OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE

NIGERIA-CAMEROUN DISPUTE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING

AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF

BAKASSI PENINSULA

BY

OMADA CHRISTOPHER

PG/M.Sc./12/64131

A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULLILMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

SUPERVISOR: PROF. E.O. EZEANI

NOVEMBER, 2013.

i

TITLE PAGE

OBASANJO’S ADMINISTRATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE

NIGERIA-CAMEROUN DISPUTE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING

AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF

BAKASSI PENINSULA

ii

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this work entitled ‘Obasanjo’s Administration and the Management

of the Nigeria-Cameroun Dispute: A Critical Analysis of the Fundamental Rights of the

People of Bakassi Peninsula’ has been approved for the Department of Political Science,

University of Nigeria, Nsukka

By:

------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ PROFESSOR E.O. EZEANI PROFESSOR JONAH. ONUOHA SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ PROFESSOR C.O.T. UGWU EXTERNAL EXAMINER DEAN FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

iii

DEDICATION

This project is specially dedicated to God Almighty for giving me the life and

health to arrive at this end. I cannot thank him enough for His mercies.

I equally dedicate this work to my children- Nneka Omada, Ogechi, Chineye, and

K.C. - whose prayers saw me through in this academic journey.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a common saying that while man proposes God disposes. In God’s manner of

disposing both material goods and services, He uses human person as his agents. Thus, I

could not have known the meaning and direction of academic project work without the

patient and kind attention of my supervisor, Professor E.O. Ezeani I cannot thank him

enough, but to pray that God will give him long life and blessings of prosperity in Jesus

name. Amen.

I cannot make the mistake of omission as to forget somebody whose contributions

to the entire welfare of the students of my school are so immense. I thus hail our PG

coordinator Professor Aloysius-Michaels Okolie. May the Almighty God reward him for

the selfless services to me. In like manner, I acknowledge all the lecturers in the

department particularly the HOD Professor Jonah Onuoha and Professor Ifesinachi.

I wish to finally, appreciate my God given partner for life Mrs. Ngozi Omada

whose love, endurance, understanding and contributions helped me to make the race a

success. God’s love shall always bind us in years of our lives.

v

Abstract

The Nigeria-Cameroun border conflict, which had claimed many lives and properties, was finally resolved on October 2002 following the ICJ ruling which ceded the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. The rapidity with which President Obasanjo implemented the handover of Bakassi to Cameroon was seen in the average eye of a Nigerian as a diplomatic blunder considering the historical underpinnings of the people of Bakassi. This study was therefore aimed at a critical examination of the fundamental rights of the people of Bakassi Peninsula in the management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute by President Obasanjo. In doing this, the study was anchord on two research questions, thus: (1) Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity?; (2) Has the Nigerian government is inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?. We used qualitative descriptive method to collect data from secondary sources. Qualitative descriptive method was equally used in analyzing our data. Thus, applying logically the core assumptions of Games theory, the study contended that Obasanjo’s acceptance of the ICJ ruling to cede away the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Republic of Cameroon was against the national interest of Nigeria. Arising from this therefore, we recommended, among other things, that Nigerian foreign policy machinery should be henceforth situated and located in the hands of experts.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page - - - - - - - - - - i

Approval Page - - - - - - - - - ii

Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iii

Acknowledgements - - - - - - - - - iv

Abstract - - - - - - - - - - - v

Table of Contents - - - - - - - - - vi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study - - - - - - - 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - - 3

1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - - 5

1.4 Significance of the Study - - - - - - - 5

1.5 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - - 6

1.6 Thesis and Contributions to Knowledge - - - - - - 6

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review- - - - - - - - - 9

2.2 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - - - 19

CHAPTER THREE: METHOD OF RESEARCH

3.1 Method of Data Collection - - - - - - - 23

3.2 Research Design - - - - - - - - - 23

3.3 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - - - - 24

3.4 Logical Data Framework - - - - - - - 25

vii

CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND TO THE BAKASSI DISPUTE

4.1 Geography of the Nigerian Cameroun Boundary - - - - - 27

4.2 Evolution of Colonial Boundaries - - - - - - 30

4.3 British/German Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroun Colonial International Boundary - - - - - - - 40

4.4 The Place of General Gowon in the Bakassi Dispute - - - - 51

4.5 Abacha’s Effort - - - - - - - - - 54

4.6 The climax of the Bakassi Dispute - - - - - - 55

CHAPTER FIVE: OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S SUPPORT OF THE ICJ RULING

OVER THE DISPUTED BAKASSI AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL

INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION OF HER CITIZENS’ RIGHTS

AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

5.1 Signing of the Green Tree Agreement Between Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroun - - - - - - - - 57

5.2 The World Court Judgment and Olusegun Obasanjo’s Support of the UN Mixed-Commission - - - - - - - - 62 5.3 Obasanjo’s Support of the Demarcation of Land and Maritime Boundaries Between

Nigeria and Cameroun - - - - - - - - 66 5.4 Support of Withdrawal of Nigeria’s Civilian Administration, Military and Police Forces

from Bakassi - - - - - - - - - 67 5.5 The Effects of the World Court Judgment on the Bakassi People - - 68 CHAPTER SIX: NIGERIA GOVERNMENT INABILITY TO EXPLORE

ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS TO ICJ RULING AND

THE RIGHT OF BAKASSI PEOPLE TO DECIDE WHERE

TO BELONG

6.1 Political Option - - - - - - - - - 77

6.2 Legal Option - - - - - - - - - 82

6.3 Military Options - - - - - - - - - 92

6.4 The Right of Bakassi People to Decide where to Belong - - - - 95

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary - - - - - - - - - 99

7.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 99

7.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - - - 100

BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - - - - - - - 101

Appendix i - - - - - - - - - - 104

Appendix ii - - - - - - - - - - 107

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The dispute along the Nigeria-Cameroun border was a matter of historic

proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section wherein the Bakassi

Peninsula (Ekpenyong, 1989) lies. The disputed Bakassi Peninsula is an area of some of

mangrove swamp and half submerged islands mostly occupied by fishermen settlers

(Anene, 1970). Remarkably, Bakassi Peninsula came under British protection on

September 10, 1884. Following the Berlin West African Conference of 1885, Britain and

Germany defined their territorial spheres of influence in Africa in November 15, 1893.

When the two installments of amalgamation were proclaimed in Nigeria in 1906 and

1914, the Bakassi Peninsula was subsumed under the frontiers of Southern Cameroon.

Then the London Treaty of March 11, 1913 established clear-cut regulations on

navigation on the Cross River. The end of World War I brought Bakassi under British

Cameroon. During the interwar years, the Franco British Declaration of July 10, 1919 on

Bakassi and what came to be known as British-Cameroon were placed under British

mandate and were administered conterminously with Nigeria. In 1946 following the end

of World War II Britain divided Cameroon into Northern Cameroon and Southern

Cameroon (Idumange, 2010). While Southern Cameroun fell under the British colony,

the Northern Cameroun was administered by France. Upon gaining political

independence by Nigeria and Cameroun as well as the discovery of oil and other natural

resources in the Bakassi Peninsula, the border conflict between the two countries began

to gather fresh momentum.

2

Successive Nigerian governments had made various efforts in settling the Bakassi

question. Specifically, after the ‘Maroon Accord reached between the Heads of state,

General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon in which Gowon

allegedly gave out the territory to Cameroon, General Murtala Mohammed that took over

from the Gowon military regime threatened that rather than accept the outrageous

agreement, Nigeria would go to war if Cameroonians refused further negotiations

(Babatola and Jadesola, 2012). On assumption of office as the military head of state after

the bloody coup d’etat that led to the assassination of General Murtala in 1976, Obasanjo

made significant efforts to re-open the border negotiations with the Cameroonian

authorities with little or no achievement recorded (Babatola and Jadesola, 2012)

Between May 15th 1981 and 1993, the Peninsula remained a subject of serious

dispute, between Cameroon and Nigeria with scores of lives lost due to military

aggressions and tribal squabbles (Olumide, 2002). As tension continued to mount and

many more lives lost as a result of the conflict, the Cameroonian government got tired

and, on March 24, 1994, filed a law suit against Nigeria at the International Court of

Justice, at Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which they

said were occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to sovereignty

over the peninsula.

Remarkebly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling (on Thursday 10th

October 2002) over the Bakassi conflict in favor of Cameroon (against the wish of the

Bakassi people and the majority of Nigerians) during the Obasanjo Civilian

Administration has indeed, opened a vista of debates among scholars pertains to the

3

implications of the ICJ position on the national interest and in extension, foreign policy

of Nigeria

Against this background, this study critically examines the fundamental rights of

the people of Bakassi Peninsula in the management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute

under President Obasanjo civilian administration.

1.2 Statement of the problem

At the core of foreign policy of any given state is its national interest. Thus,

according to Igwe (2007:157):

Foreign policy is the coordinated application of the elements of national power for the promotion of national interest as defined by the ruling class in relations between states and other international actors, a practical substantiation of grand-strategy, the external expression of domestic policy and the main object of foreign policy analysis

Since actors in the international system are numerous, interest pursuing cannot exist

without interacting with other actors in the system. It therefore behooves on them to draw

up well-defined programmes and activities coupled with certain behavioral traits or

tendencies with which it interacts with other actors so as to maximize their interest, and

possibly, even at the detriment of other actors in the system (Ofoeze, 2011)

Interestingly, at the core of Nigerian foreign policy is the advancement of her

national interest, especially as it affects the interests of the citizens. But suffice it to say

that President Obasanjo’s diplomatic approach to Nigerian-Cameroun border dispute,

which eventually led to Bakassi people being ceded away to Cameroun, had indeed,

raised serious debate as it concerns the Nigeria’s national interest.

4

The Nigerian-Cameroon border conflict gained international dimension and

prominence in March 24, 1994 following a law suit filed by Cameroonian government in

the International Court of Justice in Hague against the Nigerian government. The suit

sought an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which they claimed were

occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from establishing to sovereignty over

Peninsula (Tariebbea and Baroni, 2010). The 1913 Anglo-German agreement shifted the

Peninsula from its original position in Nigeria in favor of Cameroon. This was indeed,

supported by the 1975 “Maroon Declaration” between the Heads of state, General Yakubu

Gowon of Nigeria and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon in which Gowon allegedly gave out the

territory to Cameroon (Olumide, 2002)

Various steps taken by successive Nigerian leaders to retain Bakassi as part of

Nigerian federation proved abortive. This was indeed, to climax in the ICJ ruling in October

10, 2002, which placed Bakassi under the ownership of Cameroon. By this judgment,

sovereignty over Bakassi was transferred to the Republic of Cameroon. The judgment was

overwhelmingly condemned by the mass of the Nigerian people.

The swift and unilateral action that was taken by the Obasanjo civilian administration

in aiding the outright ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon had indeed, generated mixed feelings in

Nigeria pertaining to the rationale behind the ICJ judgment.

Scholars such as Asobie (2003), Baye (2010), Anene (2005), Nweke (1982), Ngan

(2010), Fombo (2006), Rose and Sama (2006), Eke (2009), among others, have written

extensively on the Nigerian-Cameroon border conflict and its management. However, none

of these scholars has critically examined the ceding away of the disputed Bakassi territotry to

Cameroon by the Obasanjo civilian administration and the fundamental human rights of the

people of Bakassi Peninsula. It is however, this noticeable and existing lacuna in the extant

5

literature that this research work is aimed at filling using the under listed research questions

as a guide:

1. Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi

Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens rights

and territorial integrity?

2. Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ

ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to critically examine the ICJ ruling over the

Bakassi Peninsular and the extent to which it infringes on the fundamental human rights

of the Bakassi people. However, the specific objectives include:

1. To ascertain whether Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over Bakassi

Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens rights

and territorial integrity

2. To determine if Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to

ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people

1.4 Significance of the study

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. The theoretical

relevance of this study derives from its focus on ascertaining whether the role played by

Olusegun Obasanjo in Bakassi dispute undermined Nigeria’s national interest of protection of

her citizens and territorial integrity and if the Nigeria government inability to explore

alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the

Bakassi people, thereby providing a new framework under which the problem could be

explained and analyzed. Furthermore, the findings of this study will add to the existing

6

stock of scholarly literature on the Nigerian-Bakassi boundary dispute. As such, it will

then serve as a reference material or data for scholars whose interest would eventually be

aroused by the findings to undertake further studies on the area.

Practically, this study will be of immense importance to the Nigerian government

and law makers at various levels, international observers, and indeed, other relevant

bodies interested in the issues pertaining to the Nigerian-Cameroon border dispute. And

as such, will provide valuable data/information that will assist them to articulate potent

policies that will help to address the issue.

1.5 Hypotheses

The understated hypotheses are put forward to guide the study:

1. Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi

Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens’

rights and territorial integrity

2. The Nigeria government’s inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling

undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people

1.6 Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge

The central thesis of this study derives from our major findings arising from lacuna

that exist in the views of scholars in the area of the study. These findings are in two

different dimensions. Firstly, it was one the findings of this study that even though there

were policy options to Obasanjo’s civilian administration, the Nigeria government

support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s

national interest of protection of her citizens and territorial integrity. To this end, and in

order to ensure that this thesis has not been implicated in the views of other scholars that

have carried out research on the area, we reviewed the views of scholars such as Asobie

7

(2003), Baye (2010), Anene (2005),To Ngan (2010) and Fombo (2006), Rose and Sama

(2006),among others. Asobie (2003) and Baye (2010) admit that the existence of

authoritarian regimes in both countries and military approach equally posed difficulty in

resolving the crisis. Anene (2005) was of the view that the lingering border crisis

between Nigeria and Cameroon and its difficulty in managing it stems from the manner

under which African boundaries arbitrarily demarcated. Rose and Sama (2006) whether

President Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi

Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and

territorial integrity

Secondly, it was equally the finding of this study that the Nigeria government’s

inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide

where to belong by the Bakassi people. This was derived from the lacuna that exists from

the views of scholars we reviewed on the area. For instance Ebeghulem (2008) contends

that the diplomatic impact of the Nigeria’s foreign policy over Bakassi, and the Nigeria’s

handling of the Bakassi imbroglio before, during and after the ICJ judgment, had left

nothing to desire. His argument centers on the fact that the population of Bakassi is

overwhelmingly Nigerians. Its local government, functions as part of Cross River State

since the inception of the State. The Efik Nigerians have always voted to choose their

representatives whenever the civilian governments hold sway since Nigeria’s

independence in 1960. The residents of Bakassi according to him believe themselves as

Nigerians because they have always participated in all decision-making process since the

nation was born. He recommends that Bakassi people should have therefore, been given

the privilege to determine their future instead of being partitioned into Cameroon as

implied by the ICJ’s ruling.

8

Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) noted that the arbitrary delimitation of Africa

into sovereign entities has remained the root cause of the dispute between Nigeria and

Cameroon. They opine that the African territories which have attained independence and

national sovereignty, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as national states. They do not

embrace a common past and a common culture. They are indeed, the arbitrary creations

of colonialist. Rouke (1997) has however examined the general trend of European

colonial imposed boundaries on Africa; pointing directly at Bakassi as one of such

imposed African boundaries. He assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa.

He points out that the industrialization of the North was one factor that caused the

colonization of the South in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He noted that Africa was

largely controlled by its indigenous peoples in 1878 but had, by 1914 become almost

totally subjugated and divided into colonies by the European powers.

However, these scholars, among others, have failed to examine whether the

Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined

the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people. This constitutes our second thesis

and contribution to the existing knowledge.

9

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

The study focuses on the examination of alternative policy options in the

management of Nigeria-Cameroun border dispute under President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Accordingly, the aim of this review is to examine pertinent literature with respect to the

following research questions in order to locate the gap in the literature:

1. Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi

Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens’

rights and territorial integrity?

2. Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ

ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?

The ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula and Nigeria’s national interest of

protection of her citizens’ rights and territorial integrity

In a study of the international conflict between two neighboring and under-

developed African States, Nigeria and Cameroon, Asobie (2003) anchored his analysis on

the principles and norms thrown up by the conflict situation, and of the domestic political

and economic contexts of international and practical policy interest. He identifies a clear

link between authoritative repressive regimes and high proclivity in resolving

international disputes such as the Bakassi question by the use of violence and the

escalation of the dispute. Thus, according to him, it was under the highly repressive

regimes of Babangida and Abacha in Nigeria and Paul Biya in Cameroon that the conflict

between the two countries arising from the dispute over boundaries and territories almost

degenerated to violent confrontations. He maintains that economic interests, especially

10

stakes in some valuable natural resources, rather than concern for human lives and

consideration for human welfare, underlie most international conflicts.

Baye (2010) examines the geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and

Cameroon and outlines socio-economic implications of its peaceful settlement. He

observes that the neglect and subsequent discovery of oil deposits subjected the Bakassi

peninsula to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military occupation and recourse

to the international court of justice (ICJ). He maintains that the ICJ ruling in 2002 in

favor of Cameroon, although based on sound historical evidence, had faced

implementation difficulties. Thus according to him, following mediation by the United

Nations (UN) Secretary – General, the Green-tree agreement and subsequent instruments,

Nigeria completed the withdrawal of her military, policy and administration from the

Bakassi peninsula by 14 August 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social

movements, the entire process, he contends, could be viewed as a model in peaceful

resolution of border conflicts.

Anene (2005) takes a more thorough and holistic approach to the establishment of

Nigeria’s boundaries. He debunks the popular theory of Africa’s boundary arrangement,

and especially that of Nigeria being naturally injurious to the pre-colonial political order.

Treating with remarkable details, the ethnic composition of contiguous areas on Nigeria’s

borders, and the diplomatic negotiations that took place to establish them, he describes as

being “unhistorical” and “dangerous” the emotive phrases denouncing the existing

international boundaries in Africa. He maintains that the various tradeoffs among

European states and the ethnic considerations they took, gives us an inkling of the

11

enormous difficulties inherent in embarking on revisionisms of the present borders of

Nigeria to satisfy ethnic sentiments or claims, and by extension, the rest of Africa.

