north wrongdoing and forgiveness

8/3/2019 North Wrongdoing and Forgiveness

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

Wrongdoing and ForgivenessAuthor(s): Joanna NorthSource: Philosophy, Vol. 62, No. 242 (Oct., 1987), pp. 499-508Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3750929 .

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Wrongdoing and ForgivenessJOANNA NORTH

To forgive a person for a wrong he has done has often been valued asmorally good and as indicative of a benevolent and merciful character.But while forgiveness has been recognized as valuable its nature as amoral response has largely been ignored by modern moral philosopherswho work outside the confines of a religious context.' Where it has beendiscussed, forgiveness has been thought particularly difficult to define,and some have thought the forgiving response paradoxical or evenimpossible. I shall discuss some of these difficulties and suggest firstlythat the value of forgiveness lies in the fact that it essentially requires arecognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action, andsecondly that forgiveness typically involves an effort on the part of theone wronged: a conscious attempt to improve oneself in relation to thewrongdoer.Most of the great moral philosophers of the past have recognized theintrinsic worth of retribution as a response to wrongdoing. Kant tiedretribution into the framework of the moral law by arguing that thedesire for retribution arises from the perception that one's rights havebeen violated by the wrongdoer, and these rights, in Kant's view,belong to us in virtue of our rational nature. As a consequence we oughtto punish the wrongdoer for his wilful disregard for us as ends inourselves. In Hegel we find the view that the criminal has freely chosenviolence and pain as the maxim of his action, and therefore has a 'right'to be punished. Punishment is an act of respect for the wrongdoer.Neither Kant nor Hegel gives a coherent account of forgiveness,however. For both of them, forgiveness involves a wiping out of thecrime, a making undone what has been done, and Kant adds to this thethought that forgiveness always involves the forgoing of punishment. Itis not therefore surprising to find Kant and Hegel regarding forgivenessand retribution as in conflict, for on this view the extending of forgive-ness to the wrongdoer is a matter of relinquishing the demands ofjustice, and perhaps even condoning the crime.In fact, Kant regards forgiveness not merely as problematic but asliterally impossible: for once wrong has been done it cannot be undone

Two notable exceptions are Aurel Kolnai's 'Forgiveness', Proceedingsof the Anrstotelian Society, 1973-4, and R. S. Downie's 'Forgiveness' inPhilosophical Quarterly, 15, No. 59, 1965.499


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even by God. God is a Divine Judge against whose law the wrongdoerhas consciously and wilfully trangressed. The moral law, and hence thepunishments that are incurred by wrongdoing, share the necessity andeternity of the divine nature. God, in His capacity as judge, cannot bemoved by our pleadings and prayers for forgiveness: we cannot affectGod's nature in this way and somehow 'change His mind' as to ourmoral deserts. Kant's account offers no hope to those who try to escapepunishment by appealing to God's mercy. We will receive our justdeserts with or without our prayers. Our only hope lies in our positiveendeavours to make amends for our sins and in our decision to actrightly in future. Kant seems to think that through such a positivechange of heart a person can become a'new man'. The sinful person heonce was will be punished while the new person he has become will not.This ingenious solution creates many problems of personal identity,and makes forgiveness redundant. If I repent, and in so doing, becomea new man, asking for forgiveness seems to be a matter of asking for aresponse aimed at a person who no longer exists. But if this is really so,then there can be no point in asking for forgiveness, and the person whois asked for forgiveness can only aim his response at a metaphysicalshadow.

If forgiveness is to be coherent we should reject this account ofrepentance. The person who repents fully recognizes that the crimecommitted was his own, and that his responsibility for it continues overtime, just as he does. In asking for forgiveness he wants this very sameperson to be forgiven, and the forgiver is required to recognize him assuch. When we do speak of a person as 'becoming a new man' throughhis repentance we must remember that this phrase is usedmetaphorically, suggesting a spiritual transformation from bad togood, but not implying his literal re-creation.Kant's problem, however, is slightly different. For him, forgivenessis impossible not because the person who once committed a crime nolonger exists but because he views forgiveness as a literal wiping out ofsins, and as a reversal in a supposedly irreversible process of crime andpunishment. I suggest that far from removing the fact of wrongdoing,forgiveness actually relies upon the recognition of this fact for its verypossibility. What is annulled in the act of forgiveness is not the crimeitself but the distorting effect that this wrong has upon one's relationswith the wrongdoer and perhaps with others. If this is correct thenforgiveness is possible even for God. He may still accept the wrongdoerback into His all-embracing love and set to rights the damage which thewrongdoer has done to his personal relation with Him. This does notexclude the possibility of God punishing him also. Indeed, for mostChristians God's forgiveness does not exclude retribution: it is a matter500


