nj case law pdf

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Education Justice at Education Law Center, 60 Park Place, Suite 300, Newark, NJ 07102

www.EducationJustice.org ~ 973-624-1815 ~ Fax: 973-624-7339 1

On multiple occasions during more than 30 years of litigation, the Supreme Court of NewJersey found the states school funding system to be inadequate. The 1970s case ofRobinson v. Cahillwas followed by Abbott v. Burke, which was first heard in the statesupreme court in 1985 and continues to be active to this date. Crawford v. Davy, a morerecent voucher case, was dismissed in 2009.

Robinson v. CahillIn Robinson v. Cahill, plaintiffs brought a claim that the state education finance systemviolated the equal protection and education clauses of the New Jersey Constitution because itresulted in great disparities in dollar input between pupils. 303 A.2d 273 (1973)(Robinson I).The Supreme Court of New Jersey dismissed their equal protection claim, holding that wealthwas not an inherently suspect classification and that education was not a fundamental right.However, the court concluded that the constitutional mandate that the state maintain andsupport a thorough and efficient system of free public schools could have no meaning otherthan requiring equal educational opportunity for children. The court further established that,while education can be provided through local governments, the state must ensure that the

local government is fulfilling the constitutional command, or must intervene to itself meet theobligation. The court found that the constitutional demand had not been met, and thereforeordered the state to define the constitutionally mandated educational opportunity, compel thelocal school districts to raise the money necessary to provide that opportunity, andcompensate for local failures to reach that level.

In Robinson II, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that it would not disturb thestatutory scheme as long as the Legislature enacted legislation to address the constitutionaldeficiency by December 31, 1974, and effective by July 1, 1975. 306 A.2d 65 (1973). Thoughthe Legislature failed to meet the December deadline, the court in Robinson IIIdeclined toimpose an immediate remedial order, 339 A.2d 193 (1975) but in Robinson IV, the courtestablished a provisional remedy redistributing state education funds for the 1976-77 schoolyear. 351 A.2d 713 (1975).

In September of 1975, the state legislature enacted the Public School Education Act of 1975,which defined the educational opportunity required by the constitution, established aprocedural mechanism for its implementation, and included a provision for the state to compellocal units to raise funds as necessary, but did not address how the states obligation would be

NEW JERSEY

SUMMARY OF EDUCATIONAL

OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION
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met if a local government were not able to carry the burden. The Supreme Court of NewJersey concluded in Robinson Vthat the act was facially constitutional as long as it was fullyfunded. 355 A.2d 129 (1976). However, the legislature failed to enact legislation funding thefinancial aid provisions of the Act, so in Robinson VI, the court granted an injunctionpreventing the expenditure of any funds for the support of any free public schools. 358 A.2d

457 (1976). The injunction was later dissolved in Robinson VIIwhen the state passedlegislation to fully fund the Act. 360 A.2d 400 (1976).

Abbott v. Burke

In Abbott v. Burkeplaintiffs brought a new challenge to the 1975 Act asserting that, though ithad finally been funded, it was unconstitutional as-applied (or as-funded) because the financialdisparities among school districts remained excessive and because the state had not providedan empirical demonstration of adequate funding. In Abbott I, the Supreme Court of NewJersey remanded the case to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing to develop a

record. 495 A.2d 376 (1985). Based on the evidence presented in that hearing, the courtconcluded in Abbott IIthat, the poorer the district and the greater its need, the less the moneyavailable, and the worse the education. 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990). The court held that thissystem was neither thorough nor efficient, and consequently found the Act unconstitutional asapplied to poorer urban school districts. The court therefore ordered the state to amend theact to guarantee that poorer urban districts receive funding every year that is substantiallyequal to that of property-rich districts as well as adequate to address the extremedisadvantages and special educational needs in the poorer districts.

Because the evidence presented in the hearing focused on the vast gulf between the richestand poorest districts, and little evidence was introduced about the quality of education provided

in the districts in the middle, the court concluded that for the majority of districts in the state,there was no showing that the constitutional mandate was not being satisfied. The courttherefore declined to find the entire state funding system unconstitutional, limiting its remedy tothe poorer urban districts.

In July 1990, shortly after the Abbott IIdecision was rendered, the state enacted the QualityEducation Act (QEA), which was supposed to close the spending gap between rich and poordistricts. The QEA was then amended in 1991 to divert $360 million for property tax relief.The plaintiffs returned to court, arguing that the QEA failed to comply with the Abbott IImandate. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed in Abbott III, finding the QEAunconstitutional because, although it authorized the special needs districts to spend enougheach year to achieve parity, it did not guarantee funding sufficient to pay for the authorizedlevel of spending. 643 A.2d 575 (1994). The court further noted that students in special needsdistricts need educational programs and services beyond those provided in wealthier districts,and that this requirement was not fulfilled by the QEA. The court refrained from intervening atthat point, giving the state until the 1997-98 school year to fully comply, but noted that it wouldentertain applications for relief prior to that date if it became evident that the state was unlikelyto meet that deadline.


