Working Group on

Climate, Nuclear, and Security Affairs

Nuclear Energy Developments, Climate Change, and Security in Egypt

MAY 2019

AUTHORSAndrea Rezzonico

Christine Parthemore

WORKING GROUP ONCLIMATE, NUCLEAR, AND SECURITY AFFAIRS

May 2019

Nuclear Energy Developments, Climate Change, and Security in Egypt

Cover Photo:With President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt looking on, ministers from each country shake hands after El Dabaa nuclear power plant discussions. Russian state atomic eneRgy coRpoRation (Rosatom)

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table of contents

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

EGYPT’S ENERGY NEEDS & PLANS

NUCLEAR PLANS IN CONTEXT:SECURITY, CLIMATE, AND OTHER TRENDS

RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

NOTES

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key RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States should work to renew its past leadership in international nuclear affairs, including in promoting safety and security of civil nuclear programs and helping to shore up the nonproliferation regime. This can include:

• Encouraging countries such as Egypt not to pursue domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. As one example, the United States can play a stronger role in exploring new multilateral fuel cycle arrangements.

• Developing a new set of standards and methods for how it will pursue international atomic energy assistance, including via a rejuvenation of its nonproliferation programs.

• Beginning to develop an approach to the renewal of the U.S.-Egypt 123 Agreement, which will expire at the end of 2021.

• Helping to strengthen the global web of nonproliferation and export control systems by:

• Extending the New START treaty with Russia.

• Making credible efforts to shape future arms control agreements.

• Tailoring its nuclear weapons modernization plans to indicate its seriousness regarding its NPT obligations.

• Quietly pushing for universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention (which Egypt has not yet ratified), and possibly as a Middle East chemical weapons free zone as a step toward a region free of weapons of mass destruction.

Egypt---and other nations and international entities assisting in its nuclear energy program--- have a responsibility to prepare for the full range of effects climate change could have on the nation, including direct and indirect effects on any nuclear facilities Egypt builds in the future. This should include:

• Forecasting and planning for increasing flooding around coastal sites

• Modeling and planning for the effects of extreme temperatures on nuclear-related infrastructure and personnel

Government and non-governmental entities should offer to share methods for developing comprehensive climate security assessments with countries such as Egypt. This can include the use of advanced modeling and artificial intelligence-based systems that can help understand the convergence of climate, security, and sociopolitical dynamics.

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Egypt is moving forward with its long-held plans to develop its nuclear energy sector, starting with the El Dabaa nuclear plant that is scheduled to begin construction in 2020. As these plans move forward, concern is rising about Egypt’s readiness to safely operate its nuclear sites in the coming decades, manage and store nuclear materials securely for potentially much longer, and maintain the peaceful purposes of the program in the long term.

These concerns must be viewed in the context of an array of regional and global trends. In a 2005 speech upon receiving the Nobel Prize, former Egyptian diplomat and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei spoke of challenges such as environmental degradation, armed conflict, poverty, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction as “closely connected and interrelated.” He detailed some of these threats and stated that “With this ‘big picture’ in mind, we can better understand the changing landscape in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.”1 His comments clearly extend beyond proliferation risks, to those of security, safety, and stability as well.

This report explores some of this interrelated “big picture” in which Egypt is currently advancing its nuclear energy plans. It begins with an overview of Egypt’s growing energy needs and nuclear energy plans. It then explores several key dynamics in the security environment, including domestic and regional pressures, and climate and environmental challenges. Only by examining these issues in tandem can we begin to understand the fuller landscape in which Egypt’s nuclear energy program is being developed.

Introduction

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Egypt’s Energy Needs & Plans

Today, Egypt has expansive energy needs. Some models project an annual growth rate of 4.46% for electricity demand until mid-century.2 In 2016, oil and natural gas contributed to over 90% of Egypt’s total annual energy consumption, making it the largest consumer of both resources in Africa.3 Cairo is working to phase out gas and electricity subsidies to help curb the country’s energy demands. The challenges created by this situation are likely to continue to plague the government in the future, as Egypt’s population is projected to significantly grow throughout the rest of the 21st century.

Egypt’s energy relations with its near neighbors continue to evolve. Following insurgent attacks in the Sinai in 2012, Egypt was ordered to pay Israel Electric Corporation more than $1 billion over a failed natural gas export deal. Representatives from both states are still negotiating the final payment amount. Regardless of this dispute, Tel Aviv has signaled its long-term interest in pursuing energy deals. Last year, an Israeli company signed a $15 billion deal to transport its offshore gas to Egyptian export terminals.4

Taking advantage of its strategic location, Egypt controls the Suez Canal and Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline which have historically given it critical influence over regional energy trade. As the chief operator, Cairo collects shipment fees on north and southbound oil and liquified natural gas supplies.

