rNOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regardedas authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy inall aspects. and its interpretations are not necessarilythose of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est pr~liminaire et n'a aucun caract~re afficiel.On n'a pas v~rifie son exactitude et les interpretationsqulil cantient oe sont pas necessa;rement cel1es du Servicehistorique.

Directorate of HistoryNational Defence HeadquartersOttawa, CanadaK1A OK2

July 1986

, • r\ef _ Jrdnance ... urvey ofnglunl n, (..lIes, onc-inch. h,...ets 1 5 ...nd 134.Duol1cate

Cun~ ian C rps EA rcise "1

CANmlED

26 Apr. 41

D' e i·a ••"i"l\.-.'~DHON

'"DolO' -

h tl ,L.lJ:.t .a,

C .u. II '. l;.ltar./ u... CockO>J-u:' tr~et,

L""nd In, .m..,~;D.

Th~ :'·1 .•:13c to,r,H.i~tvrlc 1 "- ction,

• _1.0.;.1. 1 taft,f ~.C .1 d \.i..1 tors,

II DA.

a to. rter~,• • 1,

1. '" furthor r .rt.:.. re t d. Tid." c la Hh the CanadIan

.0 !~5 ..... rei 0 K110, n by tho cOd -n~ "![. ", hlel, took 1 co on

•

9-11 l' ,.lrl1 1 "41. I R.., .,re ... ent in th. l'ea of the Aerclstl on

_0-11 prll.

PLAr, JF

ic.. TIJe c.. ocUI:.·.'nts 011 thL. €.I. rcls6 ro to h f~Wld 11 C••• H••

fll~ / .. " rcls"s/5.

ThO' ob,1 ct e.S "to xe:rc15e 1 l,;uu 01v in CfJ. rylng out its

op r t.:!.ol,&.l c 'untcr- .tt·~ck role". '11'1 thl..:ol'ctlc 1 ...!.t tion c.s

sketched .s In gen""r

• my

D • C L·& I' i "i I • ill"""--.. DHO ..... ...

Door

~ . till I. 1 .in.. tJt ttlIe T J.;v~h1clos lnv lv d.•I

ere 1n I ~ V 4 Ci.n

~. t 0 ~ t kine p rt i t,

t.:1811

:r Y L •rl.1l.:. ~.l.:mnt. th(".G.), ell 11th.

~.u tllu 1 th ~1ght • • nt (

1um

t .11 unit).

gw.nt,

Til Clv~t;

t OtlOO hr ~ ou

u ,port .0... l' J..tr }l, ..... ,r.~, .Dl:

rt;;d to1''' 1

u r.n' Ie),• •

.....i!,.,ril, th.l~o lnv lov a......,.c.

5.

til L1 1 ar a to ct u er 1 1v. At 15vO hr. Cdn Corps

J. C d U11 r util- ~ t ru at .000 lira it as

~rd l' d t mev 1 Odn iv to rca (G

_ Y ... L. - H . L Y - . )e

.1'

t tl

atory to 0

G

r t~ne to th

...vU b rd..

o. Jt 100 hrs l,;on!' ne S 11 1 t H•• Cdn G....rps. Itt.J.OU ..,t t wli ... t tL.... dl my' ... V he\.;{. tJ:' 0 ... re (JU t1. g n-

tHG - ... ~ •• - '.i' Y .1. G - Uli T.'! • _UT - A Ter 1 lin

CIlI~LmGTIN L UTH £-T.IG v L - _1 :I'Ll G . -vO 1v and 1 u·r. e1v r loJ)J I' tin, • of • u

W1 91' Cor s; C n iv, Ullt r •• C lid, " b 1n;: or rcd

to c nc it t • f I., lL.k. ( 0 U ,ir, t. uctl n_ l' tll

o • u .)

