacity, the volume of investments for this construction will be a very considerable sum.

As can be imagined, when we conduct our speeches about the control of nuclear weapons and the peaceful coexistence of people, adherence to one’s word by all sides is of utmost importance. Our common democratic house will not be strong, if we leave our partners in trouble after giving them hope of receiving aid.

The reality is that, despite official pledges, Ukraine in the end remained face to face with the consequences of disaster.

The State authority jointly with Kyiv city authority are working on a solution of whole complex of questions related to the Chernobyl disaster.

On April 25, 1992, the Chernobyl Museum was opened. In four years it acquired the status of a National Museum. The exposition is dedicated to helping people understand the post-Chernobyl situation; to pay attention to the lessons the Chernobyl catastrophe taught in all spheres of life; and not to give to the world the slightest possibility of forgetting these lessons.

Within the framework of the municipal program "Turbota" social and financial help is provided to the persons who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe. The program provides for: financial and medical aid; preventive measures and health improvement; transport for disabled persons. "Turbota" funds the development of the career-guidance center for disabled children

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(“Find Yourself Center”), established on the basis of International Charity Fund "Help for the Children of Chernobyl".

One of the main factors in guarding the health of the city population is the development and introduction of the measures regarding warnings and reduction in electromagnetic and radioactive exposure of the population. Harmful radioactive contamination – mainly caused by the Chernobyl tragedy of 1986 - is widespread in the Kyiv region. The half-life for some elements is well over a hundred years. A great number of the artificial radioactive elements have been absorbed by the land as a consequence of the failure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant. Despite the passage of eighteen years, investigation into the consequences of the disaster remains as urgent as ever.

Kyiv is a flourishing, historic city that overcame the crisis of the transitional period and is successfully developing today. About a million square meters of real estate are becoming available every year. The unemployment rate among Kyivers is the lowest in Ukraine being close to zero point five per cent – a very low level even for Europe. Such a level was possible because of an effective employment policy of the city. Last year’s economic transformations initiated and supported by Kiev city authorities made it possible to create almost twenty seven thousand additional jobs in Kiev enterprises, firms and organizations. And the number of positions created in 2004 appears to be almost two thousand already. So it is obvious that the dynamics are positive. Kyiv transformed itself into an attractive place for labor resources from all over Ukraine. A progressive economy provides more workplaces than the inhabitants of Kyiv actually fill. Today, as a result, there are over twenty thousand vacancies in the database of the City Service for employment.

New homes are being constructed, the budget is being met successfully, there is a need for workers--what can better testify that the city lives and develops? Modern shopping and office centers, rest areas are being built, all the infrastructure is developing. The quality of life is getting better. Cathedrals, historical sites and architectural masterpieces are being restored solely by the City. All this regenerates a genetic memory of an industrious and talented Ukrainian nation.

Definitely such confident steps are due greatly to the strong economic basis. Our city economy provides about 11% of Ukrainian gross domestic product, supporting its continual elevation at about 6% each year. Our successes in the city’s development provides the secure top position of Kyiv in the investment rating of regions of Ukraine, which are being calculated annually by the “Institute of Reforms” Independent Research Organization supported by the World Bank.

About 17% of general capital investments in the country goes to the City of Kyiv. The total volume equals 27% of total gross domestic product, which is quite an achievement. However we are not going to stop here. We are aiming to develop to a higher level, to compete with the capitals of neighboring Eastern European countries, like Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sophia, and Bucharest. Even today, Kyiv in some aspects stands in line with the abovementioned cities, and in some aspects, it even surpasses them. This is acknowledged by numerous foreign guests and specialists who visit and work in Kyiv.

The economy of the capital of Ukraine includes an extraordinarily wide spectrum of industries. Our industrial complex includes about 485 large and medium companies supported by over 4.5 thousand small enterprises, where productivity increased by 14.5% in 2003 and even more in the

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preceding year. Our industrial production is valued at $2.3 billion, which accounts for 6% of all national industrial production.

The city is a large center of foreign trade on a national scale, providing one-fifth of the combined value of external trade. The export of goods and services by Kyiv firms has grown to $2.6 billion. An event that took place last year we see as a well-deserved reward to our city. The capital of Ukraine was granted the title “European region of the year for 2005.” We were chosen from among 20 other candidates by an international jury. Nevertheless, the Chernobyl tragedy is with us to stay. It serves as a tragic symbol of the defenselessness of cities before nuclear technology. While making daily efforts to make our cities better, we must always remember that looming evil capable of destroying in the blink of an eye everything that was created by the hard work of previous generations. Nuclear weapons, international terrorism, technological failures combine today to create a mutual threat to peace and to the peace of mind of our citizens.

With apologies to the mayors of the American cities present in this hall, I must point out that it is the US Government that is proposing a fatal thesis regarding the use of small-yield nuclear wepons, the so-called mini-nukes. Bombs and shells with depleted uranium were widely used in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Surely this is not a price one is forced to pay for victory. The world scientific community speaks with one voice to highlight the heavy ecological impact in regions of armed conflict.

Completing my address I would like to once again underscore the fact that nuclear weapons are the greatest misfortune our planet has suffered. Any idea for regulating nuclear weapons sounds like nonsense. The very presence of nuclear weapons is an enormous risk, regardless of any expression of peaceful intentions.

Therefore it is extremely important to remove this sword of Damocles. An agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing must enter into force in full and without exception. For this to be realized, we must have an effective agreement on the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation.

I believe that humanity can find within itself the power to overcome the threat of nuclear catastrophe. We mayors, as heads of local authorities from all continents of the planet Earth, intend to speak out forcefully through public diplomacy.

Gathered here at UN Headquarters, we add our voice to the global antinuclear appeal, declaring: “In our city people resolutely object to all nuclear proliferation!” I know that all the delegates present support me in this appeal.

Thank you for your attention!