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of God's 'raising us up' from the position into which we have fallenthrough sin, and restoring us to His love.Consider the New Testament parableof the ProdigalSon. The sontakes his share of the inheritance and spends it in debauchery andriotous living. Cast down by his resultant poverty and suffering heresolves to return to his father, to confess his sins, and to admit hisunworthiness to be called his son. Upon his return his father is filledwith compassion and joy; he gives him the best garmentsto wear, putsshoes upon his feet and orders the fatted calf to be killed and prepared,saying 'For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost and isfound'.2The son returnsin humility, broughtdown in his own estima-tion and conscious of his unworthiness. The father's love and compas-sion, however, heal the breach between them and restore the son to hisoriginalpositionof dignitywithin the household. The act of forgivenesshas brought the son backfrom a state of 'death' or sin to one of 'life'orgoodness. From being 'lost' (both to his father and his home, and, byanalogy,to God) the son is 'found', that is, he is returnedto his rightfulplace, redeemed by his own repentanceand his father's love.It is true that the son is not punished upon his return,but the point ofthe parable is that the suffering and poverty he has experienced pre-viously were themselves a punishment for his wrongdoing. Thepunishment due to us may be of this kind or perhaps of some other,meted out to us after death. But in neither case does the fact ofpunishment preclude our being forgiven subsequently. There are, nodoubt, other problems with the notion of God's forgiveness,3 butKant'sproblem, at least, can be solved by rejectingthe view of forgive-ness asaliteralwiping out of sins, and asessentiallyinvolvingaforgoingof retribution.In the human realm, forgiveness may involve a forgoing of punish-ment, but that does not constitute forgivenessas such. We have to lookin each case for the reasonwhy the wrongdoeris not punished. Theremay be many reasons for this, and not all of them have the moralsignificance possessed by forgiveness. One may, for example, simplychoose to 'turn a blind eye' to the wrongdoing, not wanting to con-template its existence. One might also forgo retribution out of a desirenot to seem intolerant or a 'moral bore'in the eyes of others, or out of adesire to fit in with otherpeople who themselves do not see the action aswrong. But blindness to wrong and particularlywilful blindness is notforgiveness; indeed, it may be said to indicatemoralweaknessor someother personal defect of character.

2 St Luke,15,xxiv.3 Anne C. Minas deals with some of these in her article 'God andForgiveness',PhilosophicalQuarterly,25, No. 99, 1975.501


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Forgiveness is also misunderstood if it is taken to involve an 'excus-ing' of the wronged party. To some extent this misunderstandingisencouraged by our ordinary usage. We often say, for example, 'youshould forgive him-you know he is very young' or even 'forgivehim,he doesn't know what he is doing'. But although the attempts that wemakeas a result of these statements to overcome our angerand hostilefeelings share many similarities with the true forgiving response, I donot believe thatin these cases we can be said to be tryingto forgive. Theimplicationof the firststatement is that theyouth or inexperienceof thewrongdoeris in some way a mitigatingcircumstance for his action, andthat as a result he cannot be said to be fully responsible for it. We arebeing askedto excuse the actionby endeavouringto see it as less wrongor less reprehensible than it first appeared, and to overcome our feel-ings because they are not appropriateto the situation. In the secondcase, similarly, the wrongdoer'signoranceof his crime is taken to be anexcuse for him, perhaps with the implicationthat if he had known hewould not have done wrong. His lackof awarenessof otherpeople, andperhapseven his lackof moralsense, aretreated asthingswhich removehim from the realm of rewardand punishment, praiseand blame. Hisresponsibilityfor his action is thought to be lessened by his ignorance.Once again our feelings of anger and hostility are thought to be inap-propriateto the facts of the matter.Forgiveness is quite anothermatter. If we are to forgive, our resent-ment is to be overcome not by denying ourselves the right to thatresentment, but by endeavouringto view the wrongdoerwith compas-sion, benevolence and love while recognizing that he has wilfullyabandoned his right to them.There aremany ways of excusing a person'sbadbehaviour,but suchexplanationsremove him some distance from the moralarena,and thelanguageof morality, involving as it does the notions of responsibility,merit and blame, is replacedby a discoursewhich speaksof influences,mitigatingcircumstances,determinationby forcesand drives. We thenno longer see the person as responsible for his action, and once thispoint is reached the appropriateresponseto him is not retribution,buttreatment ordeterrence.There is no point in seeingthatjusticebe donewhen therehasbeen, not an actof injustice, but ahappeningoverwhichthe person had no control.But now if retribution is inappropriateso too is forgiveness: onecannot forgive when no wrong has been done, for there is no breach tobe healed and no repentance is necessary or possible. Forgivenessrequires that a wrong not be disregarded,overlooked or dismissed.Let us now look at the results of wrongdoing and the nature offorgiveness itself. Typically an act of wrongdoing brings about a dis-tancing of the wrongdoerfromthe one he has harmed. This distancing502


