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NIDS China Security Report2013 National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

NIDS China Security Report 2013

Published by:The National Institute for Defense Studies2-2-1 Nakameguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8648, JapanPhone: +81-3-5721-7005E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.nids.go.jp

Copyright © 2014 by the National Institute for Defense Studies, JapanAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without written, prior permission from the publisher.

This publication is a translation of the Japanese version originally published in January 2014.

ISBN 978-4-86482-010-3 Printed in Japan

NIDS China Security Repor t 2013

Contents

Preface iii

Executive Summary iv

Acronyms and Abbreviations vi

IntroductionChina’s New Assertiveness 2

Possibility of Crisis Management with China 3

China’s External Crisis Management SystemCentralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society 6

From Leading Small Groups to State Security Committee 9

Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command 12

China’s Concept of Crisis ManagementCrisis Management to China 16

Chasing Conflicting Targets 18

Politics of Crisis Management 21

Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis BehaviorThe 2001 EP-3 Incident 26

Toward Accident Prevention 29

Conclusions 36

　　　 The Role of Chinese Think Tanks in Foreign and Security Policy Making 8

　　　 The Fire-control Radar-lock by a PLAN Vessel 38Column

Column

i

Distributed widely in Japan and overseas, the NIDS China Security Report analyzes China’s security policy and military trends from the mid- to long-term perspective. From the inaugural issue released in April 2011, a series of reports has attracted keen interest from Japanese and overseas research institutions and the media and provided increasing opportunities for dialogue with experts and research institutions based on the analysis in the reports. We hope to continue to make a contribution to facilitating policy discussions concerning China in Japan and other countries, and to broadening opportunities for dialogue, exchange, and cooperation in the field of security and defense between Japan and China.

This fourth issue focuses on crisis management in China. The report begins with an overview of the Chinese mechanisms for decision-making and execution for international crisis management and shows how Beijing regards unified decision-making as important. Reviewing some research on Chinese crisis management, the report considers Beijing’s intellectual process and concepts that lie behind deciding their behavior in crises. Then the study analyzes how Beijing is preparing to prevent the occurrence of external crises and how they react to an actual crisis, with a particular focus on Sino-U.S. relations as a case. This report carried out analysis with reference to open source resources, including media reports and research materials. The authors would like to thank a number of scholars from many countries and regions including China for sharing their views and valuable insights.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of Defense or the Government of Japan. This report was authored by Masayuki Masuda, Yasuyuki Sugiura and Shinji Yamaguchi. Editorial work was conducted by Yoshiaki Sakaguchi (editor-in-chief), Akihiro Ohama, Shuji Sue, Naoki Tohmi, Masayuki Masuda, Rira Monma and Akira Watanabe.

January 2014NIDS China Security Report Task Force

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

Preface

iii

China’s External Crisis Management System

As a diversifying society has emerged in China, state-owned enterprises, local governments, think tanks, and public opinion have become important actors that can influence Beijing’s foreign and security policies, along with the Communist Party of China (CPC), the government and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Nonetheless, this does not mean the decentralization of decision-making authority. The decision-making for important issues is exclusively made by the CPC Politburo Standing Committee. The collective leadership system at the Standing Committee, however, might impede swift decision-making. The PLA has no official authority to directly take part in decision-making at the Politburo Standing Committee, whereas does influence it through providing information and policy recommendations. The leading small groups are in charge of providing information and recommendations, and coordination and formation of policies under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee. The authority of the groups relies on the status and responsibility of the political leader who concurrently heads the Party, the state and the military. China’s maritime law enforcement agencies were merged into the State Oceanic Administration/the China Coast Guard in June 2013. However, its organization structure is complicated and the internal relationship of the agents remains unclear. Almost nothing is currently clear about the State Oceanic Commission as the policy coordination body and about the Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime Interests reportedly established in the latter half of 2012.

Concept of Crisis Management to China

China’s crisis management aims at preventing an escalation while maximizing its national interests. Three sets of characteristics can be found in the Beijing’s crisis management: adherence to principles and flexibility at the same time; the pursuit of self-righteousness and initiatives; and the primacy of political decision. First, Beijing stands firm on issues related to their principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity and hardly anything is compromised. However, China often behaves in a relatively flexible manner, unless these principles are breached. Second, Beijing tries to keep the appearance that the opponent, not China, is always wrong in a crisis, while taking the initiative in its actual conduct. Third, Beijing strives to properly use military, diplomatic and economic tools during a crisis. In addition, the primacy of politics is established in Beijing’s crisis management concept; therefore, political decisions are very important in realizing these characteristics.

Executive Summary

iv

Chinese Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior

The handling of the 2001 EP-3 incident is regarded in China as one of the most successful cases in Chinese crisis management. Beijing consistently stuck to the principle that the U.S. side should bear full responsibility and make apologies, and to maintaining China’s legitimacy, while Beijing was flexible in its actual behavior. Nevertheless, not only top leaders but also working sections could not properly communicate with each other in the immediate aftermath of the incident. Thus, how to establish and ensure an emergency communication mechanism is an issue to be addressed in crisis management with China. Washington and Beijing have discussed safety standards and procedures for military activities in peace time in the framework of Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA). However, Beijing has been focusing on restricting U.S. military operations in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in MMCA meetings. In addition, the shift of responsibility from PLA Navy (PLAN) to maritime law enforcement agencies in order to conduct disruptive actions against foreign military activities in the waters close to China gives rise to a new challenge for regional countries including Japan as well as the United States; namely, how to approach China’s maritime law enforcement agencies and move towards sharing safety standards with them?

A crewmember on a Chinese trawler uses a grapple hook in an apparent at tempt to snag the towed acoustic a r ray o f t h e U S N S Impeccable. (March 8, 2009) (U.S. Navy photo)

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BCD Border Control Department

CBMs confidencebuildingmeasures

CCG ChinaCoastGuard

CFIS ChinaFoundationforInternationalandStrategicStudies

CICIR ChinaInstituteofContemporaryInternationalRelations

CMC CentralMilitaryCommission

CMS ChinaMaritimeSurveillance

CPC CommunistPartyofChina

CUES CodeforUnalertedEncountersatSea

EEZ ExclusiveEconomicZone

FALG ForeignAffairsLeadingSmallGroup

FLEC FisheriesLawEnforcementCommand

GAC GeneralAdministrationofCustoms

GSD GeneralStaffDepartment

IISS InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies

INCSEA IncidentsatSeaAgreement

JMSDF JapanMaritimeSelf-DefenseForce

KMT ChineseKuomintang

MMCA MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement

MSA MaritimeSafetyAdministration

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NDRC NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission

NPC NationalPeople’sCongress

NSC NationalSecurityCouncil

NSLD NationalSecurityLeadingSmallGroup

PLA People’sLiberationArmy

PLAN People’sLiberationArmyNavy

PRC People’sRepublicofChina

SAREX SearchandRescueExercise

SARS SevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome

SMS SpecialMissionShips

SOA StateOceanicAdministration

UNCLOS UnitedNationsConventionontheLawsoftheSeas

UNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil

WPNS WesternPacificNavalSymposium

WTO WorldTradeOrganization

Acronyms and Abbreviations

vi

IntroductionChina

,s New Assertiveness

Possibility of Crisis Management with China

BasedonDengXiaoping’sstrategicconceptof“TaoguangYanghui (hidecapabilitiesandbidetime)”Chineseleadershavebecomeincreasinglycognizant of the need tomaintain a soundinternationalenvironment. Thisconceptaimsatthegradual increaseofChina’scomprehensivenational powerwhileavoidingdirect conflictswithothermajorpowers.Theideaof“thepathofpeacefuldevelopment”thatChinahasproclaimedhasalsobeenregardedasconsistentwiththispolicydirection.

Beijing, however, has become increasinglyassertiveaboutnational interestfromtheendofthe2000sagainst thebackdropofchangesin theglobalpowerbalancefavorabletothecountry.Astheglobalfinancialcrisisbecameevident in late2008,Chinese leadership,diplomaticauthoritiesand thePeople’sLiberationArmy (PLA)havebeenbolsteringclaims,since2009 inparticular,onChina’s“core interests”with little roomforcompromise,anddemandingwithastrongertonethatothercountriesshould“respectthrough concrete actions”China’score interests (italic is anewexpressionfrequentlyusedsince2009).

In2007, theChinesegovernmentdecided toinitiateregularpatrolsintheSouthChinaSeabythe thenChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)oftheStateOceanicAdministration(SOA)underthebannerof“rightsprotection”(weiquan).Inaddition,for theprotectionofChinesefishingvesselsandpersonnelintheSouthChinaSea,theFisheriesLawEnforcementCommand(FLEC),anorganof theFisheriesManagementBureauundertheMinistryofAgriculture,hasalsoenhancedits“rightsprotection”activities. Since2009, it has been frequentlyreported that under these “rights protection”activities,Beijinghas takenaggressiveactionsagainstthevesselsofothercountriesindisputes.

Oneof therecentexamples is the two-monthlong(fromApriltoJune2012)confrontationbetweengovernmentvesselsofChinaandthePhilippinesover thedisputedScarboroughShoal(HuangyanIsland)whichbothcountriesclaimtheirjurisdiction.Beijing intensified diplomatic, economic andmilitarypressureon theManila. Furthermore,Chinesegovernmentvesselsremainedinandaround

the shoal andChinese fishingboats continuedoperationevenafterthePhilippinegovernmentshipsretreatedfromtheshoalinJune. ThiseffectivelymeansChina’snewoccupationoftheislands,whiletheChinesegovernmentsaid itwasanactionof“keepingeffectivejurisdiction”overtheislands.

This newassertivenessmight increase thepossibilityofsomecrisesarisingbetweenChinaand other nations in this region.At the12thInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS)AsiaSecuritySummit(Shangri-LaDialogue) inMay2013,NguyenTanDung,theprimeministerofVietnam,whileavoidingnamingChina,remarked“Somewhere in the region, therehaveemergedpreferencesforunilateralmight,groundlessclaims,andactionsthatruncountertointernationallawandstemfromimpositionandpowerpolitics.”

Japan’snationaldefensewhitepaperDefense of Japan 2013, released inJuly2013,states“Inregardtotheissuesonconflictinginterestswithitssurroundingcountries,includingJapan,Chinahasattemptedtochangethestatusquobyforcebasedonitsownassertion,whichis incompatiblewiththeexistingorderofinternationallaw.Theattemptshavebeencriticizedasassertiveandincluderisk-relatedbehavior thatcouldcausecontingencies.Thus,thereisconcernoveritsfuturedirection.”Inotherwords,forcountriesinthisregion, thewaytheydealwithactualorpotentialcrisesinvolvingChinaisanimportantchallengeof theirnationalsecurity.

China’s New Assertiveness

A Chinese marine surveillance ship patrols around the Scarborough Shoal (May 2012) (Kyodo News)

2

Introduction

These threatperceptionsandpossible responsesof the regional countriesmeanadeteriorationofsecurityenvironmentforChinaaswell. Forinstance,YuHongjun,ViceMinister of theInternationalDepartmentoftheCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)CentralCommittee,clearlypointedoutsecurityconcernsforChina:theissuesintheSouthChinaSea; thediscordbetweenJapanandChinaovertheSenkakuIslands;the“re-balance”oftheU.S.toAsiaPacificregion.Basedonthisunderstanding,therearesomeargumentsthatcrisismanagementisacriticalmatter forChinaasothercountries.WhenitcomestoSino-Americanrelations,ChinesePresidentXiJinpingstated“thetwosidesneedtofindanewway tomanage theirdifference.”HealsomentionedthatChinashould“seekeffectivemethodsforappropriatelycontrollingandresolvingtheissue”ofthediscordbetweenTokyoandBeijingover theSenkaku Islands.Moreover,ChinesePremierLiKeqiangannounced“the twosidesshouldcontrolandsettle theirdifferences in theSouthChinaSea.”Asaresultofthesestatementsoftheleadership,Chinesescholarshavebeguntodiscussthewayofcrisismanagementinthesetypesofsituations.

Never theless, despi te China’s change,international society, neighboringcountries inparticular, regardChina’sactionsasbeingquiteinconsistent. Chinasometimesstandsfirmagainstothercountriesandevenundertakesdangerousactionswith thePLA,whileatother times (orsametime)itshowsafairlymoderateattitude.Forexample,whilemaritimelawenforcementagenciesbehaveprovocatively in theSouthChinaSea,diplomaticauthoritiesemphasizetheimportanceofa“soundinternationalenvironment”anda“win-winrelationship.”ThesecontradictorypostureofChinaforceneighboringcountriestoquestionwhetherandhowtheycanmanageacrisiswithChina.

Why doesChina take these contradictoryapproaches, a ha rsh and f lex ible s tancesimultaneouslywhen it facesactualor loomingcrises against other countries? One possibleexplanationis thelossofeffectivecontrolbytheCPCleaderoveractorsintermsofChina’sforeign-and security- policy-makingprocess and their

implementation;thecontradictionsandinconsistencyinBeijing’sexternalbehaviormightbeinterpretedasaresultoflackofgovernance.Ifthisistherightexplanation,theproblemistheabilityofthePartytocontroleachpolicy-executionbody,anditmustbetakenintoconsiderationinordertomanagecrisissituationswithChina.Therefore,firstandforemost,analysisoftheChinesesystemsandmechanismsfordecision-makingorcoordinationisnecessary.

On theotherhand, theexplanation that theexternal actions conceived byChina alreadyincludesomecontradictoryfactorsandfeaturesisalso feasible. According to thisexplanation,Chinamaximizes its profit throughwieldinganuncompromisingattitudeoracalmattitudeaccordingtothesituationat thetime. Ofcourse,thishypothesiscouldbeconsideredcorrectonlyontheassumptionthatChina’spolicy-makingishighlycentralizedtothetopleadersoftheParty.Toprovethevalidityof thehypothesis,onemustexaminefundamentalquestionssuchaswhatisacrisisforChinaandwhatactionChinaconsidersrational.

Inthisreport,wearguethatthelatterhypothesisis to thepoint in comparisonwith the former.NIDS China Security Report 2012, released inDecember2012,stressedthatwhilethenumberofactorsinvolvedinthedecision-makingprocessisincreasing,finaldecisionsregardingimportantpolicyissuesaremadebytheParty’sleadership,especiallytheCPCPolitburoStandingCommittee. Thatis,China’sexternalbehaviorisbasicallycontrolledbythePartyleadership;contradictoryfactorsinChina’sactionsreflecttoaconsiderabledegreetheintentionsofthepartyleaders.

These Chinese domesticmechanism anddynamicsofpolicymakingareimportantnotonlyforanalysesofChina’sbehaviorinanexternalcrisisbutalso,inabroadersense,forconsideringChinesestrategicdirection. Theinternationalcommunitypayscloseattention tohowChinaexercises itsgrowingpowerandinfluenceindealingwithconflictordispute.Neighboringcountriesinparticularareconcernedaboutwhetherthisever-moreassertivecountry is abandoning thestrategicconceptof“TaoguangYanghui”or its recent behavior isbasically justaresponsetocrisesandthereisno

Possibility of Crisis Management with China

3

fundamentalchangeinitsstrategy. AnalysesofChina’sbehaviorincriseswilloffersomeinsightstohelpunderstanditsstrategic trendsina largercontext.

