nietzsche's contribution to the theory of language author

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Philosophical Review

Nietzsche's Contribution to the Theory of LanguageAuthor(s): Roger HazeltonSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 1943), pp. 47-60Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180560 .Accessed: 14/01/2011 03:12

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NIETZSCHE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THETHEORY OF LANGUAGE*N W that the problemof languagehas begunto receive thesustained nd systematic ttention romphilosopherswhichit deserves, t becomes speciallynterestingo review hethinkingof earlier men with an eye to discovering ome contributionsothis criticalmatter.Not infrequently new perspective pon afamiliarphilosophical andscape has the meritof rearrangingtsessentialdata, and occasionally he still greater dvantage of re-

vealingnew connections etween hem.Thereis, moreover, lwaysthepossibility hatsuch re-examinationmayafford ositivebene-fitby way of insight nto the problem onfrontinghinkers f thepresent.Among those who have such a contributiono make to thepresent iscussion f theproblem f language,FriedrichNietzscheis preeminent. e was not only himself scholar and teacher nthefieldof classical philology;he was a conscious iterary rtist,farmore tellingly ware than many of his fellow-thinkersf thepower and purposes of the written nd spokenword.More thanthese,he was throughout is active ife concernedwith anguageexplicitly s a philosophical roblem, o much so that this prob-lem may justly be called one of the major areas in which histhinkingmoved.The importance f Nietzsche's comments n the problem oflanguagedoes notconsist, t s true, ither na systematictatementof the problem r in a cogentdeclaration f its solution.These arenot the sort of benefits onferred y a typeof thinkingwhich ssuggestive nd evocativerather han systematicr declarative. tconsists ather,s we shallattemptoshow, nlocating ndestimat-ing a certain ensionwithin anguage itself.Nietzsche's thinkingon thissubject may conveniently e traced n termsof its actualdevelopment; ollowing hiswe may attempt o relatehis state-mentsabout languageto otheraspectsof his thought,nd moreparticularlyo showhowhis theory bout anguage s consistentlyrelatedto his own use of it; and finallywe mayseek to evaluate* Expandedfrom paperread before heWestern ivision, he AmericanPhilosophical ssociation, pril 5, I94I.47


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48 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.his contribution rom the standpointof presentphilosophicalcontroversyn the field,with the hope that our studymayyieldsome clarification f contemporaryssues.

IIn his earlierwritings ietzsche till peaks s a scholarunder heinfluence f such academicphilologists s Burckhardtnd Ritschl,though he nfluence f the metaphysical nd esthetic octrines fSchopenhauers prominent. e is primarilynterestedntheprob-

lem of the origins f language,whichhe approachesby discussingthe relations etween anguage nd music.According o himmusicis, so to speak, a "universal anguage", functionings a "cosmicsymbolism".t "stands n symbolic elation o theprimordial on-tradiction nd primordial ainintheheart f theprimordial nity,and thereforeymbolizes spherewhich s above all appearanceand beyond ll phenomena".Music is the "languageof theWill",which anguage n the verbal sense strains o imitate ut "cannotat all disclose".' This is clearly Schopenhauerover again, andmakes no sense apart from the thought-backgroundith whichhe providedNietzsche.The meaning f such statementss further larified y the dis-tinctionNietzschemakes between he originof musicand its ob-ject. The object of music s theWill or "Nature n itsmostgeneralform"; its origin,however, s not the Will but "something yingbeyondall individuation"2 hich s unfathomable. e thereforerejects all efforts o trace the originof music to more specializedphenomena uch as feelings, mages or ideas. A musician whowritesa melody for a poem, for example, s not movedby theimages or emotions n the poem; "a musical inspiration omingfrom uitea differentource choosesfor itself hat song-text" sitsallegorical xpression. ones canproducemetaphorsnd ideas,butthesecannotproduce ones.Nor can feelingsuchas love,fearand hope be portrayed, utonly evoked,bymusic. The functionof these feelings,ike that of metaphors nd ideas, is rathertosymbolizehemusic.3The symbolismf music, hen, s a primary ymbolism. ones,