To Ngan (2010) and Fombo (2006), economic interest was the major issue that

brought Nigeria and Cameroon to the brink to war. As Ngang (2010: 20) had noted:

Socially speaking, both Cameroon and Nigeria had not carried out any reasonable development in the area in terms of communication networks, health and education as to claim ownership

Furthermore, he maintains that the security issue and national interest are closely linked

to economic interests while the political aspect was just a mere effort by politicians to

divert public attention from the real issues they had failed to address. Fombo (2006)

reiterates that invariably, economic nationalism inspired by the mineral and other natural

endowments of the disputed areas, is central to the dispute. He posits that besides

economic factor, domestic political forces in these countries and their colonial

backgrounds synergized with the basic economic element to reinforce the conflict

situation. Thus according to him, the whole legalistic considerations embodied in the

international court of justice judgment of Oct. 10 2002, had in essence, proved to be a

novel vista for renewed bilateral diplomacy to resolve the dispute.

Rose and Sama (2006) had examined the question of identity and power play in

Bakassi, which according to them, had constituted serious impediments in managing the

border question, from the level of the community to the state and external levels. For

instance, they argue that ethno-cultural forces unleashed by the political liberalization

process have always accentuated the struggle to control resources.

Eke (2009) contends that the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi

was a carryover effect of the unhealthy relationship between Nigeria and France resulting

12

from the overwhelming influence of France in the sub-region. He observes that Nigeria

got her independence in 1960 and became a Republic in 1963 with sovereign authority

over her international relations with the world at large. Nigeria, at infancy, was engaged

in a civil war with the secessionist Biafra between 1967 and 1970. He further infers that

at the end of the war after 30 months, border skirmishes erupted between the Cameroon

gendarmes and Nigeria villages in the Bakassi area.

The alternative policy options to ICJ ruling and the right to decide where to belong by

the Bakassi people

Focusing on what he calls “diplomatic blunder” in handling the Nigeria’s foreign

policy, Ebeghulem (2008) contends that the diplomatic impact of the Nigeria’s foreign

policy over Bakassi, and the Nigeria’s handling of the Bakassi imbroglio before, during

and after the ICJ judgment had left nothing to desire. His argument centers on the fact

that the population of Bakassi is overwhelmingly Nigerian. Its local government,

functions as part of Cross River State since the inception of the State. The Efik Nigerians

have always voted to choose their representatives whenever the civilian governments

hold sway since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. The residents of Bakassi according to

him, believe themselves as Nigerians because they have always participated in all

decision-making process since the nation was born. He recommends that Bakassi people

should have therefore, been given the privilege to determine their future instead of being

partitioned into Cameroon as implied by the ICJ’s ruling.

Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) noted that the arbitrary delimitation of Africa

into sovereign entities as the cause of the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. They

opine that the African territories which have attained independence and national

sovereignty, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as national states. They do not embrace

13

a common past and a common culture. They are indeed, the arbitrary creations of

colonialist. The manner in which European nations descended on Africa during the

closing years of the nineteenth century in their scramble for territory was bound to leave

a heritage of artificially controlled borderlines, which now demarcate the emergent

African states. Having examined critically, the international court of justice (ICJ)

judgment on the Bakassi Peninsula, they demonstrate clearly that the international

agreements of the era of the scramble for Africa are sources of conflict among African

states, themselves, equally, they noted that several boundary disputes, have broken out

between African states and so far, there is no acceptable criteria which may afford the

best guide to a settlement of an ‘unhappy legacy of colonialism’, and they historical

research may enable African states men to borrow a leaf from their pre-colonial

ancestors, whose attitude to international frontiers between one ethnic group and the

other was much less emotional, much less rigid and much more pragmatic than that

which may African leaders are adopting today.

Rouke (1997) however examined the general trend of European colonial imposed

boundaries on Africa; pointing directly at Bakassi as one of such imposed African

boundaries. He assessed at length the legacy of colonialism in Africa. He points out that

the industrialization of the North was one factor that caused the colonization of the South

in the late 1800s and early 1900s. He showed that Africa was largely controlled by its

indigenous peoples in 1878 but had, by 1914 become almost totally subjugated and

divided into colonies by the European powers. The colonial boundaries had little

relationship to the territories occupied by the various indigenous peoples, grouping

nations together in some cases and dividing them in others. He further points out that

14

within seven decades, virtually all of the colonies regained their independence, but many

of the new countries (such as Rwanda) have been troubled by the legacy of trying to get

two or more states to live peacefully in a single state.

Akamode (2000) emphasized on the paradox of the peninsula when he maintained

that the peninsula is a community that subsists in the midst of plenty-plenty of fish and

oil deposit – but is ravaged by poverty. He further traced the dispute in the oil rich area

between Nigeria and Cameroon from 1993, leading to loss of lives from military

aggressions that have been mostly instigated by Cameroon.

Kolapo (2002) gave a critical analysis of the far-reaching political and economic

implications on the Nigerian state. He points out that the ICJ ruling would have adverse

effect on the Nigerian state as a whole. His primary emphasis was on the security

implications, the social structure, the pride of Nigerians and the economic jeopardy on

the Nigerian state amongst others.

Sanusi (2002) studied the international court of justice ruling on the Nigeria

Cameroon problems and indeed he was interested on the way of the judgment that ceded

the peninsula to Cameroon. He hopwever pointed that the judgment made no sense. His

question was “How do you cede a people with different culture, different language and

background to another nation whose background differs completely?” He insisted that

Bakassi people are Nigerians who cannot become Cameroonians overnight. He pointed

out the need for the Nigerian government to appeal to the World Court for a review of the

judgment.

Rudin (1938) traced the activities of the Germans and British traders in the areas

during her colonial days. He observes that the German administrators in the Cameroons

15

attached great importance to the Benue and its tributaries as the best, quickest and most

profitable way of gaining access to the hinterland of their colony. He further observes

that the attempts at penetrating this hinterland from the Cameroon coast failed

disastrously. Hence, the Germans through their agent Flegel pretended to regard all the

region north of the latitude of the Cross River ‘rapids’ as no man’s land. Though the book

is highly critical on the activities of the Germans and the British during the period, it

failed to highlight the consequences of their actions on the boundary areas and inter state

relations between the two African States.

To Uffot (2008), the final handover ceremony which took place in Calabar, the

Cross River state capital last Thursday, August 14 was, however, not devoid of tension

and anxiety. That even on the eve of the historic event, the mood of residents of the

peninsula was that of fear, anger and uncertainty. The uncertainty according to him was

informed by the order from a federal high court that without prejudice to the judgment of

the world court in Hague, the status quo should be maintained on the Bakassi Peninsula.

But, while some Nigerians in Bakassi were urging the federal government to obey the

order by the high court and shelve the handover, the administration of President Umar

Musa Yar’Adua insisted on obeying the judgment of the international court which ceded

the disputed Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon and the Green Tree Agreement which fixed

August 14 as handover date.

Francis (2010) examines the Article 3 of the Green Tree Agreement, which spelt

out the modalities for the transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon. To him, the section states that

Cameroon shall not force Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsula to have the zone or

change their nationality. Other sections of the agreement provides that Cameroon shall,

16

respect the culture, language, beliefs and rights of the Bakassi people to continue their

agricultural and fishing activities as well as protect their properties and that there shall be

no imposition of discriminatory decisions on them. He noted that the task of resettling the

displaced people of Bakassi who have chosen to move to Nigerian was enormous.

According to him, in as much as the Cross River State government and the federal

government were committed to ensuring that the people were catered for, the

international community should assist with the provision of funds to complement the

efforts of government.

Michael (2006) noted that the task of completing the implementation of the

International Court of Justice judgment by handling over Bakassi to Cameroon was

painful. He however noted that the fact that the event eventually took place was a vivid

demonstration of President Yar’Adua’s commitment to the rule of law. He infers that the

government was very much interested in the welfare of the Bakassi returnees and

enjoined the Cameroonian authorities to abide by their guarantee that they will fully

integrate all those who elect to remain in their ancestral home in Bakassi.

The climax of the ceremony was signing of the hand over instrument and

exchange of flags. While Aondoakaa, attorney-general of the federation and minister of

justice signed for Nigeria, Ahmadou Ali, Cameroonian justice minister signed on behalf

of his country. Ali held President Paul Biya of Cameroon as a man of peace who would

abide by the commitment he made under the Green Tree Agreement, GTA. Kieran

Prendergast, chairman of the follow-up committee who represented Ban Kimoon, UN

secretary-general described the event as the triumph of the rule of law. Said Djinnit,

17

Algerian diplomat and chairman of the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission

commended the Nigerian government for respecting the rule of law.

The fate of Bakassi has been a subject of controversy. While the militants and the

students under the aegis of the National Association of Nigeria Students (NANS) has

warned government on the consequences of the handover, a few other Nigerians

threatened to sue President Yar’Adua for contempt if government went ahead to disobey

the order of the Federal High Court. Henshaw (2005) Observes that the National

Assembly was not in support of the handover because it has not ratified the ICJ judgment

and the Green Tree Agreement..

Although the handover of Bakkassi has been done, many indigenes still feel that

the problem associated with the ceding of the area might still linger. Florence Ita-Giwa

who is heading the resettlement committee said Bakassi people were ready to live in the

peninsula provided the Cameroonians respect their rights. But some indigenes said this

may not be feasible if the antecedents of the gendarmes are anything to go by. Ogen

(2010) argued contrary to the positions of other scholars who have taken the historic side

of the peninsular, when he submitted that Nigeria’s claim of ownership of the peninsula

is logically indefensible and historically unsustainable. Contending further, he noted that

Effik irredentism which found its expression in Nigeria’s attempt to forcefully annex the

Bakassi peninsula is based on historical claims that are in reality largely not historical. He

is of the opinion that Nigeria’s occupation of and attempts of exercise sovereignty over

the peninsula emanated from the predictable desire of the Nigerian ruling elite to

appropriate Bakassi’s abundant natural resources and the strategic advantage that the

peninsula holds for Nigeria’s oil interest in the Gulf of Guinea. He further analyses the

18

border-cum-migration problems that prevail in the peninsula. He argues that patterns of

migrant life rooted in historic and still functioning socio-cultural and economic networks

persist in defiance equally of national and international agreement and political claims to

ethnic solidarity. He concludes that peace can only be guaranteed in the Bakassi, and

indeed in virtually and conflict prone African borderlines, if African governments

respects the old ‘Glass house rule’ (ie. The 1964 Cairo Declaration by the OAU) and

acknowledge that colonial treaties and national borders, irrespective of their arbitraries

and artificiality, constitute the foundation of all modern African state structures.

Uffot (2011) argued that until August 14, 2008, Bakassi was one of the 774 Local

Government Areas recognized by the 1999 constitution of Nigeria. That however,

following the ceding of the peninsula to Cameroon on that day, after years of legal battles

at the international court of justice (ICJ), it became constitutionally dead. But

investigations have revealed that three years after the council became defunct, statutory

monthly allocation of about N50 million is still being made to it from the federation

account even as the constitution has neither been amended to that effect nor much done

about the right of the affected people.

Gap in Literature

From the review of extant literature pertaining to Nigerian-Cameroon boundary

conflict and its management, most of the literature reviewed were of the same view that

the discovery of oil in Bakassi Peninsula at commercial quantity contributed to the

escalation of the crisis and difficulty in its management. This is because, according to the

scholars, each of the countries in question would not want to compromise its position

over the ownership of the oil-reached zone. However, Asobie (2003) and Baye (2010)

19

added further that the existence of authoritarian regimes in both countries and military

approach equally posed difficulty in resolving the crisis. Anene (2005) was of the view

that the lingering border crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon and its difficulty in

managing it stems from the manner under which African boundaries arbitrarily

demarcated. Rose and Sama (2006) examined the question of identity and power play in

Bakassi, which according to them, had constituted serious impediments in managing the

border question. But none of these scholars has critically examined whether Predient

Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula

undermined Nigeria’s national interest of protection of her citizens and territorial

integrity and whether the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options

to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people. It is

therefore, this noticeable lacuna in the views of scholars that this paper seeks to fill

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This research is situated within the context of the Classical Games Theory. The

theory has become imperative in this study because of its effectiveness and merit among

other means for the study and understanding of behavioral patterns of state and non-state

actors in conflict situation across national frontiers. The theory was propounded by the

great mathematician and economists, Neumann and Oscar (1944) and in its original sense

Game theory is used to model situation where decisions must be made within certain

constraints. The idea is to reduce situations to a game where the potential of achieving

certain outcomes must be maximized. They further relate to game theory as a body of

thought dealing with the rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and

competition, when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize

losses.

20

Thus, according to Kanppi and Viotti, (1957), games theory is a decision-making

approach based on the assumption of actor rationality in a situation of competition. Each

actor tries to minimize losses under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete

information, which requires each actor to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities,

and try to discern what the other actor is going to do

Expatiating furthermore, Igwe (2007), perceives games theory as a long

anticipated by a versatile German philosopher, Gottfied Wilhem Leibniz (1646-1716),

and a multi-disciplinary, pro-quantitative, often conflict decision-making theory, using

the analogy of games, clear rules, predictable or consistent behavior, rational assumptions

and choices, equal or balance of power attributes, comprehensive information among

others, to examine and forecast outcomes in any competitive political process, and

develop strategies for the optimization of the chances of success. Hence, the multiform

application of the theory to military strategy, political contests, business and

administrative affairs, government, among others.

In analysis of political situation, Riker (1962) therefore, contends that the theory

as it affects the analysis of competition and conflict situation in politics is likened to the

many games which we play for recreation such as poker, bridge, or chess, which bear

some abstract and hunted resemblance to conflict situation in real life, such as business

competition, politics, diplomacy, and war and it is in part, for this reasons that people

have found such games interesting and attractive. Furthermore, according to Riker, such a

game, each player has a scale of utilities according to which he prefers some outcomes,

so long as he plays the game at all. He also has a range of options among different moves

21

which he can make, and he has some set of expectations as to the probable outcome of

any move he may choose.

More still, in this kind of game, especially as it concerns politics, for any player to

play well, he must know what he wants, what he knows and also what he does not know.

His knowledge of the outcome of his moves is uncertain, because in a typical game, the

result of one’s moves will depend on the move the opponent makes. So often, players

will not know completely such uncertainty; players must make their moves on the most

rational possible guess or estimate (Ricker, 1962). As long as they are playing the game,

the players play to win or at least not to lose. It is for this purpose that they choose single

moves and short sequence called “tactics” as well as longer patterns and sequence of

moves, which is called “strategy”, and in which the tactical moves are included as

components. The most rational strategy then for a player, according to Riker, is the one

most likely to produce a winning outcome or by another criterion, if the pay-off can be

expressed in quantitative terms, then the most rational strategy is the one that minimizes

net losses.

Application of Theory

Nigerian-Cameroon border dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula had

presented a clear example of game situation whereby by each player plays to win or at

least not to lose within certain constraints. For this purpose, it is therefore expected that

the two countries involved be as much as possible, rational and strategic or indeed,

choose single moves and short/long sequences in handling the Bakassi conflict. Although

the decisions or judgments of the ICJ are binding on Nigeria as member of the United

Nations, the country’s political actors (including especially President Obasanjo) during

22

and after the ICJ judgment, which was in support of ceding oil-rich Bakassi to the

Republic of Cameroon, could not consider the available strategies and tactics that

constitutes alternative policy options in pursuing the Bakassi question given the

economic and strategic importance of area to Nigeria. It is not surprising therefore that

Nigeria lost the long established historical part of her federation to Republic of

Cameroon. To the people of Cameroon, the victory at ICJ was indeed, kudos to their

President, Paul Biya while Nigerians perceived it as eternal mistake, especially given the

alternative policy options.

23

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Method of Data Collection

We relied mainly on qualitative descriptive method of data collection. Qualitative

desciptive method represents a more or less selective type of research often used in

exploratory and normative designs, where the main objective is to gain a variety of

insights so as to discover and identify decision problems and opportunities (Biereenu-

Nnabugwu, 2006). To this end, we made use of secondary sources of data namely,

textbooks, Journals, magazines, newspapers, internet sources, and publications from the

international organizations such as ICJ and UN documents.

3.2 Research Design

Research design is like a blueprint that leads the researcher to plausible answers

to the research problems by enabling him to determine how much of the observed

variance of the dependent variable can be attributed to the independent variable and how

much can be attributed to other substantive variables (Leege and Francis 1974). To

Nwana (1981), it is used to describe a number of decisions which need to be taken

regarding the collection of data before ever the data are collected. However, two main

research designs have been identified namely, survey research design and experimental

research design; the former is further divided into descriptive research and ex-post facto

research (Obasi, 1999). In this study however, we adopted expost facto research design,

in which there were series of pre-measurement and post measurement or before and after

observation required for establishing casual relationships of cause -effect relationship.

O1 O2 O3 O4 X O5 O6 O7 O8.

24

There were series of pre-measurement and post measurement, but the change

between 04 and 05 was the principal focus for measuring the effect of the quasi –

experimental treatment, that is, the effect of President Obasanjo’s approach to Bakassi

dispute on the ICJ judgment. In other words, the difference in score (i.e. the ceding away

of Bakassi to Cameroon) from 04 and 05 was attributed to the causal event (i.e. the

Obasanjo’s diplomatic approach). The design, despite its lack of control group,

overcomes for a wide variety of threat to internal validity. However, the principal threat

to the design is history. The series of before observation from 04 to 03 and after

observation from 04 to 08 was used to control for the interactive effect of history.

