ny b17 atf fdr- 7-24-03 atf email and 10-25-01 atf after action report 092

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURYBUREAU OF ALCOHOL. TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

2 5 2 0 0 1

900000:MRB

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Arson and ExplosivesPrograms Division

FROM: NRT- Special Agent inCharge

SUBJECT: After Action Report- NRT-01-29,Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia

INCIDENT BACKGROUNDOn September 11, 2001, at approximately9:30a.m., American Airlines flight 77 was hijackedand intentionally crashed into the Pentagon. Thecrash is one of four that occurred on this date,and are believed to be terrorist acts. Initialreports indicated that 189 people were killed inthe Pentagon incident.The incident was covered by news agencies fromaround the world.There were numerous visits to the scene bycongressional members, members of the President'scabinet, various military leaders, the Vice-President, and on two occasions, the President ofthe United States.On September 11, 2001, the northeast andsoutheast national response teams were activatedand later staged in the Washington, DC area.

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Chief, Arson and ExplosivesPrograms Division

On September 12, 2001, per the Washington FieldDivision (WFD) special agent in charge, (SAC) aresponse team consisting of 30 members wasrequested by the FBI to assist at the Pentagon.The WFD SAC stated the FBI would integrate theATF team into their ERT operations.After numerous attempts at trying to contact theFBI ERT at the scene, and watching an ongoingcrime scene search on television, a team of 30KRT members arrived at the Pentagon atapproximately 2:00 p.m.Upon arrival at the scene, the FBI on-sitesupervisor stated he was not aware that ATP wasasked to assist at the scene. Immediatelythereafter, there were discussions between theWFD SAC and the FBI WFO SAC wherein the FBI SACasked that all ATF personnel leave the scene.The onsite FBI supervisor was notified of thisdecision and he asked that 8 agents remain at thescene to assist with a crime scene search. Theremaining agents were dismissed by the NRT SACand instructed to remain on call for duty.Later, on September 12, 2001, the FBI on sitesupervisor requested another 30 NRT members toassist at the scene. The additional agents were * to be used for search teams in and around thebuilding, as well as for sifting operations.On September 13, 2001. the total number of ATFagents at the scene was 47. Thie included thetwo team leaders, two team SAC's and four agentsto ataff the NRT truck and the Command vehicle,which had been loaned to the Arlington FireDepartment. (The teams worked two 12-hour shifts,each truck staffed with one agent per shift).

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On September 13bh, the FBI asked for additional 6-8 agentB to assist in logging evidence in. Theyarrived on September 14th.During the first few days of operations, numerousother ATF personnel arrived to deliver equipment,supplies, fix radios, telephones etc.During the first three days of operations, ATPNRT members were scheduled to work with the FBIon entry teams to collect bodies, evidence, siftdebris, act as safety officers in the building,as well as log evidence and photograph the scenefor the FBI. However, the manpower was notutilized as planned due to a number of issues.The lack of coordination and use of resourceswill be discussed under "Problems andRecommendations."

Due to the building collapse, heavy equipment wasutilized. it was acquired through FEMA. ATFalso utilized two "Gators" to transport equipmentand supplies between the Pentagon and the northparking lot where sifting operations wereconducted. The NRT was advised that FEMA wouldpay for the "Gators" . They were returned to theArlington Fire Department logistics center. No vagreements between ATF and the rental companywere executed.Also, Verizon provided 47 Nextel phones to ATF.These phones were provided as part of the FBIagreement with Verizon. (According to theVerizon representative, the phone and servicewere loaned to those at the scene.) ATF's Voiceand Radio Branch were instructed to handle thetransaction with Verizon. All phones werereturned to Verizon when the NRT left the scene.