NIDS China Security Report 2013firstoutlinesChina’sdomesticmechanismtodealwithexternalcrises,andshowsthatitssystemsandmechanismsfordecision-makingare centeredon theparty

leadership.ThereportthenattemptstoascertainthefeaturesofChina’scrisismanagementconceptsbyreviewingresearchinChinatorevealitsparadigmasaprerequisite todealwithinternationalcrises.Basedonthefindings,thereportofferscasestudiesonChina’sresponsestocrises,including,the2001EP-3incidentandtheU.S.-ChinaMilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement(MMCA)mechanism.

4

Centralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society

From Leading Small Groups to State Security Committee

Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command


The People’s Republic of China (PRC) hasmaintainedaoneparty rulingsystemunder theCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)sincethePRC’sfoundationinOctober1949.TheConstitutionofthePRCexplicitlystipulates thatnationbuildingmustbeconducted“under the leadershipof theCPC.”Meanwhile,pluralisticsocietyhas,tosomeextent,emergedinChinaasaresultoftheeconomicgrowthassociatedwiththe“ReformandOpeningUp”policy, theparticipation to the internationaleconomicsystem,highlightedbythemembershipof theWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)andthedevelopment of communication tools such astheInternet. Assuch, thischangehasinfluencedChineseforeignandsecuritypolicies.

Currently,thehighestdecision-makingauthorityiscentralizedtotheCentralCommitteeoftheCPC,inparticular thePolitburoStandingCommittee;however,itisbelievedthatthenumberofactorswhocaninfluencetheleadership’sdecisionsisincreasingmorethaneverbefore.Theseactorscanbedividedintotwotypes:oneswhoareofficiallyauthorizedtoengageindecision-making,andthosewhoareunofficiallyengaging.

Theformer type includes:(1)agenciesunderthedirectcontrolof theParty,suchasthePolicyResearchOffice, theGeneralOfficeof theCPC,theInternationalDepartmentoftheCPC,andthePropagandaDepartmentoftheCPC;(2)theStateCouncil’sagencies, for instance theMinistryofForeignAffairs,theMinistryofStateSecurity,andtheXinhuaNewsAgency;and (3) thePeople’sLiberationArmy (PLA). These agencies aretraditionalactorsintheChineseforeignandsecuritypolicy,and theyengage in thedecision-makingprocessthroughtheprovisionofinformationandpolicyrecommendationsviaofficialchannelsofeachagency.

The latter type of actors are: (1)Chineseexpertsandthinktanks;(2)state-ownedenterprisesincluding huge defense companies; (3) localgovernments;and(4)thepublicopinionanddebateson theInternet. Theseactorsarerelativelynew,gaininginfluenceonthepolicieswiththegrowingpluralisticsociety.Littlehasbeenknownabouttheroutethroughwhichtheseactorscommunicate

theirinterestsorexpectationstodecision-makers.Inparticular,itisdifficulttodemonstratetowhatextentChinesepublicopinion,heavilytingedwithnationalism,influencesforeignandsecuritypolicy.Chineseleadershipanddiplomaticauthoritiesadmit,however, thatpublicopinion is influential in itsforeignandsecuritypolicy.

Thisstronginfluencecanalsobeobservedinthecrisismanagementprocess.Forexample,facedwiththeunintentionalbombingofChina’sEmbassyinBelgradebytheU.S.-ledNATOforcesinMay1999andtheEP-3collisionincidentinApril2001, theleadershipoftheCPCsoughtforthenormalizationofdiplomatic relationsbetweenChinaand theUnitedStates,whilegivingdueconsideration topublicopinion inbothcases.Domestic factorshaveincreasinglybecomeconstrainingregardingdecision-making inexternalcrisismanagementpoliciesbythecurrentChineseleadership.

Nevertheless, the increase in thenumberofinfluentialactorsinvolvedintheforeignandsecuritypoliciesalongwith thediversificationofsocietydoesnotmeanthedecentralizationofauthorityofdecision-making.Thedecision-makingforimportantissuesisexclusivelymadebythePolitburoStandingCommitteeoftheCPC,consistingof7members,andbythePolitburooftheCPC,consistingof25members(including7membersof thePolitburo

Centralized Decision-Making in a Pluralistic Society

Chinese demonstrators burn the American flag in Beijing. (May 9, 1999) (Reuters/Kyodo News)

6


StandingCommittee). Amongothers,itisnotthePolitburo,but thePolitburoStandingCommitteewhichseems to retain thehighestauthority fordecision-makingonforeignandsecuritypolicies.ThePolitburoStandingCommitteeholdsexpandedmeetingsas needed tobuildconsensusamongleaders.Inthisway,althoughthesocietybecomespluralistic,decision-makingoncriticalissuesisascentralizedasever.

Thatsaid,currently,thereisnooverwhelminglycharismatic leader likeMaoZedongorDengXiaopingamongthesevenmembersofthePolitburoStandingCommittee.Therefore,inthePolitburoaswellasthePolitburoStandingCommittee,decisionsonimportantissuesaremadeunderthecollectiveleadership system. This collective leadershipsystem in thePolitburoStandingCommittee ischaracterizedbysuchmechanismsas“thecollectivemechanismwithdivided responsibilitiesamongindividuals,”“thegroupstudymechanism”and“thecollectivedecision-makingmechanism.”Asamatteroffact,eachmemberof theStandingCommitteealsoservesas thehighestexecutive in importantorganizationsincludingtheCentralCommitteeoftheCPC,NationalPeople’sCongress,StateCouncilofChina,ChinesePeople’sPoliticalConsultativeConference,CentralMilitaryCommission(CMC),CentralCommissionforDisciplineInspectionoftheCPC,and theCPCPropagandaDepartment,basedonacollectivemechanismwiththedivisionofresponsibilitiesamongindividuals.Eachmemberof theStandingCommitteebringsanddiscussesviewsandinformationoftheorganizationofwhichtheyareincharge,andtheymakeaconsensusandaunifieddecision.

Through thegroup studymechanism, eachmember of the StandingCommittee tries tounderstandothermembers’viewson importantissues tosmoothly reachaconsensuswitheachother.ThesolidarityandcoherenceoftheCentralCommittee of theCPC is emphasized in thecollectivedecision-making.Even if there is adisagreementwithinthemembersoftheStandingCommittee,itwillneverberevealedtotheoutside.Theleadershipof thePartystressesthesolidarityoftheCentralCommitteeandtheunifieddecision-making,undertheprinciplethattheminorityfollowsthemajority.Fragmentationwithintheleadershipof

theCentralCommitteemustbeavoided.Thisstrictcollectiveleadershipsystem,however,

mightimpedequickdecision-makingtomanageaninternationalcrisis.Forexample,inthe2001EP-3aircraftcollision,thePLAreportedtotheStandingCommitteeimmediatelyaftertheincident,whereasnoquickinstructionsweregivenforthebranchesconcerned. This isbecauseof theabsenceofallthemembersof theStandingCommitteeandthecommitteedidnotdelegateauthorityinanticipationofsuchaccidentstootherspecificseniorofficials.Ontheotherhand,intheareaofforeignanddefensepolices,theStandingCommitteemembersaresaidtobeinclinedtofollowtheopinionoftheparamountleaderwhoservesastheGeneralSecretaryoftheCPC,Presidentof thePRCandChairmanof theCMC.

ForinstanceitseemedthatHuJintaohimselfdraftedthepaperexpressingChina’sofficialpositiontowardNorthKorea’snucleartestinOctober2006sincenoothermembersofthePolitburoStandingCommitteewantedtobearthefinalresponsibilityofthematter.Inwartime,undertheguidanceoftheparamountleaderwhoalsoservesas theGeneralSecretary of theCPC, President of PRC andChairmanof theCMC,theCMCwill takedirectresponsibilityformilitaryoperationswhilereportingto thePolitburoStandingCommitteeasneeded.AsofDecember2013,XiJinping,astheGeneralSecretaryof theParty,Presidentof thePRCandChairmanoftheCMC,istakingthecentralroleindecision-makingprocessofthePolitburoStandingCommitteeforforeignandsecuritypolicy.

Meanwhile,thePLAdoesnothaveamemberinthePolitburoStandingCommitteeofXiJinping’sregimeaswas thecase inHu Jintao’s regime;thePLAhasnoofficialauthority todirectly takepart in importantdecision-makingprocessat thehighest level in theParty. Moreover,GeneralFanChanglongandGeneralXuQiliang,theViceChairmenoftheCMC,aretheonlytwowhocanrepresent thePLAamongthe25membersof theCentralCommitteeat thePolitburoof theCPC.In thissense, thePLAdoesnotholdasuperiorpositionagainstpoliticalleaderswhorepresentpartyorganizationsorgovernmentagencies. Thus,itislikelythatthePLA’sdirectinfluenceonthedecision-makingprocessitselfforexternalcrisismanagement

7

The Role of Chinese Think Tanks in Foreign and Security Policy MakingColumn

islimited.Thatsaid,thePLAseemstotakeanimportant

role in providing information and policyrecommendationsfor referenceof thePolitburoStanding Committee when the Committeedecidespolicies tomanage internationalcrises.

Internationalanddomesticattentionisstartingto focuson theexpanding rolesplayedbyChinesethinktanksandresearchinstitutionsand their growing influence in China’sdiversifyingsociety.IthasbeenpointedoutinsomerecentresearchthattheirroleshavebeenexpandingasBeijingincreasesitsinvolvementininternationalsociety.

China’sthinktanksareroughlyclassifiedintothreetypes.First,researchinstituteswithintheParty,governmentorPeople’sLiberationArmy (PLA), such as theCentral PolicyResearchOfficeof theCentralCommitteeof theCommunistPartyofChina (CPC),the National Development and ReformCommission(NDRC)’sDepartmentofPolicyStudies,thePLAAcademyofMilitaryScience,and thePLANationalDefenseUniversity.Second, government-affiliated researchinstitutessuchas theChineseAcademyofSocialSciencesundertheStateCouncil,ChinaInstitutes ofContemporary InternationalRelations (CICIR) as a think tankof theMinistryofStateSecurity,orthoseunderthedirectauthorityoflocalgovernmentsincludingtheShanghaiInstitutesforInternationalStudies.Third,non-governmental researchinstitutes,such as those in universities and privateresearch institutes. Nevertheless,given thefinancialsupportfromthepublicorganizationsincludingtheCPC,thegovernmentorthePLA,noneofthemcanbesaidtobeanindependentorganization,

The r o l es o f t h i nk t anks i nc l udeformulationof information, intelligenceand

InformationfromthePLAisprovideddirectlytotheCMCortothePolitburoStandingCommitteeof theCPCthroughtheGeneralSecretaryof theCentralCommitteeof theCPCwhoalsoservesas theChairmanof theCMC. Inaddition,PLArepresentativesalongwithciviliansarebelieved

policyproposalsaswellasshapingdomesticpublicopinionandspreading internationalpropaganda.Furthermore, think tanksexertan influence indirectlyon theCPCleaders’decisionmakingand thepolicydraftsmadeby the government agencies through, forexample,writinginternalreportsandattendingclosedsessions;participatinginopenresearchconferencesinsideandoutsideChina;exposureindomesticandforeignmedia;andcontributionto domestic and foreignmajor academicjournals. Aboveall,the“groupstudy”ofthePolitburoof theCPC,whichhasbeenheldregularlyfromtheHuJintaoeraon,providesexpertswithavaluableopportunitytodirectlypresenttheiropinionstodecisionmakers.ThethemeofthestudyisselectedbytheCentralPolicyResearchOfficeof theCPCCentralCommitteeundertheguidanceoftheGeneralOfficeoftheCPC,whiletheothernecessaryarrangements, includingselecting suitableparticipants, aremadebyeachdepartmentconcerned. Forinstance,onJuly31,2013,someexpertsincludingGaoZhiguo,directoroftheChinaInstituteforMarineAffairsundertheStateOceanicAdministration,lecturedinaPolitburogroupstudysessionchairedbytheGeneralSecretaryXiJinpinginordertodiscuss“maritimepower”strategy. Basedon theselectures,Xiemphasizedontheoccasionofthisstudytheimportanceofsafeguardingmaritimerights and interests and stated thatChinawouldneverabandonits“legitimaterightsandinterests”whileadheringtothepathofpeacefuldevelopment.

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toattend theexpandedmeetingof thePolitburoStanding Committee, which is summoneddependingonthesituationinacrisis.Furthermore,itisbelievedthatPLAofficialscandirectlysubmitpolicyrecommendationsormeet toconveytheirviewstocivilianleaders. TheGeneralOfficeoftheCMCandthePLAGeneralStaffDepartment(GSD)seemtoplayacrucial role in theprocessof these provisionsof information andpolicyrecommendation.

Infact,duringthe1995-96TaiwanStraitcrisis,the information and policy recommendationsprovidedbythePLAareconsideredtohaveplayedsignificantroles.Itisalsofrequentlypointedoutthat

ThePolitburoStandingCommitteeof theCPCand the Politburo of theCPC have advisorybodiesknownas“leadingsmallgroups.” Thegroupsseemtobeunderthedirectcontrolof theCentralCommitteeoftheCPC,andthemembersareselectedfromrelevantsectionsof theparty,the government and the PLA depending onissuesagroupisresponsiblefor. Theirconcreteresponsibilities areconsidered tobeprovidinginformationandrecommendations,andcoordinationandformationofpolicies.

Theleadingsmallgroupshavebeenestablishedtraditionallyinthedecision-makingprocessoftheCPC.Forexample,theCPCestablishedthegroupsforfinanceandeconomy,politicsandlaw,foreignaffairs,scienceand technology,andcultureandeducationunderthedirectleadershipoftheCentralCommitteeand theGeneralOfficeof theCPC.Later,allthegroupsexcepttheCulturalRevolutionGroupweredisbandedin thechaosof theGreatCulturalRevolution; however, theyhavebeenrestoredoneafteranothersince1980s.

Atpresent, thereare leadingsmallgroups intheCentralCommittee in the fieldsof finance,diplomacy,Taiwan,andpublicsecurity. However,itdoesnotmeanthatallthesegroupshavethesamecharacterandduties. Thegroupsaredividedintotwotypes:astandingbodytodealwithlong-term

informationprovidedbyGeneralXiongGuangkai,theDeputyChiefof theGSD,whoearnedJiangZemin’sdeep trust,playeda remarkable role indealingwiththe1999Embassybombingincidentandthe2001EP-3incident.

Thus,while thePLA’sauthority todirectlyengageindecision-makingprocessatthePolitburoStandingCommitteeoftheCPCislimited,thePLAappearstobeabletoprovidemilitaryintelligenceandpolicy recommendationsexclusively to theparamountleader. Giventhesepoints,thePLAisoneoftheimportantactorswhocanexertacertaindegreeofinfluenceonthedirectionoftheprocessoninternationalcrisespolicy.

From Leading Small Groups to State Security Committee

agendas,includingtheFinanceandEconomySmallLeadingGroup,andanadhocbodytodealwithshort-termissuessuchastheSmallLeadingGroupforthepreparationsoftheBeijingOlympicGames.

