ocr hegel and the hermetic tradition

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H cgcl and the H crm etic Tradition G L E N N A L E X A N D E R M A G E E

Glenn Alexander Magee’s controversial book argues that Hegel was decisively influenced by the Hermetic tradition, a body of thought with roots in Greco-Roman Egypt. In the Middle Ages and modem period, the Hcrmetic tradition became entwined with such mystical strands o f thought as alchemy, Kabbalism, Millenarianism, Rosicrucianism, and theosophy. Recent scholarship has drawn connections between the Hermetic “counter-tradition” and many modern thinkers, including Leibniz and Newton.

Magee contends that Hcgcl accepted the central Hermetic teaching that God is complete only when he becomes known by the Hcrmetic adept. Magee traces the influence on Hegel of such Hcrmetic thinkers as Baadcr, Bohmc, Bruno, and Paracelsus, and shows that Hegel shared their entire range of interests, including a fascination with occult and paranormal phenomena.

Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition covers Hegel’s complete philosophical corpus, showing that his engagement with Hermcticism lasted diroughout his career and intensified during his final years in Berlin. Viewing Hcgcl as a Hcrmetic thinker has implications for a more complete understanding of the modem philosophical tradition and German idealism in particular.

Hcgcl and the Hermetic Tradition

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T h i s On#=*

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H E G E Land the Hermetic Tradition

G L E N N

A L E X A N D E RM A G E E

Cornell University Press

Ithaca and London

4


Copyright © 2001 by Cornell University

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Magee, Glenn Alexander, 1966*

Hcgcl and the hermetic tradition /Glenn Alexander Magee,

p. cm.Includes bibliographical rcfercnccs

and index.ISBN 0-8014-3372-11. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,

1770-1831. 2. Hcrm crism — H istory—19th century. I. Title.

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Contents

List o f Illustrations p.ix Acknowledgments p.xi Abbreviations and Conventions p.xn

Introduction1. Hcgcl as Hermetic Thinker p.i2. Scholarship on Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition p.43. W hat is Hermeticism i p.84. Hegel: A Metaphysical View p.145. T h e Plan o f T h is Book p.17

Parr OneThe Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship

Chapter One: A Brief Overview of the Hermetic Tradition1. T h e Earliest Hermeticists p .n2. Meister Eckhart p.233. Nicholas o f Cusa p.264. Renaissance and Reformation p.285. A g r ip p a p .306. Bruno p.337. Franck and Weigel p.348. Böhme p.36

Chapter Two: The Hermetic Milieu o f Hegel’s Early Years1. Rosicrucianism and Freemasonry p.512. Goethe the Alchemist p.573. Swabian Pietism and F. C . Oetinger p.614. Hegel's Lehrjahre p.70jT~Pantheism, Hölderlin, and Schelling p.76

Chapter Three: The Mythology of Reason1. T h e Absolute Religion p.84 z7 Speculation and Recollection p.88 jT~Speculation as"M ythic" p.914. Further Parallels Between Speculation and M yth p.965. Imagination and the Symbolic Forms p.98öT~The Divine Triangle" and the Triangle Diagram p.1047. Sum m ary o f the Argument T hus Far p.119


C on ten ts vii

Part TwoMagnum Opus

Chapter Four: Hegel's Initiation Rite: The Phenomenology of Spirit 1. Initiation p.127 iZZH crm ctk Influences

a) Jena p .i}2b) T h e Hermetic Subtext to Hegel’s Preface p.134c) Bohmean Elements in the Phenomenology p.138d) Alchemical Elements p.145e) The Foaming Chalice p. 146

Chapter Five: The Kabbalistic Tree: The Science of Logic1. The Project o f H egels Logic p.150 2~Bohm ean Influences on the Logic p.i$73. T h e Kabbalah p.165

a) The Kabbalistic W ritings p.165b) Hegel’s Knowledge o f Kabbalism p.166c) Bereshith . . . p.168d) Language and Method in the Kabbalah p.175

4. Ramon Lull and the Tradition o f Pansophia p.177

Chapter Six: T h e Alchem ist’s Laboratory: The Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

1. Introduction p. 187 ~2. The Four Elements p.igi3. Aether p.1964. The Alchemical Opus p.zoo5. Hegel and Alchemy p.2096. Hegel on Mesmerism and E S P p.213

Chapter Seven :"T he Rose in the C ross o f the Present":Hegel’s Philosophy o f Objective and Absolute Spirit

1. Introduction p.2232. H e g e l's P h ilo so p h y o f R e lig io n : T h e In flu e n ce o f M y stic ism

p.2233. Hegel's Philosophy o f H istory: The Influence o f Isaac Luria and

Jewish Eschatology p.2274. Joachimite Mysticism and the End o f H istory p.2365. Hegel and Prussian Rosicrucianism p.247

Bibliography p.259 Index p.279


Illustrations

1. Hegel’s triangle diagram p.m

2. Key to m angle diagram p.112

3. From an eighteenth-century manuscript known to Goethe p.114

4. Mercurius redivivus p.115

5. "Speculation" graphically depicted p.121

6. T h e “ Tree o f Life" as rendered by Brucker p.171

7. The dove o f Spirit returning to G od (the Father) p.208

8. The Lurianic Sephiroth p.231

9. T h e Three Ages o f Joachim de Fiore p.239


Acknowledgments

I thank the individuals who have taught me H egel: M artin J . D e N ys, W ayne J . From an, Thelm a Z . Lavine, D onald Phillip Verene, and R ichard D ien W infield. T h an k s are also owed to four m en who have never been m y teachers but w hose work has been the principal influence on m y interpretation o f H egel’s system : Eric Voegelin, J . N . Findlay, Errol E . H arris, and G . R . G . M ure. T h e ir w ay o f reading H egel is cu rrently unfashionable, but I believe that it is substantially correct.

I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation for a generous grant that enabled me to continue w ork on this book during the academ ic year 19 9 8 -9 9 . 1 would also like to thank the Em ory U niversity D epartm ent o f Philosophy for funding my research in G erm an y during the sum m er o f 1996 . 1 thank the sta ff o f the Staatsbib liothek Preussischer K ulturbe- sitz in Berlin for allow ing me to consult H egel’s m anuscripts and other m aterials. O tto Poggeler at the H egel-A rchiv in Bochum was also kind enough to point me in the direction o f som e useful literature. I also thank M arsha Keith Schuchard, who lent me her expertise on the H ermetic tradition.

In particular I m ust express m y gratitude to D onald Phillip Verene. H is generosity, support, good advice, and, above all, good taste have m eant a great deal to me. I also thank D avid Carr, A nn H artle, Donald Livingston, D onald Rutherford , and C ynthia W illett, all o f Em ory U n iversity, for their support, kindness, and constructive criticism . I am also grateful to Tom D arby and C yril O 'R egan for their thoughtful rem arks on an earlier draft o f this work, and to C h ris M atthew Sciabarra for his efforts on m y behalf.

Special thanks m ust also go to C atherine Rice, m y editor at Cornell. H er support and enthusiasm have meant much to me.

G reg jo h n so n has been a great help at all stages o f m y w riting. Indeed, he suggested the project in the first place; therefore, I dedicate it to him.

Atlanta, Georgia G . A . M .


Abbreviations and Conventions

Butler-H egel: The Litters, trans. C lark Butler and Christianne Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984)-

BL=Encyclopedia Logic. Reference is by Hegel's paragraph number; e.g.,n _ / _ax. § 9 .

Geraets=Tfce Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T. R Geraets et al. (Albany: State University o f N ew York Press, 1991).

Hoffmeister =Johannes Hoffmeister, Briefe von und an Hegel, 4 vols.(Ham burg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952-81). Reference is by Hoffm eisters letter number, e.g.,"H offm eister #15”.

K n o x= Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M . Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I9 S2).

LHP=Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. E. S . Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1892).

l p r =L<ctures on the Philosophy of Religion, 3 vols., ed. and trans. Peter C .Hodgson et al. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984).

M iller=The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A . V. M iller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)- Reference is by M illers page number, not paragraph number. The paragraph numbers in M iller do not exist in Hegel's original and simply provide a reference for J . N . Findlay’s commentary, which forms an appendix to the translation; or The Science of Logic, trans. A . V. M iller (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1969). W hich text is being referred to is clear from the context.

Nisbet=LecfMr« on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H . B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)-

Petry=Heg«rii Philosophy of Nature, 3 vols., trans. M . J . Pctry (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970); or Hegels Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, 3 vols., trans. M . J . Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978). W hich text is being referred to is clear from the context.

p g = Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. v. Hans-Friedrich Wessels und Heinrich Clairmont (Ham burg: Felix Meiner, 1988).

pn= Philosophy of Nature. Reference is by H egels paragraph number. p r = Philosophy of Right. Reference is by Hegel's paragraph number. p s = Philosophy of Spirit. Reference is by Hegel’s paragraph number, v ie -D ie Vernunfi in der Geschichte, hrsg. v. Johannes Hoffmeister (Berlin:

Akademie Verlag, 1966).

Copyrighted mater

Abbreviations and Conventions xiii

v p r = Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, 3 Bde., hrsg. v. Walter Jaeschke (Ham burg: Felix Meiner, 1983-87).

Wallace= Hegel 's Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

Werken G . W. F. Hegel: Werke, 20 Bde., hrsg. v. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl M arkus Michel (Frankfurt am M ain: Suhrkamp, 1986).

wL=Wisstnschaft der Logik, 3 Bde., hrsg. v. Hans-Jürgen Gawoll (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986-92). T his includes the 1812 edition o f Das Sein, but unless otherwise noted, reference to "W L 1" is always to the 1832 edition o f Das Sein, hrsg. v. Hans-Jürgen Gawoll (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990).

z=Zusatz

Unless otherwise noted, reference is by page number.

W hen referring to specific texts by Hegel, such as the Philosophy of Nature, I have italicized their titles. I have not italicized the names

o f the individual Hegelian sciences, but I have adopted the familiar convention o f capitalizing words that have a

special technical meaning in Hegel's philosophy, e.g. "the Absolute,""Being,""Logic,"

"the Concrete," Substance."


H egel an d the H erm etic T rad ition

♦


I

Introduction

God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and mans knowledge of God, which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God.

— Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences

i. Hegel as Hermetic Thinker

H egel is not a philosopher. H e is no lover or seeker o f w isdom — he believes he has found it. H egel w rites in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, “ T o help bring philosophy closer to the form o f Science, to the goal w here it can lay aside the title o f 'love o f know ing and be actual know ledge— that is w hat I have set before m e" (M iller, 3; p g , 3). By the end o f the Phenomenology, H egel claim s to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with w isdom .

H egel's claim to have attained w isdom is com pletely contrary to the original G reek conception o f philosophy as the love o f w isdom , that is, the ongoing pursuit rather than the final possession o f w isdom . H is claim is, however, fully consistent w ith the am bitions o f the H erm etic tradition, a current o f thought that derives its name from the so-called Hermetica (or Corpus Hermeticum), a collection o f G reek and Latin treatises and dialogues w ritten in the first or second centuries a . d . and probably containing ideas that are far older. T h e legendary author o f these w orks is H erm es Trism egistus ("T h rice-G reatest H erm es"). "H erm eticism” denotes a broad tradition o f thought that grew out o f the "w ritings o f H erm es" and w as expanded and developed through the infusion o f various other traditions. T h u s, alchemy, K abbalism , Lullism , and the m ysticism o f Eckhart and C u sa— to name ju st a few exam ples— became intertwined w ith the H erm etic doctrines. (Indeed, H erm eticism is used by som e authors sim ply to mean alchem y.)' H erm eticism is also som etim es called theosophy, or esotericism ; less precisely, it is often characterized as m ysticism , or occultism .

It is the thesis o f this book that H egel is a H erm etic thinker. I shall show that there arc striking correspondences betw een H egelian ph ilosophy and H erm etic theosophy, and that these correspondences are not accidental. H egel w as actively interested in H erm eticism , he w as influ-

i. Ancoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, vol. 1 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), JS-


cnccd by its exponents from boyhood on, and he allied h im self w ith H erm etic m ovem ents and thinkers throughout his life. I do not argue m erely that we can understand H egel as a H erm etic thinker, ju s t as we can understand him as a G erm an or a Sw abian or an idealist thinker. Instead, I argue rhat w e must understand H egel as a H erm etic thinker, i f we are to truly understand him at all.

H egel’s life and w orks offer am ple evidence for this thesis.T h ere are references throughout H egel’s published and unpublished

w ritings to m any o f the leading figures and m ovem ents o f the H erm etic tradition. T h ese references are in large m easure approving. T h is is particularly the case w ith H egel's treatm ent o f Eckhart, Bruno, Paracelsus, and Böhm e. Böhm e is the m ost strik ing case. H egel accords him considerable space in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy— m ore space, in fact, than he devotes to m any significant m ainstream thinkers in the philosophic tradition.

T here arc, furtherm ore, num erous H erm etic elem ents in Hegel's w ritings. T h ese include, in broad strokes, a M asonic subtext o f "in itiation m ysticism " in the Phenomenology o f Spirit; a Böhm ean subtext to the Phenomenology’s fam ous preface; a Kabbalistic-Böhm ean-Lullian influence on the Logic; alchem ical-Paracelsian elem ents in the Philosophy of Nature; an influence o f Kabbalistic and Joachim ite m illennialism on H egel's doctrine o f O bjective Sp irit and theory o f world history; alchem ical and Rosicrucian im ages in the Philosophy of Right; an influence o f the H erm etic tradition o f pansophia on the system as a w hole; an endorsem ent o f the H erm etic b elief in philosophia perennis; and the use o f perennial H erm etic sym bolic form s (such as the triangle, the circle, and the square) as structural, architectonic devices.

H egel's library included H erm etic w ritings by A grippa, Böhm e, Bruno, and Paracelsus. H e read w idely on M esm erism , psychic phenom ena, dow sing, precognition, and sorcery. H e publicly associated h im self w ith know n occultists, like Franz von Baader. H e structured his ph ilosophy in a m anner identical to the H erm etic use of'correspondences." H e relied on histories o f thought that discussed H erm es Trism egistus, Pico della M irandola, R obert Fludd, and K n o rr von Rosenroth alongside Plato, G alileo, D escartes, and N ew ton . H e stated in his lectures more than once that the term "speculative" m eans the sam e thing as "m ystical." H e believed in an "E arth Sp irit" and corresponded w ith colleagues about the nature o f magic. H e aligned him self, inform ally, w ith "H erm etic" societies such as the Freem asons and the Rosicrucians. Even H egel's doodles w ere H erm etic, as we shall see in chapter 3 when I discuss the m ysterious"triangle diagram .”

T h ere are four major periods in H egel's life during which he seem s to have been strongly under the influence o f H erm eticism , or to have actively pursued an interest in it. First, there is his boyhood in Stuttgart, from 1770 to 1788. A s I shall discuss in detail in chapter 2, during this period W ürttem berg w as a m ajor center o f H erm etic interest, w ith much o f the P ietist m ovem ent influenced by Böhm eanism and Rosicru- cianism (W ürttem berg w as the spiritual center o f the Rosicrucian

2 Introduction

Co

m ovem ent). T h e leading exponents o f Pietism , J . A . Bengel and, in particular, F. C . O etinger were strongly influenced by G erm an m ysticism , Böhm ean theosophy, and Kabbalism .

M ost H egel scholars have nor thought it necessary to consider the intellectual m ilieu o f his boyhood. H egel is alm ost universally understood sim ply w ith in the context o f the G erm an philosophical tradition— as responding to K ant, Fichte, and Schelling. N eedless to say, the influence o f K ant, Fichte, and Schelling w as im portant, but it w as not the only influence on H egel. Part o f the reason other sources o f influence arc m issed or ignored is that few scholars are fam iliar w ith the com plexities o f religious life in eighteenth-century G erm any. T hose w ho are fam iliar are alm ost always from disciplines other than philosophy, and alm ost always G erm an. (T h e study o f G erm an Pietism is alm ost exclusively the province o f G erm an-speaking scholars.) T h e relig ious and intellectual life o f W ürttem berg is, however, the obvious place to begin to understand H egel’s ow n intellectual origins, characteristic ideas, and aims.

H egel has to be understood in term s o f the theosophical Pietist trad ition o f W ürttem berg— he cannot be seen sim ply as a critic o f K ant. Indeed H egel, as I w ill argue, w as always a critic o f K ant and never a w holehearted adm irer precisely because he was "im printed" early on by the tradition o f pansophia, which w as very much alive in W ürttem berg, and by O etinger's ideal o f the truth as the W hole (see chapter 2). H e could not accept Kant's scepticism , nor could Schelling, and for identical reasons. Yet they both recognized the pow er o f K an ts thought and labored hard to m ove from his prem ises to their ow n conclusions, to c ircumvent his scepticism at all costs, in the name o f the speculative ideal o f their youth.

From 1793 to 1801 H egel worked as a private tutor, first at Berne, then at Frankfurt. A s I shall discuss in chapter 3, Hegel's biographer Karl R osenkranz referred to this period as a "theosophical phase" in Hegel's developm ent. D uring this tim e, H egel appears to have becom e conversant w ith the w orks o f Böhm e, as w ell as Hckhart and Johannes Tauler. A lso during this period H egel becam e involved in M asonic circles.

In Jen a ( 18 0 1-7 ) , H egel’s interest in theosophy continued. H e lectured at length, and approvingly, on Böhm e and Bruno. H e com posed several pieces, which have only com e dow n to us in fragm entary form , em ploying H erm etic language and sym bolism (see chapters 3 and 4). H is lectures on the Philosophy o f N ature during this tim e reflect an ongoing interest in alchemy. It is likely that Schelling, w ho had com e to Jen a som etim e earlier, introduced H egel to his circle o f friends, which included a num ber o f Rom antics w ho w ere heavily interested in H er- m eticism . Schelling h im self w as an avid reader o f Böhm e and O etinger, and likely encouraged H egel's interest.

T h e final "H erm etic" period o f H egel's life is his tim e in Berlin , from 1818 until his death on N ovem ber 14 ,18 3 1 . T h is is contrary to w hat one m ight expect. It m ight be assum ed that H egel's "H erm eticism " was m erely an aberration o f youth, which the "arch rationalist" moved away

Introduction 3

Co

from as he m atured. Surprisingly, precisely the reverse seem s to be the case. In Berlin , H egel developed a friendship w ith Franz von Baader, the prem iere occultist and m ystic o f the day. Together they studied M eister Eckhart. T h e preface to H egel's 1827 edition o f the Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences in Outline m akes prom inent m ention o f Böhm e and Baader. H is revised 1832 edition o f the Science o f Logic corrects a passage so as to include a reference to Böhm e. H is preface to the 1821 Philosophy of Right includes alchem ical and Rosicrucian imagery. H is 1831 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion show the influence o f the m ystic Joachim o f Fiore, as w ell as certain structural correspondences to the thought o f Böhm e. In sum , all the evidence indicates that in the last period o f his life, H egel's interest in the m ystical and H erm etic traditions intensified, and that he becam e m ore bold about publicly aligning h im self w ith H e rmetic thinkers and movements.

T h e divisions o f Hegel's philosophy follow a pattern that is typical o f m any form s o f m ystical and H erm etic philosophy. T h e Phenomenology represents an initial stage o f “purification," o f raising the m ind above the level o f the sensory and the mundane, a preparation for the reception o f w isdom . T h e Logic is equivalent to the H erm etic "ascent" to the level o f pure form , o f the eternal, o f "U niversal M in d " (A bsolute Idea). T h e Pfei- losophy of Nature describes an "em anation" or "othering" o f Universal M ind in the form o f the spatio-tem poral world. Its categories accom plish a transfiguration o f the natural: we com e to see the w orld as a reflection o f U niversal M ind. T h e Philosophy of Spirit accom plishes a “return" o f created nature to the D ivine by m eans o f man, who can rise above the m erely natural and “actualize" G o d in the w orld through concrete form s o f life (e.g., the state and religion) and through speculative philosophy.

2. Scholarship on Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition

It is im portant to note that these claim s w ould not have been particularly controversial in the decades after H egel’s death. In the 1840s, Schelling publicly accused H egel o f having sim ply borrow ed much o f his philosophy from Jak o b Böhm e. O ne o f H egel's disciples, Friedrich T h eod o r V ischer once asked ,"H ave you forgotten that the new philosophy cam e forth from the school o f the old m ystics, especially from Jacob Böhm e ^ A nother H egelian, H an s M artensen, author o f one o f the first scholarly studies o f M eister Eckhart, rem arked that "G erm an m ysticism is the first form in which G erm an philosophy revealed itse lf in the h istory o f thought" ( “philosophy" for H egelians generally means Hegel's philosophy).’ W ilhelm D ilthey noted the sam e continuity betw een G e rman m ysticism and speculative philosophy.4

Perhaps the m ost fam ous nineteenth-century study o f H erm etic

2. See Ernst Benz, The Mystical Sources o f German Romantic Philosophy, crans.Blair R . Reynolds and Eunice M . Paul (A llison Park, Pa.: Pickw ick Publications, 1983), 2.3. Ibid., 2.4 . Ibid., 2.

4 Introduction


aspects in H egel w as Ferdinand C hristian Bauer's Die christliche Gnosis (1835).' Bauer's w as one o f the first w orks to attem pt to define G n o sticism and to distinguish betw een its different form s. T h e term Gnostic is used very loosely even in our ow n tim e, and very often w hat w ould more properly be term ed "H erm etic” is labeled "G n ostic” instead. (I w ill d iscuss the differences between the tw o in the next section.) A fter a lengthy discussion o f G nosticism in antiquity, Bauer argues that Jak o b Böhm e w as a m odern G nostic, and that Schelling and H egel can be seen as Böhm es intellectual heirs, and thus as G nostics themselves. Die christliche Gnosis is about the closest thing to a book on H egel and the H erm etic tradition that has yet been published, though, as I have said, Bauer's focus is on gnosticism , not Herm eticism .* In 1853, Ludw ig N oack p u b lished a tw o-volum e w ork. Die Christliche Mystik nach ihrem geschichtlichen Entwicklungsgänge im Mittelalter und in der neueren Zeit dargestellt, in which he dealt w ith the Idealists as m odem representatives o f m ysticism .

Later discussions o f H egel's connection to H erm eticism are often coupled w ith sim ilar discussions o f Schelling. T h is is the case with Ernst Benz’s Mystical Sources o f German Romantic Philosophy, a b rie f but indispensable text by the leading scholar in this highly specialized field. In 1938, a G erm an scholar named Robert Schneider published Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesahnen in W ürzburg. M ost o f the copies o f Schneider's book w ere destroyed during the allied firebom bing o f W ü rzb u rg on M arch 16, 1945- Schneider w as destroyed along with them . H is book is a valuable study o f the theosophical Pietism prevalent in W ürttem berg during H egel and Sch ellin gs youth.

O ther w orks by G erm an scholars dealing w ith the relationship o f m ysticism or H erm eticism to G erm an Idealism and H egel include Jo s e f Bach's Meister Eckhart der Vater der Deutschen Spekulation. Ein Beitrag zu einer Geschichte der deutschen Theologie und Philosophie der mittleren Zeit (1864); G ottfried F isch ers Geschichte der Entdeckung der deutschen Mystiker, Eckhart, Tauler u. Seuse im 19. Jahrhundert (1931); Em anuel Hirsch's Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum (1926); Fritz Leeses Philosophie und Theologie im Spätidealismus, Forschungen zur Auseinanderset- zung von Christentum und idealistischer Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert (1919), and Von Jakob Böhme zu Schelling. Z u r Metaphysik des Gottesproblems (1927); W ilhelm Lütgert's Die Religion des Deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende (1923); and H einrich M a ie rs Die Anfänge der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus (1930). T here has also been a fair am ount o f D utch literature on the topic, including G . J . P. J . Bolland's Schelling, Hegel, Fech- ner en de nieuwere theosophie ( 19 10 ); J . d 'A uln is de B ourrou ill’s Het mystieke

5. T h e bibliography contains full inform ation on all the works mentioned in this introduction. G enerally I have mentioned only books here. Both books and articles are listed in the bibliography.6. M .-M . C ottier refers to Hegel's philosophy as"U n c G nose christoiogiaue“ in his L'Atheisme Du Jeunt Marx: Ses Origin« Hegeliennes (Paris: Vrin, 1969), 2 0 -3 0 . Eric Voegclin has also argued, critically, for Hegel as a "gnostic thinker," for instance in Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (W ashington, D .C .: Regnery Gateway, 1968), 4 0 - 4 4 , 6 7-8 0 .

Introduction 5


karakter van Hegel’s logica; and H . W. M ook’s Hegeliaansch-theosofische opstellen (1913).

In French, Jacques d ’H ondt's Hegel Secret (1968) is an extrem ely im portant study o f Hegel's relationship to H erm etic secret societies such as the M asons, Illum inati, and Rosicrucians.

T h e re is also an im portant body o f English-language literature on H egel and m ysticism , beginning w ith G eorge Plim pton A dam s’s The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings ( 19 10 ). Frederick C opleston authored a useful article, "H egel and the R ationalization o f M ysticism " in 19 71. Perhaps the m ost w idely read English-speaking interpreter o f H egel, J . N . Findlay w as h im self a theosophist, and his interpretation o f H egel is attuned to its m ystic-H erm etic aspects. In Findlay's Hegel: A Re-Examination (1958), he suggests tantalizingly that H egel w as a "nineteenth-century representative o f som e philosophia G er- manica perennisT7 H . S . H arris ’s tw o-volum e intellectual b iography o f H egel, Hegel’s Development (1972/1983), contains asides regarding H egel’s relationship to E ckhart, Bohm e, Baader, and alchemy. Recently, C yril O ’Regan has published a m assive and groundbreaking study o f the m ystical roots o f H egel's philosophy o f religion, The Heterodox Hegel (1994).

T h u s far, however, the m ost influential English-language account o f H egel’s H erm eticism is E ric Voegelin's. In his essay,"Response to Professor Altizer's 'A N e w H isto ry and a N ew but A ncient G o d ,’ " Voegelin adm its that "F o r a long time I studiously avoided any serious criticism o f H egel in m y published w ork, because I sim ply could not understand him .” T h e turning point cam e w ith Voegelin's study o f gnosticism , and the discovery th at,"b y his contem poraries H egel was considered a gn ostic thinker." Voegelin goes on to claim that Hegel's thought "belongs to the continuous history o f m odern H erm eticism since the fifteenth century.”* Voegelin's principal statem ent on Hegel's H erm eticism is a sav- agely polem ical essay, "O n H egel: A Stu d y in Sorcery," referring to the Phenomenology o f Spirit as a "grim oire" which "m ust be recognized as a w ork o f m agic— indeed, it is one o f the great m agic perform ances.’"

Voegelin's claim s are unique in that he does not sim ply claim that H egel w as influenced by the H erm etic tradition. H e claim s that H egel was part o f the H erm etic tradition and cannot be adequately understood apart from it. Unfortunately, however, Voegelin never adequately developed his thesis. H e never spelled out, in detail, how H egel is a H erm etic thinker. Voegelin has, however, encouraged other scholars to develop his thesis m ore system atically (and m ore soberly). D avid W alsh, for instance,

7. J . N . Findlay, Hegtf: A Re-Examination (N ew York: O xford University Press, 1958)» 49-8. Eric Voegelin, "Response to Professor Altizer's A N ew H istory and a N ew but Ancient G o d ’ " in The Collected Works o f Eric Voegelin, vol. 12, Published Essays, 1966- 198s, cd. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990). 297.9. Eric V oegelin ,'O n H egel: A Study in Sorcery,” Published Essays, 1966- 198s, 222; cf. Voegelin’s Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, 6 8 -6 9 , and his Order and H istory, vol. 5, In Search of Order (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity Press, «987). 54- 70.

6 Introduction


Introduction 7

has w ritten an im portant doctoral dissertation entitled The Esoteric O rigins o f Modern Ideological Thought: Boehme and Hegel (1978), in w hich he m akes strong claim s about H egel's indebtedness to Böhm e.10 G erald H an ratty has also published an extensive tw o-part essay, entitled "H egel and the G n ostic Tradition" ( 19 8 4 -8 7 ).

Yet for all this scholarly activity, there has never been a system atic, book-length study o f H egel as H erm etic th inker that takes into account not only his intellectual developm ent but also the entirety o f his m ature system until the present b oo k .“

I consider this w ork not only a continuation o f the tradition o f scholarship I have sketched out above but also as a contribution to an ongoing project in the h istory o f ideas pioneered by such w riters as Voegelin, Frances Yates, A ntoine Faivre, R ichard Popkin, A llan D ebus, Betty Jo Teeter D obbs, Paul O skar Kristeller, D. P. W alker, Stephen M cK n igh t, and A lison C oudert (see bibliography). T h ese scholars argue that H erm eticism has influenced such m ainstream rationalist thinkers as Bacon, D escartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and N ew ton and has played a hitherto unappreciated role in the form ation o f the central ideas and am bitions o f m odern philosophy and science, particularly the m odern project o f the progressive scientific investigation and technological m astery o f nature.12

It is surely one o f the great ironies o f history that the H erm etic ideal o f m an as m agus, achieving total know ledge and w ielding G od lik e p ow ers to bring the w orld to perfection, w as the prototype o f the m odern scientist. Yet, as G erald H an ratty w rites, "the w idespread recourse to

10 . See D avid W alsh, The Esoteric Origins o f Modern Ideological Thought: Boehme and Hegel (Ph .D . D issertation, U niversity o f Virginia, 1978). S e e also The Mysticism of Innerworldly Fulfillment: A Study o f Jacob Böhme (Gainesville: University Presses o f Florida, 1983),“ T h e H istorical D ialectic o f Sp irit: Jacob Böhm es Influence on Hegel," in History and System: Hegel's Philosophy of History, ed. Robert L . Perkins (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1984), 28, and “A M ythology o f Reason: T h e Persistence o f Pseudo-Science in the M o d em World,” in Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern Thought, ed. Stephen A . M cK night (Colum bia: U niversity o f M issouri Press, 1992).11. In addition to H egel’s published w ritings, the prim ary sources I have relied on include letters, m anuscripts, lecture notes, student notes, and reports by contem poraries o f rem arks made by H egel. Rem arks culled from student notes have been published as the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences, and the published editions o f H egel's lectures on the history o f p h ilosophy, art, religion, and world history are also largely m ade up o f student notes.12. In addition to Bacons use o f Rosicrucian images, Descartes’s search for the Rosicrucians, Spinoza's debts to K abbalism , Leibniz's fascination w ith Rosi- crucianism . Kabbalah, and alchemy, and Newton's fascination w ith millenni- alism and alchemy, there is also evidence that K ant w as interested in the visions o f Em anuel Sw edenborg; Schelling w as interested in Böhm e, Sw edenborg, and M esm er; Schopenhauer w as interested in Böhm e, Sw edenborg, and Lavater; W illiam Jam es was interested in Sw edenborg, Fechner, spiritualism and E S P ; C. S . Peirce w as interested in Sw edenborg and Böhm e; C. D. Broad w as interested in E S P ; and, today, M ichael D u m m en is interested in tarot cards (M ichael D um m ett, The Visconti-Sforza Tarot Cards [N ew York: G . Braziller, 1986]).


magical and alchem ical techniques inspired a new confidence in man's operational pow ers. In contrast w ith the passive and contem plative attitudes which generally prevail during earlier centuries. Renaissance alchem ists and M agi asserted their dom inion over all levels o f being."” H erm eticism replaces the love o f w isdom w ith the lust for power. A s we shall see, H egel's system is the ultim ate expression o f this pursuit o f mastery.

3. W hat is Hermeticism ?

W hether or not H egel can be understood as "H erm etic" depends on how H erm eticism is defined. In truth, H erm eticism is difficult to define rigorously. Its adherents all tend to share certain interests— often classed as "occult" or "esoteric"— which are held together merely by fam ily resem blances. In part, my argum ent for Hegel's H erm eticism depends on dem onstrating that Hegel's interests coincide w ith the curious m ixture o f interests typical o f H erm eticists. T hese include alchemy, Kabbalism , M esm erism , extrasensory perception, spiritualism , dow sing, eschatology, prisca theologia, philosophia perennis, Lullism , Paracelcism, Joachim ism , Rosicrucianism , M asonry, Eckhartean mysticism, "correspondences," secret system s o f sym bolism , vitalism , and "cosmic sym pathies."14

T h ere is, however, one essential feature that I shall take as definitive o f H erm eticism . Ernest Lee Tuveson, in his The Avatars o f Thrice Greatest Hermes: An Approach to Romanticism suggests that H erm eticism constitutes a m iddle position betw een pantheism and the Judaeo-C hristian conception o f G o d . A ccording to traditional Ju daeo-C hristian thought, G o d utterly transcends and is infinitely distant from creation. Furth erm ore, G o d is entirely self-sufficient and therefore did not have to create the world, and would have lost nothing i f H e had not created it. T h u s the act o f creation is essentially gratuitous and unm otivated. G o d creates out o f sheer abundance, not out o f need. T h is doctrine has proved dissatisfying and even disturbing to many, for it m akes creation seem

13. G erald H anratty,“ Hegel and the G nostic Tradition: 11," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 31 (19 8 6 -8 7): 30 1-2 5 , 308. W alsh w rites th a t 'T h e em pirical investigation o f nature received its im petus from the conviction o f N eoplatonic H erm eticism that reality is a hierarchy o f occult or hidden sym pathies uniting the whole and ultim ately em anating from the divine O ne” (W alsh,"A M ythology o f Reason," 146).14 . Antoine Faivre w rites that "H erm eticism " has come to be u se d 'to designate the general attitude o f m ind underlying a variety o f traditions and/or currents beside alchemy, such as H erm ctism [the religion o f the Corpus Her- meticumJ, Astrology, Kabbalah, Christian Theosophy, and philosophia occulta or magia (in the sense these two w ords acquired in the Renaissance, that is, o f a magical vision o f nature understood as a living being replete w ith signs and correspondences, which could be deciphered and interpreted)." See Faivre, "Renaissance H erm eticism and W estern Esotericism " in Gnosi* and Hermeticism, ed. R o e lo f van den Brock and W outer J . H an egraaf (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1998), n o . Faivre distinguishes between "H erm eticism " and"H erm etism ," the latter term designating the Corpus Hermeticum and its intellectual milieu.

8 Introduction


Introduction 9

arbitrary and absurd. Pantheism , by contrast, so thoroughly involves the divine in the w orld that everything becom es G o d , even m ud, hair, and d irt— which drains the divine o f its exaltedness and sublim ity. T hu s, pantheism is equally dissatisfying.

H erm eticism is a middle position because it affirms both G o d s transcendence o f the w orld and his involvement in it. G o d is metaphysically distinct from the world, yet G o d needs the world to complete H im self. T h u s the act o f creation is not arbitrary or gratuitous, but necessary and rational. Consider these lines from the "D iscourse o f H erm es to Tat: The m ixing bowl or the m onad" (Corpus Hermeticum 4 ) :“ I f you force me to say som ething still m ore daring, it is [G od's] essence to be pregnant with all things and to make them. A s it is impossible for anything to be produced without a maker, so also is it impossible for this maker [not] to existalways unless he is always making everything----- H e is him self the thingsthat are and those that are not.''“ Consider also Corpus Hermeticum 10: “G od 's activity is will, and his essence is to will all things to be.“ ’6 Finally, consider Corpus Hermeticum 14 :“ For the tw o are all there is, w hat comes to be and w hat makes it, and it is impossible to separate the one from the other. N o m aker can exist without som ething that comes to be."17 Thus, according to H erm eticism , God requires creation in order to be God.a T h is H erm etic account o f creation is central to H egel’s thought as well.

But there is m ore. H erm eticists not only hold that G o d requires creation, they make a specific creature, man, play a crucial role in G o d ’s self- actualization. H erm eticism holds that man can know G o d , and that man's knowledge o f G o d is necessary for G o d s ow n com pletion. C o n sider the w ords o f Corpus Hermeticum io :"F o r G o d does nor ignore m ankind; on the contrary, he recognizes him fully and w ishes to be recognized. For m ankind this is the only deliverance, the know ledge o f G od . It is ascent to O lym pus."1’ Corpus Hermeticum n ask s ,"W h o is m ore v isible than G o d Z T h is is w hy he made all things: so that through them all you m ight look on h im ."" A s G arth Fowden notes, what G o d gains from creation is recognition: "M an ’s contem plation o f G o d is in som e sense a tw o-w ay process. N o t only does M an w ish to know G o d , but G o d too desires to be know n by the m ost glorious o f H is creations, M an."11 In short, it is man's end to achieve knowledge o f G o d (or "the w isdom o f

15. Hermetica, tr.»ns. Brian Copenhaver (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press. 199a), 10 .16. Ib id .. 30.17. Ibid. 56.18. Tuveson, however, goes too far in identifying this position with H erm cri- cism, rejecting ocher aspects— such as interest in alchem y and correspondences— as “accidental” and "not truly" H erm etic. Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Avatars o f Thrice Great Hermes: An Approach to Romanticism (Lew isburg, Pa.: Bucknelf University Press, 198a), 15 - 16 ; 34.19. Copenhaver, 33.20. Ibid., 42 .21. G arth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Im i c Pagan Mind (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 104.


io Introduction

G od ," theosophy). In so doing, man realizes G od 's ow n need to be recognized. M an’s know ledge o f G o d becom es G od 's know ledge o f him self. T h u s the need for w hich the cosm os is created is the need for self- knowledge, attained through recognition. Variations on this doctrine are to be found throughout the H erm etic tradition.

It is im portant to understand the significance o f this doctrine in the history o f ideas. O n the standard Ju daeo-C hristian account o f creation, the creation o f the w orld and G o d ’s com m and that m ankind seek to kn ow and love him seem arbitrary, because there is no reason w hy a perfect being should w ant or need anything. T h e great advantage o f the H erm etic conception is that it tells us why the cosm os and the hum an desire to know G o d exist in the first place.

T h is H erm etic doctrine o f the “circular" relationship betw een G o d and creation and the necessity o f man for the com pletion o f G o d is utterly original. It is not to be found in earlier philosophy. But it recurs again and again in the thought o f H erm eticists, and it is the ch ie f doctrinal identity betw een H erm eticism and H egelian thought.

H egel is often described as a mystic. Indeed, even he describes h im self as one (see chapter 4). But m ysticism is a broad concept that subsum es m any radically different ideas. A ll form s o f m ysticism aim at som e kind o f knowledge of, experience of, o r unity w ith the divine. I f we ask w hat kind o f m ystic H egel is, the answer is that he is a H erm eticist. H erm eticism is often confused w ith another form o f m ysticism , G nosticism (particularly in reccnt H cgcl scholarship).” G nosticism and H erm ericism borh believe that a divine “spark" is im planted in man, and that man can com e to know G o d . H owever, G nosticism involves an absolutely negative account o f creation. It does not regard creation as a part o f G o d ’s being, or as “com pleting" G o d . N o r does G nosticism hold that G o d som ehow needs man to know H im . H erm eticism is also very often confused w ith N eoplatonism . Like the H erm eticists, P lotinus holds that the cosm os is a circular process o f em anation from and return to the O ne. Unlike the H erm eticists, P lotinus does not hold that the O ne is com pleted by m ans contem plation o f it. (Centuries later, however, the N eoplatonism o f Proclus and o f the Renaissance w as influenced by H erm eticism .)

A n o th er parallel betw een H erm eticism and H egel concerns the in itiation process th rough w h ich the intuitive p ortion o f the intellect is trained to see the R eason in heren t in the w orld . A s Fow den notes. H erm etic in itiation seem s to fall into tw o p arts , one dealing w ith se lf

22. See for exam ple G erald H anratty,“ H egel and the G nostic Tradition: I,” Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 30 (1984): 23~ 48 ;"H egel and the G nostic T radition II," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 31 (19 8 6 -8 7): 30 1-2 5 ; J e f f M itscherling, “ T h e Identity o f the H um an and the D ivine in the Logic o f Speculative P h ilosophy" in Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in Honor of H. S. Harris, ed. M ichael Baur and Jo h n Russon (Toronto: U niversity o f Toronto Press, 1997). 14 3 -6 1. M itscherling's understanding o f G nosticism derives from the M essina C o llo quium on the O rigins o f G nosticism . A s R o e lo f van den Brock points out, however, the M essina Colloquium defines G nosticism so broadly "it loses all concrete substance." See Broek,"G nosticism and H erm etism in A ntiqu ity" in Gnosis and Hermeticism, 4.

Introduction 11

know ledge, the o th er w ith know ledge o f G o d .” It can easily be sh ow n , sim p ly on a theoretical level, that these tw o are intim ately w edded. T o really kn ow one's se lf is to be able to give a com plete speech ab out the cond itions o f on es being, and th is involves speaking about G o d and H is entire cosm os. A s P ico della M iran d o la pu ts it, "h e w h o kn ow s h im se lf kn ow s all th in gs in h im self."14 A lso , in the N e a r E ast it w as typical to p o rtray G o d as hovering strangely betw een transcendence and im m anence. T h e attainm ent o f en ligh tenm ent involved som ehow seeing the d ivine in oneself, indeed becom ing divine.

W e do not really know anyth ing about the H erm es cult that m ay have em ployed the H erm etic texts as its sacred w ritin gs. W e know little or noth ing o f their rites o f in itiation or how they lived. W e can, how ever, say that H erm etic in itiation d iffered from in itiation into, for exam ple, the E leusin ian m ysteries in classical G reece. W e also happen to kn ow quite little about w hat happened at E leusis, but it does seem to be the case that illum ination there consisted in the participation in som e k in d o f arrestin g experience w hich w as intended to change the initiate perm anently.” W e do not kn ow w h at that experience w as, but we do know that it could be had by young and old, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. T h is is not the case w ith H erm etic in itiation. Sa lvation for the H erm eticists w as, as we have seen, through gnosis, through understanding. T h is could be attained on ly through hard w ork, and then it could be attained on ly by som e. H erm es is quoted in Corpus Hermeticum 16 as statin g that h is teaching "keeps the m eaning o f its w ords concealed," h idden from the discernm ent o f the unworthy.

H owever, it would be a m istake to treat the H erm etic initiation as purely intellectual. Enlightenm ent does not occur sim ply by learning a set o f doctrines. O ne m ust not only know doctrine, but have the real-life experience o f the truth o f the doctrine. O ne m ust be led up to illum ination carefully; one m ust actually explore the blind alleys that prom ise illum ination but do not deliver. O n ly in this w ay w ill the true doctrine mean anything; only in this w ay w ill the initiates life actually change. Fowden w rites that H erm etic initiation is envisaged as “a real experience, stretching all the capacities o f those who em bark upon it," and he quotes Corpus Hermeticum 4 , stating that "it is an extrem ely tortuous way, to abandon w hat one is used to and possesses now, and to retrace one's steps tow ards the old prim ordial th ings."* W e w ill see in chapter 4 that H egel preserves both the intellectual and em otional m om ents o f th is H erm etic conception o f initiation.

Enlightenm ent, for the authors o f the Hermetica and for H egel, is not ju st an intellectual event; it is expected to change the life o f the enlight-

23. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, 106.24. G iovanni Pico della M irandola, Oration on the Dignity o f Man, rrans. A .Robert Caponigri (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1956), 28.25. Joseph Cam pbell, Transformations o f Myth Through Time (N e w York:H arper and Row, 1990), 189!?.26. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, 106.


12 Introduction

cncd one. Philosophy, for H egel, is about living.2’ In brief, the man who achieves Selbstbewusstsein is the man w ho becomes selbstbewusst: confident, self-actualized, no longer an ordinary hum an being. K laus Vondung w rites that "T h e H erm eticist does not need to escape from the w orld in order to save him self; he wants to gain knowledge o f the w orld in order to expand his ow n self, and utilize this knowledge to penetrate into the se lf o f G o d . H erm eticism is a positive G nosis, as it were, devoted to the world."“ T o know everything is to in som e sense have control over everything. T h is is w hat I term the ideal o f man as m agus, and it is unique to the Hermetica. See, for exam ple, Corpus Hermeticum 4 : "All those who heeded the proclam ation and im m ersed them selves in m ind [nous] participated in knowledge and became perfect [or "complete,” teleioi] people because they received mind. But those w ho m issed the point o f the proclam ation are people o f reason [or "speech," log<ik>on] because they did not receive [the g ift o f ] m ind as well and do not know the purpose or the agents o f their coming to be."** In other w ords, the m en o f com plete self- understanding w ho know even th e 'p u rp ose or the agents o f their com ing to be" are perfect hum an beings. I f H egel did not believe that man could literally become G o d , he certainly believed that the w ise man is daimonic: a m ore-than-m erely-hum an participant in the divine life.

In the Corpus Hermeticum we find a kind o f"b rid g e position" between Egyptian occultism and the m odern H erm eticism o f H egel and others. Instead o f conceiving w ords as carrying literal occult power, w ords com e to be seen as carrying a kind o f existential empowerment. T h e ideal o f H erm etic theosophy becom es the form ulation o f a “com plete speech" (teleeis logos, "perfect discourse” or perhaps "Encyclopedic discourse," which m eans, o f course, "circular" discourse). W hen acquired, the com plete speech, which concerns the w hole o f reality, will radically transform and em pow er the life o f the enlightened one. S o H egel w rites in a fragm ent preserved by Rosenkranz,

Every individual is a blind link in the chain o f absolute necessity, along which the world develops. Every individual can raise him self to dom ination over a great length o f this chain only i f he realizes the goal o f this great necessity and, by virtue o f this knowledge, learns to speak the tnagic words which evoke its shape. T h e knowledge o f how to simultaneously absorb and elevate oneself beyond the total energy o f suffering and antithesis that has dominated the world and all forms o f its development for thousands o f years— this knowledge can be gathered from philosophy alone.*0

27. H . S . H arris, Hegel's Development, vol. 2, Night Thoughts (O xford : O xford U niversity Press, 1983), i9 iff.28. V ondung/M illenarian ism , H erm eticism , and the Search for a Universal Science." In Science. Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern Thought, ed. Stephen M cK night, (Colum bia: U niversity o f M issouri Press, 199*)* 13*-29. Copenhaver, 16 - 17 ; em phasis added.30. K arl Rosenkranz, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben (D arm stadt: W is- senschafrliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969). «4>- T h e fragm ent is referred to by H arris and K nox as “ T h e Supposed Conclusion o f the System o f Ethical Life.” See H . S . H arris and T. M . K nox, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy o f Spirit (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1979). 178.

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A nother parallel betw een H erm eticism and H egel is the analysis o f the divine into a set o f “m odes" or "m om ents." H erm eticists do not rest content w ith the idea o f an unknowable G o d . Instead, they seek to penetrate the divine mystery. T h e y hold that it is possible to know G o d in a piecem eal fashion, by com ing to understand the different aspects o f the divine. T h e best exam ple is K abbalism , both in its Jew ish and C hristian form s. Lull, Bruno, Paracelsus, Böhm e, O etinger, and many others in the H erm etic tradition hold this belief.

A nother parallel between H erm eticism and H egel is the doctrine o f internal relations. For the H erm eticists, the cosm os is not a loosely con nected, or to use H egelian language, externally related set o f particulars. Rather, everything in the cosm os is internally related, bound up with everything else. Even though the cosm os m ay be hierarchically arranged, there are forces that cut across and unify all the levels. D ivine powers understood variously as "energy” or “ light" pervade the w hole.” T h is principle is m ost clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet o f H ermes Trism egistus, which begins w ith the fam ous lines “A s above, so below.“ T h is m axim becam e the central tenet o f W estern occultism , for it laid the basis fo r a doctrine o f the unity o f the cosm os through sym pathies and correspondences between its various levels. T h e most im portant im plication o f this doctrine is the idea that man is the m icrocosm , in w hich the w hole o f the m acrocosm is reflected. Self-know ledge, therefore, leads necessarily to know ledge o f the whole.

To sum m arize, the doctrines o f the Hermetica that becam e enduring features o f the H erm etic tradition can be enum erated as follows:

1. G o d requires creation in order to be G o d .2. G o d is in som e sense "com pleted” or has a need fulfilled through man's contem plation o f H im .3. Illum ination involves capturing the w hole o f reality in a com plete, encyclopedic speech.4 . M an can perfect h im self through gnosis: he becom es em pow ered through the possession o f the com plete speech.5. M an can know the aspects or "m om ents" o f G od .6. A n initial stage o f purification in w hich the initiate is purged o f false intellectual standpoints is required before the reception o f the true doctrine.7. T h e universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosm ic energies.

T o make clear the parallels betw een these doctrines and H egel's, here is a preview o f w hat I will be arguing in the rest o f this book:

1. H egel holds that G o d s being involves "creation,” the subject m atter o f his Philosophy o f Nature. N ature is a m om ent o f G o d s being.2. H egel holds that G o d is in som e sense "com pleted" or actualized through the intellectual activity o f m ankind: "P h ilo sop h y” is the final stage in the actualization o f A bsolute Sp irit . H egel holds the

31. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, 77.

Introduction 13

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“circular” conception o f G o d and o f the cosm os I referred to earlier, involving G o d "returning to H im se lf” and tru ly becom ing G o d through man.3. H egel's philosophy is encyclopedic: he aim s to end philosophy, for all intents and purposes, by capturing the whole o f reality in a com plete, circular speech.4 . H egel believes that w e rise above nature and becom e m asters o f ou r ow n destiny through the profound gnosis provided by h is system.5. H egel's Logic is an attem pt to know the aspects or "m om ents" o f G o d as a system o f ideas. In a fam ous passage o f the Science o f Logic, H egel states that the Logic "is to be understood as the system o f pure reason, as the realm o f pure thought. T h is realm is truth as it is w ithout veil and in its ow n absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition o f G o d as H e is in his eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite S p irit” (M iller, 50; w l 1, 33- 34).6. Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit represents, in the H egelian system , an initial stage o f purification in which the would-be philosopher is purged o f false intellectual standpoints so that he m ight receive the true doctrine o f Absolute K now ing (Logic-N ature-Spirir).7. H egel's account o f nature rejects the philosophy o f m echanism . H e upholds w hat the follow ers o f Bradley w ould later call a doctrine o f “ internal relations," as against the typical, m odern m echanistic understanding o f things in term s o f "external relations.”

4 . H e g e l: A M e ta p h y s ic a l V ie w

Given the evidence for H egel's place in the H erm etic tradition, it seem s surprising that so few H egel scholars acknowledge it. T h e topic is often dism issed as unim portant or uninteresting (it is neither). Usually, it is treated as relevant only to Hegel's youth (which is false). Su re ly one reason for this attitude is disciplinary specialization. Few scholars o f the h istory o f philosophy ever study H erm etic thinkers. A nother reason is the recent tendency am ong influential H egel scholars to argue that it is w rongheaded to treat H egel as having any serious interest in m etaphysics or theology at all, let alone the sort o f exotic m etaphysics and theology that we find in H erm eticism . T h is is the so-called "non-m etaphysical reading" o f H egel. A s C yril O 'R egan has pointed out, it goes hand in hand w ith an "anti-theological" reading.” For instance, D avid Kolb w rites,“ I w ant most o f all to preclude the idea that H egel provides a cosm ology including the discovery o f a w ondrous new superentity, a cosmic se lf o r a w orld soul or a superm ind."” But this is exactly what H egel does.

T h e phrase "non-m etaphysical reading" seems to have originated with K laus H artm ann w ho, in his influential 1972 article "H egel: A N on- M etaphysical View,” identified Hegel's system as a “hermeneutic o f cate-

32. See C yril O 'R egan , The Heterodox Hegel (A lbany: State University o f N ew York Press, 1994). 86.33. D avid Kolb, Critique o f Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1986), 4 2 -4 3 .

14 Introduction

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gories."* O ther well-known proponents o f H artm anns approach include Kenley Royce Dove, W illiam M aker, Terry Pinkard, and Richard Dien W infield.

T h e non-m etaphysical/anti-theological reading relies on ignoring or explaining aw ay the m any frankly m etaphysical, cosm ological, theological, and theosophical passages in H egel's w ritings and lectures.” T h u s the non-m etaphysical reading is less an interpretation o f H egel than a revision. Its advocates som etim es adm it th is— H artm ann, for instance— but m ore often than not they offer their "reading" in opposition to other interpretations o f w hat H egel m eant. It is, furtherm ore, no accident that the sam e authors finish ou t their "interpretation" by tacking a left-wing politics onto H egel, for they are, in fact, the intellectual heirs o f the nineteenth-century "Young H egelians" w ho also gave non-m etaphysical, anti-theological "interpretations" o f H egel. T h e non-m etaphysical reading is sim ply H egel shorn o f everything offensive to the m odern, secular, liberal m ind. T h is does not, however, im ply that I am offering an alternative "right H egelian" reading o f H egel. I am sim ply reading H egel. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the "nonpartisan, historical and textual analysis" o f H egel’s thought called for by Louis D u p ré .“

Su ch a reading, I am convinced, p laces H egel’s p h ilosophy squarely in the trad ition o f classical m etaphysics. In this view, I am in accord w ith the broad ly "ontotheological" interpretation o f H egel offered by M artin H eidegger, w ho coined the term , and by such scholars as W alter Jaeschke, E m il Fackenheim , C yril O 'R eg an , M alco lm C lark , A lb ert C hapelle , C lau d e Bruaire, and Iw an Iljin .” "O n toth eo logy" refers to

34 ."K lau s H artm ann ,“ H egel: A N on-M etaphysical View," in Hegel: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. A lasdair M acIntyre (N otre Dam e: U niversity o f N otre Dam e Press, 1972), 124 .35. N on-m etaphysical/anti-theological readers o f Hegel m ust som ehow explain passages such as the follow ing:“G o d is the one and only object o f philosophy. (Its concern is] to occupy itse lf w ith G od , to apprehend everything in H im , to lead everything back to H im , as well as to derive everything particular from G o d and to ju stify everything only insofar as it stem s from G od , is sustained through its relationship w ith H im , lives by H is radiance and has (within itse lf] tne m ind o f G od . T h u s philosophy is theology, and [one’s] occupation w ith philosophy— or rather in philosophy— is o f itse lf the service o f G o d "(tP R 1:84; vpR 1 :3 -4 ) .36. Louis D upré, forew ord to O 'R egan , The Heterodox Hegel, ix.37. M artin H eidegger,"T he O nto-Theo-Logical Constitution o f M etaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, bilingual ed., trans. Joan Stam baugh (N ew York: H arper and Row, 1969); W alter Jaeschke, Reason in Religion: Tne Formation o f Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, trans. J . M ichael Stew ard and Peter H o d g son (Berkeley: U niversity o f California, 1990), Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels (D arm stadt: W issenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, i983),"Speculative and Anthropological Criticism o f Religion: A Theological O rientation to Hegel and Feuerbach ,""Journal o f the American Academy of Religion 48 (1980): 34 5 -6 4 ; Em il Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension of Hegel’s Thought (Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1967); M alcolm C lark , Logic and System: A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel (T h e H ague: M artinus N ijhoff, 1971); A lbert Chapelle, Hegel et la religion, 3 vols. (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 19 6 4 -7 1)? C laude Bruaire, Logique et religion chrétienne dans la philosophie de Hegel (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964); Iwan Iljin, Die Philosophie Hegels also kontemplative Gotteslehre (Berne: Francke, 1946).

Introduction 15


16 Introduction

the equation o f Being, G o d , and logos. H egel's account o f the A bsolute is structurally identical to A ristotle 's account o f B e in g as Substan ce (ousia): it is the m ost real, independent, and self-sufficient th ing that is. H egel identifies the A bso lu te w ith G o d , and does so both in his public statem ents (h is books and lectures) and in h is private n otes— and w ith a straight face, w ith ou t w in k in g at u s .M H egel docs not offer the categories o f h is L o g ic as m ere "herm en eutic devices" but as eternal form s, m om ents or aspects o f the D ivine M in d (A b so lu te Idea). H e treats nature as "expressing'’ the divine ideas in im perfect form . H e speaks o f a "W orld S o u l" and uses it to explain how d ow sin g and an imal m agnetism w ork. H e structures his entire p h ilosop h y around the C h ristian Trin ity, and claim s that w ith C h ristian ity the “principle” o f speculative p h ilosophy w as revealed to m ankind.'* H e tells us— again w ith a straight face— that the state is G o d on earth.

I see no reason not to take H egel at his w ord on any o f this. I am interested only in w hat H egel thought, not in w hat he ought to have thought. To be sure, Hegel's appropriation o f classical m etaphysics and C hristian ity is transform ative; H egel is no ordinary believer. But his m etaphysical and religious com m itm ents are not exoteric. H e believes that his A bsolute and W orld So u l, and so forth, are real beings; they are ju s t not real in the sense in w hich traditional, pious "picture-thinking” conceives o f th em .* I f H egel departs from the m etaphysical tradition in

38. In a Ju ly 3 ,18 26 , letter to Friedrich A ugust G ottreu T holu ck (17 9 9 -18 7 7 ), Hegel w rires,“ I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at once com pletely confirm ed in Lutheranism .” See Hegel: The Letters, trans. C lark Butler and Christianne Seiler (Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1984), 520; cf. Johannes H offm eister, Briefe von und an Hegel, 4 vols. (H am burg: Felix M einer, 19 52 -6 1). H offm eister num bers the letters. T h is is num ber 514a. H enceforth, references to Hegel's letters w ill be written as follow s:"Butler, 520; H offm eister #514»." In 1826 a small controversy erupted in Berlin when a priest attending H egel’s lectures com plained to the governm ent about allegedly anti*Catholic statem ents made by H egel. H egel responded: "Should suit be filed because o f rem arks I have made from the podium before Catholic students causing them annoyance, they w ould have to blame only themselves for attending philosophical lectures at a Protestant university under a professor w ho priaes h im self on having been baptized and raised a Lutheran, which he still is and shall remain" (See Butler, 532). In an 1829 review o f K . F. G oschel, Aphorismen uber Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im VerhHltnisse zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis, Hegel m akes it clear that he is pleased to have his work regarded as a "C hristian philosophy.“BcrIiwer Schriften, 1818- 1831, ed. Eva M oldehauer and K arl M arkus M ichel (Frankfurt am M ain: Suhrkam p, 1986).39. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel notes that "the Arians, since they did not recognize G o d in C h rist, did aw ay w ith the idea o f the Trinity, and consequently w ith the principle o f all speculative philosophy" (l h p 3:20). J . N . Findlay w rites that "[H egel’s] whole system m ay in fact be regarded as an attem pt to see the C hristian m ysteries in everything whatever, every natural process, every form o f hum an activity, and every logical transition" (Hegel: A Re-Examination, 131).4 0 . In the Encyclopedia I^ogic, Hegel w rites o f picture-thinking:"Finding itself displaced into the pure realm o f the C oncept, it does not know where in the w orld it is" ( a t § 3; G eraets, 27).

Introduction 17

anything, it is in dispensing with its false modesty. H egel docs not claim to be m erely searching for truth. H e claim s that he has found it.

5. The Plan o f T his Book

In this book I w ill be concerned to do tw o things:

1) To dem onstrate the influence o f the H erm etic tradition on H egel— by w ay o f rem arks made in his texts and lectures, w orks he is know n to have had access to, and individuals he is know n to have corresponded w ith or met.2) T o situate H egel’s thought within the H erm etic tradition; to show that H egel self-consciously appropriated and aligned h im self w ith H erm eticism ; to show that Hegel's thought can best be understood as H erm etic. T h is is the m ost radical clem ent o f my thesis.

W h at w ill em erge from m y discussion is, I hope, a radically new p ic ture o f H egel's thought. It w ill no longer be possible to treat him as an "arch rationalist," as m any still do, let alone to read him in a n on m etaphysical o r anti-theological m anner.

C h ap ter 1 is devoted to an overview o f the H erm etic tradition up until the seventeenth century, dealing m ainly w ith G erm any. C h apter 2 starts w ith the early seventeenth century and covers up to and including H egel’s youth. I will be concerned in chapter 2 m ainly w ith the intellectual m ilieu H egel w as born into. C h apter 3 is central to m y account. It presents an overall interpretation o f H egel’s thought in light o f his H e rmetic connections. C hapters 4 through 7 cover Hegel's m ajor w ritings.

In these chapters, I w ill not be concerned to present an "intellectual b iography" o f H egel. Such a w ork has already been w ritten by H . S . H arris, and I do not intend to try to surpass it. T h e study is text-centered, although I have skctched-in im portant details about H egel’s life throughout. In term s o f m y treatm ent o f Hegel's intellectual developm ent, I have not made fine distinctions between "stages" in his thinking. D evelopm ental readings which speak o f “early” and "late” periods in a thinker's life very often stem from an inability to see the underlying identity or com m on tie between texts which are superficially different (e.g., in their use o f different philosophical vocabularies). In the case o f great th inkers— like Plato, A ristotle, and H egel— I th ink that there is very little developm ent. G reat m inds do not, for the m ost part, change (though in chapter 7 I w ill discuss one im portant w ay in which I believeH egel did change his m ind, and his allegiances). TTie different w orks produced by great philosophers over a lifetim e are usually variations on a them e, or them es. T o borrow H egel's language, one m ust learn to see the identity in difference.


Part i. The Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship


Chapter One 21

A B rie f O verview oj the Hermetic Tradition

1. The Earliest Hermeticists

T h is chapter presents a b rie f account o f the m ajor figures and m ovem ents in the H erm etic tradition up to the end o f the seventeenth century, w ith special attention given to thinkers H egel read and discussed and th inkers w ho were part of, or influenced, the H erm etic tradition in G erm any. C hapter 2 will be prim arily devoted to the H erm etic context o f Hegel's early developm ent.

T h e first m ajor philosopher w ho show s signs o f H erm etic influence is Proclus ( 4 12 -8 5 ) . Speaking o f Proclus in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, H egel refers to the Corpus Hermeticum: "Proclus studied everything pertaining to the m ysteries, the O rphic hym ns, the w ritings o f H erm es (die Schriften des Hermes], and religious institutions o f every kind, so that, w herever he went, he understood the cerem onies o f the pagan w orship better than the priests w ho w ere placed there for the purpose o f perform ing them " ( l h p 2 :4 33 ; Werke 19 :4 6 7 ) .

H egel adm ires Proclus as a "profoundly speculative man" and states that w ith him the N eoplatonic philosophy "has at last reached a more system atic order” ( l h p 2 :434/ 435 ; Werke 19 :4 6 8 , 469)- W h at H egel seem s to adm ire chiefly in Proclus is his use o f the dialectic and the tr iadic form . Proclus attem pts to dem onstrate, according to H egel, "the m any as one and the one as many," and how,"all determ inations, and p articularly that o f m ultiplicity, are resolved into them selves and return into unity" ( l h p 2 :4 36 ; Werke 19 :4 7 0 ). W h at Proclus adds to the Plotin- ian system is teleology. Plotinus, like the H erm eticists, offers a circular account o f the cosm os as em anating from the O ne and then returning back to it through the speculative activity o f the philosopher. U nlike the H erm eticists, however, he also holds that the O ne is entirely self-sufficient and em anates the w orld not out o f need, but out o f superabundance. T h u s the O ne is in no w ay com pleted by the return. Proclus, however, follow s the Hermetica in teaching that the O ne m ust emanate creation in order to be com plete. A ccording to H egel, Procluss philosophy displays the "self-developm ent" o f the O ne (l h p 2 :435; Werke 19 :4 7 0 ) . H egel describes in detail the three spheres, each "complete in it- selfT which constitute the m om ents o f the O ne ( l h p 2 :4 4 0 ; Werke 19 :4 7 4 ). In short, H egel sees much o f h im self in Proclus.


A s Antoine Faivre notes, from the end o f the Rom an world until the Renaissance, the Latin Asclepius w as the only portion o f the Corpus H er- meticum available in the W est.1 D uring this period o f nearly a thousand years, the prim ary transm ission o f H erm etic ideas to Europe was through alchemy. D urin g the M iddle Ages H erm es Trism egistus was given as the author o f scores o f occult w orks, and even medical texts. Prom inent am ong this “pseudo-H erm etic" literature were the various A rabic texts attributed to H erm es. T h e m ost fam ous o f these w orks was the Emerald Tablet. A very short w ork (about a page long) it w as nevertheless extrem ely influential, particularly on alchemy. A ccording to the text, A pollonius o f Tyana discovered the tom b o f H erm es Trism egistus and, inside, an engraved em erald tablet still clutched in his gnarled hands. T h e text o f the tablet then follows. It consists o f twelve prop ositions. T h e initial one is the m ost fam ou s:"In truth certainly and w ithout doubt, whatever is below is like that which is above, and whatever is above is like that which is below, to accom plish the miracles o f one thing." O thers are clearly alchem ical in nature: "Separate the earth from the fire and the subtle from the gross, softly and w ith great patience."2 T h e oldest know n version o f the Emerald Tablet dates from the eighth century a . d . A rab Spain functioned as a conduit for this and other Islam ic-H erm etic texts to C hristian Europe.

In the late tw elfth century, a book appeared in W estern Europe entitled Book of Propositions or Rules o f Theology, said to be by the Philosopher Ter- megistus (also know n as the Book of Twenty-four Philosophers). It contained tw enty-four propositions, the second o f which subsequently enjoyed a long career, borrow ed by a succession o f other authors: “G o d is an infinite sphere w hose center is everyw here, and w hose circum ference is now here."' A s Brian C openhaver notes, this w ork becam e a favorite o f A lbertus M agnus and his student T hom as A qu in as/ A quinas w as su pposed to have authored a w ork in which it was claim ed that A bel, the son o f A dam , carved esoteric teachings on stones, which then passed into the hands o f H erm es Trism egistus, and then to T h o m as/

A m ong the H erm etic thinkers o f the H igh M iddle Ages w hom I shall discuss later in the text are Joachim de Fiore ( 1135 -12 0 2 ), a C a labrian m onk w ho developed a m ystical theory o f history that came to exercise an influence on G erm an Pietism and H egel; Ram on Lull ( 12 3 5 -13 16 ), w ho w as perhaps the first individual to develop a system atic science for the achievem ent o f pansophia— universal w isdom ; and M eister Eckhart (ca .126 0 -ca .1327), one o f the fathers o f the G erm an m ystical tradition.

1. Faivre, The Eternal Hermes, 18.2. David Fideler, Jesus Christ, Son of God: Ancient Cosmology and Early ChristianSymbolism (Whearon, III.: Quest, 199})» 233.3. T h is passage is highly descriptive o f many kinds o f mystical philosophy.Ronald G ray takes it as Spinozistic! See Gray, Goethe the Alchemist (C am bridge, U .K .: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1952), 72.4- Copenhaver, xlvii.5. Faivre, Eternal Hermes, 94.

22 The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


T h e first significant G erm an figure w ho can be called "H erm etic" is A lbertus M agnus ( 119 3/ 12 0 6 -12 8 0 ) , the teacher o f T h o m as Aquinas. A lbert w as a renowned alchem ist who m entions H erm es Trism egistus by name in tw enty-three o f his w ritings. A nother o f his students, D ietrich o f Freiburg (also know n as T heodoric o f Freiburg; c a .12 50 -13 11) m elded A lbertian alchem ical theory w ith the N eoplatonism o f Proclus. D ietrich held a version o f em anation theory in which a transcendent G o d gives rise to the O ne. C ontra Plotinus, he identified the O ne with the Logos that in form s all the levels o f creation, including m an, the "im age o f the One.'*6

T h e fourteenth century in G erm any, know n as the “century o f heresy,'7 w itnessed a trem endous flowering o f m ysticism . V irtually no centers o f higher learning existed in G erm an y until the fourteenth century, and as a consequence it was necessary for G erm an thinkers to go to Italy and France to be educated. T h u s, am ong other things, H erm etic philosophy— which had seeped into France and Italy through Arabic Sp a in — gradually found its w ay into G erm any. T h e Rhineland w as already a haven for freethinkers and m ystics. T h e region produced its ow n hom egrown m ysticism in the form o f the so-called Frauenmystik, which included figures such as H ildegard o f Bingen ( 10 9 8 -117 9 ) . H er Book of Divine Works ( 116 3 -7 3) includes the m em orable image o f creation as an act o f G o d m aking countless m irrors in which to behold H im self.

2. Meister Eckhart

Johannes Eckhart, better know n as M eister Eckhart, w as born in H ocheim near G o th a about 1260 and died about 1327. N o one has dem onstrated direct H erm etic influences on Eckhart, bur his thought exhibits certain “ H erm etic“ features and was co-opted by G erm an H e rm eticists in later tim es. Eckhart's significance for G erm an philosophy and intellectual culture in general cannot be overstressed. Ernst Benz w rites that

the G erm an language o f the H igh M iddle A ges w as essentially poetic. G erm an literature o f the M iddle A ges w as the literature o f the Minnesang, o f the troubadours, o f the Heldenlied, o f epic songs such as the Nibelungrnlied, w hich m eans that it w as a lan guage o f im ages, allegories, parables, not a language o f abstract concepts and philosophical and logical term s. T h ere w as no philosophical term inology in the G erm an language, and there w ere no G erm an translations o f Latin philosophical or th eo logical t re a t ise s .. . . T h e G erm an language o f the M iddle A ges did not take p art in the scholastic developm ent o f philosophy, th eo logy, and the sciences. It is on ly w ith . . . M eister E ckhart that all th is changed.*

6. Lew is W hite Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cam bridge, M ass: Harvard U niversity Press, 1969), 39.7. Ibid., 41.8. Ernst Benz, Mystical Sources. 8.

The Hermetic Tradition 23


E ckhart w as a D om inican m onk and university professor, initially at Paris and then at C ologne. Part o f his duties in C ologne consisted in preaching to convents o f D om inican nuns. T h e sisters did not know Latin , and so Eckhart w as forced to translate Latin philosophical and theological term s into G erm an. (For instance, Eckhart w as the first to translate the Latin actualitas as "w erkelich keit") G iven the rather unusual nature o f his thought, he w as also forced to em ploy com m on w ords in an uncom m on way, and to em ploy m etaphors and im ages o f all kinds (thus, w ords like abyss [ Abgrund] took on philosophical or mystical m eaning). For the first time, through Eckhart, philosophy began to speak G erm an. Benz w rites that "M eister Eckhart is indeed the creator o f a new G erm an philosophical and theological term inology; and since his ow n theology w as a m ystical one, founded on m ystical experiences and intuitions, it is truly w ith m ystical speculation that philosophical speculation in G erm an began.’"'

Eckhart preached that intelligere, know ing, is the basic attribute o f the divine. L ike A ristotle ’s Unm oved M over, E ckh arts G o d th inks H is ow n thought, but unlike Aristotle's G o d , E ck h arts is thoroughly involved w ith the world. In fact, it is hard to sec w here the difference between G o d and the w orld is to be draw n at all for Eckhart, fo r he taught that apart from G o d there is nothing.10 L ike so m any m ystics, Eckhart conceived G o d as the “coincidence o f opposites.” By collapsing the distinction between G o d and W orld, Eckhart obviously opened h im self up to the charge o f pantheism — but actually his philosophy is much m ore radical than sim ple pantheism .

In h is tenth serm on, E ckh art preached that ju s t as a son requires a father to give him existence, so the father is not father w ith ou t the son. Sim ilarly, G o d w ould not be G o d w ithout creation: G o d m ust create to actualize H is nature.11 (T h is is one o f the innovations o f the Hermetica.) Ju s t as in H egel m ore than five hundred years later, G o d the Father is conceived as "abstract" and "incom plete" apart from n a

9. Ibid., 10. Benz gives as exam ples o f philosophical term s originating in carly G erm an m ysticism Abbild, Anschauung, Bild, Bildhaftigkeit, entbilden, entichen, Entichung, ergründen, Erkennen, Erkenntnis, Form, Gestalt, Grund, Ichheit, das Nichts, Nicht-Ich, nichtigen, Nichtigkeit, Sein, das Seiende, Ungrund, Urgrund, Vernunft, Vernünftigkeit, Verstand, Verständigkeit, Verständnis, Wesen, Wesenheit.10 . Eckhart, Serm on 21, in j . M . C lark , Meister Eckhart, An Introduction to the Study o f His Works with an Anthology o f His Sermons (London: T hom as N elson and Sons, 1957)» *30.11 . In the Philosophy of Spirit, in one o f the Zusätze, Hegel rem arks that “A ccording to Christianity, G o d has revealed H im self through C h rist, H is only begotten Son . Picture-thinking takes this proposition to mean that C h rist is merely the organ o f this revelation, as i f that which is revealed is som ething other than the source o f the revelation. H owever, the true m eaning o f the proposition is rather that God has revealed that His nature consists in having a Son, Le., to differentiate, to lim it H im self, yet to remain with H im self in H is difference; to contemplate and reveal H im self in the Son , and through this unity with the Son , through this being-for-self in the other, to be absolute spirit. Consequently, the Son is not the mere organ, but the very content o f the revelation" (p s § 384, Z ; Petry 1:57; em phasis added).



ture. N atu re or creation is the So n . T h e "return" o f the So n to the F ather is the H o ly Sp irit and, again as in H egel, this specifically denotes m ankind. In Serm on 12 E ckh art declares, “ W hen all creatures p ro nounce H is nam e, G o d com es into being.",: G o d requires m ankind to com plete the "circle" o f H is being. W e can fulfill this function because, as a p art o f nature, we too are the “S o n ” and possess a divine "spark" w ith in us (Serm on 20). T o find th is spark , affirm its existence, and strive to develop and increase the d ivine w ith in us, is to hold up a m irror to creation: the Logos in form ing the w orld can reflect on itse lf through hum an self-kn ow ledge.1* E ckhart w rites: “ I f I had not been, there w ould have been no G o d " (Serm on 4 ) .14 H um an sclf-reflection is the actualization o f G o d .

E ckhart com es quite close in m any places to affirm ing that man is G o d . H e w rites in one place: "T h e soul cannot bear to have anything above it. I believe that it cannot bear to have even G o d above it. I f he is not in the soul, and the soul is not as good as he, it can never be at ease."1* N o t surprisingly, in Ju ly 1326 Eckhart w as brought up on charges o f heresy, but he w as subsequently cleared. T h e charges w ere reopened the follow ing year, however, but Eckhart died before anything cam e o f it. In 1329 a papal bull, In Agro Domenico, condem ned a num ber o f E ck hart s theses. A s a consequence, Eckhart s pupils were frightened into retreating from som e o f their m asters m ore speculative ideas, at least publicly.16

Franz von Baader reports that he heard H egel exclaim, upon reading a certain passage in Eckhart,"d<i haben wir cs ja , was wir w ollen i ("T h ere , indeed, w e have w hat w e w ant!").1' H egel quotes Eckhart not once in his published w ritings, and only once in his 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion: "T h e eye w ith which G o d sees me is the sam e eye by w hich I sec H im , m y eye and H is eye are one and the same. In righteousness I am weighed in G o d and H e in me. I f G o d did not exist nor would I; i f I d id not exist nor w ould H e" ( l p r 1 :3 4 7 -4 8 ) .“

Q uite a num ber o f authors have attem pted to argue for the decisive

12. C lark , Meister Eckhart, 184; quoted in Beck. Early German Philosophy, 52.13. In K arl R osenkranzs discussion o f H egel’s early Jen a Philosophy o f Sp irit, he w rites:"H egel still loved, even now, as we already saw above, in his first ex position o f m etaphysics [the Triangle fragm ent— see chapter 3), to present the creation o f the universe as the utterance o f the absolute Word, and the return o f the universe into itse lf as the understanding o f the W ord, so that nature and history become the medium between the uttering and the understanding o f the W ord— a medium w hich itself, as other-being, vanishes" (Rosenkranz. Hegels Leben, 193).14 . Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, trans. Raym ond Bernard Blakney (N ew York: H arper and Bros., 1941)» 23I*15. Ibid., 163.16. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 46.17. G unther N icolin, ed., Hegel in Benchten seiner Zeitgenossen (H am burg: Felix M einer, 1970), 261.18. T h is is actually a “quilt quotation" n u d e up o f lines from several o f E ckh arts serm ons (certainly the reference to “the concept” looks suspiciously like an H egelian interpolation).


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influence o f E ckhart on H egel.1* Such argum ents have been based partly on the fact that we know H egel to have read E ckhart in the years 17 9 5-9 9 and 18 2 3 -2 4 ,® but they arc m ainly based on the strik ing parallels betw een H egel's language and Eckhart s. A t one point in the Encyclopedia, H egel w rites, “G o d is G o d only in so far as H e know s him self; this self-know ledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man’s know ledge o f G o d , w hich becom es man’s self-know ledge in G o d " ( p s § 564; W allace, 298). I shall return to the issue o f H egel’s debt to E ckhart in chapter 7.

3. Nicholas o f Cusa

N icholas o f C u sa ( 14 0 1-6 4 ) is another m ystic w hose influence on the H erm etic tradition was im portant. H e stands also as a transitional figure betw een the M iddle Ages and the Renaissance. Forgotten by m ainstream philosophy until the nineteenth century, C usa influenced such figures in the H erm etic countertradition as Bruno.1* A s a young man, C u sa w as educated by the Brothers o f the C om m on L ife at Deventer. T here, as Ernst C assirer w rites, "for the first tim e, C u sa was touched by the spirit o f G erm an m ysticism in all its speculative depth and in its m oral and religious force."" G erard G roote, the founder o f the brotherhood, w as associated w ith Ruysbrock, w ho w as profoundly influenced by Eckhart.

L ike E ckhart, C u sa w ould teach that G o d is the coincidence o f o p posites. (H e w as also the first author to refer to G o d as Absolutum.) In deed, C assirer w rites that in m any places, C u sa seem s to do noth ing m ore than “ repeat thoughts that belong to the solid patrim ony o f m edieval m ysticism . C u sa constantly refers to the sources o f th is m ysticism , especially to the w ritin gs o f M eister E ckhart and the Pseudo- Dionysius."*'' C u sa also held the perennial H erm etic-m ystical doctrine o f"in tern al relations" (im p ortan t for G erm an Idealism , w ith w hich the term is associated): the view that everyth ing is involved w ith or con nected to everyth in g else.