9. Proliferation: Finding the Common Thread Delivered by Alice Slater, GRACE After years thinking man could control the atom, the drumbeat of new outbreaks of nuclear proliferation must give the world pause. In reality we’ve been pushing our luck since 1945 when we unleashed the atom’s awful power and envisioned our jerry-built structures containing its terrifying consequences. As more countries acquire nuclear power, against a backdrop of unauthorized pre-emptive war to strike at “rogue” nuclear weapons—the nuclear phantoms are chasing us—we imagine them where they aren’t and fail to see them under our very noses; or we

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deliberately turn a blind eye for geopolitical reasons or commercial greed. To manage the nuclear apocalypse, in 1953, U.S, President Eisenhower announced the “Atoms for Peace” policy later enshrined in this now tattered Non-Proliferation Treaty. Acknowledging the first instances of horizontal proliferation, he said, “the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone… the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, Great Britain and Canada whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to…the designs of atomic bombs. The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.” He warned that “knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others”. Having accurately described the problem, his proposed “solution” was an Atomic Energy Agency to harness what he termed the “peaceful power “of atomic energy for all. Curiously, Eisenhower called to “begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles” while only moments earlier he noted “the current US stockpile…which, of course, increases daily.” The US, USSR and the UK were joined by France and China as nuclear weapons states, in this NPT agreement to control the spread of nuclear weapons by sharing “peaceful” nuclear power, while promising to get rid of their own lethal arsenals. Yet today there are more than 30,000 bombs.5 We’ve seen the bombardment of more than 2050 nuclear tests on indigenous lands across the globe, and the wasted wealth of the world spent on new, better, bigger, smaller, usable, strategic, tactical, earth penetrating nuclear bombs—spending $4 trillion in the US alone—creating an appetite in other countries to join the nuclear club, thus triggering further proliferation. We now have 44 “nuclear capable” countries which are required to ratify the forlorn Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, because the world is well aware that so-called “peaceful” nuclear power bestowed on them, under the illusion that it could actually be controlled, essentially handed each of them the keys to the bomb factory. Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, and Libya used their “peaceful” nuclear power to start nuclear weapons programs which they abandoned. Israel, however, did not forego its clandestine program and now has its own unacknowledged nuclear arsenal. India, too, had quietly acquired its own bomb in 1974. When the 1997 CTBT was with loopholes demanded by President Clinton to permit computer-simulated and underground “sub-critical” tests, appeasing the lethal appetite of the weapons laboratories for more proliferation and buying their support for its ratification, India played catch up with a series of underground tests. Pakistan swiftly followed. There are now 440 “peaceful” reactors in 31 countries — all producing deadly bomb materials with 283 research reactors in 56 countries, some producing highly enriched uranium. US CIA Director, George Tenet warned, “The difference between producing low-enriched uranium and weapons-capable high-enriched uranium is only a matter of time and intent, not technology.” There are nearly 2 million kilograms of reactor wastes in the world—with only 5 kilograms

5 http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd02nukenote.html [US reactors, 50 more by 2020: www.ne.doe.gov/nerac/ntdroadmapvolume1.pdf Doe report, A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010 sets goal of 50,000 MW=50 reactors] Citation for John Burroughs

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needed to make one bomb. The US plans 50 more reactors by 2020; China plans 30; with 31 more presently under construction--to churn out bomb-making materials. There is no known solution to safely containing the tons of nuclear waste that will be generated over the unimaginable 250,000 years it will continuously threaten life on earth. Today, United States mobilizes to dominate and control the military use of space. It withdrew from the ABM Treaty, despite its 2000 NPT promise to maintain its “strategic stability, fielding an aggressive missile program on earth and in space, planning a new plutonium bomb factory, waging an unauthorized pre-emptive war on Iraq under the pretext that Iraq had nuclear weapons, and exercising a belligerent foreign policy against so-called ‘rogue nations” and “axis of evil” countries. Meanwhile, the “peaceful” nuclear reactors, ignorantly promoted around the world under the mistaken delusion that we could actually “control” their deadly by-products, are being used by countries under siege by the Empire and its allies to make or threaten to make their own nuclear weapons in defense. Asserting its “inalienable right” under the NPT to the dark fruits of its Faustian bargain, Iran wants to enrich its nuclear materials to bomb-grade to achieve “energy independence”. This same schizophrenically characterized right is given to all NPT parties, and implemented by other non-nuclear weapons states— such as Japan, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Canada, Brazil, India, Kazakhstan, and Australia. North Korea is using its nuclear capability as a “bargaining chip” to gain economic and diplomatic relief and assurances of non-aggression from the US. News is revealed of technology developed within a country, or stolen, or sold, either openly or covertly, by nations, or by a whole network of black market nuclear suppliers, to support the efforts of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, Libya and others to get the makings of the bomb. From Germany, Britain and the Netherlands’ Urenco, to France, Russia, Norway, China, South Africa, Malaysia, Dubai, Pakistan, and no doubt other sources yet discovered, the ability to make nuclear bombs has been acquired around the globe from the earliest days—in a frightening scenario of nuclear proliferation run rampant. And how do the arms controllers propose to handle this widening proliferation? Israel intimates it is prepared to bomb Iran’s facilities to deny it the power to make nuclear weapons, just as it bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. Bush calls for a crackdown on nuclear proliferation by “dangerous and secretive regimes that build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and force their influence upon the world”. What country is he describing? The US and its allies turn a blind eye to their own vertical proliferation in nuclear weapons states while nuclear-armed submarines patrol the seven seas, the US accelerates space weapons programs, and with Russia, keeps thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert, while threatening further preemptive war. Bush would create another discriminatory class of “haves” and “have nots” in this already flawed bargain which enshrined five nuclear weapons states as the only “haves”. Bush seeks a Security Council resolution criminalizing horizontal proliferation without accepting responsibility for the nuclear weapons states’ NPT obligation to get rid of their own nuclear weapons, let alone to stop making new ones. He is calling on nuclear supplier states to ban exports of enrichment and reprocessing equipment to “have not” countries while promoting their capacity to keep running