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involves a forfeiting of the right to the wronged party's sympathy,affection or trust, and is felt as a breakdown or a distortion in thepersonal relations between the parties. The distortion may also affecttheir relations with other people who are not directly involved. Forexample, a manwho cannotforgivehis son's rudeness ordisrespect mayhave bitter feelings which affect also his relationshipwith his wife andother children.

Initially, the breakdown effected by wrongdoing maybe felt more orless painfully only by the wronged party. But it may be that thewrongdoer feels a similar anguish almost immediately. Consider abitterargumentin which one party deliberatelyutterssomethingharshand cruel to the other. On perceiving the hurt in the other's face, orperhaps even as he says the words, he regrets his remark, inwardlyrecoils from his own words and begs for forgivenessand reconciliationeven before the other has had a chance to respond.Forgiveness is a way of healing the damage done to one's relationswith the wrongdoer, or at least a first step towards a full reconciliation.The repentanceof the wrongdoer, his recognitionof and regretfor hisaction, and his willingness to make amends, although not essentialpreconditions of forgiveness, no doubt facilitate its progress. Retrib-ution, againnot essential, may also be helpful, for it may play a partinthe wrongdoer'spath towards repentanceand it may also help to easethe wronged party'ssense of outrageand hostility.In most cases of forgiveness there are two aspects to consider. Thefirst is that internal 'change of heart' which leads naturallyto certaingestures or outwardactions towardsthe wrongdoer, which express thewronged party'sdesire to makegood the relations between them. Thesecond aspectis the effect of these gestureson the wrongdoerand on therelations between him and the wronged party. In typicalcases the twopartiesstill come into contact with one another, althoughtheir contactis strained. Forgiveness, when offered and accepted, enables them toresume harmonious comunication. But there are other cases in whichthe wrongdoer is no longer present and where forgiveness cannot beaccepted. We may forgive those who are absent or dead. In such casesthe change of heartwhich is the essence of forgivenessmay or may notlead to any externalgestures or outward indications. But even in thesecases there is an implicit connection between forgivenessand outwardaction, for if I forgivesomeone who is no longer presentit is truethat ifI were to see him again I would behave towardshim in a differentwaythan if I had not forgiven him.Let us consider two examples. Take the case of awoman who has hadan adulterousaffair, and whose husband refuses to allow her back intothe home when she regrets her action and wishes to return. The

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husband is angry and coldly turns her away when she comes to theirdoor.Time passes and the wife makes repeatedattempts to returnhome;she acknowledgesherguilt andsuffers both fromthe recognitionof herwrongdoing and from their estrangement. She begs her husband forforgiveness, expresses her sorrow, and declares her readiness to befaithful in future. The suffering is not all on her side, however. Thehusband has naturallybeen hurt by her affairbut he also suffers fromtheir estrangement; we may suppose that he is not unmoved by herpleas, and he comes to realizethat her remorse is sincere.It is not alwayseasy to recognize the existence of sincere repentanceand remorse. Nor, for that matter, is it alwayseasy to recognize whenone has been forgiven. The reason is the same in each case. Repentanceand forgiveness are changes of feeling and perception, and while theytypically express themselves externally they are not constituted byoutwarddisplay. A person may be an exceedingly good actorand maypretendto regrethis action orto forgiveanother with such skilfulwordsand gestures that we are completely taken in by him. There are,however, at leastsome factors one or moreof which will enableapersonto judge whether repentance is sincere. One might take past conductand character into account, in order to assess a person'ssincerity andhonesty in this particularcase. Or one might also assess the intensityand frequency of his requests for forgiveness as indications of hisrepentance. In the example we are considering the wife does makerepeated attempts to gain her husband's forgiveness. Another factormight be the extent to which the wrongdoer is already trying to makeamends for his actions-the wife has ended her affair-and one mighteven test the wrongdoer'swillingness to complywith one'srequestsandrespect one's wishes.Let us return to the story. The man now decides that his wife is trulysorry for her action and that she genuinely wants to be reunited withhim. He is readyto tryto forgiveher. At leastone thing must occurif heis to do so: he must allowher to come home. But this externalgesture isnot sufficient. Suppose that he re-admitsher and yet thereafterkeeps adiligent watch on all her movements, treats her with suspicion, andopens her mail in case there is some communication between her andthe other man. It is clear that in this case he has not yet forgiven her.Without a 'changeof heart',without a change in the wrongedparty'semotional perception and reactions towards the wrongdoer, the out-wardgestureswhich he may perform-the smiles, the promisenever tomentionthe matteragain, the re-admittance ntothe familyhome-willremain, and probably appear, what they really are, namely, emptygesturesonly. Having said that, I think it is worth noting that forgive-ness maybeginwith such gesturesandmayeven help to bringabout the504