The country’s domestic energy production is evolving, while it also continues to meet limitations. Recent developments are feeding Egypt’s ambition to become a major natural gas trader and exporter. In 2015, it discovered what has become one of the largest offshore natural gas sources in the Mediterranean. Although hydropower accounts for 7% of Egypt’s power generation, there is little room for expansion as the government has almost entirely tapped the Nile’s production capacity.5 At the same time, its upstream neighbor Ethiopia is in initial stages of hydroelectric development and is currently constructing the multi-billion dollar Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. These plans have alarmed Egyptian officials as Egypt’s water security and economy are extremely reliant on the resource.

Egypt struggles with widespread blackouts due to increasing temperatures, rising demand, and deteriorating infrastructure. In light of these issues, the Egyptian government is increasingly pursuing alternative energy sources. Its goal is to have renewables contribute at least 20% of its domestic energy needs by 2022.6

As one influence on its energy plans, Egypt signed and ratified the Paris climate agreement that aims to cap global temperature increase at less than 2°C. Egypt’s Nationally Determined Contribution (a document signatory countries submitted outlining how they plan to work toward the 2°C target) notes that the country will suffer many effects of climate change, including related to its energy sector. As one of many measures listed for its greenhouse gas mitigation efforts, Egypt committed to seek “new generations of nuclear power,” stating:

“Using advanced generations of nuclear reactors could be important to fill the gapbetween reducing fossil fuel dependence and the deployment of renewable energy. In addition, nuclear energy can be an important contributor in the future energy mix to stabilize CO2 levels as energy demand continues to grow.”7

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Nuclear Energy

Egypt’s nuclear energy program first began in 1955, though it did not advance significantly until recent years. As for many countries, its program began with research reactors mostly designed for training, experiments, and production of radioisotopes. The Soviet Union launched Egypt’s first research reactor in 1961, with a second provided by Argentina that opened in 1997.8

Egypt originally selected El Dabaa as its proposed first nuclear power plant site, about 170 kilometers west of Alexandria along the Mediterranean coast, in 1980. Progress staggered around this time and through the 1980s due to the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, lack of financing, expanding natural gas production, and other factors. In 2007, then-President Hosni Mubarak renewed plans to build a nuclear power plant, and Egypt proceeded for several years with site characterization and early technical assessments.9 Since 2007, Egypt has also worked to update its legal and regulatory frameworks to comply with international guidance for countries expanding their nuclear activities.

After delays during the Arab Spring, in 2013 Egypt renewed regular nuclear energy engagement with Russia, including discussions on the provision of nuclear reactors as well as financing and other related support. Egypt centered once again on the El Dabaa site, and the two countries signed a cooperation agreement in 2015 that continued to advance their intended supplier-buyer relationship. In late 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin made strategic visits to Egypt, Turkey, and Syria that included nuclear energy cooperation in the first two stops. In Cairo, Putin held talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on their countries’ increasing military and economic cooperation, and their teams inked a $21 billion agreement to move forward on the El Dabaa project.10 Based on current plans, Russia’s support to Egypt’s nuclear energy program will likely extend across plant development, fuel supplies, personnel training, financing, and more.

Egyptian and Russian officials conducting an El Dabaa site visit in 2018. egypt's nucleaR poweR plants authoRity

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All signs indicate that the El Dabaa project is moving forward. In January 2019, Daily News Egypt reported that support facilities (for utilities, water, etc.) for forthcoming nuclear plant construction were now completed at the site.11 In March 2019 Egypt’s regulatory authority issued the site’s permit, an important step toward licensing and construction.12

Egypt is also progressing in its expected consultations between the IAEA and Egyptian nuclear authorities. The IAEA conducted a Site and External Events Design review at El Dabaa in January 2019, which praised much of the site analysis work Egypt has conducted to date and offered recommendations for further safety enhancements.13 A more extensive process, the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review, is planned for El Dabaa for October 2019. This review covers 19 baseline preparedness topics including security, safety, legal and regulatory adequacy, emergency preparedness plans, environmental protection, grid capacity, and other issues critical to a country’s readiness to build nuclear power reactors. The IAEA and Egyptian government will have the results of this evaluation, though it may or may not be publicly released.

While the timeline for the project has shifted (as is normal for most countries developing new large-scale nuclear power plants, especially for the first time), the El Dabaa plant is currently planned to begin construction in 2020 and be operational by the end of that decade. Egypt also still appears to be exploring additional sites for further expanding its nuclear energy capacity in the future, including via discussions with China and South Korea.