Therearethreeleadingsmallgroupsinvolvedinforeignandsecurityissues:(1)theForeignAffairsLeadingSmallGroup(FALG);(2)theTaiwanWorkLeadingSmallGroup;and(3)NationalSecurityLeadingSmallGroup(NSLG).Themembershipsofthesethreegroupsareconsideredtobelargelyoverlapping.Amongthethree,theFALGoperatesinonewiththeNSLG. It ispointedout that themajorresponsibilitiesofthegroupsare(1)importantpolicydecisionswiththeapprovalofthePolitburoormembersofthePolitburoStandingCommittee,(2)judgmentonamajoreventorlong-termtrendsbasedonvariousreports,(3) inter-agencycoordinationamongtheParty,governmentandthePLA,and(4)internationalcrisismanagement.

Themembersof thegroupson foreignandsecurity issueshavenotbeenofficiallyrevealed.Nonetheless,accordingtoavailableliterature, theFALG/NSLGisheadedbytheGeneralSecretaryoftheCPCCentralCommitteewhoholdsconcurrentlythePresidentofthePRCandtheChairmanoftheCMC,with theVicePresidentof thePRCor thePremierof theStateCouncilashisdeputy. ThedirectorofCentralForeignAffairsOffice, the

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administrativeorganoftheFALG/NSLG,isaVicePremier-rankmemberof theCentralCommitteefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairs;atthemoment,YangJiechiisbelievedtoholdtheposition.Othermembersof this leadingsmallgroupappearedto include theVicePremier/StateCouncilor forForeignTrade,theMinisterofForeignAffairs,theMinisterof the InternationalDepartmentof theCPC, theMinisterofStateSecurity, theMinisterofPublicSecurity, theMinisterofCommerce,theDirectorofStateCouncilHongKong-MacaoOffice, theDirectorofStateCouncilOverseasChineseAffairsOffice, theMinisterofNationalDefense,thePLADeputyChiefofStaffforForeignAffairsandIntelligence,theHeadofPartyPublicityDepartment,and theDirectorof thePropagandaOfficeofCentralCommitteeandInformationOfficeoftheStateCouncil.

ItissaidthattheTaiwanWorkLeadingSmallGroup isnowheadedby theGeneralSecretaryof theParty, holdingconcurrently the rankofPresidentof thePRCand theChairmanof theCMC,withtheChairmanoftheChinesePeople’sPoliticalConsultativeConferenceashisdeputy.Thedirectorofitsadministrativeorganisbelievedtobeoneof theCentralCommitteemembersfromtheMinistryforForeignAffairsequivalenttotheVicePremier.OthermembersofthisgroupincludetherelevantVicePremier/StateCouncilorforTaiwanaffairs,ExecutiveSecretaryofthePartySecretariat,HeadofthePartyUnitedFrontWorkDepartment,MinisterofStateSecurity,Directorof theStateCouncilTaiwanAffairsOffice,ChairofAssociationforRelationsacrosstheTaiwanStrait,HeadofthePartyPublicityDepartment,VicePremier/StateCouncilorforForeignTrade,ViceChairmanoftheChinesePeople’sPoliticalConsultativeConference,ViceChairmanof theCMC,andPLADeputyChiefoftheGeneralStaffforForeignAffairsandIntelligence.

Asadministrativeofficesforthetheseleadingsmall groups, the role played by theForeignAffairsOfficeandtheTaiwanWorkOfficearealsoimportant.TheForeignAffairsOfficereplacedtheformerStateCouncilForeignAffairsOfficein1998.OneoftheCentralCommitteemembersfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairsorPartyInternationalDepartment,whoisequivalenttoVicePremier,has

servedastheDirectoroftheForeignAffairsOffice.ThestaffoftheofficeconsistsofthepersonnelfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheInternationalDepartmentof theCPC. Given thefact that theForeignAffairsOfficeservesastheadministrativeorgan of the FALG and NSLG, diplomaticbureaucrats can influenceChina’s foreignandsecuritypolicytosomedegree.Ontheotherhand,theTaiwanWorkOfficeandTaiwanWorkOfficeoftheStateCouncilarebasicallyasingleorganizationhavingthesamepersonasthedirector.Theseofficesareinchargeofvariousgeneraladministrativework,includingdraftingandmanagementofdocuments,arrangingmeetings,collection,managementanddeliveryofinformation,andsurveyandresearch.

Theleadingsmallgroup’sroleinforeignandsecuritypolicieswassaidtobestrengthenedintheJiangZeminera.ThatJianghimselfheldthethreeconcurrentpostsof thechairmanof theFALG,NSLGandTaiwanWorkLeadingSmallGroupissaidtohavemadethegroupsimportant.Also,HuJintao,successorofJiangZemin’spositionasthetripledirector,isconsideredtohaveenhancedthenumberandrolesofthestaffofthegroups.

Meanwhile, ithasbeenpointedout that theenlargedmembershipoftheleadingsmallgroupsmightmakeinter-agencycoordinationmoredifficult.Asaleadingsmallgroupis justanadvisorybodyfortheCPCbasedontheparty’snoticeordecisionwithoutauthorityandcapacityaccruingfromlegalfoundation, itheavilydependson thedirector'sauthorityandpowerintheCPCinordertoplaythemultiplerolesmentionedabove, includingpolicyrecommendation. Furthermore, theleadingsmallgroupscannotmakeanypolicydecisionsbytheirownforimportantfieldssuchasforeignandsecuritypolicies.TheyneedtoobtainanapprovalfromtheCentralCommitteeof theCPCandthePolitburoStandingCommittee in particular as theonlyauthoritiestomakesuchdecisions.

Consideringtheselimitationsoftheleadingsmallgroups,ChinahasdiscussedtheestablishmentofanagencyequivalenttotheNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)oftheU.S.ChinaappearedtoestablishtheNSLGwithaviewtodevelopitintotheNSCinthefuture.Sincethen,itisbelievedthatJiangZeminproposedtheestablishmentofanagencyequivalentto theNSCin theBeidaiheConference in2002,

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anditwasraisedagaintwoyearslaterintheFourthPlenarySessionofthe16thCPCCentralCommitteetoestablishanagencybasedontheNSLG.

Againstthisbackdrop,itwasdecidedtofoundtheStateSecurityCommitteeintheThirdPlenarySessionof the18thCPCCentralCommittee inNovember2013.Accordingtoacommuniqueissuedafterthesession,thepurposeofthiscommitteeisto improveChina’snationalsecuritysystemandstrategytosafeguardthecountry.GeneralSecretaryXiJinpingpointedoutthatChinahadtoestablishapowerfulagency toconsolidateandcontrolallnationalsecurityactivitiesintherelentlessforeignanddomestic security environment. He thenexplainedthatsuchestablishmentwouldstrengthenthecentralizedandunifiedleadershipinthenationalsecurityfieldanditwasanurgentbusiness.

TheactivitiesoftheStateSecurityCommitteeremainunclear.HuaYiwenstatesinhiscommentaryinthePeople’s Daily(theoverseasedition)thatthebackgroundforthefoundationoftheStateSecurityCommittee is thestill-deteriorating internationalanddomesticsecurityenvironment. Accordingto thearticle, theconceptofnationalsecurity isnowconstitutedwithnotonlytraditionalsecurityelementssuchasdiplomacy,nationaldefense,andmilitarybutalsofactors inabroaderscopesuchaseconomics, finance,energy, information,andsociety. Thenhecontinues todescribe that theexistingFALGand/orNSLGareinformalandad-hocorganizationsandarenotable toplayanyimportantroleasthecoreagencyinroutinenationalsecurityduties;furthermore,theydonothavetheability,budget,andmanpowertodealwithseriousemergencysituationsandtoestablish,coordinate,andexecuteacomprehensivenational securitystrategy.HeindicatesthatBeijingmustestablishanagencythatcoordinatesmanyrelateddepartmentswithastrongleadershipandpower todealwithsevereandcomplicatednationalsecurityissues.

Ontheotherhand,ProfessorMengXiangqing,DeputyDirectoroftheStrategicResearchInstituteat thePLANationalDefenseUniversity,puts itin thePLA Daily that the lackofcoordinationathigh-levels fornon-traditionalsecurity issuesincludingcounter-terrorismis themotivebehindthefoundationof thecommittee. Hearguesthatthenon-traditionalthreatssuchassocialinstability,

economic or financial crises, environmentaldestruction,andproblemsofethnicindependencemovements are increasing inChina’s currentnationalsecurityenvironment,whilethetraditionalthreatsagainstChina’s territorialsovereigntyandmaritimeinterestsarenoteasing. Hestates thatBeijingrequirescoordinationat thehighest levelforunifiedcommandandactionamong relateddepartments.This isbecauseChina is facinganinternationalizationofdomesticnationalsecurityissuesandviceversa, and thereforeamistakeindealingwithdomesticproblemswilldegradeBeijing’sstandpointexternally,whileamistakewithforeignissueswillcauseinternalsocialinstability.HeconcludesinthearticlethatthiscommitteewillgreatlyimproveBeijing’squickresponsecapability.

These articles appeared inChina’s officialmediasuggest that thereasonfor thedecisiontofoundtheCommitteeintheThirdPlenarySessionwouldbe,withanewnationalsecuritystrategy,toestablishaunifiedleadershipandtoinstitutionalizethepolicycoordinationamongrelevantnationalsecuritydepartmentsinordertorealizeswiftandcomprehensiveactionagainstdiverse,internalandexternalthreatstoChina’snationalsecurity.

It is not certainwhether theStateSecurityCommitteewillbeasimilarorganization to theNSCoftheU.S. AlthoughtherehasbeentalkofestablishinganNSC-likebodyforcoordinatingnationalsecuritypolicyforoveradecadeinChina,ithasnotbeenestablishedbeforebecausetherehasbeenaconcern that theNSCwould transfer theauthorityofdecision-makingonforeignandsecuritypoliciesfromthePolitburoStandingCommitteetoone individual, theGeneralSecretaryof theCentralCommittee; theNSCmight result in thetransformationofthecurrentcollectiveleadershipsystem.Furthermore,iftheNSCisestablishedasagovernmentagency,notapartybody,thereisariskthatthefundamentalprincipleoftheChinesepoliticalsystemthatthegovernmentisledbythePartymightbechanged. Therefore, ithadbeenpointedoutthatitwasquitedifficulttofounditasagovernmentagency.

Whilewho heads this newStateSecurityCommitteeisstillnotunveiled,Xiisconsideredasthemostlikelyprospect. IfhedoestakethehelmoftheCommittee,hispowerfoundationinnational

11

securitypolicywillbe reinforced. Inanycase,furtherresearchwouldberequiredonthemembers

ofthecommittee,itsrole,andthenationalsecuritystrategiesitwilldevelop.

TheChinesegovernmentannouncedattheNationalPeople’sCongress (NPC) inMarch2013 that itwouldestablishtheStateOceanicCommissionasthehigh-levelcoordinationbodyanda renewedStateOceanicAdministration(SOA)consolidatingtheorganizationsandresponsibilitiesofthepreviousSOA,theChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)underSOA, theMaritimePoliceof theBorderControlDepartment (BCD)of theMinistry of PublicSecurity, theChinaFisheriesLawEnforcementCommand(FLEC)oftheMinistryofAgriculture,andtheGeneralAdministrationofCustoms(GAC).TheSOAwill enforce themaritime lawunderthenameof theChinaCoastGuard(CCG).Theresponsibility,organization,andformationof thenewSOAwereannouncedinJune2013,andthedepartmentofCCGwasestablishedwithintheSOA.ThenewlyestablisheddepartmentofCCGastheheadquartersoftheCCGandtheCCGCommandCenter is inchargeofdrafting thesystemsandmeasures for theenforcementofmaritime law,proposingvariousregulations,coordinatingthejointcommandofthemaritimelawenforcementactivitiesbytheCCGunits,andtrainingtheunitsofCCG.Inthisway,Chinahasconsolidateditspreviouslydividedmaritimelawenforcementagenciesintoasingleorganization,exceptfortheMaritimeSafetyAdministration(MSA)oftheChineseMinistryofTransport.

However,theorganizationstructureoftheSOAandCCGiscomplicated. First, the regulationsfor thegovernanceof theoceans and the lawenforcementaredraftedbytheSOA,andtheywillbefinallyauthorizedandannouncedbytheMinistryofLandandResourcesafteritsexamination. Ontheotherhand, themaritime lawenforcementactivitiesimplementedunderthenameoftheCCGrequire theoperationalguidanceof theMinistryofPublicSecurity.Second,LiuCigui,thedirectorofthepreviousSOA,wasmovedsidewaystothenewSOAasthedirectorandthepartysecretaryoftheSOA,andMengHongweitookanewlyadded

Toward a Unified Coast Guard CommandofficeofthevicedirectoroftheSOAandthedeputysecretaryof thepartywhileservingas theviceministeroftheMinistryofPublicSecurity,whichisregardedasministeriallevel.Inaddition,MengassumedtheroleofdirectoroftheCCG,whileLiutooktheofficeofitspoliticalcommissioner.SincethedirectoroftheSOAisrankedasequivalenttotheviceministers,Mengwhoholdsaministerial-levelpositionbecomessuperiortoLiuwhoholdsthevice-ministerial-levelpostunlessheisdesignatedasministerial-level.Thus,littleisknownaboutthenewlyestablishedSOAandCCGincludingtheiroversightorganizationsandauthority.

The relationshipbetween thenewly refinedSOA/CCGand thePLANavy(PLAN) remainsunclear.ProfessorLiangFangofthePLANationalDefenseUniversitypointsoutthatthePLAN,whichhascooperatedwith theformerCMSandFLEC,willbeabletoprovidemoreefficientsupportthanbeforetotheSOAbyvirtueoftheunification.

There have been few reports of the actualactivitiesorstatusoftheStateOceanicCommissionuntilnow. Nothingiscurrentlyclearother thanthat theCommission is responsibleforplanningandcoordinatingthenationalstrategyforoceanic

The sign of the newly established China Coast Guard is put up by officials on the building of the State Oceanic Administration (July 2013)(Xinhua/Kyodo News)

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Toward a Unified Coast Guard Command

developmentandotherimportantissuesregardingtheocean,whiletheSOAisresponsibleforactualoperations. LiGuoqiang, researcher from theChineseAcademyofSocialSciences, indicatesthattheStateOceanicCommissioniscomposedofseveralministriesincludingagriculture, transport,environmentalprotection,scienceandtechnology,aswellastheSOA.LiuShuguang,thedeputydirectoroftheInstituteofMaritimeDevelopment,theOceanUniversityofChina,explainsthattheStateOceanicCommissionisnotanindependentbody,butapolicycoordinatingmechanism. Furthermore, it isstillunknownaboutthePLA’sinvolvementintheStateOceanicCommission,andabout therelationshipbetweenthecommissionandtheexistingPLA-ledNationalCommitteeofBorderandCoastalDefense.