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emotional change which itself takes place at a later date. Just as thetraditionalstages of mourning may help the bereaved feel their grief atthe appropriatetime and in appropriatedegrees, so too may outwardgesturesandspoken words enable the victim of wrongdoingto feel loveand affection in the place of resentment and bitterness. Forgivenessneed not, perhaps even cannot, be instantaneous, for it takes time toheal the wounds of estrangementand to restore the free-flowingtrustand affection which once existed. But aresponsethat is initiallyhesitantand reserved may gain momentum and strength through outwardmovements and rituals (indeed this is one of the functions of ritual).Genuine forgiveness is thus more than an outward show of good-heartednessor generosity. Indeed the person who asks for forgivenessis not asking merely to be allowed home or to appear to the outsideworldto be reunited with the other. He wantsto be really acceptedandrestored.Only if a changein the wrongedparty'semotionaloutlook liesbehind his gestures can this be so. Without it all outwardgestureswillremain hollow, and for the penitent who realizes their emptiness theywill be an ever-constant reminder of his unworthinessandhumiliation.

It is not easy to forgive another. Forgiveness requires that a wrongnot be disregardedoroverlooked,but it alsorequiresthat the wrongnotbe allowedpermanentlyto damageand distortone's personalrelations.We arerequiredto accept back into our hearta personwho is respons-ible for having hurt and damaged us. If I am to forgive I must riskextending my trust and affection, with no guaranteethat they will notbe flungbackin my faceorforfeitedagainin the future. Onemight evensay that forgiveness is an unconditionalresponseto the wrongdoer, forthere is something unforgiving in the demand for guarantees.I said earlierthat retributionand repentanceoften makeforgivenesseasierto achieve, but that neither is strictlynecessary.To see this take acase of two people who used to be close friends. For years they havevisited one another, had many interesting and amusingconversations,gone to films and parties together, and sharedtheir joys and sorrows.Then one of them hearsof an excellent opportunityabroad andgoes tolive in anothercountry without first telling his friend. The one who isleft behind hearsthathe hasgone andwhy, andalthoughpleasedfor hisfriend'sgood fortunehe is hurt that he was not told of it personally.Hewrites to his friend but the letters arenever answered. He realizes thathe has been 'dropped',abandonedforgreaterand moreamusing things.Naturally he feels betrayed by this turn of events, and is angry andresentful. But he has no wayof knowingwhether the otherknowsof hisfeelings, nor can he tell whether the other feels sorry for having aban-doned him.In such a situation there is no possibility of retribution and noknowledge of repentance. But forgiveness may still be possible.505


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Forgiveness in such a case will not result in a renewal of the friendshipbut it will enable the man to overcome his bitterness and resentment.He may, in short, undergo the same emotional re-acceptance of hisfriend in his thoughts, so that he may come to contemplate him withouthatred or anger, and once again be able to enjoy the memories of theirclose association.This change of heart may be accomplished in a number of ways,which help to alleviate the soreness he feels. For example, he mayrefuse to dwell upon the thought of his friend's rude departure, and theunanswered letters. This is not to say that he forgets them, but whenthe thought of them occurs he does not dwell upon them. He will turnhis mind to other things and take steps to avoid nursing and nurturinghis resentment. We all know how a small stinging wound may be coaxedto grow out of all proportion by reverting to it in one's thoughts, feedingand nourishing it by recalling many other slights and careless remarksthat have happened in the past. Although it is less easy it is surelypossible to reverse this process by replacing bad thoughts with good,unpleasant memories with pleasant associations. If the man tries tothink of his friend's good points, of his amusing wit and charm, of hiscourage, strength and adventurous spirit, he may eventually manage toexpel his resentment and anger, and regain his original affection andcompassion for his friend even while he recognizes his faults. In thisway he manages to forgive his friend, and the wrong that has been doneceases to distort and sour his thoughts-he has accepted him back intohis heart.

