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  • 8/2/2019 Nuclear Pres.


    Whats happening in the

    nuclear worldfrom Fukushima to Iran.

    Peter CarterHead, Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    UK Dept of Energy and Climate Change

    Bristol University IAS

    21 February 2012

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    Global Civil Nuclear Power

    So what exactly happened at Fukushima? Energy demand and nuclear energy - a bit of history why nuclear? why not

    nuclear? Issues raised by Fukushima


    The link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons What aspects of the nuclear technologies are particularly proliferation sensitive? Central elements of the international nuclear non-proliferation framework

    Policing: IAEA

    Securing States commitment: Nuclear NP Treaty Controlling movement of sensitive nuclear technologies/ materials: Nuclear

    Suppliers Group guidelines So what challenges does the world face?e.g. States of concern:

    Iran Syria North Korea (DPRK) What about others? e.g. India/Pakistan/Israel



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    So what happened at Fukushima?

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    Source: German Aerospace CentreSource: USGS/

    Accident at Fukushima Daiichi: 9/3/11.

    Chain of Events

    Source: /

    Reactors shut


    Tsunami cut the

    Power1 2

    3 Cooling needed
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    Factors contributing to the Fukushimaaccident

    One of the most active seismic areas of the world.

    Earthquake 5th largest ever recorded. Sea wall dropped and easilybreached by tsunami.

    BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) design old: relies on electrical power torun the cooling water systems i.e. keep the nuclear core and fuel poolscool. 3 Units closed down for refuelling: core cooling lost on the othersand fuel pool cooling for all 6.

    Level of coolant lost for various reasons. Fuel rods exposed: hencereason to flood with sea water. Lack of electrical power at the site wasthe main problem. No ability to power pumps, and both generators

    destroyed and assistance delayed owing to the tsunami.

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    Keeping hazards in perspective





    dose from one

    day in average

    town near theFukushima


    BBC, Guardian Datablog, Mayo Clinicdata:

    Using a CRT Monitor for a year

    Flight from New York to L.A.

    Eating a banana




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    2.0mSv Natural



    (exposed per



    day dose at the

    two sites 50Km

    NW of


    6.0mSv Dose

    from spending

    one hour on the

    grounds of

    Chernobyl in


    Smoking 1.5 packs ofcigarettes a day for a year

    Severe radiation poisoning,

    nausea, but recovery likely

    Immediate, severe vomiting &

    coma death within hours

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    The worlds insatiabledemand for electricity.

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    How much do we need?Global electricity demandprojected to grow 76% by 2030 (average 2.5% per year - 6,429 TWh

    to 28,930 TWh)

    What energy source? Both Govts/energy suppliers

    need to assess. Reliability/Resilience (24/7/365) does the wind blow all the





    Post-operational lifetime (one-off/ongoing, such as radioactivewaste)

    Operational impact

    Climate change

    Use of finite resources

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    WHY NUCLEAR? #1The Basics

    massive global demand for more energy e.g. India,China. Need every source possible

    demand/availability/alternative uses of fossil fuels

    global concern about climate change

    no real shortage of uranium given the relatively

    small amounts required per kWh

    low cost of fuel as share of running cost for nuclearplant (i.e. low price sensitivity)

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    WHY NUCLEAR? #2Its Climate friendly


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    WHY NOT NUCLEAR?Operators Issues

    Massive sunk costs ~5bn for a EPR (EuropeanPower Reactor the current French design)

    Long timescale to build/generate revenue: longer ifneed for legislation, building of infrastructure

    No scope for small scale current reactors ~1.6GW. Smaller scale would still require containmentvessel, fuel/waste handling, safety and security, externalinfrastructure, operations staff.

    Need for assured fuel supply Need to manage waste (store it as a minimum) Need for specific skills

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    WHY NOT NUCLEAR?Wider considerations

    (at State and international level )

    Spread of nuclear technology: mastery of thenuclear fuel cycle = ability to make nuclearweapons (i.e. proliferation concerns)

    Security issues: how well will nuclear material beguarded? who has the knowledge?

    Safety issues what is the likelihood of an incidentor accident? Who pays?

    Public perception/political expediency

    Public/private ownership How much of the nuclear fuel cycle will be

    mastered? enrichment? reprocessing? Overall energy strategy: How will nuclear fit with

    the energy mix?