7. t till_ t.im , 1 c.:c:n L1v ~ 0 I'c ) t _ .W'

or U fr • L b U l' eh 11::. d1-t ly N. of L ), r cing ".t n • 1 1; n. (b) to

" .- T t ..... L (l.u., t r t •..1- L

1 ..:ing

t rd. ) f r. _~lght.... t uth 1,' \oJ r d to c(;n-

C T.tr t h ...1'\i ... ::'0 iJ. tll l' S nt v ( r. 5) re-;J r tor to d

e l:

eh d r lle" r

1 g t.n

•

.h u

11(.

+•

1

~. -

h r

•

. .

n W , -

•8. 11

C ott" t J.

Fd egt n 1

rebr r 1 Cdn Div

gt

II

rod fc y Corp~ to c n-

et u r lt~ c mm nd.

• ThJ •••F.... 1_ t uct.l ...u_ r tjl ... rcl ...e cu tJr • c!d d

t 1 U~C r thfj .o •. ,.C. end t.r e 1)(;r u(1 ... (r ~J1• .';> nt ~dby LyaaDder rmy-co-~?~r t10n ~"'cra1't) WId r Cdn Corp". ,u both

10 and 11 r11, tl~ ~1 n. r •• ud tu r fr~ G TICK

11 c••• ~•. art, ~. 00 n (1.5 six 1~ s) frum ~Iil.~ to

ngL go 1n t ctic' 1 ....c nn 1s nc f c. tu. nemy' s":'c.e. JO 11

....pr1.t.., thrt.:c J.)lb.ne .. r un G T rCK ..cr to 00 ~()nt-" .' -yin;;

hie e llumber Elb n Britl&h •.••C W11t.

d

ougho c ...Jl .....nued ... lJuth t

f1cultleb rl~lng :rom tha

Qvln ..........UJ. '-' n u ...ly, rw

FOi "'I:, 0 • m minor t, ffie

f ct tlut ritLh f ru Lens r

the It''d guns of 1 Fd rl~gt., .C••

}'~4.D l.n U .l

•111.order••

II

Bera.e ara parmitted to read the Divlalon'a opuretlon

!beaa .era to the attect that 1 OdD Int Bda aa to deliver

•

Ua attack the tolio.1III "'1'II1JII at a zero bOW' tentatively tked

at 04411 bra. !be bl'llad~'a a.....bly eraa • a to be~ WOOD _

IAS~ KOATIILY - S'rOIIB CROSS - LAUOII'1'OI LODOBJ 110 ..a to be 1D tb1a•area by 1800 bra. .. '>ad ~1Mt a_ l_ta ot 110 8Ilter1lll tb1a

area .1th plent)' ot 101M to apare. It .aa to IIU'Ch 1n to 1ta t_

1III-UP plaoa (wb1cb ..a ALCIftOI - ALJ'RIftOI) u aOClll aa U ..a

dark. '1'be attack .. to be &Uppol'te4 by the lat aDd 8r'd P1eld. lith

AraJ hald aDd. let ~1_ Bel~ta."a.C.A. (!be repol't on the

axarc1aa - a.. belo•• para•.811 -"DOt......10 1lIIa tU.. tlald ragta.

ere to lay d_ a ban.... aDd the 1IIId1_ relt. to 'covar the ax-

poaed tlUlk'.) II OdD Int Bda. 1n reaane.... to be 1D 1ta aaa_bl:J

area by 0800 bra OIl li Apr.

18. OIl leav1Dl BAS~ KOATHLY .e obaerved a LyaaDd.er alrcratt rly-

1DI lo~ aDd. evidently closely ob.en1Dl the aaaOllbly araa ot 1 OdD

Int Bde. 1'b1a.e aaalllll8d to·1l? ODe ot the planes trOll OOIIIAJI en-

laled 1n "~ac R" trOll the en~'a a1de (para. 8 aboVe). We ra~

to LAUGUOI (ala1D paaa1Dl the R.C.R.) aDd cODt1Dued via HOLIIKS HILL

aDd CHlLVIIGTOI (1D the vlc1D1ty or which "e pa~aed 2 l"d Re~.