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No other equipment rental or procurement wasauthorized at the scene. However, there was agreat deal of supplies, small tools andprotective gear that were procured withindividual government issued MasterCards. The WFD, except for those acquired by NRT TeamSupervisors collected all receipts.The local Home Depot representative offered toestablish an "open purchase order" for the team.The offer was declined. The team supervisorswere instructed to advise the team members thatno purchases were to be made withoutauthorization, and all purchases should be madethrough a MasterCard.The ATF Command vehicle was offered to theArlington Fire Chief because as incidentcommander, he did not have an adequate commandpost. The chief accepted the offer throughBattalion Chief Schwartz.He also accepted the offer to use a tent(provided by ATF) to protect his expensive gear.This was placed next to the command post.The FBI also accepted ATF's offer to provide aprotective tent for those at the sifting site.They later asked that the tent be removed,however, they later reconsidered afterdetermining their staff was utilizing the tentfor peer support, employee assistance and minormedical needs.A FBI ERT team leader also accepted ATF's offerto supply a second command vehicle at the siftingsite. The team leader accepted after stating sheonly had a "pick-up truck" to use as anadministrative poet. The Atlanta Command Vehicledeparted for Washington after this request was

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made. The FBI on-site supervisor later cancelledthe request for the bus stating the FBI had oneon its way. (The FBI did not have a commandvehicle delivered to the scene. They borrowedone from the DC Disaster Management Agency, 2days after they declined ATF's offer.)The equipment and supplies on the NRT truck wereutilized by a number of agencies (including FBIERT). Many expressed thanks and commented on howwell equipped the truck was.PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONSSeveral problems were encountered during thisinvestigation. It is recommended that a meetingbetween FEA and the DAD'B (FO) be held so theycan hear all of the details about these issues,Many of the problems should be addressed throughagreements with the FBI. While attempts havebeen made in the past, perhaps a new approachshould be made under the premise of both agenciesdiscussing an "after-action" assessment ofactivities. While there were numerous issuesthat arose, only a few will be addressed here.Problem - The FBI lacks the experience to manageevery facet of crime scene investigations. Thisrevolves around the fact that the FBI managersand ERT members are more familiar with protocols-for ^general" crime scene searches. They lacksufficient experience in overseeing overhauloperations at large fire and explosion scenes.Recommendation- Executive level managers from ATFshould meet with the FBI to fully explain ourlevel of expertise, the number of large scenes weroutinely handle and attempt to establish aprotocol wherein ATF and the FBI technical"experts" can work together at scenes. Eachagency has its strengths and they should berecognized. For instance, the beat use of ATF's

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resources would have been to allow ATF NRTmembers to oversee the removal of debris from thebuilding, as well as the sifting operations.While this case was clearly under the FBI'sjurisdiction, they should have allowed ourexperts to handle jobs they are familiar with.A good analogy is the fact that the FBI stoodback while the search and rescue teams did safetyassessments and shored up the building. Whilethe FBI was present when decisions were made andexecuted, they deferred to these teams because oftheir training and expertise. The same actionswere not taken with respect to our expertise.While this has traditionally been the problem,perhaps the new FBI director should be made awareof the level of expertise available to assistthem at these types of scenes.The lack of experience was most evident when FBImanagers and team leaders stated it could take4-6 months to complete the processing of thescene. The NRT supervisors informed them withinthe first 2 days that this scene should take nomore than 2-3 weeks to complete. The experiencelevels in dealing with these types of scenes wereclearly shown.Another example was found when the FBI ERT teamleader charged with overseeing the removal ofdebris inside of the building explained theextent of the damage in the building to the NRTSAC and team supervisors. Also present were theFBI SAC and ASAC.The FBI team leader tried to explain the fireprogression, blast effects and fire damage butrepeatedly stated "I don't know much about fireor explosions but..." He also prefaced many of hisstatements by saying "the ATF agents explained itto me...." After one of the ATF team supervisor's

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explained the fire progression, basic firedynamics and blast effects, the FBI SAC asked to"sit down some day so you can explain how fireworks."This same FBI team leader consistently praisedATF's efforts and relied upon our knowledge byasking for ATP agents to be assigned to his team.His superiors overruled him after the third dayat the scene.At the same time, perhaps ATF should utilize theFBI's expertise at ATF controlled scenes. Forinstance, their teams are more used to collectingtrace evidence such as hair, fibers, blood, etc.Perhaps if the two directors could agree toutilize the expertise of each agency, teams couldwork/train together, much like they will be doingfor the upcoming Olympics.Problem - The FBI'a command structure for theirERT's is disjointed. For instance, each teamoperated independently of the others, theychanged team leaders on a daily basis, switchedpeople between jobs on a daily basis so theycould be "trained" in various duties. It wasdifficult to determine whom the "team leaders"report to, and who dictates the goals andobjectives for the overall mission.Since many of the FBI team leaders and managershave little to no experience in dealing withthese types of scenes, they can offer little tono guidance to others.Recommendat i on- It is recommended that as part ofthe protocol, both agencies include team leadersand supervisors in certain decision makingprocesses. For instance, the NRT team