Northern Egypt. The area of the El Dabaa site is at left. climate centRal “suRging seas,” 2019, http://sealevel.climatecentRal.oRg/

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It is important to understand the broader context in which Egypt’s nuclear energy program is taking shape. Some of the many important trends include a continuing consolidation of authoritarian power in Egypt, a tense security environment domestically and regionally, continual stress in global nonproliferation norms and structures, challenging environmental and climate issues, and more.

Traditional Stability and Security Issues

Egypt’s internal stability has vacillated quite a bit in recent decades, though its fragility in the face of stress has long been concerning to many. Currently, the Fragile States Index ranks it in the “warning” category based on social, economic, political, and other indicators.14

Nuclear Plans in Context: Security, Climate, and Other Trends

Celebrations in Tahrir Square after Mubarak's resignation. February 2011 . Jonathan Rashad / flickR

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Since the height of hope for a transition to greater democracy after the Arab Spring, Egypt’s leaders have once again consolidated and elongated their reigns. The country democratically elected Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood as president in 2012. He tried to enshrine the longevity of his power before being overthrown in a 2013 military coup led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Now president since the coup, an April 2019 referendum granted el-Sisi further powers over the judicial and legislative branches of government and extended presidential terms to allow him to remain in power until 2030. Free expression and public-facing opposition have declined during this time, including diminishment of press freedoms and thousands jailed.15

The character of violence in Egypt has shifted since the Arab Spring. In 2013, attacks became better organized and political in nature.16 According to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database, there were 1,992 incidents in Egypt between January 2013 and December 2017. These included attacks against the police, military, educational centers, businesses, and tourism sites. In the past five years, 66% of all domestic attacks have specifically targeted security forces.17

In attempts to exert control, Egyptian authorities have periodically renewed a national state of emergency. The current one was enacted following Islamic State-affiliated bombings of two churches. It permits el-Sisi’s administration to implement the “necessary measures to confront the dangers and funding of terrorism, safeguard security across the whole country, and protect public and private property and citizens.”18 This tool gives the government sweeping authority over citizens and the media by utilizing questionable and, some argue, repressive tactics. However, this approach has not necessarily diminished Egypt’s terrorism problems. Local militant groups continue to recruit members both from Egypt and abroad.19

Egypt must also grapple with the security risks of its broader neighborhood, as well as trends within certain areas that could affect regional stability. Libya and Sudan, for example, have undergone extreme political upheaval since 2011. Following Muammar Gaddafi’s fall from power and subsequent death, Libya has been plagued by great instability. Rival government factions are battling for influence while jihadist militias have flourished under the anarchic conditions of many areas. In this same time period, Sudan split into two seperate states after years of violence, civil war, and conflict-driven internal migration. In April 2019, the Sudanese armed forces staged a coup and ousted President Omar al-Bashir after months of widespread protests, and years of atrocities committed by his government.

Some parts of North Africa and the Middle East are seeing relative stability, greater potential for economic growth and democratization, and the benefits of investment in their growing populations. However, the region is also clearly experiencing countless cases of conflict, warfare, natural disasters, famine, population displacement, and other stressors. It is also home to many trends that hold the potential to be extremely stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on how they unfold. This includes increasingly widespread international land leasing and acquisition deals by which foreign companies make use of territory in places such as Ethiopia and Sudan for food production or other purposes---often to tap into the freshwater resources of the host countries.20

The region is also greatly influenced by the behavior of external powers. While Russia’s relationships from Syria to Iran draw frequent concern, it is also working to extend economic and political influence further around the Mediterranean and Red Seas.21 Its cooperation with countries from Eritrea and Sudan, to Egypt and Turkey, includes potential trade in nuclear energy technologies and military

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equipment among other things. Furthermore, defense and economic cooperation among many of these countries---and between them and Gulf states---is creating the impression of a new strategic bloc that would certainly influence Egypt’s behavior regarding its regional security environment.

Still, U.S. influence has not completely diminished. Although both the Obama and Trump administrations publicly withheld aid from el-Sisi because of myriad conflicts, including human rights concerns and North Korea associations, the United States continues to support Egypt. Congress agreed to appropriate almost $1.5 billion in total bilateral assistance for fiscal year 2019.22 Nevertheless, U.S. defense support has been declining. Over the last several years, Egypt has increasingly turned to France, Germany, and others to fulfill its large arms requests.23

Nuclear Issues

As these types of regional security dynamics unfold, the broader international order established after World War II is undergoing monumental changes. This is especially true for the international nonproliferation regime, which has seen significant strain in recent years from Russia-U.S. nuclear arms racing, the likely end of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and brazen use of chemical weapons by Syria, North Korea, and Russia---among other factors.