'CompleteWorks(Eng. tr., dit.Levy) I I2I, 55, i26.2 ibid.1135, 36. 'Ibid. II 37,34.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 49as its components,o not dependon thephenomenal ealmof emo-tions, mages or ideas,and still ess uponwords.They are original,independent f all such phenomenal ontent, nd "cosmic",bothin theirorigin nd theirobject.Linguistic symbolism, n the otherhand, is secondary.Evenlyricpoetry,which s most similar omusic n its form, llustratesthis dependence f word upon tone.The "only possiblerelation",Nietzschetells us, of the poeticword, mage or concept s one ofdependenceupon the "absolute sovereignty f music", and thisdependence s one of superficial ontact chieved through mita-tion ratherthanbeing essentially elatedto it by revelationorgenuine nsight.4 nlike music, anguagedepends on pictures ndconcepts nd the like, arising n theeffort o communicatehem.It owes a curious dual allegiance, o its source in tone and to itsobjects in the phenomenal ealm.Hence there arises a basic in-stability, mbiguitynd even tensionwithin anguage tself.ThistensionNietzschefinds llustrated n the history f the formationof the Greeklanguage,as its twomain currents: anguagemayseek to imitate eitherthe world of phenomena nd of pictures,or theworld of music".5This tension s stillfurther xplored n termsof the familiarcontrastbetweenthe Apollonianand the Dionysian.Underlyingall discourse s a "tonalsubsoil"of organicpleasure-pain esponses(Lust- und Unlust-Grade) which does symbolize, owever ndi-rectly nd weakly, heWill common o all men and to theuniverse.This is expressed n thetoneof thespeaker,which s a not-to-be-forgottenactor n his verbalexpression.On thisas a foundationdevelops the more arbitrary nd wholly phenomenal"gesture-symbolism", hich ncludesall thosealterations f physicalposi-tion within heorganism roducing owelsand consonants s wellas the more obvious muscular,manual, respiratory,nd otherchangesof the totalorganism. his latter esture-symbolisms but"a strophic ext to thatprimalmelodyof the pleasure and dis-pleasure-language. . . . As our whole corporeality stands in rela--tion to thatoriginalphenomenon,heWill, so the word builtupout of its consonants nd vowels stands in relationto its tonalbasis."6 n Nietzschean erms, hetonal subsoilof all speech s its

' Ibid. I 52, 55. "Ibid. I 52. 'Ibid. II 3Y.


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50 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.Dionysianorigin, ooted n the Will as thedeep, nnermostprimalcause" common o all living things; thegesture-symbolism,ithits gradual proliferationnto theconfusingmultiplicitynd arbi-trariness f languages, s Apollonian,for t seeks to communicatethe clearerbut more uperficial ealmof feelings,deas and imageswhichare its objectivereferents.The secondarysymbolism hat is language may thus be con-sideredeither s representationalnd imitativewith respect o itsobjects, or as expressive nd evocativewith respect o its origin.This tensionbetweenmetaphysical rigin nd phenomenal bjectsgives rise in turnto the diversity f functioning ithin anguageitself.Turning in the writings f his middle period more especiallytoward a discussion f the functions f language,Nietzschetakesup the important otions f consciousness nd communication.ndoingso he forsakes n part the Schopenhauerian rameworkndmakes some new and distinctiveontributionso social thinking.In Die frahlicheWissenschaft e developswith ome care the deathat consciousness, ar frombeingpurely ndividual, s actually"only a connecting etwork etweenman and man" whichgrowsup "under the pressure of the necessityfor communication".surplusof theartandpowerof communications acquired"wherenecessity nd need have long compelledmento communicate iththeirfellowsand understandone anotherrapidly and subtly".7Brieflyput, the two noteworthy eaturesof this view are therendering f consciousness n social terms,which antedatestheworkof Mead and others, nd the mportantdea that ommunica-tionbyverbalexchangeof signs precedes nd even conditions hegrowth f consciousnessn the ndividual.The force t workhereproductiveof both consciousness and communications whatNietzsche calls "social utility".

