KristynaChabova

Normsandvaluesconnectedtocorruption:Istheredifference

betweenpost-communistcountriesandtherestofEurope?

Abstract

This paper is looking at theoretical approaches linking norms and values to corruption and then tests these

approaches on the data from the ESS and the WB focusing specifically the differences between post-

communist countries and the rest of European countries. Author concludes that even 25 years after the fall

of the iron curtain the values connected to corruption are still different in post-communist countries.

However, there is no significant difference concerning the norms about corruption between post-

communist countries and the rest of Europe, which might signify positive future development in a fight

with corruption in post-communist countries.

Introduction

Corruptionisperceivedasoneofthemostseriousthreatstosociety,democracy,andtogood

governance.Assomeauthorssuggest(Rose,2001,p.105;Rose-Ackerman,1999),corruptionis

the greatest obstacle to progress and to democratization in post-communist societies.

Corruption decreases the quality of the public sector in many areas, can be an obstacle to

democratization and can even trigger civic unrest (Brown, Touchton, & Whitford, 2011;

Pellegata, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Corruption distorts the formal system of rules and

governance(Scott,1972,p.2).Moreover,asKarklinsadds(2005,p.4).,corruptioninvolvesthe

lossofequalaccesstopublicpowerandposition,whichdistortsthenormsofequalityandthat

leadstoalossofpublictrustandbeliefinthepoliticalsystem.Instates,wherethedemocratic

norms and institutions are still in process of building, the distrust to public officials can be

translatedintodisbeliefofdemocracyperse.Corruptionisalsodangerousfromtheeconomic

pointofview. It canbeabarrier toeconomicgrowth (WorldBank,1997b), italsonegatively

impacts the ratio of investment to GDP (Mauro, 1995;World Bank, 1997a) and the level of

foreigninvestment(Wei&Wu,2001).Corruptioncanalsocontributetoanuncertainbusiness

climate,canholdbackstatereformandcannourishorganizedcrime(Rose-Ackerman,1999,p.

17).

One would expect that European countries could have similar levels of corruption, being

culturallysimilarandgeographicallyveryclosetoeachother.However,politicalandeconomic

developmentofEuropeancountrieswas interruptedwhencommunistregimedividedEurope

intowestandeastforalmosthalfofcentury.Statesundercommunistregimedevelopedunder

verydifferent conditions. Today, 25 years after the fall of the iron curtainwhenEuropewas

reunited, thanks to the EuropeanUnion and to globalization the countries are influencedby

eachotherandunitedasneverbefore.

However, even after 25 years, European countrieswith a communist history have in general

higher levelsof corruption (Shleifer,1997) than the restofEuropeandpolitical corruption is

thereinfactaseriousproblem(Karklins,2005).Onepossibleexplanationtothisproblemmight

be that citizens of communist countries have different values, which are more prone to

corruption.Anotherexplanationmightbethatbeingcorruptisstillanorminpost-communist

countries.Thisarticleistryingtoanswerthequestionwhypost-communistcountriesstillsuffer

fromhighcorruptionlevelsandwhetheraredifferentvaluesornormsrootofthisproblem.

CorruptioninEurope

Eventhoughcorruption inEurope ingeneral isvery low,especially inScandinaviancountries,

post-communist European countries are an exception with levels of corruption consistently

highaswarnsforexampletheWorldBankthroughits indicatorControlofCorruption(graph

1).

Graph1:Controlofcorruption,pooleddata

Source:WorldBank.Averagecontrolofcorruption1996-2014.Controlofcorruptionshowshowthecountriesare

successfulincontrollingcorruption,theindicatorgoesfrom-3to3,while3indicatesthatcountryissuccessfulin

controllingthelevelofcorruption.

Similar results can be observed through direct experience with corruption (graph 2).

Communistregimeprovidesincentivestobribeeitherduetoscarcityofgoodsortothegeneral

belief that it is alright or even the encouraged to steal from the state. As the famousCzech

sayingillustrates:“Whodoesnotstealfromthestate,stealsfromhisownfamily”.