Egypt has long been an active participant in nonproliferation fora, though its full participation in related conventions is incomplete. Egypt is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), though it has neither signed nor ratified the Additional Protocol that would extend the ability of the IAEA to ensure Egypt’s nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes.24 It is one of just four countries that have not signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, alongside Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan.25

Since the 1970s Egypt has taken a leading role in annually advocating for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, later expanded to a push for a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This concept flowed into the NPT Review Conferences (held every five years) in 1995, when a resolution was adopted calling on all states in the region to establish such a WMD-free zone.26 Little progress has been made, and it has become a serious block to progress in all subsequent Review Conferences.

The issue came to a head at the 2018 UN General Assembly’s First Committee session. Among other steps, Egypt submitted a draft resolution again calling for the establishment of a regional nuclear-weapon free zone and pushing to mandate a UN meeting to this end.27 A final resolution adopted requires the UN Secretary General to convene a one-week meeting in 2019 on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.28 The measure passed with 3 voting against (including the United States and Israel) and 71 abstentions. That meeting is scheduled for November 2019.

These moves are seen by many as blatantly designed to isolate Israel as much as promote nonproliferation goals. To others, they are simply a formal manifestation of the region’s continuing security dilemmas, among both countries within the area and active outside nations such as the United States and Russia. How all of these Middle East-focused events in nuclear diplomacy transpire will strongly influence the strength of the NPT and the broader future of the world’s nonproliferation order.

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Many countries in the region certainly have legitimate electricity needs, and some of those exploring nuclear energy are also doing so as a mechanism for actively asserting the NPT’s promotion of civil nuclear technology. This pursuit raises the importance of ensuring countries’ nuclear activities remain peaceful over many decades. For its own activities, early in Egypt’s nuclear energy program, the country explored nuclear energy-related activities that would give it potential pathways to develop nuclear weapons if its leaders chose to do so. This included exploring domestic uranium sourcing, experimenting with fuel production, and an attempt in the 1960s to purchase a large reactor capable of producing plutonium at a rate that would be useful for a nuclear weapons program. Exporting countries courted for assistance included the United States, Russia, China, and West Germany.29

The early- to mid-60s were the years thought to be Egypt’s most active in hedging toward nuclear weapons capabilities. Many observers took Egypt’s 1980 ratification of the NPT as a firm sign of its commitment not to pursue them. At this stage the country would have long work of ramping up the human and technical capabilities needed to pursue nuclear weapons if such a political decision were made. Egypt’s official policy is to have an open fuel cycle (though whether that will entail significant domestic fuel cycle capabilities isn’t clear). Still, trends such as Iran’s past nuclear pursuits and the U.S. pullout from the nuclear deal that sought to cap that pursuit are helping to drive concerns that Egypt may increasingly hedge toward latent weapons-related capabilities as it expands its peaceful nuclear activities. These concerns are further fueled by past issues in fully accounting for its nuclear activities with the IAEA,30 its continuing interest in domestic uranium mining, and even small-scale research relevant to enrichment and reprocessing.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Egyptian official reviewing Egypt’s nuclear research program, February 2019. iaea

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Climate and Environmental Security Dynamics

Added to these significant dynamics, Egypt and its region are feeling the increasing pressure of climate change effects and other environmental factors on the security landscape. As a densely populated country, Egypt sits on the Mediterranean coast and is traversed by the extensive Nile River. More than 95% of the country’s inhabitants live in the Nile Delta and Valley, an area that consists of less than 5% of Egypt’s total land area.

Low-lying river deltas are extremely at risk to sea level rise, and Egypt’s is one of the most vulnerable in the world. One study projects that by the end of the century, sea levels may inundate 22-49% of Egypt’s coastal land.31 To exacerbate the issue, the Nile Delta is sinking due to numerous factors including natural compaction and upstream dam construction. Hydro-projects can interfere with river flow and sediment deposit patterns, weakening terra firma foundations.

The combination of sea level rise and subsidence makes the region especially susceptible to extreme flooding, salt intrusion, and erosion. Coastal zones are already experiencing an increase in the frequency and intensity of storm surges (in some cases up to 3 feet above sea level).32 Flash flooding will become more common as will severe events. As Egypt stated in its Nationally Determined Contribution, “sea level rise threatens the electric power plants and networks located along the coasts.”33 This is likely to apply to the El Dabaa site and any future nuclear reactor sites planned for coastal areas.

Meanwhile, mean annual temperatures are also projected to increase by at least 2°C by 2050. Higher temperatures and drier conditions overall will create more sand storms, resulting in topsoil degradation. International standards recommend nuclear reactors in design or under construction factor in these types of extreme temperatures and the impacts of events such as sand storms to ensure safe operations; however, this work may not adequately account for the changes projected to occur as the world warms.

