novel reconfigurable silicon physical unclonable functions yingjie lao and keshab k. parhi...
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Novel Reconfigurable Silicon Novel Reconfigurable Silicon Physical Unclonable FunctionsPhysical Unclonable Functions
Yingjie Lao and Keshab K. ParhiYingjie Lao and Keshab K. Parhi
Department of Electrical and Computer Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringEngineering
University of Minnesota, Twin CitiesUniversity of Minnesota, Twin Cities
April 11April 11thth, 2011, 2011
FDSCPS 2011
Outline
Summary and Future Work4.
Experimental Results3.
Solutions2.
Introductions1.
Motivation
“It is estimated that as much as 10% of all high-tech products sold globally are counterfeit which leads to a conservative estimate of $100 billion of revenue loss.”
[Guajardo et al, 2008]
Several invasive and semi-invasive physical tampering methods have been developed, which made it possible to learn the ROM- based keys through attacks and compromise
systems by using counterfeit copies of the secret information.
Introduction
Physical Unclonable Functions(PUFs) -a function which is an innovative circuit primitive that
exploits the unique intrinsic uncontrollable physical features which are introduced by manufacturing process variations.
Physical Objects
Process Variations
Unpredictable Behavior
Easy to Evaluate
Hard to Clone
PUFPUFPUFPUF
Anti-counterfeiting marks for ICs
Previous Work
Ravikanth et. al proposed the first PUF in literature in 2001. After that, several research groups have developed a variety types of PUFs. At the same time, commercialization of the PUFs also has led to some startups.
S-RAM PUF[Guajardo et al., Su et al. 2007]
MUX Silicon PUF[Gassend et al. 2002]
FPGA "butterfly“ PUF[Kumar et al. 2008]
Ring Oscillator Silicon PUF[Edward et al. 2002]
Problem for Static PUF
Reconfigurable PUF: updatable
Challenge-like
Challenge-like
Vulnerable to attacks & Poor performance.
The frequencies of ring oscillators can be evaluated by attackers
Reconfigurable RO Silicon PUF
Hard to implement: lower level design detail, symmetrical routing
FPGA based
Reconfigurability for PUF is desirable:1.To updatable authentication keys2.To improve the security, as we can reconfigure the challenge-response behaviors
Outline
Summary and Future Work4.
Experimental Results3.
Solutions2.
Introductions1.
SolutionsNon-FPGA based methods
1.Reconfigurable Challenge- Response Behaviors
PUFn
(Challenge) Response
2. Reconfigurable PUF Circuits
Method One (I)
LFSR (Linear Feedback
Shift Register)
Hash Function
Pre-process Challenge
- To generate new sets of challenge bits, while ensure the security
Method One (II)
Output Recombination
Similar idea used in prior Ring Oscillator PUF
No correlation amongdifferent outputs
Method Two (I)
Reconfigurable Feed-Forward PUFWhy feed-forward?- Add nonlinearity into PUF, make it hard to model, improve the security
Types of feed-forward?1. Feed-forward Cascade2. Feed-forward Overlap3. Feed-forward Separate
[Lee et al, 2004]
Method Two (I)
Reconfigurable Feed-Forward PUF- Can be configured among the 3 different types of
feed-forward structures
Method Two (II)
MUX and DeMUX PUF- Can choose to skip some stages instead of
propagating the rising edge signal successively
Outline
Summary and Future Work4.
Experimental Results3.
Solutions2.
Introductions1.
Experiment
Methodology-SPICE Simulation-65nm technology-Parameter Model from SSTA
(Statistical Static Timing Analysis)
Measurements: -Security: Inter-Chip Variations -Reliability: Intra-Chip Variations -Reconfigurability
Result I
StructuresInter-chip Variation Intra-chip Variation
Max Min Max Avg
Non-feed-forward
59% 22% 13% 5.8%
Feed-forward Overlap
66% 27% 15% 8.7%
Feed-forward Cascade
64% 25% 20% 10.7%
Feed-forward Separate
65% 26% 17% 9.9%
Reconfigurable Feed-forward
65% 25% 19% 10.3%
MUX and DeMUX 57% 23% 16% 7.1%
*Variation is the Hamming Distance of two digital responses divided by the total bit length ( challenge and response both have 100 bits in our simulation)
Result II
StructuresReconfigurability
Max Avg Min
Challenge LFSR 44% 34.6% 28%
Challenge Hash 42% 28.3% 19%
Output Recombination
57% 38.9% 25%
Reconfigurable Feed-forward
47% 32.4% 22%
MUX and DeMUX 33% 24.7% 13%
*Reconfigurability is the Hamming Distance of two digital responses, which we generated by only altering the configure data but fixing the challenge bits, then divided by the total bit length ( Used to test the randomness )
Outline
Summary and Future Work4.
Experimental Results3.
Solutions2.
Introductions1.
Summary
Problem: reconfigurable PUFNovel non-FPGA based methods: - Reconfigurable CRPs - Reconfigurable PUF circuits
Simulation results validated proposed structures
Also take the reliability and the security into consideration:
- Reconfigurable feed-forward MUX PUF has the best performance!
Future Work
Strong authentication scheme for reconfigurable PUFs
Examine the properties of reconfigurable PUFs by mathematical methods
Improve the reliability and the security of reconfigurable PUFs
LOGO
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