AChinese-HongKongpaper,Wenweipo,andsomeWesternmedia reported that theCentralCommittee of theCPCnewly established theLeadingSmallGroupontheProtectionofMaritimeRightsandInterestsinthelatterhalfof2012astheprincipalgroupresponsibleformaritimerightsandinterests,andsomeChinesemediaalsomentionedtheexistenceofthegroup. Reportedly,thegroupiscomposedoftheSOA,theMinistryofForeignAffairs,theMinistryofPublicSecurity,theMinistryofAgriculture,andthePLA,andXiJinpingtookthepostofchair. However,thesereportsmustbecarefullyexaminedbecauseotherofficialmediasuchasthePeople’s Daily,theofficialorganoftheCPC,andthePLA Daily, theofficialorganofthePLA,havenotreportedanythingaboutthegroupasofDecember2013.Inaddition,italsoneedstoascertainwhethertheleadingsmallgroup,ifittrulyexists, isastandingbodylike theFALG/NSLG,oranadhocbodyformedinresponsetogrowinginternationalattentiontoChina’smaritimeadvances.Meanwhile,thiskindofleadingsmallgroupattests,

if it trulyexists, that the leadershipof thePartyrecognizesmaritimerightsandinterestsasapressingissue.

Thus, theChinesemaritimelawenforcementagenciesarenowintheprocessofconsolidation.Nevertheless,theactualstatussuchasthecompetentauthorityand theprogressof integrationarenotcurrentlyclear. Detailsabout theStateOceanicCommissionestablishedforhighlevelcoordinationalsoremainslargelyunknown. Furthermore,it isstilluncertainwhethertheleadingsmallgrouponprotectionofmaritimerightsandinterestsactuallyexists.However,thesemovesseemtoindicatethattheChineseleadershiprecognizestheimportanceofmaritimeissues. Therearethreeimportantpointsthatmustbepaidsomeattention.First,whichoneofthefourmergedagencieswillleadtheoperationofSOA/CCG?Second,whoarethemembersoftheStateOceanicCommission,andhowdoesthePLAparticipate?Third,whatkindofrelationshipSOA/CCGwillestablishwithChina’sleadership?Moreover, who, among themembers of thePolitburoStandingCommittee,takesresponsibilitytoleadtheseagencies?

ThisconsolidationandreorganizationofChinesemaritime lawenforcementagenciesshouldbeaconcernforthecountriesaroundChina,includingJapan, as itwill strengthen the capabilitiesoftheagencies. Inaddition, thenewCCG,whichincorporated the formerMaritimePoliceof theBCD,seemstobeauthorizedpolicepoweratseathatCMSandFLECdidnotpossess.Atthesametime, from theviewpointofcrisismanagementof neighboringcountries, the consolidationofChina’sdividedagencies,thatis,theunificationofacounterpartfor thesecountries,enablessmoothcommunicationbetweentheirandChinesemaritimeagencies.

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Figure: The Consolidation of the Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies

MSA North Sea Law Enforcement Fleet(Shandong MSA)

State Oceanic Commission

Consolidation (June 2013

)

Cooperation

Regional MSAs

CCG North Sea Fleet

CCG East Sea Fleet

CCG South Sea Fleet

CCG Department

CCG Logistics Department / SOA Finance and Equipment Bureau

CCG Political Department / SOA Personnel Bureau

CCG North Sea Branch/ SOA North Sea Branch

CCG East Sea Branch/ SOA East Sea Branch

CCG South Sea Branch/ SOA South Sea Branch

CGC Command Center

CCG Headquarter

Ministry of Transport

Ministry of Land and Resources

Ministry of Public Security

（Special tasks）

Same organization in two names

State Oceanic Administration

(SOA)

China Coast Guard (CCG)

MSA South Sea Law Enforcement Fleet(Guangdong MSA)

MSA East Sea Law Enforcement Fleet(Shanghai MSA)

Maritime Safety Administration

(MSA)

Administration

Operational Guidance

Ministry of Agriculture

General Administration of

Customs

Sources: “Provisions on Main Functions, Internal Structure and Staffing of the State Oceanic Administration,” State Council Gazette, No. 20 (2013); “End of ‘Nine Dragons Stirring up the Sea,’ Official Opening of China Coast Guard,” Beijing News (Xinjingbao), July 23, 2013, p. A22; web pages of Shandong MSA, Shanghai MSA and Guangdong MSA.

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Crisis Management to China

Chasing Conflicting Targets

Politics of Crisis Management

China’s Concept of Crisis Management

Crisis Management to ChinaQuiteafewleadingChineseresearchersarguethatChina’scrisismanagement in theforeignaffairscontext isanactivity tomaximize thenationalinterestsasBeijingsimultaneouslyeschewswar.ZhangTuosheng,directoroftheresearchdepartmentat theChinaFoundation for International andStrategicStudies (CFISS)and theauthorityofresearchintocrisismanagementinChina,explainsthatthepurposeofcrisismanagementistoavoidanescalationtomilitaryconfrontationswhileBeijingpursuesitsinterestsandthengraduallyalleviatesthecrisis.ItisfairtosaythathisviewissharedamongChineseexpertsandPeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)officialsandcapturesthebasicfeaturesoftheChineseconceptofcrisismanagement.

ProfessorXiaLiping,Deanof theSchoolofPoliticalScience&InternationalRelationsatTongjiUniversity,statesthatChineseculturedefinestheword“crisis”as“apossibledisasterordanger,”andat thesame time regards theword“ji” incrisis(weiji)asexpressingthepresenceof“opportunity.”Accordingtothisdefinition,acrisiscanbecome“afavorableturn”byeffectivelydealingwithit.Fromthisviewpoint,crisismanagement toChinais“apolicyandmeanstoavoiddangerousconflictswhilerealizing thefavorable turn.” Xiacompares thisChineseperceptionwiththatoftheU.S.Asheputsit, therearethreeacademicexplanationsofcrisismanagementintheU.S.:firstly,crisismanagementaimsatapeacefulsettlementofconflicts;secondly,itisaprocesstovictoryandthereforethepurposeistoforcetheadversarytomakeasignificantconcessioninordertoenhanceU.S.interests;thirdly,itaimsforboth.XiapointsoutthatwhileWashingtontendstotakethesecondpositionwhenitdealswithacrisiswithmiddleorsmallpowercountries,it takesthethirdwhencopingwithothergreatpowers.

ProfessorLiYunlongof theCentral PartySchoolof theCommunistPartyofChina(CPC)studiestheconceptofcrisismanagementindetail.He asserts that an international crisis has thefeaturesofpeaceandwarat thesametime,sinceitliesinbetween.Thus,thefirstpurposeofcrisismanagementisapeacefulsettlement;whetherwarcouldbeavoidedisthequestionofvitalimportance.The secondpurpose is victory. Basedon this

explanation,acrisisistheopportunitytoadvancenational interests;successfulcrisismanagementismeasuredbythemaximumcompromisebytheopponent.Linotesthesetwoobjectivesarepursuedincrisismanagement. Crisismanagement is tocontrolacrisistopreventprecipitatingawar,andatthesametimetoprotecttheimportantinterestsofthecountry. Thesedoublepurposesnecessitatedualmeans toaccomplish them. Listresses thefundamentalway tomanageacrisis isproperlyusing“coercion”and“negotiation,”and“crisismanagementisatechniquetoresolveconflictsandaccomplishnationalintereststhroughcoercionandnegotiation.”ThedualityofcrisismanagementcanbeobservedinsomeargumentsofPLAofficialsandresearchersinthemilitary. SunXuefuoftheGeneralStaffDepartmentargues inanarticle inthe PLA Daily,“amilitarycrisisbringsnotonlydangerorthreatsbutalsosomekindofchance.[…]Althoughchancesexist inmilitaryconflicts, theyarethicklyveiled,difficulttofind,andwillvanishinablink.” Moreover,ZhengJian,a researcherofthePLAAcademyofMilitaryScience,definesan international crisis as “bargainingbetweentwoopposingparties centeredondiplomacy.”Furthermore,aPLAstudyintocrisismanagementregardingtheTaiwanStraitlistsfourobjectivestobeachievedthroughcrisismanagement:stoppingtheescalation towardswarandsolvingthecrisisthroughpeacefulmeans;pursuingtheirintereststothemaximumextentpossible;removingthesourceofthecrisis;maximizingtheirinterestsbychangingthesituationthroughutilizingthecrisis.Assuch,thegeneralpointislargelyconsistentwiththeviewsofZhangTuoshengandothers.

PLAofficialsandresearchersinthemilitaryuse“deterrenceofwar”and“crisiscontrol”asanalogousconcepts.TheseareregardedaspartofBeijing’smilitarystrategy,andthePLAandthePLA-relatedmediatendtousetheseterms.AnarticlepublishedinthemilitarynewspaperChina National Defense News(Zhongguo Guofangbao)argues,forexample,that“Controllingamilitarycrisisisanactivitytotiltthebalanceinitsfavorbyusingseveralmeansinordertoprotectnationalinterests.” Thearticlealsopointsoutfiveprinciplesfortheachievementof

16


suchagoal:first,topursuelimitedinterests;second,todistinguishanaccidentaleventandagenuineconflictofinterests; third, tofocusonpreventionofacrisis; fourth, towieldvariousmeans inacomprehensivemanner;andfinally,politicsmustcontroltheactions.

Thewaytodealwithcrises isacrucial issuewithin thePLAaswell.For instance,asChina’sdefensewhitepaper,China’s National Defense in 2002puts it,China’sstrategicguideline“stressesthedeterrenceofwar”and“thePLA,byflexiblyemployingmilitarymeansandinclosecoordinationwithpolitical,economicanddiplomaticendeavors,improvesChina’sstrategicenvironment, reducesfactorsof insecurityandinstability,andpreventslocalwars and armed conflicts.”Meanwhile,China’s National Defense in 2006states,aboutthesamesubject, that thePLAwill“workforclosecoordinationbetweenmilitarystruggleandpolitical,economic,diplomatic,culturalandlegalendeavors,usestrategiesandtacticsinacomprehensiveway,andtaketheinitiativetopreventanddefusecrisesanddeterconflictsandwars.”Furthermore,the2008editionof theWhitePaperexplainstheguideline“laysstressondeterringcrisesandwars,”andthePLA“worksforclosecoordinationbetweenmilitarystruggleandpolitical,diplomatic,economic,culturalandlegalendeavors,strives tofosterafavorablesecurityenvironment,and takes the initiative topreventanddefusecrises,anddeterconflictsandwars.”Thus,astheserevisionsoftheWhitePapershow,thePLAcomestoplacemoreemphasisontheprevention,restrictionandeliminationofcrises.

All thesemake it clear that it isdifficult todetachChina’scrisismanagementfromotherissues,since thescopeof itsconcept isquitebroadandoverlapswithmanyotherbehavioralconceptsforcrisessuchas“coercion.” Thissuggeststhatit isnecessarytoconsiderBeijing’soverallapproachestointernationalcrisesinordertounderstandChina’scrisismanagement.

CrisismanagementitselfisratheranewconceptforChina;thefirstresearchonthesubjectappearedinthe1990s,andsomeresearchwasintroducedintheearly1990sfromtheU.S. Oneoftheearliestworks in the fieldwasHuPing’s publication,Analysis of International Conflicts and Study of Crisis Management in1993.Then in the2000s,researchin thisfieldflourished. TheCFISSandCarnegieEndowment for International PeacestartedcollaborativeresearchoncrisismanagementbetweentheU.S.andChina,andpublished theirworksin2006.Thus,recently,theresearchoncrisismanagementhasbeenburgeoninginChina.

ItwasnotaninternationalcrisisbuttheSevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome(SARS)epidemicin2003that triggeredthespreadof theterm“crisismanagement.”Facedwithseveredomesticandinternationalcriticismregardingthegovernment’sincompetenthandlingof the situation,BeijingrecognizedthecountermeasuresforSARS-likeeventandcrisisasamatterof“crisismanagement.”Thiskindofcrisismanagementiscalled“publiccrisismanagement,”whichdealswithnon-traditionalsecurityissues,anditisconceptuallydifferentiatedfrom“internationalcrisismanagement,”whichcontrols interstateconflictorcrisis. This reportcoversonly the latter; aboveall foreigncrisismanagement throughwhichanationdealswithfrictionsandcriseswithothernation(s)overnationalinterests.

Whatare thereasonsbehindChina’sembraceof theconceptofcrisismanagement? Thefirstreason is thatBeijingexperiencedawide rangeof internationalcrisesfromthelatterhalfof the1990stothebeginningofthe2000s. Namely,the1995-1996TaiwanStraitCrisis,the1999bombingincidentoftheChinaEmbassyinBelgradeandthe2001EP-3incidentmaderesponsestointernationalcrisesactualpolicypriorities.

Thesecondreasonisthatcrisismanagementfor

The spokespersons for the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC present the national defense white paper (March 31, 2010) (Kyodo News)

17

BeijingisconsistentwithDengXiaoping’sprinciple“Taoguangyanghui”(hidecapabilitiesandbidetime).Chinamustavoidconfrontationsandmilitarydisputeswithexistinggreatpowers. Itmustnotmakeconcessions,however,onthenationalinterestsofprinciplessuchassovereigntybyexcessivelystickingtotheavoidanceofwar.Therefore,Chinacametoemphasizecrisismanagementasawaytoavoidanescalationtowarandsimultaneouslytopursueitsinterests.

Zhang Tuosheng suggests that a nationconfrontingan internationalcrisiswithpossiblemilitaryescalationcanchooseamilitaryresponseorcrisismanagement. ChinaexperiencedseveralmilitaryconflictssuchastheKoreanWarandtheSino-SovietBorderConflictowingtoBeijing’spasttendencytoadoptmilitarymeasures.ZhanggoesontosaythatmilitaryconfrontationsinvolvingChina,however,havesubstantiallydecreased,especiallysince the startofDengXiaoping’s reformandopeninguppolicy.

Furthermore,thenecessitytopreventthespilloverofacrisisfromonesingleproblemintootherareasisemphasized.InanarticleinthePeople’s Daily writtenbyYuanPengof theChina Instituteof

ContemporaryInternationalRelationsforexample,hestatescrisismanagement is important in therelationshipbetweenWashingtonandBeijingsothattheoverallrelationshipbetweenthemwillnotbenegativelyinfluencedbyasingleproblem.

ThethirdreasonisachangeofChina’sdecisionmakingsystem. Therewere somecharismaticleaders likeMaoZedongorDengXiaoping inthepast, and theiropinionswere so importantthatalmostallcriticaldecisionsweremadebythemespeciallyduringacrisis. However,becausethere isnosuch leadernowadays, thedecision-makingsysteminBeijingismorepluralistic andinstitutionalized. Zhangpointsoutthatbuildingatheoryforcrisismanagement isbecomingmuchmorecriticalintheabsenceofcharismaticleaderswhocanexclusivelymaketheimportantdecisions.

Viewedinthislight,crisismanagementinChinaisnotdevelopedsystematicallyenough,giventheconceptof“crisismanagement”isarelativelynewconcept.

However, itdoesnotmeanBeijinghasneverexperiencedcrisismanagement. TheCPChasfacedvariouscrisessincetheSino-JapaneseWarandChineseCivilWar,andthoseexperiencesarereflected inBeijing’scurrentapproach tocrisismanagement. ThePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)alsohasvastexperienceincrisesfromitsfoundation–someofthemendedupaswars,whileothersdidnot. TheyincludetheKoreanWar,the1st to3rdTaiwanStraitCrises, theSino-Indianborderconflict,theSino-Sovietborderconflict,andtheSino-VietnamWar,aswellas theaccidentalbombingbyNATOforcesoftheChineseEmbassyinBelgrade, theEP-3 incident,and theChinesetrawler/JapanCoastGuardcuttercollisionincidentneartheSenkakuIslandsin2010.Theseexperiencesconstitute thebasisfor theChineseconceptsandprinciplesoncrisismanagement.