Hotter weather and sea level rise will have a detrimental effect on nearly every facet of the Egyptian economy, and are especially significant to government earnings---both factors that can drive instability. Major sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, industry, and tourism are based in the Delta region and are particularly sensitive to climate change.34 Nile Delta activities employ over 30% of the population and contribute to about 20% of Egypt’s GDP.35 More than half of its crops are grown in the area and the agricultural sector alone consumes over 80% of the country’s freshwater supplies due to an intensive irrigation system. Higher rates of evapotranspiration, salt water contamination, and long-term flooding in the Nile region would diminish these national freshwater reserves. In fact, 15% of agricultural lands in the area could be lost to salinization in the near future.36 Fisheries in the area are also at risk; 60% of Egypt’s fish catch comes from Delta lagoons.37 Disruptions to this region’s environment could be calamitous for the Delta-reliant labor force and shake Egypt’s economic foundation.

Salinity issues have been a historical challenge along the coast but upstream demand and rising sea levels are compounding the issue. Decreased flow means there is less pushback against the sea, and the water that does make it to the coast is heavily polluted. Thus, salt water is increasingly infiltrating the Delta aquifer, wells, and lands, making it harder for farmers to grow their crops. In an attempt to combat the harsher soil conditions, many are forced to add sand to their lands and increase their

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fertilizer usage.38 The sand is often taken from the coast, further diminishing Egypt’s natural barriers to sea level rise. Some farmers have deserted their parcels altogether.39

The Egyptian government is well aware of such climate and environmental security risks and has begun the process of forced relocation in vulnerable zones along the Delta. However, some residents are resistant and are more fearful of the potential livelihood repercussions of relocation than the threat of rising tides.40 As part of a sea level rise risk mitigation plan, Egypt and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) approved the “Enhancing Climate Change Adaptation in the North Coast of Egypt” project in 2017. This grant allocates $31.5 million to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, which plans to develop a 60 kilometer wall along the coast that will help mitigate extreme weather related flooding in exposed areas.41

Demographic trends are a serious concern for Egypt. In 2006, the country's population amounted to an estimated 72 million, and eleven years later that number skyrocketed to almost 95 million. The Egyptian population is projected to reach 153 million by 2050.42 A significant portion of that growth will prompt a youth bulge. Water, food, and energy demands will skyrocket, further straining climate related resource stress. At the same time, it is probable that excessive flooding in the Delta system will lead to mass population displacement, which could further destabilize the country. Currently, an estimated 6 million Egyptians reside in the one meter low elevation coastal zone.43 Over half a million inhabitants could be uprooted in Alexandria alone with a sea level rise of just .3 meters.44

More people in compact areas grappling with dwindling employment opportunities and acute resource shortages have the potential to fuel unrest. Add in environmental refugees from harder hit areas unable to cope with climate impacts, and the situation worsens.45

Challenges beyond Egypt’s borders will affect it as well. Today, Egypt does not produce enough food to feed its population, making it the world's top grain importer. If local cultivation decreases because of climate change, Cairo could be forced to increase its food imports. This would further tie the nation’s food security to international markets, risking domestic upheaval if exporters are also experiencing climate hazards.46 As previously mentioned, water demand in upstream countries like Sudan and Ethiopia may decrease river flow. President el-Sisi has not been demure about his disapproval of Ethiopia’s massive hydro-electric project and has labeled the issue a “matter of life or death.”47

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Egypt faces a complex web of security, economic, and energy risks. Sea level rise and subsequent flooding/saltwater intrusion, projected fresh water insecurity, hotter temperatures, and climate-influenced population movement are all likely to unfold in tandem over the next several decades. Alongside these issues, Cairo is trying to meet rising energy demands from a growing population, including by pursuing its long term nuclear power goals. Other security dynamics from domestic terrorism to regional fragility will shape the government’s ability to address these parallel and interrelated risks.

Since 2016, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) has led a working group to examine the intersection of these types of security, nuclear, and climate concerns.48 Many of its members describe Egypt as a “pressure cooker” because of these dynamics. At the same time, Egypt is considered a regional linchpin; its future stability or instability, prosperity or struggles, will have ripple effects across the Middle East and North Africa---and possibly beyond.

This points to several key focus areas that warrant policy attention, including for the broad pursuit of global stability and prosperity as well as for specifically protecting U.S. security interests.

Recommendations

Flooding caused by heavy rains in Alexandria, Egypt, 2015. anadolu agency

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First, the United States should work to renew its past leadership in international nuclear affairs, including in promoting safety and security of civil nuclear programs and helping to shore up the nonproliferation regime.

One focus area could be finding ways to encourage countries such as Egypt not to pursue domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities---activities that can be concerning for their potential application as a hedge toward nuclear weapons programs. As one example, the United States can play a stronger role in exploring new multilateral enrichment and reprocessing arrangements that could minimize excuses for countries developing national-level programs. Many experts and scholars, including Mohamed ElBaradei, have championed this approach, which gained additional thrust with the 2017 inauguration of the IAEA’s low enriched fuel bank in Kazakhstan. This fuel bank and similar constructs can assure member states they will have access to nuclear fuel supplies even when the open market is failing them, thereby undercutting the need for individual countries to develop their own enrichment or reprocessing systems.