C u sa is m ost fam ous for his doctrine o f"learn ed ignorance," which he

19. Benz, Mystical Sources; Ernst Lichtenstein,"Von M eister Eckhart bis Hegel: Z u r philosophischen Entw icklung des deutschen BildingsbegriffT in Kritik und Metaphysik, ed. Friedrich Kaulbech and Joachim R itter (Berlin : de G ruvter, 1966), 260 -98 ; C yril O 'R egan , "H egelian Philosophy o f Religion and Eckharrian M ysticism ," in New Perspectives on Hegels Philosophy of Religion, ed. David K olb (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1992) and T J* Het- erodox Hegel; G . R alfs,'Leben sform en des G eistes: M eister Eckhart und Hegel," in Kant Studien, suppl. no. 86 (1966); W . Sch u ltz ,“ D er Einfluss der deutschen M ystik a u f H egels Philosophie," in Theologie und Wirklichkeit (K iel: Lutherische Verlagsgesellschaft:, 1969), 14 7 -7 7 .20. See 0 'Regan,"H egeIian Philosophy o f Religion and Eckhartian M ysticism," 110 ; also see H . S . H arris, Hegels Development, vol. 1, Toward the Sunlight (O xford : O xford U niversity Press, 1972), 230.21. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 58.22. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. M ario Dom andi (N ew York: H arper and Row, 1963), 33.23. Ibid., 8.

26 The Sorcerer s Apprenticeship


set forth in a w ork o f the same name (14 4 0 ). “ Learned ignorance" in volves know ing that we do not know G o d , meaning, technically, that we can predicate nothing univocally o f G o d . W e can “ k n o w "G o d through a series o f contradictory predicates (hence G o d as "coincidence o f opposites"), but this sort o f knowledge, o f course, seem s thoroughly paradoxical to ou r lim ited hum an capacities. For instance, N icholas asserts in O f Learned Ignorance that G o d is both M axim um and M inim um : since to be the M axim um is to be everything that can be, in the fullest sense, G o d as M axim um m ust also be as small as H e can be, and hence M inim um .24 C u sa understood the relation o f G o d to w orld in term s o f the first two persons o f the Trin ity: creator is to creature as Father is to Son . H oly Sp irit constitutes the unity o f these tw o. A s the identity o f U nity and Plurality, G o d m ust contain the whole wealth o f existence "contracted" into H im self.

To say that all things arc "contracted" into G o d means that every in d ividual thing has its m eaning or significance through its relation to the whole, and thus, as noted earlier, everything is bound up w ith and related to everything else. To C usa, this w as equivalent to saying that every individual thing is itse lf the universe, contracted into one set o f relations knitted together at one unique point in the cosm os.” T h e parallel to Leib n izs doctrine o f m onads is obvious. T h u s, we find in C u sa a situation quite sim ilar to Eckhart, w here the distinction between G o d and W orld has been collapsed in the very process o f upholding the tran scendence or otherness o f G o d . C u sa also taught that the m ind o f man is structurally isom orphic with the m ind o f G o d . T h e m ajor difference betw een hum an mens and divine is that w hile G o d creates things with H is m ind, w e create only images or ideas o f things. G o d creates an actual world, whereas man creates a mental world, a w orld o f ideas. We can, however, through physical labor, bring our ideas to fruition in reality w ith exactitude, through ou r use o f m athem atics. T h ere is, then, an analogy between man and G o d , and C u sa is not shy about exploiting it and treating man as a "little G od."

In D e visione Dei (1453) C u sa takes advantage o f the am biguity o f the phrase “the vision o f G o d " to make a tru ly m ystical point, very much in line w ith Eckhart and also w ith the H erm etic tradition. For C usa, G od's vision and our vision o f G o d are one and the sam e. T h is is an idea we find in Eckhart: “ T h e sam e know ing in which G o d know s H im se lf is none other than the know ing o f each detached spirit."2*' G o d reveals H im se lf in a m ultiplicity o f "points o f view." What God is can only be ap proached som ehow through an insight into the m any individual "thoughts" o f or on G o d , into which G o d has "specified" H im self. T h u s ou r “vision" o f G o d is G o d s vision o f H im self. To open ourselves to the divine is to open ourselves to the particularity through which the divine

24. N icolas o f Cusa, O f learn ed Ignorance, trans. G erm ain H eron (N ewH aven, C onn.: Yale University Press, 1954)» !*•25. C usa, O f Learned Ignorance, 82.26. Eckhart, In dtebus suis p'.acuit, in Deutsche und lateimscben Werke, vol. 1, ed.Jo s e f Q uint (Stuttgart: Kohlham m er, 1963), 162.


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unfolds. (In the Phenomenology of Spirit, H egel w rites that the Absolute m ust be conceived in “the w hole wealth o f the developed form . O nly then is it conceived and expressed as an actuality" [M iller, n ; p c , 15].) A gain, this is the sam e H erm etic doctrine o f G o d requiring creation, and specifically man, for H is actualization. It is the doctrine that flowers fully in the Bõhm ean-H egelian theosophy. Lew is W hite Beck notes in h is Early German Philosophy that C u sas "theory o f the polarity but unity o f man, G o d , and nature is elaborated by Schelling (w ho, we know, was actually influenced by reading Nicholas)."*7 Beck also m akes the claim that the Naturphilosophie o f the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as well as theosophy and Protestant m ysticism , have their roots in C usa. H ow ever, H egel never m entions C u sa anyw here in his p u b lished w ritings or in his lectures.2*

4. Renaissance and Reformation

In 14 6 0 , fourteen out o f the fifteen “philosophical" Hermetica were brought to Florence from M acedonia by a m onk em ployed by C osim o de’M edici to locate m anuscripts for him . Rem arkably, C osim o ordered M arsilio Ficino (14 33-9 9 ) to interrupt the translation he w as preparing o f Plato’s dialogues to begin w o rk im m ediately on a Latin translation o f the Corpus Hermeticum. Ficino's translation, entitled Pimander (after the first o f the treatises) and printed for the first tim e in 14 7 1, had an in credibly w ide circulation. It w ent through sixteen editions up until the end o f the sixteenth century.

In the preface to Pimander, Ficino presented his ow n genealogy o f w isdom , which he culled from a variety o f sources, including the church fathers Augustine, Lactantius, and C lem ent. It began w ith H erm es Tris- m egistus and Z oro aster, and traced a direct line to Plato. Subsequent to his translation o f the Hermetica, Ficino developed his ow n magical ph ilosophy o f occult correspondences, described in detail by Yates in G iordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition.

T h e next m ajor event in the history o f H erm eticism w as the rediscovery by Europeans o f the Jew ish Kabbalah after the expulsion o f the Jew s from Spain in 1492. Jew ish trade and social netw orks served as a conduit for Kabbalistic teachings. I shall discuss the Kabbalah at length in chapters 5 and 7. First to make significant use o f the Kabbalah was P ico della M irandoia (14 6 3-9 4 )* Pico, a younger contem porary o f Ficino, jo in ed Kabbalah and H erm eticism in the w ords o f Antoine Faivre,"through the basic them e o f C reation through the W ord.” ” Yates w rites that “ for the Renaissance m ind, which loved sym m etrical arrangem ents, there w as a certain parallelism between the w ritings o f H erm es Trism egistus, the

27. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 7 1.28. D avid W alsh notes that although there is no evidence that Hegel ever read Cusa, he w as indirectly influenced by him through J . G . H am ann and G iordano Bruno. See W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 326. See also Jo s e f Stallm ach, "D as Absolute und die D ialektik bei C usanus im Verglcich zu Hegel,” Seholastik 39 (1964): 49 5-50 9 .29. Faivre, The Eternal Hermes, 98.




Egyptian M oses, and Cabala which w as a Jew ish m ystical tradition su pposed to have been handed down orally from M oses him self."'0 W ith Pico, w ho acquired num erous followers, the tradition o f"C h ristian Kab- balism " begins.

In i4 8 6 , Pico, at the tender age o f tw enty-three, w ent to R om e w ith "nine hundred theses": precepts derived, he claim ed, from the perennial philosophy o f the ages. H e hoped to debate the theses in public. Instead, he created such a scandal that he was forced to publish an Apology in 14 8 7 . A long w ith the Apology, he published the fam ous Oration on the Dignity of M an, in which the "m an as m agus” thesis is argued for most eloquently. T h e Oration opens w ith the fam ous lines from Asclepius 1.6 : "a great wonder, A sclepius, is man."

Johannes Reuchlin ( 14 5 5 - 15 2 2 ) , also called C apnion, was one o f the great figures o f the Renaissance in G erm any. Reuchlin was a Sw abian— a fact that H egel h im self w as careful to note. H e studied for a time in Italy and made the acquaintance o f P ico della M irandola. Reuchlin su bsequently becam e a C hristian K abbalist h im self and did even m ore than Pico to prom ote study o f the Kabbalah in the C hristian world. R eu ch lins first Kabbalist w ork, De verbo mirifico, appeared in 14 9 4 . H is De arte Cabalistica (15 17) w as the first in-depth study o f the Kabbalah by a gentile author. D urin g the tw enty-three years that separated R euchlins two m ajor w orks, m any m ore K abbalist treatises had com e to light, which Reuchlin w as able to utilize in w riting De arte Cabalistica. In this later w ork, Reuchlin refers to the Kabbalah as "an alchem y transform ing external perceptions into internal, then into im ages, opinion, reason, in tuition, spirit, and, finally, light."11 A s Josep h Blau has w ritten , "from R euch lins tim e no w riter w ho touched on cabalism w ith any thoroughness did so w ithout using him as a source

R euchlins w ork did m uch to increase study o f the Kabbalah. A s Ernst Benz notes, his ideas were preserved in the circles o f "Sw abian theosophical scholars."” In his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, H egel praises Reuchlin for single-handedly rescuing H ebrew philosophy from the flam es:"T h ere was in hand a project to destroy all H ebrew books in G erm any by an im perial decree; Reuchlin deserves great credit for having prevented th is" (l h p 3 :113 ; Werke 2 0 :15 ) . R euchlins vision o f a con- gru ity between the G reek, Jew ish , and M uslim traditions would become a cornerstone o f H erm etic thought in the next tw o centuries, especially as espoused by the Rosicrucian m ovem ent.

T h e sam e year that Dc arte Cabalistica w as published, Luther nailed h is"N inety-five theses" to the door o f the castle church at W ittenberg on O ctober 31 or N ovem ber 1. T h e C atholic church had not been particularly tolerant o f H erm eticism (as the cases o f P ico and Bruno illustrate),

30. Yares, Giordano Bruno, 84.31. G . M allery M asters,"Renaissance Kabbalah" in Modern Esoteric Spirituality,ed. Anroine Faivre and Jacob N eedlem an (N ew York: Crossroad, 1995), 142.32. Joseph Leon Blau. The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance(N ew York: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1944)» 60.33. Benz. Mystical Sources, 47*


and the Lutherans w ere little better. D urin g the sixteenth century, Lutheranism was a considerable im pedim ent to the dissem ination o f H erm etic philosophy in Germ any, but it spread w idely nonetheless. Luther him self, although he rejected m ystical "excesses," incorporated vivid quasi-m ystical im agery in his serm ons. (C om m enting on L u th ers condem nation o f A ristotle for rejecting Plato's theory o f Ideas, Lew is W hite Beck w rites, “O n ly i f P lato is thought o f in term s o f N eoplaton ism, and N eoplatonism is seen through the eyes o f C hristian m ystics, is such a strange judgem ent intelligible at all in a man like Luther."” ) O ddly enough, though, Luther had nothing but praise for alchem y:

T h e science o f alchem y I like very well, indeed, it is truly the natural philosophy o f the ancients. I like it not only for the many uses it has in decorating m etals and in distilling and sublim ing herbs and liquors, but also for the sake o f the allegory and secret signification, which is exceedingly fine, touching the resurrection o f the dead at the L ast Day. For, as in a furnace the fire retracts and separates from a substance the other portions, and carries upw ard the spirit, the life, the sap, the strength, while the unclean matter, the dregs, rem ain at the bottom , like a dead and w orthless carcass . . . even so G o d , at the day o f judgem ent, will separate all things through fire, and righteous from the ungodly.’4

Still, L u th ers followers were not entirely pleased w ith the next major figure o f G erm an H erm eticism , T heophrastus Bom bastus von H oh en heim, called Paracelsus ( i4 9 3 -i5 4 i)- Alchemy, w hether in its practical or m ystical form , flourished in Germ any, and Paracelsus is definitely the most significant figure in the history o f G erm an alchemy. In his ow n time Paracelsus’s name became inseparably linked with alchemy, and his doctrines, as well as others often erroneously attributed to him, exercised a great influence over esoteric philosophy in Germ any. H egel drew on Paracelsus in com posing his Philosophy of Nature, though in the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy he com pares him unfavorably with Böhm e, stating that Paracelsus w as "m uch m ore confused, and w ithout Böhm es profundity o f m ind” (LHP 3:191; Werke 20:94). I shall discuss Paracelsus more fully in chapter 6.

5. Agrippa

O f alm ost equal im portance w ith Paracelsus was H enricus C ornelius A grippa von N ettesheim (14 8 6 -15 35 ) . A grippa is m ost fam ous for his m assive w ork The Occult Philosophy (De occulta philosophia), w ritten som etim e after 15 10 and published in 1533. The Occult Philosophy w as an a ttem pt at a com plete synthesis o f H erm etic philosophy, alchemy, and K abbalah (A grippa had read Reuchlin). A grippa offered his w ork as a

34. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 93; see Luther, Heidelberg Disputation, Thesis36, Early Theological Writings, rrans. Jam es A tkinson (Philadelphia: W estm inster Press, 1962), 281.35. Q uoted in J . W. M ontgom ery,'C ross, Constellation, and Crucible:Lutheran A strology and Alchem y in the A ge o f Reform ation," Ambix 11 (1963): 65-86 .

jo The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


rem edy for the "chaotic" state o f learning in his day— in short, his Occult Philosophy was to be a realization o f the pansophic idea o f a"superscience."

In 1530, A grippa published The Vanity o f the Sciences (D e vanitate scien- tiarum). In this work, A grippa presents h im self as a skeptic, launching argum ents against the possibility o f any knowledge and the efficacy o f any o f the sciences, including the occult sciences. The Vanity o f the Sciences w as widely read by hum anists and exercised an influence on M o n taigne, am ong others. T hree years later, however, A grippa would publish The Occult Philosophy, arguing for Kabbalah as a prisca theologia and for the pow er o f magic based on Kabbalah. C ould A grippa have sim ply changed his m ind i T h is is certainly a possible explanation but not a very satisfying one. A s Yates suggests in Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tra- dition, A grippa probably suppressed TJ>e Occult Philosophy for tw enty- three years because he realized, quite rightly, that its doctrine would be considered dangerous by many. A grip p as reputation as a “ black m agician," which reached ridiculous extrem es after his death, is testam ent to the legitim acy o f this concern. In the interim , he published The Vanity of the Sciences as, perhaps, a kind o f “safety device": i f anyone challenged him on the contents o f The Occult Philosophy he could always point to the argum ents o f The Vanity of the Sciences and insist that he w as a mere chronicler o f occult lore and did not mean to be taken seriously.** In other w ords, The Vanity o f the Sciences w as A grippas “exoteric doctrine."”

A grippa received his H erm etic education in Italy, under the tutelage o f scholars trained in the tradition o f P ico and Ficino. In Italy, A grippa made the acquaintance o f C ard inal Egid ius o f V iterbo and o f A gostino R icci, both o f w hom were interested in using C hristian Kabbalah to advance the Catholic reform movement. T hrough them and others Agrippa had access to much o f the K abbalist literature (including R euch lins De Verbo Mirifico). A s Yates notes, A grippas Tf)e Occult Philosophy"4belongs to the tradition o f C hristian Kabbalah, because it leads up, in the third book on the supercelcstial world, to the presentation o f the N am e o f Je su s as now all-pow erful, containing all the pow ers o f the Tetragram - m aton [the four-letter H ebrew name o f G o d ], as is confirm ed by H e brew s and C abalists skilled in the D ivine N am es.' ’**

A grippa divides The Occult Philosophy into three m ajor sections: N a tural M agic (based on a quasi-Aristotelian physics), Celestial M agic (based on a Pythagoreanized m arhem atics), and C erem onial M agic (based in

36. Yare*. Giordano Bruno. 131; as A ndrew W eeks points out, A grippa published a revised version o f The Occult Philosophy ju st tw o years prior to his death. See W eeks, German Mysticism from Hildegard o f Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1993), 113 .37. John Trithem ius, abbot o f Saint Jan ies o f H eroipolis, wrote to Agrippa in 1510 that "this one rule I advise you to observe, that you com m unicate vulgar secrets to vulgar friends, but higher and secret to higher, and secret friends only. G ive hay to an ox, sugar to a parrot only: understand my meaning, lest you be trod under oxen’s feet, as oftentim es happens." Sec A grippa, The Three Books o f Occult Philosophy, ed. Donald Tyson and trans. Jam es Freake (S t. Paul, M inn .: Llewellyn Publications, 1995), lvii. I have altered the translation.38. Yates, Giordano Bruno, 37.

T h e Hermetic Tradition 31

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what Agrippa calls"theology"). Like alchemy, Agrippas magic is both an art and a philosophy.

T h e theory o f "N atural M agic" is founded on the doctrine o f the four elem ents. A grippa draw s on Ficino’s De vita coelitus comparanda (1489) for his account o f the occult virtues, which are inculcated in things through the rays o f the stars, com m unicating the influences o f Ideas from the "W orld Soul." A grippa then explains how w e can use our knowledge o f this world-system to m anipulate occult sym pathies.

A grippa divides "C elestial M agic" into arithm etic, music, geom etry, optics, astronom y, and m echanics. H e accepts the Pythagorean claim about the higher reality o f number, and thus ranks Celestial M agic higher than N atural M agic, which concerns mundane, earthly objects. Basically, A grip p as Celestial M agic is a kind o f numerology, in which the adept exploits certain num erical correspondences between things. A grippa gives an account o f the sym bolic and m agical significance o f the num bers from one to twelve. H e also includes a discussion o f gem atria, the science o f attaining w isdom and occult prow ess through the substitution o f num bers for the letters in w ords o f power.*9 For this practice, H ebrew is the m ost pow erful language. T here is nothing here that is original w ith A grippa: K abbalists had for centuries practiced gem atria, the m ost fam ous o f them being A braham A bulafia ( i2 4 0 -c a .i2 9 i) . T here follow s an account o f the use o f celestial im ages or sym bols in magic, prim arily in the preparation o f talism ans. T h e im ages— o f the planets, zodiacal signs, and even dem ons— were to be engraved on certain specially prepared objects and then "activated” through magic, which can be practiced only by a highly developed adept, w ho becom es thereby a "co-operator" w ith G o d and can “do all things.”40 H ere w e are again confronted w ith the H erm etic doctrine o f m ans "divinization," which we have seen in Pico, Eckhart, and shall see again in Bruno, and others.

T h e highest level o f magic, however, A grippa reserves for the third book o f The Occult Philosophy. C erem onial M agic is a practical Kabbalah designed to give the adept divine powers to invoke and m anipulate dem ons and spiritual guides. A grippa derives m uch o f his account o f this "spirit w orld” from the Kabbalah. H e gives the names o f the Sephi- roth and their significance, and relates each to the angelic powers. A grippa accepts the standard H erm etic m icrocosm -m acrocosm analogy, and so his account o f the intelligible structure o f the cosm os is also an account o f the structure o f m an. T h u s, to m aster the occult philosophy and becom e an adept is to attain self-knowledge.

A grippa had a far-flung influence but led a singularly unhappy life and in death w as excoriated as an evil necromancer. T h e legendary character o f D octor Faustus, as well as the tale o f the "sorcerers apprentice," were based on him . In 1567, many years after A grippas death, a fourth book o f

39. J . L. Blau discusses Reuchlins use o f gem arria. See Blau, The Christian Interpretation o f the Cabala, 8.40. Q uoted in Yates, Giordano Bruno, 136.

32 T h e Sorcerer s Apprenticeship


De occulta philosophic*,“ O f M agical Cerem onies," w as published, claim ing to be a key to the previous three books. It was denounced by A grippas pupil Joh an n W ierus as spurious, and m ost scholars have accepted that judgm ent. Curiously, w e know from the auction catalog o f H egel's l ibrary, com piled in 1832, that H egel possessed a copy o f that w ork.41

6. BrunoO ne o f the m ajor thinkers influenced by A grippa w as G iordan o Bruno ( 15 4 8 - 16 0 0 ) . Bruno’s influence in G erm an y w as significant enough for H egel to devote a section o f his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy to him . (H egel also discusses Ficino and P ico in his Lectures, although quite briefly and in no depth; lh p 3 :112 ; Werke 2 0 :14 - 15 ) . T h e auction catalog o f H egel's library reveals that H egel ow ned Brun os w orks.42 H egel's rem arks on Bruno in the Lectures fill roughly eighteen pages in the Suhrkam p edition o f his w orks.

Bruno took Ficino's lily-white, C hristian ized m agic o f correspondences and developed it into the basis fo r a new H erm etic religion. H is aim , in fact, w as to return Renaissance occultism to its pagan Egyptian roots. Bruno conceived h im self as the m essiah o f this new religion. Its central teaching w as a fam iliar idea, that the "A ll" is O ne.4’ T h is m ust certainly have appealed to H egel, for in his schooldays, he and friends such as H ölderlin adopted a pantheist outlook, their m otto being hen kai pan (O ne and A ll; I shall discuss this m ore fully in chapter 2).**

In h is Lectures, H egel refers to Bruno as a "noble sou l” w ho has "a sense o f indwelling, and know s the unity o f its ow n Being and all Being to be the w hole life o f thought” ( lh p 3 :12 1 - 2 2 ; Werke 2 0 :2 4 ) . H egel com pares Bruno w ith P roclu s:"W ith Proclus in the sam e w ay the understanding, as substantial, is that which includes all things in its unity" ( lh p 3 :124 ; Werke 2 0 :2 6 ). C alling Bruno a "very original mind," H egel states that his philosophy is "on the w hole certainly Spinozism , Pantheism " ( lh p 3:123 ; Werke 20 :25). A n d: "T h is system o f Bruno's is . . . objective Spinozism , and nothing else; one can see how deeply he penetrated." Sum m arizing this Spinozism -Pantheism , H egel writes

T h e m ain endeavor o f Bruno w as . . . to represent the A ll and O ne [das A ll und Eine], after the m ethod o f Lullus, as a system o f classes o f regular determ inations. H ence, in the m anner o f Proclus he specifies three spheres: First, the original form (huperousia) as the originator o f all form s; secondly, the physical world, w hich im presses the traces o f the Ideas on the surface o f matter, and m ultiplies the original picture in countless m irrors set face to face; thirdly, the form o f the rational w orld , w hich individualizes num erically for the senses the shadow s o f the Ideas, brings them into one,

4 1. Berzeichniss der von dem Professor Herrn Dr. Hegel und dem Dr. herrn Seebeck hinterlassen Bücher-Sammlungen (Berlin , 1832). In tne collection o f the Staats- bibliothek Preussischer Kulrurbesitz, Berlin.42. Ibid.43. Yates, Giordano Bruno, 248.4 4 . H arris, Toward the Sunlight, çôff.

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and raises them to general conceptions for the understanding. T h e m om ents o f the original form itse lf are term ed Being, goodness (nature or life), and unity, ( l h p 3 :134 -35 ; Werke 20:36)

A nother sum m ary passage em ploys language strikingly like the later preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807): "T h e unity o f life he thus determ ines as the universal, active understanding (n o u s), which m anifests itse lf as the universal form o f all the w orld , and com prehends all form s in it s e lf . . . . It is the artist w ith in , w ho shapes and form s the m aterial w ithout. From w ithin the root or the seed-grain it m akes the shoot com e forth; from this again it brings the branches, and from them the tw igs, and from out o f the tw igs it calls forth the buds, and leaves, and flowers" ( l h p 3:124 ; Werke 20:26; cf. Phenomenology o f Spirit, M iller, 2; pg, 4 .)

In the end, H egel, as he does w ith all o f his predecessors, points out the fatal flaws that prevent Bruno from arriving fully at w isdom . In this case, H egel’s analysis is fascinating for it is nearly identical to his critique o f K an t: "B u t w hile the system o f Bruno is otherw ise a grand one, in it the determ inations o f thought nevertheless at once become superficial, or mere dead types, as in later tim es w as the case w ith the classification o f natural philosophy . . . [Bruno’s] twelve form s laid dow n as basis neither have their derivation traced nor are they united in one entire system, nor is the further m ultiplication deduced" ( l h p 3:137; Werke 20:39).

Bruno sojourned for a tim e in Germ any, holding a university professorship in W ittenberg from 1586 to 1588. Bruno claim ed to have founded a sect am ong the Lutherans there that he called the"G iordan isti." W hile in W ittenberg, Bruno w rote Lampas triginta statuarum (ca.1586-88), an attem pt to extend the magical m em ory system that w as his life’s work. B ru n o s stay in W ittenberg resulted in a lasting influence o f his m em ory system on G erm an H erm eticism . I w ill suggest in chapter 3 that H egel w as influenced by this tradition o f"m em ory magic." T h e m nem otechnic art o f m em ory w as o f ancient origin and originally had little or no occult connotation. H ow ever, in the Renaissance it becam e integrated into the new H erm etic philosophy, as discussed in detail by Yates in The Art of Memory. It w as thought that the techniques o f ars memoria could be used to reawaken the adept’s latent know ledge o f the structure o f the cosm os and the nature o f rhe occult influences. T h e structure o f Brun os m em ory system was set out in h is first work, D e Umbris Idearum (1548), and rem ained basically constant throughout his career. T h e goal o f this system w as self-transform ation, self-actualization: the adept w h o "recollected" the cosm ic forces described by Bruno w ould acquire a new and pow erfu l personality.

7. Franck and Weigel

Sebastian Franck and Valentin Weigel are tw o lesser-known, but still influential figures in G erm an H erm eticism . Luther referred to Franck ( 14 9 9 -15 4 2 /3 ) as "the devil’s most cherished slanderous m outh."45

45. Q uoted in Beck, Early German Philosophy, 149.




Franck w as essentially a pantheist w ho held G o d to be im m anent in n ature. L ike many m ystics, he taught that man is im bued w ith an em ber o f the divine personality. H owever, Franck held the unusual position that G o d just is w hat H e reveals H im se lf to be, under different aspects in the spiritual lives o f individual m en ."G od is for us," Franck contends,"just as w e represent him ."* Beck rem arks that "Fran cks ontology' o f m ind and spirit is not sufficiently developed for him to know, or for us to be sure, that he is here adum brating a thesis o f later transcendental philosophy. . . . H e does not and could not w ork this out; but his philosophical heir is Schelling."47 T h e presence o f G o d w ithin us is a "natural light," w hich Franck calls Sp irit. H e m akes a distinction between w hat he calls the church "visible” and "invisible." T h e "invisible church" is constituted by the H oly Sp irit, through the loving hearts o f all men. T h is conception o f the invisible church, stated here by Franck for perhaps the first tim e, w ill later be im portant for the Rosicrucians and Freem asons, and for their intellectual heirs, Schelling, H ölderlin and H egel.

Valentin W eigel (1533-88) m akes frequent reference in his w orks to Paracelsus and Eckhart. H e refers nineteen tim es to "M ercu riu s"o r H e rmes Trism egisrus. A s A ndrew W eeks notes, H erm es Trism egistus rep resents for W eigel “the com patibility o f natural and supernatural, o f pagan and C hristian knowledge."44 W eigel w as also deeply influenced by C usa, and by an anonym ous m ystical tract called the Theologia Germ anica, w hich he m ade the subject o f a com m entary in 15 7 1. T h e Theologia Germanica w as w ritten around 1350 by a cleric in Frankfurt am M ain w ho belonged to the Teutonic O rder. T h e w ork achieved a w ide circulation when it w as discovered and printed in 1516 by Luther. T h e Theologia Germanica teaches that G o d requires man to redeem the world, but to achieve this man m ust first com e to know G o d . G o d is a perfect whole, and know ing the whole requires em ptying the m ind o f images. G o d is O ne, but the text also says that H e is A ll, “and m ust be A ll."4* Evil occurs when hum an beings break aw ay from the whole and turn their m inds and hearts to the lim ited, the partial. "AH knowledge lim ited to separate parts w ill com e to nought when the W hole is perceived,” states the anonym ous author.” T h e Theologia Germanica holds that strict obedience to G o d s law does not oppress, rather it is the realization o f true freedom .’1

D raw ing on Paracelsus, Weigel states that "All corporeal things are an excrem ent or coagulated sm oke . . . from the invisible stars; the same sm oke has rhree substances: sulphur, mercury, and salt.”'’ Following

46. Paradoxa (1534): quoted in Beck, Early German Philosophy, 151.47. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 151.48. A ndrew W eeks, Valentin Weigel (A lbany: Stare University o f N ew YorkPress, 2000), 55.49- The Theologia Germanica 0 /Martin Luther, trans. Bengt H offm an (N ewYork: Paulist Press, 1980), 126.50. Ibid., 82.51. Ibid., 7», »36. See also W eeks, Valentin Weigel, $0 .52. Q uoted in W eeks, Valentin Weigel, m .


C u sa and the Theologia Germanica, he holds that all creatures are contained w ithin G o d . M an, however, is unique. H e contains w ith in h im se lf the characteristics o f all creation. W eigel uses the term Begrijf to designate the "enfolding" w ithin man o f the nature o f all things. Begriff com es from begreifen, w hich in m odern G erm an m eans "to understand," but literally' m eans "to grasp." Der Bcgriff (in m odern G erm an , "concept") is “ the grasped." M an is the "quintessence," the fifth elem ent, rising above the four elements.

For W eigel, the mental restraint necessary to achieve know ledge o f G o d involves pure consciousness or self-know ing, not a knowledge o f particular things. In being absolutely passive, however, it is absolutely active, fo r this type o f know ledge is precisely G od 's know ledge (W eigel conceives G o d as the "N o th in g and A ll"). So , the m ystic does not come to know G o d but to become Gods knowing. T h is , as w e have seen, is a perennial H erm etic them e. A lso present in W eigel is the ideal o f w isdom as a know ledge o f all things, as well as the conception o f the “ invisible church" first put forw ard by Franck. W eigels ideas exercised a great influence on G erm an m ysticism and philosophy, and w ere spread by w riters such as Joh an n A rndt, G o ttfried A rnold , and Leibniz.

8. Bohme

Jak o b Bohm e ( 15 7 5 -16 2 4 ) began to w rite ju s t before the publication o f the first Rosicrucian m anifestos. H e w as a native o f G orlitz , in Lusatia on the borders o f Bohem ia. Bohm e w as a sim ple shoem aker w ho, in 16 0 0 had a m ystical vision: looking at a gleam o f light reflected on a pew ter vessel, he felt h im self able to peer into the inner essence o f all th ings. In a letter, he described the experience:

T h e gate w as opened unto me, so that in one quarter o f an hour I saw and knew m ore than i f I had been m any years together at a U niversity; at w hich I did exceedingly adm ire, and I knew not how it happened to m e; and thereupon I turned m y heart to praise G o d for it. For I saw and knew the Being o f all b e in g s ;. . . also the birth or eternal generation o f the H o ly T rin ity; the descent and origin o f th is w o rld / ’

For twelve years he rem ained silent, and when he did write for the first time in 1612 , it w as only a personal exercise; he never intended his w ork to be copied and read by others. D urin g the intervening years, there is evidence that Bohm e read the alchem ists, especially Paracelsus. In Bohm e's first w ork, Aurora (Morgenrdthe im Aufgang), he both denies and claim s expertise in alchem ical theory in the sam e passage: "D o not take me for an alchem ist, for I write only in the knowledge o f the spirit, and not from experience. T h o u gh indeed I could here show something else, viz. in how many days, and in what hours, these things m ust be prepared; for gold cannot be m ade in one day, but a w hole m onth is requi

53. Jakob Bohm e, letter to C aspar Lindner, in Jakob Bohme: Essential Readings, ed. Robin W aterfield (W ellingborough, England: C ru cib le/T horsens, 1989)» 64-

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site for it."54 A n drew W eeks speculates that Böhm e did actually experim ent w ith alchemy, perhaps w ith one o f his wealthy friends.* Böhm e w as also acquainted with the w ritings o f the m ystics (e.g., W eigel), and possibly som e Kabbalisric w orks.*

B öhm es G ö rlitz was, as P ierre Deghaye puts it, "rich in spiritual h eterodoxy and H erm eticism ."4' T h e medical doctors o f G ö rlitz were m ainly Paracelsians. T h ere was even a m inor scandal over their Paracel- cism , which erupted in 157o.*4 T h is scandal only increased the appetite o f the citizens, particularly o f the nobility, for H erm etic and alchemical philosophy, in which they were w idely know n to dabble. Supernatural events were frequently reported in or near G örlitz : giant m eteors crashed to earth at propitious tim es, grain w as said to rain from the sky, etc.w

O ne im portant influence on the underground H erm etic culture o f G ö rlitz w as Dr. Balthasar W alter, a C hristian K abbalist and alchem ist w ho befriended Böhm e after 1612. W alter had traveled to the O rient in search o f w isdom , but declared that he had found it only w ith Böhm e. It is through W alter that Böhm e probably first became deeply im m ersed in the K abbalah. A nother influential acquaintance o f Böhm e was D r. T obias Kober, a Paracelsian physician, w ho m ay have been the source o f Böhm es Paracelcism . A nother friend was the alchem ist Johann Rothe, w ho w as well-versed in medieval m ysticism , including Tauler.

Böhm e is a turning point in the history o f H erm etic philosophy. H er- m eticism and C hristian ity had always been strange bedfellows, and as we have seen, much o f H erm etic thought— such as its conception o f the divine or sem i-divine status o f m an— is heretical by C hristian stan dards. Bruno even went so far as to advocate the abandonm ent o f C hristian ity and the return to a H erm etic,"Egyptian " religion. Böhm e, in effect, acted to prevent the self-destruction o f H erm etic philosophy in the face o f its clear conflict w ith the dom inant, orthodox faith. D avid

54. Aurora, in Sämtliche Schriften, ed. W ill-Erich Peuckert and August Faust (Stuttgart: Fromann, 1955)* vol. 1, chap. 22, § 105. (A ll references to Böhm es works will be given by chapter and paragraph number.) English translation: Aurora, trans. Jo h n Sparrow , ed. C . J . Barker and D. S . H ehner (London: John M . W atkins, 19 14 ), 6 10 . Sparrow 's translation w as originally published in 1656. It is the only English translation o f the entire w ork. I have included page num bers from Sparrow , because his paragraph num bers do not correspond to those in the Germ an.55. W eeks, Boehme: An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philoso- plrer and Mystic (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1991), 57; H . H . Brinton has rem arked that "Böhm e did more than borrow a large part o f his vocabulary from alchemy, he took over the whole alchcm istic world-view, which he developed into a philosophic system.” See H ow ard H aines Brinton, The Mystic Will (N ew York: M acm illan, 1930), 81.56. T h e influence o f Kabbalah on Böhm es works seem s to increase w ith time. Ernst Benz believes that Böhm es sources for Kabbalism were probably oral (Benz, Mystical Sources, 48).57. Pierre D eghaye,'Jacob Böhm e and H is Followers,” Modern Esoteric Spirituality, a io .58. W eeks, Boehme, 29.59. Ibid.. 31.



W alsh w rites that "F o r the new occult philosophy to w ork, the old C hristian philosophy m ust be redirected. T h e individual w ith the theoretical genius to effect their reconciliation and, thereby, becom e the transm itter o f the new sym bolism to the m odern w orld w as Jak o b Böhm e."60

W alsh sum m arizes the radical "redirection" o f C hristian philosophy, and the key to Böhm es thought, as fo Ilo w s:"T h e crucial sh ift is from the idea o f all reality as m oving tow ard G o d to the idea o f G o d h im self as part o f the m ovem ent o f reality as well."61 T h is is the core o f Böhm es H erm eticism : the conception o f G o d not as transcendent and static, e x isting "outside” the w orld , im passive and com plete, but as an active process unfolding w ith in the w orld , w ith in history. W h at initiates this p rocess in the first place i Böhm e held that G o d is m oved by the desire to reveal H im se lf to H im self, but that this self-revelation is psychologically im possible unless an other stands opposed to H im .“

In a later w ork, Böhm e w ro te ,"N o thing can be revealed to itse lf w ith out opposition [ Wiederwärt igkeit]: For i f there is nothing that opposes it, then it always goes out o f itse lf and never returns to itse lf again. I f it does not return into itself, as into that from w hich it originated, then it know s nothing o f its origin ."'' In short, the "other” is necessary fo r G o d s self-consciousness. W ithout self-consciousness G o d w ould not be G o d , for H is know ledge would be incom plete. T h is other "lim its" G o d ; by "othering,” G o d lim its H im self, giving H im se lf discernible "boundaries.” A lthough it is not clear that Böhm e thinks G o d exists at all apart from creation, the m ind can think H im apart, can th ink H im as transcendent— but as transcendent G o d is m erely a "dark inchoate w ill fo r se lfrevelation"64 w hich Böhm e calls the Ungrund (a conception not far rem oved from E ckh arts Abgrund, o r A byss).64

G o d does not know H im se lf through the w orld qua absolute other, however. A n absolute other would be so foreign as to be unknowable. Instead, G o d in creation "others H im scIfT corporealizes H im self, a p rocess that reaches its consum m ation w ith C h rist. It is through C h rist

60. David W alsh,“A M ythology o f Reason," 151.61. Ib id ., 152; Jurgen H aberm as has rem arked that Böhm e w as the first to "historicize" G o d or the A bsolute; i.e., to claim that it develops through time. Sec H aberm as’s “ D as Absolute und die G eschichte: Von der Zw eispält igkeit in Schellings Denken" (Bonn: Ph.D . dissertation. Rheinische Friedrich W ilhelm s U niversität, 1954),62. To borrow term s from G ershom Scholem s treatm ent o f Isaac Luria. Böhm es theosophy conceives G o d as"m acro-anthropos"and man as "microcosm os." See Scnolem , Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (N e w York: Schocken Books, 1946), 269.63. See Jako b Böhm e, Vom Göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, in Sämtliche Schriften, ed. W ill-Erich Peuckert (Stuttgart: From m ann, 19 55 -6 1) , vol. 4 , chap. 1, § 8. H egel quotes this passage in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy 3:203; Werke 20:106.6 4 . W alsh,“A M ythology o f Reason," 154-65. T h e term Ungrund seems to appear first in Böhm es treatise,“O n the Incarnation o f Christ."



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that the nature o f G o d and the w orld is revealed to man. T hrough C h rist, w e can reflect on our nature as divine products, and this reflection constitutes a "return" to the source; G od 's w ill to self-revelation is fulfilled w ith H is creations know ledge o f H im . A s W alsh purs it suc- cinctly/'Böhm e is the herald o f the self-actualizing evolutionary G o d ."* A n d F. Ernest Stoeffler w rites ,"T o Böhm e G o d w as that ultim ate M y stery which moves deliberately and constantly tow ard self-understanding through progressive self-actualization. Philosophy, then, as Böhm e understood it, becom es basically the history o f the ultim ate M ystery striving to know itself."47

B öhm es first w ork, which came to be know n sim ply as Aurora, w as titled Morgenröthe im Aufgang, which W eeks translates as "M orn in g Glow , Ascending." T h e preface to Aurora em ploys the m etaphor o f the "tree o f revealed truth,” which is a kind o f intellectual history leading up to Luther and the Reform ation. Böhm e includes h im self in his m etaphor, claim ing that before the tree is at last consum ed by fire, it w ill sprout one final branch, a final and consum m ate revelation o f the truth o f the tree, from its root. A s Böhm e w rites later in Aurora,"this book is the first sprouting or vegetation o f this tw ig, which springs or grow s green in its m other, like a child that is learning to walk, and is not able to run apace at the first."6*

Aurora is a fragm ented, inconsistent text. A t tim es its outlook appears pantheistic, even proto-Spinozistic. Böhm e w rites in the second chapter: "In the H oly G h o st alone, w ho is in G o d , and also in the whole nature, out o f which all things were made, in H im alone can you search into the w hole body or corporeity o f G o d , which is nature; as also into the H oly T rin ity itself."*9 A nd:

But here you m ust elevate your m ind in the spirit, and consider how the whole nature, w ith all the pow ers which are in nature, also the w idth, depth and height, also heaven and earth, and all w hatsoever is therein, and all that is above the heavens, is together the body or corporeity o f G o d ; and the pow ers o f the stars are the fountain veins in the natural body o f G o d in this world.*

T h is is not pantheism , however. It is H erm eticism in its classical form , ju st as I described it in opposition to pantheism in the introduction: w hat is claim ed is not that all the things in the w orld are divine or are "full o f gods," but that the w orld as a w hole is a part o f G o d s being. N ature is the “ body o f G od," but G o d is m ore than ju st H is body. A long w ith Eck- hart, C usa, and H egel, Böhm e reads the second person o f the Trinity, the "Son,” as equivalent to nature. T h is is unusual enough in H egel, but in an untutored seventeenth-century shoem aker it is quite radical indeed.

66. W alsh The Mysticism of Innernvrdly Fulfillment, 1.67. F. Ernest Stoeffler, German Pietism During the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1973)» » 0 .68. Aurora, chap. 21, § 63; Sparrow , The Aurora, 563.69. Aurora, chap. 2, § 1a; Sparrow , The Aurora, 53.70 . Aurora, chap. 2, § 16: Sparrow , The Aurora, 55-56 .

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Böhm e w rites: "B u t the Father everywhere generates the Son out o f all his pow ers."71 In chapter 16, Böhm e speaks o f the deity being "continually generated" (immer geboren).72

I w ish now to exam ine the details o f B öhm es theory o f divine selfm anifestation, as it develops throughout h is w ritings, in Aurora and beyond. For Böhm e, G o d is O ne, but w ithin H im is generated a trin ity o f w orlds: the dark w orld , the light world, and the elem ental world. T h e th ird w orld functions to "reconcile” the first tw o. D arkness yearns for L ight; the unm anifest strives to becom e m anifest. In its yearning, there is kindled w ithin the D arkness a fire. L ight is the pure principle o f openness, o f m anifestation w ithout any hiddenness. Fire is the actualization o f the pure principle o f L ight in reality. W ith the kindling o f fire (the alchem ical agent o f change), a reconciliation is reached between D arkness and Light. T h e fire burns, but w ithin D arkness: the self-revelation will be o f an entity that m aintains its integrity, its identity— and thus always an elem ent o f inw ardness— in and through its m anifestation; presence will carry w ith it a concom itant absence. Böhm e w rites in Mysterium Magnum that "the eternal free w ill has introduced itse lf into darkness, pain, and source; and so also through the darkness into the fire and light, even into a kingdom o f jo y ; in order that the N oth in g m ight be know n in the Som ething."’ ’ Böhm e further details the divine self-m anifestation in term s o f w hat he calls the seven "source spirits.”

B öhm es account o f the sp irits— their order, their relationships, even rheir nam es— varies from w ork ro w ork. T h e follow ing is a kind o f am algam ation o f the various accounts, fo llow ing Aurora m ost closely. Böhm es seven source spirits are Sour, Sw eet, Bitter, H eat, Love, Tone, and Body. In addition to referring to them as "source sp irits" (Quellgeis- ter), Böhm e also calls them "properties” (Eigenschaften),“q u a lities ’ (Qualitäten), and "form s" (Gestalten). A ll o f these spirits are "contained" w ithin G o d as Ungrund, in potentia. G o d as Ungrund is both Alles and Nirkf*. T h e first three sp irits— Sour, Sw eet, and B itter— form a prim ordial T rin ity o f conflict w ith in the G odhead, preceding its m anifestation. T h e y are a triad o f the unm anifest G o d or G od -in -H im self. S o u r (Herb) is a negative force, a "cold fireT74 the w ill o f G o d to rem ain unm anifest, unrevealed. T h is is the first stage o f desire, as described above: a prim itive, egoistic w ill to self-assertion w ithout self-reflection. But opposed to S o u r there is Sw eet (Sü5i): a positive force that contrasts w ith sourness as expansion, or opening outw ard, contrasts w ith contraction, or in w ardness. S o u r is a "pull" to rem ain in-itself, unm anifest; Sw eet is a "push" to exteriorize, go out and becom e for-itself. S o u r is the "Eternal N o "; Sw eet is the "E tern al Yes.” S o u r is a pucker; sw eet is a kiss. T h e third source-spirit. B itter (Bitter) is a kind o f com prom ise: a going-out

7 1. Aurora, chap. 7, § 43; Sparrow, The Aurora, 138.72. Aurora, chap. 16, § 12: Sparrow , The Aurora, 412.73. Mysterium Magnum, (1623), in Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 7, chap. 26, § 37.74-"C o ld fire,” as Ju liu s Evola points out, is an alchemical term. Sec Ju liu sEvola, The Hermetic Tradition, trans. E . E . Rehm us (Rochester, V t .: Inner T raditions, 1995), 37.

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that preserves and seeks identity. B itter reconciles S o u r and Sw eet because it is the being o f a being that freely gives itse lf o r opens out, but s im ultaneously collects and preserves its m anifestations as the revealed aspects o f one identical being.

T h is triad is referred to by Böhm e as a "w heel o f an gu ish ." ' Böhm e at tim es identifies it w ith the H oly Trinity, w ith the Paracelsian triad o f Salt, M ercury, and Sulphur, and he conceives it as H ell. Basarab N icolescu refers to it as the “death o f G o d to H im se lf inasm uch as H e is the G o d o f pure transcendence."'" T h e "w heel o f anguish” is, in fact, the birth o f G o d . In Mysterium Magnum, Böhm e refers to G o d before this process, G o d as Ungrund, as "the dark nature” and states that "in the dark nature he is not called G od ."77

T h e triad Sou r-Sw eet-B itter describes the birth o f the living G o d , the birth o f life itself, and the fundam ental nature o f all living beings. Sou r-Sw eet-B itter gives w ay to H eat (Hitze). H ear is vitality, the inchoate living force that has arisen through the conflict o f Sou r-Sw eet- Bitter. It is the first and m ost basic outw ard (that is, worldly) m anifestation o f the conflict o f G o d in-H im self. It is as i f Böhm e conceives o f Sou r-Sw eet-B itter as rubbing up against one another, giving rise to H eat. T h is H eat then gives w ay to w hat Böhm e calls the Flash (Schracle). T h e Flash is not one o f the source spirits. Instead, it is literally the force o f the preceding four spirits taken together: it is the ignition produced by their activity, and it is life and real being, burgeoning, grow ing, now sep arated, externalized, leading on to other th ings— "positive” and "external" th ings.7* .

T h e Flash is a w ill to the creation o f self-revealing essence— a determ inate nature that is open, not closed, to itse lf— for w hich Böhm e uses the alchem ical designation Tincfur. T h e first four spirits taken together constitute a kind o f vector o f m anifestation. P icture a lightning flash, consisting o f the four in dynam ic interaction.7'* T h e Flash also represents m ystical vision o f the kind Böhm e had in 160 0 : the invisible w orld is illum inated to the m ystic in this Flash.

W h at the flash produces is a "h ot fire," w hich Böhm e calls Love (Liebe). H eat, the w arm th o f exteriorized life, is not inert, nor even stable (yet). It is still a seeking, it is Love. W hat began as a drive towards m anifestation continues. Love is the T in ctu r in which all the preceding sp irits are united in jo y fu l ecstasy. T h is is an externalization seeking fu lfillm ent— it is an individuation through self-m anifestation. L oves desire is for com plete illum ination, display, and represenration to itself. T h is

75. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 3, § »1.76. Basarb N icolcscu, Science, Meaning, and Evolution: The Cosmology o f Jacob Böhme, trans. Rob Baker (N ew York: Parabola Books, 1991), 29.77 . Mysterium Magnum, chap. 7, § 14.78. Hegel refers to it in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy as the "Absolute G enerator" (das absolut Gebärende) ( l h p 3:208; Werke 20 :111).79. In Kabbalah, a lightning flash is often spoken o f as "zigzagging" its way through the ten Sephiroth o f the “ Tree o f Life," representing the process o f em anation.


seeking (Love) issues in a phenom enon that is a kind o f “eject” o f the seeking— a kind o f significant epiphenom enon. T h is is So u n d or Tone (Schall or Ton). A s separate from Love, but as a product o f Love, Tone has the potential o f m aking Love m anifest to itself. Love m anifest to itse lf is the com pletion o f the cycle.

It can easily be seen already that the spirits are nor absolutely separare from one another, but, to use H egelian language, arc "m om ents" o f a w hole. Tone is the "song o f Love"; Love is the desire for fulfillm ent energized by the Flash, ignited by H eat; H eat is the energy produced by the unity in opposition o f S o u r and Sw eet w ithin Bitter. W ith Tone, the life o f G o d (and the life o f life) is ready for fulfillm ent: having given rise to a "speech" or "expression" o f itse lf (Tone), the process becom es a thing definite to itself. Body (Corpus), the seventh spirit, encom passes the other six. It represents the "concretization" o f the process through its self- expression. T h is concretization is the com pletion o f the cycle, but as in volving the cycles self-aw areness it includes the cycle as well. Bohm e w rites in Aurora, "T h e Seventh Sp irit o f G o d in the divine pow er is the corpus or body, which is generated out o f the other six sp irits, wherein all heavenly figures subsist, and w herein all things im age and form them selves, and w herein all beauty and jo y rise up."*0 For Bohm e, no spirit can really be w ithout a "b o d y f w ithout giving rise at som e point to its ow n concretization. A ll things strive to becom e fully specified and concrete, including G o d . Bohm e also calls Corpus Leiblichkeit, and also som etim es Begreiflichkcit, "the graspcdncss” (in m odern G erm an, "intelli- gibleness”; recall W eigel’s Begrijf).

Bohm e refers to sp irits activity o f creating a body or a determ inate being for itse lf as M apa.*1 In Six Mystical Points, he w rites that

M agic is the m other o f eternity, o f the being o f all beings; for it creates itself, and is understood in d e s ire .. . . Its desire m akes an im agination, and im agination or figuration is on ly the will o f d esire. . . . True M agic is not a being, but the desiring spirit o f the b e in g .. . . M agic is the greatest secrecy, for it is above N ature, and m akes N ature after the form o f its w ill. It is the m ystery o f the Trinity, viz. it is in desire the w ill striving tow ards the heart o f G o d .«

Body is also a return to the original spirit, Sour. S o u r w as the expression o f the desire o f G o d to contract into a hard, self-contained, and self- absorbed center, w ithout external expression. In fact, however, G o d as Ungrund could not achieve this desire for concretization and integrity w ithout self-expression. T hrough the cycle, consum m ated in Body, the original w ill, now heavily qualified, has actually been fulfilled: G o d is now a concrete, self-subsistent entity, but through H is othering and self- expression. A s N icolescu puts i t ,"T h e loop is thus closed: the seventh

80. Aurora, chap. 11, § 1.81. Six Mystical Points (Kurtze Erklarung von seeks mystischen Puncten; 1620), in Samtliche Schriften, vol. 4 , Point 5, §5.82. Six Mystical Points, Poinr 5, §§ 1-6 .

4 2 The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


quality rejoins the f ir s t . . . . T h e line changes into a circle: paradoxically, in the philosophy o f Jak o b Böhm e, the Son gives birth to the Father."®’

Böhm e h im self em ploys circle m etaphors to characterize h is system (much as H egel w ill do w ith his ow n system ). O f the seven source sp irits, Böhm e w rites at one p o in t,"T h ese seven generatings in all arc none o f them the first, the second, or the third, or last, but they are all seven, every one o f them , both the first, second, third, fourth, and last. Yet I m ust set them dow n one after another, according to a m aturely way and manner, otherw ise you could not understand it: For the D eity is as a wheel w ith seven w heels made one in another, wherein a man sees neither beginning nor end.”*4

Standing as an interm ediär)' between G o d and creation is W isdom (Sophia). It is referred to by Böhm e as the "m irror" o f G o d (recall Eck- h arts m irror, and H ildegards m any m irrors). T h e m irror reflects G o d back to H im self, but in sensual, im agistic form , as the created world. T h is is necessary for Böhm e, because, as Aurora m aintains, w hat G o d projects in his creative will to self-revelation is in fact his corporealization. Ift short, the products o f G o d , including G o d s W isdom , must take sen suous form .

A s with gnostic conceptions o f the Logos, Böhm es W isdom is conceived as active.*5 It is the source o f the further specifications o f G o d s corporeality. Further, Böhm es W isdom is conceived m etaphorically as female.“ For Böhm e, G o d s desire for self-m anifestation echoes throughout creation as a desire inherent in all things. L ike G o d as Ungrund (w hich, in proto-H egelian language, Böhm e describes as G o d "in H im se lf") , each thing is first merely an egoistic, infantile desire to exist for it self, but then this gives w ay to a desire for self-awareness. Böhm e analyzes G o d s W isdom — w hich is sim ultaneously the thought o f G o d , the process o f creation and the essence o f created nature— into a sevenfold cycle o f desire.’1' In G o d , these seven are as one, but ou r lim ited human capacities require us to know G o d and creation in a piecem eal (stückweise) fashion.

R eturning to B öhm es conception o f Tone, the “epiphenom enon” or song o f love through which Body is actualized and the process o f self- m anifestation is com pleted, Böhm e conceives the highest form o f Tone in nature to be the speech o f man. It is through hum an speech, human thought, that G o d achieves his highest and m ost consum m ate self- knowledge, for we are the beings w ho in thought and speech can reflect

83 . N icolescu, SdfMcc, Meaning, and Evolution, 32.84. Aurora, chap. 23, § 18; Sparrow, The Aurora, 6 15—16; see also chap. 13. § 7 «-74-85. D eghaye,"Böhm e and his Followers," 224.86. Bönm e m ay have been influenced here by the Kabbalistic conception o f Sbekinah, which is the tenth Sephtrab. Sl>ekinah is conceived as female and containing all the other Sephiroth in herself as in a body.87. Walsh w rites that the seven spirits in Böhm e correspond "to the last seven Sefiroth [o f the Kabbalah] which exem plify the order o f the cosm os"(W alsh,Boehme and Hegel, 84-85).



on the w hole o f the cycle o f creation. A s A rth u r Versluis states, "U lt imately, G o d com prehends h im self through m an. T h e m ystery o f divine nature is, finally, the m ystery o f hum an nature as well."“ B öhm es account o f the order o f creation is quite com plex, and I can only indicate som e o f the m ost im portant points here.

In w ords that call to m ind the Emerald Tablet, Böhm e w rites at one point o f the unity o f all th ings: "W h e n I take up a stone or clod o f earth and look upon it, I see that which is above and that which is below, in deed [I see] the w hole w orld therein."1” H e w rites in Clavis ( 16 2 4 ) :"T h e whole visible w orld is a jo y fu l sperm atic [eitel spermatischen] active ground; each essence longs for the other, the above fo r the below and the below for the above, since they are separated from one another, and in such hunger they em brace one another in the desire.'*” Böhm e describes the "world's existence” as "N oth in g else than coagulated sm oke from the eternal aether, which thus has a fulfillm ent like the eternal."91

Before m en, G o d created angels. T h e angels aid G o d in the form ation o f all things according to the seven spirits, for, as Böhm e w rites in Aurora, “A ll the creatures are m ade and descended from these qualities.'**2 A m ong the angels, Lucifer was the m ost m agnificent. H ow ever, Lucifer, representing the “S o u r” quality o f in-draw ing, broke aw ay from G o d , thinking h im self able to create through the em ber o f divine fire w ith in him . Lucifer represents the w ill to isolation, cutting-off, a selfishness that all th ings exhibit. A s W alsh puts it, Lucifer "can'im aginate' his angry fire into all things and by hardening their w ills can extinguish the divine light w ith in them."”

M an, for Böhm e, is a m icrocosm containing all the seven spirits w ithin him self. Böhm e speaks o f man receiving G od 's W isdom (Sophia, again, conceived as fem ale) as w ife. In man's soul there"hovers the revelation o f the divine holiness, as the living outflow ing W ord o f G o d w ith the eternally know n Idea, which w as know n in divine W isdom from eternity as a Subjectum o r form o f the divine im agination.”** T h e first man w as an drogynous and possessed supernatural pow ers. H e /S h e could procreate at w ill by the pow er o f im agination, could exist w ithout eating or sleeping, and could alter the essences o f objects through m agic w ords (a pow er which suggests alchem ical transm utation).*4 In nam ing the animals, A dam drew on the essence o f each, for in the Natursprache (nature language) o f A dam , the being o f a th ing is captured in its nam e.*“ In B öhm es telling o f the m yth o f the G arden o f Eden, man must fall be

88. A rth u r Versluis, Wisdoms Children (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew YorkPress, 1999), 133.89. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 2, § 6.90. Q uoted in W alsh, Boehme and Heget, 241.91. Six Thcosophical Points ( Von sechs thcosophischcn Puncten; 1620), in SämtlicheSchriften, vol. 4 , Point 1, chap. 2, § 19.92. Aurora, chap. 2, § 1; Sparrow , The Aurora, 50.93. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 227.94. Q uoted in ibid., 237-38 .95. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 17, § 43.96. Ibid., chap. 35, § 56.



cause the unity man enjoys w ith G o d in paradise is an unthinking, unre-

flective, and thus inferior unity. M an m ust becom e alienated from G o d and return to a higher state o f unity, in full consciousness o f his nature and the nature o f G o d .

H o w did the fall com e about i Adam wanted knowledge o f each o f the spirits o f nature. In the garden, the Tree o f G o o d and Evil represents disharm ony, a separation o f the spirits o f nature into units under the sw ay o f the "Eternal No," w ithdraw n into them selves, spurning unity. Adam's eating o f the fruit o f this tree is sym bolic o f a transform ation o f im agination. In what Bohm e calls Lust, im agination and desire are in harmony. B u t Adam broke this happy equilibrium when his im agination w as perverted into a base and sensualistic form . A t this point Lust b ecom es Begierde, an infinite, negative, insatiable striving.1'’ Adam's action constituted a turning aw ay from divine unity. Im m ediately, A dam ’s n ature w as radically altered and he desperately sought reunification with the divine. T h is desire m anifested itse lf first in sham e, in awareness o f the exposure o f his bodily im perfection. T h e revulsion that Adam and all hum an beings feel about their condition o f lack, degradation, and frailty just is the urge to reunite w ith G od .

W isdom was revealed yet again to m en, however, through a man, Jesu s C h rist, who was perfectly m arried to Sophia. C h rist is the second Adam . Through Christ's passion, death, and resurrection (which Böhm e m akes equivalent to the w ork o f alchem ical transmutation)** a secret teaching has been revealed to man, which can show him the w ay to at- one-m ent w ith the divine. T h e interpretation o f the Scriptures opens up the possib ility o f man the m icrocosm s self-know ledge— w hat Böhm e has striven to accom plish in his work. Böhm e w rites in Aurora that “you need not ask, W here is G o d ? H earken, you blind man; you live in G o d , and G o d is in you; and i f you live holily, then therein you you rself are G o d .”5" T hrou gh our self-reflection nature reaches a kind o f closure: its pure, eternal form s are identified for w hat they are. G iven that w e are natural beings, our contem plation o f the form s o f nature am ounts to nature's holding up a m irror to itself, and given that the nature o f nature is the thought o f G o d , it is a m irror held up to G o d . T h u s, through our human understanding, G o d is fully actualized: H e achieves self-awareness and closure.

Böhm e does not present philosophical argum ents. H o w then does he explain his access to this w isdom i H e holds the view that before his fall, A dam w as privy to the W isdom o f G o d , "B u t yet when he fell, and was set into the outw ard birth or geniture, he knew it no more, but kept it in rem em brance only as a dark and veiled story [sondern als eine dunkele und verdeckte Geschichte im Gedächtnis behalten]; and this he left to his posterity." Buried in ou r subconscious (a w ord w hich, o f course, Böhm e did

97. For a discussion o f this, see Antoine Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition, trans. Christine Rhone (Albany: State University o f N ew York Pres«, 2000), 106.98. De Signatura Rerum (1622), in Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 6, chap. 11, § 6.99. Aurora, chap. 22, § 46; Sparrow , The Aurora, 594.



not know ) are significant im ages— “dark and veiled stories'*— which are keys to the m eaning o f the cosm os, and these images are com m on to all m en— to Adam 's "posterity.“ Böhm e claim s, as W alsh puts it, "that it should not be considered im possible for som eone to talk about the creation o f the w orld as i f he w ere there, because the Sp irit w hich is in us is the sam e which breathed into A dam form eternal and w hich sees it all in the light o f G od ."lo> U sing a kind o f active im agination" to recollect these latent sym bols, Bohm e w orked out his theosophy.

In Access to Western Esotericism, Faivre ranks "im agination" as “the essential com ponent o f esotericism ."1'1 T h e idea o f occult correspondences that figures so largely in H erm eticism depends on "a form o f im agination inclined to reveal and use m ediations o f all kinds, such as rituals, sym bolic images, m andalas, interm ediary spirits." 01 But this im agination does not create from nothing, rather it “recalls" im ages and associations from the collective unconscious o f the race. Im agination depends on memory. Faivre writes that "it is especially under the inspiration o f the Corpus Hermeticum rediscovered in the fifteenth century that m em ory and im agination are associated to the extent o f blending together. A fter all, a part o f the teaching o f H erm es Trism egistus consisted o f'in terior- izing' the w orld in our mens, from whence the ‘arts o f m em ory’ cu ltivated in the light o f magic, during and after the Renaissance."1 ;,i A s we have seen, the occult philosophy o f Bruno depended on the relationship o f im agination to mem ory. Böhm e continues this tradition by developing his theosophy entirely in term s o f images that carry both a literal (often alchem ical) and figurative sense.

Böhm e w as attacked during his lifetim e, and even briefly im prisoned, but he managed to exert a great influence over a sm all group o f friends, m ainly from the local nobility, w ho copied and distributed his m anuscripts and acted to protect him as much as they could. In his Kabbalah, G ershom Scholem w rites that "In certain circles, particularly in G e rmany, H olland, and England, C hristian Kabbalah henceforw ard assum ed a Böhm ean guise.” ’®4

A t first, B öhm es theosophy had little fo llow ing in G erm any, but became quite popular in England, first through the translation and publication o f his w orks by Joh n Sp arrow (16 15 -6 5 ) . It w as Jo h n Pordage ( 16 0 8 -8 1) w ho w as the center o f the first Böhm ean m ovem ent in E n gland (called "behem ism ” there). From this group w as form ed the Philadelphian Society, led by Jan e Lead (1623-1704)» a visionary with w hom Pordage had a liaison after the death o f his w ife in 166 8 . W ith L ead s death, the Böhm e m ovem ent in England m ore or less died out.

10 0 . W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 139; cf. Description o f the Three Principles o f GodsBeing (Beschreibung der drey Principien Göttliches Wesens; 16 19 ), in SämtlicheSchriften, vol. 2, chap. 7, § 7.10 1. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 21.102. Ibid ., 12.103. Ibid ., 13.104 . G ershom Scholem , Kabbalah (N ew York: N ew Am erican Library, 1974)*200.



Böhm es thought w as kept alive, however, by solitary figures such as the theologian W illiam Law (16 8 6 -17 6 1) and the poet and painter W illiam Blake (17 5 7 -18 2 7 ).

It was through French H erm eticisrs such as Louis C laude de Saint- M artin ( 17 4 3 -18 0 3 ) , w ho translated Böhm e into French, that Böhm e eventually cam e to m ake an im pact on G erm an thought, but as H ein rich Schneider notes, “ in the G erm an secret societies [B öhm es ideas] had never been forgotten.’’ 1'” I w ill have m ore to say about these soc ieties in the follow ing chapter. B öhm es theosophy became quite influential in P ietist circles, until by the end o f the seventeenth century Böh- m eanism , as F. Ernest Stoeffler states, "constituted a considerable challenge to established Lutheranism ."'* Böhm es first G erm an follower o f note w as Joh an n G eo rg G ichtel ( 16 3 8 -17 10 ) , who had been a student o f Philipp Jacob Spener, the "father” o f G erm an Pietism . G ichtel published an edition o f Böhm es w orks in 1682, as well as w orks o f his own in which he developed B öhm es theosophy. Q uirinus Kuhlm ann (16 5 1-8 9 ), a chiliast w ith m essianic aspirations, w as introduced to Böhm e by Friedrich Breckling ( 16 2 9 -17 10 ) , the sam e man who had taught G ich tel. K uhlm ann eventually turned up in M oscow to preach his evangel and w as prom ptly burned at the stake. Böhm e also influenced Pierre Poiret ( 16 4 6 -17 19 ) , w ho, though a French Protestant, was a pastor in G erm any. Poiret edited the w ritings o f Antoinette Bourignon ( 16 16 -8 0 ) , a m ystic w h o announced herself as “ the Virgin" Böhm e had prophesied as appearing at the end o f time.

T h e radical Pietist G o ttfried A rnold ( 16 6 6 - 17 14 ) published his landm ark w ork Impartial History o f Churches and Heretics in 1699. A rnold shocked m any by arguing that it w as the heretics— am ong w hom he gave prom inent place to Böhm e— who represented the true religion. Standing in antithetical relationship to A rn old w as Ehregott Daniel C olberg (16 59 -9 8 ). W ithout actually using the term , C olberg attacked the influence o f the H erm etic tradition in G erm any. C olberg attacks Böhm e, Paracelsus, astrology, alchemy, and m ysticism as such, seeing in all o f them a com m on elem ent: the desire o f man to m ake h im self G od . Significantly, C olberg also attacks P ietism , seeing in it the sam e tendencies.

Ernst Benz has w ritten that “ In a certain sense one can refer to the philosophy o f G erm an Idealism as a Böhm e-Renaissance, when Böhm e w as discovered at the sam e tim e by Schelling, H egel, Franz von Baader, T ieck , N ovalis and m any others."'* Baader ( 17 6 5 -18 4 1) , called"Böhm ius redivivus," is often still regarded as B öhm es principal interpreter. H e w ould becom e perhaps the m ost significant and influential H erm eticist o f the nineteenth century. Baader, w h o studied m ineralogy under

105. H cinrich Schneidcr, Quest fo r Mysteries: The Masonic Background fo r Literature in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Ithaca, N .Y .: C ornell U niversity Press, 1947), 81.106. Stoeffler, German Pietism, 168.107 . E rnst Benz, Adam der Mythus wm Urmensehen (M unich: Barth, 1955), 23.



A lexander von H um boldt, discovered Böhm e in 1787 and m ade it his project to revive the m ystical tradition. Indeed, it is Baadcr w ho should receive much o f the credit for the aw akening o f interest in m ysticism in the nineteenth century. H e w as not, however, as faithful a disciple o f Böhm e as w as, fo r instance, O etinger. A devout C atholic, he believed in a transcendent G o d and strongly opposed pantheism , or any other a ttem pt to inim anentize G o d . T h e world, Baader held, is a product o f G od 's thought and utterly dependent on him . L ike O etinger, he interpreted nature as an "em blem book" and advocated an organic m odel o f reality, rejecting m echanistic m aterialism . In politics, Baader w as an tiegalitarian, anti-capitalist, and advocated the subjection o f the state to the church. H is collected w orks run to sixteen volum es.

H egel w as an avid reader o f Baader.106 C lark Butler refers to "H egel's abortive courtship o f von Baader" and w rites that "despite apparent d ifferences, H egel sought to persuade both the public and von Baader h im self that their positions w ere reconcilable."1(W Baader did not share this view, but he did do H egel the honor o f dedicating his lectures on B ö h m es Mysterium Magnum to him . In 1824 , Baader stated in a letter that H egel's system was a "philosophy o f dust."110 N evertheless, he shared H egel's opposition to scientific rationalism and to the philosophy o f K an t. H egel even stated in print that he and Baader shared the goal o f translating B öhm es eccentric, sensualistic theosophy into "scientific" term s (see chapter 5).

In Hegel’s Development, H . S . H arris w rites that " I am inclined to believe in Böhm es influence upon H egel from 1801 onw ards."1’ 1 It is possible, however, that H egel could have encountered B öhm es w ork as early as the m id to late 1790's, in the m idst o f w hat R osenkranz has term ed h is 'th eosoph ical phase"(see chapter 3). D avid W alsh has argued that H egel's use in the Phenomenology of Spirit o f such term s as element, aether, expansion, and contraction has its roots in his acquaintance with Böhm e and Paracelsian alchem y.112 I w ill deal w ith the Phenomenology’s further debts to Böhm e in chapter 4 . Heg* 1 refers to Böhm e explicitly in his Science o f Logic (1832 edition), Philosophy of Nature, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and elsewhere.

H egel's m ost fam ous treatm ent o f Böhm e is in his Lectures on the H istory o f Philosophy o f 1805. T here, H egel couples Böhm e w ith Francis Bacon as the tw in representatives o f "M odern Philosophy in its First Statem ent." H e m akes the transition from Bacon to Böhm e by rem arking, "W e now pass on from this English Lord Chancellor, the leader o f

108. Buder, 57a; H offm eister *699.109. Butler, editorial com ment, 570.n o . Berichten, 4 0 1. Q uoted in Butler, 571.in . H arris, Night Thoughts, 85.112 . W alsh,“ Tt)e H istorical Dialectic o f Spirit," 28. W alsh believes that only the influence o f Bohm e can explain why H egel believes that history has a structure, and that it is to be understood in term s o f the development o f Spirit.




the external, sensuous m ethod in Philosophy, to the philosophicus teutoni- cus, as he is called— to the G erm an cobbler o f Lusatia, o f w hom w e have no reason to be asham ed. It w as, in fact, through him that Philosophy first appeared in G erm an y with a character peculiar to itself: Böhm e stands in exact antithesis to Bacon" ( lh p 3:188; Werke 2o :9 i) .u*

H egel's discussion o f Böhm e in the Lectures occupies tw enty-eight full pages in the Suhrkam p edition o f his w o rk s— significantly m ore space than he devotes to im portant m ainstream figures such as Locke, H obbes, H um e, Rousseau, and Jacob i. H egel's account o f Böhm es theosophy is quite faithful and positive and show s that H egel w as fam iliar w ith several o f B öhm es w orks. H egel draw s com parisons between Böhm e and Proclus, Bruno, and Paracelsus. It is clear that he sees much o f h is ow n thought in B öhm es peculiar, im agistic theosophy. H egel w rites that although it "appears strange to read o f the bitterness o f G o d , o f the flash, and o f lightning," once w e have "the Idea" in hand, "then we certainly discern its presence here" ( lh p 3 :19 3 ; Werke 2 0 :9 s).'1* H egel w rites, further, that,

Böhm es chief, and one may even say, his only thought— the thought that perm eates all his w orks— is that o f perceiving the H oly Trin ity in everything, and recognizing everything as its revelation and m anifestation . . . in such a way, m oreover, that all things have th is divine T rin ity in them selves, not as a T rin ity pertaining to the ordinary conception, but as the real Trin ity o f the Absolute Idea, ( lh p 3:196; Werke 20:98)"*

H egel notes that Böhm e regards the Trin ity as "the absolute S u b stance" (die absolute Substanz; l h p 3:212; Werke 20 :115).

H egel's m ajor objection to Böhm e is well know n: "B ö h m es great m ind is confined in the hard knotty oak o f the senses— in the gnarled concretion o f ordinary conception— and is not able to arrive at a free presentation o f the Idea” ( lh p 3:195; Werke 20:98). From this, som e com m entators have concluded that H egel decisively rejects B öhm es theosophy. H ow ever, H . S . H arris finds that H egel's criticism is "quite con sistent w ith his evident desire [discussed earlier in section tw o above] to show that the older alchem ical tradition o f Paracelsus (and probably Böhm e h im self) contained sym bolic expressions o f im portant speculative truths."1“ In other w ords, H egel rejects the "sensuous" m anner in w hich B öhm es theosophy is presented, but accepts the inner core o f its

113. Hegel m entions in the same passage that philosophia teutonic<i w as once used as a term for mysticism.114 . Later, Hegel w rites that "the principle o f the Concept [Begriff] is living w ithin him , only he cannot express it in the form o f thought" (l h p 3:197; Werke 20 :100).115. Com pare this com m cnt to J . N . Findlay's observation about H cgcls system : “ [Hegel's] whole system m ay in fact be regarded as an attem pt to see the Christian m ysteries in everything whatever, every natural process, every form o f hum an activity, and every logical transition" (Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, 131).116 . H arris, Night Thoughts, 399.

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teaching. A s W alsh puts it,"such qualifications aside, when H egel comes to the content o f B öhm es speculation he is clearly a believer.""7

I w ill have som ething to say about H egel's relation to Böhm e in every chapter that follows, so deep is Hegel's debt to h im .11*

117 . W alsh,“ T h e H istorical Dialectic o f Spirit,” 18.118 . 1 concur w ith C yril O 'R egan when he suggests“massive structural correspondences" between Hegel and Böhm e. See C yril O ’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, 18 -19 .



Chapter Two 51

T h e Hermetic M ilieu o f Hegels Early Years

One has only to say the words “College o f Tübingen" to grasp what German philosophy is at bottom— a cunning theology.. . . The Swabians are the best liars in Germany, they lie innocently.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ

i. Rosicrucianism and Freemasonry

In the introduction and chapter 1, I have dealt w ith the fundam ental concepts o f H erm eticism and the first 1,600 years o f the H erm etic tradition. In this chapter I shall deal in part w ith events in the seventeenth century, but in the main w ith the late eighteenth, the so-called Goethezeit, the period o f H egel’s youth. H istories o f this period often portray H erm eticism as on the decline. T h is is far from true. I f anything, the eighteenth century saw a renaissance o f H erm eticism .

By far the m ost im portant event in the history o f seventeenth-century H erm eticism w as the appearance o f the Rosicrucian m anifestos. T h e first appeared in the town o f K assel in Brunsw ick in 16 14 . T itled Fama Fraternitatis and totaling only thirty-eight pages, the w ork w as addressed to "all the learned in Europe," and named as its source “the praisew orthy order o f the Rose C ross." T h e Fama Fraternitatis had been circulating in m anuscript throughout Europe since at least i 6 i o , ‘ and som e o f the R osicrucian texts were being circulated in m anuscript form am ong certain like-m inded individuals in T ü bin gen as early as the 1590s.2 T h e Fama w as later republished w ith tw o other w orks— Reform of the Universe and Short Reply to the Esteemed Fraternity o f the Rose-Cross— in a volum e totaling 147 pages, by A dam H aselm ayer, a follow er o f Paracelsus and notary public to A rchduke M axim ilian .

T h e three w orks m odestly proposed the "G en era l R eform ation o f the E n tire W orld ." T h e R osicru cian m anifestos centered around the legendary figure o f C h ristian R o sen kreu z, w ho w as su p posed to have been born in 1378, taught the H erm etic art by A rab s, and d ied in

1 . Roland Edighoffer,“ Rosicrucianism : From the Seventeenth to the Tw entieth Century," in M odem Esoteric Spirituality, 186. See also Donald R . D ickson, The Tessera o f Antilia (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 18.2. See J . M ontgom ery, The Cross and the Crucible, 2 vols. (T h e H ague: N ijhoff, J973). 204ff; also W Ul-Erich Peuckert, Die Rosenkreutzer: Z u r Geschichte einer Reformation (Jen a: E . D iederichs, 1928), 96-99 .

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14 8 4 . T h e se w ritin gs contain , in the w ords o f A n toine Faivre, “ traces o f the C h ristian K abb alah , Pythagorean ism , and a stron g dose o f P aracelsism ."’

T h e second Rosicrucian m anifesto, Confessio Fraternitatis, appeared in 1615. T h e third and m ost fam ous Rosicrucian work, The Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreuz, an allegorical prose poem laden w ith alchem ical imagery, appeared in 16 16 . T h e principal author o f these w orks, and perhaps the "inventor" o f Rosicrucianism , seem s to have been Johann Valentin Andreae ( 158 6 -16 54 ), a native o f W ürttem berg. A ndreaes father w as a clergym an and practicing alchem ist. Joh an n Valentins m other w as later court apothecary to the duke. H is grandfather, Jakob Andreae, had a hand in drafting the Formula of Concord o f 1580, which aim ed at unifying Lutherans and C alvin ists. It w as Jak o b w ho created the Andreae fam ily coat o f arm s: a S t . A n d rew s cross w ith four roses. Johann Valentin w as trained as a pastor at the T übingen Stift, but was expelled follow ing a political scandal.

A ccording to H einrich Schneider, the Rosicrucians, "declared that unification w ith G o d w as dem onstrable and possible already on earth. For that dem onstration they were leaning upon a m odification o f enlightened natural philosophy which upheld that nature in its id e o logical structure w as a gradual revelation o f G od ."4 G iven that Bohm e’s first w ork w as not even w ritten until 16 12 , it is not plausible that he influenced the Rosicrucians. Rather, it is m ore likely that the R osicrucian m ovem ent influenced Böhm e. Schneider has suggested that “ Böhm e took up the Rosicrucian pansophy and the reform atory plans connected w ith it."'1 A ndrew W eeks notes that Böhm e incorporated tw o Rosicrucian slogans into his w ritings: the "age o f the rose" and the "new reform ation."6

T h e R osicrucian m ovem ent involved m em bers o f m any different religious denom inations. T h e R osicrucians held a doctrine o f prisca theologia, the position that there is one true, trans-denom inational, trans-cultural theology, an account o f divine being revealed by G o d to man in the rem ote past. T h e y believed that i f th is ancient w isdom could be recovered it w ould un ify the w o rld s relig ion s.7 T w o im ages are associated w ith R o sicru cian ism , ow in g to the am bigu ity o f the G erm an Rosenkreuz: a red cross, and a cross w ith roses, usually b loom ing from the center. T h e m eaning o f these im ages has provoked m uch speculation. T h e R osicrucians w ere supposed to adopt the dress and m anners o f the d ifferent lands into w hich they traveled, a fact w hich Ju liu s Evola takes as sym bolic o f the b e lie f in prisca theologia or

3. Antoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 64- For a discussion o f the influence o f the Corpus Hermeticum on Rosicrucianism , see Roland Edighoffer, "H erm eticism in Early Rosicrucianism ,” in Broek, 19 7 -2 15 .4 . H einrich Schneider, Quest fo r Mysteries: The Masonic Background fo r Literature in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Ithaca, N .Y .: C ornell U niversity Press, 1947), 45 -5. H einrich Schneider, Quest fo r Mysteries, 43-6. W eeks, Boehme, 95.7. A llison Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, 8.



philosophia pertnnisS A ntoine Faivre offers the fo llow ing list o f im p ortant authors w ho helped dissem inate R osicrucian ideas: R o b ert Fludd ( 15 7 4 - 16 3 7 ) , Ju liu s Sp erb er ( ? - i6 i9 ) , E lias A shm ole (16 x 7 -9 2 ), M ichael M aier (ca .15 6 6 -16 2 2 ), Sam uel H artlib ( 15 9 5 -16 6 2 ) , Jan A m os C om cn iu s ( 15 9 2 - 16 7 0 ) , Jo h n H eydon (The Holy Guide, 1662), and T h eo p h ilu s Sch w eighardt (Speculum sophicum-Rhodo'Stauricum, 1618).*

T h e Rosicrucian m anifestos captured the im agination o f scores o f intellectuals throughout Europe, many o f w hom desperately tried to make contact w ith the “order“ and to jo in their ranks. D escartes and Bacon w ere tw o such seekers.*0 Som e, like R obert Fludd, even wrote their ow n “Rosicrucian" w orks in hopes o f earning the favor o f the order. Eventually, Andreae became disgusted w ith the furor he had created and sought to distance h im self from those w ho were now calling them selves “ Rosicrucians." In 1619, Andreae published Christianapolis, which called for a “new reform ation." T h ere w as no longer any talk o f Rosicrucians, but as Frances Yates puts it, “A rose by any other name . . *u

Christianapolis preached a m ysterious doctrine o f “theosophy,” which involved a theory o f “mystical archirecture." In Christianapolis, as in the Rosicrucian w ritings, Andreae places a strong em phasis on medicine and healing, perhaps reflecting the influence o f Paracelsian medicine. Andreae now issued a call for the form ation o f "C h ristian Societies" or “C hristian Unions." Such groups, which w ere sim ilar to Sw abian Pietist societies, were actually form ed, but th e“Socieras C hristiana” cam e to an end w ith the outbreak o f the T h irty Years W ar.u In 1628 Andreae attem pted to restart the organization in N urem berg. Leibniz is su pposed to have jo in ed a Rosicrucian society in N urem berg in 1666, and it m ay have been the very one founded by A ndreae.1’ T h e precepts o f L eib niz's proposed “O rder o f C h arity" are, according to Yates, "practically a quotation from the Fama”14 I shall discuss a later incarnation o f the Rosicrucian m ovem ent, and Hegel's connections to it, in chapter 7.