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their reactors with fuel supplied by “have” states. This is idle folly driven by commercial greed; greed not unlike that of the AQ Khan network which seeks to buy and sell the same materials for their own personal material gain. What is the difference between the commercial nuclear industry that seeks to sell nuclear materials “at reasonable cost” and the international Mafia that is now trading and profiting from the same materials? It is the delusory vision held by the “legal” nuclear industrialists that proliferation can be controlled. We will never be able to guard loose nuclear materials and black market smuggling while we constantly generate ever more lethal nuclear waste. The time for nuclear arms control fixes with business as usual is over. The game is up. There is only one way to move forward. Nations of the world must call not only for complete nuclear disarmament, but for an end to “peaceful” nuclear power. At this critical moment, with a world mired in poverty and the constant threat of imminent war, our survival depends on implementing a plan for sustainable energy abundant in nature—local renewable resources—the sun, the wind, the tides. We urge you to take action to fund and harness these natural treasures by establishing an International Sustainable Energy Fund. Abolition 2000 has produced a model statute for such a Fund and we recommend that you implement its provisions. We have the money. Taxpayers subsidize the nuclear power industry for nearly $8 billion a year. And Export Credit Agencies in eight industrial countries loaned over $12 billion in 2001 to build new reactors around the world. This is big business! Imagine using that money for safe, clean, sustainable energy for all, ending the devastation to our environment, the increased cancers, leukemia, birth defects from mining, milling, and handling these awful materials, and the threat of further weapons proliferation. We urge you to begin serious negotiations on a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and call for a moratorium on the building of new nuclear reactors as we close the old ones down. Shift those loans and subsidies to an International Sustainable Energy Fund and promote life, not death. Albert Einstein said that “the release of atom power has changed everything except our way of thinking... the solution to this problem lies in the heart of mankind”. Listen to your hearts, try new thinking, and let us put an end to the nuclear age and the deluded dream of “atoms for peace” that has only led to war and death. 10. Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: Issues and Policy Recommendations Delivered by Elahe Mohatsham, NWN&ISS Politics has often been described as the art of bringing aspirations, hopes and ideals to meet reality. Such a task would be challenging in any context, but it would probably be more challenging in the context of the Middle East, where it often appears that the achievement of peace and security belongs more to the realm of dreams than reality. Working towards the resolution of problems in the Middle East reminds one of the words of Florizel in Shakespeare’s play ‘The Winter’s Tale’ which says

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‘How Camillo May this, almost a miracle be done? That I may call thee something more than man, And after that trust to thee.’ Since the last gathering of the NPT Preparatory Committee in Geneva in 2003, new developments have taken place, and new proposals have been put forward to manage and control nuclear power both in its military and civilian forms in a global format. Some of these developments and proposals, especially those made in reference to the Middle East region, could be viewed as attempts to bring together the aspirations and hopes of the international community for peace in the Middle East closer to reality. The public revelations about Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing programs between June 2003 and February 2004, highlighted a number of issues, namely the proliferation implications of civil nuclear fuel cycles and the means of controlling civil usable nuclear material. Libya’s decision to disclose its nuclear weapon activities in December 2003 brought into public attention the existence of a complex network of black market in radiological and nuclear procurement activities, operating across the globe. The 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee is mandated to deal with the substantive issues as well as procedural arrangements and prepare recommendations for submission to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In order to assist this process, in this presentation, three sets of recommendations are being discussed in the context of the Middle East and South Asia. The first set of recommendations concerns the strategies needed for the incorporation and involvement of India, Israel and Pakistan in the NPT process. The second set of recommendations relates to the current status of the Additional Protocol in Iran and the impact of Iran’s internal political system on the ratification process which would have significant bearing on Iran’s compliance with its NPT and the IAEA’s safeguards, and it would also have longer term implications for regional and international security. The third set of recommendations relates to the proposals concerning the NPT put forward by the Director General of the IAEA on 12 February 2004, especially in relation to the role of the United Nations Security Council not allowing any withdrawal from the NPT under Article X of the NPT, and the need for multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle. President Bush in his speech of 11 February 2004 also expressed concern in the existing loopholes within the NPT and made proposals in relation to assisting nations to end the use of weapon grade uranium, research reactors, and urged increased efforts in preventing further proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. If all these proposals are pursued further in the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee or the 2005 NPT Review Conference, a number of important discussions concerning the NPT and the related IAEA safeguards system should be anticipated. In addition, while universal criminalization of the weapons of mass destruction activities is urgently required, the submission of proposals, such as the draft proposal to the Security Council for a mandate requiring states to adopt and enforce laws to deny weapons of mass destruction to any ‘non-state’ actors, there is a growing concern that the Security Council may be turned into a legislative body of its own, undermining and replacing traditional multilateral treaty forums such as the existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

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List of Recommendations i. India, Israel and Pakistan: The three de facto nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) are situated in South Asia and the Middle East. However, any use of nuclear weapons, even a low yield atomic device in South Asia would cause immediate significant civilian casualties and have environmental ramifications for the whole of the Middle East. As part of the efforts to achieve the universality of the NPT as well as to promote the goal of Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, the NPT member states could send formal invitations to India, Israel and Pakistan for the presence of official observers from these three countries in the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences, providing them access to both the open and closed sessions. The presence of official observers could, in the short term, resolve the controversy over the question of how to include these three nuclear weapon states within the NPT in view of the current Article IX.3 of the NPT which defines a nuclear weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.” In the past, a number of non-NPT states have intermittently attended the NPT Preparatory and Review Conferences. For example, in the 1997 and 1998 NPT Preparatory Committees, the following then non-NPT states, Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan were present as observers (with access only to the open sessions of the Committees) with the exception of Pakistan, which did not attend the NPT Preparatory committee in 1998. Since that time, Brazil (on 18 September 1998) and Cuba (on 4 November 2002) have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. In the long term, and bearing in mind the differences between the legal position of Israel (as a non-declared nuclear weapon state) and India and Pakistan (as self declared nuclear weapon states) in relation to the NPT, different strategies may be needed to include these three states within the NPT framework. It may be possible to persuade India and Pakistan to adopt responsible policies as far as export controls are concerned and act in the manner as though being a party to the NPT, at least in this respect. In the case of Israel it might be more appropriate to pursue negotiations for the establishment of a regional nuclear safeguards inspection system or an international one under the existing IAEA arrangements. ii. Iran: A better understanding and appreciation of the internal political system of Iran would be crucial in preventing a potential regional and international crisis at this critical stage when the Additional Protocol is in the process of being presented and ratified by the Iranian Parliament (Majles) and the Council of Guardians. At the present time, the moderate elements within the Iranian political system (especially in the Foreign Ministry) have been instrumental, in a communication with the Director General of the IAEA, to commit Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol as early as 10 November 2003. On that basis, the IAEA has been able to question Iran about its past and current nuclear activities and to conduct investigations, have access to sites, nuclear sources and materials within Iran. The IAEA has been able to conduct all these activities despite the reluctance of some conservative elements in the Iranian political system who may wish to postpone any full compliance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol until the completion of the full ratification process by the Council of Guardians and Majles. The Council of Guardians has often been associated with the conservative, hard line Islamic elements in the political system. It tends to block any 'unIslamic' laws, which may be passed by the Majles. In the context of the current uncertain security situation in the region, an international crisis (such as a military attack on Iran's nuclear