Graph2:Directexperiencewithcorruption

Source:ESSround2,2004.

Researchanddatashowthatinauthoritarianregimesthelevelofcorruptionishigherthanin

democraticregimes,however,surprisingly,therearemixedresultsoftheeffectofdemocracy

onthelevelofcorruptionconcerningtransitiontodemocracy(Blake&Martin,2006;Pellegata,

2012;Treisman,2000).Brown(2011)presentsthehypothesisthattheeffectofdemocracyon

corruption is nonlinear and thus the results describing the effect of democratization on

corruption aremixed.According to Pellegata’s analysis, countries that aremoving fromnon-

democracytodemocracy(hybridmode)havethelevelofcorruptionhigherinthebeginningof

the transformation than they had in non-democratic regime. Researchers suggest that the

transitioncomehandinhandwithdistortionorevenabsenceoftheformerrules,whichbrings

morepossibilitiestocorruptactivities.However,overtime,thelevelofcorruptionshouldstart

slowly declining thanks to enforcing new rules and laws (Pellegata, 2012). This theory is

supported by findings of Triesman, whose regressionmodel shows that the current level of

democracydoesnothaveanyeffectonthelevelofcorruption,butlongexposuretodemocracy

lowerscorruption(Treisman,2000).

Inregardtothesefindings,onewouldexpectthatthelevelofcorruptionwouldslowlydecline

in post communist European countries, which are now for more than 25 years exposed to

democracy.

Table1:Controlofcorruptioninpost-communistcountriesovertime

Country/year 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 Difference

AL -1.09 -1.01 -0.86 -0.81 -0.49 -0.55 0.54BA -0.35 -0.28 -0.35 -0.29 -0.32 -0.28 0.07BG -0.78 -0.24 -0.2 -0.1 -0.21 -0.28 0.5BY -0.93 -0.63 -0.78 -0.63 -0.73 -0.32 0.61CZ 0.65 0.55 0.36 0.3 0.26 0.32 -0.33EE -0.06 0.57 0.64 0.96 0.86 1.27 1.33HR -0.82 -0.72 0.25 0.09 -0.03 0.19 1.01HU 0.58 0.65 0.52 0.61 0.25 0.13 -0.45LT -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.27 0.48 0.54LV -0.82 -0.03 -0.12 0.29 0.13 0.34 1.16MD -0.2 -0.29 -0.95 -0.58 -0.69 -0.85 -0.65

ME -0.38 -0.24 -0.01 MK -0.96 -0.67 -0.88 -0.37 -0.06 0.09 1.05PL 0.54 0.67 0.33 0.17 0.41 0.59 0.05RO -0.22 -0.68 -0.38 -0.15 -0.22 -0.14 0.08RS -1.03 -1.08 -0.91 -0.28 -0.29 -0.19 0.84RU -1.02 -0.94 -0.92 -0.85 -1.06 -0.87 0.15SI 1.32 1.3 0.72 1.02 0.85 0.69 -0.63SK 0.36 0.25 -0.1 0.4 0.24 0.12 -0.24UA -1.03 -1.15 -1.02 -0.68 -0.98 -1 0.03

Source:WBGovernance Indicators.Averagecontrolofcorruption indicator inpost-communiststates.Controlof

corruptionshowshowthecountriesaresuccessfulincontrollingcorruption,theindicatorgoesfrom-3to3,while

3indicatesthatcountryissuccessfulincontrollingallofthecorruption.

However,asshowninTable1,thecontrolofcorruptioninpost-communistcountriesdoesnot

increase in time in general. In fact, on average the control of corruption remains the same

between 1996 and 2014, increasing most significantly in Estonia, Latvia or Croatia, but

decreasing in Slovenia or the CzechRepublic. According to Johnson (Johnson, 2005, p. 31) it

seemsthatdemocratizationinCentralEuropehasnotreducedcorruption.

Sowhy it is that central andeasternpost-communist countries inEuropedidnotmanage to

lowertheircorruptionlevels,asresearchersexpected?