It is uncertain when Freem asonry w as founded, or w hat its original purpose w as. It nevertheless becam e a repository for H erm etic philosophy, even em ploying the sym bolic figure o f H erm es Trism egistus in som e o f its r itu a ls ." T h e Freem asons num bered am ong their m em bers som e o f the m ost prom inent m inds in Europe, and flourished in G e r many. M asonic historians distinguish between “Speculative" and "O p erative” M asonry, the latter actual stonem asonry, indicating that the society

8 . Evola, Hermetic Tradition, 161 . O n e is also rem in d ed o f p a r t 3 o f D c*cartess Discourse on Method, in which he recommends, as a m atter o f prudence, obedience to the laws and custom s o f the country in which one finds oneself. See below for Descartes’s relation to Rosicrucianism .9. Faivre, Access to Western Esotercicism, 65.j o . See Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 1 18 -2 9 .n . D ickson, Tessera, 147.12. D ickson considers A ndreae“the forerunner o f Philipp Jakob Spener and G erm an Pietism " (ibid., 19).13. Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 154.14 . Ibid., 154.1$. Faivre, The Eternal Hermes, 177.

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probably developed from craft guilds. W ith the inception o f Speculative M asonry, the rites and trappings o f the stonem asons took on a sym bolic, and m etaphysical significance. T h e Rosicrucians came to exercise an influence over Freem asonry, helping to make it even m ore mystical.

T h e first lodges in G erm any were established in the 1730s and were o f the Franco-Scottish "speculative" variety. T h e Stuarts, while in France, were intimately involved in the spread o f M asonry throughout Europe. It is from them that the "Scottish Rite" o f M asonry originates. T h e Scottish Rite involves further, higher degrees over and above those offered by other lodges. Scottish R ite M asonry exhibits connections with such aspects o f H erm etic thought as alchemy and Kabbalism . A n offshoot o f the Scottish Rite, the so-called "Strict Observance" Masonry, maintained that M asonry originated in Scotland as a survival o f the Knights Templar. It is claimed that before his execution the last G rand M aster o f the Templars, Jacques de Molay, assigned H ugo von Salm , a canon o f M ainz, the mission o f sm uggling important Tem plar documents into Scotland. D e Molay's hope was that the Templars could be reactivated there under another name. T h at name, according to the tradition, is Freemasonry. Strict Observance M asonry incorporated references to the Tem plars into its rites and degrees.

Like the Rosicrucians, the M asons believed in the fundam ental identity o f all religions. Beneath the superficial differences o f religions w as supposed to lie a prisca theologia. A ccording to S ch n eid er,"T h e aim o f the lodges w as the creation o f a new man through m em bership in ac o m m u n io n m ir r o r in g a r a t io n a l u n iv e r s e o f fr e e d o m a n d lo v e , ju s r as

prim itive C hristian ity had once sought to call into being children o f G o d for the K ingdom o f G od .” 1* Indeed the conception o f an invisible church— an idea advanced, as w e saw in the last chapter, by the m ystic Sebastian Franck— w as one o f the precepts o f M asonry.17 Edm ond M azet w rites that M asonry would lead its m em bers, “each through proper understanding o f his ow n faith, to this transcendental truth."“ Indeed, M ason ry would com e to "incorporate" Rosicrucianism , investing its higher degrees w ith Rosicrucian imagery.*9

In 1738 Pope C lem ent X I I , alarm ed by the ecum enical nature o f Freem asonry, issued a papal bull excom m unicating Freem asons. A m ong other things, the M asons were accused o f denying C h ris ts divin ity (an accusation also leveled against the K nights Tem plar in 1307)* T h e pope also claim ed that the forces behind M ason ry were identical w ith those that incited the R eform ation . (Som e have suggested that the R o sicru cians were intended as a Protestant counterpart to the Jesu its .“ )

T h e M asonic lodges differed in the messages they im parted to their m em bers. M any w ere H erm etic or mystical in character, and politically conservative. O thers were vehicles o f Enlightenm ent secularism and

16. H einrich Schneider, Quest fo r Mysteries, 57.17 . Ibid., 100.18. Edm ond M azer,‘ Freem asonry and Esotericism ,” Modern Esoteric Spiritual-ity, 249-19. Yares, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 218.20. W eeks, Boehme, 95.


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rationalism , and by the end o f the eighteenth century these had grow n in number. C hristopher M acintosh points out that reccnt scholarship has tended to focus on the "enlightened" strain o f M asonry, and to ignore the mystical, which w as also quite strong. Indeed, as M acintosh points out, these tw o w ere not mutually exclusive. M any "enlightened” Germ an M asons actively engaged in alchemy, and saw no contradiction in it.il

In the final four decades o f the eighteenth century legions o f fam ous men in G erm an y aligned them selves w ith M asonry, including Bürger, C laudius, Fichte, G oethe, H erder, Klinger, Knebel, Lessing, N ovalis, R heinhold, Schelling, and Schiller. M any o f these men published w orks dealing explicitly w ith M asonry. Fichte, for exam ple, becam e a M ason in Z ü rich in 1793. T h ere had been no lodge in Jen a since 176 4 , so he jo in ed the G ünrher Lodge o f the Stan din g Lion at Rudolstadt in T huringia (w hich w as about eighteen m iles from Jen a). In 1799 Fichte worked w ith Ignaz A urelius Fessler (1756 -18 39 ) on the developm ent o f various higher degrees for the lodge in Berlin .22 A s part o f h is w ork, Fichte w rote tw o lectures on the “philosophy o f Masonry,” which he presented to Joh an n K arl C hristian Fischer. In 18 0 2 -3 , Fischer published the lectures as “ Letters to C onstant" in tw o volum es o f a jou rn al entitled Eleusinians of the Nineteenth Century, or Results of United Thinkers on the Philosophy and History of Freemasonry. T h e form at o f "letters” to C onstant (a fictitious non-M ason) w as im posed on the text by the publisher, along w ith other arbitrar)' and ill-conceived changes. T h e lectures have since been published in a form that approxim ates Fichte's original, though his m anuscripts have been lost.“

In 1778, Lessing published his Ernst and Falk: Dialogues for Freemasons (Freimaiirgesprdche). Lessin gs Nathan the Wise (1779 ), a play w ith some broadly construed M asonic them es was a great influence on H egel/4 A m on g other things, the play presses the M asonic them e o f a unity o f the w o rld s religions, and thus o f an "invisible church." In act IV, scene 7, the C hristian Friar praises N athan, a Je w :

Friar: O N athan, N athan! You’re a C hristian soul! By G o d a better C hristian never lived!Nathan: A n d w ell for us! For w hat m akes me fo r you a C hristian , m akes you rse lf for me a Jew !

T h e first letter w e possess o f G oethe's, w ritten in 176 4 when he was sixteen, has him applying earnestly for adm ission to a M asonic lodge.” H e w as not perm itted M asonic m em bership, however, until 1780, w hen,

21. C hristopher M acintosh, The Rose Cross and the Age o f Reason (Leiden: E . J . Brill, 1992), 2, 45-22. See W illiam R . Denslow, 10,000 Famous Freemasons, vol. 2 (Trenton, M o.: T h e Educational Bureau o f the Royal Arch Mason Magazine, 1958), 46.23. Roscoe Pound, Masonic Addresses and Writings o f Roscoe Pound (N ew York: M acoy Publishing and M asonic Su pply Com pany, 1953), 1 1 1—13; Pound also prints a translation o f Fichtes text, pages 130 -9 8 .24- H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 38.25. Richard Friedenthal, Goethe: His Life and Times (London: W eidenfeld,1963). 31.

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on Ju n e 23 he w as initiated into a lodge in W eimar. In 1782 he w as the recipient o f "H ig h er Tem plar D egrees o f the R ite o f Strict O bservance."

A ccording to H einrich Schneider, the G erm an M asonic lodges were "teem ing w ith m agical, theosophical, m ystical notions."* Schneider notes that much o f their lore w as K abbalistic in origin .27 T h e G erm an M asonic m ovem ent w as strongly influenced by the w ritings o f the French M ason and Bohm ean, L ou is C lau de de Sain t M artin . A bout 1770 , the year o f H egel’s birth, a"H erm etic R ite” was established, based on the doctrines o f the H erm etiea* H erm es Trism egistus h im self appears in such G erm an M asonic rites o f the eighteenth century as that o f the "M agi o f M em ph is."" In general, the higher degrees o f M asonry were (and are) strongly m ystical. Schneider has claim ed rhat the Enlightenm ent is partly responsible for this. T h e Enlightenm ent quest for universal knowledge and pow er over nature led to a revival o f m ysticism and occultism , for these had always prom ised to deliver ju st those boons. In a reaction against the im plicitly (and som etim es explicitly) anti-spiritual, anti-religious rationalism o f m odern science, certain individuals sought a truer enlightenm ent in H erm eticism , and hoped to make these secret societies into secret w eapons. Schneider w rites:"Lo n g before Kant's im portant answ ers to the great problem s o f hum an life, the m ystics in the secret societies had transform ed these societies into anti-Enlightenm ent organizations and, in thus keeping alive the m ystical traditions, had made possible the later m erging o f G erm an idealism and m ystic ism .. . . T h is mystical m ovem ent w as the conservative revolution o f the eighteenth century, and i f in its beginnings its character w as not exactly C hristian , it w as undoubtedly religious."’0

T h e individuals know n as the Illum inati were the reaction to this reaction. T h e Illum inati were founded in 1776 as a means to advance the ideals o f the Enlightenm ent: opposition to traditional religion, superstition, and feudalism , and advocacy o f scientific rationalism and the rights o f man. Initially th ey w ere led by their founder, A dam W eishaupt (17 8 4 -18 3 0 ), a law professor at the Bavarian U niversity o f Ingolstadt. W eishaupt, however, proved inept at organization and he soon delegated a great deal o f authority to Freiherr A dolph von Knigge (1752 -9 6 ), w ho m ounted a highly successful m em bership drive in 1781. W eishaupt s jea lou sy o f Knigge's abilities led to their break three years later. W eishaupt appears to have endow ed the order w ith H erm etic trappings m erely as w indow dressing, to entice m em bers and, perhaps, to d iscourage the authorities from investigating.” M em bers w ere encouraged to

26. H einrich Schneider, Quest for Mysteries, 22.27. Ibid., 102.28. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 80.29. Faivre, The Eternal Hermes, 189. Faivre notes that the rite m ay originallyhave been French in origin.30. H einrich Schneider, Quest fo r Mysteries, 7 6 -7 7 .31. K laus Epsteins account o f the history o f the Illum inati and its suppressionmakes for fascinating reading. See Epstein, The Genesis o f German Conservatism(Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1966), 88 -9 5; 10 0 - 10 4 .

56 The Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship


believe that their superiors possessed som e special secret that they would be m ade privy to in time.

A t its height, the Illum inati included literati like G oeth e and H erder, as w ell as num erous other public figures and m em bers o f the aristocracy: K arl-A ugust, duke o f W eimar, the Prussian reform er K arl von H ardenberg, D uke Ferdinand o f Braunschw eig, D uke Ernst o f G otha, the publisher C . F. C otta, C ou n t Joh an n C obenzl, and m any others. T h e order thus m anaged to insinuate itse lf into the governm ents o f A ustria and G erm any. N o t surprisingly, W eishaupt and com pany m ade the infiltration o f the educational system a top priority. T h e s ta if o f the K arlss- chule in Stuttgart included several Illum inati.

T h e influence o f the order was short-lived, however. In 1784 Elector K arl T h eo d o r o f Bavaria, seeing the Illum inati as a threat to religion, issued a proclam ation com m anding them to disband. In 1785 W eishaupt w as forced out o f his professorship at Ingolstadt and went to live w ith a friend, Jak o b Lanz, in Regensburg. W hile out walking together one day they w ere caught in a sudden dow npour and Lan z w as struck by lightning and killed. T h e Illum inati m em bership list w as found on his body, constituting p ro o f positive that the order had defied the electors proclam ation. T h e elector then issued a second proclam ation com m anding all Illum inati to register with the governm ent and prom ising a full pardon i f they did so. T h is put the order in a terrific bind. T h e m em bers could not possibly know how com plete a list the governm ent had obtained, so i f they registered they risked im prisonm ent or w orse ( i f K arl T h eo d o rs prom ise w as disingenuous). O n the other hand, i f they did not register and their nam es w ere on the list, they risked im prisonm ent (or w orse). In this im possible situation the order self-destructed, as m ost m em bers chose to obey the electors edict. A lthough rum ors o f the influence o f the Illum inati continue to this day, it w as never— so far as we k n o w — officially reactivated, and i f it w as reactivated there is no evidence that it regained anything like the influence it had from 1776 to 1785.

M ost o f the Illum inati were also M asons. Jacques D ’H ondt in his Hegel Secret provides a fascinating discussion o f the influence o f the Enlightenm ent ideals and term inology o f the Illum inati on the young Hegel.'* I shall discuss som e his conclusions in section 4 here, as well as in chapter 7.

2. G o e th e th e A lc h e m is t

T h e life o f Joh an n W olfgang von G oeth e (174 9 -18 32) provides a fascinating case study o f an eighteenth century H erm eticist. H is exam ple m akes it vividly clear that an em inent scientist and man o f letters could still be deeply im m ersed in H erm eticism as late as the second h a lf o f the eighteenth century.

M ost scholars treat the Enlightenm ent as a single, unitary phenom enon: the effort to em ancipate m ankind from tradition, superstition, and

32. See Jacques D 'H on dt, Hegel Secret (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 6 2 - 1 14 .

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despotism . But in fact the Enlightenm ent took radically different shapes in different countries. T h is is especially true o f G erm any. C hristopher M acintosh w rites that when the Enlightenm ent "fell on G erm an soil it often took root in strange and contradictory ways."” A n exam ple o f this is the G erm an phenom enon o f the "Enlightened despot," exem plified by Frederick the G reat. In particular, the scientific spirit o f the Enlightenment took longer to gain ground in Germ any. W ell into the tim e o f H egel and G oethe, H erm eticism w as still seen in m any quarters as a progressive influence. A lchem y survived much later in G erm any than it did in the rest o f Europe.

R onald G ray, w ho has produced an entire study o f the influence o f alchem y on G oethe, writes that "At the time o f G o eth es birth, in . . . M annheim , alchem y was all the rage. M any o f the m ost respectable citizens had established alchem ical laboratories, and so w idespread w as the enthusiasm that the city authorities felt them selves obliged to suppress it by law, on the grounds that the num erous ill-guarded fires and the waste o f labour and m aterials were dangerous, and harm ful to the econom y o f the state."*4 A s a young m an, G oeth e read Paracelsus, Basil Valentine, van H elm ont, Sw edenborg, and the K abbalah .” In particular, as G ray notes, G oeth e w as influenced by an anonym ous alchem ical w ork entitled Aurea Catena Homcri (ca .1723).* G o eth es letter to E . T h . Langer o f M ay 11, 1770 , discusses the Em erald Tablet o f H erm es Tris- m egistus.17 G o eth es notebook from Frankfurt and Strasbourg contains m any references to Paracelsus and A grippa.“ A ccording to R ichard Friedenthal, for G oeth e "alchem y w as a thing o f the present, not o f the past, a still living survival from the m iddle ages."” Indeed, G ray claims that "T h e degree to which alchcm y had established control over G o e th es interests in early m anhood can scarcely be over-em phasized.’’4'’

In Septem ber o f 1768, G oethe, exhausted, took leave from Leipzig U niversity and spent the w inter at hom e. H e w as much o f the tim e in the com pany o f Susanna von K lettenberg, who belonged to the sect o f H errnhuter, a P ietist m ovem ent founded by the notorious H erm eticist C ou n t von Z in z e n d o rf ( 17 0 0 -6 0 ) . A n alchem ical adept, K lettenberg introduced G oeth e to the Opus Mago-Cabbalisticum et Theosophicum o f G eo rg von W elling.41 Together, they engaged in alchem ical experim ents in G o e th es fa th ers attic. Friedenthal describes their w ork in dram atic detail:

33. M acintosh, The Rose Cross, 15.34 . Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 4.35. Friedenthal, Goethe, 6 6 -6 8 ; see also G ray, Goethe the Alchemist, 5.36. Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 5.37. Ibid., 182.38. Ibid., 6.39. Friedenthal, Goethe, 67. See also G ray's entire Goeffce the Alchemist. G ray claims that G oethe probably encountered much o f alchem y in a Böhm ean form ulation, though he probably never encountered Böhm es thought directly.40. G ray, Goethe the Alchemist, 7.4 1. T h is w ork was based on Paracelsus and Bohm e. G oethe is also known to have read Kabbalistic w orks. See Friedenthal, Goethe, 66.

58 T h e Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship


T h e pious Fräulein von Klettenberg stood with the young G oethe in front o f a wind furnace, with sand-bath and chemical flasks. T hey stirred up the'ingredients o f M acrocosm and M icrocosm .'They tried to produce silicic acid by melting quartz pebbles from the river M ain. T h ey discussed mysterious salts, to be conjured up by unheard-of means, a'virgin soil'w ith extraordinary p o w ers.. . . Even in his [later] natural science he remained for truer to the world o f prima materia and the Chemical Marriage, as the text-book o f the Rosicrucians was called, than subsequent opinion has been willing to adm it.42

In later years, G oeth e w as far m ore critical o f a lch cm y:"It is a m isuse o f genuine and true ideas, a leap from the ideal, the possible, to the reality, a false application o f genuine feelings, a lying prom ise, which flatters our dearest hopes and aspirations."“ H ow ever, G o eth es disapproval appears to have extended only to the actual practice o f laboratory alchemy. H e continued to be influenced by alchem ical theory and sym bolism . In 1795 he com posed an alchem ical fairy tale laden w ith H erm etic im agery o f all sorts— such as, for instance, the image o f the ouroboros (the snake biting its tail).

T h e conception o f a unity o f the w orld s religions is jo in ed in G oeth e’s thought, as it is in Rosicrucianism and Freem asonry, to a quasi-pantheistic nature m ysticism . In w ords that call to m ind Schiller's poem Die Freundschaft (1782)» which is quoted— or rather deliberately m isquoted— by H egel in the final passage o f the Phenomenology o f Spirit, G oeth e w rites in the Sorrow; of the Young Werther (1774):

From the inaccessible m ountains across the desert that no foot has trodden, and on to the end o f the unknow n ocean, breathes the spirit o f the eternally creating O ne, rejoicing in every speck o f dust that hears H im and is alive. — A h , in those days, how often did my longing take the wings o f a crane that flew overhead and carried me to the shore o f the uncharted sea, to drink from the foam ing cup o f the infinite that sw elling rapture o f life, and to taste but for an instant, despite the lim ited force o f m y soul, one drop o f the bliss o f that being which produces all things in and by m eans o f itself.44

D avid W alsh notes that “G oeth e m ade frequent use o f the idea o f un ifying opposites in the sense derived from the alchem ical sym bolism , both in his literary and scientific w ritings.''4' H is aim , as G ray puts it, w as "an incorruptible perm anence which em braces in itse lf all opposites.”46 G oeth e w rites: “ I w as pleased to im agine to m yself a divinity [Gofifeeif] which reproduces itse lf from all eternity, but since production cannot be thought o f w ithout m ultiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit], this divin-

4a. Friedenthal, Goethe, 67; in Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of Nature o f 1803, he discusses a " V irgin Earth,” m entioning in this context "the elders,* w hom H . S . H arris argues refers to Paracelsus, Bohm e, and the alchem ists (Nigbr Thoughts, 274).43- Q uoted in Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 6 6 -6 7 .4 4 . G oethe, The Sorrows of the Young Werther, trans. Bayard Q uincy M organ (N ew York: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1957), 69.45. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 326.46. Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 1 1 - ia .

H egels Early Years 59


ity necessarily appeared to itse lf at once as a Second Person [ein Zweites], w hom we recognize by the nam e o f the Son."47 T h e sim ilarity to Böhm es doctrine is obvious here.** G oeth e continues, speaking o f the Father and So n : “ T h ese tw o had now to continue the act o f creation, and appeared to them selves again as a T h ird Person [im Dritten], w ho w as now ju s t as living and eternal as the whole. B u t w ith this the circle o f divin ity was closed, and even they w ould have found it im possible to create again a being fully equal to them selves.”'*

G ray has described G o eth es color-theory as, "entirely alchem ical in conception.”50 T h e color-theory, w hich had a great influence on H egels later Naturphilosophie, w as influenced by the alchem ical teaching that all colors arise from the opposition o f darkness and light.*1 G oeth e h im self acknowledges the influence o f alchem y on the Farbenlehre:“ H e w h o pon ders this m atter m ore deeply,” G oeth e states, “w ill be so m uch the better able to relate these rem arks w ith the secret philosophy and experience o f the chem ists.”'* Furtherm ore, G oeth e acknowledged the im portance o f the form o f ”trip licity” in his color-theory, a trip licity w hich, o f course, figures prom inently in H egel and, as w e have seen, in Böhm e and his fo llow ers: " I f one has rightly understood the separation o f blue and yellow,” G oeth e states,

and has sufficiently considered in particular the developm ent tow ards red, w hereby the opposed sides incline tow ards one another and com bine in a th ird being, then a certain secret significance will becom e apparent, to w it that a spiritual m eaning can be read into these tw o separated and opposed beings, and one w ill scarcely refrain, when one sees them producing green below, and red above, from thinking in the form er case o f the earthly, and in the latter case o f the heavenly creatures o f the E lohim .”

G o eth es botanical theory, the doctrine o f the so-called Urpflanze, is also heavily influenced by Böhm e and alchemy. G o eth es search for the Urpflanze led him to postulate a sequence o f seven stages o f plant developm ent, m oved by the tw in forces o f "diastole” and "systole." R o lf C h ristian Z im m erm an has argued that G o e th es conceptions o f diastole and systole derive from O etinger’s conceptions o f expansion and contraction.*4 R obert Schneider speaks o f these concepts as part o f the "old

47. Q uoted in Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 50.48. T h e m ore immediate source m ay have been the thought o f O etinger. See Robert Schneider, Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesahnen (W ürzburg- Aum ühle: Konrad Triltsch Verlag, 1938), 136.49. Q uoted in Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 50.50. Ibid., 128.51. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 94-5a. Q uoted in Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 127.53. Q uoted in ibid.. 12254. R o lf C hristian Zim m erm an, Das Weltbild des jungen Goethe: Studien zur hermetischen Tradition des deutschen 18. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (M unich: Fink, 1969. *979). 1:187. O etinger actually em ployed the term s systole and diastole. T h e “contraction/expansion” theory originates, not surprisingly, with Böhm e. See W alsh, The Mysticism of Innerwordly Fulfillment, 6 0 -6 1 .

6o The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


vitalistic tradition" and points out that they crop up later in Sch ellin gs Weltalter” D avid W alsh has also com pared G oeth e’s seven stages to B öhm es seven source-spirits.*

T h e Urpflanze is conceived by G oeth e as a microcosm o f the universe. T h e seven stages o f plant developm ent m irror the seven stages o f the unfolding and division o f creation as a w hole. But all the parts and stages are sim ply the m odes o f one fundam ental form . G oeth e believed that each stage o f the plant’s developm ent w as understandable as a transform ation o f the prim ordial leaf. G ray w rites that G oeth e held this observation (w hich has been disputed by m ost botanists) to be “confirm ation o f his belief that the w hole w as present in all o f its parts.^7 A gain, we are rem inded o f a sim ilar position in H egel. G oeth e also believed in the reality o f an Urtier, o f w hich all anim als are m odifications, though he did not develop this theory as extensively as he did that o f the Urpflanze.

G oeth e w as an active and enthusiastic M ason. H e even com posed songs and orations in honor o f deceased M asonic brethren, in which he elaborated his ow n view s o f the true m ission o f M asonry.“ Som e o f these views may be inferred from his 1784 fragm ent Die Geheimnisse, a fable about a spiritual order o f knights (m odeled, it seem s, on the T em plars). T h e knights are led by a Humanus, w ho unites in his person the underlying ''truth” o f the various religious faiths— again, we find the conception o f the invisible church. M ore than once in Die Geheimnisse, G oeth e uses the im agery o f the cross and roses. G o e th es name and reputation served to lend a m easure o f respectability to H erm eticism throughout his lifetim e. M any were undoubtedly introduced to aspects o f H erm eticism through G oethe, and his w ork w as a m ajor conduit for the indirect influence o f alchemy, Böhm e, K abbalah, and various other H erm etic offshoots.

3. Swabian Pietism and F. C . Oetinger

Laurence D ickey has argued recently that the approach o f going"back to the text” with Hegel's w ork is m isguided, for so much o f the intellectual context o f w hat H egel w rote is unfam iliar to us.w T h e G erm an y o f H egel's youth consisted o f alm ost tw o thousand sovereign states, cities, dukedom s, and bishoprics. T h ere w as no centralized governm ent, and no center o f intellectual and spiritual life. T h u s any G erm an thinker m ust be understood in term s o f his local context. D ickey argues that H egel m ust be understood in the context o f w hat he calls the “ P rotestant civil p iety" o f O ld W ürttem berg. T h is tradition involves, am ong

55. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 103. For the Weltalter passages see F. W . J.Schclling, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 8, ed. K .F .A . Schelling (Stuttgart: J . G . C ot-ta'schcr, 1856-58), 231, 320, 327.56. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 94.57. Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 74.58. H einrich Schneider, Quest fo r Mysteries, 123.59. Laurence Dickey, Hegel: Religion. Economics, and the Politics o f Spirit1770-1807 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1987). v ii-viii.

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other things, the goal o f establishing the kingdom o f G o d on earth through a transform ation o f society. R obert Schneider, in fact, refers to the "kingdom o f G o d '' (Das Königreich Gottes) as the "consum m ate idea" o f Sw abian P ietism .“

Sch n eiders Schellings und Hegels Schwäbische Geistesahnen w as the first major study o f the influence o f Sw abian theosophy on G erm an idealism. H e refers to the widespread scholarly ignorance o f H egel’s Sw abian roots as an "em barrassing situation" (Zwangslage) and argues that Schelling and H egel w ere influenced by such aspects o f Sw abian cultural life as the Geschichtstheologie o f Johann C occejus ( 16 0 3 -6 9 ) , m ystical pantheism , Paracelcism , and theosophical Naturphilosophie (especially that o f the Böhm ean F. C . O etin ger)/1

In Hegel's ow n tim e his Sw abianism w as the subject o f som e discussion, as w ell as ridicule. K arl R osenkranz w rites that “ In Berlin it was the case that much that w as attributed to H egel as a person w as typical o f all Sw abians, and w as not regarded as being in any w ay peculiar to him so long as he lived in southern G erm any. T h is is true o f his warm , unpretentious manner, his intuitive openness, the directness o f his speech, and the straightforw ardness, m atter-of-factness and sincerity o f his mental attitude."" In the year follow ing H egel's death, O. H . G ruppe (w riting under the pseudonym "Absolutulus von H egelingen") played A ristophanes to H egel's Socrates w ith his play. The Wind, or an Entirely Absolute Construction o f World History Through Oberons Horn, in which H e g e l 's S w a b ia n o r ig in s w e r e la m p o o n e d . U n d e r s t a n d in g H e g e l ’s

Sw abian roots is indispensable for m aking sense out o f his philosophical presuppositions and attachm ents.

T h e D u ch y o f W ü rttem b erg w as an extrem ely insular state, w hich, after turn in g P rotestan t in 1534» becam e fertile ground for m any form s o f religious enthusiasm , including m ysticism and H erm eticism . Indeed, the Sw ab ian s are the m ystical people o f G erm any, notorious for th eir interest in esoteric, theosophical, and occult strains o f thought. R euch lin , A ndreae, O etinger, H ahn, M esm er, Sch iller, Sch ellin g, H egel, and H ölderlin w ere all Sw abian s. W iedm ann w rites o f the Sw ab ian s, “ R eserved and uncom m unicative, they conceal deep w ith in them selves a quiet faculty fo r b rooding and m editating."61 P ierre D eghaye states that "Sw ab ia is accustom ed to reconciling op p osites."64 W ü rttem b erg , Laurence D ickey claim s, w as a land o f"b o th - and" rather than "eithcr-or."M "T h e Sw abians," w rites H einrich Schneider, “alw ays search for the totality o f being behind the reality


60. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 146 . See chapter 7 for a discussion o f the "K in gdom o f G o d " in relation to H egel, Schelling, and H ölderlin.61. Ibid., 5.62. Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 22.63. Franz W iedm ann, H egel An illustrated Biography, trans. Joachim Neu- groschel (N ew York: Pegasus, 1968), 14.64. D echaye,"Jacob Böhm e and H is Followers," 236.65. Dickey, Hegel, 11.


w ith its confusing m ultiform ity, and beyond the rationale w ith its sh arp antithesis o f truth and Essence."“ R ob ert Sch n eider w rites o f the Sw ab ian “m ental attitude” (Geisteshaltung), w hich continually poin ts tow ard die Ganzheit des Seins.67

Even w ell into the nineteenth century, little o f the scientific spirit o f the Enlightenm ent had seeped in. W alsh w rites: “ T h e influence o f the Enlightenm ent, to the extent it had m ade itse lf felt in W ürttem berg, w as integrated w ith a theosophic philosophy o f nature and a speculative Pietism which w as concerned w ith the progressive revelation o f the divine structure o f history."“ Indeed, for this reason, R ob ert Schneider holds that the influence o f the Aufklärung on the young H egel has been very much exaggerated.^ W e m ay think o f biblical scholarship and “speculative ph ilosophy" as w idely different activities, but to the P ietists o f W ürttem berg they were intim ately connected.

Ju st w hat exactly is "speculative Pietism " ? D efining Pietism itse lf is rather difficult, for it existed in G erm an y (and elsewhere) in a variety o f form s. Lew is W hite Beck characterizes Pietism as "the public re-emer- gence o f a m ore or less continuous effort in G erm an y to achieve a sim pler, less dogm atic, and m ore m oralistic C hristian ity than that to be found in any o f the established churches.''70 T h e P ietists were inspired by a variety o f sources. O ne highly significant source o f inspiration was Böhm e. By the end o f the seventeenth century, Böhm es follow ers had becom e a thorn in the side o f the established church. In W ürttem berg in 1681 Pastor Joh an n Jak o b Z im m erm an o f Bietigheim w as dism issed from his post for “ Böhm eanism ." A sim ilar fate befell Ludw ig Brun- nquell o f G rossbotw ar in 1679. D espite this, Böhm eans in W ürttem berg w ere generally treated w ith m ore tolerance than anyw here else in G e r many.

T h e strain o f "B öhm ean Pietism " becam e particularly strong in the eighteenth century, when m any P ietist th inkers becam e active o p p o nents o f the m athem atical and mechanical model o f science and advocated instead a Böhm ean “vitalistic philosophy o f nature."71 T hese religious m ystics, som e o f whom , like Böhm e, had no form al education, came to exercise a wide influence, and by the m iddle o f the eighteenth century, as Beck puts it, "a P ietistic patina spread over alm ost all o f G e r man culture." '’ In addition to the open, Pietist religious societies, which w ere tolerated by the D uchy o f W ürttem burg, secret societies flour

66 . H c in ric h S ch n e id e r, Quest fo r Mysteries, 62 - 63 . H e re S c h n e id e r is actuallyexplicating the views, with which he is in sympathy, o f H . O. Burger in hisSchwabentum in der Geistesgeschicte (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1933).67. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 23.68. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 296.69. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 7.70 . Beck, Early German Philosophy, 157. T h is is indeed the case, for these“ Pietist” concerns are to be found in such G erm an mystics as Eckhart, H ild egard, Seuse, Tauler, Joachim , and others.7 1. Ibid. 159.72. Ibid., 10.


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ished there as w ell.'’ Som e o f these societies w ere alchem ical in nature. A lchem y w as quite popular at the W ürttem berg court in the seventeenth century. T h e Schwäbischen Magazin, one o f the m ost im portant publications in Sw abian literary life, published w orks on theosophy and alchem ical Naturphilosophie including Ph. M . Hahn's anonym ous work, “ Von G ottes Dreyeinigkeit und von der Versöhnung."74

I w ill have m ore to say about the influence o f Sw abian Pietism and H erm eticism on Schelling and H egel in section 4 o f th is chapter. In the rest o f this section, I w ill discuss the life and thought o f O etinger, w ho exercised considerable influence on both Schelling and H egel.

Friedrich C hristoph O etinger (170 2-8 2 ), virtually unknow n to English-speaking scholars, ranks as the second m ost im portant figure in W ürttem berg Pietism after Johann A lbrecht Bengel ( 16 8 7 -17 5 2 ).” S to effler w rites that "B y m ost estim ates [O etinger] was, in fact, the m ost original theologian o f the eighteenth century in W ürttem berg, and perhaps in all o f Germ any.''’6 R obert Schneider has characterized Bengel as "the philosopher o f history w ho anticipated the w ork o f Schelling and H egel."77 Bengel believed that he was the herald o f a"final age" o f m an in w hich G o d w ould achieve perfect self-actualization in the world, history would end, and all reality would be absorbed into G o d . Specifically, B en gel held that this w ould occur in 1836. Bengel and his follow ers, who called them selves “ T h e Free” (Die Freien), proclaim ed the perennial ideal o f the invisible church, w hich w ould prepare man for the end o f tim e. (I w ill have m ore to say about Bengel in chapter 7.)

O etinger, after undergoing a conversion experience in 172 1, entered the theological sem inary in T übin gen , w here H egel w ould study sixty- seven years later. O etinger w as decidedly unim pressed by the W olffian philosophy o f rationalism and m echanism that was popular at the time, and yearned for som ething m ore. D iscussing his intellectual frustrations w ith Joh an n K aspar O berberger, the proprietor o f the pow der m ill in T übin gen , the latter gave O etinger the w orks o f Böhm e. It w as not long before O etinger openly declared h im self a disciple o f Böhm e. Indeed, O etinger s first book was a com m entary on Böhm e: Aufmunternde Gründe zur Lesung der Schriften Jacob Böhmens (1731).

73. H cinrich Schneider has drawn interesting parallels between G erm an Freem asonry and Pietist sects in his Quest fo r Mysteries, 4 8 -4 9 .74 . Ronald G ray notes that as a consequence o f Böhm es influence on Pietism , it is possible to say that "wherever in G erm any Pietism was s tro n g . . . there w as likely to be also some belief in the validity o f alchem y" (Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 4).75. O ne place English-speaking scholars have encountered O etinger is in H an s-G eorg G adam er s Truth and Method, in which O etinger s doctrine o f sensus communis is discussed briefly. To be sure, G adam er appropriates Oetinger for his own purposes and says nothing o f the role played by sensus communis in O etinger's Böhm ean theosophy. See Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., trans. Joel W einsheimer and Donald G . M arshall (N ew York: Crossroad, 1989), 2 7 -30 , 485.76 . Stoeffler, German Pietism, 107.77. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 38.

64 T h e Sorcerers Apprenticeship


O etinger is also know n to have visited a circle o f Jew ish K abbalists at Frankfurt am M ain, w ho introduced him to K n o rr von Rosenroth's Cabala Denudata, as well as to the m essianic K abbalism o f Isaac Luria. T h rou gh O etinger, L u rias Kabbalah would exercise an indirect influence on G erm an idealism . H is fam iliarity w ith K abbalism enabled O etinger to appreciate w hat w a s“ K abbalistic" in B öhm es w orks and to attem pt to effect a synthesis o f Böhm e and K abbalism . T h is tendency is reflected in one o f O etinger s most im portant w orks, öffentliches Denckmal der Lehrtafel (1763). T h is w as a com m entary on a Kabbalistic painting— com m issioned by Princess A ntonia o f W ürttem berg— hanging in a sm all church at Teinach in the Black Forest. O etinger s account o f the Kabbalah in this w ork is alm ost entirely Lurianic. Antonia w as a follower o f a C hristian K abbalist pastor w hose K abbalism had been influenced by R euchlin . O etinger also corresponded w ith Em anuel Sw edenborg. In 1765 he published a tw o-volum e w ork entitled Swedenborgs und anderer irdische und himmlische Philosophie, zur Prüfung des Bestens (1765), which w as subsequently banned in W ürttem berg.

O etinger was also an accom plished scientist, quite learned in the th eories o f his tim e. N evertheless, he was a fierce opponent o f both m echanistic m aterialism and the rationalism o f D escartes, Leibniz, and W olff. In the spirit o f Böhm ean vitalism he com posed a "theology o f electricity.''’* G reatly influenced by alchemy, in 1749 he w rote that “C hem istry and theology are for me not tw o things but one thing."*' O ne com m entator notes th at“ Various theosophic currents, including the H erm etic and panvitalistic system s o f G iordan o Bruno and Paracelsus, the Kabbalah, the Rosicrucian tradition and, m ost im portantly, the obscure speculation o f Jak o b Böhm e, were incorporated into the Sw abian Pietistic revival by O etinger and his school."* A n enthusiastic chiliast, in the tra dition o f Joachim de Fiore, he also published a book o f inspirational serm ons— Reden nach dem Allgemeinen Wahrheitsgefühl (1758)— which becam e quite popular with the laity o f W ürttem berg.

O etinger holds that "G o d is an eternal desire for self-revelation" (eine ewige Begierde sich zu offenbaren).11 H e w rites in one place that "T h e ancients [die Alten] saw G o d as an eternal process in which H e emerges from H im se lf and returns to H im self; this is the true conception o f G od and o f H is G lo ry ; it is the true conception o f H is infinite life and power which issues in the Blessed Trinity.''92

O etinger identifies the fully realized G o d with Geist and treats Geist as what he calls an Intensum. An Intensum is a com plex whole, which cannot

78. Sec Ernst Benz. The Tlxolcgy o f Electricity, trans. W olfgang Taraba (Allison Park, Pa.: Pickw ick Publications, 1989).79. Q uoted in Albrecht RitschI, Geschichte des Pietismus in der lutherische Kirche des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3 (Bonn: Adolph M arcus, 1880 -86), 140 .80. H anratty,“ Hegel and the G nostic Tradition: 11." 314 .81. O etinger, Biblisches und emblematiscbes Wörterbuch (1776 ; reprinted, H ildesheim : G eo rg O lm s Verlag, 1969), 536. Pagination refers to the original edition.82. Q uoted in H anrarty,“ Hegel and the G nostic Tradition: II,“ 314; his translation.



be divided into separable pieces. In his Biblisches und Emblematisches Wörterbuch (1776 ), O etinger defines Wissen (to know ) as "to see a thing according to all its parts."*’ Glaube (belief, faith) is supposed to consist "not in annuling [aufoeben] the syllogistic order o f thought but in enlivening it."M Putting the tw o definitions together, one can see that w hat O etinger is after is a kind o f thought that proceeds organically, o r which aim s at the articulation and grasp o f organic wholes. O etinger thus does not reject reason per se; he m erely opposes a "living” to a "dead" reason. W e com e to know the G od-process through its m anifold aspects, which are not conceived as separable pieces. O etinger holds, in a manner identical to H egel, that in the case o f an Intensum such as Geist, the whole is im m anent in every part. It is this imm anence that enables us to progress from one moment to another in the gradual articulation o f the w hole.”

T h e "m om ents” o f G o d represent the “ forces" that bring about G o d s realization in the w orld , w hich consists in H is corporealization or em bodim ent in nature and in history. B öhm es claim that no spirit exists “disem bodied" is the linchpin o f O etinger's thought. O etinger w rites: "Em bodim ent is the goal o f G o d s w ork" (Leiblichkeit ist das Ende der werke Gottes).* O etinger departs from the entire earlier philosophical tradition o f idealism , by holding that sp irit does not exist separate and apart from its em bodim ent. Rather, spirit com es to progressively more adequate expression through corporeality— w h at O etinger calls Geiit- leiblichkeit. A perennial idea in the theosophical tradition, Geistleiblichkeit h a s its p ro b a b le o r ig in s in C a s p a r S c h w e n k fc ld ( 1 4 9 0 - 1 5 6 1 ) . A s d is c u s s e d

in the last chapter, for Böhm e Leiblichkeit w as the last stage o f G o d s selfunfolding. S till, Geistleiblichkeit is a highly obscure conception, perhaps best understood along the lines o f an A ristotelian entelecheia (actuality): a perfect m arriage o f (divine) form and matter.

T h e forces that set in m otion this process o f cosm ic "spiritual corporealization" are antagonistic and m utually determ ining, and are derived in large m easure from O etin ger’s studies o f the Kabbalah. A s w as com mon am ong C hristian K abbalists, O etinger identifies the first three sephiroth o f the K abbalistic Tree o f L ife w ith the T rin ity and states that they deal solely w ith the G od head . T h e other seven relate to creation. L ike Böhm e, O etinger refers to these as "seven spirits," and like Böhm e he favors this w ay o f speaking because it accords w ith scriptural references to the seven spirits o f G o d (Rev. 4:5). T h e y are the m echanism o f G o d s corporealization or m anifestation. H e conceives the supernal T rin ity as in som e degree beyond understanding.

T h e tw o fundam ental cosm ic processes, according to O etinger, are expansion (Ausbreitung), which he identifies w ith the fourth Kabbalist sephirah, Hesed ("mercy," also know n by a nam e w hich O etinger also uses, Gedulah), and contraction (Stärke), which he identifies w ith the fifth

83. Oetinger, Biblisches und emblematisches Wörterbuch, 689.84. Ibid.. 282.85. See Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 114 .86. Oetinger, Biblisches und emblematisches Wörterbuch, 407.



sephirah, Gevurah (judgm ent). C reation, and thus G o d s "em bodim ent” is set in m otion by the prim ordial conflict o f these tw o forces.

Central to Oetinger s theory o f knowledge is his conception o f sensus communis, which he discusses most fully in Die Wahrheit des Sensus Communis (also 1753). Sensus communis, O etinger notes,“is concerned only with things that all men see before them , things that hold an entire society together, things that are concerned as much with truths and statements as with the arrangements and patterns com prised in statements.”*'' Oetinger frequently refers to sensus communis as an “unmediated cognition" (unmittelbare Erkenntnis). Robert Schneider describes sensus communis as "the feeling o f the deep, total bond [ Verbundenheit] o f man with G o d and with other beings."®’ Sensus communis cannot be defined with full clarity and precision because it in some sense transcends subject and object.” Sensus communis is understood by O etinger to lie at the"very center" o f our being— it is a state or a faculty that lies beyond the run-of-the-m ill distinctions made by consciousness, including the distinction between consciousness and external world.

O etinger also speaks o f a 'generative method," which understands both nature and scripture according to their “generative order," as organic system s that unfold as plants do from their seeds.*5 M ore exalted than sensus communis is w hat O etinger calls Zentrailerkenntnis, an unm ediated, syn optic vision in which the mind m om entarily sees existence through the eyes o f G o d . O etinger w rites that Zentrallerkenntnis leads to the realization that "T h e truth is a whole [Die Wahrheit ist ein Games]-, when one finally receives this total, synoptic vision o f the truth, it m atters not w hether one begins by considering this part or thar."*' A s Robert Schneider points out, the them e o f the truth as a whole (or the whole) is a perennial them e o f Sw abian speculative P ietism . It is for this reason, Schneider suggests, that the sceptical moment o f K an ts philosophy was alm ost universally rejected and reviled in W ürttem berg.’2 Schneider w rites that “there can no longer be any doubt, that in the [T übingenJ Stifi, spurred on and enriched by the Enlightenm ent, the original spirit o f the [Swabian] Heimat w as at work, seeking the Truth only in the W hole.“®*

O etinger reads the entire text o f the Bible as a “ holy em blem book": every detail is in som e w ay significant or sym bolic. T h e Bible is itse lf an em bodim ent o f G o d — not a physical em bodim ent, but an expression o f the divine in term s o f concrete images, m yths, and allegories. O etinger distinguishes between a "narrow " and a “wide" m eaning o f scriptural

87. O etinger, D ie Wahrheit des sensus communis oder des allgemeinen Sinnes, in den nach dem Grundtext erklärten Sprüchen und Prediger Salomo oder das beste Hausund Sittenbuch fü r Gelehrte und Ungelehrte (T übin gen, 175}). Q uoted in Gadam er, 27.88. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 124 .89. Stoeffler, German Pietism, 115.90. Priscilla A . H ayd en -R o y .'A Foretaste o f H eaw n’ : Friedrich Hölderlin in the Context o f Württemberg Pietism (Am sterdam : Rodopi, 1994), 42.91. F. C . O etinger, Sämtliche Schrißen, vol. 5, ed. K arl C hr. Eberh. Ehm ann (Stuttgart: Steinkopf. 1858-64), 45-92. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 56.93. Ibid., 54.



term s.“4 T h e narrow is the literal meaning, the w ide the speculative. Because O etinger holds that both are, in their ow n way, true, he can claim that his views do not conflict w ith orthodoxy (though few accepted such a defense in his tim e). Follow ing Böhm e, O etinger extends this conception to include all o f nature, stating that "the natural realm, as well as scripture, is a medium o f divine revelation, and . . . therefore the study o f one w ill yield at least som e insights into the other.”'* N ature, like the Bible, is an em blem -book, where everything is to be read as a sensuous representation o f the divine. Since N ature is an emblem book— a sensu- alization o f G o d in the world progressing toward true spiritual em bodim ent— scientific experim ent or investigation into N ature are for O etinger a w ay o f"th inking G o d s thoughts.’** O etinger refers to the science that studies these "emblems” as theologia emblematica and claims that when fully realized it will unify the sciences and all o f human knowledge. O ne aurhor refers to it as "an eclectic com bination o f alchemy, Böhme, the cabala, and emblematics."*7

T here are m any parallels between O etin gers thought and H egel’s. T h e foregoing discussion o f O etinger should have made som e o f these obvious, but I will offer a b rie f summary' (further parallels will be drawn in later chapters). First there is O etin gers ideal o f an unm ediated cognition beyond subject and object; there is his conception o f the truth as a "w hole"; there is O etingers understanding o f nature as a self-specification o f G o d and his treatm ent o f natural philosophy as providing insight into "G o d s m ind”; there is O etin gers organicism , his conception o f the intensum in w hich the whole is im m anent in every part, and his ideal o f an organic form o f thought; there is the centrality in O etingers thought o f Geist and his ideal o f Geistleibliehkeit, or spiritual em bodim ent, which finds its analogue in H egel’s O bjective and Absolute Sp irit. H egel states that "Sp irit is in the m ost concrete sense. T h e absolute or highest being belongs to it" ( l p r 1 :14 2 ; v p r 1:56). Ju st as in O etingers thought, H egel’s G o d or the Idea is "em bodied" in m ore or less adequate form s. In nature it exists in inchoate form , but finds m ore adequate realization in hum an projects, institutions, art, and religion, finally reaching perfection in an ideal m edium : the pure aether o f thought realized in speculative philosophy.

Tw o im portant followers o f O etinger were Johann Ludw ig Fricker (1729 -66 ) and Philipp M atthäus H ahn (1739 -9 0 ), both o f whom studied at Tübingen. Fricker, along with other associates o f O etinger such as G . F. Rosier and Prokop Divisch, developed O etingers "theology o f electricity” and m ay have exercised an influence on Franz Anton M esm er (1734-18 15).'* (O etinger was, in fact, the first Germ an scholar to take note o f M esm ers theories.)*' However, perhaps the most influential follower o f O etinger w as H ahn, whose theology was sim ilar in most respects to

94. H ayden-Roy,“ A Foretaste of Heaven," 43.95. Stoeffler, German Pietism, n o .96. Ibid., 114 .97. H ayden-Roy, "A Foretaste o f Heaven,” 46.98. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism. 77.99. Benz, Ttyeology o f Electricity, 69.



O etinger s. T h e young H ahn spent h a lf a year at a vicarage in H errenberg w ith Oetinger, w ho was by then quite ill. D uring his rime there, he read O etingers voluminous alchemical library.'00 In 1770 H ahn, who had won the favor o f D uke Karl Eugen for his design o f an astronom ical clock, became a pastor in Kom w estheim , north o f Stuttgart. In 1781 he moved to Echterdingen and died there nine years later. W hile at Echterdingen, he made frequent visits in the sum m er to N ürtingen, where he may have com e into contact with the young Schelling and Hölderlin.

H ahn attracted num erous followers from Stuttgart, w here he established som e conventicles (scriptural "study groups" for lay Pietists), including one exclusively com posed o f city officials and leading citizens.’01 H ahn was acquainted also with Joh an n G ottfried H erder (17 4 4 -18 0 3), w hose ow n H erm ericism m ay well have been fueled by this contact with speculative P ietism .'" In 1774 H erder published Ober die älteste Urkunde des Menschgesclechts, in which he devoted considerable space to a serious discussion o f H erm es Trism egisrus. T h e w ork concluded with a chapter dealing w ith, am ong other things, the Kabbalah. In 1801, in his journal Adrastea, H erder published a dialogue between “ H erm es and Pymander," styled after the dialogues found in the Corpus Hermeticum.m

D espite O etin gers influence, the church and academ ia remained largely closed to his followers. T h e T übingen Stift, for instance, was intolerant o f O etingerites. N evertheless, even there O etinger exercised a subterranean influence. T h e m etaphysical w ritings o f Professor G o ttfried Ploucquet ( 17 16 -9 0 ) w ere strongly influenced by O etin gers critique o f Leibniz. P loucquet did not, however, dare to cite O etinger.11'* H ayd en -R oy w rites that "for pastors hoping for a successful career w ithin the W ürttem berg church, it w as politically expedient to espouse conservative rather than speculative view s."105

P. M. H ah n is not to be confused w ith Joh an n M ichael H ahn (17 5 9 -18 19 ), an influential disciple o f Böhm e, w hose ow n life bore a num ber o f parallels to that o f the Lusatian cobbler. H ahn founded the Sw abian "H ahnisch Fellowship" (Hahniscl>e Gemeinschaft), the m em bers o f which were all conventionally religious laity, w ho ju st happened to meet every Sunday afternoon to discuss H ah n s brand o f Böhm ean theosophy.106

roo. H ayden-Roy, “ A Foretaste o f Heaven," 55-56 .10 1. Ibid., 65.102. Robert Schneider (Geistesahnen, 10) claim s that H erder w as influenced by Oetinger.103. H erder w as a lifelong H erm eticist. In 1769, when he w as only twenty-five vears old. H erder wrote two essays in which he treated the universe as the body o f G o d and G o d as the “idea o f the world.” H e also advanced the microcosm -m acrocosm thesis, held that human thoughts are a form in which G od m anifests H im self in the world and claimed that the acquisition o f theosophical w isdom gives one “pow er” over things. K laus Vondung has discussed Herder's H erm ericism in fascinating detail. See V ondung/M illenarianism , H erm ericism , and the Search for a Universal Science,” in Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern Thought.10 4 . See Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 47.105. H ayden-R oy,"A Foretaste o f H eaven" 69.106. Stoeffler. German Pietism, 121.



4. H egels Lehrjahre

In the w inter sem ester o f 1788, H egel began his studies at the Tübingen Stifi, w here J . V. Andreae, O etinger, J . L . Fricker, and P. M . H ah n had studied. O ne w ill search his early w ritings, including the jo u rn a l in G e r man and Latin which he began keeping in 1785, in vain for signs o f interest in Naturphilosophie, idealism , or any o f the philosophical concerns o f the tim e. Instead, as Law rence D ickey claim s,"it w as the culture o f O ld- W ürttem berg, not the principles o f G erm an idealism , that furnished w hat Lucien Febvre w ould have called the mental equipm ent’ o f his m ind."1*'

W e know fairly little about H egel’s religious education. In the gym nasium at Stuttgart, H egel had been taught J . W . Jä g e rs Catechism, which w as based on the thought o f Bengel and C occejus. C occejus interpreted the progress o f history in biblical term s, holding that history w as the "progressive realization o f the divine plan.’’ 1“' T h ere is general agreem ent am ong scholars that H egel m ust have had som e degree o f exposure to the strain o f m ysticism in Sw abian Pietism . R obert Schneider w rites that H egel and Schelling inhabited an entirely different “conceptual w orld" (Begriffswelt) from that o f Enlightenm ent rationalism and m echanism . T h e irs w as that o f the "ancient categories o f chem ical (i.e., alchem ical)-biological ph ilosophy o f nature" (die uralten Kategorien der chemisch (alchimistisch)-biologischen Naturphilosophie), stem m ing from “O eringer, Böhm e, van H elm ont, Boyle, Fludd, Paracelsus, A grip p a von N ettesheim , Telesio , and o th e rs .. . . T h is philosophy o f nature was still alive in W ü rttem b erg during H egel and Sch ellin g ’s youth ."1” W ied mann w rites that "H eg e l’s hom e, like that o f every old, established fam ily in Stu ttgart up to the beginning o f ou r century, w as m arked by Protestant P ietism . A n d thus H egel w as steeped in its theosophy and m ysticism from childhood. H is Sw abian disposition w as never rarefied— not e v e n ‘ in the elem ent o f the universal, the ether o f thought and philosophy/ "uo T h ere w as certainly easy access in W ü rttem berg to theosophic literature. Im portant w orks by O etinger and P. M . H ahn w ere still being brought ou t in the 1780s and 179 0 s. Schneider notes that the w orks o f Paracelsus and Böhm e, as w ell as num erous alchem ical w orks, w ere plentifu l in O ld W ü rttem b erg .1"

In his publications, m anuscripts, and youthful diaries H egel says nothing about Sw abian speculative P ietism and theosophy, and nothing about figures such as O etinger. T h is does not, however, constitute a decisive reason for discounting their influence. R obert Sch n eider’s hypothesis is, I think, quite reasonable: "w orüber man ständig spricht, schreibt m an nichts in sein Tagebuch” (“one docs not w rite in one’s diary

107 . Dickey, Hegel, 6.108. W alsh, Boefm e and Hegel, 296.109. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 20; m y translation.n o . W iedm ann, Hegel, 14- See also K arl Lütgert, Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende (G ütersloh: Bertelsm ann, 1913)-111 . Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 2.

7 0 The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


about that o f w hich one constantly speaks").112 In other w ords, the Begriffswelt o f theosophy and H erm eticism w as so prevalent in W ü rttem berg that it did not provoke com m ent from the young H egel. A lso, the exam ple o f Ploucquet (see the preceding section) is enough to show that there w as concern am ong scholars that open alliance w ith H e rm etic philosophy and figures such as O etinger m ight provoke censure from their colleagues. H erm eticism w as som ething o f a “grass roots" m ovem ent in W ürttem berg— though, as I have show n, it exercised a clandestine influence in academ ia, the church, and governm ent.

R obert Schneider w rites that "H eg e l’s upbringing can only have been 'P ie tis t .'" 1” A lthough there is no record o f his parents having been m em bers o f any P ietist conventicle, H egel’s ow n youthful religious o r ientation seem s to have been Pietistic.114 H is "early theological w ritings" are alive w ith the sort o f issues and questions that were characteristic o f W ürttem berg P ietism . W hatever the exact nature o f his parents' Lutheranism may have been, devout Lutherans they were. W hen H egel would later com e to develop philosophic interests, he saw the philosophies o f K ant, Jacob i, and Fichte as outgrow ths o f Protestantism . H egel's Protestantism appears to have been sincere and in no w ay m erely "orthopractic.”

Som e o f the earliest entries in H egel's jou rn al consist in passages from religious and theological texts, laboriously copied out. A s H . S . H arris w rites,"a fifteen-year-old w ho . . . spends several days w riting out som eone else's views on heavenly bliss really docs h im self believe in heaven.’’11- H arris w rites that H egel entered the theological sem inar)' at T ü bin gen sim ply because he got his education there for free.116 H o w ever, as far as we know H egel did not consider studying anything other than theology.11’ T h e picture that em erges from a study o f his early days is that o f a pious, alm ost deliberately conventional and conform ist youth, in w hom , nevertheless, were planted the mystical Pietist seeds that w ould later bloom as speculative philosophy.

Pietism exercised a considerable influence on the T übingen Stift."' H egel’s instructors there w ere actively concerned w ith how Pietism could be reconciled w ith orthodox Lutheranism . A r T übingen , Hegel read Plato, K ant, Schiller, Jacobi, H em sterhuis, M ontesquieu, and H erder. H e declined to jo in a “ K an t C lu b" form ed at the Stift, because he

112 . Ibid., 17.l l j . Robert Schneider, Geittesahnen, 16; m y translation.114 . There w as, o f course, much in Pietism that Hegel rebelled against throughout his life, in particular its denigration o f knowledge in favor o f faith. M y contention is merely that Hegel w as at the same tim e influenced by m uch else in Pietism . H egel’s endorsem ent, late in life, o f the w ork o f K arl Friedrich G oschel (178 4 -18 6 2), w ho attem pted a kind o f synthesis o f Hegelianism and Pietism , suggests that Hegel may have been more sym pathetic to Pietism than is often thought. See Butler, 537 -4 6 .115. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 23.116 . Ibid., 64.117 . W iedm ann, Hegel, 15.118. Stoeffler, German Pietism, 91.



claim ed he w as too busy reading R ousseau ."1* T h e later testim ony o f M agister Leutwein o f the Stift indicates that H egel had no interest in K ant or m etaphysics while there.130 Further, H arris has w ritten o f H egel's early "indifference” to theoretical philosophy. T h is is w hat one would expect o f som eone w ho had been exposed early on to the heady air o f theosophy— Schelling, for instance, could only stom ach m ainstream philosophy in so far as he could read theosophy into it.

N evertheless, we know that som e o f H egel’s instructors had been influenced by K ant, particularly G ottlo b C hristian S to rr ( 17 4 6 -18 0 5 ) .111 S to rr— w ho, according to R obert Schneider, was also influenced by Bengelia— appears to have made much o f K an ts claim to have "lim ited reason, in order to make room for faith." Despite the fact that this would have supported the kind o f quasi-Pietistic, or sim ple, natural faith to which H egel was attracted, he and Schelling (his room m ate at the Stift, along w ith H ölderlin , beginning in 1790) appear to have reacted strongly against it. T h is again suggests that their "P ietist” religious upbringing w as anything but conventional. O n ly a "speculative P ietist” w ould have been so unm oved by S to rr s appropriation o f K an t, because speculative Pietism believes in the possibility o f w isdom — a knowledge o f all things hum an and divine— and thus m ust reject sceptical philosophies such as K an t’s.

A s I m entioned earlier, H egel's "early theological w ritings" are alive w ith the sort o f issues and questions that were characteristic o f W ü rttem berg Pierism . In the w ritings from the Stift period, H egel maintains that unreflective "folk religion" is at root identical w ith the highest, reflective philosophical understanding o f the nature o f G o d . A s H arris w rites o f H egel’s early notes on religion, "H e is contrasting the healthy, undivided, natural consciousness o f the G reeks with the corrupt, divided, artificial consciousness o f the m oderns; and this, too, is a contrast that he never abandoned."i:5 T h e im port o f H egel’s position is clear, though he does not say it outright: true religion, true thought about the divine, is som ehow already given to man in an unreflective way, in advance o f anything like theoretical philosophy. H egel finds in the H ebrew w ritings, especially Job , the sam e sort o f sim ple, unreflective "connectedness” to the divine as he found in the G reek s.124 H egel’s idolization o f G reek culture has been overem phasized by m ost scholars. It is easy to see that the sam e “unreflective connectedness to the divine" w as to be found also in the Pietist milieu w ith which H egel w as acquainted from childhood on.

119. W iedm ann, Hegel, 19.120. Johannes H offm eister, Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung (Stuttgart: Fro- mann, 1936), 430.12 1. Interestingly, S to rr w as the son-in-law o f Jerem ias Friedrich Reuss ( 17 0 0 -17 7 7 ) , the favorite student o f Bengel, and m entor o f Philipp M atthaüs H ahn. Reuss studied with Oetinger, and w as also the m entor o f Köstlin , uncle o f Schelling.122. Robert Schneider. Geistesahnen, 7.123. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 76.124 . H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 84.



In the so-called "T ü b in gen fragm ent" (Religion ist eine) (1793)» Hegel m odifies his stance toward folk religion, and we now see Reason entering the picture, Enlightenm ent being reconciled w ith the happy unreflective- ness o f the Volk. Hegel now holds that religious consciousness must develop, and although the state o f the G reeks and H ebrew s represents a state o f idyllic oneness with G o d , it is inferior insofar as it is an unthinking unity. T h e developm ent o f religious consciousness is a developm ent toward a thoughtful reappropriation o f relatedness to the divine. (W e are rem inded o f Böhm es doctrine that the Fall had to happen, so that man could achieve a self-conscious unity with G o d .) Hegel's position, as H a rris notes, recognizes the form o f consciousness man has come to display over time as being the mature or most fully developed standpoint o f m an.1” N evertheless, he does not abandon the idea that in som e sense the realizations that w ill com e w ith philosophical insight are already laid up in the m ind in an inchoate form — som ething we appear to possess sim ply by virtue o f being hum an. (It will be im portant to keep this idea in mind for the discussion which follows in the next chapter.) Indeed, H egel maintains in this essay that "the heart” m ust be followed first, before philosophical consciousness is possible. H e maintains that the "subjective religion" o f all men is at root identical and cites the line from Lessings Nathan the Wise quoted earlier:"w hat m akes me for you a C h ristian, m akes you rself for me a Jew ."1*

In a letter from H egel to Schelling dated Jan u ary 1795, H egel w rites: "R eason and Freedom rem ain ou r watchw ord, and our rallying point the Invisible C h u r c h I have already noted the use o f the term invisible church by G erm an m ystics and Freem asons. H . S . H arris w rites: “ It seem s to me virtually certain that for H egel, at any rate, the ‘invisible C hurch ’ originally referred to the cosm opolitan ideal o f Freem asonry as envisaged by Lessing in Ernst und Falk."123 H ow ever, R obert Schneider holds that H egel's use o f the term invisible church, as well as the phrase "K in gdom o f G o d ” (w hich occurs in the sam e letter), is evidence o f the influence o f Pietist theology.1*'' It may very w ell be that H egel and Schelling encountered this term inology in both M asonic and Pietist c ircles. H arris m akes m ention o f a "secret club" at T übingen , in which M asonic ideals w ere discussed (although he thinks that the term invisi* ble church w as not much used there).1“ H egel was also influenced early on by the m illenarian ideas o f tw o French M asonic philosophes, Volney and Rabaut de Sain t-É tienn e.151

In 1793/ H egel graduated from the Stift and in O ctober he took a jo b

125. Ibid.. 127.126. T h e lin e 'tru th is not like stamped coin" in the Phenomenology (M iller, 22)is from Nathan, 4:6.127. Butler, 32; H offm eister *$ .128. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 105.129. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 4 1. A Ju ly 10 ,17 9 4 letter from H ölderlinto Hegel refers to "the Kingdom o f G o d " as "our rallying cry” (Butler, 24).130. H arris, Toward the Sunlight. 106.131. Sec D 'H on dt, Hegel Secret, 83-153.



as tutor in the home o f C . F. Steiger von Tschugg in Berne. T here, in his leisure time, he read M eister Eckhart, as well as G rotiu s, H obbes, H um e, Leibniz, Locke, M achiavelli, M ontesquieu, Shaftesbury, Spinoza, and Voltaire. H e read K an t m ore seriously, particularly Religion within the Bounds o f Reason Alone. H e also began studying Fichtes w orks and made preparations for w orking out a “ Philosophy o f the Subjective Sp irit." In 1795, encouraged by Schelling, H egel appears to have becom e deeply im m ersed in Fichtes idealism . In an A pril 1795 letter to Schelling, H egel refers to the Fichtean conception o f G o d as Absolute Ego as a part o f “esoteric philosophy."'“ In an A ugust 1795 letter he m akes it clear that he accepts this idea.1”

I have already m entioned that Fichte w as a M ason , but his connections w ith the H erm etic tradition do not end there. T here is a very strong sim ilarity between Fichtes dialectic o f A bsolute Ego, N on-Ego, and L im ited Ego and N o n -E go in the Science of Knowledge (179 4 ) and the initial tripartite dialectic in Bohm e’s doctrine o f the "seven source sp irits." Ernst von Bracken devoted an entire volum e to discussing the relation o f Fichte to M eister E ckhart.114 O f this connection, W alsh has w ritten ,"F ichte adopted the insights that had been form ulated w ith the greatest difficulty by Eckhart as the union o f the soul w ith G o d s creative power, to denote the norm al condition o f m an in w hich the T created the w orld by the pow er o f thought and realized the action o f G od ."1”

In Berne, H cgcl becam e part o f a fam ily circle that m et in the evening for various sorts o f entertainm ent. H e kept in touch w ith them after he went to Frankfurt in 17 9 7 .'* H arris w rites that "this association, like all o f H egel’s subsequent connections in Frankfurt— as far as these can be traced— has strong overtones o f Freem asonry."1' Joh n Burbidge writes th at"W h en ever the young tutor arrived in a strange town he soon established contact w ith people know n to be active in the m ost progressive strands o f the M asonic order."1“ H egel w as an enthusiastic reader o f the quasi-M asonic jou rn al M inerva, w hich, am ong other things, d issem inated the radical thought o f the French Jacob in s.1 w Its covers bore curious M asonic and chiliastic inscriptions. For instance, one cover featured the ow l o f M inerva flying over G reek colum ns, next to which stands a

13a. Butler, 35; H offm eister »11.133. Butler, 4 1 ; H offm eister * 14 .134 . Ernst von Bracken, Meister Eckhart und Fichte (W urzburg: KonradTriltsch Verlag, 1943)- (Lest anyone think there is litde to be said on th is subject, it should be noted that Brackens book is more than 650 pages long!)135. W alsh, Boebme and Hegel, 318.136. Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 43.137. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 156. See also D ’H ondt, Hegel Secret, 24 1.138. Burbidge is sum m arizing the w ork o f Jacques D ’H on dt, in the introduction to his translation o f D 'H on d t s Hegel en son temps (Hegel in his Time, trans.Jo h n Burbidge (Lewiston, N .Y .: Broadview Press, 1988], viii).139. H ecel refers to Minerva in a letter to Schelling written on Christm as Eve«794» while Hegel w as in Berne. Butler, 28; H offm eister *6.



child holding a trow el (an im portant M asonic sym bol). In the shade o f a tree stands a wom an surrounded by children. N ext to her is a shield on which is the head o f M edusa and the inscription "T h e present age is pregnant w ith the future.'*140

G e ra ld H an ra tty has w ritten that "D u rin g h is youth H egel eagerly assim ilated M ason ic ideas and asp iratio n s w hich w ere propagated in G erm an y by the su p po rters o f the French revolution . T h ro u g h o u t his life he in terested h im se lf in the M ason ic m ovem ent so th at its ideas and asp iration s w ere im portan t elem ents o f the m atrix from w hich H egel’s G n o stic system em erged.’’141 W e have no record o f H egel having ever becom e a M ason . A lth ou gh he appears to have been associated exclusively w ith the “progressive stran d s" o f the ord er (i.e ., the Enlightenm ent, rationalist strands), he w as clearly conversant w ith its H erm etic or m ystical aspects as well, as his p oem "E leu sis" illustrates.

In 1796, H egel learned through H ölderlin in Frankfurt that a m ore attractive post w ith the fam ily o f the w ealthy Jean N o e G ogel m ight be available for him there. H egel welcom ed the opportunity to be back with H ölderlin , and wrote “ Eleusis” for him , in com m em oration o f their friendship. Jacques D 'H ond t has argued that this poem is deliberately laden w ith M asonic imagery. T h e G ogels were well-known M asons, and H egel w as apparently hoping that H ölderlin would share "E leusis" with them , and that it would help to cement their relationship.141

T h e Eleusinian m ysteries w ere very im portant to the M asons, who traced their initiation back to them .14’ In the poem H egel refers at one point to “ this bond no oath has sealed," which for H arris "suggests a brotherhood inspired by the ideals o f Freem asonry but w ithout formal organization.” 144 C lark Butler suggests that the "b on d " united Schelling, H egel, and H ölderlin as well as Isaak von Sinclair, another, less fam ous, friend from the T übingen Stift.1* H egel w rites:

Your halls have fallen silent, oh G oddess!F low n is the circle o f gods back to O lym pus from their consecrated

altars.Flow n from the grave o f a desecrated m ankind isT h e G en iu s o f innocence that brought them here in thrall.’46

14 0 . D 'H on dt, Secret, 2 3 -2 4 .14 1. H anrartv,” Hegel and the G nostic Tradition: II," 3 12 -13 .142 . D 'H on dt. H ijjfl Secret, 2 27-8 1.143. See, for example, S ch ilie r .'D ie Sendung M oses" in Sämtliche werke, vol. 5 (Berlin : Sanssouci-Ausgabe, 1937), 3 9 1-4 14 : 399-144- H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 1 14 : D ’H ondt, in Hegel Secret, like H arris, fo cuses almost exclusively on the political ideals o f M asonry.145- See Butler, 45. Interestingly, Sinclair w as descended from a very old S co ttish fam ily considered to be the hereditary leaders o f the Freem asons. Am ong other things, they were responsible for the construction, around 146 0 , o f Rosslyn Chapel in Scotland, which is decorated w ith Tem plar, M asonic, and Kabbalistic imager)'.14 6 . 1 am using Butler’s translation o f the poem , which appears in Hegel: The Litters, 4 6 - 4 7 . 1 have altered his translation slighdy.



D 'H o n d t suggests that "the grave o f a desecrated m ankind" is an allusion to the desecrated grave o f H iram , the central m yth o f M asonic in itiatio n .147

T h e poem m ay also contain veiled reference to Sw ab ian speculative P ie tism . H egel w rites:

Sen se is lost in contem plation, w hat I called m ine does vanish,U n to th e B o u n d less d o I m y se lf abandon.I am in it, am everything, am only it.

T h is is rem arkably like a description o f O etinger's Zentrailerkenntnis, a concept that w ould have been very fam iliar to H ölderlin . H e w rites, further, "Fan tasy [Phantasie] b rin gs the Eternal closer to sense, w edding it to shape." A gain , this is quite rem iniscent o f the Böhm ean- O etin gcrite concept o f the im agination as the faculty o f em bodying the ideal.144 H arris notes that in the original d raft H egel stru ck out som e lines intended to "explain how the im agination achieves the union o f finite and infinite sp irit w hich reflective thought breaks dow n ."1**

A cou ple o f lines later, H egel w rites: “ I feel it is th e eth er o f m y h o m eland [Heimath] as w ell, th is earn estn ess, th is radiance su rro u n d in g you." T h is stren gth en s the im pression that H ege l m ay b e a llu d in g to th e ideas o f specu lative P ie tism , callin g H ö ld e rlin s m in d back to th e ir com m on S w ab ian ro o ts. H eg e l refers to h im se lf an d H ö ld erlin as “son s o f the G o d d e ss” (C eres) an d rem arks that they have not spoken o p en ly o f her m ysteries (“on th e ir lips you d id n ot live” ), b u t have "preserved them in th e san ctu ary o f th eir heart."

W hatever H egel's intentions w ere in w riting “ Eleusis,” they appear to have paid off, for in m id-January 1797 he arrived in Frankfurt as tutor to the tw o G ogel boys (actually the sons o f Joh an n D avid G ogel, brother o f Jean N oe, w ho died in 1793).

5. Pantheism , H ölderlin , and Schelling

T h e chiliasm o f W ürttem berg Pietism , the subject o f much discussion at the T ü bin gen Stift, com bined w ith the dram a o f the French revolution to create the sense in H egel and his schoolm ates that history w as m oving tow ard som e ultim ate, final act.140 A lan O lson w rites that both H egel and H ölderlin "w ere convinced that the future o f G erm any, especially its political unification, depended on the generation o f a com m on spiritual bond am ong its people— a Volksreligion w holly independent o f the alien, im ported orientalism o f Christianity.” 1*'1

H ölderlins T übingen poetry (1788 -9 3) contains few references or allusions to C hristian doctrine. Instead, a kind o f"pantheistic paganism ”

147. D ’Hondt, Hegel Secret, 263.148. Faivrc argues that Schellings Philosophy of Art was influenced by this idea.See Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition, 116.149. Harris, Toward the Sunlight, 245.150. Hayden-Roy,“ A Foretaste o f Heaven," 216151. Alan M. Olson, Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy as Pneumatology (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 58.

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prevails. H e speaks o f the "spark” o f the "god w ithin us.",Si It is often thought that H ölderlin adopted the G reek phrase hen kai pan (O ne and A ll) to express his m etaphysical outlook w hile at the Stift. A s H . S . H a rris argues, however, hen kai pan should really be seen as the collective m otto o f H ölderlin , Schelling, and H egel, though H ölderlin m ay have been the one w ho brought it to the groups attention.1*' T h e phrase hen kai pan itse lf is m ost likely taken from Jaco b i’s Briefe Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an der Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (1785), in which Jacobi records Lessing as having said, "T h e orthodox concepts o f the deity’ are no longer for me. Hen kai pan, I know no other.” (T h e context o f the com m ent is a conversation betw een Jacob i and Lessing about G oeth e ’s poem Prometheus.) Jacobi printed B ru n o s abstract o f his w ork On the Cause, the Principles, and the One as an appendix to his book.

Jaco b i's Über die Lehre des Spinoza w as principally responsible for the Sp in oza revival o f the late eighteenth century. H . S . H arris refers to the "rom antic Sp in ozism ” o f H egel's day.1* Ja c o b i’s book exercised a profound influence on m any th inkers, including Sch ellin g and H egel. It w as not, however, Jacob i's intention to generate a revival o f Sp in - ozism . B y revealing L essin g ’s Sp in ozism , Jaco b i hoped to d iscred it one o f the heroes o f the A u fk lä r u n g T o Jaco b i, Sp in o za ’s ph ilosophy rep resented rationalism and determ inism in their m ost extrem e and v iru lent form . (Interestingly, Jaco b i also claim ed that Sp in ozism w as a form o f K abbalism .)

Friedrich H einrich Jacobi ( 17 4 3 -18 19 ) w as a fo llow er o f Joh an n G eo rg H am ann (born 1730 in K önigsberg, died 1788). A lm ost forgotten today, H am ann, a K abbalist and Böhm ean w h o held the fam iliar thesis o f "nature as em blem -book," w as extraordinarily influential in his time. H am anns "M etakritik " essay (published in 1800) stated, in the w ords o f Frederick Beiser,"one o f the central goals o f all post-Kantian philosophy: the search for the inner unity, the com m on source o f K an t’s dualism .” 15* Beiser w rites that "H erder, Schlegel, and H egel all accepted Ham ann's advice to see reason in its em bodim ent, in its specific social and historical context.” " ' G oeth e and Schelling adm ired H am ann greatly.” * T h e already- fam ous Jacob i m et H am ann and, converted to his anti-Enlightenm ent philosophy, becam e his m ost vociferous advocate.1” It w as Jacob i who transm itted H am ann’s thought to the Rom antics, and to those, like Schelling, engaged in Naturphilosophie. (H egel appears not to have been

15a. H ayden-Roy,” A Foretaste o f Heaven,' 208.153. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 10 1-5 .15 4 . Ibid., 29$.155. Som e doubted the authenticity o f Jac o b is claim s about Lessing. But, as Frederick Beiser notes, Lessings Naffeun the Wi$f “ is indeed little more than a dram atic presentation o f the philosophical doctrine o f Spinoza's Tractatus" (Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate o f Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte [Cam bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press, 1987), 56).156. Ibid., 43*157. Ibid., 18.158. Isaiah Berlin , The Magus o f the NorfJ?: J . G. Hamann and the Origins o f M odern Irrationalism (N ew York: Farrar, S trau s and G iro u x , 1993), 2 -3 .159. ib id ., 17-


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very directly influenced by H am ann, but in 1828 he published a critical review o f H am an n s collected w o rk s.:w)

T h e significance o f the Pantheismusstreit o f the late eighteenth century cannot be overstated. T h an k s to Jacobi s revelations, pantheism became, as H einrich H eine w ould put it in the next century, "the unofficial religion o f Germ any.''’“ Rheinhold's extrem ely influential popularization o f K an t— Briefe über die kantische Philosophie (178 6 )— aim ed at m aking K an t relevant to the pantheism controversy. Su ch lum inaries as G oethe, Novalis, H erder, Schlegel, and Schleierm acher all dallied with pantheism. T h e re w as little difficulty in being both Lutheran and pantheist: as Beiser points out, Lutherans believed in an im m ediate relationship to G o d , and pantheism , teaching that all things, including men, are G o d or are w ithin G o d , certainly provided that.1“ H ölderlin , in his ow n jou rn al, copied out the hen kai pan passage from Jaco b i’s b oo k .14’ In a letter to his m other from February 1791 H ölderlin m entions that he has im m ersed h im self in w orks by and about Spinoza. A ccording to K arl Rosenkranz H egel, Schelling, and others at the Stift all read Jaco b i’s book.