3.3 Method of Data Analysis

Our method of data analysis is equally anchored on qualitative descriptive

method. Qualitative method of analysis is “the interpretations study of a specified issue of

problem in which the researcher is central to the sense that is made” (Parker quoted in

Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006:365). Through qualitative descriptive analysis, descriptive

explanation is given to the data gathered in a research in order to establish a relationship

between the variables under study

25

3.4 Logical Data Framework

Research

questions

Hypotheses Major

variable of

the

hypotheses

Indicators of

variables

Sources of data Method of

data

collection

Method of data

analysis

(1) Did Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity?

Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity

X Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula

• Signing of the Green Tree Agreement with Paul Biya of Cameroun

• Support for the UN Mix-Commission meant to facilitate the implementation of the ICJ ruling

• Support for the demarcation of land and maritime boundaries between Cameroun and Nigeria

• Withdrawal of Nigeria’s civilian administration, military and police forces from Bakassi

Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials

Qualitative descriptive method

• Qualitative descriptive methods

• Classical Games Theory

Y Undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial integrity

• Protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Nigeria

• Protection of the universal rights of self determination of the citizens

• Promotion of the security and economic wellbeing of the citizens

Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials

Qualitative descriptive method

• Qualitative descriptive method

• Classical Games Theory

26

(2) Has the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?

The Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people

X The Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling

• Obasanjo’s inability to explore the following alternative options:

-Legal options -Political options -Military options

Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials

Qualitative descriptive method

• Qualitative descriptive method

• Classical Games Theory

Y Undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people?

• Right for self determination

• Right of freedom from security threat

• Right of freedom of expression

Questionnaire, Books, Journals articles, Official documents, Internet materials

Qualitative descriptive method

• Qualitative descriptive method

• Classical Games Theory

27

CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND TO THE BAKASSI DISPUTE

4.1 Geography of the Nigerian Cameroun Boundary

Cameroon and Nigeria are states situated on the west coast of Africa. Their land

boundary extends from Lake Chad in the north to the Bakassi Peninsular in the south.

Their coastlines are adjacent and are washed by the waters of the Gulf of Guinea. Four

States border Lake Chad: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The coastal region, where

the southern part of the land boundary ends, is the area of the Bakassi Peninsular. This

peninsular, situated in the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea, is bounded by the River

Akwayafe to the west and by the Rio del Rey to the east. It is an amphibious

environment, characterized by an abundance of water, fish stocks and mangrove

vegetation. The Gulf of Guinea, which is concave in character at the level of the

Cameroonian and the Nigerian coastlines, is bounded by other states, in particular by

Equatorial Guinea, whose Bioko Island lies opposite Nigerian/Cameroons coastlines

(Ekoko, 2004).

According to Fombo, (2006:39), “the border between Nigeria and Cameroon can

be differentiated into roughly four physical and ecological sectors”. In its northern most

part, the land boundary traverses Lake Chad and the neighboring plains at an average

altitude of about 200m above sea level. This unbroken plan during the rainy season from

June to September is inundated over large areas by waters of the Yedseram River and its

tributaries. This area, especially as one approach Lake Chad, becomes completely water

logged during the rains. During the dry season, which is longer, the soil loses the excess

water and becomes hard, providing rear water, cultivable land and pasture.

28

Beyond this, the second phase which can be characterized as the land boundary is

a near continuous chain of mountains and valleys only broken by Benue valley near Yola.

The area provides the source of headwaters for many rivers that drain into either the

Benue or Cross River basins that flow into Nigeria or the Sanaga and its tributaries that

flow into the Atlantic on the Cameroon Coast. The predominant human activity in this

sector is grazing although there are patches of cultivated grounds. This sector continues

with a gradual descend from the Savanna mountains region through more peaks and

valleys and traverses very dense equatorial forest before approaching the cost. Describing

this border, Anene (1970), gives a vivid account of its features that the region stretching

from the Bamenda Plateau to the Alantika Mountain peak south of Yola, is of fantastic

mountain formations, including Plateaux, Parallel ranges and innumerable hill-tops.

These are broken into the deep ravines which provide the river systems through which

tributaries flow north-westwards of the Benue and North-board plain, some eighty miles

by forty miles, dominated by Yola. Between the Benue and Lake Chad the geographical

configuration repeats the features of the region south of Yola. There are the same

irregular masses and a broken sea of granite peaks. The Yadseram valley, however,

provides uninterrupted access to the plains of Ornu. The irregular mountain formations,

north and south of Yola, gradually disappear as one moves Eastwards into Cameroon

Republic, to give way to a low Plateau covered with grass in the north and thick tropical

forest in the south (Anene, 1970:40).

The third geographical sector of this border is the coastal region that descends

into the area of the Bakassi peninsular and the adjoining Islands. This area is in the

trough of the Gulf of Guinea with predominantly mangrove swamp vegetation. The

29

Akpayafe assumed to be at the boundary in this area; the Rio del Rey and Ndian River to

the east, as well as the Calabar and Cross River to the west, dominate the hydrology to

this generally amphibious environment.

Fourthly and perhaps the final sector of this boundary is the maritime zone

characterized by a broken and adjacent coast. The maritime boundary between Nigeria

and Cameroon also ends in an ill-defined tripoint with Equatorial Guinea. The presence

of Eloko Island (Fermando po) belonging to equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and

Principe within this gulf further complicated delineation and demarcation efforts and the

fact that the latter pair was not party to the dispute at the Hague precluded a

comprehensive judicial ruing on the entire maritime boundary between these countries.

Considerable oil deposits in this area and the maritime life have impassioned commotions

and compounded efforts, and at the same time, accentuated the need for a clear

demarcation of the maritime zone (Anene, 1970:40)

To this end, the import of understanding the geography of the Nigeria-Cameroon

frontier to guide our appreciation of the border dispute cannot be overemphasized. As

noted by Aghemelo and Ibhasephor, (2006:2) “the geography of most of the zone in the

boundary, has impact or even dictated the settlement patterns along the boundary.

Besides, its direct impact on settlement patterns, equally critical is the fact that human

activities along the border are also dependent on the geography, which indeed carriers a

higher premium for developing societies that depend more heavily and directly on the

immediate environs for subsistence exploitation of hydrological resources. On one side of

the border, for instance, the flow pattern of rivers that takes their rise and flow across to

the other. (eg. Persistent wrangles over water management on the river kilia). There is the

30

significant overhand of population and human activities across the border, especially

where the same people straddle the boundary. In the maritime zone, natural resources in

the form of marine life and oil deposits lie across the border, providing opportunities for

intense competition and bickering over their control.

4.2 Evolution of Colonial Boundaries

African territories which have attained independence and national sovereignty

today, cannot in a strict sense, be regarded as nationals states. They do not embrace a

common past and a common culture, they are indeed, the arbitrary creations of the

colonialists. The manner in which European nations descended on Africa during the

closing years of the nineteenth century in their scramble for territory, was bound to leave

a heritage of artificially controlled borderlines, which now demarcates the emergent

African states. Reflecting on the emergency of many new sovereign states in

contemporary Africa, Davidson (1967) observed: “Their history begins anew”. They

reappear today in the sad evening of the world of nation-states: yet their own tradition,

one may note was seldom on the narrow nationality. Their genius was for integration-

integration by conquest is the times prescribed, but also but an every partful mongling

and migration. They were never patient of exclusive frontiers… the problem of redrawing

frontiers on a national plan. As independence widens across these coming years, will this

plan stop short with the making of nation-states aping European example?... it remains to

be seen (cited in Agbemelo and Ibahsebhor: 179). In other words, Africa was largely

controlled by indigenous people in the 1870s, but by 1914, it became almost exclusively

subjugated and divided into protectorates/colonies by the European powers (Aghmelo

and Ibhasebhor, 2006:1; Ronrke 1997:5). A clear example of this is as obtained in the

case of Nigeria state. As Chukwu (2002) writes, no doubt, Nigerian-British relations in

31

the early years of the twentieth century showed how weak the former was in relation to

the latter, militarily and technologically. To this end, Britain was able to successfully

impose her political and economic policies and practices without the consent of the

people. Among the propelling forces for territorial acquisitions in Africa was the rise of

the capitalist class in Britain following the Industrial Revolution. The capitalists, in

search of investments abroad, did demand that the British government should establish

political control over the indigenous Nigerian peoples. Such political control was

traditionally designed to be backed by military power on the part of the invading state.

Let us therefore consider how the British used their military power in an attempt to

conquer, how they equally and their military security for their economic and political

investments.

The year 1851 has always been seen as making a watershed in the annuals of

Nigerian political history. This is because it was in that year that the event that would

affect the whole of the Niger area (which eventually emerged as Nigeria) took place. As

at the time the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was Lord Palmerston who

had as his policy thrust the extension of British legitimate trade to all parts of the world

and was prepared to remove any impediment on his way to actualizing the policy. It was

thus in a bid to execute his pogramme of trade expansion in West Africa that Palmerston

appointed Mr. John Beecroft a British Consul in charge of the Bights of Benin and Biafra

with a residence at Fenrnando Po.

At the time in question, the King of Dahomey had bluntly refused to give up his

alleged involvement in slave trading activities unless the King of Lagos was first forced

to stop it. It would be recalled that the international slave trade was at this time an outlaw

32

and was being replaced by the so-called legitimate trade that would benefit the European

economy. Consequent upon the controversy and statement over who should first be made

to stop the trade Beecroft was instructed by London to deal with the Lagos King Kosoko,

a man considered by some analysts as being of a strong and resolute character. It was this

air of boldness and assertiveness on the part of Kosoko that necessitated the use of force

by Consul Beecroft to attack and deport him. Although he put up some initial resistance,

when the British employed the maxim guns, Kosoko, (undermined by his local

opponents) was defeated and driven into exile.

Having gone into exile, Kosoko was quickly replaced by his uncle, Akitoye, who

had assisted the British in dethroning the former. A man of weak character Akitoye was

pro-British for fear of being deposed as had happened to Kosoko. On January 1, 1852, a

treaty was signed between him and the British representative. The following were the

principal terms of the treaty:

i. The abolition of the slave trade

ii. Provision for freedom of trade for British subjects, other Europeans not

excluded e

iii. Expulsion of European slave traders and

iv. Protection of the European missionaries giving them the right to build

churches and schools.

As can be inferred from the foregoing, the essence of the treaty was to provide

freedom and security that would facilitate the so-called legitimate trade for European

traders. It would be re-called that the slave trade at the time was becoming obsolete and

unprofitable and had therefore, become illegitimate in the eyes of the British. On the

33

whole, the essence of the treaty was guided by commercial ambition, though coated in a

religious language.

While in exile, Kosoko made some subterranean moves to re-posses his lost

throne. For instance, in 1853 he started an attack known as the “Ija Ifaseg Boja” war on

Akitoye. Amidst these inspired attacks by Kosoko, Akitoye was said to have died and

was consequently succeeded by his son, Dosumu.

A man of weaker character, Dosumu was supported to the throne with a view to

the eventual cession of Lagos to the British. At the time when the Whig government in

London was emphasizing trade expansionism everywhere in the world especially West

Africa, the British only needed a pliant king in the person of Dosumu to dominate the

trade in Lagos. A coastal enclave that had hitherto played a dominant role in the slave

trade, Lagos was badly needed by Britain in the merging legitimate trade. Besides

London needed the Lagos port at all cost to be able to ward off the French military

incursion in parts of the West Coast of Africa. According to source, however, as at June

22, 1861 when Dosumu and his people received London’s threat of bombardment, they

had refused to cede their kingdom by peaceful means. It was through the use of force that

king Dosumu was eventually forced to sign away his kingdom on board the

“Prometheus” in 1861. Thus the land which had hitherto belonged to the King of Lagos

henceforth was called a colony of the British government – a small strip costal land one

hundred and ten miles long by four to twenty miles wide in the Southern portion of the

country (Chukwu, 2002: 30-32).

34

The cession of Lagos by king Dosumu in 1861 signified a number of things in the

history of the Niger area. First, it marked the beginning of the conquest of Nigeria by

Britain. Secondly, it would cause trade expansion not only along the costal areas, but also

in the hinterland. Thirdly, it would help British focus more closely on the independent

political states of the Niger valley. This political gerrymandering of Lagos by the British

would further encourage her territorial aggrandizement in Africa. But more importantly,

this political conquest of “Nigeria” was accentuated by the Berlin Conference on West

Africa of 1884 – 5 (Chukwu, 2002: 30-32).

To this, apart the artificial demarcation or partitioning of the Africa (African

boundaries) by Europeans during the closing hours of the 19th century, to form our

modern statehoods today, African was grouped and controlled by indigenous people

along ethnical bases. Baye, (2010:10) notes that “The colonial boundaries in these

configurations were not established according to the various indigenous groupings”.

Grouping nations together in some case and dividing them in others was a common

feature as long as it was consisted with the security and economic interest of the colonial

powers. Continuing, he points out that after independence, most of Africa became and is

still troubled by the legacy of the trying to get originally different indigenous groupings

to live peacefully in a single country or to get the same ethnic group to live peacefully in

different neighboring countries. This is corroborated by Asobie (2005) when he stressed

that “the eastern part of Nigeria’s international frontier was particularly problematic. It

consisted of along stretch on land and a shorter maritime section. Extending for a

distance of about 1,500 miles (or 1,696 kilometers) between Lake Chad and the Bight of

Biafra, much of the land border was undemarcated. The entire length was never properly

35

marked on land, or even clearly delineated, throughout colonial rule. The process of

demarcation was begun on the stretch from Lake Chad to the Kombon Mountains in the

1932-1940 period, but was not completed. On land, the few border posts that existed

before the interaction of Nigeria with the former Southern Cameroon (later known as

Western Cameroon), had disappeared during the long period (1922 to 1960), when the

British administered the territory as part of Nigeria, with respect to the maritime side, the

uncertainly regarding what was the boundary was even greater. The Anglo-German

Agreement, which formed the basis of the boundary line, was based on speculation about

the nature of the territory. For instance, in one of the Agreements concerning the southern

– most section of the eastern border (dealing with the Bakassi peninsula), the Rio-Del-

Rey was assumed to be a river 80 miles (129 kilometers) long and flowing into the sea.

But subsequent explorations revealed that it was rather a maze of creeks, a network of

rivulets, linking two larger streams, namely, the Akapayafe and the Ndian. But, then,

instead of now using the Ndian river, which fairly neatly separates two ethnic groups on

either side, as the boundary, the Akpayafe was used, thus splitting the Efiks into two-

some in Nigeria, the rest of their kith and kin in Cameroon (Ede, 1981: 294-298).

It was not the Efiks alone that were divided by the eastern boundary. The Ekoi

and the Boki ethnic groups were also split by the south-eastern boundary (Anene, 1970:

285). Furthermore, many Eastern Nigerians remained in Western Cameroon after its

separation from Nigeria in 1961. Yet, the Western provincial government of Cameroon,

fearful that if the boundary did not operate as a ‘human divide’, the Igbo of south-eastern

Nigeria would flood Cameroon and dominate the economic life of the country, insisted

on strict application of state functions at the border.

36

As in most of Africa, therefore the origins of the conflict situation between

Cameroon and Nigeria over border issue can be partly, traced to the colonial ear and

some post-independence political activities. The European diplomats who have little or

no knowledge of our local realities in terms of the ethnic groupings in Africa that had

formed walls of separation, came and were merging and remerging arbitrarily the ethnic

groups on board. Hence the spread of one ethnic group, in so many international

independent territories today in Africa.

Nevertheless, there seems to be little logic in relation to the demarcation of the

boundaries of African colonies by European states. Asiwaju (1984), quoted in Ross and

Sama, (2005: 105-106) points out that “a study of European achieves supports accidental

rather than intentional making of African boundaries. This meant that the European

interest were of primary concern. The population of the frontier areas was envisaged, if at

all, only as dim and inarticulate presence in the background”. Therefore in determining

boundaries the Europeans did not take African interest into consideration. An Anglo-

French commission of diplomatic and colonial experts was formed for the purpose of

demarcating the boundaries, but the limits of its expertise soon became evident. Lord

Robert Salisbury, British prime minister at that time of partitioning, as quoted in Asiwaju,

(1984), described the partitioning process quite aptly in the following words.

We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white mans feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and Rivers and lakes were (Lord Salisbury, Speaking in 1890, cited in Asiwaju 1984:64).

37

Although geographers were available to advise, Europeans’ knowledge of the

physical, let alone the human, geography of Africa was still rudimentary. According to

Asiwaju (1984), a famous epigram defines geography as being about maps rather than

Chaps, but its value is always defined by the knowledge of the chaps who draw the maps.

Just like Fanso (1986), as noted before, opined that “the notion and function of the term”

boundary differed fundamentally in the European and African contexts.

In traditional Africa, the concept of a political or ethnic boundary was expressed in terms of neighbours with whom the particular state or polity shared a territory and such a boundary was conceived of in terms of a region or a narrow zone fronting the two neighbours marked off by it. In this sense, the boundary was the zone where two states were united or jointed together (Fanso, 1986:12).

In other words, African boundaries were usually rooted in ethnic and social contact.

European states, however, conceived of boundaries as liens or points of separation. In the

case of Cameroon, the Anglo-French partition of the former German colony in 1916

provided that inhabitants living in or near the border region had six months form the time

that the border was delimited to express their intention to settle in a region placed under

the jurisdiction of the other colonial power. A problem was thereby created, as Fanso

notes again “The Africans who had become frontiersmen had no immediate knowledge

that their lands and kin divided by the boundary were now “foreign”. They did not know

that the new boundaries functioned differently from the traditional ones with which they

were familiar. They thought the former were only important to the white men who made

them and were not immediately concerned about their existence until they were checked

at crossing points. It was then that they began to feel the impact on their relations with

38

their kin and neighbours and began to create new and secret routes across the frontiers

(Fanso, 1986: 72).