Forgiveness, through such active mental and emotional endeavour,is therefore possible even in the absence of repentance and retribution.It is essentially an internal change of heart that is appropriatelydescribed in terms such as 're-acceptance', 're-admittance', and 'over-coming'. The example I have just given also suggests that forgiveness isa matter of a willed change of heart-the successful result of an activeendeavour to replace bad thoughts with good, bitterness and anger withcompassion and affection. It is as the result of an active endeavour thatforgiveness is of value. One might say that it involves a kind of deliber-ate self-improvement. Simply ceasing to be angry as the result of a goodnight's sleep or a tranquillizer, or merely through boredom or thepassage of time, cannot be called forgiveness. Harmonious personalrelations may be restored through such methods but this result cannotbe said to be of any moral worth. It is this thought which explains theintuition that apparently 'instantaneous' forgiveness is really moralweakness or a defect in moral character, suggesting the wronged party'sinability to appreciate the wrong that has been done to him or his over-willingness not to let the wrong upset him too deeply. The Christianreligion does, it is true, hold out as an ideal the development of a506


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forgiving 'character'or disposition which enables a person to extendforgiveness without hesitation or reserve. Some, like Nietzsche, haveconceived Christianity as a religion of weakness as a result. But it issurely no coincidence that such people also criticize human love andaffection on the same grounds. The forgivingcharacter s one which isachievableonly after a hard-foughtbattle, and should not be confusedwith timidity or moral feebleness.Thus forgiveness may be seen as a morally valuable response towrongdoingin three respects. Firstly, forgiveness, likeretribution,canonly begin from the recognition or belief that wrong has been done.Any account which denies the existence of wrongor which describesanact in terms outside the arena of moral discourseis one which leaves noroom either for retributionor for forgiveness. Both requirethat moralvision in which the human agent occupies a centralplace, and in whichpraise and blame are allotted in full recognition of his nature as aresponsible being.Secondly, the act of forgivenessis awayof restoringthe damagedoneto one's personal relations through an active endeavour to changeoneself and one's emotional reactions to thewrongdoer.The forgiveris,in a sense, in a position of moral superiority: the wrongdoer has,through his action, removed himself from the realm of the (relatively)guiltless, and has 'cast himself down' in the eyes of the wronged party.However, the latterwould be foolish and morallyat fault if he proudlyand loudly proclaimed his superiorityover the wrongdoer. Indeed, todo so would in effect threaten the response as a case of genuineforgiveness, since it would humiliate the wrongdoerstill further, andnegatewith one hand the affection and trust that arebeing offered withthe other. So although the forgiveris morallysuperior, at least in thisinstance, and although this fact is recognized by the wrongdoerin thevery act of asking for forgiveness, the knowledge should be implicitlyshared and not openly displayed. Indeed, if the wrongdoer is to be'lifted up' and 'raised' to his original position it is made easier if thewronged party goes some way to meet him, by 'lowering' himself inmodesty and humility. As we saw in the exampleof the ProdigalSon itis partof the act of forgiveness itself that the son is treatedwith honourand respect by the very person who surpasseshim in moral worth.The terms used here to describe forgiveness-'restoration', 'over-coming', 'acceptance'and so on-all suggest the third sense in whichforgiveness is of moral worth. I have spokenof forgivenessasrestoringthe wrongdoer to his proper place in our affection, of healing thedamagedone to one's personalrelations, of overcomingestrangement,andof acceptingthe wrongdoeronce more into his original place in ouresteem. The ideathat lies behind allthese phrasesis that of harmoniousties of trust, affection andmutualsympathywhich arethe fundamental

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bonds between human individuals. If it is right to say that these bondsare the foundations of a natural moral vision it becomes clearjust howforgiveness maybe regardedas of wider moralsignificance. In being anactwhereby such personalties areenhancedforgiveness maybe seen asupholding and furtheringthe fundamental human valueswhich them-selves lie at the heart of moral rules and principles. Forgiveness is thenaturalcompletion of a process of restoring and healing the relationswhich the wrongdoer has, for a time, suspended: the relations ofaffection andregardthat form the basis of harmoniousmoral andsociallife.BirkbeckCollege,London

north wrongdoing and forgiveness

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