H ölderlin w rote his only novel, Hyperion, in the years I7 9 * - I 7 9 9 - Priscilla A . H ayden-Roy, in her study o f the influence o f W ürttem berg P ietism on the poet, claim s that the them atic content o f Hyperion was influenced by O etinger's doctrine o f sensus communis.1* H ayd en -R oy is not alone in this thesis. A s she notes, U lrich G aier and W alter D ierauer have also argued that H ölderlins poetic theory is based on W ürttem berg speculative P ietism .14* H ölderlin m ay have been indirectly acquainted w ith P. M . Hahn's w ork through a poet, C . F. D . Schubart. H ölderlin m et Schubart, a follow er o f H ahn, in the spring o f i789 .1M

A lthough H egel w as happy to be reunited w ith H ölderlin in Frankfurt (he had apparently succum bed to depression w hile in Berne), he w as forced to w itness H öld erlin s deteriorating m ental state. In N ovem ber 1800 , after receiving a sm all inheritance upon the death o f h is father, H egel w rote to Schelling in Jen a, appealing for his assistance

160. H egel,“ H am anns Schriften" in Werke, vol. 11, 275-352- Hegel was critical o f H am ann, but had studied him carefully. Johann Peter Eckerm ann reports a dinner conversation between G oethe and H egel: “A great deal w as said about H am ann, w ith respect to w hom Hegel was ch ief spokesm an, displaying a deep insight into this extraordinary m ind, such as could only have arisen from a m ost earnest and scrupulous study o f the subject." See Johann Peter Eckerm ann, Conversations o f Goethe, trans. Jo h n O xenford (N ew York: D a C apo Press, 1998), 244 .161. Q uoted in Beiser, German Romantics, 45-162. Ibid., 52.163. H arris, Toward the Sunlight, 99.164 . H ayden-Roy, "A Foretaste o f Heaven," 227.165. U lrich G aier, Der gesetzliche Kalkül: Hölderlins Dichtungslehre (Tübingen: M ax Niem eyer, 1962); W alter D ierauer, Hölderlin und der Spekulative Pietismus Württembergs: Gemeinsame Anschauur.gsljorizonte im Werk Oetingers und Hölderlins (Z ü rich : Juris, 1986). G aier claim s that H ölderlin s theory o f the “m odulation o f tones" ( Wechsel der Töne) is based upon a sevenfold distinction in O etinger's Kabbalism .166. H ayd en -R oy .'A Foretaste o f Heaven," 185.


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in relocating there. T h e tw o men had not corresponded in five years, and in that tim e Schelling had becom e a celebrity, receiving his post at Jen a w ith the backing o f G oethe. I shall not enter here into the fam iliar details o f Sch ellin g and H egel's turbulent friendship. Suffice it to say that H egel cam e to Jen a in early 1 8 0 1 , sharing quarters w ith Schelling. A fter som e m onths, he produced his first philosophical w ork for pu blication, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy (180 1).

W h at seem s to have attracted H egel to Schelling’s early system is Schelling’s claim that at the root o f all that is real is an infinite life (recall O etinger's Theologia ex idea vitae deducta). In Schelling'« early "System o f Identity,” "philosophy o f nature" is understood as the story o f how Reason, the A bsolute Ego, unconsciously produces a tangible w orld that reaches its consum m ation w ith the com ing into being o f man, w ho can em body self-conscious Reason or Ego. T h is is held to be parallel to "transcendental idealism," Reason's actual self-understanding, because in both it is Reason or Ego that is the underlying principle and "result.” T h u s, the subject-object distinction is transcended: nature, the external w orld or object, really is Ego expressing or developing itself. T h is infinite Ego lying behind the subject-object distinction, m oving or generating the whole process, w as conceived by Schelling as an infinite and prim ordial life.

Schelling maintained much the sam e doctrine in the later Freiheitschrift (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom; 1809): “G otr ein Leben ist," he w rites, "nicht bloss ein Sein" ("G o d is a life, not merely a being”).“ 7 T h e influence o f Böhm e on the Freiheitschrift— in which Schelling em ploys the term theosophy— has been rem arked on by m any,1** but R obert Schneider argues that the m ore direct influence is that o f O etinger. A ccording to Schneider, Sch ellin gs use o f such term s as Licht, Finsternis, Abgrund, Band der Kräfte, außöslich, unauflöslich, bestand-

haltend, lebendige Bewegungskräfte show s the im press o f O etinger's thought.1” E rnst Benz w rites that Schelling’s "principal ideas are dependent upon the term inology o f Bengel and O etinger in such a direct and visible w ay that it is im possible to ignore these fundam ental sources o f his thought.*'170

167. Sämtliche Werke, vol. 7, 403.168. Sec Edw ard Allen Beach, The Potencies o f Gods: Schellings Philosophy of Mythology (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1994), and Robert F. Brow n, The Later Philosoplyy o f Schelling: The Influence o f Boehme on the Works of 1809- 181S (Lew isburg, Pa.: Buckneil University Press. 1977)«169. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 10 . G ershom Scholem (Kabbalah, 200) finds the influence o f O etinger “discernible“ in the works o f both Schelling and H egel. K laus Vondung notes th at’ H erm eticism w as brought to Schellings attention by O etinger. w ho was an expert in all sorts o f esoteric knowledge, although this connection has not yet been investigated satisfactorily." H e regards O etinger as having conveyed to Schelling and Hegel the pansophic ideal o f a universal “super science" ( Vondung, “ M illenarianism , Her- meticistn," 132 ,126 ).170 . Benz, Mystical Sources, 30.



Sch ellin gs connections to Sw abian speculative Pietism are much better docum ented than are H egel's. W e know, for instance, that Schellings father ow ned O etinger's w orks.171 Sch ellin gs father and grandfather w ere both follow ers o f Bengel. Sch ellin gs great uncle Friedrich Philipp von R ieger w as a supporter o f O etinger and J . M . H ahn, w ho expressed his gratitude to R ieger in his autobiography. W hen Schelling was ten or eleven years old, he lived in N urtingen w ith his uncle N athanael Friedrich K ostlin ( 17 4 4 -18 2 6 ), a deacon. K ostlin w as know n to have close ties to the Bengel-O etinger circle and m ay have proselytized his nephew .r ; P. M . H ahn’s diary reveals that Sch ellin gs father, who taught at the m onastery school in Bebenhausen, called on H ahn, with his wife and young Friedrich in tow, on O ctober 6 ,17 8 4 .1:1 Schellings first published w ork w as a poem that he wrote on the occasion o f the death o f H ahn. Schelling later wrote o f H ah n in a letter:"A s a little boy, I beheld this great man with hidden, uncomprehending awe; and strangely enough, the first o f the few poem s I have w ritten in my life was upon his death. I w ill never forget his countenance."174 Schelling w as actively interested in Bohm e (eventually acquiring three editions o f his works), but he remarked to one o f his Jen a students that O etinger w as'c learer than Bohm e."in

O etinger attem pted to prove his thesis about the reality o f “spirit body" through an actual experim ent. H e claimed that i f crushed balm- mint leaves are boiled their ju ice will form the partem o f the original leaves on the surface o f the water. T h is was supposed to prove the existence o f spirit as som ething separate from the material body, which it inform s. O etinger coined several w ords from the Latin essentia to describe the unfolding o f the potentialities o f a thing as m ade possible by its spirit. H e frequently likened the process to the alchem ical opus.'76 Schelling borrowed Oetinger's language o f essentia, creating the term Essentification. H e borrowed the balm -leaf experim ent as well. In a lecture, Schelling contrasted tw o different ideas about death: one which holds that in death soul and body are sundered, and another (Schellings own) which holds that death is simply an advance to a higher form o f existence, in which both soul and body are retained, and perfected. Schelling writes:

T h is other idea com pares the effect o f death w ith the process by w hich the spirit or the essence o f a plant is extracted. T h u s one

17 1 . Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 8. In a Septem ber 7 ,18 0 6 , letter to his father. Schelling states that Franz von Baader asked him i f he could obtain for him the w ritings o f Oetinger. Schelling passed the letter along to his friend Pregizer. Pregizer, an O etingerite. was the founder o f ’ the Joyous Christians," a Pietist sect. According to Pregizer, when he first met Schelling in 1803 they spent alm ost the entire time talking about Bohm e and O etinger. See Benz, Mystical Sources, 13-14 -172. A ll o f these details about Schellings fam ily are to be found in Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 7 -8 .173. H ayden-R oy,"A Foretaste o f Heaven,” 54.174 . Schelling, Letter to H einrich von Schubert, A pril 4 .18 1 1 , in Sdmtliche werke, vol. 1, 34.175. See Paola M ayer, Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation o f Jacob Bohme (M ontreal: M cGill-Q ueen's U niversity Press, 1999)» 185.176. See Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 123.



im agines that all the pow er and all the life o f a plant pass into the oil extracted from i t . . . . Som e follow ers o f the doctrine o f general regeneration even affirm that the drops o f oil-of-balm form the shape o f the balm leaves again. 1 have not seen this personally and therefore will not make a pronouncem ent on this subject. H o w ever, a sim ilar phenom enon observable in etheric liquid oils reveals a strange life w ithin, and proves that it is not a m atter o f annihi- lated life but o f spiritualized life. T h u s, the death o f man would not be a separation but rather an"essentification.’’ir

(In fact, others were not able to replicate O etinger's experim ent.174)Ernst Benz has also show n that several tim es throughout his work,

Schelling em ployed translations o f biblical passages m ade by Oetinger, w ithout attributing them to h im .17* Schelling betrays his connections with W ürttem berg Pietism even in the titles o f his w orks. In 1811 he w rote a w ork entitled Die Weltalter, w hich w as also the title o f a very w ell-know n book by J . A . Bengel (published in 1746). In Sch ellin gs Die Weltalter, the influence o f O etinger is quite apparent. H e w rites at one p o in t:"T h e ultim ate purpose is that everything, as much as possible, be brought to visible, m aterial form ; em bodim ent [Leiblichkeit] is, as the ancients [Alten] expressed it, the endpoint o f the w ay o f G o d (finis viarum Dei), w ho w ants to reveal H im se lf as spatial or as tem poral.” 1*

N o sooner had Schelling em braced the Kantian-Fichtean philosophy than he insisted on its supplem entation by Naturphilosophie, which precipitated his break w ith Fichte. R obert Schneider argues that Schelling w as predisposed to value Naturphilosophie due to his early im m ersion in the thought o f O etinger and his circle. Indeed, Ernst Benz has m ade the case that it w as Sch ellin gs com m itm ent to the principle o f Geistleib-

lichkeit that drove him to reject the absolute idealism o f Fichte. Schelling w rites: "T h is is the ultim ate purpose, that everything w ill be tran sform ed as far as possible into a visible and corporal form . C orporality is, according to the ancients, the end o f the w ays o f G o d , who w ishes to m anifest H im se lf as much as in space as in place as in time.” 1*1 A ccordingly, Schelling had to find Fichte's system m erely a "realm o f shades" (as H egel describes his ow n Logic). For Schelling— as fo r Böhm e and O etin ger— the Absolute has to express itse lf in corporeal form , in nature, or rem ain an em pty abstraction. For exactly the sam e reasons, H egel would supplem ent his Logic w ith a Philosophy o f N ature and Philosophy o f Spirit.

Schelling does not, o f course, mention O etinger (I have already d iscussed the pressures that existed at the tim e to avoid m entioning him ). But the evidence for O etinger’s influence is strong. T h e authority Schelling actually invokes is Spinoza, w ho w as then becom ing a m ore

177. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 14 , 207. Q uoted in Benz. Mystical Sources.53. See Ben zs account o f this issue, and o f other evidence for O etinger's influence on Schelling, pages 51-55 .178. W alsh. Boehme and Hegel. 91.179. Benz, Mystical Sources, 54 -56 .180. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 8, 325.181. Ibid., vol. 14 ,2 0 5 . Q uoted in Benz, Mystical Sources, 5 0 -5 1.



acceptable figure to side w ith . In his "E xposition o f M y System o f P h ilosophy" (180 1), Schelling m akes the claim that the Absolute Ego o f Fichte is identical w ith Spinoza's "G o d o f N ature." H e goes on to liken the tw o parallel parts o f his system , transcendental idealism and philosophy o f nature, to expositions o f Spinoza's tw in attributes o f thought and extension. H e even refers to Naturphilosophie as the "Sp in ozism o f physics."1” Schclling's grand synthesis w as extrem ely appealing to H egel because it enabled him to reconcile the m ystical-H erm etic philosophy to which he, like Schelling, had been exposed in early life, w ith the m ainstream philosophy and theology w ith which he now, as a university professor, had to publicly align him self. (A s H . S . H arris notes, H ö ld erlins philosophical fragm ents show that he w as developing som ething like an "Identity philosophy" as far back as 1795, indicating the same dynam ic at w ork in his ow n Sw abian soul.“ *)

Like Böhme, with whom he was acquainted early on, Schelling held that the finite or nature is a m irror (speculum) held up to the infinite.1*4 Hence, speculative philosophy.M T h e speculative activity o f the philosopher, which attempts to understand creation in its telos and in all its aspects, is in effect the completion or consummation o f the Infinite’s self-reflection. Using language that would certainly have reminded some o f his readers o f Oetinger, Hegel in the Differenzschrift refers to the Ego, the "identity point" o f philosophy, as the "point o f contraction.” 1* T h e Ego is the "indifference point." In the system o f the subject (transcendental idealism), the Ego is "contracted" into its primordial self-relation. In the system o f the object, o r nature. Ego "expands” outward as a real but "frozen" expression o f itself to itself.15' (This brings to mind the doctrine o f the "coincidence o f opposites" in Eckhart, Cusa, and other mystics.) Schelling even went so far as to interpret laws o f nature as laws o f Spirit in "unconscious form." H is Identity philosophy held out the hope o f an experience o f the ultimate unity o f subject and object, and finite and infinite, in aesthetic consciousness.

H . S . H arris w rites o f the sim ilarities betw een Schelling’s system o f Identity and B öhm es theosophy: "In B öhm es theosophy'desire ' is the Abgrund o f the 'dark centre' into w hich self-consciousness contracts.' T h e full realization o f the image o f G o d requires that it should expand' again into the 'light centre/ T h e m om ent o f absolute contraction where the transition occurs is a 'fla sh ' (Schrack). T h u s all the term inology o f

182. Schelling“ Einlcitung zu dem E n tw u rf eines System s der N aturphilosophie" (1799), in Werke, vol. 2, ed. M anfred Schröter (M unich: Beck, 1927), 273.183. H . S . H arris ,"Introduction to the Difference Essay," in H egel, The Differ- ence Between Fuhte’s and Schelling s System of Philosophy, trans. H . S . H arris and W alter C e r f (A lbany: State University o f N ew York Press, 1977)* )•184. K u rt Leeses's dissertation,“ Von Jako b Böhm e zu Schelling" (University o f E rfu rt, 1927) deals w ith the Böhm ean influence on Schellings work.185. H arris,"In troduction to the Difference Essay," 4 1.186. Difference, 16 5 -6 7 ; G erm an ed. o f Differenzschrift, in Gesammelte Werke, vol.4 , ed. H artm ut Buchner and O tto Pöggeler (H am burg: Felix M einer Verlag, 1968), 7 2 -7 3 (henceforth Differenz).187. Schelling, Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (1799). in Werke, vol. 2, 268.

82 T h e Sorccrcr's Apprenticeship

Cop

'Sch illin g 's System ’ . . . bears che clear im press o f Böhm es vision."10 Like Paracelsus (w hom I shall discuss in chapter 6), Schelling held that m edicine was the highest o f all the natural sciences.1” (Recall also the em phasis Johann Valentin Andreae placed on medicine.) A ntoine Faivre w rites o f Schelling's system ,"T h e relationship to alchem y is obvious, so m uch so that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie appeared from the beginning as an attem pt to bring together the traditional givens o f pansophy and the spirit o f K antian philosophy."1“0 A s R ob ert Brow n has show n, in later years Schelling im m ersed h im self even m ore deeply in Böhm e.1**

In 1802, Schelling published a dialogue, Bruno, in which he put his philosophy into the m outh o f a character loosely patterned alter G io r dano Bruno. A fter reading an advance copy o f the dialogue, G oethe w rote to Sch iller on M arch 16 ,18 0 2 , "Schellin g has w ritten a dialogue, Bruno or On the Divine and Natural Principles of Things. W h at I understand o f it— or believe I understand— is excellent and agrees w ith m y deepest convictions. But I am doubtful w hether it w ill be possible for others to follow it through all its sections and understand it as a whole.*1”

G oeth e could not have know n at the tim e that Schelling was soon to be eclipsed by a thinker even m ore in agreem ent w ith his "deepest con v ictio n s" especially w here those convictions could be called H erm etic. O n A pril 2 4 ,18 2 5 , H egel w rote to G oeth e that "w hen I look back over the course o f m y intellectual developm ent, I see you everyw here woven into it, and may call m yself one o f your sons: w hat is inward in me has been nourished by you toward resilient strength in the face o f abstraction, and has oriented its course by your form s as by beacons."1”

188. H arris, Night Thoughts, 165. O ther authors have concentrated alm ost exclusively on Bohm e’s influence on Schelling's later period. See Beach, The Potencies o f Gods and Robert F. Brow n, The Later Philosophy of Schelling.189. Schelling, "Vorrede zu den Jahrbüchern der M edicin als W issenschaft," in Werke, vol. 4 ,6 5 .190. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 83.19 1. Schelling also became interested in the visionary m ysticism o f Emanuel Sw edenborg, particularly after the untim ely death o f his wife Karoline in 1811. See Benz, Mystical Sources, 15 - 16 , as well as Friedem ann H orn , Schelling and Swedenborg: Mysticism and German Idealism, trans. G eorge F. D ole (W est Chester, Pa.: T h e Sw edenborg Foundation, 1997).192. See Xavier Tillierte, Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen (Turin : Bottega, d 'Erasm o, 1974). 91.193. Butler, 708; H offm eister *489.



84 Chapter Three

T h e M ythology o f Reason

i. The Absolute Religion

In the beginning, H egel thought that a n ew religion w as needed to unite ph ilosophers and ord inary people, to transcend the P latonic d ichotom y betw een the "w ise" and the "vulgar." In th eir tim e together in Jen a , however, Sch ellin g persuaded H egel that it is not the p h ilo so pher's task to create such a religion. N evertheless, H egel continued to insist that a new p h ilosophy could have an effect on religion, m aking it tru er to its ow n essence. H eg e l’s view, w hich rem ained unchanged th roughout h is career, w as that a com pleted p h ilosop h y w ould take on a form that w ould m ake it accessible in varying degrees to every- o n e .T h at form w ould be a "m ythology o f reason." T h is enigm atic phrase appears in a fragm ent referred to by scholars as "erne Ethik" (its first w ords) and under the title " T h e E arliest System -P rogram o f G e r man Idealism ."

For m any years, the authorship o f the "System -Program " w as in doubt. It w as variously attributed to H egel, Schelling, and H ölderlin . I need not rehearse the various argum ents for and against H egel's authorship here. M ost H egel scholars accept O tto Pöggeler's argum ents that H egel is the author, and I shall fo llow their lead.1 Pöggeler dates the fragm ent to H egel's Berne period, in late 1796 or early 1797.1

T h e "System -Program " reflects am bivalence about the aim o f ph ilosophy. It seem s as i f H egel still clings to the idea o f a new religion, yet depicts philosophy as an absolute science. In truth, the "System - Program " is H egel's first attem pt to reconcile philosophy and religion. Philosophy can be popular and even religious w ithout becom ing religion or giving prim acy to religion i f its content happens to be the thought form s that underlie all religion and fo lk consciousness.

T h u s, philosophy for H egel w ill have as its task the recovery and perfection o f these pre-reflective thought form s granted to m ankind from tim e im m em orial, a w isdom that has expressed itse lf partially and im perfectly in all previous art, religion, and philosophy. G enuine ph ilos

1. O tto Pöggeler, "H egel der Verfasser des ältesten System program m s des deutschen Idealismus," Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 4 (1969): 17 —3 -2. G isela Schüler has argued that the “System -Program " w as Hegel's last Berne essay in h e r 'Z u r Chronologie von H egels Jugendschriften,” Hegel-Studien 2 (1963): 111-5 9 .


ophy is uncreative.' Instead, it is m erely a fully adequate expression o f this prim ordial w isdom . T h is w isdom belongs not to the consciousness o f a people, but to its unconscious.* In the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel states that “ T h e business o f philosophy consists only in bringing inro consciousness explicitly w hat people have held to be valid about thought from tim e im m em orial. T h u s, philosophy establishes nothing new; what w e have brought forth by our reflection here is w hat everyone already takes for granted w ithout reflection" ( e l § 22, Z ; G eraets, 55).' In a Zusatz to the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel rem arks that "W e usually suppose that the A bsolute m ust lie far beyond; but it is precisely w hat is wholly present, w hat we, as thinkers, alw ays carry w ith us and employ, even though w e have no express consciousness o f it" ( e l § 24 Z : G eraets, 59).* In the Science of Logic, H egel states that “ T h e activity o f thought which is at w ork in all our ideas, purposes, interests and actions i s . . . unconsciously busy [bewusstlos geschäftig] (natural logic [die natürliche Logik])." Its basis is “the soul itse lf" (M iller, 3 6 -3 7 ; w l 1 :15 - 16 ) .

T h e follow ing surreal, m acabre, alm ost unintelligible passage from Hegel's Realphilosophie m anuscript o f 18 0 5 -0 6 reflects his deep im m ersion in the realm o f the unconscious:

T h e hum an being is this night, this em pty nothing, that contains everything in its sim plicity— an unending wealth o f m any presen-

3. For Hegel's views on m ythology and what i shall call"m ytho-poetic thought” sec the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, vol. i, 8 1-9 1 (Werke 18 :10 2 -13 ). Hegel was also greatly influenced by the writings o f G eorg Friedrich C reuzer (17 7 1-18 5 8 ), a philologist and historian o f religion and m ythology w hom he knew in H eidelberg (Creuzer is mentioned in the passages cited above). C lark Butler w rites that"[H egel] borrowed from Creuzer the idea o f a prim itive O riental monism running sym bolically through all true religion, expressed in Indian m ysticism , preserved in the G reek m ysteries, lying behind classical Greek polytheism . . . implicit in classical theism , and com ing to self-conscious expression in Hegel's concept o f the A bsolute as the infinite Incarnation" (Butler, 368). Consider also this passage from a Zusatz to the Encyclopedia Logic:"Philosophy should not shy aw ay from religion, and adopt the attitude that it m ust be content i f religion sim ply tolerates it. And on the other hand, we must equally reject the view that m yths and religious accounts o f this kind arc som ething obsolete, for they have been venerated for m illennia by the peoples o f the w orld" (el § 24 Z 3 ; G eraets, 61).4 . Yates describes Bruno's thought in strikingly sim ilar term s, stating that “it w as Brunos m ission to paint and m ould within, to teach that the artist, the poet, and the philosopher are all one, for the M other o f the M uses is Memory. N othing com es out but what has first been form ed within, and it is therefore w ithin that the significant w ork is done" (Yates, The Art o f Memory, 305).5. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel states that "all persons have . . . a consciousness o f G o d , or o f the absolute substance, as the truth o f everything and so also o f them selves, o f everything that they are and do" ( l p h 1:85; v p r 1:4 ) .6. Elsewhere, Hegel states:“ Bring, Not-Being, One, Many, Quality, Size and so on are pure essences . . . with which we keep house all the time in ordinary life." S e e "R e p o rt o f Rosenkranz About H egel’s Philosophy o f Spirit in the Early Jen a Period," in System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H . S . H arris and T. M . K nox (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1979), 258. See also Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 183.

The M ythology o f Reason 85


tations, images, o f which none happens to occur to h im — or which are not present. T h is night, the inner o f nature, that exists here— pure se lf— in phantasm agorical presentations, is night all around it, here shoots a bloody head— there another white shape, suddenly here before it, and ju st so disappears. O ne catches sight o f this night when one looks hum an beings in the eye— into a night that becom es aw ful, it suspends the night o f the w orld here in an opposition. In this night being has returned."

H egel holds the traditional. H erm etic conception o f philosophia perennis: all previous systems o f thought— religious, mythological, philosophical— aim at and partially unveil the sam e doctrine.* Speculative philosophy is the final, hilly adequate, and fully conscious form o f the philosophia perennis, which can only be accom plished in m odern tim es. In a fragm ent preserved by R osenkranz, H egel w rites:"F ro m the true knowledge o f [the principle o f all philosophy], there will arise the conviction that at all tim es there has been only one and the sam e philosophy. S o not only am I prom ising nothing new here, but rather am I devoting my philosophical efforts precisely to the restoration o f the oldest of old things, and on lib erating it from the m isunderstanding in which the recent tim es o f unphilosophy have buried it."9 T h is perennial character o f speculation is made quite clear in one o f the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia Logic, where H egel states that "It should . . . be m entioned here that the m eaning o f the speculative is to be understood as being the sam e as w hat used in earlier tim es to be called the'm ystical' " ( b l § 8 2 , Z ; G eraets, 13 3 ) . '°

Speculation thus depends on recollection (Erinnerung), the recollection o f the philosophia perennis. In another fragm ent, possibly from the same

7. Q uoted in Donald Phillip Vercne, Hegel's Recollection (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1985), 7 - 8 . T h e translation is Verenes.8. See H . S . H arris ’s Introduction to the System of Ethical Life, 6 3-6 4 :"P h ilo so - phy is participation in an eternal vision. It is alw ays one and the same, and i f one achieves it, the occasion or path by which one does so becom es irrelevant, indifferent. Speculation is the end in and for itself.’' See also H arris's "In troduction to the Difference Essay," i8 :"B y reasserting the presence o f a philosophia perennis, H egel aimed to show that the dialectic o f philosophical ideas is subordinate to, and instrum ental for, the focal concern o f rational speculation, which never varies.” Hegel w rites in the Difference essay that “i f the Absolute, like Reason which is its appearance, is eternally one and the sam e— as indeed it is— then every Reason that is directed toward itself and com es to recognize itself, produces a true philosophy and solves for itse lf the problem which, like its solution, is at all rimes the sam e" (Difference, 87; Differenz, 11). Hegel is speaking here as an exponent o f Schelling's Identity philosophy (and H arris is expounding the view s o f Hegel the Schellingian), but I am maintaining that on these basic m etaphilosophical issues his position did not change.9. Rosenkranz, Hegels Lehen, 192.10 . Hegel frequently repeats this observation. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion o f 18 24 , H egel speaks o f the Eleusinian mysteries, srating that "T h e mystical is the speculative, what lies w ithin" (l p r 2 :4 9 1: v p r 2 :39 1). Later, he sta tes,"T h e Trinity is called the mystery o f G od ; its content is mystical, i.e., speculative" ( l p r 3 :19 2 ; v p r 3 :125). In the Lectures o f 1827, he states that "As a whole the mystical is everything speculative, or whatever is concealed from the understanding" (l p r 1 :4 4 5 ; v p r 1:333).



period as the "System -P rogram " know n as "O n M ythology, the Sp irit o f the People, and Art," H egel speaks o f M nem osyne (M em ory) as the "absolute M use." H e w rites: "T h e w ork o f art o f m ythology propagates itse lf in living tradition. A s peoples grow in the liberation of their consciousness, so the mythological work of art continuously grow s and clarifies and m atures. T h is w ork o f art is a general possession, the w ork o f everyone. Each generation hands it dow n em bellished to the one that follow s; each w orks further tow ard the liberation o f absolute consciousness."1' M nem osyne, M em ory or Recollection, is the m other o f the muse o f the poet, the artist, and the philosopher. Sh e is their access to prim ordial w isdom , know ledge o f the w hole. A il three may hear her voice and express her w isdom in their ow n ways. T hrou gh her voice the philosopher can learn to speak the truly com plete and adequate speech, which is speculation, the speech o f the Absolute.

T h e result o f H egel's project w as to have been, he hoped, a return to a m ore "natural" consciousness, like that possessed by the G reeks, but in a form that is fully m odern and self-aw are (to say nothing o f being P rotestant and Lutheran). Ju st as in Böhm e, man's fall is necessary because his original unity w ith G o d and w ith his ow n true nature is an unthinking unity. W e m ust be brought back to unity, but this tim e the unity m ust be achieved in full self-consciousness. Ph ilosophy w ill constitute, in effect, a perfected form o f living in the w orld , w hich w ill transform religious life, art, and our understanding o f history, science, and governm ent— o f all aspects o f man and his world. A s H . S . H arris puts it ,“ Philosophy is not ju st a nocturnal study o f shadow s and reflections; it is the perfected consciousness o f hum an living, or an actual experience o f living in the light o f the eternal day."12

Like A ristotle, H egel conceives the life o f the philosopher as the "h ighest" form o f existence. But the "life" w ith which his philosophy is concerned w ill unite all people, the m asses and the intellectuals. In the "System -Program " H egel w rites, “ in the end enlightened and unenlightened m ust clasp hands, m ythology m ust becom e philosophical in order to m ake the people rational, and philosophy m ust becom e m ythological in order to make the philosophers sensible. T h en reigns eternal unity am ong us. N o m ore the look o f scorn [o f the enlightened philosopher looking dow n on the m ob], no m ore the blind trem bling o f the people before its w ise men and priests."1’

Ph ilosophy can becom e accessible to all, it can illum inate the cave w ith sunlight, i f the “m ythology o f reason" is developed. In the same fragm ent, H egel w rites,“ H ere I shall discuss particularly an idea w hich, as far as I know, has never occurred to anyone else— we m ust have a new m ythology, but this m ythology m ust be in the service o f the Ideas, it

11. Translated by Verene, Hegel's Recollection, 36; m y em phasis.12. H arris, Night Thoughts, 199.13. 1 am using H . S . H arris’s translation o f the "System -Program ” in Toward the Sunlight, 5 10 - 12 ; 5 1 1- 12 , H arris’s interpolations. For a G erm an edition sec “ D as älteste System program m des deutschen Idealismus,“ Werke 1 (henceforth, Systemprogramm). 2 34 -36 .

T h e M ythology o f Reason 87


m ust be a mythology o f reason"1* But w hat does this mean ? H o w can speculation be a m ythology, i f its task is to recover the perennial thought form s underlying all m ythology, religion, poetry, etc. i Doesn't speculation go deeper than m yth i

T h e phrase “m ythology o f reason” never occurs again in any o f H egel's other w ritin gs or lectures, but it provides a key to u n derstan d ' ing H egel's entire philosophy. To understand th is unique conception, som ething fu rth er m ust be said about the relation o f ph ilosophy to recollection.

2 . Speculation and Recollection

Accounts o f H egel's view o f the history o f philosophy tend to overem phasize his claim that all previous philosophy approaches w hat he u ltim ately accom plishes in speculative philosophy. W hat tends not to be em phasized is the necessary presupposition o f this account: that th inking man in som e sense knew w here he w as going from the beginning, that the history o f philosophy is not the story o f the gradual creation o f different system s o f philosophy, but rather the story o f the gradual recollection o f the one true “system ," o f w isdom itself.

I f this is the case, one m ight ask: W h y does H egel insist that his final and adequate recollection o f the truth could only have occurred “after h istory” ? W hen we finally reach the stage at which we m ake the A bsolute our ow n, w hen we know that the Absolute, which is G o d , is the consum m ation o f a universal hum an consciousness, we fully grasp the “ Idea” o f philosophy and all philosophical thought reaches closure. H egel believed that this intellectual achievem ent could only have been accom plished after history itse lf was consum m ated, that is, after hum an beings have recognized them selves as free and not determ ined by an A bsolute that stands opposed to hum anity as an absolute other. T h e final form o f w isdom is necessarily a self-conscious form : the A bsolute Idea achieves full realization or disclosure through hum anity’s explicit recognition o f itse lf as the agent o f the Ideas's consum m ation. Hegelian speculation is not ju st another expression o f the perennial philosophy, but an expression that understands itse lf as an expression o f the perennial philosophy. T h u s, H egelian speculation is the in -itse lf o f human consciousness finally made for-itself, made explicit.

I f speculation involves recollection then it appears to be a fundam entally passive activity. T h is is indeed the case, for the term speculation com es from speculum, o r “mirror.” W hat does the speculative philosopher “m irror" i Speculation holds up a m irror to the Idea itself: it allow s Idea to com prehend itself. H egel's concept o f speculation harks back to

14 . H egel, System-Program, 5 11; Systemprogramm, 236. Friedrich Schlegel claimed that the creation o f a “rarional m ythology” w as the literary aim o f the Rom antic movement. Though Hegel w as not exactly sym pathetic with Rom anticism , he m ay have been influenced by this idea. See F. Schlegel, Pro- saisckeJugendschriften, 2 vols., ed. J . M inor (V ienna: Konegen, 1906), vol. 2, 357-6 6 . For sim ilar ideas see Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter H eath (Charlottesville: University Press o f V irginia, 1980), 223.



Pyrhagoras's com parison o f the philosophers to spectators at the O lym pic gam es. TTie philosopher is a vehicle o f the m uses: an oracle through which Sp irit expresses itself, an autom atic w riter w ho passively w atches the play o f the dialectic as it develops on his p a g e /

T h is talk o f "recollection" and o f the "perennial philosophy" does not, however, im ply that H egel’s project is to recover a w isdom that was once explicit long ago, and which has since been lost. In fact, in the Berlin lectures on the Philosophy o f Nature ( 18 19 -3 0 ) H egel ridicules the idea that in som e bygone age, when man w as at one w ith G o d , he possessed a “consum m ate science" and that"since ou r fall from this unity som e rem nants and distant glim m erings o f that spiritual light have rem ained wirh us in m yths, tradition, and other fragm ents, on to which the further education o f the hum an race in religion has fastened, and from which all scientific cognition has proceeded. I f it w ere no m ore difficult than this for consciousness to know truth, but one only had to sit on a tripod and utter oracles, the labour o f thought w ould certainly be spared" ( p n § 246, Z ; Petry 1:19 9 ).16 W hat H egel rejects here, first o f all, is the idea that A bsolute Science or w isdom was ever, at som e earlier tim e, w holly and self-consciously possessed by man. Second, even i f man actually had possessed such w isdom , H egel rejects the idea that it could be recovered through the use o f "pure im agination" or "creativity" in the Rom antics' sense. But this does not im ply that H egel rejects the idea o f an unconscious w isdom gradually com ing to m ore and m ore adequate expression through philosophy.

But w hy should we believe in the existence o f this "unconscious w isdom ” in the first place ? Because all philosophy is im plicitly or explicitly dialectical in nature, and the activity o f dialectic presupposes that one alw ays already possesses w isdom , but in inchoate form . D ialectic is a recollection and explication o f that w isdom . T h is is true o f both H egelian and Platonic d ia lectic .T h e pattern o f Platonic dialectic is this: attem pts are m ade to define som e universal, all o f which prove inadequate, but each o f which builds on the previous attem pt. For instance, in the Republic, C ephalus’s definition o f ju stice as "returning w hat one has borrow ed" (331b) is rejected w ith Socrates's counterexam ple o f the crazed man w ho dem ands the return o f a w eapon. T h e participants im m ediately see that this could not be ju s t , that C ep h alu s’s attem pt to define Ju stice is a failure. But they could not m ake such a ju d gm en t— rejecting C ep h alu s’s definition as w rong sim ply on the basis o f Socrates’s counterexam ple— unless rhey already had som e pre-reflecrive access to the Idea o f Ju stice . T h e key to the dialectic, then, is that the participants already know, in som e sense, the m eaning o f the term s they aim at defining.

In the sam e m anner, each category o f H egel’s Logic constitutes a "p ro visional definition o f the Absolute,” but each proves partial and inade-

15. O ne is rem inded o f Jac o b is dictum that it is the task o f the philosopher to “disclose existence" (Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 67).16. For a sim ilar passage, see the Philosophy of Spirit (p s § 405, Z ; Petry 2:231).



quare, forcing us to inquire further, and so the dialectic pushes on. W e do not rest content w ith Being, or w ith Bein g-for-se lf o r w ith the M easureless or w ith Identity, because we experience a d isparity between each category and w hat we som ehow already know the Idea to be. In the Difference essay o f 1801 H egel w rites :"W h at the so-called com m on sense takes to be the rational consists sim ilarly o f single item s draw n out o f the A bsolute into consciousness. T h ey are points o f light that arise out o f the night o f totality and aid men to get through life in an intelligent w a y .. . . In fact, however, m en only have this confidence in the truth o f these points o f light because they have a feeling of the Absolute attending these points.“ 17

H egel's muse is M nem osyne because his dialectic is a recollection o f w hat ou r finite individual sp irit has som ehow already glim psed o f A bsolute Sp irit. In the Difference essay, H egel w rites o f the "presuppositions” (Voraussetzungen] o f philosophy. O ne such presupposition, he says is "the Absolute itself. It is the goal that is being sought; but it is already present, or how otherw ise could it be sought i " 1* Jean H yppolite w rites: "In our opinion, i f we are to understand H egel's [dialectic] we m ust assum e that the w hole is always im m anent in the developm ent o f consciousness. N egation is creative because the posited term had been isolated and thus w as itse lf a kind o f negation. From this it fo llow s that the negation o f that term allow s the w hole to be recaptured in each o f its parts. Were it not for the immanence of the whole in consciousness, we should be unable to understand how negation can truly engender a content A n d H yppolite goes on to say :"W e have evidence o f the im m anence o f the w hole in consciousness in the teleological nature o f the latter's develo p m en t:'T h e goal o f know ledge is fixed as necessarily as the series o f progressions.'

D ialectic is the "m ethod" by which speculation aim s to "recollect" unconscious w isdom and to com plete the perennial philosophy. But how can H egel know that he has brought the perennial philosophy to com pletion i T h is seem s to involve a further m ethodological consideration not covered by an account o f dialectic alone. In fact, it is precisely H egel's understanding o f speculation as a "M yth o logy o f Reason”— his understanding o f speculation as in som e sense an aesthetic act— that allows him to dem onstrate the com pleteness o f his recollection o f the perennial philosophy.

17 . H egel, Difference, 98 -9 9 . niy em phasis; Differenz, 20.18. H egel, Difference, 93; Differenz, 16. T h is m ay seem ro be sim ply a starement about the Scnellingian A bsolute, but m y contention is that in H egel’s mature philosophy the Absolute is still, in a certain sense, a “goal“ to be sought. T h is w ill becom e more clear in m y treatm ent o f the Phenomenology in the next chapter. P lato, o f course, has his own doctrine o f recollection, intended to explain exactly the phenom enon described above: how we seem to already know the result we aim at in dialectic, and w hy we feel at every step as i f we are recollecting som ething we already knew.19. Jean H yppolite, The Genesis and Structure o f Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit, trans. Sam uel C herniak and John H eckm an (Evanston: N orthw estern U niversity Press, 1974), 15; m y em phasis.20. Ibid ., 15: for the quotation see M iller 51; pg , 62.




In the "System -Program " H egel w rites o f his M ythology o f Reason: “ I am now convinced that the highest act o f Reason, the one through w hich it encom passes all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty— the philosopher m ust possess ju st as much aesthetic pow er as the poet. M en w ithout aesthetic sense is w hat ou r literal-m inded philosophers [unsere Buchstabenphilosophen] are. T h e philosophy o f the spirit is an aesthetic philosophy."21 D urin g his Jen a period, H egel, like Schelling, claim ed that art as well as philosophy gives us access to the A bsolute. In the Difference essay, H egel (ostensibly speaking for Schelling) w rites: ''B oth art and speculation are in their essence divine service— both are a living intuition o f the absolute life and hence a being at one w ith it."“

A t first glance, then, H egel’s "System Program ” may seem to be ju st a repetition o f Schelling’s ideas about "aesthetic consciousness," but it is not. U nlike Schelling, H egel does not see art as such as our m eans o f experiencing the A bsolute. Instead, he speaks o f the "h ighest act of Rct?- son" as being an aesthetic act. Som ehow , rational or philosophical thought itse lf m ust becom e aesthetic. B u t how ? A n d how is this related to the conception o f a M ythology o f Reason ? A n d how is it related to speculation ? T h e second question, at least, seem s easily answ ered: it is clear that H egel sees m ythic thought as sensuous or poetic in form . Later in the "System Program " he w rites: "U n til we express the Ideas aesthetically, i.e. mythologically, they have no interest for the people, and conversely until m ythology is rational the philosopher m ust be asham ed o f it ." " H egel's system , then, as a M ythology o f Reason, w ill som ehow meld rational thought w ith w hat I shall call"m ytho-poetic" thought.

W hen H egel claim s that philosophy m ust becom e aesthetic or m ythological, he is not recom m ending that philosophers w rite poetry, or even that they incorporate poetic elements into their w ork. Instead, H egel is setring the stage for an entirely new type o f thought, one that unites elements o f rational and m ytho-poetic thinking at a higher level. H egel’s project is analogous to O etinger's theologia emblematica, which aim ed to uncover the "inner spiritual form " o f the em blem or image— as opposed, on the one hand, to a purely imaginative grasp o f the divine, and, on the other, to the "dead reason," o f the abstract concept, which kills the truth the image contains. L ike O etinger, H egel is advocating a "third position": a com pletely new form o f thought in which the truth is laid bare by transcending and synthesizing the inadequate form s o f the pure image and the abstract concept. In the "System -Program " this new form elevates poetic thought to a higher level: "Poetry gains thereby a higher dignity," he w rites."Sh e becom es at the end once m ore w hat she was in the beginning: the teacher o f mankind.”2*

21. H egel, System-Program, 5 11; Systemprogramm, 235. 1 have altered H arris’stranslation slightly.22. H egel, Difference, 172; Differenz, 77*23. H egel, System-Program, 5 11; Systemprogramm, 236.24- System -Program , 511; Systemprogramm, 235.

3. Speculation as "M ythic"


H ere an obvious question arises: D oesn ’t H egel reject “picture th inking,” and isn't that precisely w h at“m ytho-poetic th inking” is ? H egel docs indeed reject picture thinking, but he also rejects its opposite,"abstract" th inking.” W hen H egel rejects a pair o f opposites, however, one can be sure that they have not been rejected: they have been aufgehoben; they have been cancelled, but also taken up and preserved. D onald Phillip Verene m akes this same p o in t:"T h e thought o f Vorstellung m ust be aufgehoben in absolute know ing. T h e image o f Vorstellung. . . m ust be there in absolute know ing in a transform ed sense.”26 H egel's speculation will be a "sublation” o f the truth o f Bild and the truth o f Begriff. S o how exactly does H egel's speculation accom plish this? H o w does it unite the m ythopoetic and the rational ?

U nlike "picture-thinking"— poetry, m yth, art, etc.— Hegel's speculation involves the use o f concepts, ideas, or universais. H ere, however, the dissim ilarity ends, for although the m atter o f H egel's philosophy— its em ploym ent o f concepts rather than im ages— is substantially different from m ytho-poetic thought, its form is strikingly sim ilar.

H egel's system is a com plete conceptual speech about the w hole, but it is not m erely a netw ork o f abstract concepts. Instead it takes the form o f a concrete totality. In the introduction to the Phenomenology, H egel defines philosophy as the “actual knowledge o f what truly is" (M iller, 46; P G , $ 7 ) . r In fact, his philosophical aim is the traditional one: to give an account o f Substance, the really real.“ H ow ever, it is the totality o f the sys-

25. Hegel w rites in the preface to the Phenomenology: "T h e habit o f picture- thinking, when it is interrupted by the Concept [Begriff], finds it ju st as irksom e as does form alistic thinking that argues back and forth in thoughts that have no actuality” (M iller, 35; pg, 43)- H arris, in his Introduction ro his and W alter C e r f s translation o f Faith and Knou'ledge, writes: "Speculative philosophy cannot possibly be ab stract '.. . because it is a special kind o f remembering (H egel plays on the G erm an w ord Erinnerung). T h e infinite that is w ithin the finite, and reveals itse lf negatively in the perpetual perishing o f the finite, reveals itself positively in the resurrection and perpetuation o f the finite as a pattern o f ’inw ardized’ or'rem em bered' conceptual significance." S e e H . S . H arris, Introduction, in G . W . F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, ed. and trans. H . S . H arris and W alter C e r f (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1977)» 39- 40 .26. Verene, Hegels Recollection, 12. Hegel explains the m eaning o f aufheben in his Science of Logic:14Aufheben . . . constitutes one o f the m ost im portant concepts in ph ilosophy.. . . Aufheben has a twofold m eaning in the language: on the one hand it m eans to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end t o . . . . It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words w hich have in them selves a speculative meaning; the G erm an language has a number o f such” (M iller 10 6 -7 ; w l 1:10 1).27. A lso :"(P h ilosoph y ’s) element and content is not the abstract or nonactual, but the actual” (M iller, 47 ; PC, 34-JS)-28. Though, o f course, H egel’s Substance reveals itself to be Subject. In the Phenomenology, Hegel w rites that "the side o f reality is itse lf nothing else but the side o f individuality" (die Seite der Wirklichkeit ist selbst nichts anders als die Seite der Individualität; M iller, 233; p g , 256). Elsew here Hegel w rites:"Sp irit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being" (M iller, 264 ; p c , 289). T hese observations correspond exactly to Aristotle’s conception o f Substance (oujia). In H egel’s 1830 lecture m anuscript for the Lectures on the Philosophy of World H is-



tem that itse lf gives us th is reality.* Every "provisional definition o f the A bsolute” w ithin the system , that is, every category, m ust fall short because no one category can express all o f w hat the Absolute is. T h u s, the system does nor describe the Absolute, it gives form to the Absolute itself. H egel's philosophy does not tell us w hat Substance or the Absolute is (in the manner, for instance, o f Aristotle's philosophy), it brings the Absolute into being. W hy ? Because it is through speculation that the Idea becom es for-itself, that "G o d ” achieves self-awareness and thus com pletion. T h is com pleted or actualized divine is the A bso lute .”

Recall the previously quoted fragm ent preserved by Rosenkranz: Ever)' individual is a blind link in the chain o f absolute necessity, along w hich the w orld develops. Every individual can raise h im self to dom ination over a great length o f this chain only i f he realizes the goal o f this great necessity and, by virtue o f this knowledge, learns to speak the magic words which evoke its shape. T h e knowledge o f how to sim ultaneously absorb and elevate on ese lf beyond the total energy o f suffering and antithesis that has dom inated the w orld and all form s o f its developm ent for thousands o f years— this knowledge can be gathered from philosophy alone."

T h e magic w ords are the categories o f H egelian philosophy. T h e magic pow er is dialectic guided by recollection. A nd, as w e shall shortly find, ou r access to this pow er is through a form o f imagination. (I discuss the nature o f H egelian im agination in section 5.)

It is im portant to see the radical difference betw een H egelian thought and all other form s o f philosophy. N on-H egelian philosophy answ ers such questions as “ W h at is G o d ? " o r “ Wrhat is B ein g?” by equating its subject m atter w ith som e property or universal: "G o d is w ater" or "G o d is the U nm oved M over" or "G o d is N ature." W e can call this m ode o f thought propositional or predicative. It takes som e object as given, and precedes to describe it by attaching one or m ore predicates to it, usually after lengthy argum entation.

T h e problem w ith this form o f thought, as H egel points out in the preface to the Phenomenology, is that it draw s a rigid distinction between subject and predicate (M iller, 38: pg, 47)* O ne m ay laboriously dem on


tory, he w rites that “ it is proved in philosophy by speculative know ing that R eason — and we can adopt this expression for the m om ent without a derailed discussion o f its relationship ro G o d — is substance and infinite p o w e r.. . . It i* substance, i.e. that through which and in which all reality has its being and su b sisten ce .. . . Reason is self-sufficient and contains its end w ithin itself; it brings itse lf into existence and carries itself into effect" (N isbet, 2 7 -2 8 ; vpr, 2 0 -2 1) . I shall discuss this topic more fully in chapter 5.29. Hegel w rites in the Sjifem of Ethical Life,“ W hat is truly universal is intuition, while what is truly particular is the absolute concept" (System of Ethical Life, 100). G erm an edition: System der Sittlichkeit, 2nd ed., ed. G . Lasson (H am burg: Felix M einer Verlag, 1923), 415.30. "G o d is on ly G o d in so far as he know s H im selfi this self-know ledge o f G od , becom es a self-knowledge in man, and man's knowledge o f G o d ." ( p s § 564; W allace, 298).31. Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 14 1.


strate that "G o d is good" but w e know that the tw o term s are connota- tively different. T h e predicate does not exhaustively present the subject’s nature to us. W e m ay decide to add other predicates: "G o d is good," and “just,” and "all-knowing," etc. But unless w e can dem onstrate that we have com pletely captured the essence o f G o d ou r know ledge is not absolute (See l p r 3:271, 2 7 7 -7 8 ; v p r , 196, 203).” T h u s the predicative or propositional approach is inherently incapable o f giving us w hat we w ant. T h e predicate o f a proposition always places the subject in a higher, wider, or more inclusive genus, for instance, "M an is mortal,” “ D ogs are mam mals," etc. But H egel conceives the A bsolute as the W hole itself, as the ultim ate category beyond which there is no higher category. H egel does not tell us w hat the A bsolute is. H egel’s thought gives form to the A bsolute itself. Yet the dialectic is driven precisely by the supersession o f categories— "provisional definitions o f the A bsolute"— which purport to say w h at the Absolute is, but only say part. H egel can say that his system is com plete because it achieves closure as a circle o f thought; his Encyclopedia is exactly w hat it sounds like, an encirclem ent. H is philosophical "m ethod” ( if it can be described as such) is qualitatively d ifferent from the propositional m ethod o f philosophy that I have described.

To borrow a term from the Jungian Erich N eum ann, H egel's speculation is "circum scription." In his book The Origins and History of Consciousness, N eum ann discusses m ytho-poetic thought and its origins in the unconscious. C ontrasting m ytho-poetic thought w ith propositional rhought, he w rites:

T h e w ay o f the unconscious is different. Sym bols gather around the thing to be explained, understood, interpreted. T h e act o f becom ing conscious consists in the concentric grouping o f sym bols around the object, all circumscribing and describing the unknown from m any sides. Each sym bol lays bare another essential side o f the object to be grasped, points to another facet o f meaning. O nly the canon o f these sym bols congregating about the center in question, the coherent sym bol group, can lead to an understanding o f w hat the sym bols point to and o f w hat they are trying to express.”

M yth , in other w ords, does not attem pt to pin dow n its subject m atter by definitively predicating one or m ore qualities o f it. It does not say "G o d is ju st X ” o r"N a tu re is ju s t Y.” Instead, it"ta lks around” its object, describing it in many, som etim es conflicting ways, each o f which indicates som ething true about it. A s N eum ann says, only the canon o f these sym bols congregating about the center in question, only the whole, is true. T h e Egyptians, for instance, devised a num ber o f different and m utually contradictory cosm ologies, all o f which they seem ed to regard as equally true. A s H enri and H . A . Frankfort write:

T h e m ythopoetic m ind, tending tow ard the concrete, expressed the irrational, not in our manner, but by adm itting the validity o f sev-

3 2 .0 'Regan discusses this issue in The Heterodox Hegel, 76.33. Erich N eum ann, The Origins and History o f Consciousness, trans. R . E C .H u ll (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1954)» 7; em phasis added.

94 The Sorccrcr's Apprenticeship


eral avenues o f approach at one and the sam e t im e .. . . W e should not doubt that m ythopoetic thought fully recognizes the unity o f each phenom enon which it conceives under so m any different guises; the m any-sidedness o f its im ages serves to do ju stice to the com plexity o f the phenom ena.*

T h e form o f H egel’s speculation is identical w ith m ytho-poetic c ircum scription: H egel rejects propositional thought, which w ould define the Absolute, and instead "talks around" or "thinks around" the A bsolute, revealing at each point som e aspect or part o f it. T h e totality o f H egel’s philosophical speech is the Truth , the Absolute itself. T h e d ifference between H egel’s speculation and m ytho-poetic thought is that the points through which his circle o f truth is described arc not prim arily images, m etaphors, or sym bols, but concepts. U nlike conventional p h ilosophical thought, however, he em ploys these concepts in a radically different way. T h e form o f this thought is identical w ith m ytho-poetic "circum scription." W e can see, then, that H egel has accom plished exactly w hat I described earlier: the creation o f a new form o f thought, which takes up and thus in a sense "unites" elem ents o f both abstract, philosophical thought, and m ytho-poetic thought. H is is tru ly a m ythology o f reason: a new m yth-form made o f ideas, a m ytho-poetic creation that is not "concrete" in its elem ents but only in its totality, as the concrete universal, as the Absolute.**

T o em ploy a term that w as im portant in Hegel's early philosophy o f nature (and to which I shall return in later chapters), the Absolute is literally em bodied in the pure aether o f thought. H egel's philosophical speech is not an account o f the Absolute, it is the concrete,"aetherial" realization o f the A bsolute itself. O etinger s progressive corporealization o f the "spirit body" has becom e H egel s "concrete universal." A s in O etinger, G o d or the Idea is becom ing progressively "better em bodied.” F irst it exists in inchoate form , in nature, then in hum an institutions, in art and in religion, and then finally it reaches perfection in the ideal m edium : the pure aether o f thought realized in speculative philosophy. Hegel's system is the aether body o f the Absolute, O etinger's Geistleiblichkeit.

T h is does not mean that H egel believed that everything is "idea." T h e Logic has as its result that the Idea is consum m ated, and becom es Absolute, through its self-reflection. Each category o f the Logic is a"provisional definition o f the A bsolute (or o f the Idea)." T h is science constitutes an independent and self-contained totality o f thought, form ing a circlc. But, as I have said, this science is only aethcrial, in som e sense unreal. T h e Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit are accounts o f the form s in which the Idea em bodies itself, "seeking” the self-reflection conceived in the Logic. In A bsolute Sp irit, the A bsolute Idea, which is

34. H enri and H .A . Frankfort.“ Introduction: M yth and Reality,“ The Intellectual Adventure o f Ancient Man (Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1977), 20. 3$. In the 1830 manuscript for the Lectures on the Philosophy o f World History, Hegel w rites that “the universal object is infinitely concretc, all-comprchcnding and omnipresent, for the Spirit is eternally present to itself; it has no past, ana remains forever the same in all its vigour and strength“ (N isbet, 31; v ie 33).



m erely the concept o f self-reflection, achieves actual self-reflection. P h ilosophy, the highest form o f Sp irit, is a com plete account o f Idea in-itself (Logic), becom e fo r-itse lf (N ature and Sp irit). T h is does not im ply that N atu re and Sp irit are "really" ju st logical categories. Instead, the categories do not becom e fully real until they becom e N ature and Spirit.

It might be objected that my com parison o f Hegel's speculation with m ytho-poctic thought leaves out the elem ent o f the transcendent— w hether cthonic or num inous— that is always present in m ytho-poetic thought. M ythic circum scription, unlike propositional thought, does not seek to make its object fully transparent. T here is always an element o f m ystery— and the w arning that any attem pt to penetrate this m ystery is hubris. W hat could be more unlike H egel ? H egel rejects a transcendent Absolute and claims to have achieved Absolute Know ing. By G reek standards, H egel is undeniably guilty o f hubris. H is Absolute is Sp irit or Idea com e to consciousness o f itse lf through the activity o f speculation: the divine (the Absolute) cannot be w ithout humanity. It is m an w ho “actualizes” G o d , and thus man becom es, i f not G o d , then certainly a demigod. H egel can, however, legitim ately claim that he has com pleted or perfected m ytho-poetic thought, and that this achievement is true and verifiable, not em pty hubris. T h e aim o f m ytho-poetic circum scription is to reveal all aspects o f a prim ordial phenom enon through a cluster o f images and stories. But there is never any guarantee that the circle is com plete, hence there always rem ains an elem ent o f mystery. Hegel, however, believes he can dem onstrate that his system closes the circle. T h u s, he can claim w ith som e plausibility that he has rem oved all m ystery from the Absolute. H e em ploys m ythic circum scription, and uses concepts in a quasi-aesthetic manner, but by closing the circle he turns m ytho-poctic circum scription into an absolute science.

4. Further Parallels Between Speculation and M yth

In his Myth and Philosophy, Law rence J . H atab contrasts m ythic thought w ith conceptual reason on a num ber o f points, allow ing us to establish even m ore clearly the sim ilarity o f H egelian speculation to m ythopoetic thought.16

First, H atab claim s th at"M yth s express w hat is unique w hile concepts express w hat is com m on." T h is m eans that "M yth does not subsum e particular occurrences under general laws or abstract classifications."1 Recall that H egel conceives the Absolute as the W hole, and there is nothing higher or more inclusive than the W hole. T h u s in H atab ’s terms, H egel rejects conceptual reason precisely because his subject m atter is unique, the fully concrete Concrete, the true individual.

Second, H atab claims that “ In m yth, there is no separation o f form and content, thought and sensation.” “ T h is means that there is no rift in the m ytho-poetic consciousness between the form o f experience and the m eaning-content it im parts: thunder is im m ediately experienced as the

36. See Law rence J . H atab, Myth and Philosophy. A Contest o f Truths (Lasalle:O pen C ou rt, 1990)-37. Ibid., 30 -3 1.38. Ibid., 30 -3 1.


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anger o f the gods. H enri and H . A . Frankfort w rite that m odern science “creates an increasingly w ide g u lf between our perception o f the phenom ena and the conceptions by which w e make them com prehensible. W e see the sun rise and set, but we think o f the earth as m oving around the sun. W e see colors, but we describe them as wave-lengths."”

H egel saw the natural sciences as increasingly devaluing or nullifying ordinary experience and alienating the great bulk o f humanity. Part o f the aim o f H egel's system is to restore som ething o f the "undivided consciousness" o f the ancients. L ike Rousseau, however, he does not seek to go back to the golden age, but to realize som ething o f it in the m odern age. H egel does not reject m odern scientific procedure and its m ethod o f explanation, but he does seek to heal the divide between intellectuals— scientists, ph ilosophers— and laym en, the Platonic "w ise” and "vulgar.” T h is is the explicit goal o f the "m ythology o f reason," as stated in the "System -Program ."

In his system , H egel incorporates the data o f the natural sciences o f his tim e in a Philosophy o f N ature. B y show ing hum anity a G o d who expresses H im se lf (in part) in nature, he hoped to reconnect science w ith the experience o f the divine, and specifically w ith the concrete presence o f the divine.40 In the “System -Program " H egel w rites that "we are told so often that the great m ob m ust have a religion o f the senses. But not only docs the great m ob need it, the philosopher needs it too" (H arris, 5 11; p g , 235).

W h at H egel’s system prom ises is a transform ed experience o f the w orld , in w hich we sec fam iliar th ings in a new light. Science, poetry, art, religion, the state, are all seen to be expressions or em bodim ents o f the A bsolute. O rdinary things suddenly take on new meaning. T h at which had been thought to be a hum an contrivance, carried out only for finite hum an ends, devoid o f any higher m eaning, mystery, or religious significance— that is to say, w hat had been thought so qu intessential^ m odern — is now suddenly im bued w ith spiritual significance, the full system atic scope o f which can only be experienced by the typical consciousness as sublim e. T h u s, H egel attem pts to heal the rift in the m odern consciousness between thought and sensation, or thought and experience, by giving us a new form o f experience. T h e very m odern scientific and philosophical ideas that form erly seem ed to cut us o ff from experience and from our intuitions o f the divine are now seen to be m om ents o f a system o f experience that constitutes the divine itself.*1 H egel's system is an attem pt to "re-enchant" the world, to re-invest nature w ith the experience o f the num inous lost w ith the death o f the m ythical consciousness.

T h ird , H atab claim s that “ M yth is passive and receptive w hile concep

39. Frankfort,"Introduction: M yth and Reality," 11.4 0 . In the preface to the Phenomenology H egel w rites:“ Let the other sciences try to argue as much as they like w ithour philosophy— without it they can have in them neither life, Sp irit, nor truth" (M iller, 4 1 ; PC, 50).4 1. H atab also characterizes the modern rift in term s o f the “ form -content” distinction. A s is well known, Hegel explicitly claims in his Logic that he has transcended the form -content distinction.



tual reason is active."41 H atab characterizes the "activity” o f conceptual reason as involving "abstraction, analysis, synthesis, and judgem ent" which essentially take an object apart in order to get to its "real” nature.4* H egel, o f course, calls these procedures o f conceptual reason "the U nderstanding” ( Wer stand) and holds that i f w e arc to know truth, we m ust rise above this level. Speculative philosophy, by contrast, is not creative, it is recollective. Speculative philosophy is not active, it is "essentially receptive, uncritical." T h e speculative philosopher is not in control o f his thoughts. H e is "enthralled" by w hat he is th inking about.

Fourth, H atab w rites that “ In m yth, language and the w orld are coextensive."** W ords are not taken as m ere “signs" for things, but are thought o f as w edded to the things them selves, even as expressing the nature o f things. K now ing an ob jects nam e w as even thought to give the know er magical pow ers over it. T h is understanding o f language is characteristic o f the H erm etic tradition. For H egel, w ords do not carry a literal “magic pow er"— though, as we have seen, he does speak o f the "m agic w ords" that evoke the "shape" o f the A bsolute. H egel’s com pleted speech o f the A bsolute is identical to its object. H egel’s system does not describe the Absolute, it em bodies the Absolute. To give it voice is to give it being.4S T h u s it is no stretch o f the im agination to call w ords that call their object into being“magic words."

Fifth, H atab claim s that "In m yth there is no conceptual distinction between illusion and truth.“46 For the m ythic m entality anything that is experienced may be m eaningful. T h u s dream s, which to the m odern m ind are illusory, are deeply significant to the m ytho-poetic mind. T h ere is an analogue to this w ay o f thinking in H egel. T h e dialectic does not concern itse lf at each step w ith truth. In fact it moves by "canceling” false, partial, or illusory positions. Speculation em braces the partial and the fake. A ll ideas are standpoints o f consciousness on the w ay to A bsolute K now ing. T h is is m ost obvious in the Phenomenology of Spirit, w here num erous false and self-deluding standpoints— Sense-C ertainty, Sto icism , Scepticism , the U nhappy C onsciousness, the Beautiful Soul, etc.— are transcended, but sim ultaneously incorporated as necessary com ponents in the developm ent o f Sp irit.

5. Imagination and the Symbolic Forms

Hegel's dialectic functions through recollection o f the whole, which it aim s to fully articulate. Individual categories, "provisional definitions o f the Absolute," prove inadequate, because o f their failure to fully express our recollected intuition o f w hat the w hole is. T h e y only say part. But

42. Hacab, Myth and Philosophy, 33.43- Ibid., 33.44- Ibid., 34.45. Hegel writes in his Philosophy of Nature o f 18 0 3-4 that "the speaking o f theAether with itself is its reality.. . . W hat it utters is itself, what speaks is itself,and that to which it speaks is again itself" (quoted in H arris, Night Thoughts,243)-46. Hatab, Myth and Philosophy, 35.



w hat is the m echanism by which a new, further category is selected ? In other w ords, how are the transitions made in the dialectic i T o answer th is question, we m ust exam ine the role o f im agination in H egel’s system.

T h e connection between recollection, im agination, and w isdom is found in the H erm etic tradition and its "art o f m em ory .”471 w ant to suggest that Hegel's speculative activity be considered along the lines o f w hat has been called "active im agination.” Antoine Faivre characterizes active im agination— "the essential com ponent o f esotericism "— as "a form o f im agination inclined to reveal and use m ediations o f all kinds, such as rituals, sym bolic images, m andalas, interm ediary spirits."48 "Im agination” suggests, o f course, the image. It seem s straightforw ardly to be the faculty that produces im ages. B u t this is not its prim ary sign ificance. Im agination consists fundam entally in a kind o f ingenuity for giving form to som ething, som etim es to the truth.

Verene describes the role o f im agination in H egel's dialectical transitions as follow s: "Sp irit requires an ingenious act, in which through an im m ediate act o f its ow n w it it produces a new standpoint. It requires the pow er o f ingenium. . . . Sp irit m ust suddenly project a new reality for itse lf out o f a reality in which it finds itse lf becom ing exhausted and dis- m em bered."w Ingenium is equivalent to Faivre's active im agination. But Verene argues that H egel's im agination is fundam entally uncreative, for it depends on recollection. Verene w rites that the H egelian Erinnerung— or Er-innerung, as H egel also w rites it— strongly im plies an"inw ardizing o f the subject."*’ Faivre, in a com m entary on the Rosicrucian Chemical Wedding, m akes the sam e observation: er-innern means both "to rem em ber" and"to go deeply into one's self."51 W hat the philosopher rem em bers when he goes deeply into h im self are archai, to use Verene's term. "A rc h a i. . . are draw n forth from consciousness suddenly and w ithout m ethod, that is, w ithout som e set procedure. C onsciousness turns to itse lf and suddenly has in its hands som ething o f itse lf that it did nor know w as there in any explicit sense. T h is draw ing forth o f archai is . . . recollecting in its prim ordial sense.’' ' i

T h e subtext to the transitions in H egel's dialectic is his use o f recollected patterns o f thought from the philosophical, religious, and m ystical traditions. T h ese include w hat m ight be called "sym bolic forms," m any o f which are H erm etic in their origins or associations. Som e o f these show up as illustrative m etaphors or im ages in H egel's w riting.

47. Faivre w rites that “ It is partly under the inspiration o f the Corpus H er- meticum . . . that m em ory and im agination are associated to the point o f becom ing identical, part o f the teaching o f H erm es Trism egistus consisting in 'inreriorizing' the w orld in our mens." S e e Faivre, Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition, xxiii.48. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 12.49. Verene, Hegel’s Recollection, 22; it should be noted that there is no concept o f'm e th o d ” in the m odern sense implied here.50. Verene, Hegel's Recollection, 3.51. Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism, 169.52. Verene, Hegel's Recollection, 24.



O thers are explicitly referred to only from tim e to tim e, but always seem to be at w ork beneath the surface, giving form to the system itself. T h ese include the H erm etic-m ystical sym bolic form s o f the triangle (the triad, or trin ity), the square, the ennead, and the circle (the alchem ical ouroburos, w hich, incidentally, personifies M ercury or H erm es).

H egel frankly adm its that he is draw ing on this perennial resource. In fact, he seem s to revel in it. In his early Philosophy of Nature, H egel refers reverently to "the Elders," which H . S . H arris has argued refers to both Paracelsus and Böhm e.” A s H arris notes, even where H egel is draw ing from m ore recent sources he insists "on finding an earlier pedigree . . . in Paracelsus and Böhm e.''* In the preface to the Phenomenology he writes that “the triadic form m ust not be regarded as scientific when it is reduced to a lifeless schem a, a mere sh a d o w .. . . K an t rediscovered this triadic form by instinct, but in his w ork it was still lifeless and uncom prehended; since then it has, however, been raised to its absolute significance, and w ith it the true form in its true content has been presented, so that the C oncept o f Science has em erged" (M iller, 29; p g , 37).

T h e reference to K ant having rediscovered (wiedergefundne) the triadic form indicates that H egel regards it as a perennial idea. It also indicates that he regards h im self as tru ly reviving and doing ju stice to the triadic form , as well as raising it to the level o f "science" ( Wissenschaft).M In the Science o f Logic (18 12) a sim ilar passage appears: "K an t did not apply the infinitely im portant form o f trip licity— w ith him it m anifested itse lf at first only as a form al spark o f light— to the genera o f his categories (quantity, quality, etc.), but only to their species w hich, too, alone he called categories. C onsequently he w as unable to hit on the third to quantity and quality" (M iller, 327; w l 1:365).* C onsider also one o f the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia Logic, in w hich H egel rem arks that "A ny d ivision is to be considered genuine when it is determ ined by the C oncept. S o genuine division is, first o f all, tripartite; and then, because particularity presents itse lf as doubled, the division m oves on to fourfoldness as well. In the sphere o f spirit trichotom y predom inates, and it is one o f Kant's m erits to have drawn attention to this" ( e l § 230, Z ; G eraets, 298).

53. H arris, Night Thoughts, 27461.54- Ibid., 278.55. T h is passage from the Phenomenology is often distorted by well-m eaning com m entators w ho see Hegel's apparent obsession w ith triadic form as an em barrassing superstition. For instance, G ustav M üller treats the passage as follow s:"According to the H egel legend one w ould expect H egel to recom mend this'triplicity.' But, after saying that it w as derived from K ant, he calls it a 'life less schema’. . ."See M üller,“ T h e Hegel Legend o f'T h esis-A n tirh esis- Synthesis,’ " in The Hegel Myths and Legends, ed .Jo n Stew art (Evanston, 111.: N orthw estern U niversity Press, 1996), 302. M üller, however, com pletely d istorts w hat Hegel has said. A s I have pointed out, H egel says that K ant rediscovered triadic form , not that it derives from K ant. Further, Hegel says (in M illers translation) that triadic form is unscientific 'w hen it is reduced to a lifeless schema” (em phasis added). H e does not say that it is always a 'life less schema.” A cursory glance at the structure o f Hegel's system show s that he thought there was some life in this old schema yet.5 6 .T n e"th ird " H egel refers to is Measure.

ioo The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


In the next section, I w ill discuss H egel’s use o f triadicity, by w ay o f a discussion o f the "Triangle fragm ent" and the “ triangle diagram ." A s to the square, the third o f the twelve theses com posed and defended by H egel as part o f his doctoral exam in Jen a in 1801 reads as follow s: “ T h e square is the law o f nature, the triangle o f spirit."” In his early ph ilosophy o f nature, H egel conceives nature as containing w ithin itself"resting motion," which involves four dim ensions: three spatial, and one tem poral. H e refers to this as the "squareness" o f nature.* (Sp irit, by contrast, is a triangle com posed o f the dim ensions o f time itself: past, present, and future.) A s H arris sum s up H egel’s early v ie w s :"T h e eternal reality for theoretical contem plation by the m ind is a four dim ensional spatio- tem poral equilibrium . 'Squareness' is the sim plest schem a for this that w e can construct in pure intuition.’’” H ein z K im m erle has suggested that H egel attem pted to “map” the parts o f his early, quadripartite system onto the four m om ents o f “resting motion."60 In the next section we w ill see how the square w orks into H egel’s discussion o f the "D ivin e T riangle." I w ill have m ore to say about Hegel's endorsem ent o f the doctrine o f the four elem ents later.

A s to the ennead, Hegel's system as a whole is a triad, each elem ent o f which is a separate science, divided according to three ch ie f mom ents, which arc analyzed in turn into three constitutive m om ents, which are them selves analyzed into their three constitutive m om ents. T h is means that each m ajor subdivision o f each science is a triad 0/ cnneads,"nines" (m eaning that each science is an ennead o f enneads). T h e “ D octrine o f Being” in the Logic is subdivided into Q uality, Q uantity, and M easure. Q uality is subdivided into Being, D eterm inate Being, and Being-for-self. Being is subdivided into Being, N oth ing, and Becom ing. A n d so on. T h e system is a triad o f triads o f triads o f triads o f triads.

H egel describes his system in the Encyclopedia Logic, however, as a "circle o f circles” : “ T h e whole . . . presents itse lf as a circle o f circles, each o f w hich is a necessary m om ent, so that the system o f its peculiar elements

57. G . W . F. H egel, Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets ( 1801) Preceded by the 12 Theses Defended on August 27, 1801, rrans. Pierre Adler, G rad- uate Faculty Philosophy Journal 1 (1987): 269-309 ; 276. Adler is em ploying G eo rg Lasson s edition o f the Dissertation, which has his G erm an translation and the original Latin on facing pages. See H egel, Sdmtliche Werke, vol. 1, Erste Druckschriften (Leipzig: Felix M einer Verlag, 1928). Hegel does not waver from this proposition in later years. In the lectures on the Philosophy of Nature given in the Berlin period (in the years 18 19 -30 ), Hegel states that "in Spirit the fundam ental form o f necessity is the triad" ( p n § 248, Z ; Petry 1:2 11) . T h e triangle and square represent, o f course, threeness and fourness. Seven, the sum o f three and four, is a pow erful number in the H erm etic tradition. Julius Evola w rites: "M etaphysically, Seven expresses the Three added to the F o u r.. . . Seven is the m anifestation o f the creative principles (triad) in relation to the w orld made up o f the four elem ents; the full expression o f nature creating nature ( natura naturans) in action" (Evola, The Hermetic Tradition, 52).58. H arris, Night Thoughts, 86 -8 7 , 9 0 -9 1.59. Ibid., 90.60. H einz K im m crle,"D okum enre zu H egels Jen aer Dozententatigkeit ( 18 0 1- 18 0 7 ) " Hegel-Studien 4 (1967): 2 1- 10 0 .



constitutes the w hole Idea— which equally appears in each single one o f them " ( e l § 15; G eraets, 39). C ircularity is a perennial im age associated w ith H erm etic and m ystical thought. Interestingly, the phrase hen kai pan o r hen to pan is associated w ith the alchem ical sym bol o f the ouroburos. T h e G reek phrase is often w ritten inside or around the serpent.61 Erich N eum ann, in The Origins and History o f Consciousness, suggests that the ouroburos is not ju st an alchem ical sym bol but an archetype o f the collective unconscious sym bolizing the original unity o f all things and the return to that unity.*1

N otice, however, that the archai that H egel adopts as im aginative ‘ guides" to speculation (i.e, at the level o f "m eta-speculation") are all m athem atical or geom etrical. To be sure, other sorts o f "im ages" occur in H egel, but only as illustrations o f his concepts. In an "aphorism " from the"W astebook" (w ritten betw een 1803 and 1806), H egel states:"In ph ilosophizing there is nothing to be represented. N o w and then there is an image. M en cling to this. T h e tabula rasa o f A ristotle is accidental and used as a m akeshift. Everyone is fam iliar w ith this. H ow ever, it does not express the essence o f A ristotle ’s concept o f the soul."6’ In short, m etaphors or im ages are a bonus, an aid to understanding only. In order to be understood, from tim e to tim e, H egel m ust write, as Jacob Bohm e would put it, "according to a creaturely w ay and manner, otherw ise you could not understand." M any o f H egel's images or archetypes are drawn from the H erm etic-alchem ical and m ystical traditions, as I w ill show inlater chapters. (T h ese include caput mortuum, aether, and the four elem ents.) But in term s o f H egel's "m etaphilosophy" his guiding im ages are m athem atical-geom etrical alone. (In the next section I w ill explore the image o f the triangle.)

W hat are w e to make, then, o f the follow ing rem ark from Hegel's 1805 Lectures on the History o f Philosophy i

[T h ere is a] m ethod o f representing the universal content by means o f num bers, lines and geom etric figures. T h ese are figurative, but not concretely so, as in the case o f m yths. T h u s it m ay be said that eternity is a circle, the snake that bites its ow n tail (i.e., the ouroburos; see above]. T h is is only an im age, but Sp irit does not require such a sym bol. T h ere are people w ho value such m ethods

61. See C oudert, Alchemy: The Philosopher's Stone, 142- Hen kai pan is also som etim es sym bolized by a cosm ic egg. See also C oudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, 95.62. See N eum ann, Origins and History, 5 -38 . Evola in The Hermetic Tradition traces the phrase“ hen to pan" and its connection to the ouroburos to the alchemical Chrysopoeia o f Cleopatra (M arciano codex (Venice], ms. 2325. fol. 188b; and ms. 2327, fol. 196). H e w rites (pp. 2 0 -2 i) ,“ T h e alchem ical ideogram o f'O n e the All,’ is o , the circle: a line or movement that encloses w ithin itse lf and contains in itself both its end and beginning. In H erm etism this sym bol expresses the universe and, at the same time, the G reat W ork [i.e. the preparation o f the Philosophers Stone]."63. G . W. F. H egel."Aphorism s from the W astebook," trans. Susanne K lein, D avid L. Roochnik, and G eorge E lliott Tucker, Independent Journal o f Philosophy 3 (1979): 1 - 6 ; 5. Werke 1:562.


Copyrighted mater

o f representation, but these form s do not go far. ( l h p 1:88; Werke 18 :10 9 -10 )“

T h is sounds as i f H egel is rejecting the use o f sym bolic form s altogether, bur that is not the case. H e is sim ply saying that the use o f geom etrical im ages, like all images, is lim ited and not fully adequate for the presentation o f philosophical w isdom ; images cannot replace the "conceptual" language o f philosophy. But m y claim about H egel’s "sym bolic form s" is not that they are form s which occur in the text, but that they are form s that lie beneath the text, structuring it, although to be sure, w e do find H egel som etim es explicitly reflecting on these form s— as in the fam ous "circle o f circles" passage.

H egel’s speculation, as I have characterized it, is a sophisticated, post- K antian reappropriation o f the m em ory magic and "active im agination’’ o f H erm etic thinkers such as Bruno and Böhm e. T h e doctrine o f a perennial philosophy or o f a "collective unconscious" was an H erm etic com m onplace. It now becom es clear w hy and how H egel could take alchem y and the Kabbalah, and the thought o f such men as Böhm e, seriously. H e saw them as expressions o f the unconscious w isdom o f Spirit- in-itself, o f the perennial philosophy. In this respect, H egel w as very much in tune w ith the sp irit o f his tim e, in w hich, "T h e re persisted a strong sense o f the possib ility that em bedded in the accretions o f alchem ical literature lay im portant truths expressed in sym bolic form.”65

H egel’s attitude tow ard the H erm etic tradition was cautious, but cautiously approving. H egel saw the H erm etic tradition as a m anifestation o f unconscious w isdom , o f the perennial philosophy, struggling to transcend its purely sensuous form . T h is explains his strongly positive attitude to Böhm e, even though Böhm e grossly violates Hegel's prohibition on "picture-thinking." H egel's claim is that Böhm e com es close to the truth, even though he is caught in "the hard, knotty oak o f the senses." W h at accounts for B öhm es inspiration? M y contention is that Hegel w ould have to adm it that eternal truth sim ply happens to “well up" in certain special individuals, in the form o f certain archetypal form s o f expression. H egel refers to religions as "sprouting up fortuitously, like the flowers and creations o f nature, as foreshadow ings, im ages, representations, w ithout [our] know ing w here they com e from or w here they

64. Hegel m akes sim ilar rem arks in rhe Science o f Logic:" To take num bers and geom etrical figures (as rhe circle, triangle, etc. have often been taken), sim ply as symbol« (the circle, for example, as a sym bol for eternity, the triangle, o f the Trinit)'), is so far harm less enough; but, on the other hand, it is foolish to fancy that in this way more is expressed than can be grasped and expressed by thought. W hatever profound w isdom m ay be supposed to lie in such m eagre sym bols or in those richer products o f fantasy in the m ythology o f peoples and in poetry generally, it is properly for thought alone to make explicit for consciousness tne wiscfom that lies only in them ; and not in sym bols, bur in nature and in m ind. In sym bols the truth is dim m ed and veiled by the sensuous elem ent; only in the form o f thought is it fully revealed to consciousness: the m eaning is only the thought itse lf" (M iller, 21$; w l 1:228-29 ).65. Charles W ebster, From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the Making o f M odern Science (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1982), 10.



are going to" ( l p r 1:196 ; v p r 1:106). H egel states th at"R elig ion is a begetting o f the divine spirit, not an invention o f hum an beings but an effect o f the divine at work, o f the divine productive process w ithin hum anity" ( l p r 1:130 ; v p r 1:46). Recall the Zusatz to the Encyclopedia Logic quoted earlier: "It should . . . be m entioned here that the m eaning o f the speculative is to be understood as being the sam e as w hat used in earlier tim es to be called the 'mystical.' " *

6. The "Divine Triangle" and the Triangle Diagram

I turn now to w hat can be regarded as an early, fascinating, but abortive attem pt on H egel's part to realize the M ythology o f Reason: the so- called "D ivin e Triangle" fragm ent. T h e "D ivin e Triangle” show s Hegel's conscious reappropriation o f H erm etic thought, as well as h is"return” to Christianity. In Hegel's early m usings on the "new religion" there was som ething vaguely anti-C hristian about the w hole project, a charge that C hristian ity is som ehow "unnatural." C ertain ly there is nothing "C h ris tian” about the "System -Program ” fragm ent, no suggestion that its M ythology o f Reason is to involve a revivification o f C hristian myth. W ith the D ivine Triangle, however, H egel seem s to make his peace with Christianity. Part o f the project o f the M ythology o f Reason now seem s to be a reconciliation between philosophical reason and a specifically C hristian revelation.

