nuclear power status in korea · applications for nuclear power plant(july 2001) nureg–1801,...
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Nuclear Power Status in Korea
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업무처리 흐름 Operating 24 Units 23,116MW
업무처리 흐름 Constructing 5 Units 7,000 MW
업무처리 흐름 Planning(Holding) 4 Units 5,600 MW
Hanul
Operating : 6 Units
Constructing : 2 Units
Planning : 2 Units
Hanbit
Operating : 6 Unins Kori
Operating : 5 Units
Constructing : 3 Units
Wolsong
Operating : 6 Units
Cheonji
Planning : 2 Units
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Planned(Hold) Under Construction KOREA
Shin-Hanul
Shin-Kori 2018
APR1400
2021
APR1400
2022
APR1400
Shin-Hanul#1
APR1400
2018
신한울 2
APR1400
2019
APR1400
2022
APR1400
2023
UAE
Barakah 2017
APR1400
UAE 1
2018
UAE 2
APR1400
2019
UAE 3
APR1400
2020
UAE 4
APR1400
Cheonji 2026
APR+
2027
APR+
Shin-Hanul#2 Shin-Hanul#3 Shin-Hanul#4
Shin-Kori#4 Shin-Kori#5 Shin-Kori#6
Cheonji#1 Cheonji#2
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14
21.8%
30.3% 30.8%
13.2%
3.9%
Nuclear
161,995GWh
Coal
Gas
Oil Others
z Installed Capacity
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2
14
30.0%
39.6%
22.4%
5.5%
2.6%
Nuclear
22,529MW
Coal
Gas
Oil
Others
Electricity Generation
※ Source : KPX (Korea Power Exchange, Dec.2016)
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TOTAL : 540,442 GWh
TOTAL : 105,866 MW
Fuel
Supply
Maintenance
A/E + NSSS
Design
R & D
Equipment
Supply Waste
Management
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General Aspects of License Renewal
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NSSC
KINS
KINAC
NSSC : Nuclear Security & Safety Committee
KINS : Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
KINAC : Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Control
KHNP : Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power
MOTIE : Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
Local Office
Regional Nuclear
Safety Commission
Civil Environmental Monitoring Agency * Kori, Hanbit,
Hanul, Wolsong
KHNP MOTIE
Local Government
National Assembly
Nuclear Safety Regulatory
Nuclear Operation & Business The public
Units Design Life(years)
PHWRs 30
PWRs ( ~ 1,000 MWe) 40
PWRs (APR-1400, 1,400 Mwe) 60
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Safety Economic Public
Acceptance
Safety Public Acceptance Economics
• Mandatory requirement
• Safety assessment and
management over
continued operation
• Local Community
• Government, national
assembly, media
• Assess under Licensee
supervision
• Consider National Energy
Security and Supply/
Demand as a State-owned
Company
Kori unit 1 : reached its design life in June 2007. After 10-year
additional operation, went into permanent shutdown in June 2017
without second LR.
Wolsong unit 1 : reached its design life in November 2012. After
completing the 62 months-lasting regulatory review, restarted operation
in June of 2015
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Safety Assessment for intensive PSR
Fuel Channel Refurbishment
‘08.02-’09.12 ’09.04-’11.07 ’09.12
Application for LR
` Preparation
(22M)
‘13.07-’14.12 ’12.02-’14.06 ’11.07-’15.12
Fukushima
Accident(’11.03)
Countermeasure for Fukushima
Accident IAEA Peer
Review
Stress test for LR
(New President’s Pledge)
Approval of NSSC
` Licensing
(62M)
’15.02
End of Design
Life(’12.11)
‘15.03-06 ’15.06 ’15.06.23 ` After
Licensing
(4M) Operation Regional
Agreement In-Service Inspection
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Aging management program
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Nozzles(welds)
PWSCC RCS Piping
PWSCC/Fatigue/ Embrittlement
RCP
SCC/Fatigue
Reactor Internals
IASCC
RPV
SCC/Wear/Fatigue/ Embrittlement
SG Tube
PWSCC/ODSCC /Fatigue/Wear
SG Shell/Nozzles
SCC/Fatigue
2nd Piping
FAC
Generator
Corrosion
Turbine
Vibration
Pressurizer
SCC/ Env. Fatigue
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USA
NUREG–1800, Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plant(July 2001)
NUREG–1801, Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report(July 2001)
CFR, Title 10, Part 54, Requirements for Renewal of Operating
Licenses for Nuclear Power
IAEA
Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12, Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants
Technical Reports Series No 338, , Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Management for Nuclear Power Plants Components Important to Safety
Safety Reports Series No.15, Implementation and Review of a Nuclear
Power Plant AMP
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IAEA Periodic Safety Review
(68 Items for 14 Areas)
NRC’s LR Regulations
(77 Items for 10 Areas)
① Plant design
② Actual condition of structures, systems and
components (SSCs) important to safety
③ Deterministic safety analysis
④ Probabilistic safety assessment ⑤ Hazard analysis
⑥ Equipment qualification ⑦ Ageing
⑧ Safety performance
⑨ Use of experience from other plants and research
findings
⑩ Organization, the management system and safety
culture
⑪ Procedures ⑫ Human factors
⑬ Emergency planning
⑭ Radiological impact on the environment
Lifetime Evaluation
Report (LER)
① Scoping and Screening
② Aging Management
Review
③ Time-Limited Aging
Analyses (TLAA)
④ Incorporation of
Operating Experiences
and Research Findings
Radiological
Environmental
Report(RER)
① The Proposed Action
② General Environment
Information
③ General Plant Inform.