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supervisoars should have been allowed to workinside of the building and work closely with theFBI managers in planning the overall strategy inprocessing the scene. The NRT made numerousrecommendations that would have expeditedactivities and drastically minimized the manpowerneeded to complete the job and more importantlyensured the safety of those working in the scene.Most of the recommendations were ignored.Problem- There were no daily meetings betweenagency heads at the site. If there were, ATF wasnot included.Recommendation- Daily meetings with all agencyheads should be held to ensure that clear linesof communication are established. The overallstrategy at approaching the scene was nevershared with all of the agencies; therefore, itwas difficult to understand what was being done,how resources would be used etc. It would havebeen beneficial to all if FEMA would have taken amore aggressive approach at managing the overallsituation, particularly with meeting with agencyheads to share the overall goals, strategies etc,If this was done, many of the problems,misunderstandings etc., could have beenaddressed. Instead, many agencies were "left inthe dark" as to what the plans were.Problem- The EPA and OSHA declared this ahazardous material site. Specifically, theyreferred to contamination from human remains aswell as asbestos and silica dusts. Therefore,protective clothing and respirators were worn incertain areas.

Some agencies did not meet OSHA guidelines withrespect to the use of protective equipment; inparticular, respirators were worn by those withfacial hair. NRT members with facial hair shavedbefore wearing respirators. The OSHA officialscommented on the quality of the equipment ATF

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wore and the methods used to monitor employeesafety.Several ATF agents from the WFD (non-NRT members)who were assigned to assist the FBI JointTerrorism Task Force arrived at the scene underthe instruction of an FBI supervisor. Theyborrowed respirators and worked at the siftingsite. Two of these agents had beards and andnone of them had received HazMat training, werenever fit-tested, or had the proper medicalclearance. The agents were asked to leave thescene and the WFD was notified of the incident.The FBI was also advised not to send ATFemployees to the scene without notifying the NRT.Recoinmandationi ATF continue with its currentpolicy toward the use of personal protectiveequipment. Agents should be made aware of the PPEpolicy and its importance.Problem- The FBI is reluctant to utilize ATFexpertise or its equipment. For that matter,they did not rely on all of the availableexpertise from other agencies. For instance, theFBI declined ATF's offer to utilize a commandvehicle. Instead, they waited 2 additional daysand borrowed one from the District of Columbia.They also declined the offer of a large tent(however they used it anyway), and in oneinstance, refused to allow an experienced ATFbomb technician to handle a suspicious packageoutside of the Pentagon grounds. In fact the ATFbomb technician had to remind the FBI bomb technot to approach the package without a bomb suitto perform an assessment because two explosivedetecting canines had alerted to the presence ofexplosives.In this instance, two FBI bomb techniciansarrived and between them did not have a bomb suitthat fit them, nor did they have a shock tube touse with their "Pan-Disrupter." One FBI bomb

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technician had never performed a render safeprocedure (RSP)(except in class) and the otherhad only assisted with one. The ATF bombtechnician has performed numerous RSP's and infact was an instructor with the U.S. Navy EOD.Instead of allowing the experienced bombtechnician to handle the package, the two FBIagents borrowed the ATF bomb suit and shock tubeand performed an RSP on the package. (Later to bedetermined to be a briefcase full of ammunition.)Within an hour preceding this incident, the FBISAC advised the NRT SAC that he no longerrequired the services of any ATF chemists or bombtechnicians.Recommendation- This should be brought to theattention of senior level managers at the FBI.It involves the safety of not only bombtechnicians but also citizens.Also, it would be beneficial if each agency knewwhat capabilities each can provide, whatspecialized equipment was available, and how itcould be best used. For instance, debris keptpiling up at the sifting site until ATF notifiedthe FBI that several NRT members were proficientin driving "BobcatB" which were parked at thesite. The FBI had its own "Bobcat" however theyhad nobody to operate it. Once this wasresolved, NRT members operated most of theequipment. After several days, the FBI asked ifATF could train their people to operate Bobcats.They also began to allow several of theiremployees (without experience) to operate the"Bobcats." This was minimized after safetyconcerns were brought to their attention.Also, it would have made more sense to usetrained military mortuary teams, with one FBIagent to remove bodies, rather than use fullteams of special agents. It is unclear why