Language, functionings themedium f communicationetweenconscious beings, an properly ommunicate nlythe contents fconsciousness.And since consciousness s finely eveloped "onlyin relation o communal nd gregariousutility" anguage neces-sarilyfinds ts proper sphereto be "a superficial nd symbolicworld, generalized ndvulgarizedworld".8I Ibid.X 297. 8Ibid.X 298-9.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 51Amongprimitive eoples languagehas a morevital function.Since amongthem trongfeelings omprise he trueprovinceoflanguage, ts function ecomesthe correcting f feeling hroughits being communicated. s civilization evelops,Nietzscheholds,language strainsmore and more to expressthe reverse f feeling,namely thought,osingthereby ts powerto meet the real needsof men while ncreasingts tyranny vertheir ctions nd in timeeven theirfeelings, o thatmen becomethe "slaves of words".,This contrastbetweenthought nd feeling,whichmay reveal

Nietzsche'sRomantic ias,assumes great mportancenhis discus-sion. According to him, every thought, dea, concept, is the"shadow" of a feeling, nd hence is "obscurer, mptier nd sim-pler" thanthe feeling o which t is thusrelated. t is noteven agood shadow,for"passionsdo not speak n sentences", nd "evenour thoughtswe are unable to render ompletelyn words".10fcivilized language is thus inadequate to the communication fthought, ow muchgreater s theesthetic iolence accompanyingits attemptedommunicationf feelings!Nietzscheexpresses hisdoubtthat t can be thefunctionf such anguageto communicatefeelings t all, for, s he pointsout,"all simplemen are ashamedto seek for words to express theirdeeper feelings,1 a shamewhich is denied to poets and rhetoricians under which lattergroup he also seems to include philosophers).The resultof thissituation s thatlanguagehas gradually ecomea force n itselfwhichwithspectral rmscoerces and driveshumanity here t least wantsto go. As soon as theywould fain understand ne another nd unite for a common ause, thecraziness f modern oncepts,nd evenof theringof modernwords, aysholdof them.The result f this nability o communicate ithone anotheris that very roduct f their ooperative ctionbearsthestamp fdiscord,not onlybecause t failsto meet theirrealneeds,but becauseof theveryemptinessf those ll-powerful ordsandnotions....'

This natural affinityetween houghtnd language is revealedin still otherways. There is the factthat,althoughwords, likeideas, are assumedin practical ife to expresscharacters f thethings o which theyrefer, hey ctually xpressonlyrelations fthesethings o thespeakerand hearer.A word is "theexpressionIlIbid. IV I34. 10bid. V I76; X 204. '1 Ibid. VII 57-8.12Ibid. IV I33.


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52 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.ofa nerve-stimulusn sounds".To say "thestone s hard" charac-terizesnotthe stonebuttherelation f this timulus o its assumedsource.Again, the same words, ike the same ideas, have to fitinnumerableases whichare onlymoreor less similar n certainarbitrarilysolated respects.Anticipating dogma of GeneralSemantics,Nietzschewrites, the unity f theword s no securityfortheunity f the thing".'3A thinker,ikea wordmaker,s onewho "knows how to take thingsmore simplythan theyare"."Furthermore,ordsevenconditionhoughts:We always expressour thoughtswith thosewords which ie nearesttohand.Or rather,f I may revealmy fullsuspicion,t everymomentwehaveonly heparticularhoughtor hewords hat representnourminds.1'Once again,words are metaphors,nd an idea is "the residuumof a metaphor","6riginatingn the inguistic rocessof "equatingthe unequal":Everywordbecomes t oncean idea notby having, s onemight resume,to serve as a reminderorthe original xperience appening utonceandabsolutelyndividualized,o whichexperience uchword owes its origin,no, butby havingsimultaneouslyo fit nnumerable, ore or less similar(whichreallymeansnever qual,thereforeltogethernequal)cases."

Thus it is that anguage n its developments "thehistory f aprocessof abbreviation"n whichthemore frequentlyecurringsensations nd groupsof sensationsget theupperhand over therarerones. Since thehavingof averageand common xperiencesis after ll mostcommunicable,ommunicationtselfbecomes n-creasinglyndependent f thosedeeper feelingswhich it cannotadequatelytranslate nto speech,so that n timethe relationbe-tween speaker and hearer determines he function f languagemore urely hantherelation etweenwordand thing. he estheticconsideration ives way to the utilitarian, nd language in itsdevelopmentringswith t "a greatradicalperversion,alsification,superficializationnd generalization".'18The history f languageis thereforehehistory f a functionforgottenthe arousal of commonfeelings) and a function s-sumed (the communicationf common deas). As an instrumentin conceptualformulationnd clarificationt loses its real power