④ Environment
Consequences of the
Proposed Action
⑤ Consequences of the
Accident
⑥ Environment Monitoring
Plan
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AMP 10 Element
1. Scope of the program 6. Acceptance criteria
2. Preventive actions 7. Corrective actions
3. Parameters monitored or
inspected
8. Confirmation process
4. Detection of aging effects 9. Administrative controls
5. Monitoring and trending 10. Operating experience
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Aging Management Program
(Plant Specific AMPs)
Data Management (Basic Information, Data
Analysis, etc.)
1. Scope of Program 2. Preventive Actions 3. Parameters Monitored/Inspected 4. Detection of Aging Effects 5. Monitoring and Trending 6. Acceptance Criteria 7. Corrective Actions 8. Confirmation Process 9. Administrative Controls 10. Operating Experience
Aging Management Program Guideline
(Plant Specific)
AMP
DB
Implementation Results (Test, Inspection,
Examination)
Aging Management Program Computer System
Server
Integrated Aging Management
Program
Integrated Guideline of Aging Management Program (Standard Procedure)
Management Browse Input
Latest Issues of AMP in Korea NPP
01 Function of containment liner plate(CLP)
Inner mold for concrete pour during construction stage
Leaktight barrier for minimizing leakage of airborne radioactive
materials during operation
Nominal thickness of CLP in Korean PWR : 6mm
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First discovery of liner plate corrosion
Deterioration of coating and subsequent corrosion was observed on one of
containment liner plates during the refuel outage in 2016.
From the destructive examination, it was confirmed that the liner plate was
penetrated by corrosion.
The location of corrosion was near the upermost cold joint between concrete shell
and dome.
Fig. Photographs showing one of corrosion morphologies observed on a containment liner plate.
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Expansion of inspection
Similar area was inspected by ultrasonic test
By thickness measurement, suspected area was identified
Whether corrosion occurred or not was confirmed by destructive examination.
Fig. Photographs showing the corrosion status of one of liner plate backsides.
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Number of plants affected by CLP corrosion : 8 units
4 Westinghouse type units
2 Framatome type units
2 CE type units
Operation period : about 21 to 32 years
Material specifications of CLP : carbon steel
JIS3106 SM41B/SM41BN
ASME SA516 Gr.55
Material C Si Mn P S Fe
JIS SM41B/41BN Max 0.2
Max 0.35
0.60~ 1.20
Max 0.040
Max 0.040
Bal.
ASME SA516 Gr.55
Max 0.18
0.15~ 0.40
0.60~ 0.90
Max 0.035
Max 0.035
Bal.
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[Ref.] Darrell S. Dunn et al., Containment Liner Corrosion Operating Experience Summary Technical Letter Report – Revision 1, USNRC, 2011(NRCAdams Accession No. ML112070867)
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Proposed corrosion mechanism near the cold joint
The 1st stage : crevice corrosion during construction phase
Concrete
CLP (Fe)
Fe2+ +2e- Fe Fe2+
Cathode
Anode
: Cathode : Anode
Fe2+ + 2H2O + 2Cl- Fe(OH)2 + 2H+ + 2Cl-
H+
Cl-
Onset of crevice corrosion
• low pH • Autocatalytic reaction
01 Proposed corrosion mechanism near the CJ(continued)
The 2nd stage : macrocell accelerated localized corrosion
Concrete
CLP (Fe)
2Fe2+ +4e- 2Fe
O2 + 2H2O + 4e- 4OH-
OH-
e
Fe2+ + 2OH- Fe(OH)2
Fe2+
Cathode
Anode
: Cathode : Anode
Cathode
Construction and activation of macrocell Driving Potential > 0.25V
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Summary of plausible CLP corrosion mechanisms for Korean nuclear
power plants
Ingress of chlorides from marine atmosphere
• It is presumed to be responsible for all CLP corrosion cases near the CJ
• Corrosion initiation by crevice corrosion mechanism
• Corrosion may proceeds further by macrocell accelerated localized
corrosion
Presence of foreign objects
• Foreign objects of wood were identified only at two locations
• Corrosion may proceeds by macrocell accelerated localized corrosion
Concrete voids by poor consolidation
• Liners can not be protected from corrosion if they are not in high alkaline
condition.
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CLP maintenance process(corrective action)