People wearing face masks as safeguards against SARS wait for a bus (April 2003)(Kyodo News)

Aimingforcompatibilitybetween twomutuallycontradictoryfactorsisoneof thecharacteristicsofChina’scrisismanagement.Thisseemstoresultfromthefact thatChina’scrisismanagement isimplementedwiththetwoobjectivesofpreventing

Chasing Conflicting Targetsanescalationandmaximizingitsnationalinterests.

ThreesetsofcharacteristicscouldbefoundfromresearchintoBeijing’scrisismanagement:firstly,adherencetoprinciplesandflexibilityatthesametime:secondly, thepursuitoflegitimacy(orself-

18


righteousness)andtheinitiative;thirdly,theprimacyofpoliticsandthecomprehensivenessthatutilizespolitics,diplomacyandthemilitary.

For the first point, as is often pointedout,althoughBeijingstandsfirmonissuesrelated totheirprinciplesincludingsovereigntyandterritorialintegrity,Chinabehaves relatively flexiblyandmakessomeconcessions,unlesstheseprinciplesareviolated.

The jointstudycarriedoutbyProfessorWangJisiof theSchoolof InternationalRelationsatPekingUniversityandXuHuiof theNationalDefenseUniversityclaimsthat theprimeguidingprincipleofBeijingis theintegrationofstrategicprincipleswithtacticalflexibility.Inaninternationalcrisis,Beijing’sofficialstanceisethically tinged,andtherefore,itsdiscourseisunyieldingandstrong-worded.Inparticular,theprincipleofsovereigntyand territorial integrityhasalmostno roomforcompromise.Nonetheless,Beijingdoesnotalwaystakeuncompromisingactionsas itswordsimply.Rather,itoftentakesaprudentattitude.

Drawingthe“dixian”(bottomline)asthestrictminimumrequirement is thekeyforBeijing tomakeitsprinciplesandflexibleattitudecompatiblewitheachother. Chinacancompromisetosomeextentaslongastheoutcomeisabovethedixian.Thissuggeststhat thetargetsinacrisisaresetinaphasedandrestrictedway. Hence,debatesoncrisismanagementinChinaregarditasimportanttosearchforasolution towhich theothersidecanconsent,butwithoutcompromisingChina’sprinciple.

Meanwhile, i t is not considered to bealwaysnecessary to forgeacompletecommonunderstandingwith theopponentaboutChina’sprinciples.WangJisiandXuHuiarguethatinthepastpoliticalormilitarycrisesbetweenWashingtonandBeijing, theyhavenever approvedof theinterpretationoftheotherpartyabouttheincidents.WhatisimportantforChinaisthatitcaninterpretincidents inaway thatdoesnotalterBeijing’spositiononprinciples regardlessofwhether theopponentacceptssuchinterpretation. By takingthisstance,itisargued,Chinacannotonlypreserveitsprinciplesandovercomethecrisiswithsomeself-restraint,butcanalsokeeptherightforfurtherdemandsandactivitiesintheirhands.

These points are also emphasizedby someof thePLAofficials.ChengXiaodongandotherresearchersstressinanarticleinGuofang(National Defense)Magazine thatBeijingwillmake nocompromiseontheissuesofprinciples: territorialsovereigntyand the reunificationproblem; thefundamentalissuesforthelong-termdevelopmentandprosperityofthecountry;andthecriticalissuesthataffect regimestabilityandethnicsolidarity.However,theycanmakecompromisesasnecessaryto theextentwhere theprincipleswouldnotbeviolated.TheliteratureindicatesthatBeijingcande-escalateacrisisbymakingaconcessionifitcantakearealisticattitude,establish“dixian,”setarestrainedtargetandaccomplishtheobjectivewithoutfallingbelowtheline.

AccordingtoZhengJianofthePLAAcademyofMilitaryScience,itisimportant,first,toestablishalimitedtargetand“dixian”inordertokeepboththeadherencetoprinciplesandtheflexibility;second,nottooverlyconcentrateontheconflictofmoralityorprinciplesbutofinterests;third,tokeepflexibilityandbecautiousintakinganyactionthatmayresultinan irreversibleescalation; fourth, tobeself-restrainingtosomedegreewhenthesituationhasnorelationtoChina’simportantinterests;andfinally,toconsiderapproachesacceptabletotheopponent.

ThesecondcharacteristicofBeijing’scrisismanagementis topursuelegitimacyandtaketheinitiativeatthesametime.Thepursuitoflegitimacymeansthatit isimportant tokeeptheappearancethattheopponent,notChina,isalwayswronginacrisis,andthatChinaforthatpurpose,searchesfordomesticandinternationalsupportforitsposition.Theissuesoftheprinciplesaredeeplyinvolvedinthepursuitoflegitimacy.Thatis,BeijingconsidersthattheprincipleswhichChinaprotectsarealwayslegitimate rightsandacauseof thecrisis is theviolationofsuchlegitimaterights;theliabilityforthecrisisalwayslieswiththeopponentandChinaisapassivevictim.

Prof essor Wu Xinbo of the School ofInternationalRelationsandPublicAffairs,FudanUniversity, pointsout four featuresofChina’sexternal crisismanagement: first, focusof itsconcernsontheliabilityissue;second,emphasisonsovereigntyandnationaldignity;third,persistencewithsymbolicstyle;fourth,integrationofprinciples

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andflexibility.Chinahas tended toemphasizeethical self-

righteousness according to its principles. Forinstance,Wang Jisi andXuHui insist thatBeijingfirstlypoliticallyassessesacrisis,whichis followedby itsconsiderationofwhether thelegitimacycoincideswith justice forChina. Inotherwords,Beijingdecidespolitical legitimacyfromtheviewpointofChina’sprinciples,includingsovereignty,territoryandnationalunity.

Inaddition,Beijinghasrecentlyappealedforlegitimacybyinvokinginternationallaws.ProfessorZhangRuiof thePLADalianNavalAcademyproposes inhisarticleoncrisismanagement inmaritimeconfrontations thatwhenadisputeonmaritimeissuesdevelopsintoacrisis throughtheinterventionofagreatpower,Beijingshouldinitiallyanalyze thereasonsandcausesof theintervener.Then,heargues,itshouldunderminetheintervener’slegitimacybyeffectivelyemployinginternationallawsandfinallypromoteChina’slegitimacy.

Beijingalsoplacesimportanceonexplainingitslegitimacytodomesticsocietyandtheinternationalcommunity.ChengXiaodongofthePLANationalDefenseUniversity andothers argue that it iscrucialforBeijingtoseekbroadsupportfromtheinternationalcommunitybysufficientlymobilizingseveral political anddiplomaticmeans,whichinclude,forexample,expressionofChina’sstanceattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)andannouncementofofficialstatements.

Besides, Bei jing does not always showpassiveness in itsactualconduct. Instead, it isemphasizedthatChinatakestheinitiativeandthatpassivebehaviorshouldbecarefullyavoided.Thatis,recognizingthatitslegitimaterightsareviolated,China tries tomakeproactive responseswhileforestallinganyattemptsbyothercountriestoseizetheinitiativeinacrisis.

Indeed,thesecharacteristicsseemtobesimilarto“activedefensestrategy,”whichisoneof theChinesemilitary’sstrategicconcepts. In“activedefense strategy” it is important to combinestrategicdefensivepositionsandtacticaloffensiveoperations.Thisstandsasthesamewayofthinkingas theaforementionedapproach tokeepingbothrighteousnessandinitiatives.

ThethirdpointofChina’scrisismanagementis

thatChinautilizesforceandnegotiation,orinotherwords,themixtureoftheuseofmilitary,political,anddiplomaticapproaches.ComparingtheactionstakenbytheU.S.andChina,XiaLipinginsiststhatBeijing tends todealwith theopponent throughforceandnegotiation;namely,Beijing takesareciprocalapproachbyemployingnegotiationfornegotiation,ormilitaryforceformilitaryforce.

ZhengJianoftheAcademyofMilitarySciencenotesthatpolitical,military,anddiplomaticpressure,or, in some cases, restrictedmilitary force iseffectivetopromotenegotiations.Heconcludesthatwhentemperatemeasureshavenoeffectongainingconcessions,Beijingshouldresorttoeconomicand/ormilitarysanctions.Hence,forceandnegotiationareinseparable.

The achievement of political ends has topprioritywhenBeijingdealswithacrisis,andthemilitary is justameans forachieving theends.XiaLiping explains, “Crisismanagement ininternationalpoliticsis thecomprehensiveuseofpolitical,military,diplomatic,economicandothermeansandtheycouldbemoreeffectiveiftheyarefacilitatedbydiplomacy.” Beijingtriestoprotectits interestswithoutprovokingwarthroughforceandnegotiationbyproperlyusingpolitical,military,economic,anddiplomaticassets.

Amongthem,militarymeasuresneedtobeusedprudently.Beijingthinksthatmilitarypowermustnotbeemployedwithoutdueconsiderationor inordertodefinepoliticalanddiplomaticobjectives,despiteitsstrongcoerciveeffects.

Thus,China thinksmilitarymeansshouldbestrictlycontrolledbypolitics. ZhengJianof theAcademyofMilitaryScienceemphasizes that itisnecessary tocontinuouslycontrol themilitarydimension to have an efficient negotiation ininternationalcrises. ProfessorXuJiaofthePLAForeignLanguage Instituteargues inhisarticlein thePLA Daily that themilitarymust self-consciouslyobeyordersandabidebytherulesastheactionsanddispositionofthemilitarycouldbeparticularlysensitivemattersintheinformationage.

Literaturesshow that thenatureofChinesecrisismanagementisconsistentwithMaoZedong’sprinciple“On justgrounds,toouradvantage,andwithrestraint”(youli, youli, youjie).Originally,MaoexpressedtheprincipleoftheCPCtofightagainst

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theChineseKuomintang(KMT)in1940in“youli, youli, youjie”;meaning“wearetobereasonable,advantageous,andexercisemoderation.”However,thissloganhasalsobeenfrequentlycitedtoconnote“maintain legitimacy,chaseactual interests,andpursuelimitedobjectives”inthecontextofcrisismanagement.Perhaps,WangJisiandXuHui’sstudy, forexample,explainshowChinesecrisismanagementhasfollowedtheslogan.FacedwithNATO’s bombingof theChineseEmbassy inBelgrade in1999and theEP-3incident in2001,Beijingbeganbyproclaimingitslegitimacy“onjustgrounds,”stronglyblamingtheU.S.forviolatingChina’ssovereigntyand territorial integrity,andplacedWashingtoninan“unjustposition.”ThiswasfollowedbythedemandthatWashingtonadmitteditsmistakesandapologizesforwhatithaddone.Then,sinceWashingtonmadeaconcessionthatwas

nottotallysatisfactorybutacceptableforBeijingasadiplomaticsuccess(“toouradvantage”),Beijing’sattitudebecameconciliatory“withrestraint”andthecrisiscalmeddown.

HowdoesChinaconcretelymanagecrises? Firstandforemost,itshouldbenotedthatChinahasatendencytostress theimportanceof thepoliticalrelationship before taking concrete actions tomanageacrisis. China’smechanismtomanageacrisismightnotfunctioninadeterioratingpoliticalrelationship. WangJisiandXuHuipointout“ItisneedlesstosaythatthemostimportantfactortopreventandmanageSino-Americancrises is thepoliticalrelationshipbetweenthem.Inotherwords,theimprovementof thepoliticalrelationshipisaprerequisite to facilitatecommunication, reducemisunderstandings,restrainconfrontation,andreachmutualagreementbetweenChinaandtheU.S.”Inlightof theaforementionedcharacteristics, thereis littlepossibility forBeijing topromotecrisismanagementwhenthepolitical relationshipwiththeopponent,or tobeprecise, itsownprinciple,iscompromised. RegardlessofwhetherChina’sprincipleisacceptedbytheopponent,itisdifficultforChinatofacilitatecrisismanagementunlessitsclaimisatleastmaintained.

Thereare threeconcretemethods for crisismanagementaccordingtosomestudiesinChina.Thefirstistocommunicateinformationandintentions.Itisimportanttomaintainalineofcommunication

Politics of Crisis Managementincriseswhenmutualdistrustandhostilitygrows.Theconcretemethodfor thiscommunicationcanbepersonal lettersexchangedbetween theheadsofstate,telephoneconversations,orofficialroutesthrough diplomatic or intelligence agencies.Hotlinesbetweenheadsorleadersatvariouslevels,anemergencycontactmechanism,aspecialenvoy,andtrackIIdiplomacyarealsoincluded.

WangJisiandXuHuistatethatthenumberofcasesofresolvedSino-Americancrisesisincreasing

The Embassy of China in Yugoslavia after the NATO bombing.(Kyodo News)

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (L) shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan after signing an agreement to set up a hotline between Washington and Beijing (April 29, 1998) (Kyodo News)

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asaresultofimprovedcommunicationmechanismstoconveyinformationandintention.Forinstance,theypointoutthattheEP-3crisisin2001wasbettermanagedthanpreviouscases,basedonthelessonslearnedfromtheembassybombingincidentin1999.Beijingsentsomedefinitesignals toWashingtontointentionallymaintainadequatecommunicationlinesandthereweresomeimprovementstoguidedomesticpublicopinion.

Furthermore,someconsultationsorconferencesbetween theconflictingpartiesare required toalleviatecrises.Thesedialoguescouldbeformalorinformal.

The second are coercive measures. Aspreviouslynoted,becausetheChineseconceptofcrisismanagementincorporatessomethingsimilartocoercivediplomacy,variouscoercivemeasuresareincludedintheconcretemeans.ThesemeasuresareusedtomaketheopponentsbehavefavorablytoChina,forexample, toenter intonegotiationsandtotakeadvantageof thenegotiationprocess.They include actions fromannouncing strongdiscourseandstatements,cancelingleaders’visitsorconferences,andimposingeconomicsanctions,to strengthening theactivitiesof themaritimelawenforcementagencies to insiston territorialjurisdiction,andthePLA’sdemonstrativeactivitiesandexercises.

Thethirdispropaganda.Chinaproducesskillfulpropaganda toobtaindomesticandinternationalsupport,whichitregardsasveryimportant.Namely,it is emphasized thatChina“will immediatelycommunicatethesituationofthemilitarycrisisanditsrecognitionandfundamentalprinciplefor thecrisistotheUNSCtoobtainsympathyandsupportintheUN.Furthermore,Chinawilldeclarepoliticalstatements to theinternationalsocietyexplainingits recognitionof thecrisisand thefundamentalprinciplestodealwithit.”

Moreover, it is said thatmeasures to dealwithdomesticpublicopinionhavebecomemoresignificantowing to its increasing influence inrecentyears.ZhangTuoshengnotes,“theChinesegovernmentincreasinglyregardsitasimportanttopayattentiontothetideofpublicopinionandtoguideitincrises.”WuXinbopointsoutthegrowingpublic concern about international incidents,andexplains thegovernment faceddifficulties

prohibitingdemonstrationsandstruggled to leadpublicopinionduringthe1999embassybombingincident.