The NPT and larger web of nonproliferation and export control systems need shoring up as well. The U.S. ability to influence this area has been hindered by its withdrawal from multiple treaties and agreements (nuclear and non-nuclear). Its standing can begin to be regained with actions such as extending the New START treaty with Russia, making credible efforts to shape future arms control agreements, and tailoring its nuclear weapons modernization plans to indicate its seriousness regarding its NPT obligation of eventual nuclear disarmament.49

More broadly, the country needs a concerted strategy for handling technological and political changes---for example, the expansion of 3D printing---that can alter the effectiveness of past regimes developed to hinder illegal trade of nuclear and related technologies. Moreover, what the United States does regarding biological and chemical weapon norms influences international impressions of the strength of nuclear nonproliferation as well. As one idea, some in the United States and beyond have advocated that the Middle East establish a chemical weapons free zone as a first step toward a region free of WMD.50

Next, climate change is one of several drivers of Egypt’s renewed pursuit of nuclear energy. For Egypt---and for other nations and international entities assisting in its nuclear energy program---there is a clear responsibility to prepare for the full range of effects climate change could have on the nation, as many of these risks are well-known today. This includes the direct and indirect effects of climate change on any nuclear facilities Egypt builds in the future. Examples include planning for increasing flooding around coastal sites and the effects of extreme temperatures on nuclear-related infrastructure and personnel, and ensuring security around all relevant facilities in the face of trends like terrorist activities and mass population movements due to sea level rise and other factors.51

The United States and others should also increase support to efforts that minimize underlying challenges that could destabilize countries that hold nuclear facilities or materials, or will in the future. The good news regarding Egypt is that the country already clearly recognizes many of these risks, and in some cases has plans to address them. In its Nationally Determined Contributions for the Paris Agreement, Egypt proposed several areas for mitigating climate risks. These included investing in sustainable irrigation systems, rainwater harvesting, and desalination technologies; exchanging water-related data with upstream Nile Delta countries; and creating employment opportunities in areas that are less sensitive to climate impacts.

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In addition to these recommendations, Egypt’s government describes the county’s “dire need” for a strategic vision to adequately prepare for climate impacts.52 The global community should attempt to assist. Information sharing and funding are critical to developing long-term solutions. Beyond a sea-wall or end-of-century climate forecast, Egypt would benefit from comprehensive climate security assessments that incorporate geopolitical stressors and regional events.

Additionally, while this report highlighted a handful of trends that will shape Egypt’s security environment as it pursues and manages a nuclear energy program, increasingly useful analytical tools are available to make sense of even larger volumes of data. Whether it be in climate, security, or sociopolitical dynamics, advanced modeling and artificial intelligence-based systems can already serve as critical tools for monitoring the stability of countries such as Egypt.

Finally, the United States must find responsible ways to retake a strong position in assisting in the promotion of nuclear safety and security for countries that have or are pursuing peaceful nuclear programs. Among CSR’s working group experts, many held strong convictions that dominance of other countries in the nuclear energy export market was a serious challenge to U.S. security and foreign policy interests.53 This holds especially true for Russia, and to a lesser degree China based on its current vision of significantly expanding its civil nuclear exporter role. As an example of how nuclear energy cooperation can advance strategic relations between suppliers and buyers, as of April 2019 Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plants Authority website featured the following quote by its Chairman, Prof. Dr. Amgad Alwakeel:

“Construction of El Dabaa NPP is the most ambitious energy project not only in Egypt but also on the whole African continent. In terms of its scale and importance for the development of our country it can be compared only with the construction of Aswan High Dam celebrated as the engineering masterpiece and the symbol of Russian-Egyptian cooperation. Nowadays Russia is the leader on the global nuclear technology market as well as the trustworthy partner capable of providing the full package of services in the area of peaceful atom.”54

There is no singular answer for how the United States can confront this challenge, and its options are somewhat hindered by the impression of a declining domestic nuclear energy industry and its backpedaling on the Iran nuclear agreement, among other factors.

The next U.S. administration should develop a new set of standards and methods for how it will pursue international atomic energy assistance. Examples can include a rejuvenation of its nonproliferation programs, many of which have seen funding decline for years; and pursuit of agreements that can open the door for expanding civil nuclear cooperation (especially full 123 Agreements, those that require countries to adopt high standards and are necessary for the export of nuclear technologies or materials). Such nuclear cooperation agreements should be made for the purpose of advancing U.S. security interests and not because they are directly tied to pending commercial deals. On that front, it is not too early to develop an approach to the renewal of the U.S.-Egypt 123 Agreement, which will expire at the end of 2021.