R.C.A.) aDd oD tbl'OUIb RIPB. BeyOlld tb1a villale we CUl8 upon the

R.k.R. (I.G.) or a considerable part ot it. halted b,y the roads1da

on eltber a1da ot the Pall ay croaa1Dl near Il!JSHI LOCOIl.

17. We no. r.turned to GLDDIl. here (about 1800 bl'a) •• tllUllll

II l"d Coy. R.C.B., at .ork rapl&c1Dl the auppoaedly bOIIbed· br1dl•

• 1th a ...li bolt luder br1dla leeated ~lately to the ••st.

Brlladlar HER~ZBBRG (Chief llac1DHr•.Canad1_ Corps) .. atcb1nl,

aDd. "~or-Qenara1 Pearkea arrived shortly attar us. An 1lac1Deal'

_pir. ("~or ••SIR) told _ that the ~ob aa procead1Dl rather

too slo.ly. OIl this attar, a.. Appellllu ·A·. para. 12.

18. Dr1v1Dl baok to LauptoD, •• tcnlnd that tha 48!11 BIOIILA1ID-.s

bad arrived, aDd. lOa bad SOll8 ooDVaraat101l th several ott1cer..

1D~1d1Dl "~or J .S.P. AIlIS'1'ROIIO. tb8D returned to LIlWIllI, aDd.

• ena1ted .. B.Q. ot the d1reot1DC .tart ot tbe .Drob. 1& tbe

CrOG IIot.l. Br1sad1er lllDlPllBY (B.O.S., Op.) .. act1DC a. D1I'eo-

tor lD the ab._. ot the Cor,. C:...II'... Lt. lllWU (L.O.) la"u twtlMr lDtOl'UUOII on tbe. te ot the 8X8ro1H, &lid .UII••ted

Ulat U we lD the no1D1*7 ot HI" AIID ana (on tbe ALPRIllTOI _

SUPOIlI) road) at aboat oaa bra the DUt '1IOJ'IdIIc .. -U ca' aload ,,1.. ot tbe attaclt.18. W1th thU lD n... .. beck thrOlllb BlDDJ_a &0 H-0_1," the crO&ll. 1lIr19S111 pad nBLB P.I1lIt &lid thrOIIIb ALPRI8-

'fOJI w1th tile lreat ••• ot .. DClW8 CID __ r1&h', .. tollond ..

road up OIl &0 tbe rldca at HIOB AlII) ana, a polDt wh101l 0' .pd. a-pStio'" ,,1_. tIMD dl'O'pa4 dowa lDto SB&POIID, &lid drO'N

011 alO111 the Cba_l ooa.. thrOlllb IIDIIAYBII &lid PKACBllAYBII &0

ROftIIIOD&III.

'fIIJI CBADBL COAft

20. \l'Il1.... 117 tir.t 111.... ot the oout ot the Cb.IID.l lD

thi••ar. ...dl••• to 1Ia7; it f1ear.~ arb ot the 8DX1.'7 lD

.hioh IaclUld has l1..d dllJ'lDI tbe pa." 7.... Dum.n w1re 1. al-ao.t ."1')'1111.", ~ aohlDe-11IIl pe.te ot "ar1ou t7... aDd d.cr".ot .tr/tDIth (.... of thea "erT oar.tlI1lJr OOllC.aled) are n_rou

...... there ar. h1Jh clltt. t1w•• p"paraUoaa are s...lIIIat 1•••

lD ov1d_., but aber_ 1aDd1DC oparaUoll. would appear &0 be

praoUoable overT poss1bl. preoa1lt1011 Ita. beeD taIreD. Al..... the

••atront ot tbe lar,. town ,of BRIOB'fOJI .1re 1& oontlD_ aDd there

ar•••CUOII p'o.t. at short 1Dtel'Yals, aDd I u told that tbe

BRIOIft'OW ,10" haft beeD cut.