However,itmustalsobenotedthattheCPChasbeentraditionallymanipulatingpublicopinionandmobilizingpeopleininternationalcrisestoshowitsdeterminationandtostrengthenitsdomesticsupport.

Thus, what is clear from the analysis ofChina’scrisismanagementconceptis,firstofall,theimportanceofpolitics. ThecharacteristicsofChina’scrisismanagementshowthe importanceofpoliticaldecisionmaking.Namely,the“bottomline”thatmustbeachievedinitsapproachto“sticktoprinciplesandkeepflexibility” isdeterminedpolitically.Indeed,thereisnoobjectivestandardforit.Politicaldecisionsarealsoneededforitsapproachto“legitimacyand initiatives,” inwhichChinakeepsthepositionofapassivevictimwhiletakingactionswithinitiatives.Asfor“comprehensiveness,”Beijingtries tocontrolcrisesbyutilizingvariousassetsincludingmilitary,diplomatic,andeconomicones.Wieldingtheseassetsandfactorswouldneedpoliticaljudgmentsanddecisions.

Becauseof thecomprehensivenatureofcrisismanagement, it isnotsufficient toseeonly themilitaryaspect inorder tocomprehendBeijing’sactionsinacrisis;aspectsotherthanthemilitary,suchasdiplomaticandeconomicmeansshouldalsobecarefullyobserved.Beijing’sactionswithoutmilitarymeansdonotnecessarilymeantheactionisconciliatory.ThatBeijingcouldemployanyothermeanstopursuetheirinterestsmustberemembered.

Thesecondpointof theChineseconceptof

General Secretary Xi Jinping inspects a PLAN vessel. (December 2012) (Xinhua/Kyodo News)

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crisismanagementisarequirementtoconcentratedecisionmakingauthorityandcontrolofmilitaryforce. ThecharacteristicsofChina’sconceptofcrisismanagementseemtobeconsistentwiththatofitspoliticalsysteminwhichagenciesandsectors

of themilitaryandforeignaffairsareunder theleadershipoftheCPC.Hence,theperceptionsandpolicytendenciesoftheChineseleadershipmustbethoroughlyexaminedinordertointerpretBeijing’sactionsininternationalcrises.

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The 2001 EP-3 Incident

Toward Accident Prevention


Chinaexperienced several international crisesfromtheendof theColdWarsuchas the1995-1996TaiwanStrait crisis, the1999 embassybombingincident,the2001EP-3incident,andthe2010Senkakuboatcollision. ThehandlingoftheEP-3incident,whichoccurredinairspaceaboveinternationalwatersabout70milessoutheastofHainan IslandonApril1,2001, is regarded inChinaasoneofthemostsuccessfulcasesofcrisismanagement. Thissectionoverviews theactiontakenbyBeijinginthiscase,andthenrevealsitscharacteristics.

Chineseleadersheldameetingintheafternoonofthedayoftheincident,anddecideduponaninitialpolicytodealwiththeincident. TheyconcludedfirstthattheMinistryofForeignAffairsshouldtakeresponsibilityforworkinglevelcoordinationamongtheagenciesconcernedaswellasnegotiationswiththeUnitedStates. Second,itdecidedtomaketheMinistryofForeignAffairsquicklydeclareChina’sstanceinlightofthefacttheU.S.PacificCommandhadalreadyreleased thefirstannouncement,sixhoursaftertheincident.Theannouncement,postedonthecommand’swebsite,said:

In internationalwaters, aU.S.NavyEP-3maritimepatrolaircraftonaroutinesurveillancemission over the South China Sea wasinterceptedbytwoPeople’sRepublicofChinafighteraircraft.Therewascontactbetweenoneof theChineseaircraftand theEP-3,causingsufficientdamagefor theU.S.plane to issuea‘Mayday’signalanddivert toanairfieldonHainanIsland,People’sRepublicofChina(PRC).

ThisannouncementmeanttheinstigatoroftheincidentwasChina. It is likelythat theMinistryofForeignAffairswasrequestedinthemeetingtomakeitclearthattheresponsibilityfortheincidentwasnotwithChina.

In fact, that night, the ForeignMinistrySpokespersongaveafullaccountof themid-aircollision.Hestated,“OnthemorningofApril1,aU.S.EP-3reconnaissanceplaneflewsoutheastofChina’sHainanIsland.”Therefore,“twoF-8fighters

[weresent] tofollowandmonitortheU.S.plane.At9:07a.m., theChineseplanesmadeanormalflightinanarea104kilometersfromthebaselineofChinese territorialwaters.[...] theU.S.planesuddenlyveeredatawideangletowardstheChineseplanes.TheU.S.plane’snoseandleftwingrammedthetailofoneoftheChineseplanes,causingittolosecontrolandplungeintothesea.[...] relevantChinesedepartmentsimmediatelysentsearch-and-rescueplanesandshipstolookforthepilot.”“[Weare]deeplyconcernedaboutWang’ssafety.”Hefurtheradded,“TheU.S.planeenteredChineseairspacewithoutapproval,andlandedatLingshuiAirport inHainanat9:33a.m.” HeemphasizedthattheChinesefighterswereproperlytrackingandmonitoringtheEP-3inaccordancewithinternationalpracticeandpressed“theU.S.sidetofaceuptothefact,bearfullresponsibility”

ThePartyleadershipheldanothermeetingonApril2 toshareandconfirmthepositionof thisstatementonU.S. responsibility. Furthermore,Chineseleadersestablishedapolicycalled“renjifenli” (to dealwith the aircraft and its crewseparately);BeijingintendedtoreturnthecrewonHainanIslandtotheU.S.earlierthantheiraircraft.Beijing aimed at an early settlementwithoutanydeteriorationof theSino-U.S. relationshipthroughthispolicy. WuJianmin,formerChineseambassadortoFrance,remarksthatChineseleaderssetApril15,EasterDay,asadefinitetimelimittoletthecrewmembersgohome.TheyfearedthatifBeijingkeptthecrewmembersincustodyduring

The 2001 EP-3 Incident

A U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing on Hainan Island. (China News/Kyodo News)

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thisimportantfestival,theAmericanpeoplewouldfeelantipathytowardsChina,resultinginanegativeeffectonSino-Americanrelations.

OnApril3,ChineseleadersfinalizeditspolicyguidelinesthatChinawouldengagein“aresolutestruggleagainsttheerroneousbehavior”oftheU.S.butalsoplanaswift resolutionconsidering“theoverall situationofSino-American relations.”JiangZeminissuedinstructionstoVicePresidentHuJintaototakechargeofdealingwiththeincidentbeforedeparting forasix-country trip toLatinAmericawithVicePremierQianQichenandothersonApril4.

ForeignMinisterTangJiaxuansummonedJosephW.Prueher, theU.S.ambassadortoChina,intheeveningofApril4 toexplainChina’sstandpointregardingtheincidentinaccordancewiththefinalpolicydirectiondecidedbytheChineseleadership.Tangstatedfirst that theU.S.Navyaircrafthad“violatedrelevantprovisionsoftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawof theSeas(UNCLOS)”andhad“alsodamagedtherelevantconsensusonavoidingdangerousmilitaryactivitiesatseareachedbetweenChinaandtheU.S.”inMay2000.Hethenpointedout thatWashingtonshouldhaveahighregardfor the“facts”inBeijing’sannouncement.HewentontodemandanapologyfromWashingtonfor themistakeand insisted that itwouldbeapreconditionforhandingoverthecrewmembers.HealsodemandedtheU.S.“tostopdispatchingitsreconnaissanceaircrafttothevicinityoftheChinesecoast.”

Therewasalmostnochance thatWashingtonwould accept this request because they hadalreadystatedthe“facts”differedfromBeijing’s.Washingtonmaintaineditsfirmanduncompromisingposition,sayingitcouldnotapologizeforsomethingthatwasnot its fault. Nonetheless,Washingtontried“tofindaface-savingwayoutfortheChinese”(CondoleezzaRice,thenAssistanttothePresidentforNationalSecurity)toavoidescalatingthecrisis.Tothatend,theU.S.SecretaryofStateColinPowellexpressed“regret”overthemissingChinesepilotinapersonallettertoChineseVicePremierQianQichenonApril4.TheU.S.PresidentGeorgeW.Bushalsoexpressed“regret”thenextdayoverthemissingpilotandthelossofChineseairplane,whileappealingtotheimportanceoftheU.S.-Chinarelations.

Theneleven roundsofnegotiationsover thewordingwereheldbetweenAmbassadorPrueherandAssistantForeignMinisterZhouWenzhongafterApril5,sinceBeijingdidnotaccepttheword“regret”asanapology.BeijingmadenoconcessiononWashington’s“required”apology,whereas itwasflexibleaboutthewayitcouldbecarriedout.Rice remarks inhermemoir thatBeijingsentasignaltoWashingtonthatif theU.S.“wouldsendaletterthatsaidthatweweresorry”forthelossoftheChinesepilot,“wecouldendthecrisis.”ThiswasnothingbutasuggestionbyBeijingthatitwasshowingaflexibleattitudebynotinsistingontheword“apologize.” Washingtoninitiallychosetheword“regret,”then“sorry,”andfinally“verysorry”throughrepeatednegotiations.

ForeignMinisterTangJiaxuan received theletterfromAmbassadorPrueheronApril11,aftera commonunderstandinghad been formed intheMinistryofForeignAffairs that thewording“verysorry”wasequaltoaChinesewordmeaning“apologize(daoqian).” BothPresidentBushandSecretaryofStatePowellstated theywere“verysorry”overtheChinese“missingpilotandaircraft”and“theenteringofChina’sairspaceandthelanding[that]didnothaveverbalclearance”intheletter.China’sofficialnewsagency,Xinhua, identifiedthisletterasWashington’s“apologeticletter”andreported immediately that theU.S.government“expresseditssincerestapologies.”Becauseofthisletter,Beijingallowedthe24crewmembersdetainedonHainanIslandtoleaveChinathenextday.

U.S. Ambassador to China Joseph Prueher holds a press conference to announce the agreement with China to release the detained crew.(Kyodo News)

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What is clear fromChina’shandlingof thecrisis are that, first,Beijingconsistently stuckto theprinciple that theU.S. side shouldbearfull responsibility andmakeapologies, and tomaintainingChina’s legitimacy. Second,Beijingwasflexibleinitsactualbehaviortorealizethefirstpointmentionedabove; that is, theyacceptedthewording“verysorry”asanapology. ItshouldbestressedherethatBeijingdidnotnecessarilywantWashington’sfullconsenttoChina’sprinciplesandlegitimacy.TheU.S.sidestateditwas“verysorry”forthelossoftheChinesepilot’slifebutdidnotapologizeforitbeingtheirfault.WhilesomeU.S.officialsfrequentlyemphasizedthis, therewasnosignindicatingthatthisraisedconcernsforBeijing.Thismeansthatthecriticalmatterforbothsideswastohelptheotherpartymaintainitsposition.Third,theMinistryofForeignAffairscouldbehaveflexiblywiththevirtueofthedefiniteguideline,the“renjifenli,”foraswiftresolution,whichwastheconcreteexpressionoftheunderlyingpolicyof“consideringtheoverallsituation”bythetopleaders.

Furthermore, itwasadistinctive institutionalfeaturethatdecisionmakingonpolicyandguidelineswashighlycentralizedtotheCentralCommitteeoftheParty. SomepriorresearchandmediareportsarguethatHuJintaoplayedasignificantroleasthedeputychairoftheNationalSecurityLeadingSmallGroup(NSLG),whichwasestablishedin2000toreinforce thenationalcrisismanagementsystemaftertheNATObombingoftheChineseEmbassyinBelgradein1999.Thatistosay,theauthorsofthesestudiesandreportsunderstandthatHutookoverallcommandofthesituationasthedeputychairofNSLGinwhichtheCommunistPartyofChina(CPC),thegovernment,andthePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)participated.

Theguidelinesandpolicies, however,werediscussed and basically decided upon in theStandingCommitteeof thePolitburo. Therearerelevantdescriptions in thebiographyofZhangWannian,thenvice-chairmanoftheCentralMilitaryCommission(CMC);immediatelyaftertheincident“JiangZeminconvened thePolitburoStandingCommittee,andtheCommitteediscussedandmadedecisionsonthepolicyandprinciplesregardingtheincident.”ThisseemstobeportrayingthesituationinsideBeijingfromApril1toApril3.LiPeng,who

wassecondinthePartyranks,wroteanoutlineoftheincidentinhisdiaryofApril2,whichsuggeststhatsomekindofmeetingontheincidentwasheldontheday.TherewaslittlepossibilityofhisbeingamemberofNSLGor,inanothername,theForeignAffairsLeadingSmallGroup(FALG),becausehewas theChairmanof theStandingCommitteeofNationalPeople’sCongress(NPC)atthattime.AllthesethingsindicatethatthepoliciestodealwiththeincidentweredecidedintheStandingCommittee.

Ofcourse,thisisnottosaythatHudidnotplayanyrole.Infact,heseemedtomakedecisionsonindividualcasesaccordingtothePolitburoStandingCommittee

,spolicywhenTangJiaxuanreported

on theprogressofnegotiationswith theU.S. tohim. Inaddition, thenatureof this incident,acollisionbetweentwomilitaryaircraftmadeHu’sinvolvementnecessary.Theincidentwasnot justadiplomaticmatterbutamilitaryaffairinwhichthePLAwas involvedasadirectlyconcernedparty.ApartfromtheGeneralSecretaryoftheCPCCentralCommitteeandtheChairmanofCMCJiangZemin,theonlyleaderintheStandingCommitteeofthePolitburowhocouldissueorderstothePLAwasHuastheVice-ChairmanoftheCMC.ItisagainstthisbackdropthatHuwasresponsiblefordealingwiththeincident. Indeed,somemilitarymemoirsandmediareportsinChinamentionthatHuissuedsomeorderstothePLAregardingtheincident.

Thishighlycentralizeddecisionmakingsystemresultedinadelayintheinitialexternalresponsetotheincident.AlthoughtheSecretaryofStatePowelltried tocontactForeignMinisterTangJiaxuanimmediatelyaftertheincident, theattemptfailed.WashingtonandBeijing lostcontactwitheachotherfor twodaysfollowingtheincident,exceptfortheprotesttoAmbassadorPrueherpresentedbyAssistantForeignMinisterZhouWenzhong.Hence,topleaderscouldnotproperlycommunicatewitheachotherforoneweek in theaftermathof theincident.

Communicationbetweentopleadersattheinitialstageisofvitalimportancetopreventtheescalationofcrises. Despite theestablishmentofahotlinebetweentheheadsoftheU.S.andChinaby2001,itdidnotfunction.InChina,itisdifficulttocontactworkingsections,suchasdiplomaticauthoritiesunlessthePartyCentralCommitteedecidesonthe

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policytodealwith thematter. Chinesememoirson this incidentalwaysstress thefact thateachsubordinateorgan’s responsewasbasedon thedecisionsoftheParty’sleadership. Thus,howtoestablishandensureanemergencycommunicationmechanism with government and military

departmentsaswellastopleadersisanissuetobeaddressedincrisismanagementwithChinaforanyothercountries.