T h e D ivine Triangle fragm ent no longer survives. A description o f it, as well as som e quotations, were preserved by Rosenkranz. Scholars d isagree about when it w as w ritten. R osenkranz says in the w inter o f 18 0 4 -0 5 . M ore recently, H einz K im m erle has argued for the spring o f

66. T h e passage reads more fully as fo llow s:"It should . . . be mentioned here that the m eaning o f rhe speculative is to be understood as being the same as what used in earlier tim es to be called ‘mystical’ . . . . W hen we speak o f the m ystical' nowadays, it is taken to be synonym ous with what is m ysterious and incom prehensible; and, depending on the ways their culture and m entality vary in other respects, some people treat the m ysterious and incom prehensible as what is authentic and genuine, w hilst others regard it as belonging to the domain o f superstition and deception. About this we must rem ark first th at‘the m ystical' is certainly som ething m ysterious, but only fo r the understanding, and then only because abstract identity is the principle o f the understanding. But when it is regarded as synonym ous w ith the speculative, rhe mystical is the concrete unity o f ju st those determ inations that count as true for the understanding only in their separation and opposition. S o i f those who recognise the mystical as what is genuine say that it is som ething utterly m ysterious, and ju st leave it at that, they are only declaring that for them , too, thinking has only the significance o f an abstract positing o f identity, and that in order to attain the truth we m ust renounce thinking, or, as they frequently put it, that we m ust'take reason captive.' A s we have seen, however, the abstract thinking o f the understanding is so far from being som ething firm and ultim ate that it proves itself, on the contrary, to be a constant sublating o f itse lf and an overturning into its opposite, whereas the rational as such is rational precisely because it conrains both o f the opposites as ideal moments w ithin itself. Thus, everything rational can equally be called ‘mystical’; but this only am ounts to saying that it transcends the understanding. It does not at all imply that what is so spoken o f must be considered inaccessible to thinking and incom prehensible" (el § 82, Z ; G eraets, 133; em phasis added).



I804-*7 T h e m anuscript may have been accom panied by diagram s, none o f w hich survive. (H egel's triangle diagram , to be discussed shortly, does not correspond to the rem arks in the D ivine Triangle fragm ent.)

In his discussion o f the fragm ent, R osenkranz asserts that it belongs to a "theosophical” phase in H egels developm ent.6* In fact, R osenkranz claim s that the "theosophical" phase begins in the Frankfurt period. (T h is is interesting, for one thing, because, as noted in the last chapter, H egel's tim e in Frankfurt was m arked by an association with Freem asonry.) R osenkranz claim s that H egel abandoned the approach o f the Triangle fragm ent because "the lack o f correspondence betw een the im age-form and the form o f pure thinking becam e too great.’’*' T h is view is w rongheaded. A s we shall see, the Triangle fragm ent is heavily laden w ith m ytho-poetic language and preoccupied w ith what R osenkranz calls "geom etrizing,” but this is all to be found in the later w ritings, especially the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit, the Logic and the Philosophy 0/Nature.

R osenkranz suggests that H egel m ay have been inspired in part by the w orks o f Franz von Baader. A s was discussed in chapter 1, H egel tried for many years to curry B aad ers favor. T h is m ust be regarded as quite peculiar, as Baader was the leading occultist o f his era, dism issed by m any as a crank. In particular, R osenkranz suggests that it was Baadcr's 1798 essay, On the Pythagorean Square in Nature or the Four Regions of the World, that served as Hegel's source for the Triangle fragm ent. H . S . H arris (draw ing on the research o f H elm ut Schneider) sum m arizes this essay as follows:

In B aad ers essay the 3 dom ains o f natural history (anim al, vegetable, m ineral) and the 3 types o f m atter (com bustible, salty, earthy) are subordinated under 3 “ basic forces” or "principles" (fire, water, earth). T h ese elem ents would rem ain inert, however, were it not for the 4th principle (air) which enlivens them . T h e relation o f the 4 elem ents is sym bolically portrayed as a triangle w ith a point in the m iddle (representing air). T h is sym bol (triangle w ith a point) Baader calls Q uaternarius or Pythagorean Square.™

T h e alchem ical, and specifically Paracelsian, influence on B aad ers triads and his sym bolism is clear. A s H arris points out, the triangle w ith central point w as also used by Böhm e.71 R osenkranz suggests a Böhm ean influence on the H egelian T riangle fragm ent. A s w e shall see, it is

6 7 . S ee H e in z K im m e rle ,"Z u r C h ro n o lo g ie von H egel* Je n a e r Schriften ,'’ Hegel Studien 4 :12 5 - 7 6 ; 14 4 ,16 1- 6 2 . W alter Jaeschke is convinced that this dating refutes Roscnkranx's thesis o f a ’ tnystical-theosophical phase" in Hegel's developm ent. T h is has no bearing on m y claims. In effect, I am arguing that H egel's "m ysrical-theosophical phase" never ended. See Jaeschke, Rea- son in Religion, 126.68. K arl Rosenkranz,“ H egels ursprüngliches System 1798-1806 ," Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch 2 (18 44): 15 7 - 6 4 :15 7 . Trans, in H arris, Night Thoughts,184.69. Ibid., 159 (H arris, 184).70. Ibid., 159 (H arris, 184).7 1. H arris, Night Thoughts. 185, n.



B ö h m es influence (and perhaps also that o f O etinger) that is indeed decisive.72

Rosenkranz's sum m ary o f the Triangle fragm ent is as follows:To express the life o f the Idea, [H egel] constructed a triangle o j triangles, w hich he suffered to move through one another in such a w ay that each one w as not only at one tim e extreme and at another time middle generally, but also it had to go through this process internally w ith each o f its sides. A n d then, in order to m aintain the ideal plasticity o f unity am id this rigidity and crudity o f intuition, to maintain the fluidity o f the distinctions represented as triangle and sides, he went on consistently to the further barbarity o f expressing the totality as [a] square resting over the triangles and their process. But he seem s to have got tired in the follow ing out o f his labour; at any rate he broke o ff at the construction o f the animal [Thier].”

H . S . H arris has offered an ingenious reconstruction o f the geom etrical theosophy o f the Triangle fragm ent, but as w e cannot be sure that it expresses w hat H egel actually had in m ind, I w ill not go through the details o f H arris ’s reconstruction here.74

A s R osenkranz points out, H egel's preoccupation w ith triadicity does not sim ply reflect an infatuation w ith Bohm ean sym bolism , but also a conscious attem pt to em brace the C hristian Trinity, to bring it into philosophical speculation. R osenkranz w rites:“ H e wanted now to grasp the Trinity in the triangle o f triangles. H e wanted at this date, not to banish this image from h im self as irrational, in which ehe faith had for centuries reverenced its highest possession.’ R osenkranz goes on to point to H egel’s interest (starting, it seem s, in his Berne period) in C hristian m ystics such as E ckhart and Tauler.

72. H arris w rites:"H egel's attitude to Böhm e in 1804 to 1806 is critically appreciative, but he consistently attacks the direct acceptance o f Böhm es m etaphors and sym bols as the sim ple truth. See esp. the Wastebook, item s 45 and 48 (Rosenkranz, (Hegeli Leben) pp. 546, 547, and 199). S o i f we project this attitude back to an earlier period when H egel w as less discontented w ith pictorial modes o f expression generally, we might fairly take the triangle fragment as an attempt to develop what Hegel took to be Böhm es meaning in Böhm es own m ode" (N/gbr Tfwughts, 185, n). M y one quarrel w ith H arris here is that H egel never becom es fully dissatisfied with the sort o f'p ic to ria l modes o f expression” discussed in the preceding section: the m eta-dialectical“sym - bolic form s" o f the triangle, circle, etc.73. Rosenkranz,“ H egels ursprüngliches System," 160 (in H arris, Night Thoughts, 185). It is worth noting here the sim ilarity to H egel’s treatment o f the “circle o f circles” in the Encyclopedia Logic o f i8 i7 :"E ach o f the parts o f philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle that closes upon itself; but in each o f them the philosophical Idea is in a particular determ inacy or element. Every single circle also breaks through the restriction o f its element as well, precisely because it is inwardly [the] totality, and it grounds a further sphere. T h e whole presents itself therefore as a circle o f circles, each o f which is a necessary mom ent, so that the system o f its peculiar elements constitutes the whole idea— which equally appears in each single one o f them” ( e i § 15; G eraets, 39).7 4 . See also H elm ut Schn eiders attempted reconstruction in his"Anfange der System entw icklung H egels in Jena,” Hegel-Studien 10 (1975): 133—71.75. Rosenkranz,“ Hegels ursprüngliches System ," 161 (in H arris, Night Thoughts, 185).

io6 The Sorcerer's Apprenticeship


T h e influence o f the doctrine o f the Trinity show s itse lf in Hegel's claim in the Triangle fragm ent that “A m ore intelligible expression for the notion o f G o d as the universal life [Allebtns] is the term Love, but a deeper one is Spirit."7* Insofar as it is possible to penetrate the obscurity o f the lines R osenkranz quotes from the Triangle fragm ent, it appears that the triangles represent the process o f G o d s com ing to consciousness o f H im self. T h is is w hat is meant by Sp irit (w hat H egel w ill later call "Absolute Sp irit"). T h ere appear to be three triangles in all, w ith the “triangle o f triangles" being the figure made up by the set o f the three.

T h e first triangle is described by H egel as fo l!ow s:“ In this First, which is at the sam e tim e only O ne side o f the absolutely unique Triangle, there is only the G odhead in reciprocal intuition and cognition w ith H im self." T h is cannot help but rem ind us o f B öhm es description o f G o d "in H im self." Recall that Böhm es first three sp irits— So u r, Sw eet, and B itter— form a prim ordial Trin ity o f conflict w ithin the G odhead, preceding its m anifestation. T h ey are a triad o f the unm anifest G o d or G od -in -H im self. D avid W alsh w rite s :“ H egel suggested, as Böhm e also did, that the first T rin ity o f G o d in h im self is not sufficient for the divine self-revelation.'’77 In fact, H egel’s account o f the Trin ity here is quite sim ilar to his account o f B öhm es Trin ity in the Lectures on the History o f P h i- losophy ( l h p 3 :19 7 -2 14 ; Werke 2 0 :9 9 -116 ).

H egel continues: "(T h e Idea o f the G od h ead is that] in which the pure light o f unity is the middle, and w hose sides are likew ise the pure raying outw ards, and the pure refraction o f the ray back into itself."7* Light, for Böhm e, is the pure principle o f openness, o f m anifestation w ithout any hiddenness. Fire, for Böhm e, is the kindling o f light w ithin the darkness that is G o d in H im self. T h is seem s to be som ething like w hat H egel is aim ing at here: light com es to be w ithin the Idea that is the triangle o f G o d in H im self. It "rays" outw ards. T h is is "G o d the Father." T h e second triangle is "G o d the Son." H egel w rites: "In the Son, G o d is cognizant o f H im se lf as G o d . H e says to H im sclfi I am G o d . T h e w ith in -itse lf ceases to be a negative."''' T h e triangle o f the Son is the consum m ation o f the light that is kindled in the triangle o f the Father (or the Idea). "T h e w ith in -itself ceases to be negative" m eans som ething

76. H arris w rites that “ 'Sp irit is deeper’ as a name o f G o d because it nam es a self-cognitive experience" (H arris, Nivht Thoughts, 163). Rosenkranz paraphrases this line in his account. T h e line, as I nave given it, appears as a direct quotation from the fragm ent in R . Haym 's Hegel und seine Zeit (1857; reprint, H ildesheim : G eo rg O lm s, 1962), 10 1. O etinger also gave Love a central place in his thought, as Robert Schneider notes:“ Love is thus the h ighest know ledge-form [ErkenntnisformJ, because in it the beloved [Geliefcfe] is entirely contained w ithin the soul, because you (du) and I becom e identical" (Geistesahnen, 84).77 . See W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 321.78. R osen kran z,"H egels ursprüngliches System ,” 163 (H arris , Night Thoughts, 187).79. O bviously w ith the Logos in m ind, H arris w rites o f this p assage:"T h e A bsolute Being, the Father, utters h im self as the son. H e says w hat he is in order that he m ay h im self know what he is. T h e Universe as a totality is this 'say in g '" (Night Thoughts, 164). It is interesting in this context to recall what Böhm e says about Ton (see chapter 1).



analogous to B öhm es transform ation o f th e "in -H im se lf"o f G o d (Sou r- Sw eet-B itter) into G o d becom e fo r-H im self through H eat, Love, Tone, and Body.

H egel continues:T h e distinction and the w ealth o f G od 's self-consciousness is reconciled [in the triangle o f the So n ] with H is simplicity, and the realm o f the Son o f G o d is also the realm o f the Father. T h e self- consciousness o f G o d is not a w ithdraw al back w ith in H im se lf and an otherness o f the So n , ju st as it is nor an otherness o f H is w ith drawal back w ithin H im se lf as sim ple G o d , but H is intuition in the Son is the intuiting o f the sim ple G o d as H is ow n self, but in such a w ay that the So n rem ains So n , or as not distinguished and at the sam e time distinguished; or the farspread Realm o f the Universe, which has no longer any being-for-self over against itself, but rather its being-for-self is a returning back w ithin G o d , or is G od 's returning back w ithin H im self, a jo y over the m ajesty o f the Son whom H e intuits as H im self.“

H ere H egel is expressing the identity-in-difference o f the Father and Son . T h e Son is a distinct m om ent from the Father, yet the Son is G od , insofar as it is only in the Son that the Father actually becom es G od .

H egel w rites further o f th is triangle o f the S o n :"In the Second [T riangle] G o d ’s intuiting has stepped over to one side. H e has com e into connection w ith Evil and the m iddle is the bad[ness] o f the m ixing o f both. But this triangle becom es a Square, in that the pure G odhead floats above it." I have little to say about how the "square" figures in here (H arris has his ow n conjectures). T h e "geom etrical" aspects to this fragment are difficult to understand completely. W h at is m ore im portant here is the role played by Evil. W alsh w rites o f this section o f the fragm ent that "creation separated from G o d is the evil reality."8' W ith the Son , difference is introduced into the G odhead. It provides fo r G o d ’s actualization as G o d , but it is difference, division, opposition nonetheless. Taken on its ow n, this opposition is evil. Evil is the part attem pting to stand on its ow n, to stand in for the w hole. In Böhm e, as I noted in chapter i, Lucifer represents the w ill to isolation, cutting-off, a selfishness that all th ings exhibit. (I will discuss the role o f evil in H egel’s p h ilosophy m uch m ore extensively in the follow ing chapter.)

T h e separated m om ent that stands opposed to the G o d h ead m ust be "tran sfigured" and brought into unity w ith in G o d . H egel w rites that "the Son m ust go right through the E arth , m ust overcom e Evil, and in that he steps over to one side as the victor, m ust aw aken the other, the self-cognition o f G o d , as a new cognition that is one w ith G o d , or as the S p irit o f G o d : w hereby the m iddle becom es a beautifu l, free, d ivine m iddle, the U niverse o f G o d ."“ T h is heralds the arrival o f a new

80. R osen kran z,“ H egels ursprüngliches System ," 162 (H arris, Nigfcf Thoughts,286-87).81. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 320.82. Rosenkranz, "H egels ursprüngliches System ,” 163 (in H arris, Nigbt Thoughts, 18 7-8 8 ).

io8 The Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship


triangle, presum ably o f the H oly Sp irit (though H egel is not clear about th is).

T h a t the So n m ust pass over into a third stage o f the Sp irit is, how ever, obvious. C onsider the follow ing, which occurs earlier in w hat R osenkranz has preserved for u s :"W h a t stands over against the Son in his m ajesty as H e intuits the Earth , is the m ajesty o f G o d H im self, the looking back and returning hom e to H im . A nd for the consecrated Earth this self-consciousness o f G o d is the Sp irit, which proceeds from G o d , and in which the Earth is one w ith H im and w ith the Son.'’8'

H egel w rites further o f Sp irit in the following:T h is Sp irit is here the eternal m ediator between the Son returned unto the Father, w ho is now w holly and only one, and between the being o f the son w ithin him self, or o f the m ajesty o f the Universe. T h e sim plicity o f the all-em bracing Sp irit has now stepped into the m iddle and there is now no distinction any m ore. For the Earth as the self-consciousness o f G o d is now the Sp irit, yet it is also the eternal son whom G o d intuits as H im self. T h u s has the holy triangle o f triangles closed itself. T h e First [triangle] is the Idea o f G od which is carried out in the other triangles, and returns into itse lf by passing through them .”

I f w hat R o sen kran z has preserved o f the T riangle fragm ent is exam ined carefully, it becom es clear that it is the b lueprint o f H egel’s entire system . T h e nature o f h is Logic is expressed here very clearly : the first "triad'* o f the system (in the later Logic, B ein g-E ssen ce-C on cept) is the "Id ea o f G o d .” In the Science of Logic, in a w ell-know n passage, H egel declares that his aim is "the exposition o f G o d as he is in h is eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite S p ir it” (M iller, 50; w l

i 533- 3 4 )* T h is Idea is expressed (m ade real) in the triads o f the So n , that is, the P h ilosoph y o f N atu re (M echanics, P hysics, O rgan ics)“ and the P h ilosoph y o f S p irit (Subjective, O bjective, and A bso lu te Sp irit). T ow ard the end o f w h at R osenkranz quotes o f the Triangle m anuscript, H egel even em ploys em anation im agery to describe the relation o f the first triad o f the Idea o f G o d to the others: “ through the second triangle o f the So n , the T h ird has im m ediately form ed itself, the return o f all into G o d H im self, or the having-been-poured-out [das Ausgegossensein] o f the Idea overall."“ In the transition to N ature at the end o f the Science of Logic, H egel w rites that "the Idea freely releases itse lf in its absolute self-sufficiency and stasis” (die Idee sich selbst frei entlässt, ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend; M iller, 843; w l 3:305). T h e "Idea o f G o d ” becom es the "U n iverse o f G o d " (see above): the Idea becom es concrete, em bodied. H ere again we see the influence o f Böhm e and O etinger.

83. Ibid., 162 (H arris, 187); italics in original.84. Ibid., 16 2 -6 3 (H arris, 187).85. In a Zusatz to the Philosophy o f Nature (Berlin period, 18 :9 -3 0 ) , Hegel rem arks that "N atu re is the Son o f G o d . . . " ( p n § 247, Z ; Perry I, 206).86. R o sen kran z ,“ H egels ursprüngliches System ." 164 (H arris , Night Thoughts, 188).



It m ight be claimed th a t a m ajor difference betw een the doctrine o f the Triangle fragm ent and Hegel's m ature philosophy is th a t the form er describes the E arth as “the self-consciousness o f God." O n closer exam ination, however, there is no disparity. As we have seen, Hegel claims th a t "the E arth as the self-consciousness o f G od is now the Spirit.” N atu re itself (excluding m an) is one form in which the Idea o f G od finds concrete expression. But G od's self-consciousness is achieved only through a natural (terrestrial) being th a t sim ultaneously rises above nature to the ideal: m ankind or Spirit.

W riting o f the transfigured E arth as the “Universe o f God,” Hegel says: “T h is Second Triangle is (qua being in the separation) herew ith itself a twofold Triangle, o r its tw o sides are each a triangle, the one the converse o f the other, and the middle is in th is m ovem ent o f history the all-effecting force o f the absolute unity th a t floats above the first, and takes th is up in to itself and changes it into ano ther w ithin itself. But w hat is visible, th a t is the tw o triangles, b u t the m iddle is only the invisible m ight a t w ork in the inward [soul].“r T his passage is exceedingly obscure, bu t we can im mediately glean from it th a t even in th is early m anuscript Hegel is speaking o f G o d s achievement o f self-consciousness as an historical process. C ould the "invisible m ight a t work in the inw ard [soul]" be equivalent to the "cunning o f Reason” i

T his m anuscript was obviously no t intended by Hegel for publication. It constitu tes notes to himself. Its baffling, frenzied style indicates th a t Hegel was rushing to get his inspirations onto paper, to give him self a rough outline o f his system, a roadm ap for where he was going. T h is is the earliest such fragm ent to indicate the entirety o f the system in its outlines. W h at is so strik ing is how indebted H egel obviously is to H er- meticism. T he ch ief deb t is clearly to Bohme. But there is also evidence o f the influence o f Baader, Oetinger, and Eckhart. Even m ore strik ing is the way in which the entire text is ruled by a concern for an exact fit betw een speculative tru th and geom etric form.

As no ted above, the triangle diagram does no t appear to be an illustra tion o f the ideas o f the Triangle/ru^mem. H . S. H arris concurs in this judgm ent, stating, rather enigmatically, th a t the diagram "belongs in the context o f magical speculation."“ W e do no t know w hen H egel made th is diagram. W e do no t even know w ith certainty th a t he m ade it. N evertheless, it was found in Hegel's papers and has always been a ttribu ted

87. Ibid., 16 3 -6 4 (in H arris, 188); H arris interpolates "soul."88. H arris, Night Thoughts, 157. H arris w rites that the'ph ilosophical background to the sym bolism is N eo-Pythagorean, rather than Christian." I do nor see what would incline one to this judgm ent, as opposed, for instance, to the judgm ent rhat the sym bolism is"N eo-Paracelsian"or"N eo-A ggrip ian” or “ N eo-Bohm ean." H elm ut Schneider also holds that the diagram does not illustrate the fragm ent, for obvious reasons:“ T h e text describes a triangle of triangjes, whereas the draw ing show s a triangle with triangles." See H elm ut Sch n eid er,"Z u r D reiecks-Sym bolik bei Hegel,” Hegel-Studien 8 ( i973): 55~77: 57 (m y translation). T h is is one o f the very few discussions o f this draw ing in print.

no The Sorcerers Apprenticeship


i. Hegel's triangle diagram. Reprinted by permission of Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.


to him . It was first published in 1937 in G . Stu h lfau ths Das Dreick and has since been very seldom reprinted.**

I have reproduced the diagram as figure 1 . It is draw n partly in pen, partly in a ruddy pencil, on cheap, gray-brow n paper. T h e draw ings m ajor com ponents are four triangles: one large central triangle and three others at each o f its points. T h ey are all pointing in the sam e direction, but it is uncertain w hether the draw ing is to be positioned so that the triangles point up or dow n, or to one side or the other. H elm ut Sch n eider prints it w ith the triangles pointed dow n, as does H äusserm ann. A round the sides o f the large triangle is a collection o f bizarre sym bols. T h e w ord Spiritus appears three tim es, each time at the left end o f one o f the sides ( th c MS " at the beginning o f the w ord is also w ritten in pencil, w hereas the rest o f the word is in pen). A few o f the sym bols arc easily identified (see the key I have provided in figure 2). T h ey include the traditional sym bols for the sun, the m oon, M ars, M ercury, Jupiter, and Sat-

89. See G. Stuhlfauth, Das Dreieck: Die Geschichte eines religiösen Symbols (Stuttgart, 1937), Abbildung 16. In 1939 it was reprinted by Friedrich Häussermann in his "Das göttliche Dreieck’ und seine Bedeutung fur die Philosophie Hegels,” Zentrallblatt für Psychotherapie 11 (1939): 359-79- Häusser- manns article is, in fact, a Jungian discussion o f the Triangle fragment.


M2 The Sorcerers Apprenticeship

2. Key to triangle diagram

Saturn

Leo

Sagittarius

G o ld (i) $

£Potash/Antim ony %

% Jupiter

V > 0

X Piscesa *

M oon

Sun

M ars

t eM ercury

Capricorn(Agrippa) YSulphur

?

?

A

V irgo

C aputM ortuum

M ercury(A grippa)

5-point Star

6*point S tar

Triangle

urn. T h ere is a certain sym m etry to the sym bols, as Schneider points out, insofar as a planetary sym bol appears over each occurrence o f “Spir- itus."w O thers are harder to identify. O ne appears to be an alternate, older sym bol for M ercury. A nother m ight be Pisces. Som e o f the other sym bols could possib ly be chem ical or alchem ical. O ne appears to be a sym bol for sulphur, another alum or potash, still another caput mortuum (see chapter 5 for my discussion o f Hegel's use o f this alchem ical term ). T h e other sym bols, which include seven stars (som e w ith five points, others w ith six) and tw o sm aller triangles, are o f very uncertain origin.

90. H elm ut Schneider," Z u r D reiecks-Sym bolik bei Hegel," 58.


Hegel regularly employed astrological, chemical, and alchemical sym bols in his m anuscripts, as abbreviations. T hese includc the symbols for Sun, M oon, E arth , M ars, Venus, Jupiter, S atu rn , Mercury, water, fire, acid, salt, salpeter, and sulphur.*1

I f this draw ing is a copy no one has yet succeeded in locating the original. It does bear a strik ing resem blance to m any alchem ical and magical draw ings in books that H egel could have perused. For instance, as H elm ut Schneider points out, m any alchem ical or magical diagram s were printed in m ore than one color o f ink— typically black and red— and it could be that H egel substituted pencil for the parts printed in red.” In truth, although H egel’s diagram looks superficially like m any "H e rm etic’' illustrations, it is unusual in a num ber o f respects, as I shall d iscuss shortly. I have printed tw o exam ples o f genuine magical diagram s that contain elem ents sim ilar to Hegel's as figures 3 and 4.

In 18 10 , Hegel began a correspondence w ith Karl Joseph H ierony- m ous W indischm ann (17 7 5 -18 39 ). In 1809, W indischm ann had pu b lished a review o f the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-ZeitungW indischm ann's review, which was positive, was one o f the m ost significant to be published in H egel’s early career. W indischm ann had studied philosophy and medicine a t the universities o f M ainz, W ürzburg , and Vienna. In 1797 he began practicing medicine, bu t in 1803 he was made a professor o f natural philosophy at Aschaffen- burg. W indischm ann was a Freem ason (a fact o f some significance, to which I will re tu rn in the following chapter), and during the period o f his correspondence w ith Hegel he was engaged in a study o f magic. In 1813 he would publish Untersuchungen über Astrologie, Alchemie und M agie* W indischm ann considered magic to be a special kind o f con tro lling influence exerted by one individual on ano ther (H egel accepts this account com pletely— see chapter 6). However, he also a ttribu ted this power to natural forces, thus com m itting him self to a panpsychist phi-

91. See editorial m atter in H egel, Gesammelte Werke, cd. K laus D üsing and H einz Kim m erle, vol. 6 (H am burg: Felix M einer Verlag, 1975), 339-92. H elm ut Schneider,“ Z u r D reiecks-Sym bolik bei Hegel,” 60. It could also be, as Schneider suggests, that this indicates that Hegel copied the diagram , substituting pencil for red. A s I have said, however, no one has found the original and there are enough idiosyncrasies in the draw ing— for instance the triple "Sp iritu s" rather than the u sual“Sp iritus-A nim a-C orpus"— to indicate that it represents H egel’s appropriation o f som e occult sym bols for his own purposes.93. K .J . H . W indischm ann, Rezension, Phänomenologie des Geistes,Jenaische A llgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 3 1 -3 4 (1809) colum ns 2 4 1-7 2 .94- In 1818 W indischm ann w as made professor o f the history o f philosophy at Bonn. W indischm ann w as a Rom an C atholic and became increasingly orthodox as the years went on. T h is appears to have been partly the cause o f a parting o f the ways between W indischm ann and Hegel (w hose sentim ents were decidedly anti-Catholic). T h e real break came in the 1820s when H egel, lecturing on the Philosophy o f World History, publicly accused W indischm ann o f having stolen his interpretation o f C hinese philosophy. S e e Petry, Philosophy o f Subjective Spirit, vol. 2, 573-75 .



3. From an eighteenth-ccnury manuscript known to G oethe. Reprinted in J . Scheible, Doktor Johannes Fausts Magia naturalis et inaturalis oder Dreifacher Höllenswang, letztes Testament and Siegelkunst (Stuttgart, 1849). Reprinted by permission o f the Robert W . W oodruff Library, Special Collections and Archives, Em ory University, Atlanta, Georgia.

ii4 The Sorcerer’s Apprenticeship

losophy o f nature.'" W indischm ann w rote the following lines to Hegel concerning his research into magic:

Everything rests on the fundam ental though t th a t w hat is tem poral, finite, in a sta te o f becom ing . . . is the eternal itself com prehended in its evolution, developm ent, and self-knowledge, and that the im penetrable Spirit m ust o f necessity individualize itself and take form in the infinity and infinite diversity o f m om ents, which in them selves can nonetheless be m ost sharply grasped. In th is way equally num erous form s o f one-sidedness and o f incantation are

95. S e e Bu tler, 559.

4. Illustration from Sam uel N orton, Mercurius redivivus (1630).Reprinted by perm ission o f the estate o f C . G . Jung.


Copyrighted image

possible and effective, each along the path o f S p irits developm ent. All such form s m ust find the ir explication in th is investigation, beginning w ith the first and full magical power o f the Im penetrable— and o f N atu re surging forth everywhere— over man, p ro ceeding through the isolation and interlocking o f m om ents, and ending w ith the penetration, illum ination, and com plete magical power o f Sp irit itself, which dissipates all magical incantation and constitu tes the clarity and freedom o f life itself.*

96. Quoted in ibid., 559.


W indischm ann goes on to com plain o f the terrible mental state induced by his magical investigations. In his response to W indischm ann (M ay 27, 18 10), H egel offers his sym pathy: " I am very curious to have your w ork on m agic in hand. I confess I would not dare tackle this dark side and m ode o f spiritual nature or natural spirit, and am all the happier that you w ill both illum inate it for us and take up m any a neglected and scorned subject, restoring it to the honor it deserves.”*7

It seem s that H egel is saying here that he has never deliberately delved into the area o f the occult or o f esoteric philosophy. But H egel goes on to suggest— in a passage I shall quote at length— that he has at som e point in the past undergone W indischm anns torm ents him self:

C on sid er you rse lf convinced that the fram e o f m ind you depict to me is partly due to this present w o rk o f yours, to this descent into dark regions w here nothing is revealed as fixed, definite, and certain. . . . From m y ow n experience I know this m ood o f the soul, or rather o f reason, which arises when it has finally made its w ay with interest and hunches into a chaos o f phenom ena but, though inw ardly certain o f the goal, has not yet w orked its w ay through them to clarity and to a detailed account o f the w hole. For a few years I suffered from this hypochondria to the point o f exhaustion. Everybody probably has such a turning point in his life, the nocturnal point o f the contraction o f his essence in w hich he is forced through a narrow passage by which h is confidence in h im self and everyday life grow s in strength and assu ran ce .. . . Continue onw ard w ith confidence. It is science [ Wissenscha/t] which has led you into this labyrinth o f the soul, and science alone is capable o f leading you out again and healing y o u *

It seem s likely, as others have suggested, that H egel is draw ing here from his ow n experience in the Berne-Frankfurt period/" Recall that R osenkranz places the beginning o f H egel's "theosophical phase" in Frankfurt. It is likely that Rosenkranz uses “theosophical" to refer to occult or H erm etic philosophy, rather than "m ere” m ysticism , for R osenkranz knew that in Berne H egel becam e interested in Eckhart and Tauler. (In other w ords, by characterizing the Frankfurt period alone, and not the Berne-Frankfurt periods together, as H egel’s "theosophical stage” R osenkranz im plies that the “theosophy" in question was not the m ysticism o f Eckhart and Tauler.) H elm ut Schneider w rites: “ H egel had connections [Beziehungen] to alchemy, gnosticism , Rosicru- cianism . Freem asonry, and astrology. T h e draw ing is perfectly locatable w ithin this horizon [Horizont]."100 M y hypothesis is that the triangle d iagram represents, to use H egel’s ow n w ords, "a turning point," a "nocturnal point o f the contraction o f h is essence." It represents H egel’s initial synthesis o f theosophy— such as he w as exposed to in his Sw abian Heimat, as well as whatever else he encountered in Frankfurt— w ith the

97. Ibid ., 561; H offm eister *158; m y italics.98. Butler, 561; H offm eister #158.99. See Butler, 560.100 . Ibid., 7 y

n6 T h e Sorcerers Apprenticeship


idealism o f K ant and Fichte, which, as we have seen, he studied in earnest during the same period.101

T h e word Spiritus occurs three tim es in the m idst o f astrological and (possibly) alchem ical sym bols, on each o f the sides o f the central triangle. T h is could represent H egel’s philosophical realization that all reality— w hether celestial (the planets) or terrestrial (the elem ents)— m ust be understood in term s o f the developm ent o f Sp irit .'“ A round the probable time o f the Triangle fragm ent H egel begins using the term Grist to speak o f the divine: “A m ore intelligible expression for the notion o f G o d as the universal life [AHebensJ is the term Love, but a deeper one is Spirit.” 10* N atu re is to be seen as an expression o f the divine Idea, and m ankind (Spirir) as the highest expression o f nature, and the consum m ation or com pletion o f the divine. Spiritus is the "m agic w ord" that evokes the “shape" o f the Absolute, which allows us to com prehend the A bsolute in its totality.

H egel's early presentation o f his system (ca. 18 0 2 -3) consisted o f four parts: Logic and M etaphysics, Ph ilosophy o f N ature, System o f Ethical Life, and theory o f the Absolute Idea (art, religion, and ph ilosophy).104 T h e later H egel, o f course, collapsed the third and fourth parts into Philosophy o f Sp irit , turning the System o f Ethical L ife into O bjective Sp irit . (T h e triangle and the square thus seem to vie w ith one another in the Jen a period for the honor o f being H egel's central sym bolic form .) I f the diagram is from this period, the large triangle m ight possibly represent A bsolute Sp irit , and the sm aller triangles the other parts o f the system .

It is also possible that the four triangles represent the four elem ents. In h is m ature Philosophy of Nature ( 18 19 -18 3 0 ), H egel identifies the “ M ineral K ingdom " w ith E arth , the "P lan t K ingdom " w ith w ater and the “A nim al K ingdom " w ith fire. H egel suggests that fire gives w ay to “eth eria lity" (das Aetherische) but never explicitly identifies man w ith air, the fourth elem ent. T h is is, o f course, the obvious move to make, for

10 1. H elm ut Sch n eid er,"Z u r D reiecks-Sym bolik bei Hegel." 76, states that it is probably im possible to date the draw ing w ith any certainty.102 . T h e term Spiri/us is quite com m on in alchemical and magical diagram s. It is generally part o f a triad: Spiritus, Anima (Sou l), Corpus (Body). T h e fact thar Hegel includes only Spiritu* and w rites it three times ("taking the place" o f Anima and Corpus) could indicate that Sp irit is being absolutized vis-a-vis Body (m ateriality: rhe four elements) and Soul (this is a possible reading o f the Philosophy of Spirit, in which "soul" [Seele] appears at the lowest level, before Spirit proper; Sean K elly notes that "soul“ is the m ediating, com m on term between Sp irit and nature). See Kelly, Individuation and the Absolute (N ew York: Paulist Press, 1993)« 38. In his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, in the exposition o f Böhm es thought, Hegel refers to Bohm e's "three kinds o f powers o r Spiritus in different Centn*, but in one Corpore" ( l h p 3 :2 14 ; Werfce 20 :116). H owever, the description which follows does not appear to shed any light on the diagram.103. A s noted above, Rosenkranz paraphrases th is line in his account. The line, as I have given it, appears as a direct quotation from the fragm ent in H aym s Hegel und seine Zeit, 101.104 . H arris, Nigfa Thoughts, xlix ; see also Harris's Introduction to the System of Ethical Life, 6.



air = pneuma = Spiritus. T h u s , in our diagram , the central triangle could represent m an/air, and the other triangles nonliving m atter/E arth , p lants/w ater, anim als/fire.

But w hy is the Spiritus triangle surrounded by astronom ical and other sym bols ? T h is can be explained i f we rem em ber the connection A ristotle draws between pneuma and aether. In the Generation of Animals he w rites, "N o w it is true that the faculty o f all kinds o f soul seem s to have a connection w ith a m atter different from and m ore divine than the so- called e lem en ts .. . . A il have in their sem en that which causes it to be productive. I mean w hat is called thermon.This is not the fire or any such [sublunary] force, but it is the pneuma included in the sem en and the foam -like, and the natural principle in the pneum a [is] like the elem ent in the stars" (736b29~737ai). T h e elem ent in the stars is, o f course, aether. Insofar as we hum ans arc know ers (i.e., receivers o f form ), we contain som ething o f this astral substance. (P lotinus takes the doctrine a step further, claim ing that we possess an astral or aetherial body, which w as to become a m ajor tenet o f the later H erm etic philosophy and o f the contem porary "N e w A g e")

T h u s, to fo llow out this chain o f equivalences and connections, i f man = Spiritus = pneuma, and the pneuma or life-force o f man contains aether, and aether is the substance o f the heavenly bodies, then there is an identity betw een man and the heavenly bodies. T h u s, H egel blends Spir- itus w ith the planets and stars. I f H egel is draw ing on all o f this, it is a w ay for him to state w h at I said earlier: that all reality— w hether celestial or terrestrial is to be understood in term s o f Sp irit as its telos. (A s I have already m entioned and w ill discuss much m ore fully in chapter 6, the aether is an im portant concept fo r H egel.)

But this is by no m eans the only possible interpretation o f the d iagram . I f we rake the central triangle as representing the Trinity, each point stands for a person o f the T rin ity: Father (divine Logos), Son (created N ature), and H oly Sp irit. Spiritus is w ritten on each side, perhaps, because the first tw o ‘'m om ents" o f the T rin ity arc com prehended by the third. T h e Father and the Son are aufgehoben in the Sp irit. A s this is not a tem poral sequence but a logical one. Father and Son are always already w ithin the w hole that is Sp irit . T h e sides o f the triangle unite and, in fact, create the points, the "m om ents" o f the divine w hole. Father and Son are w h at they are through Sp irit . T h u s , the sides o f the triangle are identified w ith Spiritus, w hich is both an individual point o f the tr iangle and that w hich perm eates and bonds together the w hole. (H ere w e see the fundam ental inadequacy o f p ictorial expressions o f speculative p h ilosop h y: w hat can only be understood through R eason is expressed in a m ode suited to the U nderstanding, which is quite literally "tw o-dim ensional" thinking.)

It is also, o f course, possible that the central triangle represents Sp irit alone, and the three sm aller triangles, Father, Son , and H o ly Sp irit. I f this is the case, a sim ilar analysis applies: H egel draw s a large, central triangle o f Sp irit, pointing to the other three, to indicate how Sp irit is not sim ply a m om ent o f the Trinity, but the "final" m om ent that com pre-

u8 T h e Sorcerers Apprenticeship


hends and binds together the Trinity itself. If, however, we take the central triangle to represent the Trinity, then perhaps the th ree sm aller tr iangles represent the individual “sciences” o f the T rinity: Logic, Philosophy o f N ature, and Philosophy o f Spirit.

I have suggested that the diagram represents a synthesis o f theosophy w ith the Fichtean-Kantian idealism because the diagram , am idst much arcane "H erm etic" sym bolism , seem s to represent the absolutization o f hum an Sp irit or Ego. Recall Sch ellin gs 1795 letter to H egel, quoted in the last chapter: “ For Spinoza the world, the object by itse lf in opposition to the subject, w as everything. For me it is the selfT1W M y suggestion is that H egel's diagram represents a stage (or a step) in Hegel's thought parallel to Schellings: the m odification o f a Spinozistic-K abbalistic- pantheistic nature m ysticism with an absolutization o f Sp irit or Ego as Z ie l and Quelle o f nature itself. (It is also possible, o f course, that H egel realized that this "synthesis" w as in fact sim ilar to the Böhm ean- O etingerite brand o f theosophy.)

Earlier in th is chapter I spoke o f the historicity o f Hegel's speculation and stated th a t it could only have been accom plished after history itself was consum m ated, after hum an beings have recognized them selves as free and self-determ ining, no t determ ined by an Absolute w hich stands opposed to hum anity as an absolute other. If the com position o f the tr iangle diagram represents Hegel's realization o f the centrality o f Spirit or Ego, then the diagram constitu tes, in effect, a kind o f m arker po in t at the end o f history.

It certainly seems plausible to suggest, then, th a t the diagram represents the inspiration th a t led Hegel to “convert” to a form o f Schellingian idealism. W h at is significant here is th a t the conversion, contrary to w hat is usually m aintained, appears no t to have been the result o f Hegel's moving in a straight line from K ant to Fichte and finally to Schelling, as the latest and m ost adequate exponent o f idealism. Rather, the conversion was m ore likely effected through Hegel's realization that Schellings Identity philosophy represented a revision o f the K antian- Fichtean philosophy in accord w ith the "deep tru th" revealed through Proclus, Eckhart, Böhme, O etinger, and the alchemists.

7. Sum m ary o f the Argument T hus Far

T h e present chapter has been largely “program m atic": laying ou t an account o f how Hegel's overall project can be understood as a reappro- priarion o f H erm etic ideals, them es, and symbols. In the next four chapters, I will develop an in terpretation o f Hegel's m ature philosophical w ritings and lectures in term s o f my understanding o f their debts to and affinity w ith the H erm etic trad ition . I will continue to introduce sources th a t m ay have influenced Hegel and continue to spell ou t in w hat way I regard his work as itself belonging to the H erm etic tradition. Before moving on to th a t account, a b rie f sum m ary o f the argum ent thus far seems in order.


105. Quoted in Butler, 32.


Hegel's th o u g h t is no t a p a rt o f the history o f philosophy. It rep resen ts an altogether different standpoin t, one th a t represents completed wisdom, no t the search for w isdom . H egel is a wise m an offering no t Philosophie bu t Wtssenschaft, scientia, episteme. H e calls th is science o f w isdom "speculation" and opposes it to reflection (Reflexion). Recall that “speculation" comes from speculum, m irror. Reflection is no t the “m irroring" H egel advocates, because it is a m ere ‘'duplication"— observation or phenom enological descrip tion, such as we find in Kant's T ranscendental A esthetic and Analytic o r later in H usserl's phenom enology.

H egel in the Encyclopedia Logic states that "the term ‘reflection' is p rim arily used o f light, w hen, propagated rectilinearly, it strikes a m irrored surface and is thrown back by it” ( e l § 112, Z ; G eraers, 176). Reflection or understanding thinks w ithin a straitjacket o f false dichotom ies, thus it receives back from its contem plation only w hat it has put into it: its "rays o f thought" are m erely reflected back to it. By contrast, dialectical th in king does not involve projections from the thinker: instead, it allow s the m edium w ith in w hich the th inker th inks to itse lf "shine forth” truth (see figure 5). Speculation's speculum docs not m erely reflect the surface appearance of the individual. It is, instead, a "m agic mirror," reflecting the deepest essence of Spirit. A ccording to Kabbalistic tradition, M oses alone am ong prophets or w ise men "gazed through a speculum that shines.” 104 H egel is the m odern M oses receiving the new W ord and Covenant o f G o d , not on Sinai but on the G olgotha o f Absolute Sp irit, not at the beginning o f history but at its end.197

Like M oses (according to legend), Hegel is the recipient o f K abbalistic wisdom , only it is a C hristian Kabbalah, and it is received no t directly from G od bu t from Bohme, O etinger, and th e trad ition o f speculative Pietism . Hegel's "Kabbalah" is a revelation o f eternal tru th through the self-unfolding o f A bsolute Knowledge, the self-grounding display o f an organic thought-form th a t is itself the actualization o f G od in the world. T h is revelation o f G od is a t the sam e tim e the com plete speech o f the W hole. It is a reconciliation o f faith and scientific knowledge, w ith ou t following the K antian route o f lim iting knowledge to m ake room for faith. Hegel's system, furtherm ore, represents the overcom ing o f the d istinction betw een the "wise" and the "vulgar," and the achievem ent o f the classical philosophical ideal o f self-knowledge.20*

106. Sec Elliot R . W olfson, Through a Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval Jewish Mysticism (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1994). 147-107 . K o jive rem arks that "T h e W ise M an . . . entrusts h im self without reserve to Being and opens h im self entirely to the Real w ithout resisting it. H is role is that o f a perfectly flat and indefinitely extended m irror: he docs not reflect on the R eal; it is the Real that reflects on him , is reflected in his consciousness, and is revealed in its own dialectical structure by the discourse o f the W ise M an w ho describes it w ithout deform ing it." Sec Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to tbc Reading of Hegel, trans. Jam es H . N ichols, Jr . (Ithaca, N .Y .: Cornell U niversity Press, 1969), 176.108. T h e “ wise-vulgar" distinction is overcom e in H egel, but certainly not in the sense that his philosophy is fully intelligible to everyone. In the Lectures on


Co

5. "Speculation" graphically depicted. Frontispiece to Johann Joachim Becher, Psychosophia oder Seclan-Weisheit (Lauenberg, 1707). Reprinted by perm ission o f the J . R . Ritm an Library, Bibliotheca Philosophica H erm etica, Am sterdam .


Copyrighted image

H egel's science further distinguishes itse lf from philosophy by containing nothing that could conventionally be called "p ro o f" or argum entation. It is a self-grounding speech. It is, furtherm ore, a realization o f

the Philosophy of Religion (1:180 ; v p r , 88), Hegel states th at“ Religion is for everyone. It is not philosophy, which is not for everyone.” H e overcom es the distinction prim arily by show ing that the content o f philosophy is identical to that o f religion, which is accessible to the com m on man. A lso, Hegel's philosophy provides an intellectual fram ework w hich can be taught to everyone to a certain degree (as Hegel thought he had proved at the G ym nasium in N urem berg).


O etinger's quest for a "th ird" form o f thought, cutting a m iddle course betw een a purely figurative or im aginative approach to the divine and a purely "abstract" one. H egel's new form o f thought resolves the quarrel between philosophy and m ytho-poetic thought. H egel adopts the H e rm etic ideal o f a perennial philosophy, treating his dialectic, the "m ethod" o f speculation, as a "recollection” o f the inchoate w isdom o f m ankind that has been expressed in art, religion, m ythology, and philosophy in im perfect form.

T h e real pow er behind dialectic, the pow er that m akes recollection possible, is im agination. H egel recognizes perennial sym bolic form s (recall the Phenomenology; M iller, 29) and draws them , in effect, from w hat O etinger called sensus communis.109 H is use o f them in the architectonic o f his system is strikingly sim ilar to the H erm etic "m em ory m agic" o f Bruno and others (in particular, as we shall see in chapter 5, that o f R am on Lull). H egel also engages in a form o f analogical reasoning su spiciously like the H erm etic "science o f correspondences." Rccall his attem pt to map the form s o f the terrestrial w orld onto the four elem ents, as well as, m ost strikingly, the ubiquitous Trin itarian structure. Recall that O etinger opposed his science o f "em blem atics” (another variation on the ars memoria) to the m odern geom etrical, quantitative m ethod. In H egel we find the tw o, as m ight be expected, aufgehoben: the sym bolic form s, the "em blem s" that anim ate speculation are them selves "quantitative" (or "quantifiable") form s. A num erology pervades Hegel's system , in particular a fascination w ith Proclean triads.

H egel conceives the whole articulated through dialectic exactly along the lines o f O etinger's intensum. Recall that an intensum is an organic whole that cannot be divided into pieces, but only articulated into inseparable, noetic "m om ents.” Principal am ong the m om ents articulated in H egel’s science is a triad equivalent to the C hristian Trinity. Exactly as Böhm e and som e versions o f K abbalism do, H egel conceives the first m om ent, the C hristian "Father," as G o d "in -H im selfT in potentia. G o d is the eternal Logos; hence, Logic. E xactly as do E ckhart, C usa, Böhm e, and G oethe, H egel conceives the second m om ent, the “ Son," as N ature. T h rou gh the third m om ent, Sp irit, G o d achieves full actuality a s 'o b je c tive" and "absolute" Sp irit , the H egelian analogues to O etinger's Geistleib- lichkeit. Sp irit is the m ost adequate "em bodim ent” o f G o d .

A s we have seen, H egel em ploys the language o f "m agic" to describe his system . Recall the fragm ent quoted by R osenkranz in which Hegel bids us to learn "to speak the magic w ords" which evoke the "shape" o f the A bsolute.110 Further, in a passage also quoted earlier, H egel w rites in the Phenomenology: "Sp irit is this pow er only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying w ith it. T h is tarrying w ith the negative is the

109. T h e truth which speculation finds w ithin poetry (or myth) and rational (philosophical) thought, and w hich it takes up and preserves, is none otherthan the perennial philosophy. Hegel held that the philosopher is not sufficient unto him self. Like Socrates in the Crito, he held that the people and its nomoi give birth to the philosopher, n o . Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 14 1.



magical pow er that converts it into being” (M iller, 32). A n d H egel’s rem arks about "real” magic often express a respectful, i f cautious, curiosity. I have already quoted Hegel's letter to W indischm ann, in which he w rites, " I am very curious to have your w ork on m agic in hand," and expresses his hope that W indishm ann w ill restore his subject “to the honor it deserves.” I w ill discuss H egel’s interest in magic and the paranorm al in chapter 6.

H egel's attitude toward alchem y is similar. A lso in chapter 6, I will deal in detail w ith H egel's indebtedness to alchemy. For now, I will s im ply m ention that in H egel’s Naturphilosophie lectures o f 1803 he connects the d ivision “m etals-com bustibles-neutrals-earths" w ith Paracelsus's d istinction ‘‘m ercury-sulphur-salt.'’ “ 1 Earlier I noted how in his early p h ilosophy o f nature, H egel reverently refers to Paracelsus and Böhm e as “the Elders.” A n d, to repeat, even where H egel draw s on m ore recent sources he insists, as H arris puts it ,“on finding an earlier pedigree . . . in Paracelsus and Böhm e."1“ H arris speaks o f H egel’s “evident desire to show that the older alchem ical tradition o f Paracelsus (and probably Böhm e h im self) contained sym bolic expressions o f im portant speculative truths.'’ 1“

In the introduction, I briefly m entioned one aspect o f H erm eticism that, so far, I have not discussed extensively: initiation. I f H egel believed that the reception o f the system o f science could be accom plished sim ply by reading about it in a book, he would not have first w ritten the Phenomenology ojSpirit. A s I said o f H erm etic initiation in the introduction, one m ust be led up to illum ination carefully; one m ust actually explore

't h e blind alleys that prom ise illum ination bur do not deliver, and one m ust be purified o f false presuppositions. O n ly in th is w ay w ill the true doctrine mean anything; only in this w ay w ill the initiate’s life actually change. A s I have said, H egel's system is not sim ply a “theory” about the world; it is m eant to transfigure our experience and effect a new w ay o f being in the world. T h e Phenomenology of Spirit is H egel’s initiatory experience. It is H egel’s E leusis, it is his Bacchanalian revel.


in . Sec H arris. Night Thoughts, 274; G . W . F. H egel, Gesammelte Werke 6 :114 , 4 - 17-112 . H arris, Nigfcr Thoughts, 278.113. Ibid., 399.


Parc 2 . M agn u m O p u s


Chapter Four 127

H cgels Initiation Rite:

T h e P h en o m en o lo gy o f S p irit

1. Initiation

The Phenomenology of Spirit w as conceived by H egel in 1806 as an in troduction or propaedeutic to the tripartite system o f Logic-N atu re-Sp irit. It is therefore quite reasonable to ask i f the Phenomenology is really a necessary part o f the system , or m erely som ething "tacked on."

H egel's A bsolute, unlike Schelling’s, cannot be expressed in a sim ple form ula, like "the indifference point," or "the coincidence o f opposites." A ccording to H egel, to grasp the A bsolute we m ust go through the S c ience, go through every m om ent o f the Absolute, and rem ake it for o u rselves. Furtherm ore, a preparatory exercise is necessary before w e can reach this point. A few lines dow n from the passage ju st quoted, H egel w rites that "truth is not a m inted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-m ade" (M iller, 22; p g , 29 ).1 H egel believed that the consum m ation o f the love o f w isdom in A bsolute K now ing w as not equally possible in every historical epoch. Instead, he held that his achievem ent w as p o ssible only at a particular point in history, the end o f history, when the philosophical, cultural and religious achievem ents o f the ages were spread out before his gaze, when the accum ulated substance o f history w as converted to an account on w hich he could draw. Furtherm ore, he could not have acquired W isdom w ithout the consciousness o f this ground. T h u s, it is not enough to stand w ith H egel at the end o f history and read his books: one m ust w ork through the system in full consciousness o f w hat has made it possible, and one m ust overcom e all false or partial standpoints that would m ake assim ilation o f the system im possible.

I f the Phenomenology is intended in part to acquaint readers w ith the in tellectual an d cu ltu ral stra ta on w h ich the system stan d s, then is it a w ork o f history ? In a way, yes. In the final paragraph o f the Phenomenon ogy, H egel w rites that the totality o f the form s o f Sp irit "regarded from the side o f their free existence appearing in the form o f contingency, is History; but regarded from the side o f their [intellectually] com prehended organization, it is the Science o f K now in g in the sphere o f appearance." (M iller, 4 9 3; pg, 531). T h e Phenomenology of Spirit displays the form s in w hich Sp irit has appeared in tim e. W e may th ink o f each as

1. T h is is an allusion to Lessin gs Nathan the Wise, 4:6.


a "mode" o f consciousness o r m ind. Hegel shows how each “mode" is an approxim ation o f w hat he calls ar the end o f rhe book "Absolute K now ing.”-’ T he Phenomenology stands in the same relation to history as the Philosophy of Nature stands to nature. T h e Philosophy of Nature is an account o f the fundam ental m om ents, the eidetic divisions, which nature exhibits to scientific consciousness. It is no t a history o f nature, in the sense th a t Hegel though t th a t natural beings appeared in the o rder o f his chapter headings and divisions. (H egel rejected biological evolution.) Similarly, the object o f the Phenomenology is no t to p resen t a history o f m ind, bu t a “natural history" o f its fundam ental form s in their logical relationship.

As is often poin ted ou t by confused readers, however, Hegel covers m uch the same ground again in the Philosophy of Spirit (which even includes a section titled "Phenom enology"). T h is is true, bu t the context and purpose o f the Philosophy of Spirit are completely different from those o f the Phenomenology. T he Phenomenology of Spirit shows th a t all form s o f consciousness or m ind aim at Absolute Knowing. T h is includes cultural or social form s in which m ind "embodies” itself, such as natural science, art, and religion. However, none o f these form s actually achieves A bsolute Knowing. H egel’s purpose in the Phenomenology is to give his readers a total theory o f psychology, science, society, culture, and history in term s o f the ir telos, A bsolute Knowing. T h e Phenomenology is an A ristotelian Science, understanding all o f its objects in term s o f the ir "striving’' after the knowledge o f G od.

T he Phenomenology merely describes A bsolute Knowing; it does no t achieve A bsolute Knowing itself. T h is is the task prim arily o f the Logic, for in w orking ou t the categories o f the Logic the self-reflection o f Idea is realized. T he categories o f the Logic are never explicitly discussed in the Phenomenology, b u t they are there beneath the surface. T h e Logic is the recollection o f the categorial structures underlying Spirit. T he Logic is the unconscious in-itself o f Sp irit become for-itself. In the Philosophy of Nature we understand nature as an "other" to Idea, striving to express Idea. T he Philosophy of Spirit repeats m uch o f th e ground o f the Phenomenology, th is tim e in the full context o f an understanding o f Idea and its im perfect em bodim ent in nature. Spirit m ust be covered again, for once we have glim psed Idea, and understood the antecedents o f Sp irit in nature, our understanding o f Sp irit will o f necessity be transform ed.

T he Phenomenology shows why every standpoint o ther th an Absolute Knowing is partial or false and m ust be abandoned. T h e Phenomenology is the tool by which Hegel pu ts his readers in the"fram e o f m ind" necessary to work through the pure determ inations o f the Idea in-itself. T his is no t the purpose o f the Philosophy of Spirit. B ut why w ork through the Phenomenology and the rest o f the system i W hy achieve A bsolute K now ing? In eftect, I answ ered this question in the preceding chapter w hen I

2. H egel w rites in the preface: “ It is this com ing-to-be o f Science as such or o f know ledge that is described in the Phenom enology o f S p irit” (M iller, 15; PG, 2 l).

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said th a t Hegelian philosophy will constitu te a perfected form o f living in the world; in the w ords o f H . S. H arris,"an actual experience o f living in the light o f the eternal day."' T his is the attraction . All philosophy, including Hegel's, presupposes th a t a t least some m en yearn to know them selves and the w orld fu lly /Ju st as the magicians o f o ld— m en such as Agrippa and Bruno— believed th a t knowledge o f the right incantations could give one trem endous power, so Hegel believes th a t know ledge o f the"m agic w ords” th a t evoke the A bsolute can em pow er the ind ividual by reconciling him w ith the world. Kojeve defines the Hegelian wise m an as the m an o f bo th perfect self-consciousness and perfect self- sa tisfac tion / W isdom and self-satisfaction do no t consist, however, in ego-aggrandizem ent, bu t in the transcendence o f ego and identification w ith Spirit as such. Kojeve writes: "For Self-consciousness to exist, for philosophy to exist, there m ust be transcendence o f self w ith respect to self as given.”' H . S. H arris notes th a t’Tn (H egel’s] view we have to ann ihilate o u r ow n selfhood in order to en ter the sphere where Philosophy herself speaks.’’ H ere again we see a clear affinity' w ith mysticism.

If it is the task o f the Phenomenology to achieve th is transcendence o f the self, then the Phenomenology begins to look like a mystical initiation. It is a work th a t "purifies" the reader for the reception o f Divine W’isdom. Traditionally, H erm es, the guide o f souls, presided over the initiation rites o f the mystery religions.8 G arth Fowden w rites o f the H erm etic initiation th a t "it is no t envisaged as a form or symbol, o r som ething th a t one ju s t reads about, bu t as a real experience, stretching all the capacities o f those w ho em bark upon it: 'for it is an extremely to rtuous way, to abandon w hat one is used to and possesses now, and to retrace one's steps tow ards the old prim ordial things.' "• (Anyone who has ever attem pted to read the Phenomenology knows how it can stretch all o f one's capacities and be a “tortuous way,” indeed, a highway o f despair!)

Fowden w rites in the same context th a t "the [H erm etic] initiation falls into tw o phases, the form er em phasizing self-knowledge, the latter knowledge o f G od.”11 Again, there is an interesting parallel to Hegelian philosophy. T h e Phenomenology can be though t o f as a voyage o f self- discovery, w hereas the rest o f the system (also a to rtuous way) is a dis-

3. H . S . H arris, Night Thoughts, 199.4 ."H egelian W isdom is a necessary ideal on ly for a definite type o f human being, namely, for the man who puts the suprem e value in Self-consciousness;and only this n u n can realize this ideal----- In other words: the Platonic-H egelian ideal o f W isd o m is valid on ly fo r th e P h ilo so p h e r" (K ojeve, Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel, 84).5. Ibid., 7 6 -7 7 . K ojeves third definition is that the w ise man is the 'm orally perfect man" (K ojeve, Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel, 78).6. Ibid.. 39.7 . H arris, Night Thoughts, 51.8. Joseph Cam pbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1968), 73.9. Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1993), 106 . Fowden is quoting Corpus Hermeticum, treatise iv, § 9.10 . Ibid.

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covery o f the A bsolute or G o d . O f course, as I have already indicated, the entire H egelian philosophy is both a know ledge o f the W hole and o f the self. In a discussion o f O riental m ysteries that is applicable to the H erm etic tradition, Jo sep h C am pbell w rites: "In the sacred books o f the O rient, the ultim ate m ystery o f being is said to be transcendent, in the sense that it tran scen d s'.. . hum an knowledge, thought, sight, and speech. H ow ever, since it is explicitly identified w ith the m ystery o f our ow n being, and o f all being whatsoever, it is declared to be im m anent as well: in fact, that is the m ain point o f m ost O riental, as well as o f m ost pagan, prim itive, and m ystical initiations.” "

Jacques d ’H ondt and others have claim ed that the Phenomenology’s “ initiation” w as inspired by the M asons. Jo h n Burbidge w rites that the Phenomenology,"w ith its lengthy and arduous process o f initiation, came at a tim e w hen H egel w as frequenting the com pany o f know n M asons, som e o f them graduates o f the banned Illuminati.” 12 K . J . H . W indischm ann, a M ason discussed in the last chapter, took the Phenomenology of Spirit as a M asonic m anifesto in the tradition o f Lessing. H e refers to this elliptically in an 18 10 letter to H egel: “ T h e study o f your system o f Science has convinced me that this w ork w ill som e day, when the tim e o f understanding arrives, becom e the prim er [Elementarbuch] o f the liberation o f m ankind, as foretold by Lessing. You understand, o f course, w hat I am trying to say, and you also recognize w hat this w ork is to m e (not m erely as writing (Scfcri/i), but as work [Werfe])/‘n It is significant that a M ason — on the basis o f a few cues— could so easily rake the Phenomenology as a M asonic docum ent.14

In chapter 2 , 1 discussed the M asonic character o f H egel's 17 9 6 poem “ Eleusis.” Significantly, the Phenomenology m akes several references to the Eleusinian initiation m ysteries. T h e m ost fam ous occurs in the preface: "Appearance is the arising and passing away which itse lf does not arise or pass away, but is in-itself [an sich], and constitutes the actuality and movem ent o f the life o f truth. T h e True is thus the Bacchanalian revel [bacchantische Taumel] in which no m em ber is not drunk; yet because each m em ber collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is ju st as much transparent and simple repose" (M iller, 27; p g , 35). T h e Eleusinian m ysteries and the cult o f D ionysus (Bacchus) were associated w ith each other starting around the late fifth century and early fourth century.’5 Later in the Phenomenology, H egel refers to the “ Eleusinian m ysteries o f C eres and Bacchus" (M iller, 65; p g , 7 7 ; the poem “ Eleusis" also refers to C eres, or D em eter).

A n oth er allusion to B acchus/D ion ysus appears in the preface in H egel's discussion o f the essential m om ent o f negativity in the path to

n . Joseph Cam pbell, The Masks 0/God, vol. 3, Occidental Mythology (N ew York:Penguin Books, 1964), 109.12. See Burbidge’s introduction to D ’H ondt s Hegei in his Time, xi.13. April 2 7 ,18 10 ; H offm eisccr *155.14 . D ’H ondt, Hegel Secret, 29 9 -300 .15. M artin P. N ilsson, Greek Folk Religion (Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press, 1978), 48.

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A bsolute K n o w in g :"B u t the life o f Sp irit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itse lf untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and m aintains itse lf in it. It w ins its truth only w hen, in utter dism em berm ent, it finds itse lf” (M iller, 19; p g , 26). Like the Egyptian O siris, D ionysus w as, o f course, torn to pieces and then resurrected. To a M ason, these lines w ould have been highly significant. T h e central legend in M ason ry is that o f H iram , the m aster builder, w ho was m urdered, buried, resurrected, dism em bered, put together again, and then reburied. Each M aster M ason is supposed to identify h im self in his in itiation w ith H iram . A s A lexander Piatigorsky w rites, “A ll M aster M asons are raised from a Figurative Death.” 1 W h at dies in them is ign orance. T h ey are “torn apart” and then led to enlightenm ent. “ T h e candidate m oves from total ignorance to the know ledge o f the W ord, or from the total darkness to the light which would enable him to 'leaven the dea th :"17

In Bruno, Schelling has "Anselm " rem ark that in the Eleusinian rites, "m en first learned that there is som ething unchanging, uniform , and indivisible beyond the things that ceaselessly change and slide from shape to shape."1* A nselm then invites Bruno to describe the kind o f p h ilosophy im parted by the m ysteries. H egel accepts Schelling's description o f the m ysteries com pletely. In the Phenomenology, he w rites that

w e can tell those w h o assert the truth and certainty o f the reality o f sense-objects that they should go back to the m ost elem entary school o f w isdom , viz. the ancient Eleusinian m ysteries o f C eres and Bacchus, and that they have still to learn the secret m eaning o f the eating o f bread and the drin kin g o f w ine. For he w ho is in itiated into these M ysteries not only com es to doubt the being o f sensuous things, but to despair o f it; in part he brings about the nothingness o f such things h im self in his dealings w ith them , and in part he sees them reduce them selves to nothingness. (M iller, 65; pg. 7 7 )

Schelling rem arks that the purpose o f "all the m ystery rites is none other than to show men the archetypes o f all that they are accustom ed to seeing in images.’'1’ H egel's Phenomenology is an initiation into the know ledge o f those "archetypes” (the categories o f the Logic) via a tran scendence o f the understanding, w ith its penchant for the particular and for the image.

M artin P. N ilsson w rites that the Eleusinian rites consisted "in the seeing by the m ystae o f som ething which w as show n to th em ."" T h e

16. A lexander Piatigorsky, Who's Afraid o f Freemasons ? The Phenomenon of Freemasonry (London: T h e H arvill Press, 1997), 376-17. Ibid., 273. Italics in original.18. F. W .J. Schelling. Bruno: Or on the Natural and Divine Principle o f Things, in Werke, 3:233 (pagination corresponds to Sdmtliche Werke). English translation: M ichael G . Vater (A lbany: Scare U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1984)» 134-19. Ibid ., 233; 134.20. N ilsson , Greek Folk Religion, 43.

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Phenomenology is ju st such a show ing. It is a "gallery o f im ages" (M iller, 492; pc, 530).” It is the self-display o f the phenom ena o f Sp irit. (H eidegger w rites: “phenomenon [in G reek] m eans that which show s itself, the manifest.”22)

2. Hermetic influences

a)JenaT h e Phenomenology o f Spirit w as conceived and w ritten in Jen a, where H egel lived for about six years. W e know that during this period H egel w as actively interested in theosophy, a holdover from his time in Frankfurt (see chapter 3). It is likely that both the Triangie fragm ent and d iagram date from the Jen a period, though the diagram m ay have been drawn ju st prior.

H egel’s lectures on the Philosophy o f N ature during th is tim e reflect an ongoing interest in alchemy. In the lectures o f 1803 the division "m etals-com bustibles-neutrals-earths" is connected w ith Paracelsus’s d istinction “m ercury-sulphur-salt."Jt To repeat H . S . H arris ’s observation, this reflects Hegel's peculiar insistence on"finding an earlier pedigree [for his o b servatio n s]. . . in Paracelsus and Böhm e.”*4 H egel also speaks o f the "virgin earth," an old alchem ical conception, possibly originating with Böhm e, which w e first encountered in chapter 2 in connection w ith G oeth e ’s alchem ical experim ents. T h e 1803 lectures also contain d iscussions o f “noble" and "base" m etals, as well as a hierarchical structure o f m etals (though H egel is som ew hat sccptical o f the latter).1* A s noted in the preceding chapter, H egel som etim es referred ideas to "the elders" w hom H arris takes to be "the alchem ists.”1''

It was in Jen a as well that H egel becam e deeply im m ersed in Böhm e. H . S . H arris is "inclined to believe in B öhm es influence upon H egel from 1801 onwards."'" H arris contends that H egel initially viewed Böhm e w ith uncritical enthusiasm . In 18 0 4 -5 , however, H egel gained som e critical distance, w hile rem aining sym pathetic. Recall that H egel’s account o f Böhm e in his 1805 Lectures on the History o f Philosophy is s tr ik ingly detailed and positive.2*

H egel’s interest in, and sym pathy for, Böhm e m ust have been w idely know n. In 18 11, one o f H egel's form er Jen a students, Peter G abriel van

21. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel declares that the idea that the m ysteries im parted a special w isdom is "stupid" and "absurd” ( l p r

2 :18 1-8 2 : v p k 2:87-88). Hleusis w as significant for Hegel as a symbol, but he did not believe that the true and final philosophy w as taught there.22. M arrin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. John M acquarrie and Edw ard Robinson (N ew York: H arper and Row, 1962), 51.23. H arris, Nigbf Thoughts, 274; Differenz, 1 1 4 ,4 -> 7 . H arris also notes that in the sam e m anuscript H egel links nis use o f “earth” w ith Böhm e.24 . H arris, Night Thoughts, 278.25. Ibid., 274.26. Ibid., 274, n.27. Ibid., 85: as H arris notes there are indications o f Böhm es influence in the m anuscripts o f 18 0 1-3 (16 1).28. l h p 3:288; not present in Werke, see Sämtliche W'erke, vol. 19, ed. H erm ann G löckner (Stuttgart: From ann, 1928), 377-

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G h ert (17 8 2 -18 52 ), a D utchm an, sent him B öhm es collected w orks as a gift. Van G h e rt w ould not have done th is unless it w as plain to those w h o knew H egel in Jen a how im portant Böhm e w as to him . H egel thanked van G h ert in a letter o f Ju ly 29, 18 11: "N o w 1 can study Jakob Böhm e much m ore closely than before, since I w as not m yself in possession o f his w ritings. H is theosophy will always be one o f the m ost rem arkable attem pts o f a penetrating yet uncultivated man to com prehend the innerm ost essential nature o f the absolute being. For G erm any, he has the special interest o f being really the first G erm an philosopher."'1 T h is show s not only that H egel intended to continue his study o f Böhm e, but also that he regarded Böhm e as a genuine philosopher.

Hegel writes further in the same letter that Böhmes endeavor "constitutes the most arduous struggle both to bring the deep speculative [content], which he holds in his intuition, into representation and so to master the element of representational [thinking] in order that the speculative content might be expressed in it.”*’ Certainly, Böhmes thought is paradigmatic "picture-thinking,” but given the limits of his medium his thought comes amazingly close, in this inadequate form, to capturing the Concept. Furthermore, Hegel thinks that Böhme realized this inadequacy and struggled against it. Hegel continues: "There remains so little that is constant and fixed in his work, because he feels everywhere the inadequacy of representation to what he is trying to achieve, and feels representation again overturned

Hegel's social contacts in Jena must have encouraged his enthusiasm for Böhme and theosophy in general. David Walsh writes that Jena in Hegel's day

had become the focal point of the German Romantic movement, and many of its greatest figures were assembled there, including Tieck, Novalis, Schelling, F. Schlegel, and A. W. Schlegel. Within that company an intense center of interest was formed by their rediscovery of the German mystical tradition. For the first time the works of the great medieval and Reformation mystics were becoming widely available within their native land. The appearance of Eckhart and Böhme in particular was heralded as a liberating release from the deadness of Enlightenment rationalism. They read, too, the major eighteenth-century commentators of Böhme . . . and the Swabian Pietist theologian Friedrich Christoph Oeringer, in whom they found a more contemporary application of the great mystical insights of the past.“

N ovalis im m ersed h im self in the study o f Böhm e during the w inter o f 17 9 9 -18 0 0 . H e cam e to espouse the Paracelsian view that man is

29. Butler, 573; H offm eister * 192 . T h e fact that Hegel did nor ow n Böhm es works in Jen a should not suggest half-hearted interest in them- It w as difficult in those days for a young associate professor, w ith an annual salary o f only 10 0 thalers, to afford a well-stocked library.30. Butler, 573- 74-3«. Ibid ., 574-32. David W alsh,“ T h e H istorical Dialectic o f Spirit,” 22 -23 .

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charged w ith the task o f redeem ing nature and spoke o f a "magic idealism." Friedrich Schlegel called Böhm es w ork "the greatest, m ost p rofound, m ost individual, m ost adm irable w ork o f idealism ."“ H e believed he saw a correspondence between B öhm es thought and Fichte’s. Paola M ayer conjectures that Böhm e w as probably read aloud at m eetings o f the Jen a circle in 17 9 9 -18 0 0 .“

Schelling w as, o f course, an enthusiastic reader o f Böhm e and O etinger and likely encouraged H egel’s interest in theosophy. In speaking about his tim e in Jen a , Ludw ig T ieck (17 7 3-18 5 3) reported that he found Schelling very receptive to B öhm es theosophy.” T ieck had left Jen a by the tim e H egel arrived there, but H egel w as unquestionably fam iliar w ith his w ork . T h e "Force and the U nderstanding" section o f the Phenomenology includes a discussion o f w hat H egel calls "the topsyturvy world," die verkehrte Welt, the title o f a play T ieck published in 1799-* T h e first reference to Böhm e by a m em ber o f the Jen a circle occurs in a letter from Schlegel to N ovalis, dated D ecem ber 2, 1798, in which Schlegel m entions that T ieck has been studying Böhm e. O ne o f Tieck's biographers states,"N on e o f his w orks w ritten betw een 1799 and 1801 is free o f B ö h m e."57 It w as T ieck w ho introduced N ovalis to Böhm e. In com m em oration o f this, N ovalis later w rote his poem "An Tieck," in which he called T ieck "der Verkündiger der M orgenröte" ("H erald o f M orning G lo w ").“ In M unich in 1804 , T ieck established a close relationship w ith Franz von Baader.

b) The Hermetic Subtext to Hegel’s PrefaceWhat we know about the intellectual milieu of Jena can shed a great deal of light on some of the mysteries surrounding the composition of the Phenomenology. It is often difficult for interpreters to understand who Hegel is attacking in the Phenomenology—especially in the preface—and why he describes his own project in the peculiar way that he does. I have already suggested "initiation" as one possible framework for understanding the project of the Phenomenology. I wish now to suggest something even more radical: the background against which we must understand Hegel's programmatic remarks in the preface is his own critical appreciation of Hermetic theosophy.

Hegel’s attitude toward the Hermeticism of Böhme and others is sim-

33. Q uoted in Pa o b M ayer, Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation ofJacob Böhme (M ontreal: M cG ill-Q ueens U niversity Press, 1999)-14<>-34. Ibid., 182.35. Edw in H . Z eyd el, Ludwig Tieck, the German Romanticist: A Critical Study (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1935)» 13°-36. D onald Phillip Verene w as the first com m entator to point out the possible connection between H egel’s "verkehrte Welt“ and T ieck ’s (Verene, Hegel's Recob lection, 39 -58).37. R oger Paulin, Ludwig Tieck: A Literary Biography (O xford : Clarendon Press, 1985), 10 0 . Paola M ayer has recently challenged this assessm ent o f Böhm es influence on T ieck and the other Rom antics. See M ayer,Jena Romanticism.38. Z eyd el, Ludwig Tieck, 127.


ilar to his attitude tow ard m ainstream religion: he believes that it approaches the truth very closely, but is hindered by its "sensuous" mode o f expression. H egel opposes the school o f Rom antic intuitionism , often inspired by H erm eticism , which believes that truth is to be felt or intuited. H egel m akes his feeling about the Rom antics very plain early on in the preface: "Su ch m inds, when they give them selves up to the uncontrolled ferm ent o f [the divine] substance, im agine thar, by draw ing a veil over self-consciousness and surrendering understanding they becom e the beloved o f G o d to whom H e gives H is w isdom in sleep; and hence w hat they in fact receive, and bring forth to birth in their sleep, is n oth ing but dream s" (M iller, 6; p g , 9).

Ju st a few passages later occurs the fam ous paragraph in which Hegel attacks a certain conception o f the A bsolute as "the night in which . . . all cow s are black” (M iller, 9; p c , 13). C om m entators usually take this as a reference to Schelling. Indeed, in a letter to Schelling o f M ay 1 , 1807, H egel seem s to try to "soften the b low " o f the preface, w hich w as about to be printed. H e w rites th at"In the Preface you w ill not find that I have been too hard on the shallow ness that m akes so much m isch ief with your form s in particular and degrades your science into mere form alism ."’4 But there is m ore than one passage in the preface that can be taken as addressing itse lf to Schelling or his followers.

L et us look m ore closely, then, at the passage in question. A few lines up from the “cow s" sim ile we read the follow ing: "D ealin g with som ething from the perspective o f the A bsolute [according to H egel’s opponents] consists m erely in declaring that, although one has been speaking o f it ju st now as som ething definite, yet in the Absolute, the A = A , there is nothing o f the kind, for therein all is one" (M iller, 9; p g , 13). To be sure, this sounds like a criticism o f Schelling’s view o f the Absolute as the "indifference point" (the language o f "A = A” w as used by Schelling, w ho appropriated it from Fichte). H ow ever, it sounds even m ore like the m ystical doctrine o f the “coincidence o f opposites," found in C u sa and others.*5 Further, H egel uses the phrase "therein all is one" (darin sei alles Eins). W riting this, how could H egel not have recalled the youthful m otto he shared w ith Schelling and H ölderlin : hen kai pan ? In his preface to the second edition (1827) o f the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel equates the philosophy o f alles eins, "All is one" w ith the"Iden tity-System " (G er- acts 7 ; Werke 8:18). Furtherm ore, in the Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion o f 1827, H egel entertains the suggestion that the Identity philosophy o f Schelling is equivalent to pantheism ( l p r 1:37 4 -7 5 ; v p r 1:272).