According to Brownlie, (1979) “the actual demarcation of the Cameroon-Nigeria

border took place over a long period of time from 12 July 1884, when the German colony

of Cameroon was established, through the plebiscite of 11 February 1961. It was the

outcome of this plebiscite that divided the British Northern and Southern Cameroons into

distinct territories, which chose independence by joining Nigeria and French Cameroon,

respectively. Brownlie provides a list of treaties and agreements that document the

changes in the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary that took place during that time.

It is important to note that Northern and Southern Cameroons were British

protectorate territories administered as part of Nigeria before 1961. There was not a

separate administrative agency for the Cameroons. As a result the colonial boundaries

was not considered as an impediment to social and economic activities, thus maintaining

the ethnic-linguistic continuity of the region. In fact, at one time the leading political

party in Nigeria was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and

Cameroons participated fully in the Nigeria parliament. This shared colonial history

encouraged the Nigerian state to lay claim to the Bakassi peninsular as even after the

Cameroonians left, social and economic relations between the people, did not stop.

Konings (cited in Sama and Rose, 2005:107) states that “the British method of

administration led to the appearance that Nigeria rather than Britain was the colonial

master of the southern Cameroons”. As he indicated, the post-1945 nationalist struggle in

southern Cameroon was more anti-Nigeria than anti-colonial in character. Furthermore,

he mentions that this situation gave rise to the increasing peripheralization of southern

39

Cameroons, which seem to be more of a colony within a colony. As mentioned above,

being administered as an appendage of Nigeria led to a lack of socio-economic

development and little advancement in the economy from the plantation economy

established under German colonial rule. More significantly, the quasi-regional status and

limited degree of self-government gained by southern Cameroons in 1954 seemingly

undermined the existing boundaries between what had been the German Cameroon

protectorate and Nigeria. The southern Cameroons achieved full regional status within

the federation of Nigeria in 1958.

The fact of southern Cameroons autonomy led to two problems once

independence was subsequently achieved. First, the southern Cameroons entered into a

federal relationship with la-Republique du Cameroon, which proved to be unequal and

antithetical to the democratic traditions that had begun to take root there. Secondly, La

Rupublique treated the border between it and Nigeria as sacrosanct and resented the

continuing ties between Nigerian groups and that of the southern Cameroonians. Over the

forth across the border Cameroon reacted strongly and a tense, sometimes conflictual

relationship developed around the border.

In view of this background, it is not surprising that skirmishes between the two

states intensified when Cameroon field a series of pleadings with the ICJ beginning in

1994 through 1998 against Nigeria for “violently contesting Cameroon’s sovereignty

over the Bakassi peninsular and for occupying the territory with military troops (Konings,

2005). While Cameroon protested Nigeria’s impositions into the Bakassi, it did little to

develop the region. In fact, Nigeria built roads, schools and medical clines in Bakassi

further strengthening its assertions that the people living in the region were Nigerian and

40

not Cameroons. To that extent, the colonial evolution of Nigeria-Cameroon boundary

was one of the greatest colonial obfuscation as that sowed the ever continuing seed of

discord between people of similar if not the same ethnic affinities that had related

together before colonization.

4.3 British/German Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroun

Colonial International Boundary

In the first place, following the industrial revolution in Europe around and during

the 19th century, it became obvious that European traders (British and German

Marchants), had long standing interest in this part of West African that later became

known as Nigeria and Cameroon. The European trading Cameroon which started

spreading their tentacles outside the shares of European did so to counter contradictions

created by capitalism in Europe. This is because the industrial revolution led to the

massive production of goods, the urgent need for market cheap raw materials and labour.

The need therefore, to satisfy the above factors necessitated the struggle for the control of

African territories among the European nations through their trading companies. The bid

to maintain monopoly by these trading companies led to them, calling on their home

countries for protection. The protection of the trading companies by the various European

nations brought about rivalry among the countries of European (Fombo, 2006)

Nevertheless, according to Fombo (2006: 41-42), “before the age of empire

creation in Africa; trade, slavery, missionary activities as well as adventure had attracted

Englishmen to this area, such that “pidgin English” for instance, was widely spoken

among the coastal people sand the business people. British Baptist missionaries had

opened stations in Douala and Bimbia since 1845. However, the British Government had

limited interest here and even turned down an offer in 1833 by natives to cede the

41

maintain from Bimbia to Rio-Del-Rey. It is doubtful though; if the kings of this area

understood exactly what their offer meant. More plausibly, they were simply manipulated

by (Europe) traders because they desired the protection of their home governments in

area where they operated. Such alleged invitations also come from kings of Douala from

annexation of Cameroon even before the Germans did”.

To this, it was not until 1884 that the British Government finally decided to annex

the area. But by then it was too late for Britain to establish a complete domination as a

genuine race had indeed begun among the European powers for colonies in the area.

Germany deceptively dispatched Dr. Sachtigal who concluded treaties with the Douala

Kings on July 2, 1884, for the annexation of the Cameroon coast for Germany a few days

ahead of the British consult-Hewitt, who was charged with this duty for Britain (Fombo,

2006:42).

Continuing, Fombo (2006) noted also that “on July 12, 1884, a German

protectorate was declared over Cameroon. This proclamation was preceded by a long

period of manicuring by German commercial interest in Africa to enlist the support of

their home government to join the race for colonies in Africa and Asia. It had been a

policy of the German imperia government with OHO Von Bismarck as chancellor to

avoid any form of colonial entanglements that could lead Germany into conflict with the

then established colonial powers, viz Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium. It was

not until 1384-85, that Bismarck changed his mind on the issue of acquisition of colonies.

As Chukwu, (2002:33) notes, “the Berlin west Africa conference of 13

November, 1884 through January 1884 was held a the instance of the German chancellor,

Otto Von Bismark. Among the circumstances surrounding the convening of the

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conference was the issue of the Congo Free State where as at 1876 king Leopold of

Belgium had established an international association for its exploration and a possible

civilization of the interior or tropical Africa. The association was a private one with a

tinge of scientific and humanitarian objective. Thus, on the eve of the conference, the

association has laid claims overhang areas of tropical Africa with a series of treaties

concluded by H.M. Stanley.

In this light, Crowder (1968: 62) asserted that “the Berlin west Africa conference

that met from 13 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, give legal and international

recognition to the partitioning of west Africa among the European colonial powers. Also,

the conference traced its origin to the rise of Germany as a united nation after the Franco

Prussian war of 1870 through 71. At the end of the war, Germany under Bismark became

a united state and a major force to reckon within the comity of European nations. As a

result of this development, Bismark came under pressure from the German commercial

class who wanted him to secure them safe and secure markets in Africa, hence the Berlin

conference to accommodate their interests. “At around the same time or precisely on June

5, 1885, Britain declared a protectorate over the territory between the protectorate of

Lagos and the west bank of the Rio-del-Rey which was later renamed in 1893 as the

Niger coast protectorate. Discussions on the demarcation of the boundary between these

contagious protectorates were begun in 1885 and wore increasingly made clearer as

negotiations on both sides gathered more information on the claimed territories. The last

settlements on the Anglo-German boundary in Nigeria and Cameroon were arrived at by

the agreements of March 11 and April 12, 1913. In many respects, this agreement was a

formalization or refinement of the agreements preceding it, especially that of 1909 which

43

took some two years to negotiate between 1907 and 1909. Thus, the Nigeria-Cameroon

boundary was largely settled between Britain and Germany before the outbreak of the

First World War. The entire boundary had been delineated and partly demarcated with

pillars leaving little doubts as to its location (Fombo, 2006).

In this perspective, Ngang (2005:7) recounts that “in a series of agreements in

1913, Britain and Germany sought to establish an exact demarcation of the borders

between Nigeria and Cameroon, which of course did not exist as such. The first treaty

entitled: “The settlement of the frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola

to the sea”, put Bakassi proper under the jurisdiction of the Germans and the second:

“The Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River”, ceded the “navigable portion” of the

offshore border of the peninsular to Britain. Article 21 of the Anglo-German Treaty of

1913 quoted below states the exact position of the border.

From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi points and king of the navigable channel of the Akwayate River as far as the 3 mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar Rivers (UN Department of peacekeeping operations map No. 4247, May 2005).

Moreso, events of the first world war completely changed the fate of Cameroon. The war

that started in Europe was quickly carried to the colonies. German forces in spite of their

dogged resistance in Cameroon, were finally overrun in 1916 by a combination of British

forces from base in west Africa, especially Nigeria, and French and Belgium forces from

bases in French equatorial Africa and Belgium Congo, respectively, Germany lost all her

colonies in Africa including Cameroon which was divided into two territories by the

44

league of nations and administered as mandate under British and France. The Franco-

British Declaration of July 1919 placed Bakassi and the rest of the “British Cameroon”

under British mandate. This territory was then administered under the British system of

“indirect rule” as part of Nigeria respecting the borders laid down by the agreements of

1913. A further agreement between both powers in 1931 was signed to further codify the

declaration of 1919. Again maps from this period clearly show Bakassi as part of

Cameroon territory.

At the end of the Second World War, the British and French League of Nations

mandates over Northern/Southern Cameroons and Cameroon respectively, were

succeeded by trusteeship agreements under the newly created United Nations

Organization. The agreements creating these trusteeship territories re-ratified the Anglo-

German and Anglo-French treaties pertaining to the borders between both countries.

Once more, maps from this period place Bakassi under the sovereignty of Cameroon

(Ngang, 2005:8).

The condominium, which was envisaged in 1914 when Britain and France first

agreed on a joint conquest of German colonies in Africa, with Cameroon inclusive, could

not be realized in practice shortly after military operations begun in German Cameroon,

mutual suspicious of future territorial calculations bedeviled relations between the two

allies over a joint and equitable administration of Cameroon. The British involving

military necessity successfully maintained an administration that was essentially British

in the very important part city of Douala, as well as its environs, right to Buea and

Vicoria. The rest of the territories was either administered by the French where their

forces captured or by British officials from Nigeria where British forces captured.

45

Meanwhile, even before the official partition as déclassé had articulated in a

correspondence to Bertie (dated June 6, 1915), a good chunk of the territory in Cameroon

had reverted to France before the campaign could be concluded in Cameroon.

On the further insight onto the administration of the Bakassi area after Germany

left, Fombo (2006: 44-45) puts it straight:

As soon as the Germans were dislodged from their entrenched position in Yaunde and ahead of their final collapse in Mora negotiations were opened between Britain and France for the final partition of Cameroon on an agreeable formula, abandoning the attempted condominium that had to serious misunderstandings between the two allies.

At the negotiations, France demanded Douala and most of the rest of Cameroon with

Cambon the French delegate initiating that the “French colonial party were excited over

Cameroon”. He argued that France coveted Douala above all as the only port that could

serve its equatorial African colonies. However, this claim is spurious given that the

French were in control of neighboring Gabon and a considerable coastline and Douala in

itself had no good harbor.

In spite of the fact that the British had contributed more militarily to the conquest

of German Kamerun and had dominated the administration of, especially, Douala and the

neighbouring coastal districts in the course of the war, they conceded as French demands

pretty easily, abandoning their long proposed boundary line that was to begin from the

mouth of the Sanaga river. Rather a boundary (Picot Line) further west from the mouth of

Mungo was agreed on. Two main reasons can be advanced for the British reluctance to

have a fair share of Cameroon. Firstly, as Simon had rightly pointed out, Britain by not

accepting French assistance in the capture of German East Africa had effectively shut off

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the French against any claims there in any case this area was more important to the

Britain than Cameroon. So Britain was more disposed to make concessions in Cameroon.

Secondly, there was also a genuine desire in British colonial circles to make concession

to the French so as to sustain the public morale in the war effort in Europe and elsewhere.

The negotiations that ended on March 6, 1916 adopted the picot Line as the

provisional boundary between the British sphere to the west and the French to the East by

this partition Britain had about one-fifth of what was left of German Kamerun and France

and four-fifth. Despite some uneasiness in Britain, particular in the colonial officer, over

the special consideration made to France, little was changed in the subsequent post-war

negotiatons that opened in March 1919. The Milner-Simon declaration of July 10, 1919

finally settled the partition of the German colony into British and French spheres. This

declaration was mainly an endorsement of the 1916 Picot line. It was subsequently

appended to the mandate agreement in accordance with article 22 of the League of Nation

and officially became one of the most important instruments on the definition of the

Nigeria-Cameroon border.

Logically, the picot line and the Milner-Simon Declaration are the first

instruments on this boundary during the period. In consonance with the Miner-Simon

Declaration of 1919 in which it was stated thus:

The boundary commissions shall be authorized to make such minor modifications of the frontier line as may appear to them necessary in order to avoid separating villages from their agricultural lands… and deviations shall be clearly marked on special maps and submitted for the approval of the two governments [permanent mandates commission reports of the UN, sixteenth session, (Nov. 1930:84)].

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Again, the commission report stated further that: “on 29 December 1929 and 30 January

1930 Sir Graeme Thomson, Governor of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria and Paul

Marchant, commissaire de la Republique Francaise an Cameroon signed a further very

detailed agreement hence forth known as the (Thomson-Marchant Declaration) clarifying

the alignment of this border. The Thomson-Marchant Declaration was approved and

incorporated in an Exchange of Notes dated 9 January 1930 between A. de fleuriau,

French Ambassador in London and Author Henderson, British foreign minister

(“subsequently, Heuderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes”). Also, it was not a significant

departure from the previous agreements between Britain and France over their boundary

Cameroon [permanent mandates commission reports of the UN, sixteenth session

(November 1930: 84)].

What turned out to be a major change (which was not evidently so at the time of

its conception) was the 1946 order in council providing for the administration of the

Nigeria protectorate and Cameroons, subsequently known as the “1946 order in council”.

The edict was enunciated in pursuant to a decision taken by Britain on August 2, 1946, to

reorganize the administration of its disjointed share of the Cameroons. The territory was

divided into two – Northern and Southern Cameroons – to be administered respectively,

as integral parts of the Northern and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. The order in council

contained the detailed description of the boundary between these administrative units

which following the diverse paths chosen by the countries in the plebiscite of 1961,

turned out to be part of the international boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon today.

“Basically, in spite of apparent British fury over the lost of Cameroon to Germany in

1884, colonial authorities in Britain were not particularly exited with the occupation of

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Cameroon. As explained above the initial German annexation of Cameroon was thanks to

British procrastinations on doing so ahead of the German. When they again had the

opportunity of establishing a strong presence in Cameroon, following the defeat of

Germany and the forced surrender of its colonies according to the dictates of the treaty of

Versailles, Britain preferred territories elsewhere like Tanganyika. As Ronald Robinson

et al…, have shown, the Cameroon question was considered in a wider global diplomatic

context. The foreign office saved the opportunity to concede territories in West Africa to

France, Britain principally in the war and rival in the colonial race, in order to secure East

Africa, considered more vital to British interest (Fombo, 2006:46).

Terms of British Mandates in Cameroon

Britain, while agreeing to a cession of all German colonies in favor of the

principal allied power in accordance with article 119 of the Treaty of peace with

Germany signed on June 28, 1919, Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Nations made

provision for the mandate system under whose auspices the former colonies were to be

administered. Admittedly, these provisions were sufficiently vague to allow even more

elbowroom for the mandatory to carry out its will. Under Article 2 Britain became

responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the

promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being as well as the social

progress of the inhabitants. With this, Britain opted to administer her disjointed share of

Cameroon as adjuncts of continuous parts of neighboring Nigeria.

According to Anene, (1970: 96-97) “Britains grand design in 1916 was to annex

its share of German Cameroon to Nigeria”. The British has acquired this elongated bi-

partite boundary and had never intended to erect a new and separate administrative unit.

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But the terms of the mandate agreement (which was an American inclusion into the post-

war settlement) forestalled this. As such, while striving in principle to maintain the

juridical entity of the Cameroons as a mandated on an administrative integration of the

territory into Nigeria, consistent with its initial goal for acquiring the territory in 1916.

The British authorities, citing administrative convenience dismembered the territory

before joining the pieces to various administrative units of Northern and Eastern Nigeria.

Although this policy led to very serious consequences in regard to future political

developments in British Cameroons, the inconveniences cited by Britain were real. The

narrow, elongated and bisected nature of the territory, together with the formidable

geographical barrier of the manbilla escarpment, made the separate administration of the

British Cameroons practically difficult considering the parsimonious polices that inspired

empire administrators”.

The Integrative Policy of Britain

On the integrative policy of Britain, the northern part of the territory (that became

known as the British Northern Cameroons from 1946), Dikwa Emirate was reconstituted

and admitted as a division of Bornu Province. Meanwhile, the rest of Northern

Cameroons was recognized into Adamawa Emirate and placed under Adamawa province,

dominated by Yola. The entire province came under the Emire of Yola who was later

officially known as lamido of Adamawa. The Nigerian legal system also replaced

German legislation from February 28, 1924 in the Cameroons.

Generally, Asobie, (2005) stresses that this gamut of British actions, especially

the more posture ones of the mandatory between 1959 and 1961, led to the orientation of

every aspect of life in the territory to be centered on the Northern Region of Nigeria,

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subsequent nationalism in this part tended to be inarticulate and, at the critical moment

favoured independence through integration into Nigeria, as a result of the comprehensive

administrative integration that was effected. A pan-British Cameroons nationalism never

emerged in the run up to independence. Britain even advanced the fact that there was

little or no contact between the Northern and Southern Cameroon to justify its argument

for the results of the two territories to be considered separately at the 1961 plebiscite.

This affected significantly the outcome of the February 1961, Un conducted plebiscite in

the territory and led to a fundamental change of the Anglo-German colonial boundary in

this area. While British policy of administrative interaction of the Cameroons under

British administration with the colony and protectorate of Nigeria led to the

unwholesome transformation of the northern colonial boundary, it also considerably

contributed to the current dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon on the southern border,

especially in the Bakassi area. Elements of the impending dispute were evident in the

incongruities in policies under British colonial administration on both sides of the

border”.