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facilities, or undue political pressure on Iran) may delay such ratification or provide excuses for the more conservative elements in the political system to justify full withdrawal from the NPT. iii. Proposals Concerning the NPT: Long before the recent proposals on how to improve the NPT and IAEA’s safeguards system, there have been ideas and questions in both diplomatic and academic circles as to whether there was a need for any fundamental amendments to the existing NPT, or whether there was a need to interpret the existing articles of the NPT in such a way to suite the changing international security environment. However, what makes the current proposals significant is the manner in which these proposals have been put forward and being promoted. Discussions to reform the NPT and IAEA’s articles, rules and regulations should not be pursued or promoted in such a manner that a particular country or a group of countries feel alienated or threatened. Issues involved in nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East are invariably linked to much wider issues of management of nuclear energy/power at global level and to the changing role, rules and regulations of the NPT, IAEA and Security Council of the United Nations. Therefore, any prospective proposals concerning the NPT should address the wider issues of disarmament, negative and positive security assurances, and confidence building measures at the international level. In the absence of this wider perspective, measures and proposals, which are aimed at enhancing the international security may, in the long term, undermine the whole structure of the nuclear non-proliferation system. -------------- The Status of the Additional Protocol in the Middle East: The Additional Protocol is in force in the following countries of the Middle East region: Azerbaijan (signed on 5 July 2000, and ratified on 29 November 2000); Iran (signed on 18 December 2003; although Iran has not yet ratified the Protocol, in a communication to the Director General of 10 November 2003 Iran committed itself to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol with effect from that date); Jordan (singed on 28 July 1998, and ratified on 28 July 1998); Kuwait (singed on 19 June 2002, and ratified on 2 June 2003); Libya (singed on 10 March 2004; although Libya has not yet ratified the Protocol, Libya has committed itself to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol in effect from 19 December 2003); Turkey (signed on 6 July 2000, and ratified on 17 July 2001); Uzbekistan (signed on 22 September 1998, and ratified on 21 December 1998). The following additional countries have also signed the Protocol, but not yet ratified it. Armenia (singed on 29 September 1997); Kazakhstan (signed on 6 February 2004); Tajikistan (singed on 7 July 2000). Therefore, in the context of the Middle East, the following member states of the NPT have not yet signed the Additional Protocol: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates. 11. Grassroots Campaigns Delivered by Mayors for Peace (shorter versions of this presentation will be delivered)

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Hon. Bill Perkins Deputy Majority Leader, New York City Council Mr. Chairman, I am the Deputy Majority Leader of the New York City Council, which makes me the official host of the mayoral delegation here today. As such, it is my honor to introduce a delegation of mayors representing X cities in X countries. With us today are (to be determined prior to presentation). The World Conference of Mayors for Peace now has 579 city members in 108 countries and territories. This past November at the 2nd Global Citizens Assembly in Nagasaki, we formally launched what we are calling an Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. From its inception the campaign has had input and enthusiastic support from Abolition 2000, a coalition of 2000 NGOs worldwide that includes many of the NGOs present at this PrepCom. The campaign is also supported by the International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, the Association of Nuclear Free Authorities, (add names as reasonable). We are all united and participating in this campaign because the time has come to eliminate nuclear weapons. I don’t think I have to tell you why I am here. The world has yet to recover from the fear, hatred, and economic turmoil caused by the loss of the World Trade Center complex. Just imagine what would have happened if, instead, a small nuclear device had been used and half of Manhattan was turned to rubble. Or, what if the two planes that struck the towers had struck the Indian River Power Plant just thirty miles from here? We might well have lost all of New York City for centuries to come. I am taking part in this delegation to express my firm belief that we must ban, stigmatize, and proceed to actually dismantle all nuclear weapons, and the sooner the better. I also want to let you know that the mayoral delegation here today is just the beginning of a worldwide movement that will call increasingly strenuously for real action in that direction. For example, tomorrow at 3pm this delegation will meet with the New York City Council at City Hall. There, we will discuss plans for the future, and one of those plans is to hold a World Fair of Cities in Central Park next May to coincide with the NPT Review Conference. We will work closely with the Mayors for Peace to ensure that hundreds of mayors from around the world are in New York for that conference, and we will make sure that the New York residents who happen to be from the cities or countries represented have an opportunity to come out and meet the mayors. We will have food, music, poets, artists, speakers and communities from those nations all converging on Central Park, but the focus will be on what you will be doing in this building. We will be letting you know that we are tired of waiting. We are tired of living under the heinous threat of global annihilation. The nuclear weapon states promised thirty years ago to eliminate their nuclear weapons, and we demand that this promise be kept before it is too late. Thank you. Senator Patrik Vankrunkelsven, Belgium, Mayors for Peace Mr President, honoured delegates, ladies and gentlemen,

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You see before you a strange combination of a Belgian Senator and a citizens weapons inspector of secret nuclear weapon bases. In Belgium many know me from the TV screen as a most agile politician, scaling high fences - and sometimes falling down. So, why should a politician belonging to the conservative liberal party let himself be manhandled by the police and spend hours in handcuffs in cold police stations, if I already have the democratic authority to question our ministers in Parliament? Because in Parliament I can be sure of never getting a simple answer to a simple question: are there nuclear weapons in my country? Most frustrating, … Which is why I have considered it necessary to participate with other responsible citizens in “Citizens’ Weapons Inspections”. This movement anticipated, as it were, the 2000 NPT Review Conference, where all signatories to the treaty agreed to 13 steps towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. Among these steps were calls for greater transparency by the nuclear weapon states, who are also required to report on their compliance with Article VI; yet none of the weapon states has so far delivered any adequate or meaningful report on their current stocks of nuclear weapons, facilities and fissile materials

These disarmament and transparency obligations must be treated as just as binding as the commitments made by Iraq, North Korea and Libya. It is extremely hypocritical that certain nuclear powers that call for UN weapons inspections in Iraq, North Korea and Libya should themselves be unwilling to disclose information about their own stocks, even to elected members of parliament. We are particularly concerned about the complete lack of transparency and democratic control regarding US nuclear weapons in Europe. Though the NATO states concerned argue that the nuclear sharing agreements under which these weapons are deployed do not breach the letter of Articles I and Article II of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which outlaw the transfer of nuclear weapons from a nuclear weapon state to a non-nuclear weapon state, we are very concerned that these NATO deployments are in violation of the spirit and intentions of the Treaty, as understood by the vast majority of its states parties. If we want all states to abide by the norms and obligations of the NPT in spirit as well as in letter, then we must do so too. The concept of “Citizens Weapons Inspection” was developed in this context, reflecting the conflict between nuclear secrecy and democratic responsibility and accountability. Let us look back over the history of these weapon inspections. The idea of the “citizens’ inspection” arose in 1997, while international attention was focused on the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq. On July 8th 1997, the first anniversary of the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the illegality of nuclear weapons, an international delegation of peace activists served notarized Citizens’ Summons to all NATO heads of state during a NATO Summit in the Spanish capital Madrid. The summons demanded that the NATO governments fulfil their existing disarmament obligations under the NPT.