Theoriesexplaininglevelofcorruption

Thereexistmanytheoriestryingtoexplainthecausesofcorruptionandtoanswerthequestion

whyinsomesocietiescorruptionismorewidespreadthaninothers.Manyofthetextsdealing

withcorruptionareconnectedtotheoriesusingeithernormsorvalues.Firstgroupoftheories

connectedtonormsincludecriminologicaltheory,thetheoryofsocialdisorganization,theory

of ‘badapples’and ‘badbarrel’,andrationalchoicetheory.Theoriesconnectedtovaluesare

Weber’sprotestantethicsandInglehart’spostmaterialisttheory.Finally,thirdgroupoftextsis

not connected to any theories, as it is rather empirical statistical work of correlations. Even

thoughthisgroupdoesnotinmostcasesrefertoanytheory,inordertocoverthemostused

approachestostudyofcorruption, Iwillpresentthemost importantfindingsofthisgroupof

authorsaswell.

Norms

Norms are defined as shared understanding about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or

forbidden within society (Ostrom, 2000). Theories referencing to norms in the research of

corruptionareusuallycombiningmicroperspectiveandmacroperspective.Normsexistonthe

levelofsociety,however,thereareinternalizedbyanindividual,andindividual’sbehaviouris

reciprocally influenced by norms. Corruption is then behaviour of public officials, which

deviatesfromthenorms.Theliteraturestudyingtherelationsbetweennormsandcorruptionis

inconclusive, some authors argue that social norms influence corruption (Fisman & Miguel,

2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), however, there are also results showing that the relations

between corruption and norms are not that straightforward (Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, &

Gangadharan, 2005; Kapoor & Ravi, 2012). Below are presented authors, which analyse the

relationsbetweennormsandcorruption inpost-communistsocieties.Majorityofthemargue

that norms concerning corruption are different than norms in countries which have never

experiencedcommunistrule.

Rationalchoicetheory-gametheory

Rationalchoicetheoryarguesthatevery individual firstweightsthegainsandcostsandthen

actsinordertomaximizetheutilityandminimizethecosts.Apublicofficerthereforedecides

whetherthepossibilityofbeingcaughtisgreaterthantheenjoymentofmoneyhewasoffered,

andactsaccordingly.ThistheorywassupportedbyRose-Ackermanwhoarguesthatthereason

for corruption is precisely the fact that public officials believe that expected advantages

outweightheexpectedcosts(1978).

Gametheoryderivesfromthesamelineofthinkingastherationalchoicetheory.Gametheory

looksatthedecisionmakingofanindividualwhencollaboratingwithadifferentperson.Oneof

the most famous applications of the game theory is the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the classic

prisoner’s dilemma situation, there are two prisoners and each of them goes through

interrogation.Ifonebetraystheother,he/shegoesfree,however,ifbothofthembetraythe

otherone,theyserveverylongsentenceinprison.Butifnoneofthembetraytheother,they

both serve short sentence. The variation of a prisoner’s dilemma can be applied to the

evolution of norms as well. In their article Bendor and Swistak define social norms as

“behavioralrulesthatarebackedbysanctions”(2001,p.1494).Ifoneviolatessocialnorm,he

orshewouldbeavoidedorostracised.Therehavetobesanctionsfromthethirdpartysothe

normswouldbestable.Theypresentveryinterestingtheoryoftheevolutionofnorms,which

derives from the game theory. They argue that norms are developed through the repetitive

game.Whenonepersonbetraystheotherone,thethirdpartysanctionshimorher.Whenthis

game is repeated enough times, the behaviour of not betraying becomes the norm. Better

normssurviveinthesocietywhileworsewitheraway.Thisunderstandingofnormscanbeused

inthestudyofcorruption;forashortterm,orincountrieswherethesystemisnotbasedon

fairness,suchasinautocraciesorincommunismasinourcase,itisconvenienttobecorrupt.

However,forthelongerperiodoftimeorforcountries,whicharedemocraticandhavetherule

of law, it ismoreconvenient tobehonest. Incommunism,beingcorruptedcouldberational

andmaybeeven thebestdecisionnotonly for the individual,butalso for the society. Some

social scientists argue that corruption canbegood in somecases for the societyas awhole.