In the first instance, administration of southern Cameroons as an integral part of

the Eastern Region of Nigeria negated the fact of an international boundary between the

two territories. Coupled with the ethnic mix of the border area, and the seasonal fishing

occupation of most of the occupants of the hotly disputed Bakassi and associated Islands,

movement across the border was without any form of impediment. Asobie puts it thus:

The indigenous population, (the peasant famers and workers) living on both sides of the borders, some of who belong to the same ethnic stock, wish to operate and indeed were operating as if the artificial barriers, known as boundaries, never existed” (Asobie, 2005: 82).

51

To that extent, Native Authority tax office officials and law enforcement agents

from Oron (Eket Division, Calabar), purused defaulters and criminals right across the

border to areas that were opposed to be controlled from Kumba Division for the southern

Cameroons. For instance, while on tour in the fish Towns area, the Acting district officer

(D.O.) for Kumba, Mr. J.S. Smith reported he met Oron Native Court Messengers

Henshaw with two Native court warrants of imprisonment for residents (at least

temporary ones) of Ine Oriong and Ine Tayu in British Cameroons. The D.O. of Kumba

sent a memo No W.T./8/1926 of 20 June, 1926 to the D.O. of Eket, advising him to see

that the Native Authority desist from double domicile of the residents of the border areas

particularly, those of the fish Towns, that made tax collection difficult. A modus viveni

that entailed the mutual recognition of taxes paid in each other’s territory was arrived at

among local administrators of the contiguous division of southern Cameroons and

Eastern Region. This arrangement was formulized in 1928 and it was accepted that,

where taxes varied only the excess should be paid to the neighbouring administration, but

it did not clarify where the locus of power laid in this area.

4.4 The Place of General Gowon in the Bakassi Dispute

The history of the crisis between Nigeria and Cameroun over ownership of

Bakassi Peninsula cannot be complete without a mention of Gen. Yakubu Gowon. On

assumption of office in 1966, Gowon lacked the necessary experience, exposure and

intellectual wit a head of state should possess. He was young, energetic and fearless but

without brains to coordinate the affairs of a nation in disarray. The pogrom of 1966 that

resulted into the civil war that lasted for thirty (30) months was the theatre that presented

Gowon as inexperienced and sectional leader whose interest in the entire process was to

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safe guard the interest of northern Nigeria. His quest for a united Nigeria when his

maiden broadcast script contained the message secession for an Arewa nation but which

was edited some few hours before delivery expunging the paragraph on secession and

spreading the message of a more united entity called Nigeria, is indeed a matter shrouded

in confusion. (See Ademoyega, 1981)

The civil war that engulfed Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 saw the brutality and

crudity in a young soldier who swore to protect citizen and preserve the territorial

integrity of Nigeria. Gowon used every thing at his disposal to make sure Biafra

succumbs. In one of the peace meetings held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to broker peace

between the warring factions, Gowon had stated that “starvation is a legitimate weapon of

war and we have every intention of using it” (Forsyth; 1982:105). The accord between

Gowon and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroun began when the aircraft carrying arms and

ammunition to the Ojukwu government crashed in Cameroun. Aluko (1977:164) noted

that:

… not only did the Nigerian leaders immediately ask the Ahidjo Government for detailed information about the identity of the aircraft, its crew, and the origin of arms and ammunition found in but also contacted other neighbouring countries…

This singular contact manifested itself in so many forms and degrees resulting into the

emergence of Cameroun as a claimer of the ownership and sovereignty of the Bakassi

peninsula. Tell magazine (2006:31) had observed:

Nigeria may have lost Bakassi to an alleged deal Yakubu Gowon, a general and former head of state, did with Cameroun during the civil war-ceding Bakassi to Cameroun for Cameroun to blockade Biafra from the sea.

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The Tell magazine went further to state that:

During the civil war, Nigeria troops were stationed at Bakassi and fought Biafran soldiers. They were stationed in a place called Isaac Boro camp and the ijaw hero himself who was forcibly recruited into the Nigeria Army from prison during the war commanded the troops at Bakassi… with his Knowledge about maritime warfare, Boro defeated the Biafran troops up to a point called Ekondo Titi, known as small Biafra. As at then, Ekondo Titi was the accepted boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun. The Biafran troops held Ekondo Titi as their life artery to the sea while Nigeria soldiers were stationed at Abana and Atabong. It is highly believed that Nigeria sought and got the assistance of Cameroun, at a price, to get the Biafrans out of Ekondo, 2006:31)

Nyong eta, a chief of Bakassi people told Tell Magazine in an interview that:

It was after the war that I saw some people coming around that they were Camerounians. I was surprised because my father never told me that this land belongs to the Camerounians… (See Tell, July 3, 2006:12)

In an attempt to win Nigeria-Biafran war, Gowon gave out 1000km2 of a number

of low lying Mangrove Island. One then wonders how Gowon and Ahidjo had to institute

the Ngoh/Coker declaration panel just few months after the civil war, to mark the

maritime boundary between the two countries, a matter last discussed in 1913, 58 years

after and which had never generated any argument, controversy, ill-will or ill-feelings

within the said period, Gowon was once again beaten by Almadu Ahidjo in this game of

statesmanship. The heinousness of Gowon’s role in the Bakassi crisis was best captured

by Uchenna (2011:20) when he noted that:

… it is not about what Nigeria wants or what Cameroun received for its shameful role during the Nigeria-Biafra war… ICJ must prepare to receive another former dictator. The ICJ clearly has that jurisdiction to summon Gowon to the war crimes tribunal. He traded land for the blood of innocent

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women and children… Ahidjo not only got Bakassi he also received a paycheck (Blood money).

4.5 Abacha’s Effort

Late Gen. Sani Abacha assumed office in November 1993 after Ibrahim

Babangida descended form office following the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections,

which was acclaimed as the fairest and freest election ever held in Nigeria. The political

situation of the country when Abacha took over Aso Rock was so chaotic that Nigeria

was heading for total collapse. Due to character and geopolitical policies of the western

world especially France, Cameroun was mandated to start violent operations within the

Bakassi region. Certain Skirmishes were carried out be the Camerounian gendarmes

against the Bakassi people of Nigeria. Abacha as a true general in the army saw the

action by Cameroun as a slight on Nigeria as he could not stand to watch Cameroun point

her dirty fingers on Nigeria. Not perturbed by whose authority or backing Cameroun was

acting, Abacha marshalled out his arsenal against Cameroun. Abacha initiated some

Diplomatic moves that saw the foreign Affairs minister, Anthony Ani delivering special

messages from Abacha to the presidents of Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Gabon.

Uchenna (2011)

Besides, Abacha was prepared to make Bakassi de facto and de jure Nigeria. By

1996, there was clamour for the creation of more states and local government councils.

By this time Bakassi was being administered as part of Akpabuyo council in Cross River

State. In the creation of the local government council, Abacha gave two slots to Cross

River State – Etug Local Government Council and Bakassi Local Government Council.

Thus, Bakassi Local Government was created and the council by law was part of

Nigeria’s constitution (Uchenna, 2011)

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4.6 The climax of the Bakassi Dispute

Camerounian aggression against Nigeria in Bakassi intensified in 1994 and in

response to this, the government of Gen. Sanni Abacha ordered Nigerian troops into

Bakassi to repel the Camerounian aggression and restore peace and stability in the area. It

should be noted that Cameroun has been a belligerent, intrusive and capricious

neighbour. It has attempted over the years to impose its sovereignty over Bakassi, in spite

of stiff resistance from the Bakassi inhabitants. Having maintained long, effective and

peaceful control over Bakassi, Nigeria has under internationally recognized criteria for

acquisition and recognition fulfilled the essentials conditions under which it can

legitimately claim ownership of the Bakassi peninsula (Egbo, 2003)

Nigeria’s action to restore peace and stability in the peninsula with the use of her

troops was in consonance with international law as expressed in the United Nations

charter, chapter vii, Article 51 which states that,

…nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual in collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member state of the United Nations (Egbo, 2003:10)

Reasoning the seriousness of the government of the period not to toy with any

action by any individual or group of states to balkanize the territorial integrity of Nigeria,

and the preparedness of the troops sent to the Bakassi peninsula, coupled with the

aggressiveness and willingness with which the Bakassi people themselves were prepared

to dies for their own inheritance, the government of Paul Biya of Cameroun decided to

retrace and retreat their aggression in favour of an arbitrative option (Egbo, 2003)

On March 29, 1994, after several and persistent violations of the sovereignty of

Nigeria, Cameroun instituted a legal action at the international court of Justice at the

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Hague, Netherlands against Nigeria claiming among others, that the Bakassi peninsula

was under the sovereignty of Cameroun. Specifically, the Cameroonian government

requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to determine the course of the maritime

frontier between the two states in so far as the frontier had not already being established

by the Maroua Declaration. (see Guardian September 18, 2002).

In its final submissions to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Cameroun had

asked the court to adjudge and declare:

1. That the land boundary between Cameroun and Nigeria was determined by the

Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913.

2. That in consequence, sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula is Cameroun.

Nigeria responded and in its final submissions requested the International court of

justice (ICJ) to adjudge and declare:

1. That sovereignty over the peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

2. The Nigeria’s sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with

Cameroun.

From 1994 to 2002 legal icons from both sides argued their case presenting facts

and figures, to buttress their various claims. On October 10, 2002, the International

Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the matter declaring a victor and a

vanquished. (see Guardian September 18, 2002).

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CHAPTER FIVE

OLUSEGUN OBASANJO’S SUPPORT OF THE ICJ RULING OVER THE

DISPUTED BAKASSI AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE

PROTECTION OF HER CITIZEN AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Introduction

This main objective of this chapter is to examine President Olusegun Obasanjo’s

support of the International Court of Justice ruling over the Disputed Bakassi Peninsula

and the Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial

integrity. Specifically, the chapter is aimed at testing and validating or otherwise of our

hypothesis (1), which states that: Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over

the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined Nigeria’s national interest in the protection

of her citizens and territorial integrity

5.1 Signing of the Green Tree Agreement Between Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria

and Paul Biya of Cameroun

On June 12, 2006, when Nigerian democrats were ruminating on the June 12,

1993 election and electoral victory in the history of Nigeria, Obasanjo who assumed

office on the platform of electoral irregularities was in far away in USA at the Green Tree

in New York with his cohorts under fanfare and jubilation signing away a Nigerian

territory. While Nigerians were in sober reflecting on Abiola and his lost mandate,

Bakassi, one of the territories that gave Abiola his mandate was being handed over to

Cameroon under the watchful eyes of Germany, France, USA, and Great Britain, by

Nigeria’s President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo.

Following intense negotiations and regular meetings by the mixed commission

under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Presidents of Nigeria

and Cameroon signed the Agreement of Green Tree establishing the methods of

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withdrawal and transfer of authority of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroun. The terms of

the agreement stipulate that Nigeria will continue to manage a small definite part as a

specific zone for a period of two years. A non-renewable five year period of special

transition regime will then apply (www.kwenu.com). Obasanjo agreed and signed that

Nigeria shall;

(i) Not conduct or allow the conduct of any activities in the zone (Bakassi peninsula)

which would prejudice Cameroon’s peace or security;

(ii) Take every necessary measure, under the supervision of the United Nations

observes of the Cameroon – Nigeria Mixed Commission, to stop any transfer or

influx of its nationals into the zone;

(iii) Not engage in any activity in the zone which would complicate or hinder the

transfer of authority to Cameroon;

(iv) Equip its police force in the zone with only the light equipment strictly necessary

for the maintenance of law and order and for personal defence;

(v) Guarantee the Cameroonian nationals wishing to return to their village in the zone

the exercise of their rights;

(vi) Not conduct or continue the exploitation of natural resources in the sub-soil of the

zone, or to engage in any other activity harmful to the environment.

(vii) Take every necessary measure to prevent any change in land property rights; and

(viii) Not position any armed forces in the zone. (See appendix 1 for details of the

Green Tree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroun) (www.kwenu.com)

The issue of the treaty is whether Obasanjo is right in signing the treaty which

gave away the Nigerian territory of Bakassi before obtaining necessary approvals as

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specified in the constitution. The Nigerian constitution places responsibility on the

parliament when it comes to treaty implementation which is a process by which a treaty

validly entered into by a state is enacted or domesticated as legislation so that it can have

effect within the domestic plane. Treaty ratification according to the article 1 of the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 is the process by which a state

establishes in the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty. Notwithstanding

the above explanation, if Obasanjo had the interest of Nigeria as the barometer for his

actions, and being fully aware of the fact that the implementation of the ICJ judgment

involves the amendment of the Nigerian constitution, the involvement of the National

Assembly becomes unquestionable. Available records show that President Obasanjo after

signing the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) on June 12, 2006, notified the National

Assembly on June 14, 2006, two days after the actual agreement was signed. Gbanite

(2006:11) noted that:

If the ex-president respected the views of Nigerians and that of the National Assembly, he would have written earlier and allowed them to debate the matter on behalf of Nigerians, after which the National Assembly will issue a statement indicating their position before signing takes place …

Also stressing the place of the National Assembly in the implementation of the

ICJ judgement, Victor Ndome Egba (SAN) stated thus,

Bakassi is mentioned in the first schedule of the constitution of Nigeria and for us, full implementation of the ICJ Judgement cannot be considered until during the constitutional amendment (cited in Gbanite, 2006:12)

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Supporting Ndoma Egba’s position, Senator Olorunimbe Mamora queried Obasanjo for

not involving the National Assembly in the implementation of ICJ ruling on Bakassi, and

further maintained that,

Everything that was done was supposed to have involved the parliament because that is what divides democracy form autocracy. If you leave out the parliament, what you have is autocracy. Just like the European shared out Africa as an international cake, Bakassi was shared out as a national cake (www.kwenu.com)

Obasanjo did not take steps akin to a leader who has the interest of his nation at heart. He

sole handedly mismanaged the entire Bakassi issue to his own personal advantage of

securing international award as a peaceful leader, as a payback for the Biafran people

whose two strong men in the senate, Senators Ken Nnamani and Uche Chukwumerije

thwarted his ambition for a third term presidency.

On August 14, 2006, two months after the signing of the Green Tree Agreement,

Archibong community, a village in Bakassi witnessed a unique ceremony. That was the

day the Nigerian government handed the Bakassi region over to Cameroon. The event

was in keeping with the federal government’s decision to abide by the ruling of the world

court on the disputed region. Thus the event of August 14, 2006 is seen as an anti-climax,

signaling the end of a protracted battle by the two neighboring countries over a region

that has been variously described as oil rich. It is believed that the battle is not yet over as

potentials of a lingering conflict still exist. The hordes of the Nigeria population in the

Bakassi and their welfare and well-being, the maritime boundary of the Coast of

Equatorial Guinea and the increasing international involvement in the dispute for

economic interests, are all issues to watch (Newswatch, October 2, 2006:56).

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The Obasanjo’s administration equally mismanaged the Bakassi crisis is in the

area of information. The case was shrouded in secrecy as at the time it was going on. The

Nigerian Television Authority had only snippet of video clips and news reports on the

issue. The news reports emanating from the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria

(FRCN) was very short. If Obasanjo had handled the case more transparently, the case

would not have ended the way it did. It was only when the judgement was delivered that

people started getting details of what transpired at The Hague. All the intellectual inputs

as it concerns the case that is now pouring in would have been better utilized if people

had made these inputs while the case was going on (Newswatch, October 2, 2006:56).

Besides, there was this issue of the deliberate leaving out of the Aborigines of

Bakassi in the case. It cannot be understood why Bakassi indigenes were not invited as

defense witnesses. Adeniyi (2002:20) noted that:

One of the community leaders of Bakassi Chief Okpo Eyo, said during the week that officials who provided legal defence did not seek adequate proofs of the ownership of the peninsula from the aborigines and real owners. Rather, what we saw was the flying abroad to testify of strangers who know nothing about the peninsula to the detriment of the country when the real owners and inhabitants of the areas are there …

He went on to ask pertinent questions whether the people especially those living in the

peninsula were involved in the representation, and why the Obong of Calabar, who is an

internationally renowned professor or medicine and who could have helped Nigeria in the

course of the case, was at no point involved in the matter? Obasanjo and his men in their

uncanny manner of handling legal matters clumsily but deliberately bungled this matter.

To cap it all, Emeka (2002) asserted thus,

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Bakassi can be likened to Obasanjo as June 12 is to Babangida. June 12 however became more prominent because the Bakassi are minorities with almost nobody to advocate or fight their cause … It remains the biggest injustice Obasanjo perpetuated on Nigeria. Obasanjo swore to the oath of allegiance to protect the territory of Federal Republic of Nigeria thereby upholding the constitution of the country, but he would readily and weakly fail in this. Obasanjo and Bola Ajibola provided the platform under which the territory of our nation was given out to France and Cameroon, an act only as good as condemnably obnoxious because it led to the denial of Nigerian citizens. The whole drama was set out to please Britain, France and Cameroon by Obasanjo and Ajibola for the reasons not ye disclosed to Nigerians … (see www.articlebaselcom)

5.2 The World Court Judgment and Olusegun Obasanjo’s Support of the UN

Mixed-Commission

The crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula

came to its climax on October 10, 2002 when the ICJ delivered its judgment on the case

which was brought to it by the Republic of Cameroon in 1994. The lingering crisis was

brought to an adjudication end following the judgment. In the judgment, which is binding,

final and without appeal, the ICJ determined the course of the boundary from north to south

between Nigeria and Cameroon, thus, in the Lake Chad area, the court decides that the

boundary is delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated

in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (Between Great Britain and France); it

finds that the boundary starts in the Lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint and

follows a straight line to the point where the river divides into two branches (www.icj.org).