As there was no satisfactory response to the Citizens’ Summons, the main entrance to the NATO headquarters in Brussels was blocked by activists on August 6th 1997 for a ‘war crimes inspection’. This was the start of a continuing series of citizens’ inspections in Belgium and elsewhere, with concerned people asking not only for transparency, but also for governments to comply with international and humanitarian law.

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Because of the lack of openness about nuclear weapons kept by the US and its allies, and the absence of UN inspectors in these countries, many citizens felt the necessity to start their own inspections of nuclear related sites. At many sites around the world they searched for the presence, production or deployment of nuclear weapons and the plans to use nuclear weapons. To our knowledge, citizens’ inspections have been organized in Australia, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the US.

A “Citizens’ Weapons Inspection” involves groups of concerned citizens, members of parliament, community leaders and other prominent figures. These inspections can assume various forms, and our goal is to have citizens inspecting all countries which are suspected of harbouring nuclear weapons and in which there are no active UN inspections. These inspections have all been conducted nonviolently, openly and accountably. Nevertheless, in almost all cases, the official response to inspection has been repression: in the form of arrest, detention and prosecution. In the most spectacular cases, involving many hundreds of inspectors, the police have deployed huge amounts of equipment and personnel in an attempt to thwart the inspection. I myself have been arrested at least five times, and once prosecuted, for breaking various domestic laws, such as trespassing and criminal damage. I defended my action as a justified attempt to uphold international law. Europe is a densely populated region. Any use of nuclear weapons within this region would inevitably cause massive civilian casualties. It is difficult to conceive of any use of these weapons outside of the region that would not also cause indiscriminate civilian casualties or that could be justified as necessary for the “very survival” of the NATO countries involved. In either case, nuclear weapons use would be a violation of the findings of the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of July 1996. And as the Judges pointed out, if the use is illegal, so is the threat of use, and these deployments implicitly threaten use. It is alarming that a state can react in this way to prevent a legitimate action designed to uphold international law. It highlights once again the lengths to which the authorities will go to conceal information and prevent democratic debate about these weapons. The results of these weapons inspections are summarized in a detailed report coordinated by the Belgian NGO For Mother Earth. This Citizens’ Weapons Inspection report is available on the list of NGO materials and was posted on the World Wide Web today, making it accessible to all interested parties. Now we want to express our gratitude to the many members of the Citizens’ Weapons Inspection Working Group of Abolition 2000 and the other peace groups without whose efforts this report would not have been possible today. Mr President, honoured delegates, ladies and gentlemen,

What is the purpose of these inspections and report?

There is a clear need for more transparency and accountability. People are entitled to know if nuclear weapons are being developed or deployed in non-nuclear states. They are also entitled to know what is happening in the nuclear states. Where are these weapons of mass destruction located? Is there an intention to use them? Who are the targets?

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Citizens’ Weapons Inspections are designed to dispel the secrecy surrounding the weapons of mass destruction maintained by official and de facto nuclear weapon possessors, and to urge those states to comply with international law and dismantle their stocks of nuclear weapons.

Pending the coming of this greater transparency, these actions (which are most of the time well covered by the media) keep the broader social debate alive. Not only the thousands of activists and the more general peace movement, but also broad sections of the population are thus made aware of the problems of peace and security. When sufficient numbers of people shaping public opinion see a problem in this situation, politicians will be forced to take positive action towards greater transparency and more disarmament. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, stated on February 12th in The New York Times: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security, and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use”. That is why members of parliament and citizens have joined together to take part in acts of nonviolent civil disobedience in order to obtain information about weapons of mass destruction where no UN inspection teams are dispatched. We do this to force an open discussion on the issue, in parliament and in the courts. We do this to urge the UN to organize inspections in all nuclear states. We do this to prevent their use and, ultimately, to push for their complete abolition. Thank you for allowing us to share this information with you today. Abelina Shaw, Chief of Staff, City of Honolulu, Hawaii

As Chief of Staff and representative of the City & County of Honolulu, one of the largest metropolitan Islands in the Pacific and the city of Hiroshima's first sister-city, it is my duty to remind this body of an issue that affects Honolulu directly, but also affects every person in this room and on this planet. Those of us who live on islands do not see the Ocean as a separator. For centuries the ocean has been a highway indispensable to cultural exchange and development. Island people know best that the ocean is the source of nourishment and life, and we also know that what affects the ocean affects us all. Between July 1946 and August 1958, a total of 67 atomic and hydrogen bombs were detonated in the atmosphere in the Marshall Islands, just 3000 miles upwind of Hawaii. A bomb called Mike on Nov. 1, 1952 vaporized people, plants, animals and the entire island of Elugelab, leaving a hole in the ocean large enough to hold 14 Pentagons. The most powerful bomb in these early years was called “Bravo,” a15-megaton device detonated on March 1, 1954 over Bikini Atoll. It was equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima bombs, and it killed and injured Japanese fishermen on a fishing boat well out of the established “danger zone.”

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The people living on Bikini Atoll were told by a U.S. military officer that their ancestral home was needed for a military project and quote “if you give up your islands for the benefit of mankind so we can test our weapons, we will take care of you”. unquote The atolls were to be returned when the tests were completed.