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The Legislature responded by passing the Comprehensive Educational Improvement andFinancing Act (CEIFA) in 1996, but in Abbott IV, the plaintiffs contended that the newlegislation still failed to assure a thorough and efficient education for students in the states lowwealth, urban school districts, or special needs districts (SNDs). 693 A.2d 417 (1997). TheNew Jersey Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs, holding that, while the educational content

standards prescribed by the act were a facially adequate definition of a constitutional thoroughand efficient education, the Act was nevertheless unconstitutional as applied to the SNDsbecause it failed to enable students in those districts to actually achieve the standards. Thecourt based its conclusion on a number of factors, including the states failure to conduct astudy of the actual needs of students in the SNDs or the cost of supplying the programsnecessary to meet those needs, the complete lack of provisions for addressing the dilapidated,unsafe, and overcrowded school facilities in the SNDs, and the fact that the CEIFAs fundingmechanism effectively capped spending in poorer districts at an amount that would beinsufficient to provide a thorough and efficient education, while permitting wealthier districts tospend excessively by raising additional funds through local taxation.

The court adopted a two-part remedy. First, the court ordered the state to increase funding toassure parity in per-pupil expenditures between each SND and the state's high-wealth,successful school districts, and to implement administrative measures to ensure that theexpenditures would be used correctly and efficiently. Second, the court remanded the case fora determination of appropriate relief to address the special educational needs of SND studentsand the facilities needs in the SNDs, and instructed the remand court to direct theCommissioner of Education to conduct a study and prepare a report identifying studentsneeds, specifying the programs required to address those needs and the costs of thoseprograms, and setting forth a plan for implementation.

The remand court developed recommendations based on evidence presented by both parties

and a Special Master, and inAbbott V

, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a remedialorder incorporating many of those recommendations. 710 A.2d 450 (1998) The court directedthe Commissioner to implement a remedy that included whole school reform; full-daykindergarten; half-day preschool for all three- and four-year olds; supplemental or at-riskprograms as needed; on-site health and social services; adequate school security; drop-outreduction programs; summer school and after-school programs; and adequate school facilities.

In Abbott VI, plaintiffs contended, and the New Jersey Supreme Court found, that the mannerin which the DOE [was carrying] out the preschool mandate of Abbott V[was] not consistentwith the Commissioners representations to the remand court in that case. 748 A.2d 82(2000). The court therefore clarified the necessary components of a high quality preschoolprogram and ordered the Commissioner to ensure that the programs being implementedconformed to these standards. (For more detailed information about the preschool standardsoutlined by the court in Abbott VI, seeNJ Preschool Claims.)

In Abbott VII, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly asked the court to clarify itsearlier Abbottrulings. 751 A.2d 1032 (2000). In answering his inquiries, the court reaffirmedthat the State is required to fund all of the costs of necessary facilities remediation and
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construction in the Abbott districts and cannot require a district to contribute to the cost. Thecourt also established that [w]hen a district no longer possesses the requisite characteristicsfor Abbott district status, the state may take appropriate action to remove a school district fromits designation as an Abbott district.

In Abbott VIII, plaintiffs again alleged that the state had failed to comply with the courts

mandates in earlier Abbottdecisions regarding preschool programs in the Abbott districts, andrequested that the court order specific relief, including the appointment of a Standing Master tohear and resolve anticipated Abbott-related disputes. 790 A.2d 842 (2002). The New JerseySupreme Court declined to appoint a Standing Master, but ordered the state to take othersteps in a timely manner to ensure compliance with the preschool mandate. (For moredetailed information about the relief ordered by the court in Abbott VIII, seeNJ PreschoolClaims.)

In Abbott IX, the state, with plaintiffs approval, sought a one-year relaxation of the Abbottremedies for K-12 programs due to a state budget crisis. The Supreme Court of New Jerseyheld that the state could not preclude school district appeals for supplemental funding above

funding for the prior fiscal year, but that it could suspend other requirements for one year. 798A.2d 602 (2002).

Then in 2003, the state asked the court to remove some of the mandates set forth in Abbott V.The court directed the parties to mediate the disputed matters, and in Abbott X, the SupremeCourt of New Jersey accepted the mediation agreement, in which the parties agreed onimprovements to the implementation of Whole School Reform and supplemental programs.832 A.2d 891 (2003). The court ordered oral arguments to address the only unresolved issue,the states application to extend by an additional year the relaxation of remedies previouslygranted in Abbott IX. Based on those oral arguments, the court, in Abbott XI, allowed thestate to extend the relaxation of remedies, but required the state to fund that Abbott districts at

a level that would allow them to maintain the programs and expenditures authorized in 2002-2003. 832 A.2d 906 (2003).

In Abbott XII, the state, with the support of plaintiffs, sought a limited extension of the deadlineset forth in Abbott VIfor Abbott preschool teachers to obtain the required certification. 852A.2d 185 (2004). The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted non-certified preschoolteachers at DHS-licensed providers and federally-funded Head Start programs to seek waiversextending the time in which they had to comply with the mandate.

In 2004, the state asked the Supreme Court of New Jersey to grant modifications to themediation agreement the court approved in Abbott X, and in Abbott XIII, the court ordered theparties to return to mediation. 862 A.2d 538 (2004).