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untrained agents should be used for activitiesSUCll as body removals when better-trained andequipped agencies are available to handle theduties. If the argument is because potentialevidence must be collected; the presence of anFBI agent with these teams would be sufficient.Problem- Initially, there was little to nocontrol or documentation over who was working inthe building and where they were. There wereinadequate safeguards to ensure the safety of theNRT members.Recommendation- Ensure the NRT continues toprovide its own safety officers when NRTemployees are working under the control ofanother agency. This was addressed and the FBIlater initiated an accountability system forthose working in the building.Problem- There was inadequate administrativesupport at the scene. For instance, hhe teamsupervisors had to handle all of the scheduling,listing of hotel rooms, SOT sheets, and thecollection of receipts.Recconmendation- During major events, it would beadvantageous to have an administrative supportmember to assist with scheduling, hotelarrangements, handling of receipts, as well asother administrative duties.Problem- There should be more coordination withinHeadquarters in sending peer support, EAFresources to the scene. For instance, the teamSAC was called by the Office of the Ombudsman.Arrangements were made to have peer supportavailable at the hotel after the shifts ended forATF employees. Instead, an EAP contractor

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arrived, and no peer support members wereavailable. The contractors later admitted therewas a mix-up in communications.It was our understanding that the employee callsEAP when they are needed.Recommendation- Peer support should be the firstresource available to the employees. They shouldbe told of EAP availability and allowed to callthem if necessary. Instead, some of theemployees felt that EAP was being offered insteadof peer support.Problem- There were numerous requests from the HQCMIST that seemed to be synonymous with requestsfrom the field division CMIRT.The NRT supervisors were called severaltimes by CMIST employee asking for detailssuch as the room numbers for NRT members inhotels.There were several other similar incidents. Thisdetracts from the ability of the supervisors toperform their on-scene duties. While everyoneunderstands the value of a. CMIST, there weretimes when the NRT managers spent more timeanswering requests from the CMIST than they spentperforming on-scene duties. A great deal of thissame information was also answered for the fielddivision CMIRT.Recommendation- These duties should be handled byadministrative support staff. The CMIST employeestated the reason for asking for hotel roomnumbers was "in case someone asks me for them."The agents were all lodged in the same hotel, andif they had co be reached, a call to the hoteldesk would have connected them with the agent.This type of request is unnecessary.

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Highlights - EPA held daily safety meetings withall of the involved agencies. They wereforthright and informative. Every agency at thescene was informed about conditions, problemsetc., and there was an open dialogue between theagencies.The NRT teams performed in an exemplary manner.Morale remained high despite the way the teammembers were treated by the FBI. The teammember's attitudes remained positive and theirwork showed it. Numerous agencies took note oftheir performance and often sought theirguidance. Additionally, many of the agenciesrelied on ATF's NRT truck for specialized toolsand equipment.CONCLUSIONThis has been characterized as an act ofterrorism. The FBI will issue the final reporton the series of events leading up to the crash.It is essential that a protocol is reached toensure both agencies can work together andutilize the best resources available. Alongthese lines, it is essential that an agreement isreached identifying who will do what at majorincidents, therefore, embarrassing situationswill be avoided. This is apparently a regional

. problem as many areas in the country do notexperience the issues that were encountered atthis scene.Perhaps this could be resolved if the twodirectors agreed on a set protocol.

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POINTS OF CONTACTSince there were ao many agencies involved anddue to the fact that the NRT assisted the FBI,there is no need for points of contact.