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    Global nuclear power pre-Fukushima

    Country Existingreactors?


    Argentina 2 1Armenia 1 -Belgium 7 -Brazil 2 1Bulgaria 2 2Canada 18 -China 13 27ChinaTaiwan 6 2CzechRep. 6 -Finland 4 1France 58 1Germany 17 -Hungary 4 -India 20 5Iran 0 1

    Country Existingreactors?


    Japan 54 2Korea 21 5Mexico 2 -Netherlands 1 -Pakistan 2 1Romania 2 -Russia 32 11Slovakia 4 2Slovenia 1 -S. Africa 2 -Spain 8 -Sweden 10 -Switzerland 5 -Ukraine 15 2UK 19 -US 104 1

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    currently generates around a sixth of the UKs


    19 nuclear reactors at nine locations. Also a

    nuclear reprocessing plant at Sellafield UKs first commercial nuclear power reactor began

    operating in 1956

    the UK Govt gave the go-ahead in Oct 2010 for a

    new generation of up to 8 nuclear power stations tobe built. NB not Scotland effectively non-nuclear future

    Work started at Hinkley Point: full planningapplication submitted Oct 2011

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    Some History: Milestones in theDevelopment of Nuclear Power

    1890s 1930s Discoveries/ Studies on radioactivity, atomic structure,nuclear properties, nuclear reactions

    1939 Fission verified 1942 First experimental chain reaction (Fermi) 1951 First functioning nuclear reactor (Idaho, US) 1953 USS Nautilus uses nuclear power: Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace UN

    speech 1956 Calder Hall becomes site of worlds first grid connected nuclear power

    plant. 1960s - 1980s Major growth in nuclear power worldwide. UK embarkson Magnox, AGR type of reactors etc etc

    1979 Three Mile Island incident 1986 Chernobyl accident 1986 the nuclear wilderness?

    2008 UK gives green light to new nuclear power programme: general viewof global nuclear renaissance 2010 Coalition agreement notes Lib Dems will not oppose nuclear energy 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident: UK Ministers (and EU) instigate reports

    (stress tests) on nuclear safety. Germany seeks to pull out of nuclear UK National Policy Statement on Nuclear published (and 8 sites confirmed):

    reaffirmed nuclear option with no public funding

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    Issues raised by Fukushima

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    Issues raised by Fukushima

    Immediate implications for other plants around the world

    long term implications..

    -current vs old reactor designs

    nuclear safety in general

    emergency planning arrangements

    nuclear liability

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    Global nuclear power pre-Fukushima

    Country Existingreactors?


    Argentina 2 1Armenia 1 -Belgium 7 -Brazil 2 1Bulgaria 2 2Canada 18 -China 13 27ChinaTaiwan 6 2CzechRep. 6 -Finland 4 1France 58 1Germany 17 -Hungary 4 -India 20 5Iran 0 1

    Country Existingreactors?


    Japan 54 2Korea 21 5Mexico 2 -Netherlands 1 -Pakistan 2 1Romania 2 -Russia 32 11Slovakia 4 2Slovenia 1 -S. Africa 2 -Spain 8 -Sweden 10 -Switzerland 5 -Ukraine 15 2UK 19 -US 104 1

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    Global nuclear power post-FukushimaDecision to pull out over time

    Country Existingreactors?


    Argentina 2 1Armenia 1 -Belgium 7 -Brazil 2 1Bulgaria 2 2Canada 18 -China 13 27ChinaTaiwan 6 2CzechRep. 6 -Finland 4 1France 58 1Germany 17 -Hungary 4 -India 20 5Iran 0 1

    Country Existingreactors?


    Japan 54 2Korea 21 5Mexico 2 -Netherlands 1 -Pakistan 2 1Romania 2 -Russia 32 11Slovakia 4 2Slovenia 1 -S. Africa 2 -Spain 8 -Sweden 10 -Switzerland 5 -Ukraine 15 2UK 19 -US 104 1

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    Global nuclear power post-FukushimaDecision to pull out over timeDecision to re-examine very closely

    Country Existingreactors?


    Argentina 2 1Armenia 1 -Belgium 7 -Brazil 2 1Bulgaria 2 2Canada 18 -China 13 27ChinaTaiwan 6 2CzechRep. 6 -Finland 4 1France 58 1Germany 17 -Hungary 4 -India 20 5Iran 0 1

    Country Existingreactors?