Fallout from Bravo scattered over 7,000 sq. miles. In 1980, Congress issued a stinging report entitled The Forgotten Guinea Pigs, which concluded that the Atomic Energy Commission deliberately chose to conduct its atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program rather than protect the health and welfare of the human beings living near or downwind from the nuclear test sites. And since the trade winds and jet stream traverse the length and breadth of the Pacific, all islands are “downwind.” Rongelap Mayor James Matayoshi, on March 1, 2004, declared, quote “The people of Kwajalein, who sacrificed their home and society for America's nuclear ambitions, still live in squalid conditions on Ebeye, unable to live in peace and comfort in their own homeland. They have been subjected to…displacement, loss of traditional skills, social disruption, and the contamination of their lands and seas.” unquote The women of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana’s, and other Pacific Islands suffer high rates of miscarriage. Their children suffer far too many strange and severe congenital deformities. The islanders suffer high rates of cancer, hepatitis, tuberculosis and immune deficiency diseases. The plants and animals of their islands and surrounding waters were also impacted. After the island tests, the Atomic Energy Commission & the Navy took the hot ships from Bikini to Guam to wash them down. The waters of the Marianas are still contaminated with radiation, and Guam has more cancers and hepatitis per capita then any other island in the Pacific. Today, thousands of men and women living on these islands, many of whom actually served in the U.S. military, are suffering the effects of radiation and have been forgotten. In spite of overwhelming evidence of harmful radiation exposure, their claims are still routinely denied, and some claims adjudicated in their favor have never been paid as promised. Many islanders have immigrated to Hawaii, where they have been cared for at considerable expense. Yet, the U.S. federal government has been extremely slow to reimburse Hawaii for these expenses obviously incurred on its behalf. It is safe to say that none of the Islands are safe from the effects of 317 nuclear tests conducted over 30 years by the US, UK, and France. However, that fallout has traveled on wind and water to all of you as well. It is very likely that someone you know well died earlier than they would have had this testing never taken place. This story has been told over and over again, but it is our responsibility to tell it at every opportunity to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again exploded for testing or combat. That responsibility should not rest only on the most direct victims. Medical, social and cultural justice must be done, but we are all victims, and the time has come to rise up and demand that these heinous, cruel, and illegal weapons be eliminated. The nuclear weapon states have promised to do so. We must all insist now that they keep that promise. Thank you.

Mayor Andreas Pahatourides, City of Peristeri, Greece

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Dear Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues – Mayors of the World, Acting as the representative of all Mayors of Greece, I am announcing hereby our common and unanimous decision to work for a peaceful world without nuclear weapons. Allow me please to say that I am deeply touched by my participation in this delegation of “Mayors for Peace”, especially because the city of which I am honoured to be the Mayor is named in Greek “Peristeri”, which means “dove”. The name and the emblem of our city, which is the fourth most populated city of Greece and is inspired by a deeply democratic and peace-friendly consciousness, is the Dove, the International-symbol of Peace, which frames with its Semantics our faith to the eternal values of Peace and Friendship among peoples. Dear Friends, After those most terrifying experiences in the History of Mankind, the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, we have not had – fortunately – any other such experience. Unfortunately, that does not signify the disappearance of nuclear weapons. Down through the years, armament and disarmament have been a core debate among people with a profound interest in preserving peace. Since the dying days of World War II, nuclear weapons have been brandished but never used. However, can we really call this a nuclear truce? A truce is not just a temporary pause in hostilities. To use a truce to rearm for war is an abuse of the truce. We are informed that more countries are developing nuclear weapons, a fact that is lengthening the road to Nuclear Disarming. In order to achieve Full Nuclear Disarmament, we need to take many significant steps. The NPT is one of these steps. In the true spirit of a truce, the Appeal of the Mayors for Peace Executive Committee, at the very inception of the NPT Emergency Campaign, called upon ‘‘the nuclear-weapon states and the de facto nuclear-weapon states, including non-parties to the NPT, [to] immediately cease all nuclear development programs and bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force forthwith.’’ This reflects the common attitude and wish of our citizens to reduce the nuclear danger. Also, the call from the Mayors for Peace ‘‘for work to begin on mapping the road to a nuclear-weapons free world and [for] a commitment to reach that goal by 2020’’, is not just a simple wish. It is an indispensable imperative for the future of our peoples and it harmonises with the deepest and truest spirit of truce. Prior to the Review Conference in 2005, which this body can make a great turning point away from nuclear arms and threats, I ask every one of you to recollect a much-forgotten ancient Greek tradition, the Olympic Truce. During the Games, all hostilities everywhere ceased.

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This spirit of truce and friendship should be reinstituted. My Country, Greece, where the Olympic games will be held in August 2004, and my City, Peristeri, in which some of the Games Sport Events will take place, are already engaged in spreading the Olympic Truce. We believe that this is a most important step, a model for friendship, for understanding, for tolerance, for acceptance of differences and for adoption of the supreme values of peace, dialog and international fraternization. Dear Friends and Colleagues, Delegates of the World, Athletics has been proven to be one of the most effective ways of encouraging and promoting human understanding and the spirit of peace. Thus, I call to you, let us seize the opportunity and reaffirm our will for a world without violence, without threats, without nuclear weapons. Let us declare an Olympic Truce that will be a great step towards a constant and permanent truce to be adopted by the family of humankind. Towards a world of co-operation and common values, a shared peaceful future, our Vision and Hope is a Truce lasting 365 days a year. Because Peace is our Right and our Choice. Thank you. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, For a half-century every human being on this planet has been living under a threat so horrifying most of us fail to comprehend it. Today, that threat is not diminishing, it is growing. On behalf of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on behalf of the 350 million citizens in the 572 cities that are members of the Mayors for Peace, on behalf of thousands of NGOs with millions of members, on behalf of all human beings who wish to live free of the nuclear threat, and on behalf of our children and generations of children to come to whom we are duty-bound to bequeath a safe, peaceful, and clean planet, I urge you to establish a clear timeframe and begin negotiating and planning for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons. Thank you. 12. NGO Summary Recommendations Delivered by John Loretz, IPPNW Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Delegates, Frederick Douglass stated: “Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. ...Power concedes nothing without a demand.”

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We would like to conclude this body of presentations by reiterating our demand for a nuclear free world and making some specific recommendations for how to get there. States Parties have two sets of recommendations to make to the Review Conference next year-- one on procedural issues, and one on the more substantive issues. Since substance and procedure are often inextricably related, there are elements of both in many of the following recommendations. Recommendation 1: Disarm We have heard from policy makers in the Nuclear Weapon States that the NGOs put too much emphasis on nuclear disarmament at the expense of reining in proliferation. We uncategorically reject this assessment and demand that the Nuclear Weapon States stop trying to change the subject. Disarmament is the foundation of all non-proliferation efforts and of the Treaty itself, and we urge the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT to join us in holding the Nuclear Weapon States accountable to their obligations. Governments should allocate financial and personnel resources in their own countries to implement their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. New Zealand, for example, has a disarmament minister and we encourage all states to create similar high-level positions. At the same time, the non-nuclear weapon states must refrain from threats of their own -- either explicit or covert -- to break out of the NPT. This is a tall order. Nonetheless, you are all under contract, as it were, and we expect delivery. The following specific actions should be taken without further delay: A) A clear timeframe for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons should be established- no later than 2020, and negotiations should commence as of the 2005 NPT Review on a phased program of incremental steps leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within that timeframe. A specific course of milestones to reach in verification technology, in storage capability, in disposal plans, and in other aspects of dismantling and destroying existing nuclear arsenals would serve as a plan of action by which to measure progress. While attempts were made to do this with the 13 Steps of the 2000 Final Document, time bound targets were not attached to any of the goals and incessant backsliding has been the result. We recommend that the United Nations convene a Summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a prelude to the opening of negotiations on a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. A deadline of no later than the 2010 NPT Review should be set for completion of those negotiations and submission of the Convention for signature and ratification. Within this framework, an International Nuclear Disarmament Organization should be created, with the authority and resources to facilitate the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world’s arsenals by no later than 2020 and to monitor this nuclear-free status for the foreseeable future.6