13 Ibid. VI 27. 14Ibid. X I94. "3Ibid. IX 247.6Ibid. II i82. "7Ibid. II I79. "8Ibid.XII 243; X 298.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 53to evoke feeling nd spur action. In namingwhat is common talso makes commonwhatis at bottom ncommon.ts Apollonianaspecthas triumphedver theDionysian;demands f socialutilitywrencht fromtsorganicmatrix nd itsdimmetaphysical rigins;it becomes a coercive and tyrannicalforce,perhaps "the mostpotent of all forces which have hitherto perated upon man-kind".'9In his later writingsNietzsche became preoccupied with thequestion fthetruth-valuef language.We mustbepreparedhere,as elsewhere n the studyof Nietzsche,for theshockof internalcontradictionnd overstatement; ut the presenceof these habitsof expression hould keep us from dopting n oversimple iewof his conclusions.He has been labelled both naturalist andRomantic; yeta carefulreadingmakes eitherof such simplifiedpositions ifficulto sustain nhis case.There are of coursemany passages emphasizing naturalisticevaluation f language.He consistentlyegards tas conventional,arbitrary,nd presumptive vermeintlich). So for example hereduced the philosophicaldistinction etween ubject and objectto "no more thansemiotics".20o say as he does that anguage sthrough nd throughmetaphoricaleads to thehonest conclusionthat wordsnevercorrespond o things:Between wo utterly ifferentpheres, s between ubject nd object, hereis no causality, o accuracy, o expression, ut at most . . a suggestivemetamorphosis, stammeringranslation . . for whichpurposehoweverthere s needed at any rate an intermediatephere, n intermediateorce,freely omposing nd freely nventing.'This sphere and force s language. Men suppose that when theyhave put down a word theyhave made a discovery, ut theyhaveonly come upon a problem, nd insteadof solving t theyhavethereby uta new obstacle n the way of itssolution.22he wordswe use are masksforpreconceived udgments23eflecting "hid-den philosophicalmythology"24 grammar s but "popularmeta-physics".25 he "tremendous rror" of correspondence etweenword and thing26nfects anguage,as in factit infectsmorality,

"9Ibid.XII 243. ' Ibid. XV ii8. 2'Ibid. II 184.22Ibid. IX 53. 'Ibid. VII 225. 24Ibid.VII i92.25Ibid. X 300. 26Ibid. VI 2I-2.


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54 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.logic, mathematics, nd indeed everything lse in the "all-too-human" realm.

Yet also in these aterwritings, articularlyn the fragmentaryDer Wille zur Macht whichwas to have been his complete hilo-sophical statement,here s an evident tressupon languageas aninterpretive unctioningf the Will to Power which seriouslyqualifies, f it does not altogether epudiate, is sceptical valuationof language.For example, here s thisdeclaration:The Will to Power interpretsan organ n processof formationas to beinterpreted) it defines, t determines radations, ifferencesf power.Mere differencesf power could not be aware of each otheras such:somethingmust be therewhichwill grow, and which nterpretsll otherthings hatwould do the same,according o thevalueof thelatter. . . allinterpretations but means n itself o becomethe master f something.(Continual nterpretations thefirst rinciplef theorganicprocess.)27

This passage clearlymarks a return o Nietzsche'searlier n-sistenceupon the originof language in organic responsiveness.More thanthis, t suggests definitionf truthnterms f estheticexpressiveness ather han s representationf an already xistingreality.By and large,Nietzschediscussedthe language-problemin termsof the estheticrather han the epistemologicalontext.Recognition f this fact makes it apparent hatthoughhe did nothave the implicit rust n language of the rationalisticdealist,henevertheless id regard t as creative, venwhile arraigningt asconventional,mitative nd representational.his leaves us witha basic oppositionwhichwe must ttemptoclarify,nd whichwecan do only nterms f the wider contexts f his thought,s theseaffectednd were affected ythe statementsbout anguage.