    Japan 54 2Korea 21 5Mexico 2 -Netherlands 1 -Pakistan 2 1Romania 2 -Russia 32 11Slovakia 4 2Slovenia 1 -S. Africa 2 -Spain 8 -Sweden 10 -Switzerland 5 -Ukraine 15 2UK 19 -US 104 1

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    Issues raised by Fukushima

    Immediate implications for other plants around the world

    long term implications..

    -current vs old reactor designs Inevitable that potential newnuclear countries will seek designs that are proven basic design(ie PWRs) but with raised awareness of locational and passivesafety issues

    nuclear safety in general

    emergency planning arrangements

    nuclear liability

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    BWR and PWR Schematics


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    Issues raised by Fukushima

    Immediate implications for other plants around the world

    long term implications..

    -current vs old reactor designs

    -ability to model disaster scenarios

    nuclear safety in general IAEA Ministerial (6/11) agreed Action

    Plan: but inevitable tensions between nuclear/anti-nuclear States andnational/EU legal competences

    emergency planning arrangements

    nuclear liability

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    Issues raised by Fukushima

    Immediate implications for other plants around the world

    long term implications..

    - current vs old reactor designs-ability to model disaster scenarios

    nuclear safety in general

    emergency planning arrangements

    nuclear liability no real changes: UK consultation onParis/Brussels completed: Govt response early 2012. India interesting -recently taken steps to limit consequences of 2010 law establishing

    liability through supply chain

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    Q. Whats the link between

    nuclear energy and nuclear


    (i.e. Why should we worry about whichstates are planning to get into nuclearenergy?)

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    Why are we concerned about who hasnuclear energy?

    2. Nuclear energy is unique: mastery of nuclear technology(certain elements of the so-called nuclear fuel cycle)provides an option to make weapons of mass destruction.

    The only difference is between a controlled process ofnuclear fission (i.e. in a reactor) or uncontrolled fission

    (i.e. a bomb) .

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    Some basics - what is matter madeup of?

    Fundamental building blockis the atom

    Atom is made up ofprotons, neutrons andelectrons

    At the centre is the nucleus- protons and neutrons

    Orbiting around the

    nucleus are the electrons

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    Back to basics - nuclear fission

    the chain reaction

    S h lid i bl f
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    So what nuclides are suitable for anuclear reactor/ nuclear weapon?

    Those that can be induced to split (fission) with a low energyneutron, sustaining a chain reaction

    For a reactor -those that have a reasonably long half life

    The two nuclides with the highest probability of a fissionreaction are 235U and 239Pu. Neither are easilyobtainable.


    U occurs as 0.7% of natural uranium (99.3%238

    U). It istherefore obtained by a process of enrichment

    239Pu is obtained by processing fuel from a nuclear reactor (itarises from neutron capture by 238U)

    S h t i l d d t

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    So what precisely do you need tomake a nuclear weapon?

    1. Several kg of such a fissile material inpractice either

    By separating235

    U from238

    U by

    isotope enrichment, using

    centrifuge, diffusionBy building a reactor, to produce

    239Pu that

    needs to be extracted from the spent fuel via




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    - the smallest amount of fissile material neededfor a sustained nuclear chain reaction. Thiswill depend on material, size, temperature,

    surrounding material etc. But e.g. for a barefaced sphere

    235 U 52 kg 17 cm

    239 Pu 10kg 9.9cm

    How much fissile material?

    a critical mass

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    Bring together 2 sub-critical

    masses of fissile material tocreate a super-critical mass, and

    So.. simple

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    A decent mathematician/scientist

    High Explosive/detonator

    Fabrication facilities (can be relatively basic)

    Somewhere to conceal your activities

    Means of weapon delivery (airborne, missile,

    depth charge, whatever)NB: optional!