B) As a good faith step, the world's nuclear weapon states, acknowledged or unacknowledged in this Treaty, must end the design and development of new nuclear weapons and cease deployment programs.7 This body should explicitly condemn policies that seek to justify preemptive nuclear strikes. It should also condemn the creation of new generations of nuclear weapons, as well as new justifications for them, which contradict the letter and spirit of the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states should discard policies that make them dependent upon the nuclear weapons of others for their security. The States Parties to the NPT should place

6 Presentation #3, “Vertical Proliferation” 7 Presentation #3, “Vertical Proliferation”

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unrelenting pressure on States that have not yet ratified the CTBT -- particularly the Annex B states and the two nuclear weapon states who have not yet ratified.8 All forms of nuclear testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. As citizens of many of these countries, we are embarrassed and angry that their governments are so invested in cold-war era concepts of nuclear defense that they would not ratify a treaty whose objective is to prevent the widespread harm of nuclear testing. We must remember the faces of the hibakusha, of the atomic veterans, of the downwinders, of the indigenous peoples throughout the world who have suffered because of nuclear testing, and we must make every effort to prevent this from happening again. C) Disarmament of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons must go hand-in hand with disarmament of the warheads themselves. Testing of both missiles and missile defense systems must stop. Negotiations should commence for an international treaty banning testing and deployment of ballistic missiles and of missile defense systems. Research, development, testing, building, and deployment of weapons for use in space should be prohibited.9

Recommendation 2: No New Nuclear Reactors We urge a moratorium on the building of new nuclear reactors as old ones are closed down. Funds from Export Credit Agencies and government subsidies for new nuclear power plants should be transferred to an International Sustainable Energy Fund.10

Recommendation 3: Implement and Strengthen the NPT in a Non-Discriminatory Manner That Demands Accountability States Parties to the NPT -- particularly the nuclear weapon states but also non-nuclear states that are the focus of breakout concerns -- must be held to a higher standard of reporting on their Treaty compliance than presently exists. Substantive reporting should be viewed as part of the infrastructure of monitoring, verification, and enforcement of the NPT and its disarmament and non-proliferation goals. In particular: A) Step 12 of the 13 Steps obliges all states to provide regular reports on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The number of States submitting these reports must increase, as must the quality and frequency of reporting, so that they can fulfill their potential as an important transparency tool.11 B) Treaty-based, multilateral mechanisms to address disarmament and non-proliferation goals must be strengthened, so that reliance on unilateral or plurilateral measures for enforcement and verification will not become the norm. In particular, concerns regarding suspected or documented horizontal proliferation such as those seen most recently in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya must be handled within the context of the NPT and the IAEA. Where necessary, the capacity to address those concerns within the Treaty framework must be reinforced. Similarly, the capabilities for addressing and halting vertical proliferation and for enforcing progress toward the elimination of all nuclear arsenals must be built up. Mechanisms that should be

8 Presentation #4, “A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps” 9 Presentation #5, “A Fresh Look at Vertical Proliferation: Ballistic Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization” 10 Presentation #8, “Proliferation: Finding the Common Thread” 11 Presentation #4, “A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps”

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considered include a permanent NPT body, and a UN-based inspectorate, drawing on UNMOVIC capabilities.12

C) NPT Member States should make common cause with those responsible for implementing the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in pursuit of effective and mutually reinforcing systems for verification and enforcement.13

D) As one of its responsibilities, a new NPT Secretariat (see Recommendation 7, below) should formally consider the findings of civil-society-based teams of “citizen inspectors” to assist it in the task of global fact finding with regard to NPT compliance. Citizen inspectors should be recognized as legitimate gatherers of information in nuclear weapon states and in non-nuclear weapon states allegedly conducting clandestine nuclear weapons programs, regarding the locations of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; targets and suspected targets; policies governing their intended uses; and the fulfillment of disarmament commitments.14

Recommendation 4: Insist That International Means International We have discussed our growing concern today that binding international agreements that serve the goals of common global security are being replaced by unilateral and plurilateral strategies of counterproliferation that primarily serve the interests of the most powerful states. The goal of the NPT is to achieve global disarmament under “strict and effective international control,” and no one Member State or group of Member States acting as a “coalition of the willing” should be allowed to dominate the discussion about how and when to implement the Treaty, or to exempt themselves from its provisions. Specifically: A) In order to accomplish the Article VI goal of nuclear disarmament, irreversible steps to reduce nuclear weapons holdings are essential. In this regard, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russia should be brought into conformance with the principles of transparency and irreversibility reflected in the 13 Steps. NPT Member States should incorporate the measures enacted by the G8 in the Global Partnership Program into a broader, well funded multilateral verification framework under IAEA controls.15

B) As part of the effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, as well as to promote the goal of nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East and elsewhere, the NPT Member States should send formal invitations for official observers from Israel, India, and Pakistan at the NPT PrepComs and Reviews, and develop mechanisms for giving them greater access to NPT deliberations.16

C) Negotiations should commence immediately on a multilateral treaty banning the shipment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Any strengthening of the right to intercept

12 Presentation #6, “Beyond the NPT: Recent Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation” 13 Presentation #9 , “Human Tragedy of Proliferation and Nuclear Re-armament” 14 Presentation #4, “Grassroots Initiatives” 15 Presentation #4, “A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps” 16 Presentation #10, “Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia: Issues and Policy Recommendations”

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shipments, which affects both sovereignty and use of force issues, should proceed through legitimate multilateral lawmaking, and within an accountable and equitable multilateral framework. D) Excess weapons-grade fissile materials of the nuclear weapon states must be brought under IAEA safeguards, consistent with Article III of the NPT as affirmed in the 2000 Final Document.17 We support the recommendations of Mr. ElBaradei that parts of the nuclear fuel cycle should be brought under multinational control and that export controls should be universalized. Tough, on-site inspections must be universally accepted. So long as States maintain the foolhardy claim to nuclear power, dangerous fissile materials should not be in the hands of a few States, but should be internationalized and monitored heavily by an international agency such as the IAEA.18