The passage from the Phenomenology continues: “To pit this single

39. Butler, 80; H offm eister #95.4 0 . K laus D üsing argues that this doctrine w as transm itted to Schelling via Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spinoza. Jacobi printed extracts from Brunos De la Causa as an appendix to his book, in which Bruno repeats argum ents from Cusa. See K laus D üsing,“Absolur Identität und Form en der Endlichkeit: Interpretationen zu Sch illin gs and H egels erster absoluter M etaphysik,“ in Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik (1801- 1802), ed. K laus D üsing (K ö ln : Jürgen Dinter, 1988), 1 14 ,15 1 .



insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfillment, to palm off its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black—this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity.’'41 Hegel is attacking Schelling here, but he is attacking Schelling as the latest exponent of a type of mysticism which he believes is inadequate: a mysticism that stops short in the face of contradiction and declares that God is inconceivable.4* (Hegel, of course, was well aware of Schellings ties to mysticism and theosophy, and Schclling’s willingness to publicly ally himself with these currents.)

In effect, H egel rejects this kind o f m ysticism in favor o f the theosophy o f Böhm e. C onsider H egel’s rem arks about Sp in oza’s pantheism in his lectures o f 1805: "H is [Spinoza's] philosophy is on ly fixed substance, not yet Sp irit; in it we do not confront ourselves. G o d is not Sp irit here because he is not the triune. Substance rem ains rigid and petrified, w ithout B öhm es sources [QuellenJ .T h e particular determ inations in the form o f thought-determ inations are not Böhm es source-spirits which w ork and unfold in one another."4* H egel accepts the Schellingian d o ctrine o f the A bsolute as the W hole that transcends the distinction between subject and object. H e m erely contends that w ithout a developmental account o f how this A bsolute becom es actual— which constitutes, at the sam e tim e, a description o f its internal m om ents— “the A bsolute" is merely an em pty phrase. A s far as H egel and his contem poraries knew, this "developm ental" approach was Böhm es innovation— and it is, o f course, precisely the respect in w hich B öhm es brand o f "m ysticism " is different from that o f C usa, Eckhart, and others.

A couple of paragraphs later in the preface Hegel speaks of Substance becoming Subject, claiming that the Absolute is “the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual” (Miller, 10 ; p g , 14 ) . Hegel, in the next passage, then immediately makes the quasi-mystical observation that "the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as a disporting of Love with itself; but this idea sinks into mere edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative" (Miller, 10 ; p g , 4-15)» Hegel is saying that thinking which draws inspiration from such mystical metaphors is fine, and much can be learned from it, but it is empty unless supplemented by the careful, painstaking working out of the moments of the "life of God." Hegel ends this passage with the admonition that the Absolute must be conceived in "the whole

4 1. G eraets 7; Werke 8:18.4 2 . In the Lectures on the Philosophy 0/Religion o f 1827, Hegel stares that “a m ystery is called inconceivable, but what appears inconceivable is precisely the Concept irself, the speculative element o r the fact that the rational is th o u g h t.. . . N o w when the U nderstanding com es to this point it says ,‘this isa contradiction/ and stands still at this point------- T h u s the nature o f G o d isinconceivable [ f o r it]” ( l p r 3 :28 2-8 3 ; v p r 3 :2 0 7 -8 ) .43. l h p 3:288; not present in Werke, see Sämtliche Werke, vol. 19 , ed. H erm ann G löckner (Stuttgart: Fromann, 19 28 ), 377-

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wealth o f the developed form . O n ly then is it conceived and expressed as an actuality" (M iller, 11 ; p g , 15).

T h e next paragraph provides the key that explains all. It b eg in s:"T h e true is the w hole” (Das Wahre ist das G anze). Recall that O etinger, developing the ideas o f Böhm e, held that “ T h e truth is a whole [Die Wahrheit ist ein Ganzes); when one finally receives this total, synoptic vision o f the truth, it m atters not w hether one begins by considering this part or that."*4 O etinger also som etim es spoke o f his G anze as equivalent to Geist and treated it as an internum: a thing that cannot be divided into literal pieces, only into noetic m om ents. In an intensum such as Geist, the whole is im m anent in every part. It is this im m anence that enables us to progress from one m om ent to another in the gradual articulation o f the w hole.41 A s noted in chapter 2, the them e o f the truth as a whole (or the w hole) is a perennial them e o f Sw abian speculative Pietism .*

C on siderin g the context o f H egel's "T ru e is the w hole" passage— his response to Schelling and to the m ystics o f the coincidentia oppositorum school— it seem s that H egel is rebuking his fellow Sw abian b y deliberately invoking the authority o f O etinger and W ürttem berg theosophy. He is exhorting Schelling to become more BöhmeanZ7 C ouplin g this with H egel’s approving attitude toward Böhm e, we can see that there is a h id den subtext to the preface. A lthough nothing in it is com pletely transparent, the surface o f the preface involves H egel opposing h im self to all previous philosophy (as, for instance, in his odd critique o f philosophical prefaces). T h e subtext, however, involves a response to all previous m ysticism as well.

T h e reasons w hy such m aterial w ould be consigned to the "esoteric” dim ension o f the text should be clear. W e have seen that intolerance against adm irers o f O etinger existed in H egel's tim e. A lso , it m ust be kept in m ind that the Phenomenology belongs, in truth , to an older trad ition o f literary w ork in which reference to one's predecessors was largely indirect.

Ju st as H egel w ants philosophers to "lay aside the title 'love o f know - ing [W issen],’ ” and achieve actual know ing, so he w ants to raise "m ysticism " to the level o f theosophy, to know ing the w isdom o f G o d . M ysticism is inadequate because it lets m ystery rem ain. L ike A ristotle, Hegel w ants to rem ove w onder; he w ants to penetrate into the A bsolute and let the light o f truth shine w here before there w as darkness, absence, hiddenness. N one o f this is inconsistent with Hegel's critique o f Böh- m ean-style theosophy. H egel sees religion in all its form s, and particularly C hristianity, as a sort o f halfw ay house to A bsolute K now ing, and

4 4 . F. C . O etinger, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 5, ed. K arl Chr. Eberh . Ehmann (Stuttgart, 18 58 -6 4 ), 45-45. Schneider, Geistesahnen, 1 14.46. Ibid., 56.47. Böhm es Ungrund, though itse lf indeterm inate, is supposed to contain all determ inations. T h is sounds, o f course, rather like Schellings'in diffcrcnce point," which could be the reason why Hegel never m entions Böhm es Ungrund, apparently considering it a dispensable part o f Böhm es philosophy.



his ow n p h ilosophy is anim ated by religious categories and sym bolic form s.

In effect, H egel is saying that m ysticism (including Schellingian “philosophical m ysticism ”) is a clue to the nature o f the A bsolute. In its highest form , Böhm ean-O etingerite theosophy, m ysticism com es strik ingly close to the philosophical grasp o f the A bsolute. In a gesture o f philosophical syncretism , H egel opens the doors o f his tem ple o f A bsolute Sp irit to the Böhm ean theosophists, say in g ,"Y ou r G o d is my G o d , but i f you w ish to go a further step and truly know G o d , you m ust subm it yourselves to the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour o f m y initiation." (W e shall shortly see this dem onstrated even m ore clearly in the Phenomenology's account o f "revealed religion"— C h ristian ity— w hich is strikingly Böhm ean.)

If it seems im plausible th a t Hegel w ould so closely identify his own philosophical approach w ith any so rt o f mysticism at all— consider again the following lines from one o f the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia Logic:“ It sh o u ld . . . be m entioned here th a t the m eaning o f the speculative is to be understood as being the same as w hat used in earlier tim es to be called'mystical.' " ( e l § 82, Z; G eraets, 133).

c) Böhmean Elements in the PhenomenologyD avid W alsh has argued that H egel’s use in the Phenomenology o f such term s as element, aether, light, expansion, and contraction has its roots in his acquaintance with the Böhm ean-O etingerite tradition, as well as with Paracelsus.4* (I w ill discuss H egel’s concept o f aether much m ore extensively in chapter 6.) It is in H egel’s section on "Self-C onsciousness," h o w ever, that the influence o f Böhm e becom es evident in its m ost substantive form . In the sp irit o f the Hermetica, Böhm e recognized that selfhood develops in opposition to the not-self. (Fichte and H egel arc merely B öhm es follow ers in this regard, as are Sartre, P iaget, and others.) But Böhm e even had the audacity to claim that this m ust apply to G o d as w ell.49 In his rem arks in the Lectures o f 1805, H egel includes the fo llow ing quote from Böhm e: "N o th in g can be revealed to itse lf w ithout op p osition [W iederwärtigkeit): For i f there is nothing that opposes it, then it always goes out o f itse lf and never returns to itse lf again. I f it does not return into itself, as into that from which it originated, then it know s nothing o f its origin."“'0

Hegel's account o f selfhood involves the claim th a t a t som e level the self relates to its o ther by willing its cancellation. A t the root o f all the form s o f Sp irit th a t unfold in the Phenomenology is a prim al, dem onic

48. W alsh ,"T h e H istorical D ialectic o f Spirit," 28.49. D avid W alsh w rites that "At the core o f his construction w as Bohm e’s d iscovery that conflict and opposition were necessary to the self-revelation o f G o d . It was an extrapolation from what is required for the self-realization o f man to w hat is required for the self-realization o f G o d ” ("A M ythology o f Reason," 153).50. See Jako b Böhm e, Der Weg zu Chriito, S ixth Book, “ Von G öttlicher Beschaulichkeit," in Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 4 , chap. 1, § 8. Hegel quotes this passage in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy 3:203; Werke 20:106.

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drive for com plete possession or m astery o f the object, for, in effect, the annihilation o f otherness. By im plication, th is drive is sim ultaneously a will to rem ove the divide betw een subject and object, fo r by canceling "otherness” it seeks to exalt the se lf (th is im plication is crucial for understanding the section on "Self-C on sciou sn ess”). T h is drive, this com plete and utter negativity that ultim ately issues in a com plete and exalted pos- itivity, also has its equivalent in B ohm e— but in order to fully explain this I m ust elaborate further on the nature o f this negativity and how it operates in the Phenomenology.

In d iscussing rh is"prim al drive” to annul o thern ess— which is exh ib ited at all levels o f S p ir it— H egel speaks again o f the E leusinian m ysteries, in a passage I have quoted earlier. H e w rites o f how the m ysteries cause one to “doubt the being o f sensuous th ings” (M iller, 65; p g ,

77). By th is, he does not mean w h at m odern philosophers m ean when they speak o f doubting the "external w orld." A w orld o f sensible objects really is "out there," but m etaphysically speaking, it is made insubstantial by the activity o f the subject. T h e aggrandizem ent o f the subject = the "w ith d raw al" o f substance from the w orld and "into” the subject. T h e subject becom es substance— that w hich persists, the unm oving pivot around w hich the w orld o f objects is set aw hirl as it is conquered and transform ed according to the plans and desires o f the subject. W hen H egel says that the initiate "b rin gs ab out" the nihilation o f sensible things h im self he is staring the principle o f his Idealism: it is the vocation o f m ankind, or Sp irit , to transform the given w orld , to m ake it conform to Idea, to rem ove the distinction betw een real and ideal, su b je c t and object.

"T ransform ation" can mean tw o things. It can be a literal, noticeable change, w hether o f trees into dw ellings or o f children into educated men, or it can be a transform ation o f the unknow n into the know n, the grasped. In both cases w hat is involved is the annihilation o f the resistance o f things, an annihilation o f their otherness, their hiddenness. T h e first sense o f transform ation is only an approxim ation to the true unity o f subject and object, ideal and real— w hich is achieved only through the full developm ent o f the second kind o f transform ation: the total, thoughtful grasp o f the W hole through a system o f Science. For H egel, it is not enough for Sp irit to change the world; it m ust interpret it. It is ultim ately through this urge to cancel or "m aster" otherness that the true individual, true substance, true self, and true G o d are sim ultaneously actualized.

In the Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion o f 1827, H egel states, " Id e ality m eans that th is being [that is] external (i.e., its spatiality, tem porality, m ateriality, and m utual externality) is sublated. Inasm uch as I know th is being, its contents are not represented th ings, being outside one another; rather they are w ith in me in a sim ple m anner. T h o u gh a tree has m any parts, it nevertheless is m erely sim ple in m y represen tation. S p irit is know ledge. For it to be know ledge, the content o f w hat it know s m ust have attained th is ideal form , it m ust have been negated in th is m anner” ( l p r 1 :18 4 ; v p r 1:9 2). In the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel

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states th at"In cognition w h at has to be done is all a m atter o f stripp in g aw ay the alien character o f the objective w orld that confronts us" ( e l § 194 Z - i ; G eraets, 273). In the Philosophy of Spirit H egel w rites: "All the activities o f S p irit are n oth in g but the various m odes in w hich that w hich is external is led back into the internality, to w h at is S p ir it itself, and it is on ly by m eans o f th is leading back, th is idealizing or assim ilation o f that w hich is external, that S p irit becom es and is S p ir it " ( p s §

381, Z ; P etry 1:37)* “A ll the activities o f S p ir it "— all m odes o f con sciou sn ess— H egel says, are form s in w hich we strive to overcom e o th ern ess.'1

Furtherm ore, freedom is only possible through overcom ing otherness.‘‘ Freedom," H egel states,“ is only present w here there is no other for me that is not m yse lf" (e l § 24 Z -2 ; G eraets, 58). Elsew here, he writes that “A freedom for which som ething is genuinely external and alien is no freedom at all; freedom s essence and its form al definition is that nothing is absolutely external."'' A s I have said, S p ir its trium ph over the other is on ly fully actualized in Science. H egel states that "the purpose o f all true science is ju s t this, that Sp irit shall recognize itse lf in everything in heaven and on earth" ( p s § 377, Z ; Petry 1:5). A t the very end o f the Philosophy o f Nature, H egel rem arks that Sp irit “w ants to liberate itse lf by fashioning nature from w ithin itself; this action o f Sp irit is called p h ilosop h y.. . . T h e aim o f these lectures is to convey an image o f nature, in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the m irror o f ourselves, to see in nature a free reflection o f Sp irit" ( p n § 376 Z ; Petry 3:213). “Sp irit (when contem plating nature] has the certainty which A dam had when he beheld E v e ,'T h is is flesh o f m y flesh, this is bone o f m y bone’ " ( p n § 247 Z ; Petry 1:20 4).

T h e w ill to overcom e otherness is seen in all o f nature. Faced w ith the opposition o f the external w orld the anim al gobbles it up.” T h e d ifference between man and anim al, however, is that man can "m aster" nature and "absorb" the external w ithout literally annihilating it. In his early Phi- losophy o f Nature o f 18 0 5 -6 , H egel w rites, "eating and drinking m ake in organic things into w hat they are in them selves, in truth, it is the unconscious com prehending o f them — they becom e thus sublated thereby, because they are in them selves [this fire essence]."* Eating and drinking annihilate sensible things and reduce them to their elem ents, to w hat they are “ in-them selves." T h u s, eating and drinking prefigure Science,

$1.“A n out-and-out other sim ply docs not exist for Sp irit" (ps § 377 Z ;Petry 1:5).52. H egel, Naturrecht, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, ed. H arm ut Buchner and O tto Poggeler (H am burg: Felix M einer Verlag, 1968), 446 .53. For a treatm ent sim ilar to that o f the Phenomenology, see the Philosophy of Spirit, 381 Z ; Perry 1:33; also see Philosophy O f Nature, 357 Z ; Petry 3 :i36 :“ T h e organism m u s t . . . posit the subjectivity o f externality, appropriate it, and identify it w ith its ow n self; this constitutes assimilation." A nd Philosophy of Nature, 359 Z ; Petry 3 :14 4 : "Anim al appetite is the idealism o f objectivity, w hereby this objectivity loses its alien character."54. Q uoted in H arris, Nigfef Thoughts, 448 . H arris w rites that animal nutrition is "the self-intro-reflection o f the inorganic."

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the true"reduction" o f things to their essence, which is their relationship to the A bsolute.”

"Sen se-C erta in ty"— the initial division o f the Phenomenology— is the m ost basic, prim itive form in which the urge to cancel or m aster the other m anifests itse lf in consciousness. Sp irit in Sense-C ertainty believes— tacitly— that the object in its real, concrete particularity can be adequately "grasped" through bare sensory experience alone. In short, Sense- C ertainty believes that intuition can m ake the object fully present, fully transparent in its concreteness, and thus no longer "other.” Sense-C ertainty thinks it can grasp the singularity o f the object as a "this," in its pure immediacy. But, Hegel w rites, "An actual scnse-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, but an instance o f it" (M iller, 59; p g , 7 0 ). In other words, the gesture or the “this" through which we think we can grasp and thus "m aster" the particularity o f the object is really a universal, applicable nor ju st to this "this” but to all “thises." C onsciousness had wanted to grasp the other in its individuality (which is really the same thing as annihilating the other's individuality) but it eludes our grasp.

W e can now already glim pse the end o f the H egelian philosophy in its beginning. In Absolute K now ing the drive to totally grasp the object, and to annul the subject-object distinction, will be realized. Absolute K n o w ing w ill be the total grasp o f an individual in its uniqueness. In fact, it will be the total grasp o f the only true, unique individual there is: the A bsolute— again, the analog to Aristotelian ousia is very clear.16 H owever, in H egel's thought substance has becom e subject: “w hat seem s to happen outside o f [the se lf] , to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance show s itse lf to be essentially Subject” (M iller, 21; p g , 28). Know ledge o f this individual is sim ultaneously self-knowledge. O therness still exists, but it is now understood in term s o f its place w ithin the WTiole, which is the A bsolute = Substance = Subject. S u b stantive otherness, however, has passed away, because w hat is substantive has becom e subjective. In short. Absolute K now ing achieves exactly w hat is desired, covertly, by Sense-C ertainty (and the other form s o f Spirit).

In introducing"Self-C onsciousness," H egel introduces the term Desire (Begierde) to describe the prim al urge for the cancellation o f otherness and the individuation-absolutization o f subject.” But Sp irit is not ju st

55. A lso in the 18 0 5-6 Philosophy of Nature, Hegel states th a t 'T h e animal organism creates its ow n internal environ m ent.. . . [T he] animal organism feeds all it* other functions— all the functions o f its ’ inner organism '— upon the energy produced by its nutritive system ” (quoted in H arris, Nigfct Thoughts, 448). Again, there is a close analogy here between the system o f Science and the "internal environm ent" o f the animal: Science com prehends ("digests") things by locating them in the system o f Science, which is conceived by H egel as an organic unity.56. T h e A bsolute is the individual, which subsum es universals as its particular m anifestations. Sec Richard Dien W infield ,"O n Individuality," in Freedom and Modernity (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1991).57. K o jive asks, what is D esire but the will t o ” transform the contemplated thing by an action, to overcome it in its being that is unrelated to mine and independent o f me, to negate it in its independence, and to assim ilate it to



this desire to absolutize itself. A ll hum an desires aim at the sam e telos, from the base desire sim ply to negate and destroy otherness, to the m ore sophisticated form s o f "negating” otherness through transform ation. T h is telos is self-consciousness (w hich is not ju st the topic o f this one section, but o f the entire w o rk ).* H egel show s that when the subject transform s objects according to its w ill, or rages at and destroys that which resists its desires, it is really being m oved by the desire to confront itself. T h e desire o f the subject to annul the other and absolutize itse lf is ju st the sam e thing as the desire to be confronted by the se lf and no other. But as Böhm e said, "N o th ing can be revealed to itse lf w ithout opposition." T h is means that i f the goal o f consciousness is self-know ledge, it cannot achieve this by annihilating all objectivity, but only by m aking objectivity reflective, by transform ing objects into a m irror o f consciousness.

T h is entire account o f the positive role o f destructive D esire in the ultim ate realization o f the se lf and o f the Absolute is Böhm ean. For Böhm e, w hat H egel calls D esire— the urge to annihilate the other and absolutize se lf— is Evil. S ince a true hum an se lf is possible only through interaction w ith otherness, the “se lf " th a t this nihilating im pulse creates, i f left to its ow n devices, does not raise itse lf above the anim alistic concerns o f pleasure, com fort, and satisfaction. T h is is the “crim inal type,” the man w ho stands in opposition to all else, "looking out for num ber one."*'9 T h e paradox o f this "selfishness" is that it involves no real se lf at all. Böhm e designates th is w ay o f being as "the S o u r"— an indraw ing, a pulling away, a shutting o f f and negation o f all else. H e regards it as a necessary m om ent o f the being o f G o d and all creation.“ H egel w rites o f this doctrine that "B öh m e has really here penetrated into the utm ost depths o f divine essence; evil, matter, or w hatever it has been called, is the 1 = 1, the Being-for-self, the true negativity" ( l h p 3:206; Werke 20 :109). Everything good that subsequently com es to be, is only through having overcom e this negative moment.

Böhm es position is H egel's. T h is negativity in hum an nature is a "tool” used by the C un nin g o f Reason to actualize all that is good: religion, m orality, society, justice , and ultim ately G o d H im self. T h is is

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myself, to make it mine, to absorb it in and by m y I ?* (K o jiv e , Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel, 37 -38).58. H egel, like Bohm e, regards self-know ledge not sim ply as what ought to be achieved, but rather as w hat all men (and reality itse lf) are directed toward by a prim al will.59-Ju st before th e"B oh m e myth” in the Phenomenology (see below ), Hegel w rites:"E vil (Bfoe) appears as the prim ary existence o f the inwardly-turned consciousness . . . " (M iller, 468; p g , 504). Hegel w rites in the Philosophy of Spirit that “evil is nothing else than Sp irit which puts its separate individuality before all else" (ps § 382 Z ; Petry 1:51).60. Speaking o f Hegel's account o f plant life in the 18 0 5-6 Philosophy of Nature, H . S . H arris w rites, "E very 'part' o f 'life ' as the plant displays it for us, is a satanic urge to be the whole kind ‘for itse lf’ or on its ow n account. We have to conceive o f life as an absolute tension o f im perialism and anarchy in order to com prehend what its m ost elem entary form . . . can do and will do, once planted in the earth" (Night Thoughts, 447).

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H egels transform ation o f the C hristian doctrine o f O riginal S in . H egel holds that Sp irit is by nature evil. But this evil can be utilized in such a w ay that it brings good into the world. R obert Schneider states that O etinger, like H egel, sees know ledge as developing through the negative force o f D esire (Begierde). H e w rites that “the stu ff o f C oncrete Sp irit begins in H egel as in O etinger with drive [Trieb] and D esire [Begierde].”*'

D urin g 18 0 4 -5 , H egel w rote out and then criticized a "m yth" concerning the fall o f Lucifer. H egel portrays nature in its separation from G o d as evil. H e w rites,

G o d , having turned tow ard nature and expressed H im se lf in the pom p and dull repetition o f its form s, becam e aw are o f H is expansion . . . and becam e angry over it. W rath [Zorn] is this form ation, this contraction into an em pty point. H e finds H im se lf in this way, w ith H is being poured out into the unending, restless infinity, w here there is no present but an em pty transcendence o f lim it, which always rem ains even as it is transcended.“

G od 's “ W rath” here invites com parison, o f course, to Böhm es "sour" (H erb), though the parallel is not exact. In his Lectures on the History 0/ Philosophy, H egel em ploys the term Zorn to speak o f Böhm es theosophy, identifying the "first Principium" o f B öhm es thought with Goff in Zorn ( l h p 3:192; Werke 20:95).“

H egel continues: “ T h e anger o f G o d , here fixed outside H im se lf in H is otherness, the fallen Lucifer, rose up against G o d and his beauty made him arrogant. N ature, through consciousness o f its ow n form , brought it to com pletion and flattered itse lf over it."64 G od 's w rath, then, according to H egel, becom es the sp irit o f Lucifer, w ho is at hom e with the finite and ephem eral. A gain, there is a clear parallel to B öhm es idea that evil or the dem onic is a m om ent o f G o d , a m om ent "broken o ff" from the divine life. T h is is exactly w hat hum an Sp irit is, before its consum m ation: a m om ent broken o ff from the w hole. Self-consciousness “ is wrath itself, the ignition [Entzündung], o f w rath w ith in it which burns itse lf out and consum es its arrogant pomp."“

H ow ever, as one m ight expect, through the finite realm o f nature Sp irit rises up and can transcend this evil. It does so in this "m yth" through understanding and m aking peace w ith its ow n finitude. Hegel w rites,

T h e consum ed nature rises up in a newer, m ore ideal form , like a realm o f shadow s w hich has lost its first life, the appearance o f its spirit after the death o f its life. But this new form (Spirit) is the overcom ing o f the evil, the enduring o f the glow ing fire [Glut] o f pain in the center point, w here as purified it leaves all the flakes behind in the crucible [Tiegfl], a residuum , which is the pure n oth

61. Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 126.62. Johannes H offm eister, ed., Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung (Stuttgart: From ann, 1936), 36 4-65.63. S cc also l h p 3:206; Werkt 20 :109 .64. Dokumente, 365.65. Ibid.



ing. It raises itse lf up as a freer spirit, which sees its radiance only innature.66

(N o te the use o f the alchem ical im agery o f “purification.”)H egel then im m ediately goes on to criticize th is account— which he

refers to as "the intuitions o f Barbarians" (die Anschauungen der Barbarei)— because in it Sp irit rem ains unconscious o f the fact that it itse lf is the source o f this process o f the divine self-alienation and return. H egel appears to th ink that this further, higher realization is necessary to ‘'com plete” Böhm ean theosophy. D espite his objection to the "b a rbarism " o f the Böhm ean conception (which is repeated in the 1805 lectures), H egel is clearly so close in sp irit to Böhm e that he can generate Böhm ean-style "m yths” w ith ease.

Furtherm ore, m uch o f the language and spirit o f H egel's "Böhm e m yth" recur in th e"R evealed Religion” section o f the Phenomenology, and there his attitude tow ard Böhm e is m ore positive/7 D avid W alsh w rites that H egel’s account is"from start to finish identical w ith the theosophic C hristian ity o f Böhm e.”“ In "Revealed Religion” H egel presents speculative readings o f various C hristian dogm as. In his treatm ent o f the fall from paradise the Böhm e m yth reappears. Paradise for H egel represents the innocence o f im m ersion in "pure immediacy," such as we find in Sense-C ertainty. T h e w ithdraw al into "thought" is the loss o f innocence. H aving turned inward, consciousness now represents "Evil." T h is is B öhm es "Sour.” But, H egel says, "E v il'’ requires a "G ood ,” and indeed we find that consciousness has split into "E v il" and "G ood ." (H egel is not very clear, however, about w hat m om ent o f consciousness corresponds to the " G o o d ”)

H egel then states,"It can therefore be said that it is the very first-born Son o f L ight (Lucifer] h im self w h o fell because he w ithdrew into h im se lf or becam e self-centered, but that in his place another w as at once created” (M iller, 468; p c , 504). Ju st as in the "m yth” o f 18 0 4 -5 , H egel im m ediately distances h im self from this w ay o f conceiving things: "Such a form o f expression as'fallen ' w hich, like the expression 'Son ,' belongs to representation [Vorstellen; "picture-thinking"] and not to the Concept, reduces [herabsetzten] the m om ents o f the C oncept to the level o f representation, or carries representation over into the realm o f thought" (M iller, 468; p g , 504).

C om m entators, again, take H egel as roundly rejecting Böhm e here, but he goes on to pay Böhm e indirect tribute tw o paragraphs later. Still speaking o f the "m yth" o f Lucifer, H egel rem arks that p icture-th inking cannot conceive o f evil, o f the negative, as a "m om ent” o f G o d : “ R ep resentation takes the other aspect, evil, to be a happening alien to the divine being; to grasp it in the divine being as the wrath o f God, this dem ands from representation, struggling against its lim itations, its

6 6 .Ibid.67. T h e Böhm e-Lucifer issue reappears in the Philosophy of Nature, 248 Z ;Petry 1:2 11. Böhm es Lucifer doctrine, and th e“ wrath“ o f G o d are explicitlydiscussed in the Böhm e chapter o f l h p 3:20 5-6 ; Werke 2 0 :10 8 -10 .68. W alsh ,"T h e H istorical Dialectic o f Spirit," 28.

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suprem e and m ost strenuous effort, an effort w hich, since it lacks the C on cept, rem ains fru itless" (M iller, 4 7 0 ; p g , 50 6 ). Böhm e, o f course, saw evil as a m om ent o f G o d , and H egel knew th is. T h o u gh B öhm es thought could not ultim ately becom e A bsolute K now in g because o f its p icture-th inking, it com es as close to A bso lu te K n o w in g as picture- th inking can.

d) Alchemical ElementsT h a t H egel w as fam iliar w ith alchem y and w as ready and w illing to em ploy its "thought patterns" is evident from the "B öh m e m yth" o f 18 0 4 -5 , w hich states that Sp irit "is the overcom ing o f the evil, the enduring o f the glow ing fire [G/wf] o f pain in the center point, w here as purified it leaves all the flakes behind in the crucible [Tiegel], a residuum , which is the pure nothing. It raises itse lf up as a freer spirit, which sees its radiance only in nature.'”” A lchem ical m etaphors w ere com m on in the writings o f W ürttem berg Pietists. A ugust Langen writes that alchem ical language constitutes one o f the m ost im portant sources for Pietist w riters.70 (I w ill offer a much m ore extensive discussion o f H egel’s know ledge of, and indebtedness to, alchem y in chapter 6.)

T h e concept o f the negative as a m om ent in the positive is an old H erm etic them e. In alchemy, m aking gold involves breaking base m etals dow n into their prim al elem ents and then "raising them up” to the perfected m etal-form o f gold. Each m etal w as said to contain a "seed o f go ld" that could be made to sprout and blossom . A t the sam e tim e, the alchem ist w as expected to purify him self, or the process would not w ork. In this we can see an analogy to the function o f the Phenomenology itself. In the phenom enological crucible, Sp irit is separated from its im purities and, literally, perfected. T h e "seed" o f Absolute Sp irit is present in every flawed, im perfect form that Sp irit takes. T h e w ork o f this purification has happened, in part, through the historical process. But H egel provides the final, secret ingredient necessary to synthesize A bsolute Sp irit. H e has placed the historical form s o f Sp irit into his alem bic and, through the fire o f dialectic, has caused them to reorganize into a form that reveals the necessity w ithin their apparent contingency.

H egel closes the Phenomenology w ith the image o f G olgotha, o f the Schädehtätte, the "P lace o f the Skull."71 T h is im age is found in som e alchem ical texts. T h e crucifixion is an image o f the nigredo, the initial alchem ical stage o f putrefaction or death, from which com es (eventually) the p h ilosophers stone. Caput mortuum— "death's head"— w as the

69. Dokumente, 365.70 . A ugust Langen, Der Wortschatz des deutschen Pietismus (T übin gen: M ax N iem eyer Verlag, 1968), 7 1.7 1. Hegel counterposes the Schädelstätte to the Schädellehre, phrenology. Phrenology enjoyed som ething o f a revival in the eighteenth century due to the w ritings o f Johann K asper Lavater ( 17 4 1- 18 0 1) , a Sw iss preacher with mystical tendencies. A side from this, there is nothing“ H erm etic" about phrenology. It is an example o f the reductive materialism m ost H erm eticists vehemently opposed. (H egel's critique o f phrenology occurs in PC, 20 6 -33 ; M iller, 18 5 -2 10 ).

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term used by alchem ists to denote the substance rem aining after p u trefaction or purification by fire has taken place, and it w as sym bolized by a skull. Caput mortuum is a term actually em ployed by H egel, as I shall d iscuss in the follow ing chapter. T h e skull (w ith crossbones) also figures as an im portant image in M asonic initiation.

A lchem ists like H einrich K hunrath ( 15 6 0 - 16 0 5 ) identified C hrist H im se lf w ith the philosophers stone. In truth, the image o f G olgoth a at the end o f the Phenomenology is a continuation o f the "Bacchanalian revel'' im agery that occurs early on in the text. A side from ^ ' 'B a c c h a nalian revel" passage itself, another passage contains an oblique reference to D ionysus: "the life o f Sp irit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itse lf untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and m aintains itse lf in it. It w ins its truth only w hen, in utter dism em berm ent, it finds itse lf” (M iller, 19 ; p g , 26).

In Faith and Knowledge (1802) H egel w rites that the "pure C oncept" m ust "re-establish for philosophy the Idea o f absolute freedom and along w ith it the absolute Passion, the speculative G o o d Friday in place o f the historic G o o d Friday."72 M ythically, C h rist is equivalent to D ionysus (and O siris), the G o d w h o benefits m ankind through being sacrificed. Sp irit m ust die, it m ust be dism em bered, in order to attain A bsolute K now in g and becom e A bsolute Sp irit . K arin Figala w rites that the crucifixion is an “ Ursymbol o f the alchem ical process, o f the 'w hitening o f the nigredo.’ A prim ordial sym bol o f pre-C hristian gnosis for the transform ation o f nigredo into albedo is the saga o f O siris's death and resurrection."71

H egel's Phenomenology is a rite o f initiation and an alchem ical transm utation: the m aterial (m undane m ind or spirit) m ust be broken apart or sacrificed, in order to be transm uted into a h igher form .

e) The Foaming ChaliceT h e final image o f the Phenomenology is the "foam ing chalice." Sp irit as displayed in the Phenomenology's “way o f despair" constitutes "the recollection and the G olgotha [die Schädelstätte} o f A bsolute Sp irit, the actuality, truth , and certainty o f his throne, w ithout w hich he would be lifeless and alone; only, 'from the chalice o f this realm o f spirits, foam s for H im his ow n infinity’ " (M iller, 493; p g , 531).7* H egel has paraphrased Schiller's poem “ D ie Freundschaft" (“ Friendship"; 1782). T h e last tw o lines o f w hich read: "A us dem K elch des ganzen Scelen rciches, / Sch äu m t ihm— die Unendlichkeit."7' H egel has revised these lines to read "Aus

72. Faith and Knowledge, trans. W alter C e r f and H . S . H arris (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1977), 191. G erm an edition: Gesammelte Werke, 4:414.73. See K arin Figala,'D e r alchem ische B egriff des C aput M ortuum in der sym bolischen Term inologie Hegels,“ in Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage 1970, cd. H . G . G adam er (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), J43-44- Sec chapter 5 on caput mortuum.74. T h e "w ay o f despair" (Weg der Verzweifiung) is mentioned at M iller, 49; p g ,60. It is a clear reference to the via dolorosa.

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dem K elche dieses G eisterreiches, / schäum t ihm seine Unendlichkeit."T o understand the significance o f the changes, one m ust look at the

final stanza o f Sch iller s poem in its entirety:

Freundlos war der grosse W eltenmeister,Fühlte Mangel— darum sch u f er G eister,

Selge Spiegel seiner Seligkeit!—Fand das höchste W esen schon kein gleiches.A u s dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches

Schäum t ihm— die Unendlichkeit.

T h is m ight be translated:

Friendless w as the great W orld M aster Felt a lack— thus he created spirits,

Blessed m irrors o f his b liss—Still found the highest being no likeness,From out o f the chalice o f the w hole realm o f the soul

Foam s for H im — infinity. *

T h e im agery o f the W orld M aster creating "spirits" as a “m irror” calls to m ind B öhm es doctrine o f G o d s w isdom , w hich he depicts as a m irror and analyzes into the seven "source-spirits” (Quellgeister). H egel’s claim , as w e have seen in connection w ith the "m yth” o f 18 0 4 -5 , *s that any developm ental account o f the “ life o f G o d " m ust understand Sp irit as its origin and object. H egel contends that th is is the crucial com ponent m issing from Böhm ean theosophy. Encountering a sim ilar "m yth” in S ch ille rs Die Freundschaft, H egel thus identifies Sch illers created Geist (or, literally, Geister) w ith the soul o f the W orld M aster: "Seelenreiches” becom es “G eisterreiches."

T h e re is a further irony in H egel’s use o f Sch ille rs poem . H egel m ust also reject Schiller's claim that “Still found the highest being no likeness.” In a Zusatz to the Encyclopedia Logic H egel states that “the original calling o f man, to be an im age o f G o d , can be realised only through cognition [Erkennen]” ( e l § 24 Z -3 ; G eraets, 63). For H egel, th e"w orld m aster” must find an adequate likeness.

Finally, Sch iller w rites that out o f th is "realm o f the soul foam s for H im — infinity,” im plying that infinity unfolds before G o d , as an external show. H egel revises the last line o f the poem to read "foam s to him , his infinity [seine Unendlichkeit].” Sp irit is now to be identified w ith the infi-n ire . T h is m u st b e u n d e rs to o d in c o n tra s t to w h a t H e g e l c a lls “ b a d in fin - ity ” (Schlechte Unendlichkeit), w hich is an infinity that stands opposed to w hat is finite as som ething external. Such opposition lim its infinity, thus m aking it not infinite but finite. "G o o d infinity” comprehends finitude.

75. Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, 4 vols., ed. G erhard Fricke and H e rbert G . G öp fert w ith H erbert Stubenrauch, 6th ed. (M unich: Hanser, 19 7 4 -8 0 ), 1:93.76 . Translated in Verene, Hegel's Recollection, 6.



T hus, Spirit does no t face an infinity"foaming" ou t away from it; it is the infinite. T his, its true nature, has revealed itself through the Geisterreich th a t is the Phenomenology7*

T h ere is a yet another, still m ore interesting im plication to Hegel's use o f this passage. C on sid er the context in which it occurs. H egel speaks o f "the recollection and the G olgoth a o f A bsolute Sp irit, the actuality, truth, and certainty o f his throne, w ithout w hich he w ould be lifeless and alone." T h e m eaning o f this im agery seem s to be obvious: the w ay o f Sp irit to A bsolute K now in g is likened to C h ris ts passion. But H egel then im m ediately introduces his paraphrase o f Schiller. In this context, the reference to th e"K elch e" can only call to m ind the image o f the H oly G rail, the cup in which C h rist ’s blood w as captured during his crucifixion.

T h e H oly G rail w as also the cup o f the last supper, from w hich the disciples drank w ine transubstantiated into C h ris ts b lood. T h e G ra il is represented to this day by a com m union chalice. H egel’s use o f the image o f the "K elch” extends the com parison o f his doctrine to C h ristianity. It also circles back to his discussion o f the Eleusinian m ysteries, in which he spoke o f the Eleusinian "com m union": "the secret m eaning o f the eating o f bread and the drinking o f w ine" (M iller, 65; p g , 77). In drinking from the com m union cup we becom e one w ith G o d . H egel believes that he has actually realized this oneness in his Phenomenology. For a philosopher like H egel, who believes that at the end o f tim e we rend and devour our G o d like the T itan s did D ionysus, the cup o f Christ's blood is a useful sym bol for a dangerous idea.7*

T h e image o f the H oly G rail was appropriated by H erm eticists, particularly alchemists. In W olfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival (c. 117 0 -12 30 ), the version o f the G rail story w ith which H egel was m ost likely familiar, the G ra il appears not as a cup but as a stone. In the story, the herm it Trevrizent tells Parzival that the name o f the G ra il is Lapsit exillis ™ A lthough this looks like Latin , it literally m eans nothing. M ost scholars have thought it a m istake on W olfram s part. It is generally agreed that lapsit is supposed to be lapis, stone. Ju liu s Evola argues fo r lapis elixir, m aking an obvious connection w ith alchem y .*0 1 find Em m a Jung's suggestion o f “ lapis exilis" m ore plausible, however, for the philosopher’s stone w as explicitly nam ed lapis exilis in som e w orks o f A rn old o f V il- lanova, born 1220 . T h e term m ay be m uch older.*1 Exilis m eans “poor" or

77. M y interpretation o f these lines is based in part on that o f Verene, Hegel’s Recollection, 6 - 7 .78. O etinger believed that the spilling o f C h rists blood in the crucifixion was highly significant. For instance, he seem s to have held that our "participation” in the life o f C h rist rhrough holy com m union is em blem atic o f the "taking up" o f the true doctrine, transm itted through C h rist, through which we m ay nurture our spiritual body and so w ork to actualize the divine spiritual concretion which is G od . See Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 123.79. W olfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, IX . 469:7-80. Ju liu s Evola, The Mystery o f the Grail, trans. G u id o Stucco (Rochester, V t.: Inner Traditions, 1994), 153.81. ib id ., 149-

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“mean." Em m a Ju n g notes that traditionally the p h ilosophers stone is at once priceless, as well as the m ost com m on thing there is, "trodden underfoot in the street.“” Sh e w rites that the philosopher's stone is "a particle o f G o d concealed in nature, an analogy to the G o d w ho, in C h rist, came dow n to earth in a hum an body, subject to suffering. O n the other hand, the cheapness’ o f the stone . . . alludes to the fact that every hum an being is its potential bearer, even its begetter."’"

H egel finished the Phenomenology in grear haste, according to legend, on the eve o f the battle o f Jen a. W hen he looked for an im age to end the book, w hat came to him w as the crucifixion o f Jesu s on G o lgoth a— and then a chalice, the foam ing chalice o f Schiller. Perhaps H egel's inspiration to use Schiller's chalice in the context o f the image o f the crucifixion can only have seem ed right to him because o f its association w ith the H oly G ra il, perhaps even the un-Chalice o f W olfram — the G ra il as stone, the SieiM der Wehen. T h e Phenomenology has been called a Bildungsroman, but perhaps a better description would be G rail quest, w here the G rail represents w hat all other philosophers have sought, but none before H egel has attained: A bsolute K now ing.

Hegel's Initiation Rice 149

82. E m m a J u n g a n d M arie -L o u ise von F ranz , The Grail Legend, tra n s . A n d rea D ykes (B o s to n : S igo P ress , 1986), 153.83, Ibid ., 157-


150 Chapter Five

T h e Kabbalistic Tree

T h e Science o f Logic

O n ce you have en tered th e m agic circle the so rcerer h as draw n arou n d h im self, you are lost.

— E ric V o eg clin ,"O n H egel: A S tu d y in S o rc e ry "

I. The Project o f Hegel's Logic

H egel’s second book, the Science o f Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) w as published 18 12 -16 . In 1817 , H egel published another version o f his “ Logic” : the so-called Encyclopedia Logic, the first book o f his Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse). T h e Science o f Logic is verbose and obscure. T h e Encyclopedia Logic is terse and obscure. T h e latter is a collection o f num bered paragraphs that served as a lecture outline for H egel's classes in the G ym nasium in N urem berg, and later in the universities o f H e idelberg and Berlin . T h ese paragraphs are extrem ely difficult to un derstand in isolation and require H egel’s am plifying lecture rem arks. Fortunately, m any o f these rem arks were w ritten dow n verbatim by H egel's students and have been printed in subsequent editions o f the Encyclopedia as the Zusätze. Except where I have indicated otherw ise, I w ill use the term Logic to refer to both texts in general, and neither in particular.

H eidegger held that virtually all philosophers before him have " fo rgotten Being." M etaphysicians think that talking about Being means talking about som e particular ( i f exalted) being, such as G o d . Hegel's Logic is very much a part o f this "onto-thco-logical" tradition o f m etaphysics. T h e Logic is sim ultaneously an account o f w hat it m eans to be and an account o f the highest individual being. In A ristotelian term s, the Logic is an account o f substance as such, but it is also an account o f the highest individual substance.1

O n the initial page o f the preface to the first edition o f the Science of Logic, H egel im plies that he intends to provide G erm an y with its own m etaphysics: " I f it is rem arkable when a nation has becom e indifferent

1. H . S . H arris w rites th at"T h e logic presents the divine life as an absolute Substance in which the essence (being, activity) is identical w ith the existence (becom ing, passive product or expression). T h e substance is eternally as a process o f com ing-to-be” ( Night Thoughts, 300).

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to its constitutional theory, to its national sentim ents, its ethical cu stoms and virtues, it is certainly no less rem arkable w hen a nation loses its m etaphysics, when the spirit which contem plates its ow n pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life o f the nation” (M iller, 25; w l 1:3). In the introduction to the Science o f Logic, H egel contrasts his book to "form er m etaphysics" (M iller, 6 4 ; w l 1:50). In the introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel w rites that “Speculative Logic contains the older logic and m etaphysics; it preserves the sam e form s o f thought, laws, objects, but it develops and transform s them w ith fu rther categories” ( e l § 9; G eraets, 33).

S o w hy did H egel call this m etaphysics Logic ? In fact, com m entators rarely ask w hy H egel selected the title that he did. T h e answ er lies in the derivation o f the term logic from the G reek logos. R osenkranz reports that H egel in his Jen a years "loved . . . to present the creation o f the universe as the utterance o f the absolute Word, and the return o f the universe into itse lf as the understanding o f the W ord, so that nature and h istory becom e the m edium betw een the speaking and the understanding o f the W ord— a m edium which itse lf vanishes qua other-being.” '-

But I shall let H egel speak for him self, in a series o f quotations that w ill enable us to piece together an accurate account o f the subject m atter o f the Logic.

In the preface to the second edition (1832) o f the Science o f Logic, H egel discusses the consum m ating idea o f his Logic, the "C on cep t” (der Begriff): “ T h is C oncept is not sensuously intuited or represented; it is solely an object, a product and content o f th inking, and is the absolute, self- subsistent thing [Sacfoe], the logos, the reason o f that which is, the truth o f w hat we call things; it is least o f all the logos which should be left o u tside the science o f logic" (M iller, 39; w l 1:19). T h is passage im plies that H egel's "D octrin e o f the C oncept" w ill satisfy the claim o f the science itse lf to be both m etaphysics and ontology: it w ill give us the Logos both as “absolute, self-subsistent object" and as the "reason o f that which is, the truth o f w hat we call things." H egel’s A bsolute Idea (absolute Idee) is this Logos.’ H egel w rites in the Encyclopedia Logic that "ideas are not ju st to be found in our heads, and the Idea is not at all som ething so im potent that w hether it is realised or not depends upon our ow n sweet will; on the contrary, it is at once w hat is quite sim ply effective and actual as w ell” ( e l § 142 , Z ; G eraets, 2 14 ). H egel w rites, further, that "It is not we w ho 'form ' concepts, and in general the C oncept should not be considered as som ething that has com e to be at all” ( e l § 163, Z ; G eraets, 24 1).

Lecturing on one o f the early paragraphs o f the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel rem arks that the subject m atter o f the Logic is tr u th ( e l § 19 Z - i ; G eraets, 46 ). H egel am plifies this rem ark by adding that w h at thought th inks in the Logic is “w hat is eternal" ( e l § 19 Z - 2 ; G eraets, 47). T h is is

2. Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 193. H egel, System of Ethical Life, 265.3. In the Philosophy of Nature Hegel states at one point,“the idea, i.e. the logos. . . “ ( pn 1:247, Z ; Petry 1:205).


then explained as being"the supersensible w orld” ( e l § 19 Z -2 , G eraets, 48). In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, H egel states that "P h ilo sophy is no w orldly w isdom , as it used to be c a lle d .. . . It is not in fact a w isdom o f the w orld but instead a cognitive know ledge o f the non- w orld ly; it is not a cognition o f external existence, o f em pirical determ inate being and life, or o f the form al universe, but rather cognition o f all that is eternal— o f w hat G o d is and o f w hat G od 's nature is as it m anifests and develops itse lf" (l p r 1 :1 17 ; v p k is33“ 3 4 )* In the Science o f Logic, H egel identifies the eternal w ith G o d (M iller, 78; w l 1:68). In rhe Ency- clopedia Logic, H egel avers that both philosophy and religion hold that "G o d and G o d alone is the truth" ( e l § 1; G eraets, 24 ). In his m anuscript for the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1824), H egel w rites that "G o d is the one and only object o f ph ilosophy” and that "philosophy is theolo g y” ( l p r 1:84 ; v pr 1 :3 -4 ) . In a fam ous passage o f the Science o f Logic, H egel states that the Logic “is to be understood as the system o f pure reason, as the realm o f pure thought. T h is realm is truth as it is w ithout veil and in its ow n absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition o f G o d as H e is in his eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite Sp irit" (M iller, 50 ; w l 1:33-34)*

O n the basis o f all o f the foregoing, then, we are entitled to conclude that, for H egel, T h e Eternal = T ruth = Logos = A bsolute Idea = G o d , and that this is the subject m atter to be recollected in the Logic. Ju st exactly how H egel can make this series o f identifications constitutes the argum ent o f the Logic. A gainst the tradition o f "negative theology," as well as the tradition that claim s in general that rhe hum an intellect is finite and frail, H egel holds that the Infinite and Eternal must be know - able. H egel even claim s, surprisingly, that stressing man's finitude and G o d ’s unknow ability is contrary to the C hristian faith. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he states, " I declare such a point o f view to be directly opposed to the whole nature o f the C hristian religion, according to w hich w e should know G o d cognitively, G o d ’s nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all else" ( l p r 1:88 ; v p r 1 :7 ) .

In the sam e m anuscript, after H egel claim s that philosophy is occupied w ith G o d alone— "philosophy is th eology"— he goes on to say that everyone already has a consciousness o f G o d ( l p r 1:85; v p r 1:4 ; again, we see that H egel’s philosophical m ethod involves recollection). T h is is another rheme o f H egel’s Logic. In the preface to the second edition o f the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel w rites that "R elig ion is the m ode, the type o f consciousness, in which the truth is present for all men,’’ but philosophy is som ething only a few take up and com prehend (G eraets, 11; Werke 8:23). T h is does not mean that philosophers leave behind the concept o f G o d : as we have seen, H egel claim s in the Logic that both religion and philosophy hold that G o d alone is the Truth . It sim ply m eans that relig ion— ritual, w orship, devotional literature, etc.— is for all men, whereas philosophy is only for a few.

In the very next sentence o f the preface, however, H egel alludes to H om er and says that certain things, such as Truth , have tw o nam es,"one in the language o f G od s, and the other on the tongues o f us men” (G er-

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acts, 11 ; Werke 8, 23). T h e structure o f H egel's sentences suggests that he is saying that religion is to philosophy as the language o f G o d s is to the language o f men. But this is nor his meaning. It is philosophy that is the language o f G o d s. Indeed, in a Zusatz to a later section o f the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel states that "the original calling o f man, to be an image o f G o d , can be realised only through cognition [Erkennen]” ( e l § 24 Z -3 ; G eraets, 63). T h is is no innocent scriptural allusion. In the Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion, H egel states that "G o d is only in and for thought" ( l p r 1:209; v p r 1:118).

In m aking such claim s, H egel is not sim ply attacking longstanding religious view s about man's relationship to G o d , he is also opposing the K antian philosophy. H egel’s claim that we can know the th ing-in-itself is the m ajor reason w hy so m any "tough-m inded" philosophers seem to regard him as slightly mad. In fact, H egel’s claim — for which the entire Logic serves as an argum ent— is tightly reasoned and built on Kant's ow n prem ises. In the Science o f Logic, H egel w rites that the critical p h ilosophy holds that "w e place our thoughts as a m edium between o u rselves and the objects, and that this m edium instead o f connecting us w ith the objects rather cuts us o ff from them " (M iller, 36; w l 1:15 ). M uch later in the Logic, H egel in fers— as he does in m any other places— that Kant's claim that the th ing-in-itself is unknow able is equivalent to the claim th a t" reality lies absolutely outside the C oncept” (M iller, 593; w l

3 :24 ).H egel fastens on to K an t’s occasional identification o f the thing-in-

itse lf w ith "the Unconditioned." For H egel, only the Absolute is unconditioned, for it cannot be subsum ed by any higher or w ider category. N o r can it be m ade present in intuition. In the Logic he presents a sy stem which articulates the conceptual m om ents o f the Absolute, em ploying a m ethod K an t to som e degree anticipated but never fully appreciated: dialectic. T h e m om ents o f the A bsolute are sim ultaneously categories o f the real and categories o f hum an thought. In fact, a superficial glance at the divisions o f H egel's Logic reveals that it is partly a rew orking o f Kant's Table o f Judgm ents and Table o f C ategories. K an t’s categories are the conditions for the possib ility o f knowledge and con ditions for the possib ility o f objects as such. O nce this is understood, the reasoning behind Hegel's claim to know the th ing-in-itself becom es clear. For H egel, the totality o f conditions is itse lf the Unconditioned. T hese conditions form an organic totality, which can be know n as a whole. T herefore, i f the totality o f these conditions is the U nconditioned, and the U nconditioned is the thing-in-itself, then we can know the thing-in-itself.

Furtherm ore, th is U nconditioned— as an organic to tality— is an individual. It is a unique, self-sufficient individual determ ined by n oth ing, but w hose m om ents determ ine everything else. T h u s , another nam e fo r the U nconditioned is God. Because its m om ents account for all being, it also constitutes the system o f the World, or R eality as a w hole. Finally, because the categories that m ake up the U nconditioned are, as I have said , also categories o f hum an thought in all its form s, an



account o f the U nconditioned is equivalent to an account o f the M ind or Soul. T h u s , H egel believes that he has, through a radically new m ethod o f thought, m ade K an ts noum cnal realm present: w hat things- in-them selves are is the A bsolute or U nconditioned, w hich is W orld, So u l, and G o d together.

H ow ever, the w ell-know n "dual aspect" reading o f K an ts phenom ena- noum ena distinction m ight lead one to ask i f H egel's claim to kn ow the thing in itse lf m eans that he th inks we can know or experience things as they are when they are not appearing to us. T h e answ er to this question is, yes and no. W e can know things as they are in them selves because the finite things that appear to us are them selves appearances o f that in finite, em inently know able being which is the A bsolute or the U nconditioned. In other w ords, w hat individual things are in them selves is the A bso lu te— which w e com e to know through H egel's philosophy. H o w ever, w e cannot know the A bsolute in the sense o f m aking it intuitively or sensuously given. It is this kind o f know ledge that K an t has in mind when he denies know ledge o f things-in-them selves. But Kant's claim that genuine know ledge m ust alw ays involve intuition is sim ply arb itrary; it is the chink in Kant's critical armor.

H egel believes that through the "purificatory initiation" o f the Phenomenology, he has, in effect, put h im self in an altered state o f consciousness, beyond the distinction between subject and object, w hereupon the dialectic o f the Logic sim ply flows from nothing.* A s I said in chapter 3, the philosopher is a vehicle o f rhe m uses: an oracle through which Sp irit expresses itself, an autom atic w riter who passively watches the play o f the dialectic as it develops on his page.

Som e further discussion o f the nature o f this process is in order here. A s is w ell-know n, H egel claim s that there is a necessity to his dialectical transitions and a com pleteness to the system . W h at m akes these features possible is H egel's use— described in chapter 3— o f the triangle and the circle as sym bolic form s governing the fundam ental architectonic o f his system . T h e necessity o f Hegel's dialectical transitions is displayed in their triadic structure. It is frequently pointed out that this structure is often inadequately portrayed as a process o f "thesis-antithesis-synthesis."s Som e have even suggested that the "triadic form " o f the dialectic is a mere H egel "m yth" and should be discarded. A s we have seen, however, H egel placed special em phasis on the triad as an clem ent out o f the philosophia perennis (recall his rem ark about K an t and the triadic form in the preface to the Phenomenology).

T h e triadic structure o f dialectic m ay be described as fo llow s: first there is an initial idea, which when thoroughly thought through su ggests its opposite, or, at least, an opposing or contradictory idea; a third term then appears that "reconciles" these tw o. T h is reconciliation is

4. A rth u r Versluis writes o f the transform ation in rhe soul o f rhe Bohm ean theosopher that "when the soul gives itse lf up to the nothingness, then it bccom cs dead to its ow n will, and the nothing, pure G o d s will, makes the soul alive according to its ow n nature." Versluis, Wisdom's Children, 149.5. See M u ller,"T h e Hegel Legend o f'T h esis-A n tith esis-S yn th esis ." 'A s is always pointed out, Hegel h im self never uses these term s.

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accom plished in various w ays, but frequently it involves a discovery o f an underlying identity or com m onality betw een the tw o term s initially thought to be different. T h e real problem w ith the form ula thesis- antithesis-synthesis is w ith the characterization o f the third term as synthesis. N evertheless, there are som e H egelian third term s that do look like syntheses. For instance, in the Philosophy of Right, the th ird term to Fam ily-C ivil Society-State appears to take up and combine elem ents o f the first tw o: the state, like C ivil Society, is an association o f autonom ous individuals, but it cancels the external relation o f those individuals in C ivil So ciety and, like the family, relates them internally through a shared foundation o f values and interests.

T h e com pleteness o f H egel's system — especially the Logic— is achieved through its circularity. I f the final category o f the Logic (or o f the system as a w hole) leads back to the beginning, then everything that could be said has been said: nothing has been left out. H . S . H arris w rites that "T h e ideal o f philosophy as a self-justifying circle is definitive for H egel's concept o f system from the beginning."6 Speaking o f the dialectic, H egel says in the Phenomenology that "It is the process o f its ow n becom ing, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being w orked out to its end, is it actual" (M iller, 10 ; PC, 14 ) . Early in the Science o f Logic, H egel w rites that "T h e essential requirem ent for the science o f logic is . . . that the w hole o f the science be w ithin itse lf a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first" (M iller, 7 1 ; w l 1 :6 0 ) . In the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel w rites:

Each o f the parts o f philosophy is a philosophical w hole, a circle that closes upon itself; but in each o f them rhe philosophical Idea is in a particular determ inacy or elem ent. Every single circle also breaks through the restriction o f its elem ent as well, precisely because it is inw ardly [the] totality, and it grounds a further sphere. T h e w hole presents itse lf therefore as a circle o f circles, each o f which is a necessary m om ent, so that the system o f its peculiar elem ents constitutes the w hole idea— which equally appears in each single one o f them , ( e l § 15; G eraets, 39)

T h e system is a circle o f circles, and the Logic is one such circle.A n im portant question must be asked about H egel’s metaphor, h o w

ever. I f the Logic on reaching its "final" category gives w ay to the Philosophy o f Nature, then how can it be said to return to its beginning? T h e answer is that each parr o f the system — Logic-N ature-Sp iric— constitutes a sep arate "domain.” Each separate H egelian science gives a com plete speech about one o f these dom ains. It is not "Absolute Idea" that leads to the Philosophy of Nature. Rather, it is the Logic as a w hole that requires supplem entation by the categories o f N ature. H egel w rites in the Encyclopedia Logic th at" T h e Logic is the science o f the pure Idea, that is, o f the Idea in the abstract elem ent o f thinking" (e l § 19; G eraets, 4 5). A s abstract, the

6. H arris, Nigfct Thoughts, 235; K o jive also m akes rhe point that it is the circularity o f rhe system that proves its com pleteness (K o jive , Introduction to the Reading o f Hegel, 93).



Idea is w ithout full realization or expression, although it is fully intelligible in the "abstract clement o f thinking." T h e Absolute Idea is presupposed in rhe beginning o f the Logic— Being— and A bsolute Idea is a return, o f sorts, to Being. H egel’s circle o f circles m ight best be understood as a chain: each link is a whole, and although one link touches another, it is not fastened to that other or perm anently connected w ith it.7

In one o f the Zusätze to an early paragraph in the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel states: "W h en . . . w e consider the Logic as the system o f pure rhought-determ inations [reinen Denkbestimmungen], the other p h ilo sophical sciences— the Philosophy o f N ature, and the Philosophy o f S p irit— appear, in contrast, as applied logic, so to speak, for the Logic is their anim ating soul. T h u s, the concern o f those other sciences is only to (re)cognise the logical form s in the shapes o f nature and spirit, shapes that are only a particular m ode o f expression o f the form s o f pure th in king" ( e l § 24 Z -2 ; G eraets, 58). H egel continues these rem arks, in a m anner that w ill shortly em erge as very im portant: "In this w ay the Logic is the all-anim ating spirit o f all sciences, and the thought-determ i- nations contained in the Logic are the pure spirits; they are w hat is most inward, but, at the sam e tim e, they are always on ou r lips, and consequently they seem to be som ething thoroughly w ell-know n" ( e l § 24 Z - 2; G eraets, 59). H egel is here referring to the idea, explored already in chapter 3, that we alw ays already kn ow — im plicitly— the content o f philosophy.

Som ething further m ust be said, though, about rhe relation o f the Logic to the w hole system . A t the end o f his introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel gives the structure o f his system as follows:

I. T h e Logic, the science o f the Idea in and for itself.II. T h e Philosophy of Nature, as the science o f the Idea in its o th erness.h i . T h e Philosophy of Spirit, as the Idea that returns into itse lf out o f its otherness, ( e l § 18; G eraets, 42)

M uch later in the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel states that "T h e Idea is w hat is true in and for itself, the absolute unity o f C oncept and objectivity” ( e l § 213; G eraets, 286). T h e "in itse lf” refers to the parts o f the Logic that H egel calls “objective logic"— Being and Essence— whereas the truth "for itse lf" is "subjective logic," the C oncept (M iller, 6 3 -6 4 ; w l

1 :5 0 -5 1) . In the Logic, all the eidetic determ inations o f objects are explicated and are show n to lead to an idea that reflects on itse lf or is self- referential— this is w hat H egel means by the Idea being "for itse lf” or "subjective."

A bsolute Idea is the abstract conception o f self-th inking thought. T hrou gh nature and man it “seeks” w orld ly realization and finds it only in the em bodied self-thinking thought o f the philosopher.

7 . 1 owe this m etaphor o f the chain to D onald Phillip Verenc (sem inar on the Phenomenology o f Spirit, Em ory University, fall 1996). T h e m etaphor o f the chain (Kette) also occurs in O ecinger:"D ie W elt ist eine Kette." See Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 127.

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T h e Kabbalistic Tree 157

2. Bohmean Influences on rhe Logic

In 1816 Hegel received invitations to teach at H eidelberg and Berlin. H is chances in Berlin, however, were sabotaged by the powerful Berlin theologian W ilhelm M artin Leberecht de W ette (17 8 0 -18 4 9 ), who, as W iedm ann notes, denounced H egel’s Logic as an obscure "occultism" (Geheimwissenschaft).* Earlier, in an 1815 letter to H egel’s archenem y Jakob Friedrich Fries ( 17 7 3 -18 4 3 ) , de W ette w rote th a t "M ysticism reigns here mightily, and how deep we have sunk is show n in the though t o f Hegel.’"'

A t times, Hegel seems to have positively encouraged the im pression that he is a mystic. In the 1805 Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, Hegel stated th a t "T he philosophers are closer to the Lord than those w ho live by the crum bs o f the Spirit; they read, or write, the cabinet orders o f G od in the original; it is their duty to write them down. T he philosophers are the mystai w ho have been present a t the decision in the innerm ost sanctuary.'’10 In the preface to the second edition o f the Encyclopedia, Hegel writes th a t "w hat was revealed as a mystery in earlier tim es should now be revealed for th inking itself" (G eraets, 17; Werke 8:31).

T h e preface to the second edition o f the Encyclopedia (1827) provides ample evidence o f H egel’s willingness to be grouped w ith the mystics. In troducing some o f his basic ideas, Hegel m entions Bohme m ore than once. H e w rites,"T he spirit is essentially consciousness, and hence [consciousness] o f the conten t m ade into an object. As feeling, rhe spirit is ju s t the no t yet objective conten t itself (only a quale, to use an expression o f Jakob Bohme); it is ju s t the lowest stage o f consciousness, in the form o f the soul, which we have in com m on w ith the lower anim als’’(G eraets, 12; Werke 8 :24). H egel goes on to w rite o f Bohme:

T h e name "T euton ic Philosopher” has rightly been conferred upon this m ighty spirit. O n the one hand, he has enlarged the basic im port o f religion, [taken] on its ow n account, to the universal Idea; w ith in that basic im port he form ulated the highest problem s o f reason and tried to grasp spirit and nature in their determ inate spheres and configurations. [A ll rhis w as possible] because he took as his foundation [the thesis] that the sp irit o f man and all things else are created in the image o f G o d — and, o f course, o f G o d as the Trin ity; their life is ju st the process o f their reintegration into that original image after the loss o f it. O n the other hand (and conversely), he forcibly m isappropriated the form s o f natural things (sulphur, saltpeter, etc.; the sharp, the bitter, etc.) as spiritual form s and form s o f thought. (G eraets, 15; Werke 8 :28-29 )

In rhe sam e tex t H egel also makes several adm iring references to the arch-theosophist and occultist o f his day, Franz von Baader. In support

8. W iedm ann, Hegel, 53.9. N icolin, Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen, 117.10 . H egel, Geschichte der Philosophic, ed. H erm ann G lockner, Jubilaumsausgabe, vol. 3 (Sturtgart: From ann, 19 2 7 -19 4 0 ), 96.


o f his ow n attem pt to "rationalize" religious doctrine, H egel quotes volume 5 o f Baader’s Fermenta Cognitionis (1824). Baader claim s there that the idea that religion is on ly a "m atter o f the heart” is a view dear to atheists, w ho know that to underm ine religion they m ust underm ine the notion that a rational theory o f religion is possible.11 A fter quoting Baader, H egel goes on to state that

W h at is m ost sublim e, m ost profound, and m ost inw ard has been called forth into the light o f day in the religions, philosophies, and w orks o f art, in m ore or less pure, in clearer or m ore obscure shapes, often in very repulsive ones. W e can count it as a particular m erit o f Franz von Baader that he not only goes on bringing such form s to our recollection, but also w ith a profoundly speculative spirit he brings their basic im port expressly into scientific honour because on that basis he expounds and confirm s the philosophical Idea. (G eraets, 15)

In an extraordinary footnote, H egel w rites that “ I am certainly delighted to learn that H err von Baader agrees w ith m any o f m y propositions— as is evident both from the content o f several o f his more recent w ritings and from his references to me by name. A bout m ost o f w hat he contests— and even quite easily about everything— it would not be difficult for me to com e to an understanding with him , that is to say, to show that there is, in fact, no departure from his view s in it" (G eraets, 15; W erke 8:29). H egel then goes on to take issue w ith a criticism Baader made o f one aspect o f his Philosophy of Nature.'2

A lthough Baader does make som e favorable rem arks about H egel in the first volum e o f Fermenta Cognitionis, H egel’s assessm ent o f his relationship w ith Baader seem s to have been highly unrealistic. Baader, for his part, appears to have been sim ply puzzled by Hegel's attention and insistence on their ability to “com e to an understanding." It is not unusual for one prom inent scholar to "court" another, for career advancem ent, or often sim ply to establish an intellectual friendship. Baader, however, w as a decidedly strange and m arginal figure fo r H egel to cou rt— unless, o f course, H egel saw h im self as som ehow belonging on the m argins w ith Baader.

To return to Bohm e, in the 1812 D octrine o f Being o f the Science of Logic, H egel offers rhe follow ing in a rem ark concerning "quality" in the section on Dasein:

Qualierung or Inqualierung, [which arc terms from out o f] a philosophy which goes deep but into a turbid depth, refers to Determ inacy as in itself, but at the same time is another in itself; or it refers to the fam iliar nature o f opposition, as it is in its essence. In this respect opposition constitutes the inner nature o f quality and is essentially its self-movement in itself. Qualierung means therefore, in the afore

11. Baader, Fermenta Cognitionis (Berlin , 1824), preface, ix ff (quoted in G eraets, 14 ; Werke, 27).12. Baader replied to Hegel's defense o f h im self here in an 1824 essay entitled “ Hegel on M y D octrine in the Preface to the Second Edition o f the Encyclopedia." See his Sdmtlicbe Werke, ed. F. H offm ann et al. (Leipzig, 18 5 1-6 0 ),Folge 1 , 10 :30 6 -9 .

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m entioned philosophy, the movement o f a determ inacy in itself, in which respect it situates and fastens itse lf in its negative nature (in its Qual) from out o f another, signifying in general the quality’s own internal unrest by which it produces and maintains itse lf only in conflict.”

Qualierung or Inqualierung— which m ight be rendered “qualification” or “ inqualification’'— refer to B öhm es dynam ic conception o f quality. In Aurora he states that "A quality is the mobility, boiling, springing and driving o f a thing."1’ H egel quotes this line in his rem arks on Böhm e in the Lectures on the History 0 / Philosophy (l h p 3:199; Werke 20 :103).

In the 1832 edition o f the D octrine o f Being (the only segment o f the Logic Hegel finished revising before his death), the above passage has been significantly altered. It now reads as follows: “ Qualierung or Inqualierung an expression o f Jak o b Böhm es, w hose philosophy goes deep, but into a tu rbid depth, signifies the movement o f a quality (o f sourness, bitterness, fieriness, etc.) w ithin itse lf in so far as it situates and fastens itse lf in its negative nature (in its Qual) from out o f an other— signifies in general the quality’s ow n internal unrest by which it produces and maintains itself only in conflict” (M iller, 114 ; w l i : [ i832], 109). A side from cutting som e o f the more opaque lines from the original, H egel has now explicitly attributed Qualierung and Inqualierung to Böhm e, and included reference to Böhm es categories sour, bitter and “ fire” (heat ?).

For som e reason, H egel decided against referring to Böhm e by name in the first edition o f the D octrine o f Being. In fact, H egel m akes no reference to Böhm e in any o f his published w ritings until the Encyclopedia in 18 17 (in which a very b rie f reference to Böhm e occurs in paragraph 472 o f the Philosophy of Spirit). In the 1832 edition o f the D octrine o f Being— as well as in the preface to the 1827 Encyclopedia quoted above— H egel seem s to be deliberately correcting this om ission and m ore openly acknow ledging his indebtedness to Böhm e. T h is very likely indicates that since 1805 H egel continued to study Böhm e closely, no doubt m aking use o f van G h e rt ’s kind g ift o f the Böhm e edition (see chapter 4). T h u s, we are faced w ith exactly the opposite o f w hat m any com m entators on H egel’s relationship to Böhm e w ould have us expect: instead o f m oving aw ay from Böhm e in his m ature period, H egel actually seem s to be m oving, in a very public manner, toward him. H egel’s attem pt to ally h im self w ith Baader, w ho w as w idely know n at the tim e as Böhmius redivivus, only reinforces this im pression.

I now proceed to w hat is specifically Böhm ean in rhe Logic. In rhe Encyclopedia Logic H egel states that “the Logic is the all-anim ating spirit o f all sciences, and the thought-determ inations contained in the Logic arc the pure sp irits [die reinen Geister]” ( e l § 24 Z -2 ; G eraets, 59). In the Science o f Logic H egel refers to Logic as a “realm o f shades [Schatten).” ls T h ese passages make sense only i f we suppose that H egel th inks o f the

13. w l (18 12 ed.), 82. S incc M iller bases his translation on the 1832 edition, he does not include this passage.14 . Aurora, chap. 1, § 3; Sparrow , 40.15. H egel, Wissenschaft der Logik, 3 vols., cd. L . von H enning, (Berlin : D uncker and H um blot, 18 4 0 -18 4 7 ) . vol. 3 .4 7 .



categories or ideas o f the Logic as being in som e sense minds. T h e identification o f eide w ith m inds is a perennial idea in the philosophic tradition. It appears in A ristotle when he says o f the soul that it "m ust be a substance as the form o f a natural body potential w ith life, and [such] substance is an actuality [entelecheia). S o the soul is the actuality o f such a body."1'’ It is also a them e o f Sp in oza’s thought.

T h e place o f this idea in H egel’s Logic should be fairly obvious: i f A bsolute Idea is, in effect, the "pure eidos"— or, in A ristotelian term s, the actuality— o f self-thinking thought, then A bsolute Idea is a kind o f pure mind, o r form al mind. In the preface to the Phenomenology, H egel states that when Being becom es "absolutely mediated,” it becom es "d ie C o n cept," w hich, he says, is "self-like” (selbstisch; M iller, 2 1 ; p g , 29). Since all preceding categories o f the Logic arc approxim ations to A bsolute Idea, each is, in effect, an approxim ation to m ind. T h ey are ghostly (geister- haft) "shades" because they arc only partially real. Even the Absolute Idea, the P luto o f this "R eich der Schatten,” is ultim ately only the shadow cast by em bodied self-thinking thought.

W e m ight ask w hat the relation is between the spirit-shades o f the Logic and the Sp irit o f the Phenomenology and Philosophy of Spirit. Q uite simply, the Sp irit realized in m ankind is H oly Sp irit, H oly G h o st (heilige Geist). In them selves, the eide o f the Logic are, as I have already said, m erely form al and empty. In the living Sp irit o f m ankind, however, these eide-spirits have trod the Via Dolorosa o f the Phenomenology and, so to speak, "earned rheir wings.’* T h e y have becom e fully concrete, fully expressed. T h ere is m ore than a mere analogy to C hristian doctrine here, however. H egel’s sp irits and his Sp irit really are supernatural. In the 1831 preface to the second edition o f the Science o f Logic H egel w rites, " I f nature as such, as the physical world, is contrasted w ith the natural sphere, then logic m ust certainly be said to be the supernatural [über- natürliche}, which perm eates every relationship o f man to nature, his sensation, intuition, desire, need, instinct, and sim ply by doing so transform s it into som ething hum an, even th o tg h only form ally hum an, into ideas and purposes” (M iller, 32; w l 1 :10 ; m y em phasis). T h e sp irits o f the Logic are logically prior to the natural world, and the H oly Sp irit only appears in the w orld through the activity o f m en w ho have raised them selves above the level o f nature or the anim al.

Böhm e, o f course, analyzes G o d and the process o f com ing-to-be into seven "source sp irits" (Quellgeister), w hich he also calls “ form s” (Gestalten), "properties" (Eigenschaßen), and "qualities" (Qualitäten). H egel’s Logic and its “m om ents” arc analogous to B ö h m es source spirits or form s. H egel’s categories, like B öh m es, inform all o f reality and are the Grundbegriffe for all the sciences. Further, Böhm e introduces his d iscussion o f the seven source-spirits as a d iscussion "o f the corpus o f an angelical kingdom ."17 H egel does not treat his L ogic-sp irits as angels,

16. Aristotle, De Anima, B, 4 12 *2 0 -2 2 , in Aristotle: Selected Works, trans. H ip pocrates G . Apostle (G rinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1982), 266.17 . Aurora, chap. 8, heading; Sparrow , 147.

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b u t ra th e r as shades like those in H ades or Limbo. N evertheless, the parallel is clear.

Further, Böhm es account o f the interrelationships o f his seven source-spirits is strikingly like H egel’s treatm ent o f his system o f logical m om ents. In Aurora, Böhm e w rites, "All the seven spirits are generated one in another, the one continually generates the other, no t one o f them is the first, nor is any one o f them the last; for the last generates as well the first as the second, th ird , fourth , and so on to the last."1* In Böhm es Clavis, he w rites th a t "the first and seventh properties are always to be reckoned as one, and also the second and sixth as one, as well as the th ird and fifth as one, the fourth alone is the separating lim it (Scheide' Ziel), since there are only th ree properties o f nature, according to the revelation o f the H oly Trinity o f G od.”:s

W hat these quotations call to m ind, o f course, is the famous circularity o f the Logic. Böhme claims th a t his first and final spirits are one, ju s t as Hegel claims that the end o f the Logic re turns to the beginning. In the Phenomenology Hegel says that the dialectic “is the process o f its own becoming, the circle th a t presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being w orked ou t to its end, is it actual’’ (M iller, 1 0 ; p g , 1 4 ) . O f course, Böhme also says th a t his second and sixth and th ird and fifth spirits are one, bu t there is even an analogue for this in Hegel. Each o f the triadic subdivisions Being, Essence, and C oncept in the Logic“correspond"w ith one another, so that, for instance,"Quality" in Being is analogous to"Intro-reflection" (Reflexion in ihm selbst) in Essence, ju s t as the major triad o f Being-Esscnce-Concept corresponds to the major, triadic divisions o f the o ther Hegelian sciences.

W hereas Hegel employs the image o f the circle to describe the s tru ctu re o f the Logic and the system as a whole, Böhme employs the image o f the wheel. Böhme w rites in Aurora,

But if I should describe the D eity in its b irth in a small, round circle, in the highest depth , then it is thus: Suppose a wheel standing before you, w ith seven wheels one so made in the o ther th a t it could go on all sides, forward, backward and cross ways, w ithout need o f tu rn ing back. In its going, th a t always-one wheel, in its tu rn ing about, generates the o thers, and yet none o f them vanishes ou t o f sight, b u t all seven are visible. . . . T he seven wheels are the seven spirits o f G od. They are always generating one another, and are like the tu rn ing o f a w h e e l. . . and the seven wheels are hooped round w ith fellies, like a round globe.*

Böhm e goes on to liken the seven wheels o r spirits to "G od the Father,” the nave o f the wheel o f wheels (“there are no t seven naves, bur one only”) to the “Son o f God," and the spokes to the "H oly Spirit.” O f course, it is H egel’s entire "developm ental” account o f G od, and no t ju s t this o r th a t detail, which seems so strikingly like Böhme. (Interestingly,

18. Aurora, chap. 10, § 2; Sparrow , 207-8.19. Q uoted in W alsh, The Mysticism of Innerworidly Fulfillment, 82.20. Aurora, chap. 13. §§ 71-72: Sparrow , 328-29.

Copyrighted mate

O ecinger also m akes prom inent use o f the circle m etaphor. In his Philosophie der Alten (1762) he w rites, "N atu re is a circle, it has m any beginnings and endings."*’ 1)

In Mysterium Magnum, Böhme refers to G od before his "development," G od as Ungrund, as "the dark nature” and states th a t “in the dark nature he is no t called God."22 T h e concept o f Ungrund bears some sim ilarity to Hegel's aether, w hich I shall discuss m ore extensively in the following chapter. Like the aether, it is an ultim ate, dynamic ground o f all being. W alsh refers to Ungrund as a "dark inchoate will for self-revelation.'’*’’ All o f the spirits are "contained” w ithin G od as Ungrund, in potentia. Böhme refers to the Ungrund as both Alles and Nichts.24 G od as Ungrund cannot achieve self-revelation unless H e takes some determ inate form , unless, as W alsh pu ts it, H e generates "a spiritual corporeality."” T h is is, in effect, Böhm es Logic: the "system” o f seven spirits, represented as a wheel o f wheels, existing eternally, from w hich natu re o r extension will be "projected.”