    That is, assuming you have

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    Enrichment can provide both fuel for power reactors (5-20% 235U) and weapons grade uranium (>90% 235U)

    E i h t

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    Needed for fuel for nearly all the worlds nuclear reactors

    Relatively low cost

    Gas centrifuge process now the overriding way -makes use of theslight difference in weight between235U (the required isotope) and238U (the unwanted one):

    the UK/D/NL company Urenco (sites in each country) is the worldleader technology-wise: other major plants in operation in the US,Russia, France


    If you can enrich to 3%, you have the means to enrich to 90% (cfinterest in Iran)

    Easier to conceal enrichment facility/activities than reprocessingactivities that need to extract Pu from reprocessed fuel


    C t if C d

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    Centrifuge Cascades

    R i id Pl i (P ) d

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    Reprocessing can provide Plutonium (Pu) separatedfrom spent nuclear fuel

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    Spent fuel is made up of

    96% uranium

    1% plutonium

    3% fission products, which are highly radioactive

    Reprocessing separates spent fuel into its three components:

    uranium (can be re-used for further fuel)

    plutonium (can be used for weapons: cf North Korea)

    waste, containing fission products (disposal = key issue: currently noglobal operating depositaries: normally stored on-site)

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    So, what has the world done to mitigate therisks of proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    1. Set up an organisation charged with promoting nuclearpower/monitoring nuclear developments/capabilities - theIAEA (est 1957) with nuclear accounting (safeguards)measures and inspectors (with rights of access)

    2. Panic increasingly during the 1960s (by which time therewere 5 nuclear weapon states and plenty of atmospheric tests)

    3. Settle on a few Talks/Treaties: Euratom (1956), PTBT(1963), NPT (1968), SALT (1973), START (1991), CTBT(1996), FMCT (??)

    4. Set up groups to agree and control exports (e.g. NuclearSuppliers Group)

    5. Fudge it on international instances of transgression

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    Central elements of the international

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Framework

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    1. Policing nuclear activities -

    the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA)

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    The IAEA #2

    acts as the worlds nuclear inspectorate (frameworkknown as nuclearsafeguards)

    fosters safe and efficient use of nuclear power around theworld

    provides a strong, sustainable and visible global nuclearsafety and security framework

    helps countries to improve their scientific andtechnological capabilities in the peaceful applications of

    nuclear technology (not least to meet sustainable developmentobjectives in agriculture, human health, water resource management,marine environment and industrial applications)

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    2. Securing commitment by

    individual countries

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

    Nuclear Weaponsthe NPT

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    The NPT

    entered into force in 1970conceived at a time of intense international nucleartensions, especially between superpowers, rapidly risingnuclear arsenals, and nuclear ambitions of many states

    effectively forms a grand bargain- 5 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) that have right to retain (nuclear

    weapons (those who exploded a device prior to 1968) UK /US /Russia/China /France, but seek to reduce/liquidate nuclear arsenals while

    - All other signatories (are/will be Non-NWS) committed not to acquirethe technology or assist others to do so

    5 yearly review cycle: last Review Conference 2010:Preparatory Committees in each of preceding 3 years.

    Action plan agreed by RevCon in 2010

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    What particular obligations/rights does the NPT infer?

    Article III

    Each ..[NNWS] undertakes to accept safeguards.. shall conclude agreements with theInternational Atomic Energy Agency.

    Article IVNothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties tothe Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes without discrimination ..

    Preamble.Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the

    nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nucleardisarmament,

    Article IIEach [NNWS] undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of

    nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weaponsdirectly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other

    nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistant in the manufacture ofnuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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    What are Safeguards?

    Safeguards is the process to assess the correctness and completeness of aStates declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verificationmeasures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring andevaluation.

    (Basic) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (all NPT States (190) bar 6

    have one in force)

    Largely based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containmentand surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that theIAEA installs at facilities.

    Additional Protocol (114 States have one in force)

    Strengthens the IAEAs inspection capabilities. Enables the IAEA not only to

    verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provideassurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a


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    3. Controlling the trade innuclear materials and


    Export control legislation/Nuclear Suppliers Group

    E l

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    Export controls #1

    UK export controls result largely from the UKs commitments made in

    multilateral and international agreements. Export Control Organisationbased in Dept for Business (BIS)

    UK an active member of various international control regimes,including, the Australia Group (re chem/bio weapons), MissileTechnology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and theWassenaar Arrangement (primarily info. sharing)

    UK implements NSG Guidelines in its export licence legislation

    E l #2

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    Export controls #2Nuclear Suppliers Group

    NSG created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by anon-nuclear-weapon State (India), which demonstrated that nucleartechnology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.