Figure 1 below is the territorial boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun showing the

disputed Bakassi Peninsula

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Source: United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) ( unowa.unmissions.org)

Suffice the foregoing however to observe that following the Nigeria’s Federal

Executive Council meeting on the 23rd of October, 2002 about a week after the ICJ judgment,

the Federal Government through the then Minister of Transport, Ojo Maduekwe, rejected the

ruling of the court. While addressing the media shortly after the meeting, he stated that:

… There will not be any requirement for Nigeria nationals to move from where they are living at present… The judgment will have no effect on Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves. On no account will Nigeria abandon her people and their interests. For Nigeria, it is not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters, it is a matter of the welfare and well being of her people on their land (FRCN News, 7am, 24/10/2002)

64

Although this pronouncement did not come from the Attorney General of the

Federation (AGF), nor did it originate from the office of the Minister of Information and

National Orientation, yet, it is discernible that Ojo Maduekwe would not have said that

without the mandate of the Federal Executive Council (FEC). Based on this, it is

worrisome to see the official statement of the Nigerian Government on the Bakassi being

a mere call or appeal on Nigerians both at home and in diaspora to remain calm as the

government was yet to find a peaceful solution to the matter, notwithstanding the fact that

reasons and arguments presented in the entire report were so incisive, inciting and touchy

that Nigerian citizens were willing and prepared to do anything to protect and preserve

the territorial integrity of the country. Thus, according to Gbanite:

Based on the conclusion submitted by Obasanjo’s government, affirming its commitment to Nigeria’s constitution to protect its citizenry, the reasons and arguments presented in the entire report, it is easy to adduce that Obasanjo made a monumental mistake to cede Bakassi to Cameroon (see http//www.kwenu.com)

While Obasanjo was officially solidarizing with the Bakassi people over the unfortunate

judgment, and looking out for harmony and good neighborliness between Nigeria and

Cameroon, Cameroon on the other hand was Balkanizing and permeating the territorial

integrity of the Nigeria.

More so, the tripartite meeting involving President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria,

Paul Biya of Cameroon and the French President, Jacque Chirac on September 5, 2002

which was held in France in which the African leaders pledged to abide by the outcome

of the case, indeed calls to question, the patriotism and sincerity of purpose of Obasanjo,

as Nigerian president. The Guardian Newspaper Editorial incisively commented:

65

Very recently, it transpired that the French President, Monsieur Jacques Chirac, had invited President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Cameroonian counterpart, Mr. Paul Biya, to France in connection with the Bakassi palaver, which is subjudice in International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Hague. In all probabilities, the French President’s aim in arranging the tripartite meeting was to discuss the likely outcome of the judgment of the ICJ, which, as must be well known to Chirac, is imminent. France has copious investments, particularly in the oil sector, in the disputed area (Guardian September 18, 2002:25)

Given this situation, it is discernable that Bakassi was indeed sold by Obasanjo,

because, it is inexplicable that a president should pledge to abide by a decision of a court

which is not yet known to him because a super power was mediating. This is outright

cowardice. Undoubtedly, Obasanjo owes Nigerians explanations on what actually

transpired in that meeting when it only remained about a month for the judgment of the

ICJ to be released (see Guardian September 18, 2002).

In November, 2002, barely one month after the ICJ ruling, Obasanjo, in

conjunction with his Cameroonian counterpart requested the UN Secretary General to

establish the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, which was meant to facilitate the

implementation of the ruling of the ICJ on the land and maritime boundary between the

two countries. The mandate of the UN-Mix Commission covers the following fields:

• Demarcation of the land border and delimitation of the maritime boundaries

between the two countries

• Withdrawals of the civil administration, the military forces and police force, and

transfer of authority in the zones concerned located along the border in Peninsula

of Bakassi.

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• Demilitarization of the Peninsula of Bakassi

• Protection of the rights of the populations concerned

• Development of projects aiming at promoting the economic joint ventures

between the two countries and cross border cooperation

• Reactivation of the commission of the Basin of Lake Chad (see www.kwenu.com)

Since December 2002, the Mixed Commission has held regular meetings

alternatively in Yaounde and Abuja. Between 2003 and 2006, it was involved in

withdrawals of the civil administration, of military forces and of police force, as well as

transfers of authority. On June 12, 2006, following intense negotiations under the aegis of

the Secretary-General, the Presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria signed the Agreement of

Green Tree establishing the methods of withdrawal and transfer of authority of the

peninsula of Bakassi. The terms of the agreement stipulate that Nigeria will continue to

manage a small definite part as a specific zone for a period of two years. A non

renewable five year period of special transition regime will then apply

(www.kwenu.com)

5.3 Obasanjo’s Support of the Demarcation of Land and Maritime Boundaries

Between Nigeria and Cameroun

At its ninth meeting in Yaounde in April 2004, the Mixed Commission, in

support of the Nigeria’s President Obasanjo and Paul Biya of Cameroun decided that

the process for withdrawal and transfer of authority in the land and maritime boundaries

will start on 15 June and end on 15 July 2004. It also decided that the process of

withdrawal and transfer of authority on the Bakassi Peninsula will start on 15 July and

end on 15 September 2004. In order to assist the two countries in the peaceful

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implementation of the ICJ’s judgment, a budget of about $12 million for the

demarcation was approved by the Mix-Commission. Cameroon and Nigeria have each

contributed $3 million to the UN Trust Fund for initial financing; the European

Commission approved a grant of 400,000 euro for the demarcation. The United

Kingdom in the other hand offered a contribution of one million pounds sterling in

addition to other donors. From 5 to 13 March 2004, a tripartite delegation from

Cameroon, Nigeria, and the United Nations conducted a series of visits to several

countries to mobilize further diplomatic and financial support for the demarcation.

Official meetings were conducted in Paris, Brussels, Washington and New York.

(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)

5.4 Support of Withdrawal of Nigeria’s Civilian Administration, Military and Police

Forces from Bakassi

On 18 December 2003, the withdrawal of civil administration, military and

police forces and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area was completed. The

process took place in phases with some 33 villages surrounding Naga’a, Tchika, Doron

Liman, and Darack handed over to Cameroon, and Damboré to Nigeria. Chairman

Ould-Abdallah presided formal ceremonies on 16th December in Tchika and Damboré

in which the heads of the Cameroonian and Nigerian delegations participated. The

Mixed Commission decided to deploy observer personnel immediately to the Lake

Chad area for one year and to make regular reports for the year following the handover.

To strengthen confidence between the parties, the Mixed Commission has also

identified possible projects to promote cross-border cooperation and joint economic

ventures to benefit the population in the area. These include reactivating the Lake Chad

Basin Commission-- formed in 1964 among neighboring countries--and upgrading,

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with the assistance of the African Development Bank, one of the main roads between

the two countries. A draft Protocol for the protection of the rights of the affected

population was submitted. At its nine meeting in Yaounde in April 2004, the Mixed

Commission decided to refer it to the bilateral Cameroon-Nigeria Joint Commission

(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)

At its meeting in Abuja on 29-30 October 2003, the Mixed Commission

reaffirmed its commitment to guarantee the rights of all people affected by the Court’s

decision, both Cameroonian and Nigerian. In this context, the Sub-commission on

affected populations visited the Lake Chad, the affected areas in the Land Boundary

(November 2003, January-February 2004) and the Bakassi Peninsula in February 2004.

(https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selfdete.htm)

5.5 The Effects of the World Court Judgment on the Bakassi People

The socio-economic and cultural effects of resettlement on the Bakassi people are

unavoidably high. Farming, which has been the mainstay of the Bakassi people, was

destroyed and social support networks dismantled. Consequently, most small and

medium families are adversely affected and impoverished. Domestic economic activities

were disrupted and occupations lost. The cordial ethnic, tribal and religious relations

among the people were dashed. Individual life dignities were lost because of lack of

privacy necessitated by inadequate accommodation for affected persons. Families were

rooted out of their traditional and ancestral domain, practice and way of life. The

situation at the resettlement site in Ekpiri Ikang, Cross River State perhaps explains more

and elicits urgent attention of all the stakeholders to address the humanitarian crisis that

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have engulfed the relocated Bakassi people. Umahi (2012) captures the plights of the

affected Bakassi people when he noted that:

The harsh reality of the handover of Bakassi to Cameroun is striking. It was not just the oil embedded underneath; several thousands of indigenes of the area were driven forcefully out of their ancestral lands. As it said, north or south, east or west, home is the best. But for them, there is no longer a place to call home. It was indeed, a precarious situation (Daily Sun, October 3, 2011: 24)

President Obasanjo equally acknowledged the devastating effects of relocation of the

Bakassi people when he noted that “The Federal Government would set in motion an

elaborate stress-free process for the relocation/resettlement of the Bakassi indigenes from

their ancestral lands to a suitable location of their choice” (Daily Sun, October 12, 2011:

12)

Specifically, and as it pertains to the socio-cultural effects of resettlement of the

Bakassi people, before the resettlement, the people of Bakassi worshipped “Akwa Abasi

Ibom”, the Almighty God in their traditional way. They were rich in cultural heritage as

seen in their mode of dressing, bead making, masquerades, traditional wrestling, among

others. The masquerades in Bakassi were similar to that of the Efiks of Calabar, which

ranges from Nnabo, Agaba, Edem Obon, Ekiri Akata, among others. Most of these

masquerades entertain people during festival periods, marriages/wedding ceremonies and

burials. However, the relocation has had negative consequences on these cultural heritage

of the Bakassi people and has created a problem of mixed culture and religion in their

new settlements (Ushie, 2010)

To the economy of the Bakassi people, the people had obviously lived not as

beggars, which the relocation has disposed them to, but as people who worked hard to

70

meet their various economic needs. Their lands are rich in oil and maritime resources

such as fishes and shrimps, which the people depended on for their livelihood. Thus

according to Mbaga and Njo (2007), the Bakassi Peninsula had often been compared to

new found land in North American and Scandinayia in Europe. The relocation of the

Bakassi people to strange lands has however had negative effects on their means of

livelihood and raised the question on their economic wellbeing. For according to Fombo

(2006:23):

Fishing and animal husbandry constitute the mainstay of the economy of this region and the lake offers great potentials for fishing as well as grazing in its immediate environs. Its numerous islands are permanent while others are exposed only at low water tide opportunities. The lake is constantly retreating as a result of the encroaching Sahara Desert and the diversion of waters of rivers that empty into it from irrigation. During the long and very harsh dry season of which they roam in quest for these with their cattle and sheep, having no regard for boundaries

Again, Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor (2006) have noted that relocation of Bakassi

people means that Nigerians who had lived in Bakassi all their lives will have to face the sad

reality of having to evacuate a region that is part and parcel of them immediately. Most people

living in that area have business located there and so, living the area will mean detaching them

from their sources of income. Moreover, all the infrastructural facilities, including hospitals,

schools, recreational centers, that were originally put in place by the country stand the risk of

being forfeited resulting in a fruitless effort and loss of income.

The judgment of the World Court has equally far reaching consequences on the

territorial integrity of Nigeria, fundamental among which are briefly enumerated below:

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(i) The judgement of the World Court recognized Bakassi peninsula as territory

within the sovereignty of Cameroon while the native population are not merely

Nigerians, but Nigerians who are indigenous to Bakassi and owners of the land of

Bakassi. The court ceded the ancestral home of these populations to the

Cameroonians government while these people at the same time are expected to

maintain cultural, trade and religious affiliations with their kith and kin in Nigeria.

What this implies is that the judgement created an irreconcilable admixture of

factors where it grants sovereignty of a territory to one country and the nationality

of its native population to another, while at the same time recognizing the land to

be the ancestral homes of the population.

(ii) Though the International Court of Justice deals with suits brought before it on a

case-by-case basis and is not bound by its previous decisions, it usually maintains

a certain consistency in its decisions. Such an absolute departure from its previous

interpretation in this Bakassi case is inexplicable, especially when it serves

colonial policies at the expense of traditional African linkages and civilization.

(iii) The judgment is the legitimization of the scramble and partitioning of Africa by

the colonialists through the Bismarck-inspired 1884 Berlin Colonial Conference.

(iv) The judgment has created a time bomb within the Bakassi area and also within the

legitimate territories of the two parties warring over Bakassi. The relocation of the

Bakassi local council to Ikang which superimposes Bakassi people on an already

existing land owned and occupied by the Ikang people is a time bomb, which is

likely to explode anytime. Nigeria is creating a refuge problem for its own

citizens in their own land. To Cameroon, the stability of the country is standing on

72

the threshold of threat as the Anglophone secessionist movement, the Ambazonia

are re-strategizing for an independent oil rich state which they claim, Bakassi

peninsula is its heart.

(v) The judgment ceded part of Cross river estuary to Cameroon which means that no

ship can enter into Calabar without the permission of Cameroon.

(vi) The judgment of the ICJ on the Bakassi issue has re-drawn the geographical map

of Nigeria and, which requires constitutional amendment to effect change

occasioned by the ruling.

(vii) The judgment created a burden of loss of an oil and gas soaked region reputed to

contain 10 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserve. It has deprived the totality

of the Nigerian people the oil wealth of that community.

(viii) Because the ICJ ruling did not solve the problem of the inhabitants of the

Peninsula, but only addressed the issue of who has control over the territory, the

judgment only opens the door of war more widely.

(ix) The judgment recognizes Bakassi as the only area allegedly covered by the 1913

Anglo-German Treaty whose population was not proven to have participated in

the plebiscite for the purpose of self-determination. The judgement assumed that a

plebiscite must have taken place in Bakassi. This assumption is a violation of the

stated primordial role of the principal of self-determination.

(x) Enforcement of the judgment was a severe violation of the inalienable rights of

the people of Bakassi to self-determination and a threat to their socio-cultural

stability.

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The effects of the World Court judgement on the Bakassi Peninsular were equally

implicated on the overall national interest of Nigeria. In fact, the existence of many states

in the international system portends a form of permanent struggle for the maintenance of

political independence, territorial integrity, economic interest and national prestige, as

well as promotion of world peace. States, like individuals, appear naturally selfish

because of their inherent desire to pursue their parochial interests in fervid competition

with other states. With over 200 nations, the world in the midst of scarce resources and

means of survival, calls for the entrenchment of national interests in all countries. The

efforts towards the achievement of national interests have over the years proved a

herculean task. This has called for concerted efforts by the leadership of the various

nations in making decisions that would enhance the interests of the countries. National

interest therefore, becomes a conflicting issue because some interests are not actually for

the nation but personal or self-centered. However, and in spite of the embedded conflict

surrounding the concept of national interest, the fact still remains that all nations,

irrespective of its geographical location, size or population, economic status, ideological

orientation or culture, have some form of interests or the other defined as national

interests (Robert, 2010)

National interest is seen by Mongenthau (1989) as an aim to promote a nation’s

image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad. Chandra (cite in Ake, 1982) has

identified what constitutes the core of national interest to include: national security,

political independence, territorial integrity, promotion of economic interests of the nation

and world peace. Inherent in the above perception is the ardent desire by nations to secure

and maintain political independence, secure its territory and project its economic interest

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to enhance the standard of living of its citizens and the maintenance of national integrity,

territorial integrity and self-respect. National interest can therefore be viewed as the ideal

goals upon which the domestic and foreign policies of a state are hinged (Amoda, 1988).

The concept of national interest therefore, has continued to play a significant role in the

foreign policies of sovereign state. A state foreign policy is not operated in a vacuum.

The main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is invariably the promotion

and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest can further be illustrated to mean

the totality or the aggregate of interests of individuals and groups within a given nation

state (Amoda, 1988). Viewed from its classical perspective, national interest therefore

encompasses the various strategies employed in the international interactions of states in

order to ensure the preservation of the stated goals of society. Broadly conceived,

national interest is a guide to the formulation of foreign policy. It is not an end in itself

but a means to an end.

The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined

in chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria encompass the national interest of the

country. Section 14 and sub-section 2(a) states that sovereignty belongs to the people of

Nigeria from whom government through the constitution derives all its powers and

authority. Section 14, sub- section 2(b) states that the security and welfare of the people

are the primary purpose of government. Thus, Nigeria’s national interests are summed up

in the following words: sovereignty, welfare, unity, faith, peace and progress. In a

nutshell, Nigeria’s national interest is anything that concerns and affects all Nigerians. It

is the common aspirations of the various ethnic nationalities that constitute the Nigerian

State.

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According to Olukoshi (1992), since independence in 1960, the daunting task of

self-determination was placed on Nigerians. Like every other sovereign country of the

world, Nigerian national interests have been largely determined and defined by the

leadership. The following broadly spells out what constitutes Nigerian national interests

as he further observed:

(i) The defence of her sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

(ii) The creation of the necessary political and economic condition in the country,

Africa and the rest of the world, which will facilitate the defence of the

independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the

same foster national self-reliance and rapid economic development.

(iii) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the

developing world.

(iv) The promotion and defense of justice and respect for human dignity especially

the dignity of the black man.

(v) The defence and promotion of international peace and security.

In achieving these national interests, Nigeria employs several strategies ranging

from diplomacy to military actions, from cultural exchange to subversion from economic

cooperation to propaganda. In discussing the conduct of Nigerian strategies towards the

attainment of its national interest, he stressed two broad categorizations. These are; the

internal and the external strategic conduct (Olukoshi1992). Suffice this to say that the

Nigeria’s national interests since political independence in 1960 has suffered serious

setbacks; with successive government officials (whether military or civilian) in Nigeria

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being usually driven by self-interest instead of national interest as implicated in the case

of Bakassi Peninsula

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CHAPTER SIX

NIGERIA GOVERNMENT INABILITY TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE

POLICY OPTIONS TO ICJ RULING AND THE RIGHT OF BAKASSI PEOPLE

TO DECIDE WHERE TO BELONG

Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to examine the Nigeria government inability

to explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling and the right of Bakassi people to

decide where to belong. Specifically, the chapter is aimed at testing and validating or

otherwise our hypothesis (2), which states that: “The Nigeria government inability to

explore alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to

belong by the Bakassi people”

6.1 Political Options

These are policy options which bother on politics and diplomatic maneuvering.