Böhme expresses the ideality o f th is system by calling it "eternal nature." T h e com ing-into-being o f th is spiritual corporeality is a process o f specifying or determ ining the will o f the Ungrund. T h e Ungrund is an "out-going" will— a will for self-revelation— w hich Böhm e calls Nichts. To achieve th is revelation, however, the out-going will m ust fall w ithin the gravitational a ttraction o f an "in-going" will, which is a "contracting" and individuating force. It is the in-going will th a t gives Nichts determ inate being. In fact, Böhm e calls th is will Etwas. Böhm e w rites in Mysterium Magnum th a t "the eternal free will has in troduced itself into darkness, pain, and source; and so also th rough the darkness in to the fire and light, even in to a kingdom o f joy; so th a t the N o th ing m ight be know n in the Som ething.”5* Böhme w rites th a t "the no th ing is a craving after som ething.”*7

T he parallels to Hegel scarcely require com m ent. Ungrund corresponds to the pure indeterm inacy w ith which Hegel begins the Logic. Böhme calls Ungrund Alles and Nichts, ju s t as Hegel calls his indeterm inacy Reines Sein and Nichts. Further, Böhme conceives the Alles-Nichts as an active will, ju s t as Hegel sees Sein-Nichts as a kind o f conceptual dynamism , and so dubs it Werden (Becoming). For Böhme, the out-going will o f Alles- Nichts m ust enter in to or become (he is no t too clear on this point) the

21. Oetinger, D ie Philosophie der Alten, wiederkommend in der güldenen Zeit (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1762), vol. 1 ,18 2 . Som e o f H egels program m atic rem arks in the Logic also seem to bear the im press o f Oetinger. In the Science of Logic, in a passage concerning the nature o r io e ic a l form s" (logischen Formen), Hegel w rites,"W hen they are taken as fixed determ inations and consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in an organic uniry, then they arc dead form s and the spirit which is their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them” (M iller 48; w l 1:31).22. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 7, § >4-23. David W alsh, "A M ythology o f Reason," 154-24 . Böhm e, Von der Gnaden-Wahl, in Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 6 , chap. 1, § 3.25. W alsh, The Mysticism o f Innerworldly Fulfillment, 78.26. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 26, § 37.27. Bohm e goes on to say that this is"the eternal origin o f magic." Q uoted in N icolcscu, Science, Meaning, and Ewlution, 211.

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m ore determ inate will o f Etwas. In the Logic, Becom ing gives rise to Being-there (Dasein), which is translated by m any com m entators as “ D eterm inate Being." T h is is obviously analogous to Böhm es Etwas. In fact, in the Science of Logic, in a passage im m ediately fo llow ing the discussion o f Böhm es Qualierung, H egel writes that,“ Being-there is a being-there, Som ething” (das Dasein ist Daseiendes, Etwas; M iller, 115; w l i ; i i o ) .

In one o f the Zusätze to the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel describes the dialcctical"overcom ing" o f Becom ing in language that im m ediately calls to m ind Böhm e: "becom ing proves itse lf to be w hat is thoroughly restless, but unable to m aintain itse lf in this abstract restlessness; for, insofar as being and nothing vanish in becom ing— and ju st this is its concept— becom ing is thereby itse lf som ething that vanishes, like a fire that dies out w ithin itse lf by consum ing its material.” Dasein or Etwas is the ashes left behind by the fire: the energy o f W erden (= Sein/Nichts = Nichts/Sein) "coagulates" as Dasein, as D eterm inate Being.

Böhm e frequently talks about G o d "in H im self." H e often uses this expression to refer to the "contracted being" o f G o d w ithin the first o f the source-spirits, Sour. H ow ever, it is G o d s nature to becom e "for H im se lf" (an expression Böhm e does not use). In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion o f 1827 H egel states that "G o d can be know n or cognized, for it is G od 's nature to reveal H im self, to be m anifest" ( l p r 1:382; v p r 1:278). H egel claim s that to say otherw ise is contrary to the C h ris tian faith. T h e above quote continues as fo llow s: "T h o se w ho say that G o d is not revelatory do not speak from the [standpoint o f the] C h ris tian religion at any rate, for the C hristian religion is called the revealed religion. Its content is that G o d is revealed to hum an beings, that they know w hat G o d is. Previously they did not know this; but in the C h ris tian religion there is no longer any secret— a m ystery, certainly, but not in the sense that it is not known."

H egel criticizes Spinoza in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy on the grounds that his G o d or substance rem ains "in H im self." Recall that these lectures w ere delivered in 1805, during H egel's initial period o f Böhm e-enthusiasm in Jena. H egel refers to Spinoza's G o d as der Abgrund der Substanz (the abyss o f substance). Abgrund is first used in a p h ilosophical context by Eckhart. It seem s to be the conceptual ancestor o f B öhm es Ungrund (and Böhm e also som etim es uses Abgrund). T h e sense in w hich H egel uses Abgrund here m akes it very clear that he is thinking o f Spinoza's G o d as equivalent to the unm anifest, undeveloped, potentia o f B ö h m es Ungrund.

T h is im pression is confirm ed by the follow ing passage from the Lectures:

[Spinoza's] philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding substance, and no t yet Spirit; in it we are no t a t hom e w ith ourselves [man ist nicht bei sich]. G od is no t Sp irit here, because he is no t the triune [der Dreieinige]. Substance rem ains rigid and petrified, w ithou t B öhm es sources [Quellen; i.e. source-spirits]; for the individual determ inations in the form o f determ inations o f rhe understanding are no t Böhm es source-spirits [Quellgeister], w hich energize and expand in one another, ( l h p 3:288; Werke 20 :166)

The Kabbaliscic Tree 163


T h is passage is extraordinary because H egel is criticizing a m ajor "canonical" philosopher for failing to com e up to the standard o f Böhm e, a m arginal figure w idely considered even in H egel's day not to be a philosopher at all. It is also extraordinary because it show s how deeply im m ersed H egel w as in Böhm es w ay o f thinking, how in discussing a th inker very different from Böhm e, H egel w as still operating w ith the term s and distinctions and thought-patterns o f Böhm e upperm ost in his mind.

In the Appearance (Erscheinung) section o f the D octrine o f Essence in the Logic, H egel discusses the category o f "Force and its U tterance" (Kraß und ihre Äusserung). H e claim s that in Force, the opposition o f "W h o le and Parts" is reconciled. In a Zusatz to the Encyclopedia Logic H egel states, "Although it consists im plicitly o f parts, the w hole does cease to be a w hole when it is divided; a force, on the other hand, only proves itse lf to be a force by uttering itself. It returns to itse lf in its utterance, for the utterance is itse lf a force once m ore’' ( e l § 136 Z - i ; G eraets, 2 0 6 -7 ) . O ne is rem inded here o f B öhm es Ton (Sound or Tone). A t a certain point, the prim al w ill tow ard self-m anifestation gives rise to the source-spirit Love, which is a seeking after illum ination or self-com pletion. A s I said in chapter 1, this seeking issues in Tone, a phenom enon which is a kind o f "eject” o f the seeking— a kind o f significant cpiphe- nom enon. A s separate from Love, but as a product o f Love, Tone m akes Love m anifest to itself. W ith Tone, the life o f G o d is ready for fulfillm ent: having given rise to a "speech" or "expression" o f itse lf (Tone), the process becom es a thing definite to itself.

Böhm es seventh spirit, o f course, is Body (Corpus), which encompasses the other six. It represents the "concretization" o f the process through its self-expression. T h is concretization is the com pletion o f the cycle, but as involving the cycles self-awareness it includes the cycle as well. Böhm e states that G od 's "hunger and desire is after substance."* For Böhm e, all things strive to become fully specified and concrete, including G od . In a striking parallel to Böhm es thought, Hegel characterizes his Concept as a fully concrete being, and treats it as substance, as a kind o f spiritual body. O f course, for both Böhm e and Hegel this eidetic process m ust realize itself in the w orld and become truly em bodied in order for it to be fully actual. T h u s, H egel speaks in the Philosophy 0/ Spirit o f "O bjective Spirit,” in which the Idea is em bodied in law and morality, as well as of"Absolute Spirit," in which the Idea finds its highest expression in art, religion, and philosophy.

Finally, although its relevance to Böhm e is slight, the occurrence o f alchem ical term inology in rhe Logic is w orth m entioning. T h ree tim es in the Encyclopedia Logic H egel em ploys the term caput m ortuum * G eraets and his coeditors explain this as "the alchem ist's term for the 'dead' p recipitate that rem ained when all the 'living sp irit’ had been extracted or given o f f ” (G eraets, 316 n .45). C yril O 'R egan w rites that caput mortuum

28. Six Theosophic Points, chap. I, § 27.29. For a discussion o f Hegel's use o f th is term , see F igaIas"D er alchemischeB eg riff des C aput M ortuum in der sym bolischen Term inologie Hegels.“

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is the "precipitate that rem ains after spirit has been extracted."” C . J . S . T h om p son seem s to concur, describing caput mortuum as "the term given to the residue that was left in the bulb o f a retort after an operation.” ’ 1 H egel first applies the term to the Kantian th in g-in -itsclf ( e l § 4 4 ; G e r aets, 87). Later, he refers to Essence taken abstractly as "the caput mortuum o f abstraction” ( e l § 112 ; G eraets, 175). Finally, he applies the term to the transcendent conception o f G o d : "As the abstract essence in the Beyond, outside o f which all distinction and determ inacy m ust fall, G od is in fact a mere name, a mere caput mortuum o f the abstractive understanding" ( e l § 112, Z ; G eraets, 177). It is apparent that H egel would regard B öhm es Ungrund as a caput mortuum.

H egel's use o f caput mortuum to describe Essence is the m ost interesting occurrence o f the term . Essence, o f course, is a stepping-stone on the w ay to C oncept and A bsolute Idea. Essence itse lf is indeed a caput mortuum insofar as it is a negated provisional definition for the A bsolute Idea. It "dies" or falls away, yet it is at the sam e tim e "m aterial” used in the p rocess o f dialectic that presses on ro A bsolute Idea. H egel’s use o f caput mortuum to describe Essence taken abstractly (i.e., taken on its ow n, in isolation from the other categories) indicates that he recognized the parallel betw een dialectic and alchem ical transm utation: determ inate negation is the nigredo that precedes the synthesis o f rubedo, the philosopher's stone, or the Absolute (see the follow ing chapter for a more detailed treatm ent o f alchem y in relation to H egel).

3. T he Kabbalah

a) T h e Kabbalistic Writings"K abbalah" m eans "tradition.” T h e Kabbalah is thought to have been a teaching handed dow n from G o d to M oses, although the earliest textual evidence o f a Jew ish m ystical tradition dates from about the first century b . c . K abbalism is a fusion o f early Jew ish m ysticism w ith G nosticism , N eoplatonism , and possibly H erm etic G n o sis .“ So m e have argued that K abbalism definitely begins in the tw elfth to thirteenth centuries in Spain . O thers m aintain that it goes back much farther. Far from being one unitary doctrine or m ovem ent, there are various schools and strains o f K abbalism . Som e may be considered ro be fairly traditional in concurring ultim ately w ith rhe teachings o f orthodox, nonm ystical Ju daism ; others are quite radical in their departure from tradition.

A s to the m ajor texts o f the K abbalah, three m ust be m entioned. G ershom Scholem calls the Sefer Yezirah o r Book of the Creation the “earliest extant H ebrew text o f system atic, speculative thought.” “ Its date o f com position is uncertain, but we know that versions o f the Sefer Yezirah existed in the tenth century. It was first printed in M antua in 1562. C o m posed o f less than tw o thousand w ords, the Sefer Yezirah dealt w ith the

30. See O ’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, 384, n6t.31. C . J . S . T hom pson, The Lure and Romance o f Alchemy (N ew York: Bell P u b lishing, 1990). 116 .32. M . H . A bram s, Natural Supernaturalism (N ew York: W . W . N orton . 1971),157-58 .33. G ershom Scholem , Kabbalah, 23.



th irty-tw o "secret paths o f w isdom ," the m ystical significance o f the tw enty-tw o elemental letters o f the H ebrew alphabet, and the ten Sephi- roth, w hich w ill be discussed shortly. T h e Bahir ("brilliance” or"illum ination”), a collection o f Kabbalistic w ritings, som e new and som e very old, was assem bled in Provence in the tw elfth century. M any K abbalists ascribe parts o f the Bahir to R abbi N ehuniah ben H aK an a, w ho flourished in the first century a . d . T h e Bahir is notew orthy for its highly im aginative usage o f sym bolism and m etaphor. T h e classic text o f speculative Kabbalism , however, is the Sefer Ha Zohar, o r Book of Splendor, a text o f alm ost a thousand pages now thought to have been com posed by M oses de Leon o f C astille in the late thirteenth century, though attributed by him to earlier sources.

b) Hegel's Knowledge o f KabbalismH egel studied several histories o f philosophy in putting together his Lectures o f 1805. O ne o f these w as Joh an n Jaco b Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiae, w hich appeared in five Latin volum es in Leipzig from 17 4 2 to 17 4 4 (a second edition cam e out in 17 6 6 -6 7 ) . Faivre w rites that Brucker’s w ork represents the "first really system atic description o f the W estern esoteric cu rre n ts .. . . A lthough a w ork o f little objectivity, m arked by the rationalism o f the Enlightenm ent, its im portance should not be underestim ated, because for several generations it acted as a point o f reference for philosophy in general and esotericism in particula r” Faivre notes that the entry on "T h eo sop h ie“ in D id ero ts Encyclopedic w as largely plagiarized from Brucker.* Brucker's attitude tow ard H er- m eticism is predom inantly hostile.

Brucker devotes considerable attention to the H erm etic tradition. H is discussion o f"E g yp tian philosophy" includes an account o f H erm es Trism egistus. H e discusses figures like Bruno, Lu ll, and Cam panella. In volum e 4 , part 1, he includes a chapter entitled "T h e Restoration o f Pythagorean-Platonic-K abbalistic Philosophy,” which includes accounts o f the w ork o f Reuchlin, A grippa, and the C am bridge Platonists C ud- w orth and M ore. A later chapter in the sam e volum e, titled "T h e Theosophists,” discusses Fludd, Böhm e, and Francis M ercury van H el- m ont. M ost significant, however, is the m ore than 150 pages devoted to the K abbalah in volum e 2. In introducing his Lectures, H egel states that Brucker’s w ork "is so m uch useless ballast” (l h p 1 :1 12 ; Werke 18 :13 4 ) . T h e substance o f H egel's criticism is that m any o f Brucker's accounts are inaccurate and deform ed by his com m itm ent to W olffian m etaphysics.’4 N evertheless, H egel read these volum es carefully.

In his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, H egel boils dow n Brucker's extensive rem arks on the Kabbalah to about tw o pages. T hough the brevity o f Hegel's treatment might suggest that he shared Brucker's hostility, there is no evidence for this in w hat H egel actually says. H e does m ention that Kabbalistic w riters som etim es "sink into the fantastic” ( l h p

34. Faivre, Theotophy. Imagination. Tradition, xviii; 18 -19 .35. Sec also the prcface to the second edition o f the Encyclopedia Logic, inwhich sim ilar criticism s arc leveled against Brucker (G eraets, 10 ; Werlte 8:2a).

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2:395; Werke 19 :426), but he says sim ilar things about Böhm e and yet takes Böhm es thought very seriously.“ I will not discuss Hegel's account o f the Kabbalah here, for it is from start to finish identical w ith a particular form o f Kabbalah, that o f Isaac Luria (1534 -72), which I shall discuss at length in chapter y .r In the present section, I will be concerned simply with an account o f the basic concepts o f the Kabbalah. W hether or not H egel consciously recognized his indebtedness to the Kabbalah is irrelevant. H is thought is sim ilar to it in an extraordinary num ber o f ways.

I f there was an influence o f the Kabbalah on H egel, how did it take p lace? O ne source w as undoubtedly Brucker. A nother, m ore indirect source w as Böhm e, w hose indebtedness to the Kabbalah is alm ost un iversally acknowledged (Brucker even rem arks on it). W hen O etinger asked a rabbi in Frankfurt am M ain how he m ight better understand the K abbalah, the rabbi directed him to Böhm es w orks. A seventeenth-century follow er o f Böhm e, Johann Jacob Sp äth , w as so astounded on learning o f the roots o f Böhm es thought in the K abbalah that he converted to Ju d a ism .“ Lurianic K abbalism w as a m ajor influence on Böhm e. C yril O ’R egan m aintains that O etinger provides the key to understanding the influence o f the Kabbalah on H egel.’-'

It is unlikely that H egel read any K abbalist w orks in the original H ebrew. H ow ever, it is highly probable that he did read at least som e Latin translations, published as part o f K n o rr von Rosenroth's tw o-volum e com pendium o f Kabbalistic literature, the Kabbala Denudata (K abbalah Unveiled) (1677 , 1684). R osenroth , a Pietist noblem an, included large excerpts from the Lurianic K abbalah, as well as a long essay by Francis M ercury van H elm ont, an alchem ist and friend o f Leibniz. T h e Kabbala Denudata made K abbalism accessible to every educated person and affected attitudes to and interpretations o f Kabbalah until the end o f the nineteenth century.40 It contains many errors o f translation, but does not seriously d istort K abbalism .41

I now turn to som e o f the derails o f the K abbalist m etaphysics and cosm ology.

36. In the preface to the second edition o f the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel makes a b r ie f swipe at"cnostic and Kabbalistic phantasm agorias" (G eraets, 17; Werke 8:31). But “ kabbalistische“ w as a com m on epithet in Hegel's day for what the G erm ans call Schwärmerei, ecstatic, visionary m ysticism or enthusiasm o f a particularly m indless sorr. Ir docs not necessarily refer to the real Kabbalah, any more than our term “cabal” refers to actual Kabbalistic sccts.37. C yril O 'R egan also identifies Hegel's presentation o f the Kabbalah as Lurianic. See O 'R egan ,“ H cgcl and Anti-Judaism ," The Owl o f Minerva 28 (> 9 9 7)-14 1-8 2 ; 162.38. Both anccdotes arc recounted in Scholcm , Major Trends, 238.39. C yril O 'R egan , “ H egel and Anri-Judaism ," 160. O 'R egan further states (p. 166) that “ T h e historical fact that the linkage o f the Kabbalah with Böhm e was available to H egel through the mystical Pietism o f the previous generation leads one ro em phasize its value for characterizing H egelian ontotheological narrative."40. There had been earlier translations o f som e Kabbalist works. For instance, G uillaum e Postel ( 15 10 -8 1) translated the Sefer Yezirah and Zohar into Latin.4 1. Scholem , Kabbalah, 416.


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c) Bereshith . . .T h e root o f the H ebrew w ord Yahveh m eans "ro become." Scholem w rites that "T h e essence o f the K abbalistic idea o f G o d . . . lies in its resolutely dynam ic conception o f the G odhead.”42 T hou gh G o d is understood as a process, and this process is knowable, m ost Kabbalists could not accept the idea o f a G o d made w holly m anifest and so they held onto the idea that G o d possesses a transcendent aspect. T h is w as given a name by the early K abbalists o f Spain and Provence: Ein-Sof (“the Infinite"). Som e K abbalists, like M oses C ordovero (15 2 2 -7 0 ), the teacher o f Isaac Luria, m aintained that the transcendent Ein-Sof alone is tru ly G od .

In the w orks o f other K abbalists, such as Luria, Ein-Sof plays a role virtually identical to B öhm es Ungrund. T h e Zohar o f M oses de Leon ( 12 4 0 - 13 0 5 )— which Scholem characterizes as "Jew ish theosophy”45— announces that “ From the m ystery o f Ein-Sof a flame is kindled and inside the flame a hidden well com es into being. T h e prim ordial point shines forth in being w hen the well breaks through the aether."*4 Ju st as Böhm e holds that nature is an unfolding o f the dynam ic"eternal nature” contained w ithin G o d , so the Zohar, in Sch olem s w ords, holds th a t"T h e creation o f the world, that is to say, the creation o f som ething out o f nothing, is itse lf but the external aspect o f som ething w hich takes place in G o d H im self.”*4

T h e first stage in the m anifestation o f Ein-Sof is som etim es conceived as Ayin, or "N othing.” Ein-Sof, as the Infinite, is supposed to be Absolute All, w hereas Ayin is A bsolute N othing . According to Halevi, these tw o are really identical.4* (In Böhm es form ulation, Alles = Nichts; in H egels, Sein = Nichts.) Scholem m aintains th a t Ayin is a kind o f prim al unity th a t transcends the subject-object distinction.*7 Nevertheless, although Ein-Sof/Ayin is neither subject nor object, its telos is to develop into a tru e or absolute subject. Ayin is said to become Ani, "I" (Ayin le-Ani, "N oth ing changes into I”) 48 According to the Kabbalists, "G od willed to see God,” to become fully m anifest to Himself; to achieve perfect self- knowledge or self-relation.4**

In the Encyclopedia Logic, H egel uses " I" to express the self-relation o f Idea or G o d through m an, stating that "only man reduplicates h im self in such a w ay that he is the universal that is for the universal. T h is is the case for the first tim e when man know s h im self to be an T ” ( e l § 24 Z - i ; G eraets, 57). O f course, H egel holds that it is through m an that G o d "achieves” self-know ledge. A ccording to traditional Ju deo-C h ristian

42. Scholcm , On The Mystical Shape o f the Godhead: Basic Concepts in the K abbalah, trans. Joachim N eugroschel (N ew York: Schocken Books, 1991), 158.43. Scholem , M ajor Trends, 205.4 4 . Zohar 1:15a; quoted in Scholem , Kabbalah, 10 9 -10 .45- Scholem , Major Trends, 217 . See also p. 223:"Creation is nothing but anexternal development o f those forces w hich are active in G o d H im self."46. Z ’ev ben Sbim on H alevi, A Kabbalistic Universe (York Beach: Sam uelW eiser, 1977), 7-47. Scholem , Major Trends, 221.48. Ibid., 218.49. H alevi, A Kabbalistic Universe, 7.


belief, m aking G od som ehow dependent on m an is heretical. T h e K abbalah, however, is no t traditional Judaism. Scholem writes that "the Zohar identifies the highest developm ent o f G o d s personality w ith precisely th a t stage o f H is unfolding which is nearest to hum an experience, indeed w hich is im m anent and m ysteriously presen t in every one o f us.'*“

T h e “ I ” o f G o d is identified by m any K abbalists w ith Malkhut or "K ingdom ." T h is is the tenth and "final” o f the fam ous Kabbalistic Sephi' roth, which are alm ost alw ays depicted as circles and often show n grouped and interconnected in a diagram know n as the "T ree o f Life." T h e term Sephiroth first occurs in the Sefer Yezirah, which is the earliest know n K abbalistic text. Sephiroth (singular: Sephirah) means "num bers.” T h e Sephiroth are also som etim es called mekorot, “sources.” T h e role o f the Sephiroth in K abbalism is strik ingly sim ilar ro the role o f the Quell- geister in B öhm es theosophy: they in som e sense delineate the stages o f G o d s progressive self-m anifestation.

H ow ever, as C ordovero recognized, the crucial question is w hether the Sephiroth are aspects o f G o d , or m erely instrum ents by which G o d expresses H im self. C ordovero argued that the Sephiroth are "organs” o f G o d , w hich m akes them parts o f G o d in essence, but not identical w ith H im , in the sam e w ay that m y heart is a part o f me, but not identical w ith me. O f course, the Sephiroth are not physical organs, so C ordovero tried to interpret them as "stages o f the divine mind.” ' 1 C ordovero also conceives the Sephiroth as expressing the underlying structure o f nature itse lf and o f every created being. Scholem w rites that “this tree o f G od (the Tree o f L ife] is also, as it were, the skeleton o f the universe; it grow s throughout the whole o f creation and spreads its branches through all its ram ifications. A ll m undane and created things exist only because som ething o f the pow er o f the Sephiroth lives and acts in them."42 T h is idea is essentially identical to B öhm es conception o f the "eternal nature" o f the source-spirits as the essence o f nature, as well as to H egel’s claim that the Logic constitutes the "anim ating sou l” o f nature ( e l § 2 4 Z -2 ; G eraets, 58).

O th e r K abbalists were m ore radical than Cordovero. In the th ir teen th century, m any held the view th a t the Sephiroth were m om ents o f G o d ’s essence itself, and no t som ething d istinct from G od. According to Scholem, the au th o r o f the M aarekhet ha-Elohut (a very early Kabbalist treatise), "was led to the daring conclusion th a t only the revealed G od can in reality be called‘G od,’ and no t the hidden deus absconditus, who cannot be an object o f religious thought." '1 Even rhe Zohar does not make the S eph iro th "outside” G od, bu t instead conceives the "em anation" o f the Sephiroth as occurring w ithin G od.

As to the Sephiroth them selves and their structure , they are always presented in an hierarchical order th a t alm ost never varies in the works o f the Kabbalists. D espite th is hierarchy, each Sephirah is conceived o f as

50. Scholem , M ajor Trends. 2 16 - 17 .51. Ib id ., 252; cf. Scholem , Kabbalah, 102.52. Scholem , Major Trends, 2 14 - 15 .53. Scholem , Kabbalah, 89.



being equally close to its “source" in Ein-Sof or Ayin. T h u s the hierarchy is artificial. A gain, Böhm e com es to mind:

T h ese seven generatings in all are none o f them the first, the second, or the third, or last, but they are all seven, every one o f them , both the first, second, third, fourth , and last. Yet I m ust set them dow n one after another, according to a creaturely way and manner, otherw ise you could not understand it: For the D eity is as a wheel w ith seven w heels m ade one in another, w herein a man sees neither beginning nor end.w

O ddly enough, instead o f the fam iliar tree diagram , the Sephiroth are som etim es depicted as concentric circles, ju st like B öhm es wheels. Scholem says the follow ing about the doctrine o f the Sefer Yezirah: "it is em phasized that the ten Sephiroth constitute a closed unit, fo r 'their end is in their beginning and their beginning in their end ’ and they revolve in each other; i.e., these ten basic principles constitute a unity."” Lu ria depicted the Sephiroth as concentric circles and, as I have said, it is L u rianic Kabbalah that influenced Böhm e m ost strongly. (In fact, Lurianic K abbalah incorporated both the linear and circular arrangem ent o f Sephiroth, as w e w ill see in chapter 7.) Scholem notes that "From the 13th century onw ard we find the idea that each Sephirah com prises all others successively in an infinite reflection o f the Sephiroth w ith in them selves."*

T h e Sephiroth and their arrangem ent as the “ Tree o f Life" are show n in figure 6.

T h e Sefer Yezirah refers to Keter as t u ah, which can be translated as "aether" or "spirit." T h is is the point at which G o d in H im self, Ein-Sof, bursts into m anifestation. T h is m anifestation is thought o f as a circuit running through the ten Sephiroth, and it is sym bolized as a jagged flash o f lightning, touching or "activating" each Sephirah, pictured as a circle or a bow l (recall Böhm es Schrack o r "Flash"). Keter o r "crown" is on some accounts Ayin or N othing, on other accounts the O ne, or G o d s Supernal W ill. In fact, it is perhaps all o f these: it is blank O neness, w hich is yet indeterm inate and w ithout character. In this tension between unity and indeterm inacy is born a drive or a conatus toward a plurality o f determ inations. T h is is represented by the second Sephirah , Hohkmah or W isdom , which is the "thought” o f creation: the idea o f all that is or can be.

Like everything in the K abbalah, the doctrine o f the Sephiroth is expressed in figurative language that is often difficult to interpret. T h u s any interpretation is necessarily speculative. W e can say w ith som e assurance, however, that as a m ovem ent aw ay from blank O neness and tow ard determ ination, Hohkmah is a determ ination of Oneness.97 I suggest that it represents the Universal as such: H ohkm ah is the O n e-N oth - ing o f Keter becom e a determinate nothingness. A universal is precisely a determ inate nothingness: it is no thing at all, but rather an em pty— yet

54. Aurora, chap. 23, § 18; Sparrow , 6 15 -16 .55. Scholem , Kabbalah, 24.56. Ibid., 113.57. Sec A rych Kaplan, editorial rem ark in his translation o f The Bahir (York Beach, M aine: Sam uel W eiser, 1979). 97-

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Copyrighted mate

6. T h e "T ree o f Life" as rendered by Brucker, Historia Critica Philosophiae, vol. 1 ,17 4 2 . W e can be virtually certain that Hegel studied this diagram in preparing his rem arks on the Kabbalah in the Lectures on the History o f Philosophy. Reprinted by perm ission o f the Robert W . W oodruff Library, Special Collections and Archives,Em ory University, Atlanta, Georgia.


determ inate— form . Scholem w rites th a t Hokhmah "represents th e ideal though t o f C reation, conceived as the ideal po in t which itself springs from the im pulse o f the abysmal w ill."5* T hus, Hohkmah is a fu rther determ ination o f Keter, th e N o th ing th a t is a t the sam e tim e Unity.

58. Scholem , M ajor Trends, 219.

Recall from chapter i that for Böhm e, W isdom is the first stage o f G o d ’s "othering" H im self, and it takes the form o f the seven source-spirits. T h e further determ ination o f Hohkmah is Binah, or “ Understanding,” som etim es referred to as the "W om b.” Hohkmah is the U niversal contracted into an undifferentiated w hole. Binah represents the specification or particularization o f the U niversal.” It is the m atrix in which the W isdom o f G o d , or the Idea o f the Universal, becom es fully specified as a system o f universals. It can easily be seen that these three Sephiroth arc sim ilar to the Plotinian trio o f the O ne, Nous, and W orld So u l. Keter, Hohkmah, and Binah are thought by the K abbalists to be the three m ost im portant and ultim ate o f the Sephiroth (thus tem pting C hristian K a b balists to identify them w ith the persons o f the Trin ity).

T h e seven rem aining Sephiroth are conceived as representing the seven days o f creation, and deal w ith aspects, in effect, o f the created world born from the w om b o f Binah (som e K abbalists thus make a sharp d istinction between the first three and the last seven Sephiroth , but as we have seen others identify all seven w ith the essence o f G o d ). Before passing on to the first o f the seven, however, the lightning flash o f m anifestation passes through an anti-Sephirah or phantom Sephirah called Da’at. Da'at does not appear in K abbalism until the thirteenth century. Scholem conjectures that "T h is addition arose from the desire to see each group o f three Sephiroth as a unit com prising opposing attributes and as a synthesis which finally resolved them."60 In other w ords, Da'at w as intended to be a third to Hokhmah and Binah, ju st as Ti/eret is a th ird to Gevurak and Hesed, and Yesod is a third to Hod and Nezah. M eaning literally "Know ledge," according to Scholem Da’at is supposed to represent th e 'extern al aspect o f Keter’,’ which is directly above Da’at on the Tree o f L ife.61 W hat could this mean i Keter, we have seen, is a will or a drive that is constituted by the tension o f N oth in g and Unity, or Indeterm inacy and D eterm inacy. Da’at is som etim es referred to as the "tem poral present," and Keter as "eternal now." I w ant to suggest that Da’at is tim e itself, conceived in opposition to Keter’s '’eternal now," which is, o f course, ou tside o f tim e. (O ne is rem inded o f H egel's description o f T im e as "the C oncept itse lf that is there" [M iller, 487 ; pg, 524])- Da’at is not a real part o f the Tree o f L ife because the system o f the Sephiroth is outside o f tim e. Da’at is know ledge because it represents the "contact point" o f the K abbalist w ith the Sephiroth: our know ledge o f G o d and the cosm os is a unity o f W isdom (Hokhmah) and U nderstanding (Binah), a knowledge o f W isdom through U nderstanding; w e know the eternal in a sensuous way, and our know ledge is in tim e. Significantly, Da’at is also som etim es referred to as "H o ly Spirit."

From Da’at we pass on to Hesed or Gedullah, which is generally translated as “Mercy,” and then across (on the Tree of Life) to Din or Gevurah ("Stern Judgment"). These represent the forces of expansion and con

59. Kaplan notes that Binah represents differentiation (Bahir, 97).60. Scholem , Kabbalah, 107.6 1. Ib id ., 107.

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traction. T h e further specification o f being takes place in the tension o f expansion and contraction. A s we saw in chapter 2, O etinger speaks o f expansion (Ausbreitung) and contraction (Sfärfee) and identifies them explicitly w ith Hesed and Gevurah.*3 G oeth e also m akes use o f these concepts. In the last chapter, I discussed how in 18 0 4 -5 , H egel w rote out and then criticized a "m yth'’ concerning the fall o f Lucifer. H e w rites, "G o d , having turned tow ard nature and expressed H im se lf [hat sich ausgebreitet J in the pom p and dull repetition o f its form s, becam e aware o f H is expansion [Expansion].. . and becam e angry over it. W rath [Zorn] is this form ation, this contraction [Zusammennehmen] into an em pty point. H e finds H im se lf in this way, w ith H is being poured out into the unending, restless infinit)', w here there is no present but an em pty transcendence o f lim it, which always rem ains even as it is transcended."6’ H egel identifies W rath w ith contraction here. Sim ilarly, the Kabbalah identifies Gevurah/Din w ith ‘‘ fire,” "w rath," and “severity."64

A ccording to the Kabbalah, Din is the origin o f evil. O rdinarily, Din and Hesed balance each other: severity o f judgm ent is balanced by mercy; sharp distinction, cutting-off, o r closedness is balanced by unity, embrace, or openness. H owever, as Scholem n otes,"W hen [Din] ceases to be tem pered, when in its m easureless hypertrophical outbreak it tears itse lf loose from the quality o f mercy, then it breaks away from G o d altogether and is transform ed into the radically evil, into G ehenna and the dark w orld o f Satan."0' H egel, in his "m yth" o f 18 0 4 -5 , w rites that "T h e anger o f G o d , here fixed outside H im se lf in H is otherness, rhe fallen Lucifer, rose up against G o d and his beauty m ade him arrogant. N ature, through consciousness o f its ow n form , brought it to com pletion and flattered itse lf over it."*' G o d s wrath, then, according to H egel, becomes the spirit o f Lucifer, w ho is at home w ith the finite and ephem eral. T h e same K ab balistic conception o f evil, as we have seen, is to be found in Böhm e. Evil has its origin as a m om ent o f G o d — negativity is sublared within the w hole— but it is a mom ent "broken off," as it were, from the divine life.

A pplied to hum an life. Din w ould represent w hat H egel calls D esire— the urge to annihilate the other and absolutize the seih Böhm e designates this w ay o f being as "the S o u r” — it is an indraw ing, a pulling away, a shutting o f f and negation o f all else. Both Böhm e and the K ab balah regard this as a necessary m om ent o f the being o f G o d and all creation. Everything good that subsequently com es to be, is only through having overcom e this negative m om ent. T h is is, o f course, H egel’s own position, as I discussed in the preceding chapter.

6 2 .“ D urch die vierte [Sephirah], G edulah, breitet Er seine Kräften aus in sich selbst (Ps. 1 5 0 ,1 : Lobei ihn in der Ausbreitung seiner Kraft). D urch die fünfte, G ebhurah, intendirt und verfasst E r sie wieder zusam m en, dass w ir ign in seinem [sic] GebW ctf,'Kräften,’ loben (Ps. 150, i)" (Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Die Lehrtafel der Prinzessin Antonia, ed. Reinhard Breym ayer and Friedrich H äusserm an (Berlin , 1977], 1:9 }).63. H offm eister, Dokumente, 36 4-65.64. Scholem , Major Trends, 237.65. Ibid ., 237-66. Ibid ., 365.



From D in, we proceed to Tiferet, which stands in the center o f the Tree o f Life, directly below Kefer and D a’at. T h is center line is know n as the “ Pillar o f Equilibrium .'’ T h e Sephiroth standing in th is p illar have a “reconciling function": D a’at in som e sense reconciles Hokhmah and Binah, and T tferet reconciles Hesed and Din (only Keter and Malkhut stand "outside" this pattern, as w ill shortly be accounted for). A s the reconciliation o f Hesed and D in, Tiferet is som etim es (especially in the Zohar) called Rahamim, which m eans “com passion.” Tiferet is usually translated as “ Beauty“ or "Adornm ent.” It is also called “the King," and is m asculine in character. T iferet is also conceived as the "son” o f Malkhut and Binah (in m ost diagram s o f the Tree o f L ife, Tiferet is directly connected with Malkhut and Binah). Tiferet represents the Idea o f the Universe: the self- expression o f the infinite through sam eness and difference, brought forth in expansion and contraction. B u t the process is not fully realized w ith Tiferet, however.

Nezah and Hod, the last tw o dyadic Sephiroth, both represent revelation or prophecy. Unfortunately, here Kabbalists become extrem ely obscure, m aking these tw o very hard to interpret. T h e ir nam es are frequently translated as "E tern ity" and “ Reverberation” (often “ M ajesty"). Nezah and Hod appear to be the utterance or expression o f the plan o f G o d , a"reflection" back upon w hat has gone before, and a projection fo rward: the eternal structure o f the first seven Sephiroth (including the phantom Sephirah Da'at) echoing forw ard through tim e. Nezah and Hod represent G o d as eternal, yet as unfolding in tim e. Yesod or "Foundation" contains all the preceding Sephiroth. It is depicted as the male sexual organ because it is supposed to be the channel through w hich all preceding Sephiroth“ f\ow into” the final Sephirah, Malkhut.t?

Malkhut o r “ K ingdom ” (som etim es “G lo ry ”) is conceived o f as fem inine— in contrast to the "m ale” Ttferet and Yesod (the “organ" o f T iferet)— and is often referred to under the alternate nam e o f Shekhinah o r "D ivin e Presence." I f one looks at a draw ing o f the Tree o f Life, Malkhut and Keter seem to stand apart from the others. Yesod and Malkhut are the only Sephiroth in the Pillar o f Equilibrium that are not separated by dyadic Sephiroth, m aking Malkhut seem alm ost like an extension o f the Tree, a sort o f appendage. T h is is not accidental, for Malkhut represents the divine presence in the world: w ith Malkhut the Sephiroth have reached dow n into the w orld o f space and tim e. I will d iscuss the K abbalist concept o f Malkhut o r Shekhinah m ore fully in chapter7, fo r it relates to H egel's Philosophy of Spirit: Shekhinah is conceived as G o d em bodied in the Keneset Ttsrael, the "com m unity o f Israel," a doctrine rem arkably like H egel’s theory o f O bjective Sp irit.

In addition to the doctrine o f the Sephiroth, traditional Kabbalah also teaches a doctrine o f "fou r w orlds": Atsiluth, Beriah, Yezirah, and Asiyah. T h e first o f these is, in effect, the w orld o f G o d "in H im se lf" the eternal, unchanging w orld o f the Sephiroth. T h e others, however, are worlds "em anated" from the Sephiroth. In his discussion o f Kabbalah in the

67. Ibid., 2 2 7 -2 8 .

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Lcctures, H egel includes a b rie f account o f the “ four w orlds," which is entirely accurate:

In th6 first place there cam e forth ten o f such em anations, Sephiroth, form ing the pure w orld o f Azilut [die reine, azilutische Welt], which exists in itse lf and does not change. T h e second is the w orld o f Briah [die briatisehe Welt], which docs change. T h e third is the form ed w orld o f Jezirah [die geformte, jeziratische Welt], the w orld o f pure sp irits set in matter, the souls o f the stars— that is, further distinctions into which this dark w isdom proceeds. In the fourth place com es the created world, the Asiah [viertens die gemachte Welt, die asiahtischeJ: it is the lowest, the vegetative and sensible world. ( l h p 2 :396 ; Werke 19 :4 2 7 -2 8 )

d) Language and Method in the KabbalahScholem discusses how K abbalist thought can be considered a form o f G nosticism , and then rem arks, “at the sam e tim e, side by side w ith this G n ostic outlook, we find a m ost astonishing tendency to a m ode o f contem plative thought that can be called 'dialectic' in the strictest sense o f the term as used by H egel.”''* Scholem w rites, further, that "T h e process o f em anation o f the Sephiroth is described by C ordovero as dialectical. In order to be revealed, G o d has to conceal H im self. T h is concealm ent is in itse lf the com ing into being o f the Sephiroth. O n ly the Sephiroth reveal G o d , and that is w h y ‘revealing is the cause o f concealm ent and concealm ent is the cause o f revealing.' "w Scholem refers to the structure o f the Sephiroth as being "bu ilt out o f triangles."70 A ryeh K aplan , in his com m entary on the Bahir, quotes the last o f th e"T h irteen Principles o f E xegesis” o f R abbi Ishm ael: “ Tw o verses oppose one another until a third verse is brought to reconcile them." K aplan com m ents: “ It is th is dialectic that results in the basic triplet structure so often found in Kab- balah.”71 W e have already seen exam ples o f this, in the triadic structure o f the transitions in the Sephiroth: how Hokhmah and Binah are reconciled by Da'at, Hesed and Din by Tiferet, etc. T h e Bahir itse lf echoes this: "A third verse com es and reconciles the two. It is w ritten (Psalm 139:12), 'Even darkness is not dark to you. N ight shines like day— light and darkness are the same.'

T h e K abbalists believe that by m anipulating the language o f Adam they are recovering the w isdom he possessed and then lost in the Fall. Scholem w rites th at“ M an, as he w as before his fall, is conceived as a co smic being w hich contains the whole w orld in itse lf and w hose station is superior even to that o f M etatron, the first o f the angels."” T h e Sephiroth Tiferet and Malkhut arc identified w ith, respectively, the Tree o f L ife and Tree o f the Know ledge o f G o o d and Evil from the G arden o f Eden.

68. Scholem , Kabbalah, 143.69. Ibid., 402.70. Ibid.. 107.7 1. Kaplan, editorial rem ark in Bahir, 87.72. Ibid ., § 1; Kaplan, 1.73. Scholem , Major Trends, 279.



Adam's sin consisted in “separating” the tw o trees and choosing to “w o rship" only the Tree o f the Know ledge o f G o o d and Evil. H ere again, there is a rem arkable sim ilarity to Böhm e. W e saw in chapter i how for Böhm e the Tree o f G o o d and Evil represents disharm ony, a separation o f the spirits o f nature into units under the sw ay o f the “ Eternal No," w ithdraw n into them selves, spurning unity. T h in k in g that it would p rovide him w ith the w isdom he sought, A dam naively ate o f this tree.74 A d am s action constituted a turning aw ay from divine unity.

Like the K abbalists, Böhm e holds the view that before his fall, Adam w as privy to the W isdom o f G o d , “ B u t yet when he fell, and w as set into the outw ard birth or geniture, he knew it no m ore, but kept it in rem em brance only as a dark and veiled story; and this he left to his posterity." Böhm e also ascribes supernatural pow ers to A dam . For instance, A dam , w ho was originally androgynous, could procreate at w ill by the pow er o f im agination, could exist w ithout eating or sleeping, and could alter the essences o f objects through magic w ords.7* T h e K abbalist view o f Adam is very sim ilar although som ew hat m ore com plicated, as we w ill see in chapter 7.

Although there is a Böhm ean influence on the Logic and on H egel’s conception o f system , the deeper influence is that o f the Kabbalah. Böhm e is a Christian Kabbalist, and so there is an indirect influence o f the Kabbalah on Hegel, by w ay o f Böhm e. A lso, H egel read Brucker’s extensive account o f the Kabbalah and probably Rosenroth’s Kabbala Denudata as well. T here arc other possible channels o f influence, however: the writings o f Reuchlin, whom Hegel discusses very briefly in the lectures, as well as those o f Baader, and o f course, the tradition o f Christian Kabbalism in W ürttem berg as represented preem inently by Oetinger.

L et the follow ing serve as a sum m ary o f som e o f the more significant doctrinal correspondences betw een K abbalism and H egel’s system :

1. G o d is conceived in various form s o f K abbalism , as well as in H egel, as dynamic, as a G o d som ehow “ in process."2. T h e “G o d process" is delineated into separate Sephiroth, which are conceived o f as “m om ents” o f G o d s being (according to som e K ab balists)— ju s t as the categories o f the Logic are m om ents o f an organic totality constituting “ the exposition o f G o d as H e is in his eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite Sp irit" (M iller, 5 0 ; w l 1 :3 3 - 3 4 ) ”3. In K abbalism , Ein-Sof or the “A bsolute A ll" is m ade equivalent to A yin,"N oth in g." In H egel: Being = N othing.4 . Ayin (or Ayin = Ein-Sof), the point at w hich K abbalist discussions o f G od 's nature begin, is held to transcend the distinction between subject and object.77 Its telos is to develop into an"absolute subject."

74. Mysterium Magnum, chap. 18, § 33.75. Ibid., chap. 17, § 43.76. C yril O 'R egan points to a general "sym m etry" between the first three Sephiroth (K eter-H okhm ah-Binah) and Hegel's Being-Essence-Concept. See O 'Regan, "H egel and Anri-Judaism ," 161.77. In the text o f the Science of Logic, Hegel actually draw s on the mystical traditions o fln d ia to explain"Purc Being":" W ith this w holly abstract purity o f

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In H egel’s Logic, Being-N othing, which transcends the subject- object distinction, develops into A bsolute Idea, which is a kind o f “abstract conception" o f the self-thinking thought o f Sp irit.5. In K abbalism , the highest developm ent o f G o d s "personality" is identified, according to G ershom Scholem , “w ith precisely that stage o f H is unfolding which is nearest to hum an experience, indeed which is im m anent and m ysteriously present in every one o f us."7* T h e sam e could be said o f H egel’s theology.6. A ll the Sephiroth arc im m anent as a totality w ithin the final Sephirah— ju st as all the categories o f H egel’s Logic are im m anent w ithin, or constitute the "definition" of, A bsolute Idea.7. The Sephiroth are seen as penetrating and informing all levels of being, constituting the "skeleton" of nature. Hegel claims that the moments of his Logic constitute the"animating soul" of nature ( e l §

24 Z -2 ; Geraets, 58).8. Such com m entators as Scholem and K aplan have pointed out the triadic, dialectical structure o f the thought-form s in Kabbalah.9. T h e K abbalist treatm ent o f D in , or evil, as a m om ent o f G od 's being corresponds to H egel's sublation o f the negativity o f D esire w ithin his system .

4 . Ram on Lull and the Tradition o f Pansophia

In th is final section I will discuss a w holly different strand o f H erm etic influence discernable in the Logic, that o f Ram on Lull and rhe tradition o f pansophia o r encyclopedistn. A s we shall see, at a certain point Lullism crosses paths w ith C hristian Kabbalah.

Lull w as born in M ajorca in 1235 and, after m any travels and adventures, died there in 1316 . In his early life, Lull w as a courtier w ith no fo rmal training as a scholar. H e lived a hedonistic life until 1272, when he had a mystical vision on M ount R anda in M ajorca. H is vision revealed to him the “attributes o f G o d " in all their glory, radiating out into creation. Lull w as inspired to create an art based on these attributes that would allow one to know G o d and achieve total understanding o f all that exists.

Lull believed that his A rt was based on ideas com m on to rhe three great religions o f the W est, Christianity, Judaism , and Islam."'* A t the same rime, the A rt is supposed to constitute a "science o f sciences," a supcrscience


continuity, that is, indctcrm inatcncss and vacuity o f conception, it is indifferent w hether this abstraction is called space, pure intuiting, or pure thinking; it is altogether the same as what rhe Indian calls Brahm a, when for years on end, physically m otionless and equally unm oved in sensation, conception, fantasy, desire and so on, looking only at the tip o f his nose, he says inwardly only Om, Om, Om, or else nothing at all. T h is dull, em pty consciousness, understood as consciousness, is— being" (M iller, 97; w i 1:89).78. Scholem , Major Trends, 2 16 - 17 .79. Lull was influenced by M uhyi al-D in Ibn al-'Arabi ( 116 5 -12 4 0 ) , w ho was one o f the founders o f "tneosophical Sufism ." H e believed that reality is a progressive realization o f G od 's self-knowledge. See Dan M erkur, Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition o f Mystical Visions and Unions (A lbany: State U niversity o f N ew York Press, 1993). 246. M erkur w rites:"Lu ll's debts to Ibn al-'Arabi were so extensive as to am ount occasionally to plagiarism ’ (ibid.).


consisting o f the ultimate truths o f reality, which can be used to order all existing knowledge.*0 Likew ise H egel believed his Logic could "order" all the scientific knowledge o f his day and reveal its place in the divine whole.

T h e attributes or N am es o f G o d are, according to Lull, Bonitas, Mag- nitudo, Eternitas, Potestas, Sapientia, Voluntas, Virtus, Veritas, and Gloria (G oodn ess, G reatness, Eternity, Power, W isdom , W ill, V irtue, Truth , and G lo ry). T h ese he designated w ith the letters B, C , D , E , F, G , H , I, and K (Yates notes that "the unm cntioned A is the ineffable A bsolute”).*1 Lull em ployed these letters in diagram s, usually around the edge o f c ircles. T h ese circles function as "w heels”: by turning the wheels, each inscribed w ith the letters, new com binations o f the letters could be arrived at, each o f w hich bore som e ontological or cosm ological significance. T h is procedure generally involved rhe m anipulation o f three w heels— or som e other such device— yielding triadic com binations o f letters: B B B , B B C , C F G , G D C , etc.

Lull placed great em phasis on the T rin ity and trinitarian structure.“ A n thon y Bonner w rites that "it w as Lull's idea to show that the C h ris tian m ysteries w ere part o f the very structure o f the universe, which w ould therefore be incom plete or im perfect w ithout them .”** Lull believed that through the contem plation o f triadic com binations o f the divine N am es, we can ascend in thought to the Trin ity o f Father-Son- H o ly Sp irit itself. H egel's system is pervaded by triadic structures that are all "m odeled on” or reflect the prim ary triad o f Logic-N atu rc-Sp irit, w hich in turn is patterned after the C hristian Trinity.

Lull w as a prolific author w ho w rote on a very w ide variety o f su bjects , including the natural sciences. N o m atter w hat subject he took up, however, Lull always laid out its central parts in term s o f the attributes B to K . Lull w as em ploying an analogical m ethod in his "complete speech," involving appeal to fundam ental correspondences or, as Bonner puts it ,“argum ents o f congruence.”** H ere too is a clear parallel to H egel. In H egel’s system each m ajor subdivision reflects the triadic structure o f the whole, in which there are detailed conceptual analogues and correspondences between the parts o f the different “sciences" (e.g., the correspondence between “C onsciousness" in the Phenomenology and the "D o ctrin e o f Being" in the Logic). L ike H egel's Logic, it is both: a m eans to order and understand all ou r other knowledge, and at the sam e tim e the m ost fundam ental kind o f knowledge.

80. See Paolo R o ss i,"T h e Legacy o f Ram on Lull in Sixreenth-Century Thought," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, 5 (19 6 1): 18 1-2 13 ,18 5 .81. Yates, The Occult Philosophy, ti.82. See ibid., 17 8 -9 ; see also R . D. F. Prin g-M ill,“ T h e Trinitarian W orld P icture o f Ram on Lull," Romantisches Jahrbuch 7 (19 55-56 ): 229-56 .83. A nthony Bonner, ed itors introduction in Doctor Illuminatus: A Ramon Llull Reader (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, >985), Si. Recall J . N . Findlay’s observation that "[H egel’s] whole system m ay in fact be regarded as an attem pt to sec the C hristian m ysteries in everything whatever, every natural process, every form o f hum an activity, and every logical transition” (F in dlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, 131).84. Ibid ., 51.

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Lull does not ju st em ploy circles or wheels to represent com binations o f the divine nam es. H e also uses the triangle and the square. T h e circle represents the heavens (no doubt because o f the "spheres" and the circular m ovem ents o f the planets); the triangle represents divin ity (the trin ity), and the square represents the four elem ents. A s an exam ple o f L u ll’s fusion o f logic and m etaphysics, he attem pts to m ap the four elem ents onto the four categorical propositions o f the traditional "Sq u are o f O pposition." H is m ost com m on image, however, com bines the circle w ith the triangle. Lull's m ost fam ous diagram show s a circle ringed round w ith B to K , jo in ed in m yriad triadic com binations by triangles drawn w ith in the circle. Yates describes this as, "a m ystical figure in w hich we m editate on the com plex relations o f the N am es w ith one another as they arc in the G odhead, before extension into the creation, and as aspects o f the Trinity."*’ Apparently, Lull and his fo llow ers actually made "w heels” o f his concentric circles so that they could turn the circles and produce new revelations about the nature o f G o d and the cosm os.

Lull is often placed in the tradition o f C hristian Kabbalah. M any Lull scholars hotly dispute this. I agree w ith Yates, however, that an influence o f K abbalism on Lu ll w as certainly possible. A s Yates points out, the concept o f th e“ N am es o f G o d " is fundam ental to Jew ish m ysticism . T h e Zohar w as, o f course, w ritten in Sp ain during Lull's lifetim e. Lull's p ractice o f com bining and recom bining B to K and contem plating these com binations is sim ilar to the m editative practices o f A braham A bulafia."6 P ico della M irandola h im self pointed th is out.*7 Scholem speaks o f Abulafia's m ethod as a “m ystical logic" and w rites that "From the m otion o f the letters o f thought result the truths o f reason."**

H egel devotes about tw o pages to Lull in his Lectures, grouping him w ith Jo h n C harlier, Ram on o f Sabunde, and R oger Bacon as Mystiker o f the scholastic variety (Lull receives the m ost extensive treatment).** H egel w rites that

T h e ch ie f object aim ed at in this man’s 'Art' w as an enum eration and arrangem ent o f the various concepts under which all objects fall, o r o f the pure categories according to which they can be determ ined, so that it m ay be possible in regard to every object to indicate w ith ease the conceptions applicable to it. Lullus is so system atic that he becom es at tim es m echanical. H e constructed a diagram in circles, on which were m arked triangles through which the circles pass, ( l h p 3:93; Werke 19:586)

85. Yates, The Art o f Memory, 181.86. A ccording to D an M erkur, Abulafia had his followers visualize the letter com binations on a rotating wheel (M erkur, Gnosis, 249).87. Yates, The Art o f Memory, 17 7 ,18 8 -8 9 .88. Scholem , Major Trends, 134 -35 . A rth u r Edw ard W aite, in his eccentric but am bitious study o f the Kabbalah, disputes any influence o f Kabbalism on Lull. See A . E . W aite, The Holy Kabbalah (N ew York: C itadel Press, 1992),4 4 0 , 442-89. Hegel states in general o f the group,“A m ong them genuine philosophy is to be found— term ed also M ysticism ; it tends to inwardness and bears a great resemblance to Spinozism “ (iH P 3:91; Werke 19:584).



In the Science o f Logic, in the "D octrin e o f the Concept," H egel states that th e"Leibn izian application o f the calculus o f com binations and perm utations to the syllogism and to the com bination o f other notions, d iffered from the notorious A rt o f Lu ll [der verrufenen Lullianischn Kunst) solely in being m ore m ethodical on the arithm etical side, but fo r the rest, they w ere both equally m eaningless" (M iller, 685; w l 3:128).

T h is rem ark m ust be understood in the context o f the Science o f Logic, in which H egel is rejecting all "abstract" conceptions o f philosophy that oppose m ethod to subject matter, a defect present in Lull. E lsew here, Hegel is more positive. In his discussion o f Bruno, Hegel anticipates Yates’s connection o f Bruno w ith L u ll:"T h e main endeavour o f Bruno w as . . . to represent the A ll and O ne [das All und Eine], after the m ethod o f Lullus, as a system o f classes o f regular determ inations" (l h p 3 :13 4 -3 5 ; Werke 20 :36).

Earlier in his rem arks on Bruno, H egel glosses the Lullian art as "the art o f finding differences in the Idea" ( l h p 3:123 ; Werke 2 0 :3 1) . T h is is highly significant, for H egel’s Logic is precisely an articulation o f the different m om ents o f A bsolute Idea. H egel cannot have sim ply d ism issed Lull's thought i f he regarded it as a precursor to his ow n in this significant resp ect." In his rem arks on Spinoza, H egel states th at"Lu llus and Bruno attem pted to draw up a system o f form, which should embrace and com prehend the one substance which organizes itse lf into the universe; th is attem pt Sp in oza did not m ake" ( l h p 3:287; Werke 2 0 :19 4 ) .

Yates devotes a chapter in her The Art of Memory to Lu ll and attem pts to locate him w ithin the tradition o f a n memoria. H ow ever, she notes that L u lls art is devoid o f the dram atic im ages o f the classical ars memoria. Instead, it em ploys an abstract letter notation.*1 N evertheless, Lull does belong to the tradition o f ars memoria because he conceives his A rt as a m eans o f recollecting Truth.*2 W e have seen that for H egel M nem osyne is rhe "absolute m use" because by hearing her voice the philosopher com es ro speak the com plete speech.

Verene has drawn a parallel between the traditional ars memoria and the Phenomenology of Spirit, exploiting the famous line at the end o f the Phenomenology where H egel speaks o f the w ork as a “gallery o f images" (Galerie von Bildern; M iller, 492; p g , 5 3 0 ) ” T h e traditional ars memoria employed striking images arranged in system atic order to cause the onlooker to"recollect" the wisdom already latent in him. T h e best exam ple o f this is the "m em ory theater" o f G iulio C am illo (c. 14 8 0 - 15 4 4 ) , which appears to have been a small, walk-in am phitheater decorated w ith various com binations o f archetypal images, underneath which were small drawers contain

9 0 . Hegel stares that G o d “ posits determ inations w ithin H im se lf” ( l p k 1:307; v p a 1:212).91. Yates, The Art o f Memory, 17692. See Frances Yates,“ T h e A rt o f Ram on Lull: A n Approach to it Through Lu ll’s T h eory o f the Elements,“ Journal o f the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,17 (1964): 1X5-73. >62. C f. Yates, The Art of Memory, 174-93. D onald Phillip Vcrene,“ Tw o Sources o f Philosophical M em ory: V ico V ersus Hegel," in Philosophical Imagination and Cultural Memory, ed. Patricia Cook (D urham , N .C .: D uke University Press, 1993), 41«

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ing scrolls covered in further images or, perhaps, aphorism s or "abstracts” o f the works o f great thinkers. In the w ords o f a sceptical contem porary o f Cam illo, working one's w ay through the entire theater was supposed to produce a transform ation o f the mind, "in such a w ay that the beholder may at once perceive with his eyes everything that is otherw ise hidden in the depths o f rhe human m ind."* Cam illo ’s ideal was basically the same as that later cham pioned by Descartes and the rationalists: knowledge unified and organized around certain fundamental ideas.

Verene has C am illo in m ind when he com pares the Phenomenology to a "theater o f memory,” but he does not extend the parallel to apply to the entire H egelian system . In fact, the ars memoria that the system Logic- N atu re-Sp irit m ost resem bles is not that o f C am illo but that o f Lull. Insofar as speculative philosophy m ay be located w ith in the ars memoria tradition, Lull's can be seen as a kind o f "bridge position." W hereas the traditional ars memoria is bound up w ith sensuous im ages. Lull's A rt is "abstract," em ploying a quasi-algebraic notation and a "m ethod.” A s I argued in chapter 3, H egel sublares “picture thinking" and "abstract reason," producing a new type o f philosophy that em ploys w hat are norm ally term ed "abstract concepts" in an organic system o f thought governed by the Urbilder o f the circle, triangle, and square. Lull com es very close to this H egelian position. H e rejects, in the main, the sensuous im ages o f the ars memoria, but retains its ideal o f universal kn ow ledge and know ledge o f G o d . H e produces a new system o f thought that is both logic and m etaphysics, w hich a im s— as H egel h im self saw — at know ing the "m om ents" o f G o d , and which is structured according to the circle, the triangle, and the square. But he separates form and con tent, and in practice h is A rt degenerates into an extrem e form alism in which an ex te rn arm eth o d ” is im posed on a pregiven subject matter.

A s to Lull's influence on the tradition, for som e tim e those w ho expressed an interest in his w ork were subject to persecution. N icholas o f C u sa w as very much interested in the A rt, but could not say so publicly.* Lull had a trem endous im pact during the Renaissance on figures such as Pico, w ho expressly stated his desire to fuse Lull's A rt w ith K a b balism . It w as thus during this period, as Yates notes, that Lullism becam e "assim ilated to various aspects o f the H erm etic-C abalist tradition."^ A very large num ber o f pseudo-Lullian alchem ical w orks were published after Lull's death, beginning in about 1332. A s a result, by the fifteenth century. Lull w as alm ost universally regarded as a great alchem ist. H egel h im self reports on L u lls “strong inclination toward alchem y" ( l h p 3:192; Werke 19 :585)— but there is not the slightest evidence for th is. T h e first man to teach Lull's A rt publicly w as Bernard de Lavinheta (d. c. 1530), at the U niversity o f Paris. Bernard's Explanatio

94. T h e w riter is Viglius Z u ichem u s, in a 1532 letter to Erasm us, quoted in ibid., 132.95. Bonner, introduction to Doctor llluminatus, 58. M erku r notes that C u sas library contained m ore w orks by Lull than any oth er author (M erkur, Gnosis, 250).96. Yates, The Art o f Memory, 188.


compendiosague applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli (1523) m elded Lu ll w ith pansophia, alchemy, and the ars m em o ria l T h e first G erm an com m entator on Lu ll w as A grippa, w ho w rote In Artem brevem Raymundi Lulli Com - mentaria (first published in 1531). Bruno, as has already been m entioned, w as greatly influenced by Lull and w rote seven books on the A rt. Interestingly, he first took up Lu ll after his tim e in G erm an y (158 6 -8 8 ). L e ib niz w as also apparently interested in Lull.

L u lls A rt belongs to the tradition o f the search fo r pansophia,"universal w isdom ." A s we saw in the introduction, the ideal o f the ‘ com plete speech" or "perfect discourse” (teleeis logos) is a fundam ental tenet o f H er- m eticism . Pansophia, encyclopedism , and Rosicrucianism w ere in tim ately entw ined throughout the seventeenth century. It was a tim e o f grand plans for encyclopedias synthesizing all hum an know ledge. C o n sider the case o f S ir Francis Bacon ( 15 6 1-16 2 6 ). Bacon has long been revered by m odern H crm eticists, w ho have attributed an alm ost universal w isdom to h im — along w ith the w orks o f Shakespeare and Robert Burton , not to m ention the K in g Jam es Bible.*1 Paolo R o ssi and Frances Yates have, however, argued soberly and convincingly that Bacons thought m ust be understood in the context o f Renaissance H erm eticism.®’ Yates even spies Rosicrucian im agery in Bacons N ew Atlantis.100

In the Novum Organum (1622), Bacon, like Lull, called for a radically new logic, one w hich w ould deal w ith "the particulars them selves, and their series and order," and rejected the sterile form alism o f the schoolm en. Bacons projected reform o f science not only influenced such seventeenth-century Rosicrucian pansophists as C om enius, H artlib , and D ury, it also influenced the standard-bearer o f the eighteenth-century Enlightenm ent, the great Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné, des sciences, des arts et des métiers o f D iderot and d 'A lem bert, published betw een 1751 and 1772 in thirty-five volum es.101

R obert Fludd ( 15 7 4 -16 3 7 ) w as a Paracelsian physician, a C hristian K abbalist, a w ould-be Rosicrucian, and the author o f an imm ense, unfinished m ultivolum e w ork, the History o f the Macrocosm and the M icrocosm ( 16 17 -2 6 ) , which Josce lyn G o d w in describes as “m ore o f an en cyclopedia than a history in the m odern sense," insofar as it aim ed at nothing less than a total synthesis o f all hum an know ledge o f m an, the cosm os, and the correspondences between th em .1“

97. Bonner, introduction to Doctor Flluminatus, 65.98. See, for example. M anly P. H all, An Encyclopedic Outline o f Masonic, H ermetic, Quabbalistic and Rosicrucian Symbolical Philosophy, Being an Interpretation of the Secret Teachings concealed within the Rituals, Allegories and Mysteries o f all Ages (L os Angeles: T h e Philosophical Research Society, 1988).99. Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science (London: Routledge, 1968).10 0 . S e e Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 12 7 -2 9 .10 1. Bacons influence on the French Encyclopédie is m ade clear in Jean Le Rond d 'A lem bert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia o f Diderot (175*)» trans. R ichard N . Schw ab (Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1995)-102. Joscelyn G od w in , Robert Fludd: Hermetic Philosopher and Surveyor o f Two Worlds (G ran d Rapids: Phanes Press, 1991), 7 -8 .

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A nother typical and influential pansophist is Ja n A m os Kom ensky, called C om enius ( 15 9 2 -16 7 0 ) . A native o f M oravia, C om enius considered h im self a Rosicrucian. H e w as greatly influenced by Andreae's m anifestos, and associated h im self openly w ith Rosicrucian circles. Com enius was also influenced by Cusa, Paracelsus, Patrizzi, Campanella, and Fludd.“” H e received his education at H eidelberg University, from which he graduated in 1613. Yates conjectures that C om enius m ight have met Andreae w hile in H eidelberg. T h e developm ent o f a pansophic encyclopedia o f universal know ledge w as C om en iu ss goal in life. H e called his first attem pt, begun in 16 14 , an "am phitheater" o f all existence.10’ C o m en iu ss w ritings deal w ith philosophy, science, theology, politics, education, and other subjects. In 1623 he produced The Labyrinth o f the World and the Paradise o f the Heart. O ne o f the classics o f C zech literature, it contains passages lilted from A ndreae’s Rosicrucian w ritings, as well as a chapter devoted to R osicrucianism .105 T h e book is sim ilar to C am - panellas City o f the Sun in its description o f a utopian city representing all the departm ents o f learning.

C om enius believed he had discovered a means to achieve knowledge o f all th ings. H e developed an ontology and cosm ology grounded in the threefold distinction o f D ivine W ord, N ature, and M an. A ccording to D agm ar C apkova, this ontology “prom ised to reveal the com m on principles, relationships and differences concerning everything, on the basis o f w hich people w ould learn the truth and how to act in accordance w ith it."106 H is pansophic encyclopedia w as supposed to harm onize m icrocosm and m acrocosm and unite man w ith G o d . H e attem pted to com bine a transcendent w ith an im m anent view o f G o d , holding that while G o d is present in N ature, H e also possesses a transcendent dim ension. C om eniuss thought can to som e extent be called dialectical. H e attem pted to show how apparently incom patible concepts can be reconciled and stressed that a proper understanding o f the relations between w hole and parts, universal and particular, and individual and society is a central feature o f w isdom , and a prerequisite for reform .

C om enius w as associated w ith tw o other pansophists, Sam uel H artlib (159 5-16 6 2), and Jo h n D u ry (159 5-16 8 0 ). H artlib , a Pole, tran slated tw o w orks by A ndreae into English (Christianae societas imago— see chapter 2— and Christiani amoris dextera porrecta) and in 164 1 com posed a utopia, A Description o f the Famous Kingdom of Macaria. D ury, a Scotsm an w ho corresponded w ith Andreae, had made H artlib ’s acquaintance when the latter w as still in Elbing. A ll three men were given to m illenarianism . M illenarian tendencies, in fact, flourished am ong the G erm an

103. See Dagm ar C apkova,"C om en ius and H is Ideals: Escape from rhe Labyrinth" in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation, ed. M ark Greengrass et. al. (Cam bridge, U .K .: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1994). 76.104- Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 157.105. Jo h n Com enius, The Labyrinth o f the World and the Paradise o f the Heart, trans. H ow ard Louthan and A ndrea Stark (N ew York: Paulist Press, 1998), chap. 13.106. C apkova,"C om enius and H is Ideals," 83.



"system atics" o f the period (C lucas nam es A lsted , Polanus, and Bister- field) who attem pted to m arry rationalism w ith ars memoria, pansophia, and mathesis universalis.197 G erm an proponents o f mathesis universalis such as Ju n giu s believed that their new superscience w ould restore the w isdom lost w ith Adam 's fa ll.1“ A s we have seen, this is a key tenet o f K ab balism .

G . W . F. Leibniz ( 16 4 6 -17 16 ) also belongs squarely in the tradition o f pansophia and encyclopedism . In his "Introduction to a Secret Encyclopedia" (Introductio ad Encyclopaediam arcanum, c. 1679), Leibniz's description o f “G eneral Science" is strik ingly pansophic:

[T h e G eneral Science] includes not only w hat has h itherto been regarded as logic, but also the art o f discovery, together with m ethod or the m eans o f arrangem ent, synthesis and analysis, didactics, o r the science o f teaching, G nostologia (the so-called N oologia), the art o f m em ory or m nem onics, the A rt o f C om b in ation, the Art o f Subtlety, and philosophical gram m ar: the A rt o f Lull, the Cabala o f the wise, and natural m agic. Perhaps it also includes O ntology, or the science o f som ething and nothing, being and not being, the thing and its mode, and substance and accident. It does not m ake much difference how you divide the sciences, for they are one continuous body, like the ocean .109

T h ere is, furtherm ore, am ple evidence o f Leibn iz ’s interests in Rosi- crucianism , alchemy, and K abbalah. Yates m entions that "T h e re is a p ersistent rum our that Leibniz jo in ed a Rosicrucian society at N urem berg in 1666," and she speculates that this society m ay have been founded in 1628 by A ndrae him self.110 Sh e also notes that the precepts o f Leibniz's proposed "O rder o f C harity" arc "practically a quotation from the Fama."Ul

A llison C o u d ert’s Leibniz and the Kabbalah m akes a strong case for the influence o f Lurianic K abbalah on Leib n iz .lu Sh e discusses in detail Leibniz's relationship to tw o leading K abbalist-A lchem ist-H erm eticists o f the tim e: Francis M ercury van H elm ont ( 16 14 - 16 9 8 ) , and the aforem entioned K n o rr von Rosenroth ( 16 3 6 - 16 8 9 ) , editor o f the Kabbalah Denudata. H elm ont w as the son o f Jo h n Baptist van H elm ont, a renowned alchem ist w h o claim ed to have seen and touched rhe philosop h ers stone. (H egel praises H elm ont in his Lectures 01/ the History o f Philosophy as having "m any profound thoughts," but gets his dates w rong [l h p 3 :113 ; Werke 2 0 :15 ] .) Bruno is frequently cited as the source o f L e ib niz's m onadology, but C ou d ert argues instead fo r the influence o f von Rosenroth and van H elm ont. Indeed, it appears that Leibniz's relationship w ith van H elm ont was particularly close. Leibniz kept a detailed

107 . Stephan C lu cas,"In Search o f 'T h e True Logick ': M ethodological Eclecticism A m ong the Baconian Reform ers,“ in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation, 54.108. Ibid ., 63.109. G . W . Leibn iz ,T m rodu ction to a Secret Science," in Philosophical Writings, ed. G . H . R . Parkinson, trans. M arry M orris and G . H . R . Parkinson (L o n don: Everym an, 1973). 5 -6 .n o . Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 154. in . Ibid., 154.112 . 1 discuss Luria's Kabbalah in chapter 7.

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record o f his conversations w ith van H elm ont, including their d iscussions o f K abbalah. Leibniz first met him in M ainz in 167 1, w here they discussed alchem y at length. Leibniz's interest in alchem y was no secret: som e years after his m eeting w ith van H elm ont he w as elected secretary o f an alchem ical society in N urem burg, a fact to which H egel h im self alludes ( l h p 3:326; Werke 20 :234). Leibniz's final w ords on his death bed arc reported to have concerned the transm utation o f iron nails into gold "through the action o f a certain spring."1“

C oudert, draw ing on the w ork o f A nne Becco, argues that Leibniz actually wrote van H elm ont's last book, a C hristian K abbalist w ork entitled Some Premeditate and Considerate Thoughts upon the Four First Chapters o f the First Book o f Moses Called Genesis (published 1697). In this work, van H elm on t/Leibn iz describes creation as the articulation o f divine thought. Beresith, the first w ord o f Genesis is interpreted as m eaning not "in the beginning” but "in the head” (a reading still supported by som e scholars). T h is w ould m ake the first sentence o f G enesis, "In the head, G o d [Elohim] created the heavens and the earth"— calling to m ind the Egyptian creation m yths, as well as gnostic H erm eticism and, o f course, m odern idealism .

H egel invited his contem poraries to place him in the traditions o f pansophia and encyclopedism by entitling his third book Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. (A s w e shall see in chapter 7, he also invited his readers to identify him w ith a latter-day incarnation o f Rosicrucianism .) T h ese traditions were still very much alive in H egel’s W ürttem berg.

In the introduction to his Encyclopedia, H egel w rite s ,"T h e philosophical encyclopedia distinguishes itse lf from the other, ordinary encyclopedia [such as the French Encyclopédie] because the latter has to be som e sort o f aggregate o f sciences, which are taken up contingently and em pirically; and am ong them there are also so m e ‘sciences’ on ly in name, since they are them selves no m ore than a mere collection o f bits o f in form ation" ( e l § 16; G eraets, 3 9 -4 0 ) . (H egel offers heraldry as one exam ple o f

a pseudoscience.) H is Encyclopedia differs from rhe ordinary sort not only in being an integrated, internally related body o f knowledge, but also in eschew ing everything that has the status o f mere observation, mere em pirical data. T h e Encyclopedia does, o f course, deal w ith em pirical data— in the philosophies o f N ature and S p irit— but only such data as illustrate the fondam ental eidetic m om ents o f these subjects (H egel w rites in the sam e paragraph that rhe Encyclopedia"has to be restricted to the beginnings and the fundam ental concepts o f the particular sciences” [ e l § 16; G eraets, 39]).

H egel’s Encyclopedia is exactly w hat its title prom ises: an "encirclem ent" o f the w hole o f Being. It is thus the true encyclopedia. It is the true pansophia Patrizzi, C om enius, H artlib , and D u ry only dream t of, setting the stage for the com ing o f the A ge o f the H o ly Sp irit and the end o f history. It is C om en iu ss teaching o f D ivine W ord, N ature, and M an becom e Logic, N ature, and Sp irit. It is Leibniz's "innocent magia,"

113. Coudert, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, 7.


and mathesis universalis; his "G nosto logia" and h is “onto logy”— "the science o f som ething and nothing, being and not-being”— all presented as “one continuous body, like the ocean.” It is the science o f sciences and the true teaching o f the "nam es” (provisional definitions, m om ents) o f G o d . It is the absolute art o f mem ory. It is the recovery o f the W isdom o f A d am — the intim ate knowledge A dam had o f G o d "in H im self,” “ in H is eternal essence” — and thus the vindication o f the nostalgia o f the K abbalists, o f A grippa, Bohm e, Bacon, Jungius, Leibniz, H elm ont, and others. It is the true logic Bacon sought. It is the Kabbalah o f the Absolute Religion, Leibn izs "C abala o f the wise,” the teachings o f Bohm e, and O etinger becom e Wissenschajt.

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Chapter S ix 187

T h e Alchemists Laboratory:

The Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

1. Introduction

If Eric Voegelin could describe the Phenomenology o f Spirit as a grimoire, one could equally well describe the “scientific" portions of the Encyclope- dia—the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit—as an alchemical manual, an Emerald Tablet for the modern age.

M y intention is not, however, to give com fort to those w ho dism iss Hegel's scientific w ritings as charlatanry and pseudoscience. A ttacks on the Philosophy of Nature are seldom made by inform ed critics. It is sim ply assum ed that H egel's science is a product o f arm chair, a priori theorizing. But in rhe Encyclopedia Logic, H egel w rites that "the relationship o f speculative science to the other sciences is sim ply the follow ing: speculative science does not leave the em pirical content o f the other sciences aside, but recognises and uses it, and in the sam e w ay recognizes and em ploys w hat is universal in these sciences, [i.e.,] the laws, classifications, etc., for its ow n content; but it also introduces other categories into these universals and gives them currency" ( e l § 9; G eraets, 33). H egel m akes an even m ore strik ing assertion in the Philosophy of Nature that "ph ilosophy m ust accord w ith the experience nature gives rise to; in its form ation and in its developm ent, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by em pirical physics" ( p n § 246; Petry 1:197).

H egel's Philosophy of Nature is not, o f course, a mere catalogue o f em pirical data culled from the science o f his day.1 Instead H egel organizes and explains that data according to the categories o f the Logic. H egel is entirely aw are o f the "open-ended" nature o f scientific investigation. H e know s that the science he is dealing w ith is not "final.’' N evertheless, he regards the logical fram ew ork into which he has fitted science as final, because it is a reflection o f the eternal Idea. In the Dissertation H egel w rites that "the study and knowledge o f the laws o f nature rest on nothing other than our believing that nature has been form ed by reason [ratio] and our being convinced o f the identity o f all laws o f nature.’’2 T h is is a

I. In the interest o f brevity, I w ill som etim es refer sim ply to Philosophy of Nature where I have in m ind Hegel's entire treatm ent o f em pirical science, including Subjective Sp irit, the D issertation, the early lectures on philosophy o f nature, etc. T h e context w ill make it clear when I am referring exclusively to the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature.a. H egel, Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets, trans. Pierre Adler, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11 (1987): 301.


statem ent w ith which even the m ost em pirically oriented scientist could not disagree. A ll science assum es that nature is rational, that it possesses a definite order and behaves regularly, and that w e can therefore use our ow n rationality to com prehend it. H egel claim s nothing m ore than this. Because he believes that his Logic m aps out the eternal, objective order, he expects that nature can be show n, w ith a little insight and im agination, to conform to it.

It is generally conceded that H egel’s grasp o f science was superior to Schelling's and that his Philosophy of Nature w as much less fanciful and m ore solidly grounded than Schelling's scientific w orks. H egel was critical o f the Schellingians' propensity to speak in term s o f "correspondences" (an "error” w hich, as I will discuss later, H egel com m itted with abandon!). In the preface to the Phenomenology o f Spirit, H egel w rites that "Form alism in the Philosophy o f N ature takes the form o f teaching that understanding is electricity, anim als are nitrogen, or equivalent to the South or N orth pole, and so on" (M iller, 30; p g , 37). In an 1814 letter to Paulus, H egel states that "You know that I have occupied m yself too much not only w ith ancient literature but also w ith m athem atics and recently w ith higher analysis, differential calculus, physics, natural history, [and] chem istry to be affected by that hum bug in natural philosophy which consists in philosophizing w ithout knowledge by the pow er o f imagination, and in regarding em pty brainstorm s born o f conceit as thoughts."' T h e low repute in which H egel’s Philosophy of Nature is held is due alm ost entirely to the confusion o f its content w ith the content o f the w ritings o f Schelling on the sam e subject— an ignorant error made even by contem poraries o f the tw o men.

N evertheless, H egel and Schelling had much in com m on, no m atter how much H egel sought to distinguish h im self from the Schellingian school. For instance, both regarded N ew tonian science as a depiction o f a dead, m echanical system o f externally related entities. Instead, H egel and Schelling saw the w orld as a cosm os: an internally related organic w hole.4 In his later Philosophy of Nature, H egel speaks o f the "w hole organism o f the Earth" and w rites that "T h e entire condition o f the atm osphere, including the trade-w inds is . . . a vast, living w hole" ( p n § 288, Z ; Petty 2 :5 1-5 2 ) . For both Schelling and H egel, N ew tonianism is the physics o f the U nderstanding, which th inks that even organic nature can be understood mechanistically. Both Schelling and H egel hold that N ew ton m isapplies his mechanical m odel to such subjects as light, color, and gravity, which cannot be understood mechanically. Both, however, hold that there is a delim ited place fo r m echanism in their philosophies o f nature. M echanics cannot, however, explain w h at H egel calls Physics (Pfrysifc) or O rganics (Organische Physik). Schelling and H egel both cham pion the science o f Kepler, their fellow Sw abian , as superior to that o f N ew ton .