Michael R. Bouchard

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DEPARTMENTOF THE TREASURYBUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

October 23,2001902050:TRH

4

MEMORANDUM TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:iRE:

Division ChiefFirearms, Explosives and Aison Programs DivisionHarry Eberhardt, Western NRT Team SupervisorThomas R Hahn, Jr., MW NRTTeam SupervisorBrian Hoback, Western NRT Team SupervisorFrank Matter, SE NRT Team SupervisorJerry Rudden, NE NRT Team SupervisorNRT Activation to Pentagon, Washington D.CPentagonWashington, D. C.IN #701300-01-0003

INCIDENT BACKGROUNDOn September 11, 2001, at approximately 9:30a.nz, American Airlines Flight 77, aBoeing 757, was hijacked soon after it departed from Dulles Airport After a short timein the air,the plane was diverted and intentionally crashed into the west side of thePentagon, Washington, D. C. There were 189 victims killed in the Pentagon and on theaircraft. Repairs to the Pentagon have been estimated to be $500 million. No cost for theaircraft was available. After the ensuing explosion and fire, the FBI requested theassistance of the ATF National Response Team to assist. them in the investigation.Initially both the Northeast and Southeast National Response Teams responded. Afterapproximately 12 days the Midwest and Western National Response Teams rotated acontingent of NRT members in to replace those already there.

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Tom BowenVeronica HnatJohn MorganGregHineTom DaleyEricPenaPaul GemmatoScott TaylorSteve AvatoDave ShermanFrancis NeelyKevin WashingtonLou WeiersBill GromBill OtersonSOUTHEAST TEAMDave SanfordBill MarshallKen AndrewsJohn PaulKent SlayTony WaldropDennis HamptonJoe MannGene FlemingJohn SpringerPenny GoodreauBrian LettMarkTeufertMark HobackMike RolandJohn ColderSteve GillisJames "WilliamsJoey RussellNick ChennetaBarney WaggonerJeff BrownDennis KennamerJerome GantLuis VelazcoBobby McCormickL. A. BykowskyLester RichE. C Painter

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Cordell MaloneVanTuleyMike Durham

WESTERN TEAMSteve BeggsLance HartMartin YoungLarry SmithJamie LopezDanHeenanMarshall LittletonMIDWEST TEAMJohn MirochaTad HeitzlerMarty HillGreg BakerTony Piwowarc2ykPeteLobdellCHEMISTSRick LuteDoug KlapecSteve LinahanSherrie ThomasGreg CzarnopysJulia D olanKathyKlcmzETBTom WaskomMike EggJestonRich CampbellAlex Guerrero

FIELD DIVISION PERSONNELThe following ATF Special Agents from different Field Division also responded andassisted in the scene investigation:Larry Sanders Beaum ont Field Office, Dallas Field DivisionTim W ilson Reading Field Office, Philadelphia Field DivisionMark Semear Grand Rapids Field Office, Detroit Field DivisionBill Joa Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division

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Kevin Kelm HQ, FEA, Profiling Section, Quantico, VirginiaPete Pappas HQ, FEA, Canine Branch, Front Royal, VirginiaSteve Patrick Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field DivisionVic Castro Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field DivisionSuePoorbaugb Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field DivisionDoug Quartetti Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field DivisionBrian Berryman Falls Church Field Office, Washington D. C. Field Division

OTHER AGENCIES/PERSONNEL INVOLVED

Due the large number of individuals utilized in this investigation, only the agency nameswill be listed as contributing.FBIArlington County Police DepartmentEEOC, OIGNASAU. S. Postal ServiceDepartment of Defense, OIGDepartment ofDefense, CISFDIC OIGNaval Investigative ServiceU. S. Army Criminal Investigation DivisionU. S. Air Force, Office of Special InvestigationsVirginia State PoliceU. S. MarshalFairfax County PoliceD. C. Metropolitan PoliceDepartment ofEducation, OIGDepartment of Commerce, OIGNational Transportation and Safety BoardFederal AviationAdministrationVirginia Alcohol Beverage ControlFairfax County Fire DepartmentEnvironmental Protection AgencyOSHAFairfax County Search and Rescue TeamMontgomery County Search and Rescue TeamMiami-Dade County Search and Rescue TeamOrange County Search and Rescue TeamNew Mexico Search and Rescue TeamMemphis Search and Rescue TeamPuget Sound Search and Rescue Team

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ny b17 atf fdr- 7-24-03 atf email and 10-25-01 atf after action report 092

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