They do not have recourse to the law courts but derive their weight from the wits and

intelligence of the policy makers. Some of these options are highlighted and discussed

below:

(1) Self Determination

Demonstrating the importance of self-determination, the United Nations

International Conventions on Political and Civil Rights and Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (1966:50) states in its first and third paragraphs that;

(i) All peoples have the right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely

determine that political status and freely pursue their economic, social and

cultural development.

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(ii) The state parties to the present covenant, including those having responsibility for

the administration of non-self-governing and Trust Territories shall promote the

realization of the right of self-determination and shall respect that right, in

conformity with the provisions of the charter of the United Nations.

Self-determination is the principle that entails people controlling their political

destiny. It is a right recognized in many antique and modern political treaties, protocols

and conventions. Obasi (2007:396) notes that the underlying principle of self-

determination is that,

… no one has the right to impose himself on others, or to decide for or dictate to other groups how to live their lives and that the freedoms and liberties which everyone desires for himself or the group he belongs to, he should also be able to concede or extend to others …

It is regrettable that the judgment of the ICJ did not take this provision which is enshrined

in the charter of the UN into consideration before ceding sovereignty of the Peninsula

from Nigeria to Cameroon. The assumption that the Bakassi people who are indigenous

to the territory can be transferred willy-nilly to another sovereign without their consent or

even their being consulted is wrong. Even before the development of the current norm of

self-determination, notes Sagay (2002), it was recognized that as the object of cession

was sovereignty over territory, the population domiciled in the affected territory who

were citizens of the ceding state were usually given the option of deciding whether they

wanted to retain their citizenship of the ceding state or consented to their citizenship

being transferred to a new sovereign. The problems and hardship involved by the

inhabitants of the territory who remain and lose their old citizenship and are handed over

to a new sovereign whether they like it or not, necessitated the formation of movements

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that favored the claim that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants had by a

plebiscite given their consent to the cession.

According to Sagay (2002:10) in 1954, the United Nations General Assembly

expressed the opinion, regarding non-self-governing territories that:

… a mission, if the General Assembly deems it desirable, should in agreement with the Administering member, visit the non-self-Governing Territory before or during the time when the population is called upon to decide on their future status …

In line with this, the UN supervised elections or plebiscites in British Togoland territory

in 1956, French Togoland in 1958, Northern Cameroons in 1959, Southern Cameroons in

1961, Western Samoa in 1962, Rwanda-Burundi, in 1961 and the Papua-New Guinea in

1972 (Sagay,2002)

In 1993, the people of Eritrea were given the opportunity to decide whether to

remain in Ethiopia or to endorse the independent state of Eritrea. So was the case in East

Timor as they recently exercised their right of self-determination to disentangle

themselves from Indonesia and establish their own independent state. South Sudan also

held a referendum to gain independence from Sudan very recently. All these exercises are

in line with the UN charter and were supervised by the global body. This goes to

underscore the fact that self-determination is an inalienable right of all peoples of the

world to determine their political status.

In Bakassi, the various treaties that originated either within or outside, and which

were either ratified or not, never took the doctrine of self determination into

consideration. As a result, these treaties and declarations which transferred this territory

to another sovereign cannot but be invalid. To this end, the people of Bakassi, Nigeria

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and Black race have a duty to appeal to the conscience of the world to afford the

indigenous population of Bakassi the opportunity to exercise their inalienable right of

self-determination through the mechanism of plebiscite.

As a member and signatory to African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,

Nigeria should use the African Union and the African Human and Peoples Rights

Commission to press for the conduct of a plebiscite in Bakassi, even without waiting

from the UN. The result of such plebiscite would definitely put the UN on its toes and

morally pressure her to facilitate a formal and universally acceptable exercise in the

territory.

(2) Lobbying

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defined lobby as to try to

persuade the government or someone with political power that a law or a situation should

be changed. In this case, the situation that needs change is the ICJ judgment, which as a

matter of fact was against the collective interest of the people of Nigeria. There is a

decisive need for Nigeria to articulate her interest and work out formidable modalities of

actualizing these interests through a well co-ordinated mechanism of persuasion which

are centered on currying the support and sympathy of the international community for her

course.

Interaction in the international environment is a matter of politics. The ICJ

judgment is also political. Hence, lobbying is a political means of achieving goals,

Nigeria should learn if she does not know. The ICJ can be much politicized in its ruling.

The case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia before the ICJ complaining about the

inefficient discharge of duties of South Africa, as the mandatory power for the territory of

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South West Africa, now Namibia exemplifies this. In its rulling, the court noted that

Ethiopia and Liberia had not established any legal interest in the claim they had brought

against South Africa. The ruling is not the issue here but how the ruling came about,

seven judges agreed with the claims of Ethiopia while seven judges were against. It was

the casting vote of the president that had to decide the matter. It took the president of the

court some time in determining how to cast his vote. After much politicking, the

president supported the claim against Ethiopia and Liberia thereby aggravating the

wicked activities of South Africa in South West Africa. Just like this case, the Bakassi

issue and its judgement cannot but have its political “magouille” and “coloration”.

In the face of this, Nigeria should move to lobby the permanent members of the

Security Council. Since oil is the issue, Nigeria should use it as a veritable instrument of

foreign policy. With the exception of France, other permanent member of the security

council especially our new found friends China and Russia, including US should be

approached with our own side of the story and persuade them to work towards the

revision of the judgment in favor of Nigeria.

(3) Propaganda

The work of propaganda is to promote the point of view of a nation with a view to

persuading the audience to imbibe its utility, necessity or its superiority over other

competing ideas in an intensive, extensive and sustained manner. The utility of

propaganda increases the awareness on a particular issue or notion bringing it closer to

the hearts of the audience. In certain cases, propaganda may not contain the actual facts

about a situation, but it must be objective in reporting and analysis. The importance of

propaganda lies very largely on its ability to recruiting, enlarging and sustaining support

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and alliance. (Obasi, 2007). The place of propaganda comes to bear when the Nigerian

civil war is mentioned. The Biafran propaganda machinery was so effective that not only

did the people of Biafra fight with every determination and zeal, but the entire world saw

the resilience of a people faced with extermination and genocide. This led to the support

garnered by the Biafran side from many countries of the world. The racist regime of

South Africa was brought to its knees in 1994 following mounted propaganda all over the

world portraying the ills of the system. The United States used the instrument of

propaganda to paint Saddam black before the international community in order to get the

support of the UN approved allied forces for the forceful eviction of Iraq out of Kuwait.

Propaganda also played a prominent role in the coalition of the willing, which US

unilaterally with the help of her friends and allies affected its foreign policy goal of

regime change in Iraq in 1998.

Nigeria must sustain moral pressure on the world’s conscience by capturing the

attention and sympathy of the world. Nigeria must as a matter of necessity, articulate and

serialize an intensive awareness campaign using both foreign and local media to bring to

the fore the plight of the people of Bakassi and the injustice brought about by the

judgment of the International Court of Justice.

6.2 Legal options

These options are those actions whose weight lays so much on law and its

technicalities. They are legal issues that require legal instruments of the court of law for

realization. They include:

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(1) Instituting legal action against the trio of the Great Britain, Germany and

France

Nigeria should filed a fresh suit against Britain, Germany and France on behalf of

the Niger Delta Treaty kings seeking declarations as to the interpretation and legality of

the colonial era treaties of protection, and other treaties following and based upon such

treaties. The separate/dissenting opinion or reviews of the court’s judgement against

Nigeria becomes a veritable instrument. In his dissenting opinion Judge Al-Khasawneh

provided a solid ground-based scientific analysis making references to various

internationally recognized instruments such as the principle of inter temporal law; the

failure of the court to distinguish between protectorate and colonies leading to the

erroneous conclusion that Great Britain had acquired sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula

through a derivative title.

The question here should be on the interpretation of the 1884 Treaty of protection

between the Great Britain and the King and chiefs of the old Calabar which never gave

Britain sovereignty over the Bakassi. Subsequently, all other treaties including the Anglo-

German Agreement of 1913 which purportedly handed Bakassi from Great Britain to

Germany should be regarded as a nullity and an exercise in futility.

Judge Al-Khasawneh lamented that the International Court of Justice hopes to

find the basis for ceding Bakassi, to Germany form a misplaced and truncated

conception, adding that the 1884 Treaty entered into between the king and chiefs of old

Calabar with Great Britain had International legal standing, as it concerned protection

and not colonial title and the kings and chiefs of the old Calabar had capacity to enter into

treaty relations. Accoridn to him, the plain words of the treaty suggest that there was no

intent to transfer territorial sovereignty, which situation was not altered till 1913, when

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Great Britain ceded Bakassi to Germany which implied power association with territorial

sovereignty that Great Britain did not posses. (ICJ Judgement of October 10, 2002).

On this basis, Nigeria should seek interpretation from the ICJ whether the treaty

of protection extended rights of sovereignty to Great Britain vis-à-vis the transfer of same

to Germany. The impact the filling of the new suit against Great Britain, France and

Germany will have upon the present composition of the ICJ cannot be lost on

practitioners of international law. Of course, the effect which a proper interpretation of

treaties of protection would have on subsequent colonial treaties cannot also be lost on

practitioners of the law.

(2) Boycott/Non-Appearance

Accepting to appear before the International Court of Justice on the matter

between Cameroon was an error judging by the prevailing political situation in the

country at the time. What does a pariah state expect from the ICJ? Justice? Far from that.

The ICJ in many instances has experienced the phenomenon of non-appearing defendant.

This situation creates the problem of finding all the necessary evidence needed in order to

decide a case. Iceland boycotted the proceedings in the fisheries jurisdiction cases and, in

five cases since then, the defendants had not appeared (ICJ Reports, 1984). This is a

weakness in international legal proceedings and indeed international law, which Nigeria

should have very well embraced before the commencement of proceedings.

It should be noted that the international court cannot be divorced from

international politics and diplomacy. The judges at the ICJ were appointed on the

recommendation of their home governments and these governments must naturally have

a way of reaching out the judges recommended by them. To this end, judges from France,

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Germany, and Britain cannot support Nigeria in the case based on the fact that they have

interest in the matter. France is the colonial master of Cameroon. It has vested interest in

Cameroon and also a beneficiary of the oil and gas reserves in the region under dispute.

Germany and Britain will always make sure that the Angle-German Treaties must be

operative and supersedes any other treaty or declaration. The United States on its own

part will not support Nigeria based on the political situation in Nigeria then. Because

Nigeria was a Pariah state, America was certain to oppose anything that Nigeria stood

for.

Knowing full well that international court was headed by a French national and

there were judges from Britain and Germany, logic demands that Nigeria must thread

with caution. With the configuration, Nigeria should have received justice

notwithstanding the weight of evidence marshaled by her defense counsels. Based on this

fact, Nigeria should have honorably boycotted the proceedings of the ICJ.

(3) Non-Acceptance of Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the court is based on the consent of the parties coming before

it. This consent may manifest itself either in the form of a compromise (special

agreement) relating to a specific dispute, or a state may accept the “compulsory

jurisdiction” of the court more generally under Article 36 of the statute in one of two

ways. First, under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the statute, states may express their consent

to the court’s jurisdiction by entering into a conventional agreement that contains a

compromissory clause to the effect that disputes as to the interpretation and application of

that agreement are to be adjudicated by the court. Secondly, under Article 36, paragraph

2 – commonly known as the “optional clause of the statute’’ – states may make a

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unilateral declaration that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the

court in all legal disputes concerning certain categories of questions mentioned therein.

There is also exceptionally the third means of conferring jurisdiction upon the court,

namely through the institution of forum prorogatum.

States may accept the optional clause declaration with conditions or reservations.

The ICJ stated in military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua:

Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court are facultative, unilateral engagements, which states are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the Declaration, a state is equally free either to do so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions or reservations … (ICJ Reports, 1984:418).

In this regard, states condition their optional clause declaration in many ways.

Some of the most typical ones according to ICJ Year Book (1987-88:36) include:

(a) States explicitly refer to reciprocity, i.e. that they accept the jurisdiction of the

court only in relation to other states accepting the same obligation.

(b) States limit their consent to jurisdiction such as specifying that the declaration

covers only disputes which arose after it was made or only dispute in relation to

situations which arose after the date.

(c) States have qualified their optional clause declarations by excluding matters

within their domestic jurisdiction.

(d) States have included a condition in their declaration that the court may not have

jurisdiction unless all parties to any treaty affected by the decisions are also

parties to the case before the court.

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(e) States have limited their optional clause declaration by stipulating that any other

mechanisms of dispute settlement as agreed between the parties will prevail over

the general jurisdiction of the court.

(f) States exclude some specific issues or categories of issues from the jurisdiction

they grant the court in their declarations, such as territorial disputes, maritime

disputes, disputes concerning their armed forces, or disputes between members of

the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Based on the foregoing, it was an error for Nigeria to have accepted the

jurisdiction of the court. States are entitled to declare in advance that they accept the

compulsory jurisdiction of the court, but only in respect of the other states that accept

such jurisdiction in advance. Sagay (2002) noted that Nigeria signed the optional clause

long before the case, but Cameroon did not. However, Cameroon rushed to obtain

acceptance to the court’s jurisdiction opportunistically only in order to bring its claim

against Nigeria. Sagay (2002:10) stated thus: “At that state we could have walked away

freely by declining the courts’ jurisdiction in relation to Cameroon, which was not a party

to the optional clause’’

Andem-Ewu (2002) draws attention to the fact that as at 1996 only 59 member

states of the UN were signatories to the declaration of acceptance of the compulsory

jurisdiction of the ICJ, of the number, 41 member states have included reservations which

limit the scope of their acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. She pointed out that,

…12 other member states which had previously declared their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction have withdrawn such acceptance. Of the 12, 7 member states withdrew their acceptance after suits had been commenced

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against them as respondents before the ICJ (Andem-Ewu, 2000:12)

The question is, why did Nigeria not withdraw her acceptance to the compulsory

jurisdiction of the ICJ, when it had every opportunity to have done so? Was it that our

leaders were not abreast with the provisions of the statute of the ICJ or that they

deliberately wanted to give away Bakassi as they did? These are pertinent questions

whose answers will aid policy making and policy implementation in Nigeria, at least in

the future.

(4) Revision of Judgment

When a part to a case is dissatisfied over the outcome of a judgment within the

court, there is room for the revision of the judgment, but this is not without stringent

conditions. Article 61 of the ICJ statute provides that an application for revision of

judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such

nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown

to the court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such party’s

ignorance was not due to negligence. (ICJ Year Book 1987-1988:53--57). According to

the former Attorney General of Cross River State, the home state of Bakassi, Nigeria:

May seek a revision of the present judgement based on the availability of new facts such as are being made available to us by various persons, and groups both within and outside Nigeria, which facts cannot be made public at this time … (Guardian October 15, 2002:4)

Following from this, Femi Falana advised the government to institute a suit.

… for a stay of execution of the ICJ ruling ruling, pending the determination of the plea for a review of judgment … (Guardian Newspaper, 15/10/2002:4).

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The option for the revision of judgment through application is a viable one because as

Odje puts it: “It adjuncts the parties to maintain the status quo until a determination of

application for review which can take another either years as the case itself…”

(5) Recourse to the Security Council of the UN

The security council of the United Nations Organization is the appellate court on

cases emanating from the pronouncement of ICJ. Enforcement of any law or obligation as

made by the ICJ lies solely in the hands of the Security Council. The charter of the UN

gives the Security Council the power to judge the rationality, fairness, correctness and

justice of the judgment before taking any power, Nigeria has a duty to use the good

offices of the Security Council to appeal the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon by the ICJ.

In a policy paper presented to the Management of Nigeria Institute of

International Affairs (NIIA) by Mallam Abdulahi Uthman Maiyaki titled, “Bakassi

Peninsula: Alternative Options Available to Nigeria”, the road map to this recourse to the

Security Council was elaborately discussed and presented. For technical reasons, that

presentation shall be truly reproduced in the coming analysis.

There are already areas or contention with the statute of the United Nations

International Court of Justice which requires a review to meet elementary requirements

for social justice where provisions are to be made for appeal against judgment of the

International Court of Justice in particular, in relation to the case between Nigeria and

Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula.

Consequently, below are Nigeria’s proposed positions for consideration by the

UN Security Council over the case at hand. These are:

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(1) That Nigeria accepts the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2,

of the statute of the court; but that Nigeria rejects vehemently the previsions of

Article 60 of the statute of the ICJ which states that “its judgment is final without

appeal”, consequently, Nigeria is challenging the courts’ judgment of June 11,

1998 where it rejected seven of its preliminary objections (ICJ Proceedings of

June 11, 1998).

(2) Nigeria rejects in totality, the courts’ judgment of 25 March, 1999 where it

declared that Nigeria’s request for interpretation of the court’s judgment of 11th

June, 1998 was inadmissible despite intellectually, legally and logically sound

analytical presentations of some dissenting judges of the court as presented below.

(ICJ Judgment of 25th March, 1999).

In the dissenting opinion of vice president Weeramantry, he expressed agreement

with the court that “the application of Nigeria met the conditions laid down in Article 60

of the statute given the court jurisdiction to entertaining Nigeria’s request for

interpretation of the court’s judgment of 11th June, 1998,” but disagreed with the courts

conclusion that Nigeria’s request for interpretation was inadmissible, pointing out that

there is a distinction between subsequent facts and subsequent incidents. Subsequent facts

relating to an incident already pleaded would be admissible, but not subsequent facts in

the sense of subsequent incident. Nigeria was therefore entitled to seek clarification of

this aspect.

Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion could not support the judgment because

the court should have acceded to the request and find it admissible since it met all the

criteria and conditions necessary for the interpretation of a judgement, asserting that the

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courts’ judgement of June 11, 1998 had laid itself open to possible misconstruction by the

parties leading to confusion, which if not clarified, could be at variance with the

provisions of the statute of the court. He believed further that the real purpose of an

interpretation is for the court to give precision and clarification of the meaning and scope

of the judgement in question and when the court stated that it had not distinguished

between “incidents” and “facts” in its judgement of June 11, 1998 and had found that

“additional incidents” constituted “additional facts” there was room for clarification. He

maintained that,

… the request should have been declared admissible, as the applicant had established its interest, both in law and in fact, which were worthy of legal protection and would ensure that other party observed the obligation imposed by the statute and rules of the court … (ICJ Judgment of March 25, 1999).

Justice Ajibola believed that the court should have allowed Nigeria a second

round of pleading, stating his agreement with the courts’ judgments in questions relating

to jurisdiction and cost, but that the court should have considered Nigeria’s application

admissible, arguing that:

… the court should have interpreted its judgment of 11th June, 1998 because in the two paragraphs that Nigeria is requesting the court to interpret, the court has decided on the issue of the procedural right of Cameroon to: Develop what is “said” in its application and (b) present “additional facts:.. (ICJ Judgment, March 25, 1999).

Further, Judge Ajibola observed that the court had not quite clearly determined

the issue of additional incidents of new incidents, arguing that the court should have

clarified the category of incidents alleged by Cameroon to be relevant, whether they were

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pre – 1994 incidents only, or pre- and post- 1994 incidents. He pointed out that the word

“dispute” in Article 36 paragraph 2, of the courts’ statute relates only to pre-existing

disputes or incidents that occurred before filing of an application, but definitely not a

future dispute.

These legal options, especially bordering on the revision of judgment and

recourse to the ICJ are still open for Nigeria to harness, even as Cameroon has taken

possession of the Peninsula.

6.3 Military Options

Military option to the Bakassi disaster centers on the use of military strategy in

achieving Nigeria’s control of sovereignty of the Bakkasi peninsula. Because mankind

has refused to give Justice its natural way, war must continue to ravage and devastate

mankind. Any serious intention to end war must first of all start with the question of

addressing injustice and exploitation in the world. The world from the beginning has been

characterize by rivalries and competition for survival and supremacy; whether peaceful or

not which results into an unequal relations among nations. This inequality brings about

struggles which manifests into wars.

From the Marxist to the classical, the ideology that economic motives force

nations into frequent antagonism against one another cannot be over-emphasized.

Peoples’ realization that world’s resources which they hitherto thought were limitless,

were indeed limited in supply created the tendency and propensity for the struggle for

control of the resources on the basis of which the material well-being of nations will be

determined (Obasi, 1989:28).

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Just like the pre-twentieth century national interest which were expressed by

territorial ambition of states, in which ambitious rulers sought to enlarge their territories,

the Bakassi imbroglios is centered on ambition of territorial aggrandizement on the part

of Cameroun. History has it that no nation, no matter how small or vulnerable will just

fold her hands and allow other nations balkanize its territory. Idealists would prefer a

“Jaw-Jaw” approach to the resolution of the dispute but realist would believe that the

“Jaw” this time cannot hold the “nozzle”.

Plato would always say that “laws are made for fear of the unjust” (see Aja,

2000:6). The International Court of Justice was created as an army of organ of the United

Nations with the cardinal mandate to settle international disputes submitted to it with a

duty to employ preventive diplomacy and maintain international peace and security. By

international peace and security, it is mean redressing an observed injustice. The question

is, did the ruling of the ICJ actually redress the injustice regarding ownership and

sovereignty of Bakassi peninsula? If it has not, then its duty to employ preventive

diplomacy in maintaining international peace and security has opened up gun-boat

diplomacy as a lee way to peace and security in the region.

With the empowerment of the United Nations, Nigeria has a duty to defend

herself. Article 51 of the UN charter provides thus,

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense of an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations … (UN charter)

Since the ICJ has denied Nigeria justice, there is need for self help in order to defend

itself against Cameroonian aggression and attack. The benefit of the military option to the

Bakassi question is not only to maintain our sovereignty over Bakassi, it will also provide

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a welcome refreshment as Nigeria probably needs another war to really reunite the

country into a nation. The civil war dislodged the unity of the nation, and Obaanjo’s eight

years of brigandage disjointed it the more.

If the iron dice must roll, certain issues are taken into consideration because war

as an instrument of foreign policy is not a measure undertaken in a light hearted manner.

(Egbo, 2003:24). Certain questions need to be asked, if Nigeria must embark on this

adventure. They include:

� What is Nigeria’s actual military strength and potential?

� What is Cameroun’s actual strength and potentials?

� To what extent can Nigeria’s political will back-up and sustain her in a short or

long term military campaign?

� What amount of resources can be committed into the war at the expense of other

socio-economic needs of the populace?

� Who are Nigeria’s friend and allies, and what are their dispositions?

� Who are Cameroun’s friends and allies and what are their dispositions?

� What is the direction of international public opinion (IPO) regarding the issue in

contention?

In giving due consideration to these variables, Nigeria’s military might

notwithstanding that has not been tested for some time now is not comparable to that of

Cameroun. The size of Nigeria in terms of human inhabitants will consume the

population of Cameroun by six times. Economically, Nigeria is more viable than

Cameroun and can withstand a long term military campaign longer than her rival. In

considering the direction of international public opinion (IPO), Nigeria should focus her

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propaganda machinery towards sensitizing the world that her position on the matter is not

the territory and the resources there in, but the welfare of the human population. While

Cameroun is interested in the Bakassi territory rich in oil and gas reserves including

shrimps, Nigeria will be appealing to the sense of the world on the need to save the

human population form degrading conditions. In the world today, it is all about human

dignity and not the dignity of the territory.

6.4 The Right of Bakassi People to Decide Where to Belong

On October 10, 2008, the International Court of Justice delivered judgment in

favor of Cameroon in the dispute with Nigeria over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, a

1,600 kilometers border stretching from Lake Chad in the north to Bakassi in the south.

The Bakassi peninsula is a series of low lying islands at the eastern most extreme of the

Gulf of Guinea. The area has drawn attention as a potential source of commercially

exploitable oil reserves. The World Court, which is the United Nations Court of first

instance in its judgment in the Cameroun vs Nigerian, (Bakassi matter); decided that the

Bakassi boundary is delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913 so

that the sovereignty over the peninsula lies with Cameroon (Okosun, 2012)

Prior to the World Court's expected judgment, both Nigeria and Cameroon have

been pugnacious and belligerent to one another. Both nations promised before the

decision to abide by the court decision. At stake were major oil reserves believed to be in

the border area, as well as rich fish stocks in nearby waters. In pursuit of the World

Court’s judgment, on 12, June 2006, the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon signed an

agreement settling the decades-old border dispute, following intensive mediation by

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, at Green Tree New York, USA. The

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Green Tree Estate, Manhasset, New York City Concordia, executed by President

Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Paul Biya of Cameroon and witnessed by

and the United Nations, Secretary General provides for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops

within 60 days, with a possible 30 day extension, from Bakassi, which the International

Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations awarded to Cameroon in 2002. Under the

agreement, transitional arrangements were to be completed in two years for the

Peninsula, which was the last of four areas to be demarcated in accordance with the

World Court’s decision. On August 14th, 2008, Nigeria completed handing over control

of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to its neighbour Cameroon. The legal paperwork thereof,

covered the tenure of two Nigerian Justice Ministers, Bayo Ojo and Michael Aondoakaa.

On the Cameroonian side, the country’s Justice Minister, Maurice Kanto, represented his

country (Okosun, 2012)

A very worrisome perspective in the World Court’s Judgment is the total neglect

of the true intentions and wishes of the indigenous people of Bakassi to remain with their

extended kith and kin in Nigeria. Thus, raising such questions as: was it fair for the

World Court to have relied on a document that was written and executed by foreign

powers, with only their selfish economic exploitation interests at heart?; was it fair for the

World Court to have relied on a document that was written and executed by foreign

powers, to the utter neglect and detriment of the indigenous people, whose individual and

corporate destinies were severely affected but not considered?; would it be wrong to call

the execution of the original document and the recent judgment that gave the Bakassi

Peninsula to Cameroun, an obnoxious exercise in pseudo and neo slavery?; is it too late

to fix these monumental travesties of justice?. The World court delivered its judgment

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and abandoned the Bakassi people to wail and lament in the cocoon of their own worries,

fears and suffering. The Bakassi people have overwhelmingly decided to remain as

Nigerians in Nigerian territory. One of the problems begging to be resolved is that of the

resettlement of Bakassians returning from their former homeland.

The Bakassi people ought to have been given the opportunity to decide their fate

and legal right for self determination (as enshrined in the UN Charter for Universal

Declaration of Rights of 1948) through a referendum. A referendum sometimes called

plebiscite means a decree of the ballot question, in other words a direct vote in which an

entire electorate is asked to either accept or reject a particular proposal. The referendum

or plebiscite is a form of majority agenda driven, direct democracy. There are several

instances, where the U.N Security Council has conducted referendum in the past. These

include; United Nations Security Council Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara;

United Nations Security Council referendum in Myanmar; UN Security Council

referendum in which the East Timorese voted for independence; U.N. Security Council

on the complaint of Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu

and Kashmir passed resolution 47 (1948) that both India and Pakistan desire that the

question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided

through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite (Okosun, 2012). In

contrast however, the United Nations Security Council, the World Court, Cameroon, and

Nigeria have never given the Bakassi natives, who are expected to leave their ancestral

homeland, after so many years of abode there an opportunity to contribute to the

determination of their individual and corporate destinies.

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Furthermore, by virtue of section 14 and sub-section 2 (a) of the Nigerian 1999

Constitution, which states that the security and welfare of the people are the primary

purpose of government, the people of the Bakassi have the legal right of fair hearing to

decide whether to be part of Cameroon or Nigeria. Besides, the Nigerian government is

obligated under the Nigerian constitution to protect the lives and properties of Nigerians.

The inability of the Nigerian government to honor this obligation is a fundamental and a

material breach of its responsibility to the Nigerian people and Bakassi in particular.

Therefore, the Nigeria government inability to explore the alternative policy

options to ICJ ruling really undermined the right to decide where to belong by the

Bakassi people

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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

In this study, we have been able to critically examine the fundamental rights of

the people of Bakassi Peninsula in management of the Nigerian-Cameroun dispute by

President Obasanjo. Specifically, the broad objective of this study was to critically examine

the ICJ ruling over the Bakassi Peninsular and the extent to which it infringes on the

fundamental human rights of the Bakassi people. However, the specific objectives include:

(1)To ascertain whether Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over Bakassi

Peninsula undermine Nigeria’s national interest in the protection of her citizens and territorial

integrity; (2)To determine if Nigeria government inability to explore alternative policy

options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi people

The study was equally guided by two research questions, thus: (1) Did Olusegun

Obasanjo’s support for the ICJ ruling over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula undermined

Nigeria’s national interest?; (2) Did the Nigeria government inability to explore alternative

policy options to ICJ ruling undermine the right to decide where to belong by the Bakassi

people.The objectives and hypotheses were drawn from the two research questions. We made

use of qualitative descriptive method of data collection and analysis. Core assumptions of the

Games theory formed the bases of our analysis. And on the basis of the findings, the

understated conclusions and recommendations were put forward.

7.2 Conclusion

The findings of the study are as follows: (1) The rapidity under which President

Obasanjo implemented the handover of the Bakassi territory to the Republic of Cameron,

amidst numerous and alternative policy options, had indeed, undermined the national

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interest of Nigeria in Bakassi Peninsula; (2) That Nigeria government inability to explore

alternative policy options to ICJ ruling undermined the right to decide where to belong by the

Bakassi people

7.3 Recommendations

Arising from the findings of this study, we therefore put forward the following

recommendations:

• That Nigeria’s foreign policy should henceforth be national interest-centered. This

is to say that national interest should form the basis of Nigeria’s foreign policy

• Nigeria should avail herself the opportunity provided by the Security Council of

the United Nations to seek for revision of the judgment citing human factor which

was deliberately left unattended to by the ICJ, and which, as a matter of fact, is

the nucleus for the formation of the UN, as the basis,

• Nigerian foreign policy machinery should be henceforth situated and located in

the hands of experts.

• As the Nigeria plans to amend her 1999 Constitution, it becomes appropriate to

incorporate into the constitution clear provision on which organ of government

has competence in treaty-making

• Related to the above is the need for a clear role in the constitution for National

Assembly in treaty-making, similar to what obtains in the U.S.A., from where

Nigeria borrowed the presidential system of government.

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Appendix 1

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON AND

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA CONCERNING THE

MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL AND TRANSFER OF

AUTHORITY IN THE BAKASSI PENINSULA, June 12, 2006

The Republic of Cameroon (hereinafter referred to as “Cameroon”) and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as “Nigeria”), Reaffirming their willingness to peacefully implement the judgment of the International Court of Justice, Commending the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his efforts made in this respect in organizing the tripartite summits and establishing the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Considering that the question of the withdrawal from and transfer of authority over the Bakassi Peninsula should be treated in a forward-looking spirit of goodwill in order to open new prospects for cooperation between the two countries after decades of difficult bilateral relations, Determined to encourage the consolidation of confidence and peace between their two countries for the well-being of their peoples and for stability in the subregion, Have decided to conclude the present Agreement.

Article 1

Nigeria recognizes the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. Cameroon and Nigeria recognize the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the Court and commit themselves to continuing the process of implementation already begun.

Article 2

Nigeria agrees to withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula within sixty days of the date of the signing of this Agreement. If exceptional circumstances so require, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may extend the period, as necessary, for a further period not exceeding a total of thirty days. This withdrawal shall be conducted in accordance with the modalities envisaged in Annex I to this Agreement.

Article 3

1. Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, guarantees to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law and in other relevant provisions of international law.

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2. In particular, Cameroon shall: (a) not force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the Zone or to change their nationality; (b) respect their culture, language and beliefs; (c) respect their right to continue their agricultural and fishing activities; (d) protect their property and their customary land rights; (e) not levy in any discriminatory manner any taxes and other dues on Nigerian nationals living in the Zone; and (f) take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the Zone from any harassment or harm.

Article 4 Annex I and the map contained in Annex II to this Agreement shall constitute an integral part thereof. No part of this Agreement shall be interpreted as a renunciation by Cameroon of its sovereignty over any part of its territory.

Article 5

This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith by the Parties, with the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, if necessary, and shall be witnessed by the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Article 6

1. A Follow-up Committee to monitor the implementation of this Agreement is hereby established. It shall be composed of representatives of Cameroon, Nigeria, the United Nations and the witness States. The Committee shall monitor the implementation of the Agreement by the Parties with the assistance of the United Nations observers of the Mixed Commission. 2. The Follow-up Committee shall settle any dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement. 3. The activities of the Follow-up Committee shall cease at the end of the period of the special transitional regime provided for in paragraph 4 of Annex I to this Agreement.

Article 7 This Agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or modification of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002, for which the Agreement only sets out the modalities of implementation.

Article 8

This Agreement is concluded in English and French, both texts being equally authentic. Done at Greentree, New York, on 12 June 2006. For the Republic of Cameroon: Paul Biya, President For the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Olusegun Obasanjo, President

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Witnesses

For the United Nations: For the Federal Republic of Germany: For the United States of America: For the French Republic: For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

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Appendix 2

Zone in question of the Bakassi Peninsula

1. In order to prepare the Nigerian nationals living in the zone in question of the Bakassi Peninsula (hereinafter “the Zone”) for the transfer of authority to Cameroon, the Zone shall temporarily be subject to a special status as laid down in this appendix. 2. (a) Cameroon shall allow Nigeria to keep its civil administration and a police force necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the Zone for a non-renewable period of two years from the time of the withdrawal of the Nigerian forces. At the end of this period, Nigeria shall withdraw its administration and its police force and Cameroon shall take over the administration of the Zone. (b) The United Nations and the witness States shall be invited to attend the ceremony of the transfer of authority. 3. For the duration of this period, Nigeria shall: (a) not conduct or allow the conduct of any activities in the Zone which would prejudice Cameroon’s peace or security; (b) take every necessary measure, under the supervision of the United Nations observers of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, to stop any transfer or influx of its nationals into the Zone; (c) not engage in any activity in the Zone which would complicate or hinder the transfer of authority to Cameroon; (d) equip its police force in the Zone with only the light equipment strictly necessary for the maintenance of law and order and for personal defence; (e) guarantee to Cameroonian nationals wishing to return to their village in the Zone the exercise of their rights; (f) not conduct or continue the exploitation of natural resources in the sub-soil of the Zone, or to engage in any other activity harmful to the environment; (g) take every necessary measure to prevent any change in land-property rights; and (h) not position any armed forces in the Zone. 4. Following the transfer of authority over the Zone to Cameroon, the latter shall apply to the Zone a special transitional regime for a non-renewable period of five years. In the application of the special transitional regime, Cameroon shall: (a) facilitate the exercise of the rights of Nigerian nationals living in the Zone and access by Nigerian civil authorities to the Nigerian population living in the Zone; (b) not apply its customs or immigration laws to Nigerian nationals living in the Zone on their direct return from Nigeria for the purpose of exercising their activities;

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(c) allow officers and uniformed personnel of the Nigerian police access to the Zone, in cooperation with the Cameroonian police, with the minimum of formalities when dealing with inquiries into crimes and offences or other incidents exclusively concerning Nigerian nationals; and (d) allow innocent passage in the territorial waters of the Zone to civilian ships sailing under the Nigerian flag, consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, to the exclusion of Nigerian warships. 5. At the end of the special transitional regime, Cameroon shall fully exercise its rights of sovereignty over the Zone. 6. In accordance with paragraph 4 of this Annex, any acquisition of land in the Zone by Nigerian nationals not resident in the Zone at the time of the signature of this Agreement shall be perfected only in accordance with the laws and regulations of Cameroon.