E) The withdrawal clause of the NPT should be revised. A method should be established to convene the Member States to begin negotiations with any State threatening to withdraw from the Treaty, with the goal of settling any differences or disputes that may be the root cause of a State's desire to withdraw. Regrettably, there was no such a dispute settlement mechanism when the DPRK took steps to withdraw from the NPT in 2003. We urge the United States and the DPRK to engage in sincere bilateral negotiations in addition to the six-party talks in Beijing, and to resolve the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. F) The role of the IAEA in verification of peaceful nuclear activities must be supported through both financial and political commitments to the safeguard and verification regime. Member States should create a permanent monitoring and verification unit under the UN umbrella and based on the expertise of UNMOVIC.19

Recommendation 5: Enhance NGO Access As the cornerstone of accountability, transparency with regard to the implementation of NPT obligations is called for in the 13 Steps. Closed door meetings, however, represent the antithesis to this. An essential element of transparency is NGO participation in the NPT Review Process, which has the secondary effect of allowing states to benefit from the considerable expertise within civil society. To this end, we urge this meeting to recommend to the 2005 Review Conference that NGO participants be granted increased access to the proceedings, including fewer closed sessions allowing NGO observers to attend cluster discussions, and timely access to documentation. Recommendation 6: Strengthen Member State Reporting In the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, states agreed to submit regular reports on their progress toward disarmament. We note that there have been more reports submitted at each of the three PrepComs since 2000, and urge states to continue strengthening this important transparency tool. While a standardized reporting mechanism might increase ease of reporting, and the NGO Shadow Report prepared by Reaching Critical Will provides one such model, we would encourage increased participation before negotiations of a standard format. Substantive 17 Presentation #4, “A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps” 18 Presentation #6, “Beyond the NPT: Recent Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation” 19 Presentation #4, “A Living Document: Reaffirming the 13 Steps”

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statements on the part of the nuclear weapon states about nuclear holdings and fissile material stocks, operational status and doctrine, would be an important confidence building measure and encourage others to report as well. Translation and distribution of these reports will be an important contribution to the institutional memory of the NPT -- but the question remains, who is the custodian of institutional memory? Recommendation 7: Create an NPT Secretariat In the absence of an NPT Secretariat, many functions and responsibilities either fall by the wayside, or are dealt with ineffectively in an ad-hoc way. To whom are reports submitted and archived? Who is monitoring this crucial function? To whom do States lodge complaints or suspicions of non-compliance? An NPT Secretariat is necessary at this time. Such an institution could be modeled on the OPCW, and would serve as an interim body until there is a Nuclear Weapons Convention, nuclear weapons have been eliminated at long last, and we have no more need for the NPT at all. To create such an institution, States Parties of the NPT must contribute adequate personal and financial resources. They must identify a host country and develop the terms of reference for the institution, including its relationship with the IAEA. We have confidence that these tasks could be done with the assistance of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, and encourage Member States to recommend this procedural modification to the NPT. Another function that an NPT Secretariat could play would be to conduct meetings with states outside of the NPT to encourage their participation, in much the same way that the CTBT provisional secretariat meets with states that have not yet ratified that treaty. The only meaningful measure to gauge the effectiveness of the NPT is the progress and the pace of efforts by the Nuclear Weapon States to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. If the Nuclear Weapon States comply with their NPT obligations under Article VI, non-proliferation will be easier to ensure. If they do not and the nuclear double standard articulated most explicitly by the United States continues to dominate this forum, proliferation will be impossible to stop and nuclear war itself will become unpreventable. Therefore, every substantive recommendation of the NGO community made in this summation serves one, underlying purpose: to challenge the States Parties to the NPT to summon the political will required to put global nuclear disarmament on a strict, short, and unambiguous timetable. As representatives of civil society - as those who have entrusted you with the job of eliminating these genocidal weapons from the world’s arsenals- we expect action, not a proliferation of excuses for inaction. Thank you. 13. Concluding Remarks Delivered by Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba, Hiroshima, MfP Mr. Chairman, government delegates, ladies and gentlemen, you have just heard a presentation of facts and recommendations offered to you by the entire disarmament NGO community, a community that has spent months working cooperatively and devotedly to find some way to communicate to you the mounting sense of crisis we feel.

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We have here today (number) A-bomb survivors or hibakusha, ordinary people who have risen above excruciating personal pain to tell us their stories and work tirelessly to save us all from the fate they suffered. Next year will be the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings. All hibakusha pray that, in that milestone year, your 2005 Review Conference will at last show them what they have fought so long and so hard to achieve; a world preparing to save itself from nuclear holocaust. It should be obvious from what you have heard today that the time is ripe for eliminating nuclear weapons. I assure you that a powerful anti-nuclear movement is emerging and building momentum daily. I have been amazed by the support our Mayors Campaign has received, and we are only one of many initiatives that will converge on the Review Conference next year. Turn the Tide is the name of an online grassroots campaign launched by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation that will mobilize broad-based public support for US nuclear policies that work to reduce and eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons. The World Council of Churches has recently adopted a powerful Statement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The National Council of Churches in the US is making nuclear disarmament a priority, and a broad range of denominations and individual churches have made their own statements. The European Parliament this past March passed a resolution that calls for disarmament and specifically declares support for our mayors’ campaign. In addition, I have invited the Conference on Disarmament to meet in Hiroshima, a proposal now under consideration that I have every hope will be accepted. Around the world at every level, from the grassroots to mayors to parliamentarians to national leaders, people are awakening from the nuclear trance to the totally unnecessary and immoral danger of these weapons. When you gather here next year for the Review Conference, you will be the focus of greater worldwide attention, expectation, and hope than has ever been accorded the NPT in its 35-year history. Mr. Chairman, for more than half a century every human being on this planet has been living under a threat so horrifying that most of us fail to comprehend it. Today, that threat is not diminishing, it is growing. On behalf of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on behalf of the 350 million citizens of the 579 cities that are members of the Mayors for Peace, on behalf of thousands of NGOs with millions of members, on behalf of all human beings who wish to live free of the nuclear threat, and on behalf of our children and generations of children to come to whom we are duty-bound to bequeath a safe, peaceful, and clean planet, I urge you to establish a clear timeframe and begin negotiating and planning for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year 2020. Please let our venerable hibakusha go to their final rest comforted in the knowledge that the world’s leaders are at last determined to take the steps necessary to welcome future generations into a nuclear-weapon-free world. Thank you.

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