Whenthelawsandpublicofficeinthecountryisnotfairanddoesnotguaranteeequalaccess

toservices,corruptioncansubstituteforthis.Forexample indevelopingcountriescorruption

couldbebeneficialforallbecauseitcanhelptheeconomicsystemtofunctionmoreproperly

(Flatters&Macleod,1995).Beingcorruptitselfbecameanormduringcommunismandittakes

timetochangenorms.Afterthefalloftheironcurtain,thankstoemergenceofdemocracyand

the rule of law, new norms such as being fair, treat everybody equal, and integrity, slowly

startedtoemerge.First, itwasadeviancetonotofferoracceptabribe,butmoreandmore

peopleacceptthisdeviance,itbecomesanorm(Huntington,1968).

One can say that the norms in post-communist countries might have changed under the

communist rule. It became more rational to become corrupted and to bribe. New norms

emergedandbeing corruptwasnomore sanctioned,on the contrary, due to the scarcityof

goodspeoplebelievedthatitisimportanttostealfromthestate.AsthefamousCzechsaying

illustrates: “Who does not steal from the state, steals from his own family”. Almost half of

century under communism is a long time to change thenormsof thepeople, it is therefore

expected that norms in the post-communist states might be different; corruption might be

perceivedassomethingthateverybodydoes.

It is very difficult to find a proper question which can be understood as norms concerning

corruption. The closest one to the concept of norms is probably question asked in

Eurobarometer, which focuses on the business culture. Specifically, it asks respondents,

whethertheybelievethatcorruptionispartofthebusinesscultureinacountry.Theresultsfor

Europecanbeseeningraph5.

Graph5:Corruptionispartofbusinessculture

Source:Eurobarometer2011,2013.Corruptionispartofbusinessculture1-totallyagree,2-tendtoagree,3-tend

todisagree,4-totallydisagree

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CY IT HR GR CZ SK SI LT BG ES IE HU PT PL GB FR AT BE EE DE LU NL FISE DK

Values

Themotivations for one’s incline to be corrupted can be studied from the point of view of

values. According to Weber, values are “the actions of persons who, regardless of cost to

themselves,acttoputintopracticetheirconvictionsofwhatseemstothemtoberequiredby

duty,honour,thepursuitofbeauty,areligiouscall,personalloyalty,ortheimportanceofsome

‘cause’ ... value-rational action always involves commands or demandswhich, in the actor’s

opinions,arebindingonhim.”(Weber,1920).Someauthorssuggestthatvalueschangedunder

communism(Karklins,2005)

Values–security

TheSchwartz(1992)ValueSurvey(SVS)iscurrentlythemostwidelyusedbysocialandcross-

culturalpsychologists forstudying individualdifferences invalues.Below isoutlinedthemain

conceptoftheSchwartzvaluesurvey.

Table 1. Definitions of Motivational Types of Values in Terms of their Goals and the Single

ValuesthatRepresentThem

POWER: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. (social

power,authority,wealth,preservingmypublicimage)

ACHIEVEMENT: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social

standards.(successful,capable,ambitious,influential)

HEDONISM: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. (pleasure, enjoying life, self-

indulgence)

STIMULATION:Excitement,novelty,andchallengeinlife.(daring,avariedlife,anexcitinglife)

SELF-DIRECTION: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. (creativity,

freedom,independent,curious,choosingowngoals)

UNIVERSALISM: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all

peopleandfornature.(broadminded,wisdom,socialjustice,equality,aworldatpeace,aworld

ofbeauty,unitywithnature,protectingtheenvironment)

BENEVOLENCE:Preservationandenhancementof thewelfareofpeoplewithwhomone is in

frequentpersonalcontact.(helpful,honest,forgiving,loyal,responsible)

TRADITION: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional

cultureor religionprovide theself. (humble,acceptingmyportion in life,devout, respect for

tradition,moderate)