In addition to responses after incidents, thepreventionofmilitaryaccidentswhichcouldcausecrises isakey issueofcrisismanagementwithChina. Forcountries in theregionandtheU.S.,avertingmilitary-relatedcontingencywithChinainpeacetime is an important policychallenge,considering the rapidmodernizationofChineseseapoweraswellasairpowerandtheirexpandingsphereofoperations.

Asfrequentconfrontationofnavaland/orairforcesoftheU.S.andChinahadbeenwitnessedintheareanearChinasincetheearly1990s,MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement (MMCA)wasconcludedinJanuary1998betweentheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseandtheMinistryofNationalDefense of thePRC.Since then,WashingtonandBeijinghavediscussedsafetystandardsandprocedurestoavoidmilitaryincidents.

Washingtoncametorecognizethenecessitytopreventunforeseenmilitary-relatedcontingencieswhen theaircraftcarrierUSSKitty Hawk and a ChineseHan-classnuclearsubmarinesquaredoffintheYellowSeainOctober1994.TheKitty Hawk,onroutinepatrolin“internationalwaters”intheYellowSea,encounteredtheHan-classsubmarine,andtheU.S.dispatchedS-3Vikingantisubmarinepatrolaircraft towatchthemovementofthesubmarine.Inresponse,Chinasenttwofighterjets.Thevolatilestand-offcontinuedfornearly70hours.Whilethesituationfinallysettleddownwiththedepartureofthe Han,Beijingfolloweduptheincidentwithawarning,issuedtotheU.S.NavalAttaché,thatthePLAwouldopenfire inasimilar incident in thefuture.

Inthewakeofthisincident,WashingtonaskedBeijingtobuildaframeworktoavoidsuchincidentswith the IncidentsatSeaAgreement (INCSEA)betweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionin

1972inmindasamodel.Moreover,theleadersinWashingtonandBeijing,havingexperiencedbittererconfrontationduringtheThirdTaiwanStraitCrisis,bothcametoperceivethesignificanceofavoidinganaccidentandpreventingescalation. TheU.S.DefenseSecretaryandtheChineseDefenseMinisterreachedanagreementtostartadialoguetoavoidanunforeseeablecontingencyatseainDecember1996.Thedialoguebetweendefenseofficialsstartedbasedonthisagreement,andinOctober1997,thetopleadersinWashingtonandBeijingconfirmedtheirintenttoestablish“aconsultationmechanismto strengthenmilitarymaritime safety,whichwillenabletheirmaritimeandairforcestoavoidaccidents,misunderstandingsormiscalculations.”Consequently, theU.S.DefenseSecretaryandtheChineseDefenseMinistersigned theMMCAinJanuary1998.

TheU.S.-ChinaMMCAMechanismiscomposedof thefollowing threeframeworks. Thefirst isannualmeetingsinwhich thedelegationofeachpartyisledbyatwo-starflagofficer. Thesecondistheworkinggroupstostudyanddiscussagenda

Toward Accident Prevention

U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen signs the MMCA with China's Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian.(U.S. DoD photo)

29

itemsagreedat theannualmeetings. Theheadof thedelegationisaseniornavycaptainin thismeeting.Thelastisspecialmeetingsforthepurposeofconsultingonspecificmattersofconcernrelatingto theactivitiesatseaof theirmaritimeandairforces.

Thefirstannualmeetingwasheld inBeijinginJuly1998. Thedelegationsexchangedbriefson theirnational lawsandregulationsgoverningmilitaryoperationsatseaandagreed toconveneaseriesofworkinggroups todiscussmaritimenavigation safety issues. In the firstworkinggroupmeetingheldat theendof theyear, theinternationalcommunicationsstandards, thelawsofthesea,andmaritimesafetyandnavigationwerediscussed. Then,whenthesecondworkinggroupmet inQingdao inMay1999, theagreed-uponpointsculminatedinthepublicationofthe Study of Sino-U.S. Maritime Navigation Safety, Including Communications.Nonetheless,thePLApostponedallmilitary exchanges including theMMCAmeetingsandhalteddiscussionswith theU.S.aftertheNATObombingoftheChineseEmbassyinBelgradeonMay8. Awrittenagreementwasprepared in theMMCAworkinggroupmeeting,whichresumedinMarch2000,andwaspresentedinthesecondannualmeetinginMay2000.Anotheragreement about the avoidance of dangerousmaritimemilitaryactionswasconcluded in thisannualmeeting.

Notwithstandingtheseefforts,theEP-3collisionincident inApril2001revealed theweaknessoftheseefforts. Itwastheinternationalrulesaboutmaritimesafetyandnavigation,andcommunicationthatwerediscussedintheworkinggroup,andwhichhadalreadybeensignedbyWashingtonandBeijing.Furthermore, theyagreed thatmilitaryshipsandaircraftinthevicinityofeachothershouldavoidhazardsaccordingtointernationalregulations,andspecified the regulations in thesecondMMCAannualmeeting. Theagreement reads, “whenmilitaryairbornevehiclesencountereachotherininternationalairspace,bothsidesshouldproperlyobservethecurrentinternationallawandpractices,andpaydueregardtotheflightsafetyoftheotherside so as to avoiddangerous approaches andpossiblecollisions.”

Thewording “due regard” is used in the

ConventiononInternationalCivilAviation(ChicagoConvention)Article3(d),whosemeaninghadalsobeendiscussedduringtheMMCA.ThedelegationrepresentingtheU.S.intheMMCAworkinggroupatthattimesaid“their[Chineseside’s]recognitioncouldwell haveprevented theEP-3EandF-8accident.”

Thisdoesnotmean,however, thatChinahadnointentionofavoidingmaritimeaccidents. TheEP-3incidentresultedinanMMCAspecialmeetinginSeptember2001thatfocusedonprinciplesandproceduresfor thesafetyofmilitaryaircraftandvesselsoperatinginthevicinityofeachother.Thesepointsweresubsequentlydiscussed in thenextworkinggroupmeeting.Furthermore,quiteafewChinesediplomatsandPLAofficialscontinuouslyrecognized thesignificanceof theMMCAtobeamechanismfor“militaryaircraftandmilitaryvessels’avoidanceofaccidents,misunderstandingormisjudgment”forbothsides,referringtotheJointU.S.-ChinaStatementinOctober1997.Inaddition,whileU.S. reconnaissance aircrafts’operationandChinesefighter jets’air interceptsfrequentlyoccurredintheairspaceoffthecoastofChina,thePLAconductedtheseintercepts“inamuchmoreprofessionalandsafemanner”after theincident,accordingtoaU.S.Navyofficer.Moreover,directconfrontationbetweennavalvesselsofChinaandtheU.S.hassubstantiallydiminishedaftertheincident.

However, it isnoteasy toachieveacommonstandard formaritimemilitarysafty forChinaand theU.S. AnofficialofPLANavy(PLAN)comments that the actual state of maritimenavigation safety falls far short of achievingcompletion. He points out two fundamentaldifficulties:first,“thereisafairlylargediscrepancy”insecurityinterests,andstrategiesandoperatingmethodsofthenavybetweenChinaandtheU.S.;second,“thedifferentunderstandingofgeneralprinciples of internationalmaritime law andtreaties.”BeijingemphasizedinMMCAspecialandworkinggroupmeetingsresultingfromtheEP-3incidentthat“thepresenceofU.S.reconnaissanceaircraftandSpecialMissionShips(SMS)”intheChineseExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)presentedthreats totheirnationalsecurity,anddemandedahalt to thereconnaissanceoperationsrather thanmakingasafetystandard.

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Beijing,fromthebeginning,takesthepositionthatallforeignmilitaryplanesandmilitaryvesselscanenjoythefreedomofover-flightandnavigationintheEEZaslongasthereisnoconflictofinterestswith thecoastalstate. Thus,Beijingasserts thatpriorpermissionfromthecoastalstateisrequiredformilitaryactivitiesintheEEZ.Fromthisstandpoint,theactivitiesoftheU.S.militarywithoutBeijing’spriorpermissionwouldbeseenasa“reconnaissanceoperation”thatthreatensChina’snationalsecurity.Onthecontrary,theU.S.considersthatUNCLOSprovidesthattheEEZis“internationalwaters”forfreenavigationandover-flightofanycountries.Thatis tosay,Washingtontakesthepositionthatthecoastalstate’s jurisdictionin theEEZ,whichBeijinginsistson,hasaneffectonlyonresourcedevelopment,andthereforehasnoeffectonmilitaryactivities. WashingtonandBeijingare thusonadifferentwavelengthregardingmilitaryactivitiesintheEEZ.Meanwhile,thePLANvesselsoperatewithin theU.S.EEZaroundGuamandHawaiiwithoutpriorpermission from theU.S.Hence,Beijing’sdeedsdonotnecessarilymatchitswords.

Itisalsonoteworthythatwhileitwasdifficulttoexplicitlyagreeonsafetystandardswith theU.S.,Beijingassignedobstructiveactions to twomaritime lawenforcementagencies, theChinaMaritimeSurveillance(CMS)oftheStateOceanicAdministration(SOA)andtheChinaFisheriesLawEnforcementCommand(FLEC)oftheMinistryofAgriculture(atthetime),inordertoavoidmilitaryaccidentsorconfrontations.YuZhirong, formerseniorofficialofCMSEastChinaSeaBranch,remarks that“facedwithan increasinglyacutestruggleovermaritimeinterestsbetweenChinaandtheU.S.andasevereenvironmentfortheprotectionofthoseinterests,ahighleveldecision-makingbodydecidedthattheCMSshouldinheritthePLAN’sdutytorespondtoU.S.Navyvesselsconductingmilitarysurveillancemissionswithin theareaofChinesejurisdiction.”HegoesontosaythatJiangZemin,theGeneralSecretaryoftheCentralCommitteeofCPCatthetime,demandedto“sticktotheprincipletoprotectChina’smaritimerightsandinterestsandpreventthesituationworsening”formaritimelawenforcementagencies. WhileYudoesnotstatethe timeof thisdecision, it seems tobearound2001fromthecontextofhiswriting.However,the

shiftofresponsibilityfromPLANtomaritimelawenforcementagenciesprogressedslowlybecausemostofthevesselsofthemaritimeagenciesweretoooldforsuchtasksandonlyafewvesselshadthepropercapacitiestocoverthevastEEZ.

Theidea thatBeijingshouldusenotonly theassetsofCMSbutalsothewell-equippedfleetofotherlawenforcementagenciessuchasFLECwasemergingduringthesecondhalfofthe2000sfromseveralPLANofficials.ProfessorFengLiang,oneof theChinesedelegatesfor theMMCAworkinggroup,arguedthat themaritimelawenforcementagenciesshouldbeusedinpeacetimetoavoiddirectmilitaryconfrontationswhiledecreasingthedirectuseofthePLAN.LiXingguang,presidentofthePLANMilitaryCourt,asserted,withanexplanationfromChina’s standpoint for foreignmilitaryactivitiesintheEEZ,thatChinashouldreinforcethejurisdictionalcontrolintheEEZ,respondingtomilitaryactionsbysuchcountriesastheU.S.Oneofthemeasuresforthatisstrengtheningthemaritimelawenforcementactivities,whereashedidnotrefertotheroleofthePLAN.

Infact,mostof theinterruptionsagainstU.S.militaryactivities in theChineseEEZhavebeenmainlycarriedoutby lawenforcementagenciesorfishingboatsfrom2005,not thePLAN. ThevesselsandaircraftoftheChineselawenforcementagenciesaresaidtohaveenhancedtheirarmamentafter theestablishmentof theChinaCoastGuardinJune2013.Nonetheless,thereislittlepossibilitythatanydisruptiveactionsbythemshouldcauseaseveresituationincludingalarge-scalemilitaryconfrontationbecauseof their lighterarmamentcomparedtothePLAN.

China Coast Guard,s Haijing 2101 (Photo:Japan Coast Guard)

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However,someCMSofficialspointedoutthattheadministrative instructionsandoperationalprocedures toexercise the rightofhot pursuitprovidedbyUNCLOSArticle111andtheArticle12ofPRCLawonChina’stheExclusiveEconomicZoneandContinentalShelfwerenotyetestablishedatthetime.Asaresult,dangerousactionsbysuchgroups asmaritime lawenforcement agenciesfrequentlyoccurred.ProfessorFengalsoindicatedthat the problemwas that themaritime lawenforcementagencieswerenotsosensitivetosomeexternalfierceresponsesderivedfromtheiractitivies.

AtypicalexampleistheMarch2009Impeccable incident.OnMarch8,an intelligencecollectionshipof thePLAN,aCMSpatrolvessel,aFLECpatrolvessel,andtwotrawlersharassedtheUSNSImpeccable,aU.S.oceanographicship,whichwasconductingoperationsinthewatersapproximately120kmsouthofHainanIsland.InthisincidentitwastheFLECpatrolvesselandthetrawlers thatplayedacentralrole.Yuzheng 302wasdispatchedbytheMinistryofAgricultureSouthChinaSeaFisheryBureautoexecuteamissiontotrack,monitor,anddriveaway theUSNS Impeccable, andstartedchasingandwatching.Later,thetwotrawlersalsosentbytheSouthChinaSeaFisheryBureauarrivedatthesiteanddroppedpiecesofwoodinthewaterdirectlyintheImpeccable’spathandaggressivelyclosed toapproximatelyeightmetersunder thecommandofYuzheng 302. TheU.S.governmentpointedout suchobstructive actions violatedinternationallawsandmadeaprotesttotheChinesegovernmentaboutthe“unprofessionalmaneuversby theChinesevessels.” Although therewasaPLANintelligencecollectionship,shedidnottakepartdirectlyintheobstruction.

MicheleFlournoy,UnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicy,raisedthequestionofChina’sdangerousactionsandstressedtheimportanceoftheMMCAasamechanismtohandlesuchissuesattheU.S.-ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalksinJune2009.Inresponse,GeneralMaXiaotian,DeputyChiefofPLAGeneralStaffDepartmentemphasizedChina’sstandpointregarding“reconnaissanceoperations”byU.S.vesselsinChina’sEEZ.BothpartiesagreedtoholdanMMCAspecialmeetingonthe themeofmaritimesafetyand“freedomofnavigation”inChina’sEEZ.ThemeetingwasheldinBeijingat

theendofAugust.Chinastressed“therootcauseofmilitaryandsecurityproblemsin theairspaceandseabetweenChinaandtheU.S.isthelatter’sfrequentreconnaissanceandsurveillanceoperationsinandaboveChina’sEEZ,”and“thefundamentalsolutiontotheproblem”hadtobe“thereductionandhaltof thereconnaissanceoperationsby theU.S.”

It isdifficult todiscuss theproblemsaboutotheragenciesandactorsthanthenavyinMMCAmeetings. Air forcescanparticipate inMMCAaswellasnavies,sincetheagreementonMMCAofJanuary1998stipulatestheneedforpromotingcommon understandings regarding activitiesundertaken by their respectivemaritime and air forceswhenoperating in accordancewithinternational law, including theprinciples andregimesreflectedintheUnitedNationsConventionsontheLawoftheSea.” Nevertheless,Chinahasbeenthinkingof theMMCAasaframeworkforcooperationbetweennaviesfromthebeginning.Infact, theheadoftheChinesedelegationhasbeenconsistentlyaDeputyChiefofStaffofthePLAN.Moreover,basically,otherChineseparticipantshaveexclusivelybeenPLANofficials.