IIW. M. Urbanholdsthat hewholestory fWesternphilosophy

may be described n terms f thehighor low evaluationof lan-guage.28Granting orpresentpurposesthatthisis true, n whichcamp does Nietzschebelong? The answer to this questioncancomeonlyafter heproblem f languagehas beenstudied n rela-tion to othermaincurrents f his thought.It is, for example,an interesting uggestion hat Nietzsche's2"Ibid.XV I24. 28 anguage ndReality 3.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 55epistemologicalnd ethical cepticism as reached argelywith heaid of his denial of correspondence etweenwordsand things.Alate epigramhints at this connection: I am noughtbut a word-maker. What matterwords? What matter ?" At any rate, theupshot f hisline ofthought egardinghefunctioningf languageas conditioned y social utilitys a thoroughgoingcepticism otonly as to the truth-valuef languagebutas to "truth" tself.Heasks:What therefore s truth?A noble armyof metaphors,metonymies,n-thropomorphisms:n short sumof human elations hich ecomepoetical-ly and rhetoricallyntensified, etamorphosed,dorned, and after longusage seem to a nationfixed, anonic nd binding; ruths re illusions fwhichone has forgottenhatthey re illusions.'

This is not said in disparagement f metaphysical r moral"truths"on behalf of science, for scientific truths" are in thesame case:The mechanical onceptof "movement" s already a translationf theoriginalprocess nto the languageof symbols f theeye and touch.Theconcept atom", he distinction etween the seat of themotiveforceandthe force itself"',s a languageof symbols erivedfromour logical andpsychological orld.30

With these and similar passages as proof-texts,VaihingerclaimedNietzsche s an exponent f the "usefulfiction'".31 o besure, Nietzscherecognized the fictional haracterof all humanformulations,vencriticizingn a way quitenovelforhis day, andanticipating he views of an Eddington, he concepts f scienceasmerely ymbolic. et inthe ight fthepassage from er WillezurMacht already quoted, and in that of all the passages where theesthetic reatmentf languageis to the fore, t is clear that forNietzsche he"impulse o metaphor", he "myth-makingnstinct",whichunderlies ll suchactivitys creative n theesthetic, atherthan nventiven theutilitarian,ense.It belongsto the natureoforganicbeingas such. Even man's supposition f objectsand theexternalworldexpresses t the evelof humanconsciousnessucha fundamentalsthetic reativity. his capacity,whichseems toVaihinger simplythe "conscious, intentional ncouragementf

29CompleteWorks I i8o. 'Ibid. VI 2I-2.31 Hans Vaihinger, he Philosophy f As If' (Eng. tr.) 34I-62.


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56 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.illusion"32 seems to be betterunderstood s the striving f theWill to Power, Nietzsche'sexpressionfor thebasic metaphysicalreality.Returningto the question of epistemological cepticism, nwhichbasis alone such a fictionalismanhavemeaning,t is worthrememberinghat humanformulationsn morals, rt, science,orpractical ife, are fictional nly on the basis of a possiblecorre-spondencebetweenwordand thing, ubjective oncept nd objec-tive fact.This suppositionNietzsche learly nd repeatedly enies;yethis interpretersfVaihinger'spersuasionhave beensingularlyunawareof his denial. f error s coextensivewith ife,thenerrorceases to have genuineconnotativemeaning.And if there s noessential ntithesis etween rue and false, or of the subjectandobjectonwhich tdepends, hen heverynotion f correspondence,whichalone can give rise to the doctrine f languageas fictional,or for thatmatter s representationalr imitative,oses its logicalfoundation.Nietzschegoes further han o denycorrespondence; e assumesnon-correspondence.ow this s obviously uiteas "presumptive"as to assumecorrespondence, hichhe denies.His scepticism,nso far as it affects is theory f language, s possible onlyon abasis whichhis earlystatementss to thedependence f linguisticupon cosmic ymbolism,s well as his late enunciation f theWillto Power as interpretive,learlydeny. The factthat the expres-sive-evocative nd the imitative-communicativespects of lan-guageare notfinallyesolved nto systematicnity f thought yNietzschemay indeedpermit heaccusationof a certain nternalinconsistency,ut it certainly oes not justify hasty verdict ffictionalism r scepticism gainsthim. In the light of thewholedevelopmentndbearing f his thoughtt seemsthemore dequateview, as we have alreadymaintained, o regardtheseaspectsaselements f a fundamentalensionwithin anguage tself.Our contentions borne out by a consideration f Nietzsche'sown use of words. Not infrequentlye tries to communicate ismeaningby patient nalysisof terms nd repetition f proposi-tions.He wants, bitdesperately,o be understood. o, forexam-ple, ho attempts refutation f Locke's theoryof the originof