    Currently 46 members: voluntary basis, not legally binding. Annualplenary. Also a Consultative Group

    NSG Guidelines first published in 1978 to apply to nuclear transfers forpeaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be

    diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosiveactivities. Two listsTrigger list and Dual-use list.

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    So what current proliferationchallenges does the world face?

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    e.g. some States of concern



    North Korea (DPRK)?


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    1960s history of nuclear research, including research reactor

    1995 Russia agreed to pick up work on Irans only reactor, at Bushehr

    2002 discovery of work on 2 new nuclear sites: enrichment (Natanz) andArak (heavy water) site at Qom identified 2006

    France, UK and Germany (E3) tried to resolve major questions with Iran2004 IAEA report describes pattern of concealment

    2006 Ahmadinejad announces successful enrichment of uranium (3.5%)

    2006-2011 increasing calls for Iran to suspend enrichment/ regular reports

    to the meetings of the IAEA Board/ 7 resolutions passed by the UN SecurityCouncil demanding cessation of activities or imposing sanctions

    Nov 2011 IAEA Board report uses term possible military dimension for the

    first time, and identifies large explosive containment vessel at Parchin

    January 2012 latest IAEA visit (next Board report March 2012)

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    Iran: images of a nuclearenrichment facility

    S i

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    1976 Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS) established: historicallyvery limited nuclear activities: 1 research reactor (Chinese SRR-1)background of adversarial relations w Israel

    2007 Israeli airstrike on alleged Pu producing reactor construction site atAl-Kibar (Dair Alzour). Allegations of link with DPRK - that reactor matcheddesign at Yongbyon.

    2007 2011 Regular IAEA reports

    2008 IAEA discovers anthropogenic uranium at SSR-1 site

    2011 IAEA finds Syria in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations

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    2003 image of alleged nuclear site atDair Alzour

    NY Times 27/10/07


    DPRK (North Korea)

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    DPRK (North Korea)

    History of nuclear activities: background of concerns aboutUS/ROK/Japan links + general paranoia.

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    2010 satellite image of the DPRKsYongbyon nuclear site. It showsconstruction of an alleged new experimentallight water reactor and the destroyedcooling tower for an original 5 MWereactor


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    But ...

    There are three States (known as the D3) that are not signatories to the

    NPT but who possess nuclear weapons and are therefore de-factoWeapons States

    India - first exploded nuclear device in 1974Pakistan first exploded nuclear device in 1998Israel does not openly acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons(policy of nuclear ambiguity)

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    And finally.

    - Some summary thoughts.

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    y g

    Expansion of civil nuclear energy worldwide unlikely to be dentedsignificantly by Fukushima accident drivers of energy demand, concernfor climate change, price of fossil fuels will only intensify over time

    Expansion in China and India likely to dwarf nuclear new build in smallercountries. But for nuclear even to keep its share of the expanding

    electricity market will be a major feat: are there sufficient companies withthe necessary skills and resources? All developments will be underincreasing global scrutiny

    Open question as to how the supply of enrichment services will develop.Present players can satisfy market, but increasingly States may seek theirown or regional facilities. Proliferation risks will continue to be largely State


    Safeguards techniques (e.g. air sampling) should continue to develop todetect non-peaceful uses

    Activities of States of concern likely to cause even greater concern e.g.Iran, Syria, DPRK,

    Some summary thoughts.

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    y g

    Countries embarking on new nuclear will require considerable handholdinge.g. Jordan, UAE. IAEA can meet some of this need, but externaladvice/service provision will be all important

    Equally legal advice both to help put in place regulatory frameworks andfacilitate compliance with existing and international law on areas such as:

    Land use planning


    Environmental protection

    Construction law

    Financial/capital requirements

    Electricity transmission/connection/allocation Industrial (i.e. nuclear) safety

    Nuclear liability

    Administration procedures/role of regulatory authority

    will be all important

    And. Looking at the nuclear non-

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    proliferation calendar for 2012

    March/June/September/November: IAEA Board of Governorsmeetings: Vienna

    March: Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul. Follow on from 2010

    US event May: NPT Preparatory Committee: 2 weeks, Vienna

    June: Meeting of P5 (UK, US, China, France, Russia), US

    June: Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary/Consultative, Seattle

    September: IAEA General Conference, ViennaDate tba: Conference on Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free

    Zone, Helsinki

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    Thank you.