In recentyears,BeijinghasbeenattemptingtoreidentifythescopeoftheMMCAinabroadercontext. Abilateralsearchand rescueexercise(SAREX)of theU.S.Navyand thePLANwasconductedintwophasesoffSanDiegoandintheSouthChinaSeainSeptemberandNovember2006,respectively.While thisexercisewasbasedonaproposalbyWashington,AdmiralLiangGuanglie,ChineseMinisterforNationalDefense,appreciated

PLAN Liaison officers prepare to embark aboard the amphibious transport dock USS Juneau to observe a U.S.-Chinese combined search and rescue exercise. (November 2006) (U.S. Navy photo)

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theexerciseasaneffortof theMMCAthat“hasenhancedexchangesbetweenthetwonavies.”Thereseems tobeadesire inBeijingbehind thishighcommendationtomaketheMMCAaframeworktodiscussmaritimesecurityissuesinabroadercontextaswellastechnicalissuessuchasproceduresformaritimesafetyandnavigation.

APLANofficial notes that there are threemeasurestoensuremaritimesafetyandnavigation:Thefirstly,buildingmutualconfidenceinthemilitaryfield;secondly,seekingaconsensusoninternationallaws;andthirdly,takingconcretestepsattheplacetoavoiddangerousapproachesandcollisions,andinthevicinity,establishcommunicationtoconfirmtheintentionsofoneanothertopreventaccidents.Healsosaysthatbuildingconfidenceinthemilitaryfieldis theessentialprerequisitefor theaccidentpreventionmechanismtofunction.

Anotherexpert regards themaritime“crisispreventionmechanism”asapartof the“mutualconfidencemechanismformaritimesecurity”anddefinesthelatteras“anaggregationofframeworkstobuildconfidenceandgeneratedialogueandcooperation,aswellasaseriesofnorms,agreements,andarrangements.” Basedonthisunderstanding,someoftheChineseexpertsarguethatthesubstanceoftheMMCAshouldbedevelopedintwocontexts.The first is to give amore concrete shape to

procedurestoensuremaritimenavigationsafetyandflightsafety;however,apessimisticviewaboutthisideastillpermeatesinChina.Thesecondistowidenthescopeofnavalcooperation tonontraditionalsecuritytoformanoverallcooperationmechanismandbuildconfidencein themilitary. Infact, theChinese side proposed in theMMCAannualmeetingheld inQingdaoin theendofFebruary2008to“addpositiveelementsfortheimprovementanddevelopmentof relationsbetween the twomilitaries”asabasicprinciplefortheMMCA.

BeijinghasbeenfocusingonrestrictingU.S.militaryoperationsinitsownEEZ.Asaresult,theMMCA’sfunctionasconfidencebuildingmeasures(CBMs)topreventaccidentsthroughestablishmentofcommonsafetystandardsisinrelativedeclineinChina’sunderstanding.ThisischangingMMCA’scharacterintoanavalframeworkofcooperationinnontraditionalsecurityaffairs,onwhichagreementandcooperationarerelativelyeasytoachieve. Inaddition,thatthemainorganizationfordisruptiveactionsagainst foreignmilitaryactivities in thewatersclosetoChinaisshiftingtomaritimelawenforcementagencies raisesanewchallengeforneighboringcountriesaswellastheU.S.;namely,howtoapproachthesenewactorsandmovetowardssharingsafetystandardswithit?

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Conclusions

ConclusionsThewordcrisisisgenerallydefinedasadangerousanddifficultsituationrequiringcriticaldecisionstobemade.Acrisisforanationisanemergencysituationthreateningacountry’scorestructuressuchassovereignty,systemsofthestate,andeconomicdevelopment.Amongthesecrises,anationalsecuritycrisismeanstherebeingtheincreasedpossibilityofacriticalsituationsuchasamilitaryconflict,whichdirectlythreatenssovereigntyandnationalinterests.Crisismanagement in thiscontext isdefinedasactionstoremovethesetypesofcrisesandescalationrisks.

Chinahasbeenunveiling latelyanattitudeinwhich itmakesnocompromiseon its“coreinterests,”alongwithitsincreasingnationalpowerinrecentyears.Againstanactualorpotentialriskdetrimental to the“core interests,”Beijingwillremovesuchriskwithallavailablemeans.Besidesthisratherdefensivelogic,itisnoteworthythattheChinesewayofperceivingacrisishasthestrongtendency to take itasanopportunity topursueitsown interests. ForChina, therefore,“crisismanagement”iscontrollingcrisisescalationwhilesimultaneouslyfollowingnationalinterestsasmuchastheycan.

Inpursuingthesemultipleobjectives,flexibleresponses are permitted insofar asChina canmaintain its fundamentalgroundon issues likesovereignty.Furthermore,Chinatendstoclaimthelegitimacyofitsactionsthroughblamingtheotherpartyforcausingthecrisisandtherebyputtingitselfinapassiveposition.However,China,atthesametime,seekstotaketheinitiativeinitsresponsetoacrisis. Thatis,acrisisitselfcontains,inChina’sunderstanding, theachievingof twoconflictinggoalsatthesametime.Inordertomaterializethesethoughtsinresponsetoanactualcrisis,Chinaneedstoproperlyuseawiderangeofmeans,whichisconsidered tobeamatterofpolitical leadership.Theactualdecision-makingsystem inChina iscentralized.Despite thediversificationofactorsinvolved inpolicymakingand implementation,China’sresponsetoacrisisisbasicallyunderthecontroloftheParty’sleadership.

TheseconceptualfeaturescanbeobservedinChina’sactualactions.IntheSino-Americanaircraft

collisionincidentin2001,BeijingstoodfirmagainstWashington,demandinganapology. Atthesametime, insteadof sticking to“apologize,”Chinaacceptedthewords“verysorry”asan“apology”from theUnitedStates,aiming to rapidlysolvetheproblemtomaintain“theoverallsituation”ofSino-Americarelations. Chinasoughttomakeitsprinciplesandflexibilitycompatibleinitsresponseto the incident. Moreover, in thediscussionswith theU.S.aboutasafetystandardofmilitaryoperations based on theU.S.-ChinaMilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement(MMCA),Chinasimultaneouslypursues twodifferent targets: thepreventionofamilitaryaccidentandtherestraintofU.S.militaryactivities inChina’sExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ).

TheconceptsofcrisisandexternalbehaviorofChinaoffersomeinsightsintocrisismanagementbetweenthecountriesinthisregionincludingJapanandtheinternationalcommunityandChina.

Firstly,crisismanagementwithChinaispossible.Chinadeeplyunderstands thenecessityofcrisismanagementespeciallyinthecontextofpreventingacrisissituationfromescalating intoamilitaryconfrontationorclash. ThatChina’sdecision-making is centralized toaconsiderabledegreecontributestopromotingdialogueordiscussionwithChinaoncrisismanagement.

On the other hand, as repeatedly noted inthis report,China tends to regardacrisisasanopportunity to pursue its interests, and triesto implement this policy in themiddle of aninternationalcrisismanagementsituation. Thus,apossibleformofcrisismanagementwithChinawouldbethepreventionofanaccidentorsimplemisunderstanding escalating into amilitaryconfrontation,anditisdifficulttorestrainChina’spursuanceofitsowninterests.InapolicytowardChina, therefore,onemust alwaysprepare themeansandfunctionsofengagementanddeterrenceinadditiontocrisismanagement.

Secondly,whileassumingChina’spursuanceofitsowninterests, thereistheneedtoinfluenceitspolicypreferences. AlthoughChina’sdecision-making stillmaintains its features as ahighlycentralizedsystem,thenumberofactorsinvolved

36

Conclusions

inthepolicymakingprocessiscertainlyincreasing.Theseactorsmaynotbedirectlyinvolvedin theprocess,whereastheyprovidetheChineseleadershipwith informationand/orsuggestions inorder toshapepolicypreferences.Accordingly,itispossiblethat havingdiscussionson crisismanagementwithChineseofficialsandexpertshasanindirectinfluenceontheformationofthepolicypreferencesofChina.Itisagainstthisbackdropthatthetrack1.5and/ortrack2dialoguesaswellasthetrack1dialogueanddiscussionareofgreatimportance.

Thirdly,amultilateral framework toshareasafetystandardfor theoperationofarmedforcesandmaritimelawenforcementagencieswithChinashouldbeemphasized.AlessontobelearnedfromtheexperienceoftheU.S.-ChinaMMCAisthateventhoughbothcountriesaimedtoachieveasharedunderstandingof thesafetystandardsofmilitaryoperations,themechanismconsiderablydependsonpoliticalrelationsbetweenthetwocountries. TheJapan-Chinadefenseexchangetendsnottofunctionadequatelyasthepoliticalrelationshipdeteriorates.ThisisareasonwhyitisimportanttodiscussandsharewithChinathesafetystandardsofmilitaryoperationswithinamultilateralpracticalframework,whichislesssusceptibletopoliticalconfrontation.Forexample,countriesintheregionincludingJapanshouldactivelyutilize theWesternPacificNavalSymposium(WPNS),whichthePeople’sLiberationArmyNavy (PLAN)has joined, andwhich isestablishinganinternationalstandardintermsofthesafetymeasureswhennavalandcivilianshipsandaircraftencounteroneanother.

Finally,itisworthnotingsomeimplicationstheanalysisofthisreportforJapan-Chinarelations.InitsdealingwithJapanover theSenkakuIslands,ChinaactivelytakesanoffensiveposturetopursueitsowninterestsofbreakingJapan’seffectivecontrolovertheislandsthroughsharplyincreasingactivitiesof themaritimelawenforcementagencieswithinJapanese territorialwaters.Chinasimultaneouslyclaims the legitimacyof itsactionsbyassertingthat theJapanesegovernment’sacquisitionof theownershipof theislandsin2012hasunderminedthe“overallsituation”ofJapan-Chinarelations.ThiscouldberegardedastypicalbehaviorbyChinatomaintainlegitimacyandtotaketheinitiativeatthesametime,aspointedoutinthereport.

Given theseChinese actions, it is essentialto build amulti-layeredmechanism for crisismanagement between the two countries.ThedefenseauthoritiesofJapanandChinaagreedthereshouldbeamaritimecommunicationmechanismthatconsistsofthreelevels,1)annualmeetingsandworking-leveldiscussions,2)ahigh-levelhotlinebetweenthetwoauthorities,and3)communicationamongshipsandaircraft. Inadditiontotheearlyimplementationofthismechanism,engagementwithChinesemaritimelawenforcementagenciesmustbestrengthened.Thus,notonlyisamechanismforthedefenseauthoritiestopreventthesituationovertheislandsfromescalatingintoamilitaryincidentnecessary,butalsocontinuingmeetingsonmaritimeissuesatseniorofficiallevelofrelatedministriesandbuildinganaccidentpreventionmechanismbetweenthemaritime lawenforcementagenciesofbothcountriesarebecomingurgentlyneeded.

The 3rd annual Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise (WP-MCMEX) in Malaysia focuses on enhancing cooperation among Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) navies and maritime safety. (U.S. Navy photo)

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The Fire-control Radar-lock by a PLAN VesselColumn

JapaneseDefenseMinisterItsunoriOnoderagaveanextrapressconferenceonFebruary5,2013torevealthataPeople’sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)Jiangwei II-class frigatehaddirecteditsfire-controlradarat theJapaneseMaritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)destroyerYudachiintheEastChinaSeaaround10a.m.onJanuary30. HealsoaddedthataPLAN Jiangkai I-classfrigatebeamedwhatisbelieved tobe fire-control radar towardsahelicoptermountedonJMSDFdestroyerOnamiaround5p.m.onJanuary19.

The fire-control radar of awarship isactivatedbeforetheuseofweaponstotargetother ships or aircraft.DefenseMinisterOnoderadenouncedthe“veryabnormal”actsandsaidthat“thiscouldhaveputusinaverygravesituationifthingswentwrong.”Becausethiswasthe“mostabnormalcaseconsistingoftwoconsecutivedangerousincidents,”TokyomadethematterpublicandlodgedaformalprotesttoBeijingthroughdiplomaticchannels.

Immediatelyafter theannouncementbyTokyo,someChinesemilitaryexpertsarguedthat the radar-lockwasa“legitimate self-defenseaction”againstsurveillancepatrolsbyJMSDFvesselsandaircraftopposingthePLANvessels. For instance,HuangDong,

chairmanoftheMacaoInternationalMilitarySociety,stressedthattheChinesefrigatesmighthavehadnochoicebuttheradar-lockbecauseof thecontinuedmonitoringbytheJapanesevesselsandhelicopter,whileadmitting thatafire-controlradarbeamissomethingthatisused immediatelybefore firingcommencesandisthusverythreateninginpeacetime.Headdedthatafire-controlradar-lockgenerallyrequired“permissionfromanupperauthority”becauseofitsriskynature.

Nonetheless, theChineseMinistry ofNationalDefensedeniedthatthePLANvesselshad lockedfire-control radaronaJapanesedestroyerandhelicopter. China’sstatement,issuedbytheMinistry’sInformationOffice,said,“ThePLANvessel,whileconductingroutinetraininginwatersintheEastChinaSea,founditselfcloselyfollowedandmonitoredbytheJMSDFdestroyerYudachi. Radarsonthevesselwerekeptatnormalobservationandalertlevels,anditsfire-controlradarwasnotactivated.”ThestatementfurtherinsistedthatJapan’slongtimeandclose-inmonitoringandsurveillanceofChina’snavalshipsandaircraftis the rootcauseofairandmaritimesafetyissuesbetweenChinaandJapan.

This denialwould imply thatChinesemilitary leadersunderstood the radar-lockwas a threatening activity and itwas notacceptableaccordingtointernationalcustoms.Basically,not takinganydangerousactionagainstapproachingshipsand/oraircraft inpeacetimeisanestablishedrule.TheIncidentat theSea (INCSEA)Agreement betweenthegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionin1972providesthat“ShipsofthePartiesshallnotsimulateattacksbyaimingguns,missile launchers, torpedo tubes,andotherweapons” to“shipsofotherParties,”and other international agreements havesimilarstipulations.Furthermore,theCodeforUnalertedEncountersatSea(CUES)developed

The Chinese Navy,s JiangweiⅡ-class frigate

(IHS Jane,s [online news module])

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Conclusions

by theWesternPacificNavalSymposium(WPNS), inwhichChina takespart,offerssafetymeasuresincludingthatshipsshallnotbeamtheirfire-controlradaratshipsofotherParties.

Although theCUESisavoluntarycode,radar-locking by thePLANvesselwouldundermineChina’spositionagainstJapanand

in internationalsociety; it isa transgressionof accepted international practice. SuchrecognitionseemstoexistinChinesemilitary,givenitscautiousstatementaboutthepossibilityof“internationalopinionbeingmisled”by“thefalseargumentthatTokyopropagatestodisgracethePLA’snormalactionstomaintainitspreparednessforwar.”

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