21. BRIOB'fOII, .. h\I4 hRMr, ~"'•. " ~ot •••to kee, up ._ li11&ht appearanc. of 1&10'7 lD sp1te ot tbe....

•d1cap. aDd the exi.tence iIC a curt.. roaulaUoa U1r1DC all _

author1zed pal'8ODa to be ott the 'l'lIl\ _ 22110 111'••

22. .. sl.,t at a ••n hotel lD aOllIlOD&III, aDd 0lIl' &l..p ..

al tiM. d1. - ClDDe by tbe 100al WU'II1IlI .1reD (.MoIl

•,

a.peaNd \0 bll 100awel ~laM17 "talde ow lDdoe) a..-1111a

til "all olear", aDd on a Ual' 000 si0D8 by tbe aOlllld ot boa",

__ at blola bo PIId red \0 t.u .a1'7 010... a... \old

tbat ~ bad M17 bad 0 1 I'alila boabilt&. 2M a1l

•

•

II

II. '!ben appUra to be DO Deed or raproduo1Dl at l8llltll tile

oonclual_ or thi. report on the lel.on. or tbe eurolee, al tile

report 1t.eU wlll be .n1la1lle to tbe tutve hiltor1... '!be

toUow1Dl polata, howeYv, are aoMd.

ll'P. !be a••_dl Oroap a.llp" tba taU (para. 't,a1loYe) or 1-1DI tba 11IW or tba Irta taU ... ouri..01110 q1I1akb' 1114 .tt101eau,, aDd tba rift!' ... __.. dur1Dl tba

boarl or 'arllDa••• I

28. til r.lpaot to tile _,••10 of II IDt l1li. Gp to tba DOD8

(peru. 't aDd la, abon) 1_ 1. ralJ'ked tbet tiler.... baI'e17 tba

tor till. to be tteoUd bator. daJ'l1Ibt, had MW)tbhll lloaa .

wltbout a bltolli • AI 110 .a., tllere .re ....1_ dolaT., I~

or bleb ere a.oidab1a l , aDd tbe lid. Op d14 DOt 1.10 suftlcl..t.tir. IUPport OIl to tile DO 8 "bat... about 0800 br.". "III tile

eiro_tuIoel, 1t 18 probable that tbe e~ would ba•• attacked

It rirlt 11lbt aDd tIIIt tbe Dortllel'll qe of tha 00_ 0Il1d

ba.. beaD 10110."

29. '!be report conclud•• tIIIt traft-le cootrcil .....eU haDdl...

til .pedal 1' to tbe _. 1ftto tbe aa _bly ar.a, 1t 1''''

-era, 11ha1' DO cODle.10101l, 1114, .. l'.porMd b7 400 8qD••C.A.F. who opera_1DI on the m : II .14., tIIera 81'1 t ••,

it UII', lood t.aJ'1.tl pr.lenMd to the air." (cr. abolr., para. 18.)In I-al, tile report c.-..nta, -'!be eODtrol or traftle dur1lll

tbe.. _ I to tbe concentra101on ea, UI4 00 to tbe ..._bly .....abo.ed tbet tIIlI O~I'I101on bal been ...tared by tbe 01.111_.-

1lO. In tIIlI eOlllklC101oo 1t 18 PI' per to 1'_1t that bil. la

tbe ..... of 0 a101_ "~or Oenoag aDd I ... DCt!I'DI rea.bUDI

tbe bad trart1c-~... blcb be taltm plao. 1ft "'1'1111' ezercl..1

(... IQ' Ileporta 101. 11 aDd ).

31. '!be rollow1Jll co_los UPCIl tbe actual a1:taolt are repro-

duo'"

9. '!bot 01. dap1or-t dur1Dl tbe baurl 'OtdarllDaa., l1li1 tbe UD1t. read)' 1ft tbeirtorUq-VP po.l101C1l1 b7 z.I'O, bleb WI. rlxadtor 066li brl. 'lb11 _10 ... well oarr1"01110. .