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Many countries seek to expand their nuclear energy pursuits due to energy needs, climate change risks, and other factors. It is imperative to promote a future in which any such programs are managed with safety and security at the forefront, and in which proliferation risks are absolutely minimized. This report highlighted just some of the many political, economic, and environmental conditions that are affecting Egypt’s security, and that will strongly shape how non-proliferation efforts in the country and region proceed.

conclusion

Nile River Delta at Night. nasa 2011

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notes

1 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nobel Lecture,” December 10, 2005, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2005/elbaradei/26138-mohamed-elbaradei-nobel-lecture-2005-2/

2 Mondal, Md Alam Hossain, Claudia Ringler, Perrihan Al-Riffai, Hagar Eldidi, Clemens Breisinger, Manfred Wiebelt, "Long-term optimization of Egypt’s power sector: Policy implications," Energy 166, January 2019, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544218321558#bib17

3 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Egypt,” accessed May 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Egypt/egypt.pdf

4 Clifford Krauss, Declan Walsh, “Egypt looks to Offshore Gas Field for Growth and Influence,” The New York Times, March 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/business/energy-environment/egypt-gas.html

5 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Egypt.”

6 In 2018, for example, the country commissioned the Benban Solar Park, the largest solar energy project in the world. When complete, it is set to generate an estimated 90% of the energy produced by the massive Aswan Dam. “Benban Solar Project biggest in the world,” Egypt Today, July 4, 2018, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/53289/Benban-Solar-Project-biggest-in-the-world-Min

7 The Arab Republic of Egypt, “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions as per United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf

8 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Research Reactors in Africa,” November 2011, p. 10-13, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/09/research-reactors-in-africa.pdf

9 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Egypt,” 2015, https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Egypt/Egypt.htm

10 Patrick Markey, Maria Tsvetkova, “Putin, Egypt's Sisi discuss restart of flights, sign nuclear deal,” Reuters, December 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-russia/putin-egypts-sisi-discuss-restart-of-flights-sign-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1E51BR

11 Mohamed Farag, “Utilities for Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant completed,” Daily News Egypt, January 14, 2019, https://dailynewssegypt.com/2019/01/14/utilities-for-dabaa-nuclear-power-plant-completed/

12 Nuclear Power Plants Authority, “Site Approval Permit for El Dabaa NPP Issued ,” http://nppa.gov.eg/en/el-dabaa-npp-project/, accessed April 2019.

13 IAEA, “An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts has concluded an eight-day Site and External Events Design (SEED) review mission to Egypt,” February 14, 2019, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/an-international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea-team-of-experts-has-concluded-an-eight-day-site-and-external-events-design-seed-review-mission-to-egypt

14 Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index,” 2019, https://fragilestatesindex.org/

15 Vivian Yee, Egypt Approves New Muscle for el-Sisi, Its Strongman Leader," The New York Times, April 23, 2019.

16 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), “Egypt Security Watch: Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror,” July 27, 2018, https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TIMEP-ESW-5yrReport-7.27.18.pdf

17 Ibid.

18 “Egypt extends state of emergency for additional 3 months,” Middle East Monitor, April 26, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190426-egypt-extends-state-of-emergency-for-additional-3-months-2/

19 TIMEP, “Egypt Security Watch: Five Years of Egypt’s War on Terror,”

20The Council on Strategic Risks

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20 See, for example, Peter Schwartzstein, “One of Africa’s Most Fertile Lands Is Struggling to Feed Its Own People,” Bloomberg, April 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2019-sudan-nile-land-farming/

21 Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russian Moves in the Gulf and Africa Have a Common Goal,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 28, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about

22 Congressional Research Service, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” last updated March 12, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf

23 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), “TIMEP Brief: European Arms Sales to Egypt,” October 29, 2018, https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-briefs/european-arms-sales-to-egypt/

24 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Status List: Conclusion of Additional Protocols,” as of March 6, 2019, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/04/sg-ap-status.pdf

25 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 16 June 2018,” https://www.opcw.org/evolution-status-participation-convention

26 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Resolution on the Middle East,” 1995, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf

27 UN General Assembly, “Egypt: draft resolution: Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” September 28, 2018, https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.1

28 UN General Assembly, “Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction: Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019,” October 30, 2018, https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.70

29 Robert J. Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

30 Mark Heinrich, “High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA,” Reuters, May 6, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iaea-egypt/high-enriched-uranium-traces-found-in-egypt-iaea-idUSTRE54543S20090506

31 M. A. Hassaan, M. A. Abdrabo, “Vulnerability of the Nile Delta coastal areas to inundation by sea level rise,” in Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, August 2013, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10661-012-3050-x

32 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Climate Change Information Fact Sheet: Egypt,” September 2015, https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/Egypt%20Climate%20Info%20Fact%20Sheet_FINAL.pdf

33 Arab Republic of Egypt: Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution as per United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, November 16, 2015, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf

34 Notably, in 2011, tourism related activities provided Cairo with twice as much revenue as the Suez canal. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Egypt," in Daniel Moran, ed., Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011).