In Abbott XIV, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the courts mandate with respect to funding forschool construction in the Abbott districts. 889 A.2d 1036 (2005). The Supreme Court of NewJersey directed the state to estimate the cost of over 200 stalled school facilities projects byFebruary 2006.
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In Abbott XV, based on a fiscal crisis in New Jersey, the state requested authorization to flat-fund Abbott districts for Fiscal Year 2007 at Fiscal Year 2006 levels, and to preclude districtsfrom appealing state budgetary decisions regarding supplemental funding, among otherrequests. 901 A.2d 299 (2006). The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted a one-year Abbottfunding freeze, but ordered the State to work with districts to protect necessary programs,

preserved districts' rights to appeal insufficient State funding decisions, and required the Stateto conduct fiscal audits and programmatic evaluations of the Abbott districts and to promulgateprocedural regulations governing the submission of Abbott district budgets. In Abbott XVI,many of the Abbott districts asked the court for clarification of the Abbott XVorder, and theSupreme Court of New Jersey responded by setting tight time frames for district budgetappeals and directing the state to fund the opening expenses for all new and renovated schoolfacilities that came online in FY 2007, though his opinion was later withdrawn from the boundvolume. 953 A.2d 1198 (2006).

In Abbott XVII, plaintiffs requested additional funds for school construction, but the SupremeCourt of New Jersey found their request to be premature because the Fiscal Year 2008 budget

had not yet been enacted. 935 A.2d 1152 (2007). Plaintiffs again requested additional schoolfacilities funding in Abbott XVIII, and the court again found their application to be premature.956 A.2d 953 (2008).

In January 2008, the state enacted a new school funding formula entitled the School FundingReform Act of 2008 (SFRA), which increased aid to non-Abbott districts with large numbers ofpoor, disabled, and English-language-learning students, but ended the Abbott districtdesignation and eliminated many of the reforms ordered in the Abbottrulings. The state, inAbbott XIX, asked the Supreme Court of New Jersey to declare that the SFRA satisfied therequirements of the thorough and efficient education clause of the New Jersey Constitutionand that the courts prior remedial orders concerning the provision of a thorough and efficient

education in the Abbott districts were no longer necessary. 960 A.2d 360 (2008). The courtconcluded that the matter required development of an evidentiary record, and thereforeremanded the case for further proceedings. The court nevertheless ordered that its priordecisions and orders would remain in effect during the pendency of the remand and until itapproved an alternate funding program for the Abbott districts.

Expedited hearings were held to fully vet the constitutionality of the SFRA, including changesto the preschool provisions. The special master issued a report in March 2009, upholding theconstitutionality of the SFRA as applied to the Abbott districts, but finding that the Abbottsupplemental funding process needed to be continued for at least the following three years,given the "harm" likely to occur to the students in the Abbott districts under the formula. InAbbott XXthe Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded, based on the special masters report,that the SFRA was constitutional and could be applied in the Abbott districts, though thisholding was based on an expectation that the state would fully fund the formula, reassess itafter three years of implementation, and remediate any deficiencies that emerged through thereview process. 953 A.2d 1198 (2009).


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In June 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to enforce its Abbott XXdecision afterthe state failed to fund the SFRA for the 2010-11 school year. Proceedings on this motion willcontinue into the fall.

Also pending in the Abbottlitigation are ongoing issues around the facilities mandates andpreschool expansion. For the latest news, seehttp://www.edlawcenter.org/.

Crawford v. Davy

Plaintiffs in Crawford v. Davybrought a class action on behalf of students attending publicschools that have failed to meet state standards, alleging that these schools failed to provide athorough and efficient education, and seeking a remedy in which the state would institute avoucher program giving students the choice of leaving their "failing" schools to attend"successful" schools, either public or private. (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2007). The trial courtdismissed the suit against the Defendant School Districts, finding that state law gives a schoolboard no authority to assign a student to another school district in these circumstances. The

court dismissed the suit against the state defendants as well, concluding that the casepresented a political question that should be left to the legislature to decide. The court furtherfound that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action under the Equal Protection clauseof either the New Jersey or Federal Constitutions because they alleged no intent todiscriminate, which is a necessary component of an equal protection claim under bothconstitutions.

Plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Division issued a decision in November 2009 affirmingthe dismissal, but on grounds different from those articulated by the trial court. The appellatecourt instead concluded that the plaintiffs claims were premature, as they sought a wholesalerestructuring of New Jerseys system of locally-based public schools prior to there having been

an opportunity for the full implementation and operation of the statutory and remedialmeasures created under the recently-enacted School Funding Reform Act (SFRA).The court noted that the state supreme court, in Abbott XX, determined that SFRA deservesthe chance to prove in practice that, as designed, it satisfies the requirements of ourconstitution. The appellate court interpreted this to mean that, [w]hile plaintiffs may have theright to pursue their claims under the thorough and efficient education clause in anappropriate forum at some point in the future, they cannot do so until SFRA has had theopportunity to operate as required by Abbott XX.
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