CONFORMITY:Restraintofactions,inclinations,andimpulseslikelytoupsetorharmothersand

violatesocialexpectationsornorms.(politeness,obedient,self-discipline,honoringparentsand

elders)

SECURITY:Safety,harmonyandstabilityofsociety,ofrelationships,andofself.(familysecurity,

nationalsecurity,socialorder,clean,reciprocationoffavors)

Researchshowthatpost-communistcountrieshavedifferentvaluesthancountrieswhichhave

never experienced communist rule. This has been observed also by Inglehart (1997), who

analysesvaluechangein43societiesandcomeswithanobservationthatthereexistclustersof

countries falling into specific value categories (picture 1), with almost all post-communist

countriesbeinginthetopleftcornersignallingthattheyindeedsharedifferentvaluesthanthe

restoftheworld.TheclosestvaluefromtheSchwartzscaleisSecurity.

Picture1:Valuesintheworld

Dataandmethod

Formyanalysis Iuse25countries,all inEurope,9haveacommunistpastandtherest

(16)donot.IusetheEuropeanSocialSurvey(ESS),WorldValuesSurvey(WVS),Eurobarometer

andWorldBank(WB)dataasthesourcesformydataset.Thedataareaggregatedoveralltime

periods(1996-2014).

DependentVariable

Iwillbeusing theControlofcorruptionby theWorldBank.Thedata iscollectedevery

yearandtheWorldBankdataiscomparableovertime,thereforeitispossibletopoolthedata

across multiple years. Control of corruption shows how the countries are successful in

controlling corruption, the indicator goes from -3 to 3, while 3 indicates that country is

successfulincontrollingthelevelofcorruption.

IndependentVariables

ItestnormsasusedbytheEurobarometer,questionwhichisfocusedonthebusinessculture

andcorruption.ThenIusevaluesasunderstoodbySchwartz.

Unfortunately,duetoextremelysmallsamplesizeIcannotuseanyothervariables,especially

asIneedtoincludeinteractions.

Results

1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4.

Communisthistory

-0.725426**(.2722786)

-.8917325(1.338)

.9005(.750)

1.68(1.678)

Norms(businessculture)

0.9715248***(.1736062)

.9584911**(.297629)

1.171***(.750)

1.2379***(.299)

Values(Security)

0.3338753(.5605642)

.3529(.593)

-.225(.573)

-.342(.6251)

History*norms .0922(.7359) -.3673

(.702)

History*values 2.6142**(1.178)

2.806**(1.255)

Intercept -.4496253 -.41355 -1.10 -1.296AdjustedR2 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.84Numberof

cases 25 25 25 39

Results show that security valuesarenot connected to corruptionperceptions,onlywhen in

interactionwiththecommunisthistory.Thisshowsthatsecurityvaluesincreasecorruptionin

communist countries.Normsare verymuch connected to corruption, however, interestingly,

they are not significant when in interaction with communist past. It seems that norms are

importantinallcountries,thereisnotdifferencebasedonthecommunistpast.

Conclusion

Thisarticlediscusses themost important theoriesconnectedtocorruptionandoffersseveral

explanationsof the fact thatcorruption levelsarehigher inpost-communistcountries. Italso

discusseswhich theoriesmight be helpful andwhich are inconclusive in the study of higher

corruptionlevelsinpost-communistcountries.

This article serves as a basis for understanding corruption and its development in post-

communist Europe. It seems that the crucial effect that is connected to the legacy of

communismhavevalues,post-communistcountrieshavehighersecurityvalues.

First, there exist lots of authors arguing that due to a long communist rule, norms in post-

communistcountriesaretodaydifferentthanintherestofEurope.Duringcommunism,being

corruptbecamethenorm,andevenafter25yearsafterthefallofironcurtain,thisnormhas

not been changed yet. However, descriptive data and some research doubt this hypothesis,

normsofunderstandingcorruptionassomething,whichisnotseriouslywrong,arenotpresent

moreinpost-communistEuropeancountriesthanintherestofEurope.Itisthereforenotclear

whethernormsareimportantinunderstandingcorruptioninpost-communistcountries.

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