35 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Enhancing Climate Change Adaptation in the North Coast of Egypt,” accessed May 2019, https://www.adaptation-undp.org/projects/enhancing-climate-change-adaptation-north-coast-egypt

36 Kafr al-Dawar, “Egypt's fertile Nile Delta threatened by climate change,” AFP, December 7, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20181207-egypts-fertile-nile-delta-threatened-climate-change

37 UNDP, “Enhancing Climate Change Adaptation in the North Coast of Egypt”

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38 Cam McGrath, “Nile Delta disappearing beneath the sea,” Aljazeera, February 1, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/nile-delta-disappearing-beneath-sea-201412913194844294.html

39 Ibid.

40 Ruth Michaelson, “Houses claimed by the canal: life on Egypt’s climate change frontline,” The Guardian, August 29, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/aug/29/alexandria-little-venice-egypt-climate-change-frontline

41 Hend El-Behary, “UNDP offers Egypt $31.5mn for climate change affected cities,” Egypt Independent, September 18, 2018, https://www.egyptindependent.com/undp-offers-egypt-31-5-mn-for-climate-change-affected-cities/

42 Hussein A. Sayed, "Egypt’s Demographic Opportunity : Preliminary Assessment based on 2017 Census," UNFPA Egypt Country Office, CAPMAS and Faculty of Economics and Political Science, March 2018, https://egypt.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Egypt%20DDI%20%28edited%29%20-%205_Low.pdf

43 Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Egypt," in Daniel Moran, ed., Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011).

44 UNDP, “Enhancing Climate Change Adaptation in the North Coast of Egypt”

45 Al-Marashi, "Egypt," in Daniel Moran, ed., Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis

46 For an examination of how global climate change impacted the Egyptian revolution, see Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia, Troy Sternberg, “Did We See It Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and Egypt,” in SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 35, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2015, https://research.fit.edu/media/site-specific/researchfitedu/coast-climate-adaptation-library/middle-east/israel-lebanon-syria-amp-jordan/Werrell-et-al.--2015.--CC-Middle-East.pdf

47 Associated Press, “Egypt Warns Ethiopia Nile Dam Dispute ‘Life or Death,’” Voice of America (VOA), November 18, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/egypt-warns-ethiopia-nile-dam-dispute-life-or-death/4122399.html

48 The Council on Strategic Risks, Climate-Nuclear-Security Project Webpage, at https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/theconvergingriskslab/

49 See ideas in Admiral John Gower, CB OBE, “Briefer No 1: Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach,” Council on Strategic Risks, January 7, 2019, https://councilonstrategicrisk.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/improving-nuclear-strategic-stability-through-a-responsibility-based-approach_briefer-1_2019_01_7.pdf; and Christine Parthemore and Andy Weber, “The Future of Arms Control is Global: Reconsidering Nuclear Issues in the Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, February 8, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-future-of-arms-control-is-global-reconsidering-nuclear-issues-in-the-indo-pacific/.

50 For an overview of Egypt’s historical perspective on this idea, see Mostafa Elwi Saif, “In the zone? Chemical weapons and the Middle East: The Egyptian response,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1, 2014.

51 Christine Parthemore, Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, “The global responsibility to prepare for intersecting climate and nuclear risks,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/the-global-responsibility-to-prepare-for-intersecting-climate-and-nuclear-risks/

52 Arab Republic of Egypt, “Egyptian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution as per United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change,” November 16, 2015, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Egypt%20First/Egyptian%20INDC.pdf

53 Christine Parthemore and Dr. Janne Nolan, “Working Group on Climate, Nuclear, and Security Affairs: Report One: A Framework for Understanding and Managing the Intersection of Climate Change, Nuclear Affairs, and Security,” Center on Climate and Security,” November 2017, p. 38-39, https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/working-group-on-climate-nuclear-and-security-affairs_report-one_2017_11_15.pdf

54 Nuclear Power Plants Authority, http://nppa.gov.eg/en/, last accessed April 24, 2019.

22The Council on Strategic Risks

1025 Connecticut Ave., NW ∙ Suite 1000 ∙ Washington, DC 20036 www.councilonstrategicrisks.org

AUTHORSAndrea Rezzonico and Christine Parthemore

MAY 2019

Working Group onclimate, nuclear, and security affairs

NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND SECURITY IN EGYPT