' Vaihinger, p. cit.342.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 57ideas, by introducing ords as themiddle stagebetween magesand concepts "sensationand reflection",n Locke's terminology)and by tracing erception ack to themore fundamentaltageoffeeling.33 e is quite competento join philosophicalssues withfullrecognitionf theimportance f logicalprecision nd verbalclarity. t mustbe admitted, owever, hat his strivingftercom-municative laritys on thewhole ess integral o Nietzsche's nten-tion than thatafterexpressive dequacy. He tells us in one placethathewrites togetridof his thoughts", ecausehemust.Againhe confesses that thewords he uses are masks withwhichhefishesfor ikemindedpirits.The breathless, xcitedpiling up ofmetaphorsnd the staccato uggestiveness hichare so character-isticofhis style an onlybe interpretedn the ightof theexpres-sive-evocativeunctionflanguage.At thisuse ofwordsNietzschewas undoubtedly master.He lookedat themwith theeyeof anartist:

I dearly ovethe ivingword,That fliesto you like a merrybirdA dead word s a hateful hing,A barren, attling ing-a-ling.34More thanthis,he tellsus thathe distrusts ystemmaking,venhis own: it is too narrow, oo cramping, or theceaseless varietyand fluxof life.But Nietzschedoes notset theseaspects up as antitheses lone.Thoughlanguageas a means of communicationan only describerelations what wewouldcallsyntacticnd semantic unctioning),its rootage n feelingmpels t, withwhateverviolencenecessary,to expressand evoke what we would call emotive r "pragmatic"meaning.The dual functionings not matter f wordchoosing rphrasemaking,utgoesbackto thebasicdifferencelreadypointedout between hetonein whichwords are uttered nd theaccom-panyinggestures.Hence the "livingword" is the spokenword,and this in turn s bothfeelingbecomearticulate nd idea sym-bolized.And,sincethoughts at bottom hecrystallizationf feel-ing,the emotive-pragmaticunctionings even present, lthoughdimly,withint.Languagetherefore an neither scapethepull ofits origin n feelingnor avoid the necessity f characterizingts

3 CompleteWorksXII 29; XV 25. 84 bid. XVII i65.


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58 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.objects n terms f thought. hus practice nd theoryllumine neanother n Nietzsche'sphilosophizing.

A marked ove of paradox and antithesiss anotherfeatureofNietzsche'swritingwhichbears outhis notion flinguisticension.One of the mainreasons forhis persistentlyeingmisunderstoodlies here.When,for nstance, n his zeal to combat he effects f aparticularmorality e.g., Judaeo-Christianmorality)he adoptsthe term antimoral" s descriptivef his own stand,he layshim-selfopento seriousmisunderstanding.is enthusiasm orputtingthings tronglyeveals n artistic nconcern orunequivocal tate-ment.Yet hereas alwayshe is selfcritical: Antithesis s thenar-row gatethroughwhich rror s fondest f sneaking othetruth."35The blame s partlywith anguage tself,which alks"of oppositeswhere here reonlydegrees ndmanyrefinementsfgradation".36Few thinkers ave been as definitelyware as Nietzsche of thedifficultiesnd ambiguities ttendant pon the very use of lan-guage; theproblem f languagewas for hima verypractical, ndby no meansmerely theoretical,ne, and it arises in just thistensionbetween xpressive dequacy and representationallarityto which his earliestreflectionsoint.The one is an esthetic, heother logical,task; both he considered ntegral o his lifework,the revaluation f formerlycceptedvalues. It willreadilybe seenthat his use of language is entirely onsistentwithhis theoryabout it.The central nd insistent roblemfor contemporaryheory flanguage is the relation f languageto reality.The discussionofthisproblemhas proceeded argelyon the basis of exclusiveanddivisivepostulates.Nietzsche's hinkingears a definiteelation otheviewpoint f physicalism nd logical positivismn denying olanguageany workngconnectionwithits objects in the externalworld."Words relating ovalues",he affirms,are merely annersplantedon those potswherea newblessednesswas discovered-anewfeeling."37hereis no structuredierarchyfgoods towhichwords bear a revelatory,n almostperceptual, elationship. utthoughNietzschemaybe claimed as a supporter f this view'sdenialshe cannotbe supposedtoagree n itsaffirmations.e does

35Ibid. VI I79. 36 Ibid. XII 35. " Ibid. XV i82.