10•.. '!be attaclt 110••1 lutt.reel tr. _taia

• •11111ta 10.1111 d1r. UOIl. St.p., t"Oulhtto be adequata. bad been taIteJl to pre....tth1... aDd 110 1. pro ble that 110 .ould11010 ba•• occurred bad _ r.al art1UU')'.upport been t1red.

112. 'Da. to.llowiJII Ct; •••Ilt. on _ 0111181._. Group. hiGh

wa. a •• t ...tar. or W .• _01••• a)' alM1 aoted.II.- tut tllat tIIan are DOW two K.O.

b 1ra Corps fIooopa _bleB tIIa e-.JMIv.C&!I8CU... Corps to aUot &II add1U~ lIDto .aoh db181_ tor operat1Cl1l8. tid.__ lID 1. IIOI'8al17 lDol-..s 111 the •JIecoa Op :111... to _ D1.1s1Cl11a1 C..-II&Il4v a .eW. torc. wh1Gh

hboth

111 tSM ..." .pao.. 0&11 be ued.e aheador tM D1Y1a101l. It baa coos1derabl.,0_ ot ,alllt., 1nt'01'll&t101l aDd or 1'.-at.tiulaaL but 18 at pre....t haaperad !ITdUflculV ot cOIltrol. C> 7 .... ot tMcroup 18 be.t plaea4 in tM baDd. otO.C.. s.o.. lID.

presumably'Da. ret._. 1n "two LG. b in Corp. Troop.- 1. to _ taot tllat

11\

1'IIB CAJIBROI BIGIILAII1lERB OF OftA 1 (M.O.) are expeoted in _ Un1ted

K1l11doa .ery shortly, troa IcelaDd (ot. II,J Beport 10. 4). I \IIId.r-

.taDd that on the arr1val or _ !h1rd Canad1au D1.1a1on th1JI 111111081U be attached to 110 aa d.1Yb1Cl11a1 ..ch1zw-1Wl battal1on.

33. 1D _ utter ot a~r oo-operaUOII. the tollow1lll p?in1o. a)'

be lltint10nad. 18 re.peots _ ll8e ot _ C.S.B.C. (... II,J Beporta.

Ho•• U aDd 13), "C

•10

H -."or a.-a baa ktDd17 read tbb port 1& draft ,,1'11 aYl. to tbe .U_S-UOIl ot po..lble .pOl'a

~'fl'

•

•

•

•

• • (C 0 P Y)EXERCISE "HARE"

IIOTES FOR CCNFERENCE.

f{ (1'0It,. \.Jo. u•

AnL"!l'x A

1. OBJECT - Recapture SOUTH DOWilS

To acccmplish this, must

~a~ secure right flankb secure northern edge of DOWNSc concentrate in ·safetyd Attack before enemy could be reinforced or

develo» defences.

2. FACTORS - Time. Ground. luJmun1 tion.

3. ACTION OF RECCE GP

Wss it necessary to send RMR(MG) as well as 4 Recce Bn.

4. ATTEllPl' TO SECURE NORTHERN ErnE OF D07IliS

2 Inf Bde did not actually start reinforcing theDOWNS Bn until 0715hrs and did not ccmplete until 0930hrs.

Reaaons for delay:- Slow StartBattle procedure not followed.Difficulties of debuasing at 30

V.T.M. If whole of bde could not reach DOVINS before daybreak,might portion have been sent shead.

Arty direct to posn of readiness.

5. INFORMATIONVital importance of:

Gaining and passing of information not good.Tps not tactically inquisitive.

Patrolling.

Organised observations at O.Ps to keep Div contin-ually informed of enemy dispositions and of ground.

6. CONCENTRATION & ASSEMBLY

(a) Generally very satisfactory.speeding. Debuasing and fwd move

One or two minor cases otperformed efficiently.

•

(b) 2 Inf Bde carried out quick deviation round rd blockwithout delaying the coIn but no attempt made to repairdamage and block not reported.

(c) If.a new area is entered in the dark, the hour of firstlight must be used to conceal men and vehicles be:fore hoa tileaircraft arrive •

(d) Use of camouflage nets; must break outline of vehicle andcast a different shadow.