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No. i.] NIETZSCHE'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE 59not share the faith f the ogicalpositivistn logical structures, ordoes he accept verification y "pointing".His scepticism s moreradical. At the same timehis affirmationsre contradictoryo thiswhole position. t is not sciencebut music which s the "universallanguage". Furthermore, lthough value-termsmark only thepresenceof feelings, he feelings hemselves ave what can onlybe called a kind of truth, y virtueof their xpressiveness f theWill to Power, the Nietzschean ltimate eality.We can thus utilize Nietzsche's theory to disparage logicalpositivism uite as muchas to support t.Far fromdenying ruthto the languageof theemotions, e affirmsruth f the feelings.Fundamentally nd seriously,for Nietzsche it is just feelingswhich are true.And the more sensitivelywords can capturethestatesof feeling n whichtheyarise (even scientific escriptionbeinga strivingf the Will to Power), themoretruetheybecome.Of course we are not to understand nything bsolutisticn hisnotionof truth;Nietzschewas theenemy f finalityn any form.But in spite of his radical scepticism e came back in his latestwritings o a theory f languagewhichis franklymetaphysical.In so far as language s expressive nd evocative t is concernedwithfeelings,nd feelings re theorganic gradations f the Willto Power within iving hings.This way of thinking bout languagecan be betterunderstoodif we relate t rather o the development xemplified y Bergsonand Whitehead.Nietzschewas, likethem, cutely onsciousof thestultifyingnd simplifyingature of the linguistic rocess.Likethem,he gave feeling real statusin the natureof things.Hewouldhaveeagerly greedwithWhitehead hat nydoctrinewhichdoes notpresupposethe autonomy f physical cience s not un-intelligible.38ositively,Whitehead'scharacterization f life as aprocess embodying bsoluteindividualselfenjoyment,reativity,and aim, soundsalmost ike a descriptionf Nietzsche'sWill toPower.39Nietzschewould ikewisehave accepted hedoctrine en-tralto thephilosophyf organism hat the notion fmereknow-ledge is a highabstraction.... The basis of experience s emo-tional".40

" A. N. Whitehead, atureand Life 6. 39bid. 25-8.40Adventuresf Ideas 225-6.


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6o THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWViewed in thisway, Nietzsche's ontributiono a theory f lan-guage assumes real and present mportance.He stands athwart

the gulf dividing he "high" and "low" evaluationsof language.To thosenaturalists ho acceptphysicalism s thetruebasis foranaccountof language his theory ffers he soberingreflectionhateven physicalisms an arbitrary bstractionism, or cognition sbasicallyemotional. o those rationalistswhose thinking mplies,though tmaynot state, n implicit rust n the adequacy of lan-guage, it offers he devastating riticism f a scepticismmoreradical than that of their present adversaries. And since bothgroups continue o discuss the problem f language argely n thecontext f a sensationalistic r idealistic pistemology, ietzsche'sviewoffers othem newcontext,whichboth choolshave hithertoignored: the emotive-pragmaticunctioning f language consid-ered nrelation o tstruth. he notion ftruths esthetic dequacywhichNietzscheespoused opens up issueswhich ie quiteoutsidetheboundsofthispaper; but t s thisdoctrinewhich s Nietzsche'schief bequest to contemporary iscussion.When we add to thesethe further actthatwhat forthis discussionhave beenmutuallyexclusive postulatesNietzschechose to regard as elements f aninherent ensionwithinanguage tself, hepossibilitys openedupthat he either-or isjunctionmay yetfindtsplacewithin "both-and" framework f thought.

ROGER HAZELTONCOLORADO COLLEGE

nietzsche's contribution to the theory of language author

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