(e) Tracks into Sides must be controlled otherwise become traps;

(f) Fsilure to establish traffic control past convoya whenhalted still general weakness. There were a tew instances ofcutting in and double banking.

- 2 -

FALSE REPORTS - BEDDINGllAU attack launched on false reportand without verification.

left flank andsxtremely difficult

route from FIRLE BZACON. BetterMight be more strongly defended.

(b) Alternativelonger approaches.though

gROUND SELECTED FOR THE ATTACK(a) Shortest route, protected on

defiladed from right beyond DEllTON HILL butcountry.

B.

9. NATURE OF ARTY SUPPORT.(a) Barrage uses large emount of smn; if (in?)

fact 1st, 2nd lines and Corps dumps used. Some smn boundto be wasted.

(b) Barrage takes long time to prepare. The Bhours allowed after receipt of ordsrs by C.R.A. proved insuffi-cient. All guns were 1n pasn but barrage arrangements werenot complete. 2 to 3 hours required by fd regts from timetracings arrive.

( c.) BlARA working in crowded roan under greatdifficulty.

(d) Had accurate infonnation about the enemy beenavailable 1n time, concentration might have achieved the objectand enabled the Div to attack on a wider front with smallerexpenditure of amn.

10. INFANTRYOrders must get down to pI and sec camds.Start Line must be clear.Use of compass.Formations during the attack, keep control as longas possible.Objectives must be known and dispositions on arrival.Use of carriers.Danger of loosing (losing?] the barrage.Reporting progress and signals to aircraft.

n. MG.Daylight recce of posns to be occupied by night

essential.Water.

12. ENGRS7~ brs elapsed before new bridge at GLYNDE was readY.

Traffic must be diverted well back. A.A. protection.All work is against time.Bridging lorries close to site and not concealed.

Screens to hinder observation. Stores in open.

13. gg

•

(8) Cannot produce any results either recce of enemy,contact with own tps or close support bombing before sunrise.

(b) Arrangements must be made to deliver Tac.R. reportspranptly. Areas to be photographed must be defined accurately•Several cO~ies will be required.

(c) Displaying of indicators, personnel and unit.

14. SIGNALS(a) Volume of traffic to be sent by D.R. bound to be

heavy. As far as possible, D.Rs should run on properly drawn upschedule. Special D.R. being reserved for really urgent messages.No unnecessary addressees should be included on distributionlists.

(b) Signalmasters MUST keep staffs inforned of NONdelivery of messages.

(c) Signal security.

etc.

16.

- :5 -

CONCEALMENT.Vehicles assembled 1n a quarry were very visible

against white background.Camp fires were very pronounced in Bome areas.Regular :form of' windbreaks and movement of men,

vehicles on skyline would have given pesn away.

BATTLE DISCIPLINE( a) Very considerable improvement necessary if'

heavy casualties are to be avoided. A man' B chances ofsurvival on the battlefield will largely depend on thestandard of' personal efficiency he has reached before thebattle.

Junior Officers and N.e.Os show a seriouslack of sense of responsibility and lack of control.Senior officers must exercise more supervision on the ground.

Keep the best qualities of the citizen orcivilian soldier, discard those NOW that do not tend tomilitary efficiency.

(b) Duty roster - muat be drawn up and enforced.In many cases all ranks were awake at the same

time; there were cases where all were asleep.Sentries (air and ground) must be detailed with

officer and/or N.C.O. i/c'and proper reliefs provided. Sleepand meals must be controlled.

An enemy patrol could have ~obl1ized vehicles,

General alertness required.

•

17. STAFF DUTIESReliefsLocation statesKeep orders short.

18. TRAINING(a) Arty - Weekly preparations of progranrnes for

barrages and concentrations always against time.Preparation of amn by night.

(b) Inf - Following a barrage.ObservationPatrols.

(c) M.G. - Night occupation and sustained fireprogramme.

(d) All Arms - Traffic control when convoy halted•