H egel’s Philosophy of Nature is in large m easure a revival o f an older,

3. Butler, 309; H offm eister *235.4 . H arris, introduction to System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, 19.

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specifically A ristotelian w ay o f thinking about nature, which the scientists o f H egel’s day considered com pletely w orthless and dead. In particular, the Philosophy o f Nature incorporates a m odernized version o f the classical “great chain o f being."* O n H egel’s account, nature is seen to "give w ay” to Sp irit, which "constitutes the truth and ultim ate purpose o f nature, and the true actuality o f Idea" (p n § 2 5 1; Petry 1:2 16 ).* H egel understands each "level" or "m om ent" o f nature in very Aristotelian term s: as constituting an approach to— one m ight even say im itation o f— A bsolute Idea’s actualization as Sp irit. Ju st as in A ristotle, each level o f nature "strives" to be an independent, self-sufficient “system ,” like the A bsolute Idea.7

Before passing on to the H erm etic influences on the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit, som ething m ust be said here about the notorious transition from Logic to Nature. Hegel writes in the Science o f Logic that"thc Idea freely releases itse lf in its absolute self-sufficiency and stasis" (die Idee sich selbst frei entlässt, ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend; M iller, 843; w l 3:305). T h e Encyclopedia Logic is only slightly m ore helpful: “ T h e absolute freedom o f the Idea . . . is not that it merely passes over into life, nor that it lets life shine w ithin itself as finite cognition, but that, in the absolute truth o f itself, it resolves to release out of itself into freedom the moment o f its particularity or o f the initial determ ining and otherness, [i.e.,] the immediate Idea as its reflexion, or itse lf as Nature” ( e l § 2 4 4 ; G eraets, 307).

T h is concept o f "free release" is patterned on the traditional C hristian idea that G o d creates the w orld as an unnecessitated act o f generosity. (It also calls to m ind N eoplatonic em anation.) H ow ever, H egel is a heretic because he holds the view that an abstract and transcendent G o d is deficient. T h u s, Idea mwif "give rise to” nature. Because the categories o f the Logic are com plete, and thus a "category" o f nature is not required to supplement Absolute Idea, and because no physical m echanism acts on Idea to "produce" nature. Idea m ust be said to "freely" release itself. But does this make sense i Exactly w hat w ork does Idea do in bringing about or sustaining nature ? W h at is the " itse lf” that is freely released ? A rc wc to understand H egel’s language o f “ free release" as purely m etaphorical ? Is he sim ply saying that the Logic is the eidetic“su btext" o f nature, a set o f categories in which nature is to be understood ? A s is frequently claim ed by interpreters, the relationship betw een Logic

5. See H arris, Nigbf Thought}, 374.6. See O etinger’s position on Sp irit and N ature, as sum m arized by Robert Schneider: n atu re 'is . . . only the threshold for spirit, it is the signature, the cipher for the spirit o f man and for divine transcendence" (Ceistesahnen, 91).7. T h e difference between H cgcl and A ristotle, however, is that the Unmoved M over, which is perfectly independent and self-sufficient, is no “system " in the sense o f a unity o f parts, because it has no parts. A ristotle regards organic being as the most perfect form o f being in nature, because or the integrity o f the organism s parts. Therefore, it could be said that Hegel transplants A ristotle’s criterion for “natural substance” into the^heavensrand conceives the Unm oved M over (Absolute Idea) on the m odel o f organic being. T h is should not be surprising, for Hegel w ould regard Aristotle's transcendent Unmoved M over as an unrealized abstraction.

The Alchem ists Laboratory 189


and nature is not a temporal one. H egel’s language o f"free release" w ould certainly seem to be figurative, then.

In section 3, I w ill discuss the difficulties w ith treating H egel’s language as m erely figurative. For the moment, however, let us try to understand the relation o f Logic to nature in purely conceptual term s. Like Bohm e and O etinger, H egel believes that for Absolute Idea to becom e tru ly Absolute, it cannot abide sim ply in the transcendent realm o f ideas: it m ust be “embodied.” T h is occurs when Absolute Idea enters the w orld and becom es an em bodied thought that reflects on itself.* Such thought is philosophy. W e have seen in our exam ination o f the Phenomenology and Logic that H egel has generated his system through reflection on the nature o f consciousness in all its form s. H e has realized the ancient imperative o f philosophy,"K now Thyself.” T h is attainm ent o f self-know ledge by individual human thinkers is the realization o f the Absolute Idea in the world. H egel w rites in an 1819 letter to H inrichs that "C om prehension o f the Absolute is thus the A bso lutes com prehension o f itself, ju st as theology— adm ittedly theology m ore as it once w as than as it now is— has always expressed this sam e self-com prehension."9

For H egel the object o f philosophy is G od . H egel identifies G o d with the Absolute Idea, ju st as Aristotle identified G o d with self-thinking thought. However, i f G o d is identical w ith Absolute Idea, it follows that H egel m ust hold that G o d is merely formal and irreal. Earlier I quoted H egel stating that the Logic is "the exposition o f G o d as he is in his eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite Sp irit" (M iller, 5 0 ; w l

1:3 3 -3 4 ). G o d "in his eternal essence," then, is deficient. H egel states in the Philosophy of Nature, "G o d as an abstraction is not the true G o d ; H is truth is the positing o f H is other, the living process, the world, which is his Son when it is com prehended in its divine form” (p s § 246, Z ; Petry 1:204).

In other w ords, T h e A bsolute Idea does represent a system o f pure ideas, com plete unto itself. It requires no other category or concept to com plete it. H ow ever, the system as a whole is deficient because logical or eidetic being is itse lf deficient. O n its ow n, logic (or the logos) is form al and one-dim ensional. To be fully realized, the Idea m ust "express itse lf" in the w orld o f space and tim e. T h u s, the Logic m ust be supplem ented by the Philosophy o f Nature. But i f Idea com es to actual self-consciousness through a self-thinking thought, through a hum an activity, then why does H egel w rite a Philosophy of Nature instead o f ju st going straight to the Philosophy of Spirit i

T h e answer, in part, is that much o f the Philosophy of Nature pertains to hum an beings insofar as they are physical, organic system s. A com plete account o f Sp irit m ust therefore include these elem ents. But this is not H egel's prim ary consideration. H egel's aim is to w ork out a developm ental account o f reality as a whole, in term s o f which everything is made significant or intelligible. T h e telos o f the universe is the Absolute

8. Hegel states in the Philosophy of Spirit that w ith Sp irit we are concerned "w ith the m ost concrete and developed form attained in the self-actualization o f the Idea" (ps § 377, Z ; Petry 1:3). A nd later:“Sp irit is the actualized C o n cept which is for itse lf and has itself for object” (ps § 382, Z ; Petry 1:49).9. Butler, 478; H offm eister #357-

190 M agnum Opus

Idea's realization in the w orld through the speculative activity o f the philosopher, w hich is achieved through a long historical process. T h e non-hum an cannot, however, drop out o f this picture as unintelligible. T o explain w hy non-hum an physical reality ex ists at all, H egel adopts a q u asi-A risto te lian stan dpoin t and claim s that in som e sense all physical and organic reality is in telligib le in term s o f its “ap p ro x im ation '' to the self-related se lf-su fficien cy o f the A b so lu te Idea, or se lf-th in k in g thought.

A s to the transition from nature to Sp irit, the second topic o f this chapter, in the introduction to the Philosophy o f Nature H egel alludes to Schclling's description o f nature as “petrified intelligence" (versteinerte Intelligenz), and states th at"G o d does not rem ain petrified and m oribund however, the stones cry out and lift them selves up to sp irit" ( p s § 247; Petry, 206). H e is alluding, o f course, to the necessity o f the m ove from nature to Sp irit. For H egel, Sp irit is both antecedent and consequent o f nature. In one o f his m any A ristotelian m om ents, H egel states th at"It is precisely because Sp irit constitutes the end o f nature, that it is antecedent to it" ( p s § 376; Petry 3:212). In other w ords, Sp irit is the telos o f nature. Sp irit presupposes nature, and nature presupposes Sp irit . H egel w rites that "T h e purpose o f nature is to extinguish itself, and to break through its rind o f im m ediate and sensuous being, to consum e itse lf like a Phoenix in order to em erge from this externality rejuvenated as Sp irit" (ibid.).

Sp irit is characterized by its drive to overcome the subject-object d istinction, to eliminate the "otherness" o f the other. W hat Sp irit achieves is an experience o f a world that is "m erely an apprehension o f itse lf" ( p s §

377; Petry 1:5). H egel writes that "the aim o f all genuine science is ju st this, that Sp irit shall recognize itse lf in everything in heaven and on earth. An out-and-out other simply docs not exist for Sp irit" (ibid.).

H egel divides the Philosophy of Spirit into Subjective Sp irit, O bjective Sp irit, and Absolute Sp irit. I am only concerned in this chapter w ith the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

2. The Four Elements

Ernst Benz w rites that "W e m ust not overlook or even negate the fact that the language o f m odern natural science and cosm ology has its roots in m ystical natural philosophy; we m ust be aware that know ledge and m ystery are o f necessity' interrelated."1 ’ Such authors as A llen G. D ebus, P. O . Kristcller, Stephen A . M cK n igh t, D. P. W alker, and Frances Yates, am ong others, argue for the influence o f alchemy, K abbalism , magic, and H erm eticism in general on m odern science. In H egel's tim e it w as not unusual for a serious man o f science to be interested in these subjects.” To be sure, the prevailing opinion w as that these "sciences" were w orth

10. Benz, The Theology o f Electricity, 74.11. O ne o f the m ost fam ous such cases, o f course, is that o f Isaac N ew ton. Ernst Benz notes that the term s attraction and repulsion made their w ay into N ew ton s science via his teacher, the Cam bridge Platonist and thcosophist H enry M ore. M ore got rhem from an English translation o f Böhm es Mys- teriunt Magnum. Sec Benz. ibid.



less, but there w ere holdouts. H egel and the Schelling brothers, as well as G oethe, O etinger, Baader, H erder, Steffens, R itter, and others, are to be num bered am ong them .

G iven the H erm etic influences on H egel’s Logic, his application o f its categories to scientific data results in a philosophy o f nature am ounting to a sophisticated synthesis o f m odern science and H erm eticism . A s D avid W alsh puts it: "W h at H egel set out to do was to integrate the rationality o f m odern science w ith the penum bra o f larger spiritual expectations which have also been an abiding feature o f the m odem world. It is perhaps the m ost im pressive attem pt at reconciling science w ith pseudo-science."u In keeping with this aim there is an influence o f alchem y on the Philosophy o f Nature.

Central to alchemy is the ancient G reek doctrine o f the four elements: Earth, Air, Fire, and Water. W hen H egel speaks of"the square” he generally has in mind the four elements. In chapter 3, 1 discussed how squareness as a symbolic form figures prom inently in Hegel's early Philosophy o f Nature. Recall also that in the Triangle fragment the "triangle o f triangles” is made to become at one point a square. T h e triangle diagram may also refer to the four elements in its use o f four triangles.

A s we have seen, the triadic form dom inates H egel’s system , but in his early philosophy he apparently held that although the triangle predom inates as a sym bolic form in the realm o f Sp irit, the square is the key to the realm o f nature. C on sid er the third o f Hegel's twelve doctoral exam ination theses from i8 o i:"T h e square is the law o f nature, the triangle o f m ind [m ens]" T h is view is still to be found in the m ature Philosophy of Nature. H egel docs not, to be sure, organize that w ork in a quadratic fo rm — it is triadic like all the oth ers— but the quadratic form does crop up w ithin a num ber o f different divisions. Before looking at the Philosophy o f Nature and the occurrence o f the four elem ents there, let us look back at som e o f the earlier w orks.

In H egel's so-called "F irst Philosophy o f Sp irit” ( 18 0 3 -4 ) , he treats consciousness as the "ideality o f nature" and then offers the follow ing opaque observations:

T h e elem ents in w hich [consciousness] ex ists as m iddle are ju st the elem ents o f air and earth , as the in d ifferent se lf-identical e lem ents, not the u n rest o f fire and w ater1’ ; fo r con sciousn ess only is qua ab so lu tely self-identical, and qu a ex istin g m iddle it is posited as a qu iescent ind ifferent m iddle. A s con cept o f con sciou sn ess th is m iddle is in that elem ent w hich is the sim ple self-

12. David W alsh,“A M ythology o f Reason," 159. J . M . Petry w rites th a t 'F o r H e g e l. . . the Idea o f N ature involves a com bination o f the Baconian and Böhm ean attitudes to natural phenomena.'' S e e Petry, introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, vol. j , 114-13. O etinger held that fire and water are a dynam ic pair, which gives rise to all beings. See Schneider, Schellings und Hegeb schwäbische Geistesahnen. 95. T h is position is stated outright by Hegel in the Realphilosophie o f i8 o 3~ 4 :“ Fcur und W asser [sindj die G rund-A nfange und Elem ente aller Dinge.” H e also refers to them as 'tätig ,” active. Jenenser Realphilosophie, ed. Johannes H offm eister, vol. i (Leipzig: M einer, 1931), 4 7 ,4 4 -

192 Magnum Opus


identical one am ong the elem ents; its extern al m iddle [m edium ] is the a ir.14

In the Phenomenology H egel w rites:A ir is the enduring, purely universal, and transparent elem ent; W ater, the elem ent that is perpetually sacrificed; Fire, the unity w hich energizes them into opposition w hile at the sam e tim e it perpetually resolves the opposition; lastly, Earth , which is the firm and solid knot o f this articulated whole, the subject o f these e lem ents and o f their process, that from w hich they start and to w hich they return; so in the sam e way, the inner essence or simple Sp irit o f self-conscious actuality displays itse lf in sim ilar such universal— but here sp iritual— m asses or spheres, displays itse lf in a world. (M iller, 300 ; p g , 326)

A ll these ideas arc present in the m ature Philosophy o f Nature. In one o f the Zusätze from 18 19 -3 0 , he refers to polarity, saying that "there is also a positing o f the return out o f the opposition into unity, and it is this third term w hich constitutes the necessity o f the C oncept, a necessity which is not found in polarity” ( p n § 248, Z ; Perry 1 :2 11) . H ere again we find the claim that a full account o f the real m ust consist o f a triad o f m om ents. H egel goes on, however, to say that “ In nature taken as o th erness, the square or tetrad also belongs to the w hole form o f necessity, as in the four elem ents, the four colors, etc.; the pentad may also be found, in the five fingers and the five senses for exam ple; but in Sp irit the fu n dam ental form o f necessity is the triad” (ib id .). T h is particular aspect o f H egel— the obsession w ith dyads, triads, tetrads, pentads, mathe- m atico-geom etrical constructions o f all k inds— is typical o f th inkers influenced by H erm etic philosophy.

Section 281 o f the Philosophy of Nature is en tit led "T h e Elem ents" (Die Elemente). T h is and the follow ing sections, including the Zusätze from 18 19 -3 0 , m ust be taken as representing his m ature understanding o f the four elem ents. H egel states that "T h e air corresponds to light, for it is passive light w hich has sunk to the level o f a m om ent" ( p n § 28 1, Z; Petry 2 :34 ). L ike H egel's other rem arks on the four elem ents this is hardly clear. Perhaps he m eans that air, like light, perm eates everything, and air is to be thought o f as "extinguished light" (later H egel states, in language that is strikingly Böhm can, that air "is a slum bering fire" [ p n §

282, Z; Petry 2:38]). H egel refers to fire and w ater as the "elements o f opposition.” H e says that fire corresponds to the lunar plane, and water to the com etary. H e has little to say on the subject o f earth in this in itial treatm ent.

Som e paragraphs later, w e find H egel saying that air "constitutes the universal ideality o f everything akin to it; that it is the universal in relation to its other, and that it effaces all opposing particu larity" ( p n § 284, Z ; Petry 2 :4 1). Fire "is the sam e universality, but it appears as such, and

14 . H egel, System of Ethical Life, 215; System der Sittlichkeit, 277. T h ere is much m ore to this passage that is quite interesting, particularly in its treatm ent o f the aether, but I cannot deal w ith it here.

T h e Alchcm ists Laboratory 193

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therefore has the form being-for-self, it is existent ideality therefore, or the nature o f air which has passed into existence; by appearing, it reduces its other to an appearance." W ater, on the other hand, is “passive neutrality” (ibid.). H egel refers to earth as “ the individual elem ent" ( indi- viduelles Element). It is the elem ent “o f developed difference . . . In its d is tinctness from the other m om ents, this elem ent is as yet indeterm inate; as the totality w hich holds together the variety o f these m om ents in individual unity, however, it is the pow er which stim ulates and sustains their process" (p n § 285; Petry 2 :4 1) .

A t the beginning o f his rem arks on O rganics, H egel refers to the terrestrial, vegetable, and anim al organism s as belonging to the "K in gdom o f Earth ,""K ingdom o f Water,” an d "K in gdom o f Fire," respectively ( p n §

337, Z ; Petry 3 :12 - 14 ) . W h at is om itted, o f course, is the "K in gd om o f A ir "— pneuma, spiritus— which H egel could not consider here, for this K ingdom stands outside nature. U nder his treatm ent o f the Anim al O rganism , H egel suggests correspondences between the senses and the elem ents: touch is the sense o f the "m echanical sphere" and thus corresponds to earth and fire (which seem s to mean density and tem perature). Touch is "the sense o f the earthy element." Sm ell and taste, the "senses o f opposition,” correspond to air and water. S igh t corresponds to light, and hearing doesn't seem to correspond to anything, but is sim ply the reception o f "the m anifestations o f internal being, w hich reveals itse lf as such in its expression" ( p n § 358; Petry 3 :138-39 ).

S o H egel m akes extensive use o f the four elem ents— but how is this evidence o f alchem ical influence t A fter all, the doctrine originates with Em pedocles and w as developed system atically by A ristotle. Isn't this ju st evidence o f Greek influence? C ertain ly H egel and his contem poraries knew o f the h istory o f this doctrine (H egel even m entions Em pedocles in connection w ith it [ p n § 281, Z ; Petry 2 :34]). N evertheless, by H egel’s tim e the doctrine o f the four elem ents was so closely associated with alchem y that his use o f it could not have failed to have a strong alchem ical connotation not only for his listeners and readers, but for h im self as well. A s I discussed in chapter 2, alchem y was still very much on the scene in H egel's day. T h u s H egel's use o f the four elem ents w ould have "pegged’’ him in the m inds o f his audience as som eone w ho still saw som e truth in th e"H erm etic art." A fter introducing the four elem ents in the Philosophy o f Nature, H egel rem arks ruefully that “N o educated person, and certainly no physicist or chem ist is now perm itted, under any circum stances, to m ention the four elem ents" ( p n § 281, Z ; Petry 2:34). T h u s H egel is deliberately and boldly risking ridicule in order to hold fast to w hat he regards as an im portant truth.

H . S . H arris w rites that "H egel's continual appeals to the four elem ents o f this m ortal w orld are not poetic or m etaphorical.” 1' H e literally believes in the elem ental nature o f fire, air, water, and earth (or fieriness, airiness, liquidity, earthiness). T h e analogies H egel draw s betw een the elem ents and the five senses and the levels o f Sp irit, the heavenly bodies,

15. H arris, introduction to System o f Ethical Life, 203, n.

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as w ell as other types o f being, arc correspondences in the old- fashioned, H erm etico-m agical sense. It w as com m on for practitioners o f m agic and alchem y to devise elaborate tables o f correspondences betw een the elem ents o f one sphere o f being and another. A ccording to A grippa, the four elem ents o f fire, air, water, and earth correspond to the four angels ruling over the corners o f the earth (Seraph , C herub, T h ar- sis, A rie l), the four evangelists (M ark , Jo h n , M atthew, and Luke), the four seasons, the four hum ors (choleric, sanguine, phlegm atic, m elancholic), the four princes o f devils (Sarnael, A zazel, A zael, M ahazael), etc.16 Sh ould all this seem totally rem ote from H egels enterprise, it should also be noted that A grippa holds that the four elem ents correspond to the senses: fire to sight, air to hearing, w ater to taste and sm ell, and earth to touch. T h e four elem ents also correspond to the "four elem ents o f man“: fire to the m ind, air to spirit (recall Spiritus and m y discussion o f the elem ents from chapter 3), w ater to the soul, and earth to body.17

D espite H egel’s own use o f correspondences, he nonetheless criticizes the practice in o thers, especially th e Schellingian school. In the Philosophy o f Nature, we find the following:

Schelling and Steffens have drawn a parallel between the planetary series and that o f metals. T h is is an ingenious and pregnant com parison, but it is not a new idea, for the representation o f Venus by copper, M ercury by quicksilver, the Earth by iron, Ju p iter by tin, and Saturn by lead, is a com monplace, ju st as it is to call the Su n golden and the M oon silver. T here is som ething com pletely natural about this, for m etals arc the most com pact and independent bodies to be found on Earth . T h e planers do not belong to the sam e field as the m etals and the chemical process, however. Cross-references [Anspielungen] o f this kind are external com parisons and decide nothing. T h ey merely sparkle before the im agination w ithout fu rthering the scope o f knowledge, ( p n § 2 8 0 , Z ; Petry 2 :3 1-3 2 )“

H egel also attacks correspondences in the Phenomenology. Despite such attacks, H egel frequently engaged in analogical ‘ correspondence- thinking." H . S . H arris lists som e o f the correspondences to be found in H egel’s early ph ilosophy: “So lar System /Volk; Earth w ith m ineral— or, m eteorological— process/hum an organism w ith m ind process; vegetable and anim al kingdom /system o f need and system o f justice ."” Perhaps the m ost fam ous— or infam ous— exam ple is the Dissertation o f 180 1, in which H egel suggests that i f we are to believe that nature conform s to a rational pattern, then w e m ight do well to consider the ubiquitousness in nature and human thought o f the num ber seven. T h e

16. See A grippa, The Occult Philosophy, 257 -59 .17. Ibid., 259.18. O f course, these planetary-m etallic correspondences figure largely in alchemy, and no doubt Schelling and Steffens were well aware o f their source o f inspiration. H egel's treatm ent o f this system as a “com monplace” and “not a new idea" is no doubt a reference to the alchemical-m agical tradition.19. H arris, Ntght Thoughts, 68.

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im m ediate inspiration for this idea com es from Plato's Ttmaeus.* H egel suggests that there m ay be a reason w hy the m en o f his day had identified only seven planets. H e hypothesizes that seven m ay be the necessary and correct num ber o f p lanets.2' N o r is this pattern o f thought confined to H egel's youth, for he organized his entire m ature system in term s o f corresponding levels o f nested triangles.

3. Aether

H egel does not confine his Naturphilosophie to the four m undane elements. H e also deals w ith the filth element, the aether, the stu ff o f the stars. H egel refers to the aether throughout his w ritings, but in his early Philosophy of Nature it played a much m ore significant role.:: A lthough the concept o f aether w as part o f m ainstream science in Hegel's tim e, its o rigins are ancient. It figures prom inently in the philosophies o f A naxagoras, D em ocritus, Aristotle, and the Stoics. A ristotle m akes aether the fifth element, but holds that it is different from the other four in being indestructible and unchanging. A ether moves in a circle, which is the perfect form o f m otion for Aristotle. (T h e im portance o f circularity to H egel is likely a reason w hy he hit on the aether as a significant concept.) A ll the heavenly bodies and their spheres are com posed o f this incorruptible substance. T h e Sto ics identified the aether w ith pneuma or spirit and held that aether-pneum a is found not only in the heavens but in earthly m atter as well. T h e Sto ics make use o f the aether in their physicaltheory in order to explain, am ong other things, the transm ission o f light. In these early A ristotelian and Sto ic accounts o f aether, we can already sec much o f H egel's doctrine.

O dd ly enough, given its status as a fifth elem ent, aether did not enter into alchem ical speculation until the m iddle o f the fourteenth century. Jo h n o f Rupescissa's Consideration of the Fifth Essence m ay have been the first alchem ical text to popularize the idea that there are five elem ents.3' In alchemy, aether is frequently referred to as the fifth essence. M arsillio Ficino identified spiritus w ith the fifth elem ent in his m agical theory. In m agic, the “astral plane" on w hich sp irits are encountered and on

20. H arris w rites that “ W hat im pressed Hegel about this ancient example, is that w ith seven m oving bodies to organize in his W orld-Soul ’ T im aeus’ was already w orking w ith a series based on the pow ers o f tw o and three. In this instinct o f Rtûjom Hegel saw a confirm ation o f his thesis that at all tim es there has been only one and the sam e philosophy’ " (ibid., 93; m y italics).21. H egel, Orbits o f the Planets, 302. H egel does not "deduce“ that there are seven and can be only seven planets, as is often claim ed. H is argum ent is, in fact, hypothetical. See H egel, Dissertatio Philosopkica de Orbitis Planetarum. Philosophische Erôrterung über die Planetenbahnen, trans. w ith introduction and commentary, by W olfgang N euser ( W einheim : A cta hum aniora d. V H C , 1986), 5 1. Robert Schneider has argued for the influence o f the O etingerite and “electrical theologian" J . L . Fricker on H egel's D issertation (Geistesahnen, 48).22. Like H arris, I em ploy rhe“ae“ diphthong and w rite “aether” to em phasize that we are dealing w ith a use o f the term w holly different from the ordinary one, which refers to a gas. See H arris, introduction to System of Ethical Life, 2 0 2-3 , n. (H arris, however, is not consistent in using "ae.”)23. M erkur, Gnosis, 74-

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w hich the m agician can travel is also called aetherial. M agic itse lf is often conceived as a m anipulation o f the aether.24 Paracelsus referred to aether as a"fifth element,” as the substance o f stars and souls, and spoke o f an "aether Body."

In the m odern period, conceptions o f aether played roles in the scientific theories o f Descartes and N ew ron. K laus Vondung writes that N ew ton presented his theory o f aether "as a hermetic cosm ogony in the language o f science."25 N ew ton held that aether w as a plenum, perm eating all space. Aether is elastic for N ew ton and can condense and rarify. Vondung w rites, further, that "N ew ton even put forward the hypothesis that aether, in its different degrees o f condensation, is the substance o f all b od ies, and that it produces, by means o f perpetual condensation and vaporization, the cycle o f becom ing and vanishing----- In N ew tons early theoryaether assum ed the role o f a divine creative quinta essentia."* T h ese elements in N ew tons theory are seldom discussed.

A eth er w as still a living idea for scientists in H egel’s tim e, indeed well into the nineteenth century. H erder, w ho w as deeply im m ersed in the H erm etic tradition, took up N ew to n s esoteric aether theory in its entirety and incorporated it into his ow n H erm etic cosm ology.27 A ether also figured in Schclling's philosophy o f nature, w hich w as probably the m ost direct influence on H egel’s doctrine. Unfortunately, H egel's "aether doctrine" has com e down to us only in fragm ents— and the fragm ents are am ong the m ost enigm atic in H egel.

For H egel the aether is m etaphysical bedrock. It is an ultim ate plastic m edium that is nothing in particular, but has the potentiality to becom e everything. H . S . H arris w rite s ,"T h e aether is characterized objectively as absolute elasticity ' and further as uncloudable transparency.' U nlike Aristotle's prim e matter, it is an active potentiality. It is the unity o f intellect and thing, not prim e' but absolute' matter, m atter that can give itse lf form ." A n d: "T h e aether, as that which abides unchanged in all the changes which express its dynam ic essence, is the ‘ Idea o f G od ."2* T h e aether lies at the basis o f everything in experience.” It is to be conceived as boundlessly active and fertile. T h e aether is pure thought, pure m at

2 4 . Ibid ., 72.25. Vondung, "M illenarianism ." 138. See also Richard S . W estfall, "N ew to n and the H erm etic Tradition," in Science, Medicine and Society in the Renaissance, ed. A llen G . D ebus (N ew York: Science H istory Publications, 1972), 2:183-98.26. V on dung/M illenarianism ," 139.27 . Ibid., 138-39 .28. H arris, Night Thoughts, 4 20 ; cf. 305. H arris ’s discussions o f aether, in Night Thoughts and elsewhere, are the best survey o f H egel’s “aether doctrine" in English.29. H arris w rites,"[H egel] is trying to find the m ost abstractly general description o f the unform ed element or medium, which takes on different shapes and patterns in every hum an language and in every other aspect o f com m unal life and experience" (introduction to System 0 /Ethical Life, 193). A nd "T h e aether is the energy that is absolutely conserved, the continuum at the basis o f all experience" (editorial note in H egel, The Jena System. 1804- 5: Logic and Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Jo h n W . Burbidge and G eorge di G iovanni, introduction and notes by H .S . H arris [K ingston : M cG ill-Q ueen ’s University Press, 1986), 172).

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ter, pure space, and pure m anifestation all at once. It can be all o f these things because these represent the nature o f the aether expressed in w holly different layers or levels o f reality. A ether expresses itse lf in the eternal thought-w orld o f the Logic, and then as em pty space,“’ the pure possib ility o f extension, then in extension itse lf (the absolute other to thought) or absolute m atter,’ ' then in the w orld o f m atter as revealed, as light.” From these there follow s an entire w orld o f nature, including m an.” H egel also seem s to conceive the aether as the"life-force" inhabiting the E arth ; it is a"W o rld -So u l." ‘ ‘

H egel’s first transition from Idea to nature is significant as an initial exposition o f the aether doctrine.”

A s determ inate being which has returned to C oncept, the Idea may now be called absolute m atter or aether. It is apparent that this has the sam e m eaning as Pure Sp irit, for this absolute m atter is in no w ay sensuously given, but is the C oncept as pure Concept in itself. A s such it is Existent S p ir i t . . . . aether in its sim plicity and self- sam eness is therefore the indeterm inate soul o f Sp irit ; it is m otionless quiescence or the being which is perpetually returning into itse lf from otherness. It is the substance and being o f all things, that which is absolutely elastic and abhors every form , but w hich is likew ise absolutely plastic, giving itse lf and expressing every form . A ether is therefore B e in g . . . it constitutes everything. In so far as it is said to be aether or absolute matter, it is in itself, or pure self- consciousness. . . . However, this dererminateness o f non-determinate being passes over into determinate being, and the element o f

30. Difference, 4 ; Different, 14.31. Gesammelte Werke, vol. 7 , 1 7 8 , 1 - 2 , and 188, 5 -5 ; 2 8 0 ,14 - 15 - H arris w rites: “ M atter as gravity is the self-positing o f the aether which is the indifferent identity o f the divine life, the creative power that expresses itse lf in all form s o f real existence, w hether conscious or unconscious, extended or intelligent” (Night Thoughts. 76).32. H egel, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 7 , 2 18 ,1 1 ; vol. 8, 3 4 ,17 - 3 6 . 2. H arris, on Hegel's early Philosophy of Nature, w rites: “ Hegel regards light as the showing forth o f'free force.' It is the'totality ' o f the aether (which is polarized into the existing bodily units o f the system )” (Night Thoughts, 425).33. Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, 467- H arris com m ents: “ In the [early] Philosophy o f N ature Hegel traces the evolution o f the ether' (which he calls the Idea o f G o d ' but says is not 'the living G o d ') from its prim ary positing as light and darkness, through the dynam ic space-time equilibrium o f the solar system , to the physical equilibrium o f the earth-process, which sets the stage for organic life" (editorial note in The Jena System, 186). A s Bohm e claim s.'thc w orld s existence is nothing else than coagulated sm oke from the eternal aether, which thus has a fulfillment like the eternal" (Six Theosophical Points, Point 1, chap. 2, § 19).34- H arris w rites,"T h e'ab so lu te life-force'w hich exists in the Earth , but w hich has thus achieved independent existence, is the aether w hich is the u ltimate source o f things" (Night Thoughts, 286). And: "T h e aether is a world-soul in the G reek sense, i.e. it is a life principle" (ibid., 242).35. H egel m entions the aether as early a s"E leu sis ," h is 1796 poem addressed to H ö ld e rlin :"It is the ether o f m y hom eland as w ell" (Butler,46; Hoffmeister #18).

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reality is the universal determ inateness in w hich sp irit has itsbeing as n atu re .1*

In H egel's Philosophy of Nature o f 18 0 3 -4 he w rites that "the speaking o f the aether w ith itse lf is its rea lity .. . . W h at it utters is itself, w hat speaks is itself, and that to which it speaks is again itself."*7 In the so- called "F irst Ph ilosophy o f Sp irit” o f 18 0 3 -4 , H egel w rites that in the "second part" o f philosophy,"Idea fell absolutely apart in the Philosophy o f N ature; absolute Being, the aether, sundered itse lf from its becom ing or Infinity, and the union o f the tw o w as the inner aspect, the buried [essence] which lifted itse lf out in the organism and exists in the form o f singularity, that is, as a num erical u n it."“ T h en , in the sam e text:"In the Sp irit the absolutely sim ple aether has returned to itse lf by w ay o f the infinity o f the Earth ; in the Earth as such this union o f the absolute sim plicity o f aether and infinity exists; it spreads into the universal fluidity, but its spreading fragm ents itse lf as singular things.“ ” E lsew here, H egel states th at"In the indifference o f light, the aether has scattered its absolute indifference into a m ultiplicity; in the bloom s o f the solar system it has born its inner Reason and totality out into expansion."40 Later in the sam e essay:"the aether, which perm eates nature, is the inseparable essence o f the Gestalten o f nature."41

N o r is aether confined sim ply to the early m anuscripts. In the preface to the Phenomenology H egel w rites, "P u re self-recognition in absolute otherness, this aether as such, is the ground and soil o f Science or know ledge in general. T h e beginning o f philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dw ell in this elem ent" (M iller, 14). A eth er begins appearing in H egel’s m anuscripts around 1803 and continues to be prom inent until about 1806, som etim e after the Phenomenology of Spirit w as com posed, that is, w ell after the detailed outlines o f his system had been established. H ow ever, after the Jen a period, the aether is decm phasized. It is no longer a m ajor category o f the Philosophy of Nature, although it occasionally puts in a very m inor appearance, for instance, in O rganics in the Philosophy of Nature: "T h is constitutes the initiation o f the living subject, soul, aetheriality, the essential process o f articulation into m em bers and expansion" ( p n § 337, Z ; Petry 3:13).

H egel’s aether doctrine w as richly im aginative and speculative. But w hat is the question to which aether is the answ er ? T h e solution to this problem m ight tell us w hy H egel dropped the concept o f aether. Since the Pre-Socratics, philosophers have tried to identify w hat persists through changc, or w hat lies at the root o f all things. T h is is the question o f ousia, substance. For the G reeks, ousia w as not only that which persisted through change, but also, because o f its persistence and unchangingness, that which tru ly could be said to be. T h e aether is

36. H egel, Jenem er Realphilosophie. vol. 1, vol. 2, 3 -4 .37. Q uoted in H arris, Night Thoughts, 243-38. System of Ethical Life, 2 0 5 -6 ; System der Sittlichkeit, 268.39. System of Ethical Life, 206; Sysfem der Sittlichkeit, 265-66 .40. H egel, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4 , 464.4«. ibid., 467-

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H egel’s initial answ er to the question o f substance. T h e aether is the ultim ate stu ff o f nature. A s H arris puts it ,"T h e ether is the energy that is absolutely conserved, the continuum at the basis o f all experience.''4’'

H owever, as ousia, aether is a substratum , a hypokeimenon. In the M etaphysics, A ristotle considers the possibility that ousia is a hypokeimenon and rejects it, identifying ousia not w ith som e indefinite underlying stuff, but instead w ith the m ost definite and self-sufficient individual in existence: G o d . H egel’s system closely resem bles Aristotle's in putting at its apex a concept o f G o d or the Absolute, which is conceived as the one, true individual and as a self-thinking thought. T h is quasi-A ristotelian substance, the Absolute, is the m oving principle, the telos o f all o f reality for H egel. T h e aether thus em erges as a superfluous, "second ousia," in the mold o f the more naive and sim plistic ousia o f the Pre-Socratics. O nce we have understand all o f nature and history as progressively realizing the Absolute, there is no need for a “dynam ic aether” propelling change or giving rise to different spheres o f being. A s to the ultim ate physical constituents o f matter, that is an issue that m ay be left to science.

It seems likely that in his treatm ent o f the aether, H egel w as draw ing inspiration, in roughly equal proportions, from both "hard science” and alchem ical-H erm etic speculation. T here is a suspiciously close fit between the H erm etic m agus as aetherial voyager and Hegel's conception o f the philosopher w ho, from the standpoint o f Absolute Know ing, moves w ithin the plane o f Logic and brings aetherial Idea to full actualization in self-thinking thought. Furtherm ore, since H egel says that the aether is not the living G o d but only the "Idea o f God,"41 it m ust be inferred that in the transform ation effected by Sp irit at its highest level— its realization o f the "speaking o f the aether w ith itse lf"44— it has created God, using the aether as a m edium . T h is is indeed H igh M agic.

4. T h e Alchemical Opus

A ether plus the four elem ents does not entirely sum up H egel's debt to alchemy. T h e m ost interesting connection betw een H egel and alchem y does not consist in his explicit references to alchem ical term s or d o ctrine, but in the parallelism betw een his philosophical project and the alchem ical opus. Seeing th is parallelism requires reading alchem ical doctrines as sym bolic expressions o f an esoteric philosophy.

C . C . Ju n g popularized the treatment o f alchemical language as figurative. However, Ju n g ’s approach is to view alchemy as an unconscious expression o f som ething that actually goes on in the psyche o f the "alchemist." M y approach is closer to that o f Ju lius Evola, w ho regards alchemical works as deliberate instances o f esoteric writing. It is significant that this latter kind o f reading is actually encouraged by som e alchem ists, as I shall show. In order to see the esoteric meaning o f alchemy and its parallelism to H egel, we must take a look at its exoteric shell, so what follows is a b rie f overview o f traditional alchemical doctrine.

42. H . S . H arris, editorial note in The Jena System, 172.43. H egel, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 7 ,18 8 ,10 - 13 .4 4 . Ibid., vol. 4 .4 6 3 -6 4 -

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Copyrighted mater

A lchem y is often referred to sim ply as herm eticism , or as the "h ermetic art" (Evola titles his book on alchem y The Hermetic Tradition, La tradizione ermetica). A lchem ists prided them selves on being called "her- m etirists.” L ike the Emerald Tablet, m any alchem ical texts w ere attributed to H erm es Trism egistus. Indeed, alchem y appears to have com e to conceptual fru ition contem poraneously w ith the Hermetica. Bolos o f M endes in the second century' B .C . is generally regarded as the first true alchem ist, that is, the first to write o f a science o f alchem y that had sp iritual overtones and did not look sim ply like metallurgy. Tw enty-eight books o f the alchem ist Z o sim o s o f Panopolis (late third or early fourth century a .d .) have been preserved. O ther early names in the history o f alchem y include Syn esiu s (fourth century), O lym piodorus (sixth century) and Stephanos o f A lexandria (seventh century).

D avid W alsh, drawing on the w ork o f M ircea Eliade, argues that alchemy developed out o f the metallurgical m yths o f the Iron Age, as well as the Egyptian skilled crafts.45 It was believed by ancient miners that m etals were generated by a living Earth Spirit, a conception not unlike Hegel's N atural or Earth S o u l* T h e ancient sm iths believed that they played a role in the “gestation’’ o f metals in the earth. Similarly, the alchemist believed it was his task to bring metals to their natural perfection: gold. T h e aim here was not the production o f wealth, but the knowledge and perfection o f nature. A perennial H erm etic theme, as we have seen, is the idea that the purpose o f human existence is to "complete" or perfect the cosm os (or even G od). T h e means for the perfection o f nature is, according to m ost alchemists, the distillation o f the Philosophers Stone. Just w hat exactly was the Philosopher's Ston e? A lso termed "die Essence,""the Stone o f the Wise," "the Magisterium," "M agnum Opus," "the Q uintessence," and the"universal Essence,"* descriptions o f the stone vary:

It is described as being o f various colors, som etim es as a red, white, or black powder, or it may be yellow, blue, or green. Raym ond Lully calls it "carbunculus," w hile Paracelsus declares it to be a solid body like a ruby, transparent and flexible. Beregard says it is "the colour o f a w ild poppy, w ith the smell o f heated sea-salt," and van H cl- m ont describes it as being"yellow , the colour o f saffron, in the form o f a heavy powder, w ith a brilliancy like glass.” H elvetius likewise describes it as being yellow and the colour o f sulphur, but it is most frequently referred to as the red or white stone.4*

T h e Philosopher's S to n e w as thought to be at one and the sam e time priceless and as com m on as dung.4’ Em m a Ju n g w rites that the philosopher's stone is "a particle o f G o d concealed in nature, an an alogy to the G o d w ho, in C h rist, cam e dow n to earth in a hum an body, subject to suffering. O n the other hand, the cheapness’ o f the stone . . .

45. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 4 4 -4 6 .46. Sec C G . Ju n g s discussion o f Basilius Valentinus on the E arth-Sp irit in Psychology and Alihemy, trans. R . F. C. H ull (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1968), 34 2 -4 3 .47. C . J . S. T hom pson, Lure and Romtince of Alchemy, 69.48. Ibid., 7 1.49- Em m a Ju n g and von Franz, Grail Legend, 153.



alludes to the fact that ever)' hum an being is its potential bearer, even its b egetter"“

D escriptions o f the function o f the philosophers stone vary as well. By it, claim s one anonym ous alchem ical author, “all infirm ities m ight be cured, hum an life prolonged to its utm ost lim its, and m ankind preserved in health and strength o f body and m ind, clearness and vigour.’'** T h is seem s to m ake the stone identical to the fabled "elixir o f life," but it w as generally conceived as much m ore than this. T h e stone w as also held to be capable o f isolating the literal essence o f any object it was exposed to, and o f transm uting substances one into another.

T h e philosopher’s stone w as supposed to possess the characteristics o f both sulphur and mercury, which were thought by alchem ists to be the dual materia prim a o f all things. T h e four elem ents o f Earth , A ir, Fire, and W ater— which are the ground o f the active qualities o f dry, cold, heat, and w et— are often thought to proceed from the aether, the materia prima in its first or m ost pristine form . T h ese elem ents make up all o f physical reality, and each "contains" all the others (as represented in the theory that each can change into the others through an alteration in the degrees or balance o f dry, cold, heat, and wet). H eat is conceived as the m ost basic o f the qualities, and Fire the m ost basic o f the elements.

T h is theory o f the elements and their relationships constitutes the basic alchemical “theory o f matter.” There is more, however, and it is intimately bound up with the perennial H erm etic theory o f the correspondence o f the macrocosm and the microcosm . In alchemy, the metals (form ed through the interaction o f the elements) are related to the planets (we have already encountered H egel referring to this doctrine in connection w ith Schelling and Steffens). A s D avid W alsh explains it, "T h e seven planets are ordered in the tension between the tw o poles o f the active and spiritual pow ers o f the sun, gold, and the passive receptive pow ers o f the m oon, silver. T h e y are all represented by variations on the three basic sym bols . . . for the sun, for the m oon, and for the cross [representing] the elements. T h e only planet that contains all three [o f the sym bols] is M ercury, which signifies the predom inance o f the passive lunar pow er over the solarian form ation o f the four elements.’” '

Mercury, as the intersection o f the physical elements and the active and passive forces, represents the isolation o f materia prima, the aether lying at the basis o f all form s. It is conceived as the androgyne. A s we have seen, the Philosopher's Stone is the unity o f sulphur and mercury, a dual materia prima. W e can see, then, that the Philosopher’s Stone is som ething like a corporealization or "solidification" o f the aether, which is “decomposable” into the twin properties o f sulphur and mercury. In fact, the Philosopher's Stone was som etim es referred to as the lapis aethereus, and both the Philosopher's Stone and the aether arc com m only referred to as the “ fifth essence."*5 T h e alchemical operation that achieves this is often represented by tw o serpents coiling together around a rod (sym bolizing, perhaps, the

50. Ibid., 157.51. Q uoted in T hom pson, Lure and Romance o f Alchemy, 70.52. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 49-53. Jun g, Psychology and Alchemy, 2 4 3-

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aether). T h is image is, o f course, the cadeucus, the staff o f H erm es or Mercury. T h e Philosophers Stone is also som etim es sym bolized by the ouroburos, a snake biting its tail— sym bol o f the hen to pan or hen kai pan.

T h e stages o f the alchemical opus— the creation o f the Philosophers Ston e— were usually given as three, but som etim es as four. First comes the nigredo, or black stage. T h is is the caput mortuum, in which the substance with which the alchemist begins is burned or cooked until it is reduced to a dark powder. Then com es the albedo, o r white stage, in which the material is further purified. T h ird is citrinatis, the yellow stage, and fourth is rubedo, the red stage. It is impossible to describe these processes in detail, for in alchemical texts they are cloaked in layer upon layer o f allegory and image, and the texts differ widely. Around the fifteenth or sixteenth century, the yellow stage w as dropped and thereafter we meet almost always w ith only the black, white, and red stages, the red sym bolizing the Philosophers Stone. Ju n g notes that there is a vacillation and tension in alchemy between the num bers three and four:

In alchem y there arc three as well as four regitnina o r procedures, three as well as four colors. T here are always four elem ents, often three o f them are grouped together, w ith the fourth in a special position— som etim es earth, som etim es fire. M ercurius is o f course quadratus but he is also a three-headed snake or sim ply a triune. T h is uncertainty has a duplex character— in other w ords, the central ideas are ternary as well as quaternary.M

A lthough most o f the details regarding the stages o f the alchem ical opus are unclear, the initial stage is w ell-understood: it involves a principle o f putrefaction or death. A s Evola puts it, in order for the "new life" o f the P h ilosoph ers Ston e to com e to be,“ it is the unanim ous opinion o f all the herm etic philosophers that a ‘m ortification’ m ust intervene."” R onald G ray w rites that "It w as for long believed that in order for grow th to take place in an organism , that organism m ust first die."* In short, negation or cancellation is a necessary m om ent in the em ergence o f the Stone, and life itse lf is conceived as a perpetual dynam ic involving affirm ation and negation, yes and no.

T h e m ost fam ous G erm an representative o f the alchem ical teaching was, o f course, Paracelsus. Paracelsus w as supposed to have been taught alchem y by So lom on T rism osin (w hom he met in Constantinople in 1520), w ho h im self learned alchem y (and possibly Kabbalah) from a Je w .® Paracelsus, not generally given to modesty, w as not shy aboutclaim ing to have discovered the Philosoph ers Stone.'* Born in 1492 or1493 in Sw itzerland , he w as the son o f a Sw abian physician. In Paracelsus's lifetim e, only sixteen w ritings appeared under his name, but his influence w as im m ense. T h e m ajor w ork o f his m aturity, Astronomia Magna oder die Ganze Philosophia Sagus der Grossen und Kleinen Welt,

54. Ibid., 26.55. Evola. The Hermetic Tradition. 72.$6. G ray, Goethe the Alchemist, 12 - 13 .57. Raphael Patai, The Jewish Alchemists (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 268-70 .58. Ib id ., 29.



appeared in 1537 -38 . N o less a figure than Erasm us o f Rotterdam was one o f Paracelsus's adm irers. A letter from Erasm us to Paracelsus, thanking him for medical advice, is still extant: " I recognize the deep truth o f your m ysterious words," Erasm us w rites, "not by any knowledge o f m edicine, w hich I have never studied, but by my sim ple feeling."1'

D avid W alsh w rites that Paracelsus "gready expanded the significance o f the principles o f alchemy, from a limited psycho-m aterial technique to the illum inative center for an understanding o f nature as a whole, by integrating them w ith the dom inant H erm etic-N eoplatonic philosophy."“ According to Paracelsus, the w orld is an em anation o f the O ne, the Mysterium Magnum, produced via the force o f separatio. Paracelsus accepted the traditional alchem ical four elements, but supplem ented them w ith a second elemental system , that o f sulphur-m ercury-salt. Paracelsus does not hold that these three are literally present in all things. A llen D ebus writes that he illustrated their m eaning by burning a tw ig: "the vaporous fum es denote mercury, the flame was sulphur, and the final ashes were salt.”"1 (H egel well understood that Paracelsus's doctrine could not be taken literally, as w ill shortly becom e apparent.) Paracelsus identified his three principles w ith the persons o f the Trinity. T h e philosophers stone w as conceived as the union o f the three: in effect, G o d . M ercury was identified w ith the H oly Sp irit. Paracelsus w rites that "in this manner, in three things, all has been created . . . namely, in salt, in sulphur, and in liquid. In these three things all things are contained, w hether sensate or insensate. . . . S o too you understand that in the sam e manner that man is created [in the image o f the triune G o d ], so too all creatures are created in the num ber o f the Trinity, in the num ber three."6'’

M an is at the center o f Paracelsus's cosm os. M an is the quinta essentia w ho contains the spirits or essences o f all other things. T h u s, man, as the m icrocosm , can achieve know ledge o f the w hole by looking w ithin him self. T h u s, in true H erm etic fashion, Paracelsus identifies self- know ledge and know ledge o f the world: to know nature is to know it in term s o f the being which is its telos, m an. M an is not, however, m erely a passive product o f G od 's w ill, for Paracelsus holds that G o d created the w orld in an im perfect state. It is man’s role to bring the w orld to perfection: "T h e created w orld has been given over to man in order that he may fulfill it. M ore than that: man’s original and specific m ission is to lead it to perfection: he has been placed in the w orld solely for this p u rpose."*’ For Paracelsus, man has been "excreted" from the w orld as its savior, like a healing tincture drawn out from an herb.M N o t surprisingly,

59. Q uoted in Jolande Jacobi, Paracelsus: Selected Writings, rrans. N orbertG uterm an (Princeton, N .J.: Bollingen, 1951), lii-liii.60. W alsh, Boehme and Hegel, 54.6 1. D ebus, The Chemical Philosophy, vol. 1 ,5 7 .62. Paracelsus, Theologische und religionsphilosophische Schrißen, ed. K urtGoldammer. (Wiesbaden and Stuttgart: Steiner, 1955), 63-63. Jacobi, Paracelsus, xlvi.64. H einrich Sch ipperges,“ Paracelsus and his Followers," Modern Esoteric Spirituality, 156.

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Paracelsus, like E ckhart and C usa and the H erm eticists, held an organic view o f the created world: everything is related to everything else in one organic w hole ordered by G o d . H e frequently em ployed the H erm etic m icrocosm -m acrocosm principle. A ndrew W eeks has w ritten that the m icrocosm -m acrocosm correlation is a staple o f G erm an m ysticism : "from H ildegard on . . . G erm an m ysticism is preoccupied w ith large and sm all 'worlds,' ranging from the absolute w orld o f divin ity to the m icrow orlds encom passed by the sm allest organism , space, or discrete thing."65

T h e tw o theses o f man's role as"perfecter" o f nature, and o f the in terrelatedness o f all things, are the tw in pillars o f Paracelsus’s philosophy and his m edical theory. M edicine is the ch ie f science for Paracelsus (a position later m aintained by Schelling), as it deals w ith the righting o f im balances in nature, and thus w ith natures im provem ent. M edical practice is, in turn, based on the organic view o f creation, for Paracelsus's m edicine depends on the standard H erm etic theory o f correspondences and occult sym pathies. Sym ptom s o f disease are "signatures” o f im balances or disharm onies in nature. T h e practitioner o f the medical art is supposed to correct the im balance and restore harmony.6*

In keeping w ith others in the H erm etic tradition, Paracelsus held that behind the visible world lies an invisible w orld o f spirits or "astral” or "aetherial" bodies. W hat unites all the different levels o f reality is the will m oved by imagination, through which G o d generates the astral bodies, "im ages” o f the Ideas in the divine m ind. T h e astral bodies in turn p roduce earthly bodies as images o f them selves, and they com m unicate their influences to earthly things, producing health or disease. Paracelsus reinterpreted the traditional alchemical concept o f materia prima to identify it w ith the logos becom e flesh, holding w ithin it the "seeds" for everything else (the influence o f the Stoics on Paracelsus's doctrine is clear).

In Septem Defemiones (Seven Defenses), Paracelsus analyzes the origin o f disease into five entia o r causes: ens astrale, ens venale, ens naturale, ens spiritale, and ens deale. H einrich Sch ipperges w rites: “ T h ese five entia confront us w ith no less than the closed circle o f hum an life w ith all its crises, and thus w ith the anthropological conception o f an all-em bracing order and w ay o f life in days o f health as w ell as days o f sickness."*7

Ens venale, “ toxic situation," refers to the m ystery o f poison. E verything, Paracelsus claim s, is poison, i f it is present in certain quantities. T h e proportion determ ines w hat is poisonous and w hat is not. T hu s, Paracelsus holds, poison is an integral part o f nature. A ccording to him, it is the task o f the alchemist to distinguish in practice w hat is poisonous from w hat is nor. Paracelsus's treatm ent o f alchem y m akes it seem more or less indistinguishable from his theory o f m edicine: alchem y has as its task the chem ical perfection o f nature.“ Paracelsus holds an "alchem ical" view o f the structure o f the universe, claim ing that everything w as cre-

65. W eeks, German Mysticism, 9.66. Beck, Early German Philosophy, 144 .67. Schipperges,"Paracelsus ancl his Followers," 157.68. Ibid ., 159.



ated by G o d in a "chem ical" m anner and m ust be perfected'chem ically."'" Ens venale can be seen as a first step, consum m ated w ith Böhm e and H egel, tow ard an account o f creation that m akes room for the negative* Paracelsus's conception o f alchem y as a healing art, and his triad o f salt- sulphur-m ercury found their w ay into Böhm es w ritings, along with m any other Paracelsian concepts.

M any o f the alchem ical term s and conceptions o f Paracelsus and the alchem ists have a dual significance. O n the one hand, they are m eant literally, as referring to actual substances. A t the sam e time, however, they have a sym bolic and mystical significance. T h is latter docs not appear to have been a late developm ent, but rather som ething accepted by many alchem ists all along. T h e literal-m inded laboratory alchem ists seeking only to change lead into gold were derisively referred to by the genuine adepts as "puffers," in reference to their constant use o f bellows. In the m inds o f the true alchem ists, transm utation w as not ju st som ething that happened in a vessel, but "a process which transform ed the individual from an ordinary m ortal im m ersed in the physical w orld to a superior being fully conscious o f the m ystery o f life and death.'r:‘ T h e Philosopher's Stone was held to represent the hen kai pan, and the quest for the Stone the knowledge o f all things, or o f G o d .71 T h e herm etic vessel in which the opus w as to take place w as supposed to be perfectly round, in im itation o f the shape o f the cosm os. It is possible, o f course, that w hat was involved was a real chem ical procedure, which w as supposed to be "activated by" or "infused with" a concom itant psychic act, a magical spell. T h e dual physical and psychical nature o f the alchem ical opus is perhaps reflected in the recom m endation by the author o f the Liber Platonis quar- torum that the skull be used as the vessel o f transm utation.73

I f alchem y can be understood as a m ystical doctrine, w hy then is it expressed in such unwieldy and often grotesque physicalistic language ? Ju liu s Evola, w riting o f alchem y as it existed in C hristian tim es, states that alchem ists w ent "into hiding": "And the Royal A rt [i.e., the art o f acquiring the w isdom o f G od ] was presented as the alchemical art o f transm uting base m etals into gold and silver. By so doing it no longer fell under the suspicion o f heresy, and even passed as one o f the m any form s o f natural philosophy' that did not interfere w ith the faith; even am ong the ranks o f C atholics we can discern the enigm atic figures o f herm etic m asters, from R aym ond Lully and A lbertus M agnus to A bbot Pernery."”

69. See W eeks, Paracelsus, 152-53.70. C oudert, Alchemy, 96.7 1. Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 2 0 -2 1.72. T h is work w as probably written in the tenth century. T h e text is H arran- ian, and exists in both Arabic and Latin versions. Ju n g notes that it is "o f great im portance for the history o f alchem y" (Ju n g , Psychology and Alchemy, 267.88).73. Evola, The Hermetic Tradition, xviii. Recall also, from chapter 1, Lu thers approving rem arks on alchemy. T h e G erm an alchem ist H einrich Khunrath ( 15 6 0 -16 0 1) , a C hristian Kabbalist and friend o f Jo h n D ee, held the transm utation to be a process occurring w ithin the soul o f the alchem ist. In China, where alchemy also flourished, the art had already becom e exclusively m ystical and contem plative by the thirteenth century. See Coudert, Alchemy, 83. 91.

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In the Opus Mago-Cabbalistieum o f G eo rg von W elling (a w ork o f uncertain date know n to have been read by G o e th e74), it is said rhat"our intention is not directed tow ards teaching anyone how to m ake gold, but som ething much higher, nam ely how N atu re m ay be seen and recognized as com ing from G o d , and G o d in N ature." ' W elling's alchem y w as theosophy: his object w as the know ledge o f G o d , in H egel's phrase, “as H e is in H is eternal essence before the creation o f nature and a finite Spirit,” and o f G o d ’s expression in nature. T h e Paracelcist O sw ald C ro ll w rites:

[T h e alchem ists) leave them selves, and totally go out from them selves. . . . T h ey hasten from the im perfect to that which is one and perfect, the know ledge and contem plation w h e re o f. . . is a sacred. H eavenly and hid silence, the quiet or R est o f the sences and all th in g s ,. . . when at length . . . all m inds . . . shall be altogether but one thing, in one m i n d which is above every' m i n d . It is the intim ate vision o f G o d , w hich also hapneth by the L ight o f G race to the separate So u l even in this world, i f any man set him selfe about it now, and be subject to G o d . T h u s m any holy men by vertue o f the D eifick Sp irit have tasted the First fruits o f the Resurrection in this life, and have had a foretaste o f the Celestiall C ountry.7*

T h e G erm an alchem ist G erh ard D orn (know n for having said “tran sform yourselves into living philosophical stones!”77) claim ed that alchem ists possessed the secret o f freeing Sp irit from M atter.71 Ju n g w rites that “ For the alchem ist, the one prim arily in need o f redem ption is not man, but the deity w ho is lost and sleeping in matter.”79 Ju n g contrasts alchem y w ith traditional C hristian ity in that the latter holds that man is redeem ed, whereas the form er casts man as the redeemer, “man takes upon h im self the duty o f carrying out the redeem ing opus, and attributes the state o f suffering and consequent need o f redem ption to the anima mundx im prisoned in matter.’'*'’ It is the task o f the alchem ist to help spirit to free itse lf from the bonds o f the natural.

A n eighteenth-century m anuscript— De summa et utuversalis medicinae sapientiae veterum philosophorum— depicts a crucible in which Sp irit, represented as a dove (a traditional C hristian sym bol) rises out o f nature, represented by the four elements. Recall H egel s “ Bohm e myth” o f 18 0 4 -5 (chapter 4 ) :“ T h e consum ed nature rises up in a newer, more ideal form, like a realm o f shadows which has lost its first life, the appearance o f its spirit after the death o f its life. But this new form [Spirit] is the overcom ing o f the evil, the enduring o f the glow ing fire [G/wf] o f pain in the center point, where as purified it leaves all the flakes behind in the crucible

74. G ray, Goethe the Alchemist, 4.7$. Q uoted in ibid.. 19.76. O sw ald C roll, Philosophy Reformed and Im proved.. . . The Mysteries o f Nature by . . . Osw. Crollius, rrans. H . Pinnell (London: Lodow ick Lloyd, 1657), ai4-7 7 .“ Transm utcm ini in vivos lapides philosophicos!” (quoted in Jun g, Psychology and Alchemy, 148).78. Q uoted in ibid., 269.79. Ibid .. 31a.80. Ibid., 306.



7. T h e dove o f Sp irit returning to G o d (the Father). Robert Fludd, Utriusque Cosmi Maioris scilicet et Minoris Metaphysica, Physica Atque Techinica Historia, vol. I ( 16 19 ) . Reprinted by perm ission o f Phanes Press, G rand Rapids, M ichigan.

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[Tiegel], a residuum , which is the pure nothing. It raises itse lf up as a freer spirit, which sees its radiance only in nature."81

A draw ing accom panying a w ork by R obert Fludd (figure 7) depicts a jagged beam o f energy projected from the G odhead, issuing in a dove and circling back again to G o d , representing the "com pletion" o f G o d in H oly Sp irit. T h e alchem ical opus was often called circulate (circular), or represented as the rota, the wheel (see chapter 5 on Bohm e's wheel). It w as thought that the end o f the opus returns to the beginning. A s noted earlier, the P h ilosoph ers Stone is sim ply a transform ation o f prima materia; the beginning is preserved in the end, but in a higher form ; the Sp irit hidden in prima materia is freed.“ T h e stone was "alpha and omega," and the opus itse lf represented by the ouroburos, about which I have already had occasion to com m ent (see above and chapters 2 and 3). G iven the obscurity o f the texts in question, there is no w ay to decide i f the alchem ical opus is intended to be entirely figurative or sym bolic, or if

81. H offm eister, Dokumente, 365.82. See Ju n g , Psychology and Alchemy, 345. T h e Sp irit in prima materia is explicitly identified by som e alchemists with the H oly Spirit o f the Christian Trinity.

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there is bo th a literal, physical operation o f some sort coupled w ith a mystical doctrine. N evertheless, in som e sense the alchem ists believed th a t w hat they were doing involved the salvation o f nature a n d /o r the "completion'' o f G od.

5. Hegel and Alchemy

I have already had occasion to m ention alchemical ideas in Hegel a num ber o f tim es. Hegel uses the alchemical phrase caput mortuum in the Encyclopedia Logic and the Philosophy 0 / Nature ( p n § 359; Petry 3:143). Elsewhere, Hegel employs the m icrocosm -m acrocosm analogy, referring to the animal organism as the microcosm (der Mikrokosmos):“ W ithin it, the whole o f inorganic nature has recapitulated itself" ( p n § 352, Z ; Petry 3:108).

Statem ents in H egel’s Philosophy 0 / Nature certainly indicate fam iliarity w ith Paracelsus’s doctrines.” In fact, as H . S. H arris has show n, H egel w as quite attached to Paracelsianism . In H egel's lectures o f 1803 the division "m etals-com bustibles-neutrals-earths” is connected w ith Paracelsus's distinction “m ercury-sulphur-salr."*4 In the Jen a period, H egel som etim es did not refer to Paracelsus by name, but instead em ployed the rubric “ the elders“ to refer to both Paracelsus and Bohm e.1* M ost interesting o f all, however, is the fact that even w here H egel is draw ing from m ore recent sources he insists, as H arris puts it,"on finding an earlier pedigree . . . in Paracelsus and Böhm e.”46

In the m ature Philosophy of Nature, ju s t before beginning his discussion o f the four elem ents, Hegel writes:

It is a m atter o f history th a t Paracelsus said th a t all terrestrial b o d ies are com posed o f the four elem ents o f mercury, sulphur, salt, and virgin earth [jungfräulichen Erde),n and th a t these correspond to the four cardinal virtues. M ercury is metalline, and as m etal is abstract m atter; it is self-identical in its fluid corporeality, and corresponds to light. S u lphur is rigidity, the possibility o f com bustion; fire is not alien to it, bu t constitu tes its self-consum ing actuality. Salt co rresponds to water, which is the com etary principle, and its dissolution constitu tes indifferent reality, o r the subsidence o f fire into independence. Finally, virgin earth is the simple innoxiousness o f th is m ovem ent, the subject w hich constitu tes the extinction o f these m om ents; th is was the accepted expression for the abstract earthiness o f pure silica.“

Against the charge th a t the theory is absurd because these com ponents are obviously no t to be found in all things, Hegel responds th a t "T he essential po in t o f such assertions [as Paracelsus's) is however th a t there

83. See in particular paragraphs 280 and 316; Petry 2:3a; 117 .84. H arris, Nigbt Thoughts, 274; 2 7 8 -7 9 ; Gesammelte werke, vol. 6 ,1 14 , 4 - 17 .85. "Paracclsus and Böhm e together are the ciders'— i.e., the alchem ists” (H a rris, Night Thoughts, 274n).86. Ibid., 278.87. Recall G o eth es experim ents w ith “ virgin earth" (chapter 2).88. H arris points out that H egel is m istaken in attributing the "virgin earth” doctrine to Paracelsus. It acrinrily originates w ith Böhm e. See H arris, Nigfef Thoughts, 274n.



are four m om ents to real corporeality, not that these m aterials are really present. Such theories should not be taken literally, for i f they are, Jacob Böhm e and others m ay w ell be thought o f as nonsensical and lacking in experience" ( p n § 280, Z ; Petry 2:32). In short, H egel is concerned— again— to defend Paracelsus and Böhm e: i f their w ork is not taken in a literal-m inded way, it reveals im portant truths.

A n even m ore interesting statem ent about Paracclsus and Böhm e is to be found later in the text. H egel w rites that "According to an ancient and general opinion, each body consists o f four elem ents. In m ore recent tim es, Paracclsus has regarded them as being com posed o f m ercury or fluidity, su lphur or oil, and salt, which Jacob Böhm e called the great triad.” Again H egel points out that such ideas are easy to refute i f taken literally, but "It should not be overlooked . . . that in their essence they contain and express the determ inations o f the C oncept" ( p n § 316; Petry 2 :117 ). T h is is a strik ing rem ark, for here H egel is saying that i f the alchem ical language o f Paracelsus, Böhm e, and others is considered in a nonliteral way, its inner content is, in essence, identical to his system (i.e., to the "determ inations o f the C on cep t”).

In an 1808 letter to K arl Ludw ig von Knebel (a w ell-know n M ason), H egel em ploys fanciful alchem ical im ager)': " I f this age is on the whole an age o f iron, here it is still m ixed w ith lead, nickel, and other base m etals. T h in gs are indeed alw ays being reorganized to produce a nugget o f gold as well. It is characteristic o f gold, however, to grow all too slowly, and w ith all our sprinkling and greenhouse exertions no steady grow th ensues."s> It w as believed by alchem ists that m etals contained a "seed o f go ld” that could be made to "sprout" by certain chem ical procedures. T h e result w ould be that an inferior m etal would "grow into" gold.*0 H egel is draw ing on that idea here, and using it as a figurative w ay o f talking about his theory o f the "cunning o f reason" (List der Vernunft): bad tim es have a bright side, in that they are m erely a vehicle, a "negative m om ent" through w hich som ething positive or better com es to be actualized. We are powerless, however, to force along a transform ation in the fortunes o f the world. Hegel's "cunning o f reason" is his version o f divine p rovidence, over w hich m ere m ortals have no control. A ll "our sprinkling and greenhouse exertions" are in vain, for gold grow s slowly. T h is exam ple is sufficient to illustrate that H egel w as conversant w ith the basic ideas o f alchemy, and that those ideas were a part o f the "furn iture" o f his mind, which came to him quite naturally as a w ay o f expressing his ideas, w hether in a treatise such as the Logic (caput mortuum) o r in a casual letter to a friend.’ 1

In chapter 2, I d iscussed G oethe's interest in alchem y in order to argue that alchem y was still very m uch a part o f the intellectual scene in Europe, but particularly in G erm any. T h e articles on "alchem y” and

89. Butler, 147 ; H offm eister #131. H egel is also, o f course, playing on H esiods ages o f G old and Iron.90. T h e m etals in alchemy were ranked as follows, in order o f increasing perfection: lead, tin , iron, copper, quicksilver, silver, and gold.91. Hegel made Knebel s acquaintance in Jena. He was a member of Goethe's circle.

2io Magnum Opus


"alchem ist" in D id e ro ts Encyclopedic ( 17 4 6 -5 9 ) w ere predom inantly p o sitive. In 1787, the Berlin Academ y investigated the claim s o f a professor at H alle to have transm uted lead into gold.9’ A lchem y continued to be a part o f life— although never quite a m undane p art— in G erm an y until well into the nineteenth century. E . T . A . H offm ann (17 7 6 -18 2 2 ) , in his short story "T h e Sandm an" (D er Sandm an») (18 16 ), has one character rem ark quite m atter-of-factly to another, in an attem pt to explain a strange occurrence that the latter had w itnessed as a child, that it "w as probably nothing other than secret alchem ical expcrim ents.w,‘ C harles W ebster w rites o f H egel’s tim e that “ T h ere persisted a strong sense o f the possib ility that em bedded in the accretions o f alchem ical literature lay im portant truths expressed in sym bolic form.”'1' T h u s it is not su rprising that alchem y w ould capture the im aginations o f men like O etinger, G oethe, Schelling, Steffens, H egel, and others.

A system atic parallel can be draw n betw een each aspect o f the opus and H egel's ph ilosophical project. A s I have already noted, in alchem y each m etal w as said to contain a "seed o f go ld ” that could be m ade to sprout and b lossom . A t the sam e rim e, the alchem ist w as expected to p u rify h im self, o r the process w ould not w ork. In this w e can sec an an alogy to the "purification" function o f the Phenomenology itse lf. In the phenom enological crucib le. S p ir it is separated from its im purities and, literally, perfected . A s w e have seen , the “seed” o f A bso lu te S p irit is present in every flaw ed, im perfect form that Sp irit takes. T h e w o rk o f rhis purification has happened, in p art, through the h istorical process. B u t H egel provides the final, secret ingred ient necessary to synthesize A bso lu te S p ir it . A s I said in chapter 4 , he has placed the historical form s o f S p ir it into his alem bic and, through the fire o f dialectic, has caused them to reorganize into a form that reveals the necessity w ith in th eir apparent contingency. T h e Phenomenology is the nigredo, the stage in w hich the m aterial (m an) has its im perfections burned off. In H egel the albedo, the pure w hite stone from w hich the P h ilosoph er's Ston e can be m ade, is A bso lu te K n ow in g , the pure aetherial consciousness from w hich the entire system develops.

As R onald G ray w rites o f the alchem ical p rocess ,“T hese very inferior m etals . . . were to be transm u ted in the alchem ical w ork in to a G od-like form."vi H egel has u tilized the d a rk will o f D esire— and the blinkered perspectives o f m yriad form s o f D esire sub lim ated as m odes o f consciousness— in o rd er to p roduce no t a "G od-like form," b u t G od H im self. H egel's "magical pow er th a t converts [the negative] in to being" is beyond th e dream s o f A grippa, Paracelsus, o r even G o e th es Faust. H egel is the W orld -H isto rica l A lchem ist. H is p roduct is the Philosopher's S tone, the lapis aethereus or, as it was know n to the G e rm ans, der Stein der Weisen. T h e place o f transfo rm ation is represented

92. Gray, Goethe the Alchemist, 3.93. Tales o f E. T. A. Hoffmann, ed. and trans. Leonard J . Kent and E liu b c th C .Knight (Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. 1969), 10 1.9 4 . W ebster. From Paracelsus to Newton, 10 .95. Gray, Goeffce the Alchemist, 25.



in the Phenomenology as G olgoth a, the Place o f the Sk u ll (die Schadel- stdtte). A s we have seen, the alchem ical retort w as som etim es a skull, and the caput mortuum w as sym bolized by a skull.

H egel's "P h ilo sop h ers Ston e" is a "transform ation" o f the prima materia, which is aether: a "solidification" o f the eternal aether (O bjective Sp irit). U nlike the prima materia o f traditional alchemy, though, it does not contain all th ings in potentia. Instead, all things are in actuality by being contained w ithin it; it is "androgyne,” a unity o f opposites. L ike the alchem ists, H egel's philosophical project is to free Sp irit from nature. Ju st as alchem ists believe that G o d is slum bering in m atter and m ust be released by man, so H egel holds that nature is"petrified intelligence" but that “G o d does not rem ain petrified and m oribund however, the stones cry ou t and lift them selves up to spirit." L ike Paracelsus, H egel believes that nature has, in a sense, "excreted" m an, that self-conscious man has arisen from nature and has developed his potentialities through history. H is aim is the "redem ption" o f the nature from which he has arisen. H egel believes that it is in philosophical thought that G o d and the w orld are "completed," exactly as "the elders” believed that m an w as the redeem er w ho m ust "save" nature and G od .

H egel's "stone," like Paracelsus’s, is triadic. H egel h im self has claim ed that the three m aterials o f mercury, sulphur, and salt represent the three m om ents o f the C oncept. Ju s t as each stage o f the alchem ical opus dies to the next, so each m om ent o f the dialectic is negated and is superceded by another: each m om ent contains the "seed" o f the Absolute, which bloom s in the end. Ju st as Paracelsus holds that poison is a part o f all things, so Hegel's account o f the w hole finds a place fo r and utilizes the negative. H egel's dialectic is a "m agical pow er that converts [the negative] into being." T h e dialectic is, o f course, a circle. Idea issues in nature, which issues in Sp irit, and Sp irit returns to Idea in the form o f A bsolute Sp irit or philosophical thought. T h e dove o f Sp irit em erges from a G od - created nature, and circles back to G od .

H egel adopts the triad ic preoccupation o f Paracelsus and others, but h is thought exh ib its a tension betw een triads and tetrads. Recall Ju n g s com m ents on the tension in alchem y betw een three and four. H egel identifies the m ercury, su lphur, and salt o f Paracelsus w ith the three m om ents o f the C on cep t, but as w e have also seen he conjoins Paracelsus's triad w ith the "v irg in earth" and then states th at the four represent the quadradicity o f nature. Ju n g notes that som etim es three o f the fo u r elem ents are grou ped together and the fourth separated o ff. T h is represents the tendency to regard three as the p rim ary m ystical num ber. In a sim ilar fash ion , H egel argues in the Philosophy o f Subjective Spirit that the five senses m ust be un derstood as three grou p s o f senses, because the C on cep t has only three m om ents! ( p s § 4 0 1, Z ; P etry 2 :16 7).

A lchem ical texts seem to have both literal and sym bolic levels. O n the one hand, they describe actual laboratory w ork involving the physical m anipulation and transform ation o f m atter— although these processes also seem to involve psychic or m agical operations as w ell. O n the other

212 Magnum Opus

hand, they seem to describe, in allegorical form , not the transform ation o f m atter, but the transform ation o f the spirit o f the alchem ist him self, a process leading to psychic health and integration and even to mystical insight. T h ere is a change in the alchem ists soul concom itant w ith a change in the retort. H egel can be seen as separating the spiritual and the physical com ponents o f alchemy, discarding the physical as a mere caput mortuum. H e has preserved the alchem ists'aim o f perfecting nature and com pleting G o d , but now the alchem ical opus w ill take place entirely in the soul o f m an. G o d w ill achieve com pletion through man's speculative activity.

A lthough the ultim ate consum m ation o f reality takes place in A bsolute Sp irit , this level is preceded by O bjective Sp irit , w hich is the subject o f chapter 7. W e shall see there that alchem ical im agery appears again, this rim e in the Philosophy of Right. In the fo llow ing section, how ever, I shall discuss som e aspects o f H egel’s doctrine o f Subjective Sp irit.

6 . Hegel on M esmerism and E SP

T h e Philosophy o f Subjective Sp irit is divided into A nthropology, P henom enology, and Psychology. A nthropology (like the other tw o) is itse lf d ivided into three subdivisions, which H egel sum m arizes as follow s:

Initially the So u l is—a) In its im m ediate natural determ inacy— the N atural Soul,

which only is;b) [T hen] it is Feeling So u l, entering as an individual into rela

tionship w ith its im m ediate being, w ith the determ inatenesses o f which it is abstractly for itself;

c) [Finally] it is Actual So u l, having this im m ediate being formed w ithin it as its corporeality (Leiblichkeit]. ( p s § 390; Perry 1:21)

I f H egel's account o f nature seem s calculated to disturb the “ hard- headed" man o f science, his Philosophy of Spirit seem s positively “ N ew Age." H egel treats N atural Sou l as the anitna mundi ( Wdtsccle; ps § 391; Petry 2:25): a universal soul o f nature that is divided up into the individual souls o f living beings. H egel refers to the soul as "an imm ediate, unconscious totality” ( p s § 4 4 0 , Z ; Petry 3:81) and as"the sleep o f Sp irit" ( p s § 389; Petry 3:3). K elly w rites that "At its deepest, pre-individual level, the soul is identical w ith the living unity or im m ediate concrete universality o f the cosm os. A s such, it is the W orld So u l (anima m undi).. . . It is through the soul that each individual participates in the life o f the cosm os.“9* H egel's theory o f N atural So u l is a direct consequence o f his treatm ent o f the Earth as a living organism .

T h e N atural So u l is, in effect, the Earth So u l, and all psychic activity ultim ately has its origin in a kind o f efflux o f the Earth . H egel writes that “ T h e S o u l is not only im m aterial fo r itself, rather it is the universal im m ateriality o f nature, its sim ple ideal life" ( p s § 389; Petry 2:3). And: “ T h e So u l is the all-pervasive [Allesdurchbringende], and is not sim ply that which exists in a particular individual” ( p s § 4 0 6 , Z ; Petry 2 :271).

96. Kelly, Individuation and the Absolute, 39.



A s to the W o rld -Sou ls relationship to individual souls, H egel states that “ It is the substance, that is to say the absolute basis o f all the particularizing and singularizing o f Sp irit, so that Sp irit has w ith in it all the m aterial o f its determ ination, and it rem ains the pervading identical ideality o f this determ ination" ( p s § 389; Petry 2:3).

W e are, H egel claim s, “ in ourselves a w orld o f concrete content w ith an infinite periphery and have w ith in us a m ultitude o f num berless relations and connections, w hich even i f it does not enter into our sensation and representation is always w ithin u s . . . . O n account o f its infinite w ealth o f content, the hum an soul may therefore be said to be the soul o f a world, the individually determ ined W orld-Soul [Weltseele]" ( p s §

402, Z ; Petry 2 :2 11). H egel w rites further that “Ju st as light disperses into an infinite m ultitude o f stars, so the universal Sou l o f nature d isperses into an infinite m ultitude o f individual souls, the only difference being that whereas light appears to have a subsistence independent o f the stars, it is on ly in individual souls that the universal So u l o f nature attains actuality" ( p s § 390, Z ; Petry 2:23).

Recall that during his association with Schelling and H ölderlin in T übin gen , H egel w as attracted to the pantheistic-Spinozistic ideal o f hen kai pan. H is reflections on the W orld So u l seem to suggest that H egel never entirely abandoned this ideal. In A nthropology, however, he explicitly rejects Pantheism w hile at the sam e tim e conceding, as one m ight expect, that it is not a bad place to begin:

O rganization and system rem ain entirely alien to pantheism . W here it appears in the form o f presentation it is a tum ultuous life, a bacchanalian intuition, for instead o f allow ing the single shapes o f the universe to em erge in order, it is perpetually plunging them back into the universal, veering into the sublim e and m onstrous. S till th is intuition is a natural point o f departure for every healthy breast [Brtuf]. Especially in yourh, through a life w hich ensouls us and all about us, w e feel kinship and sym pathy for the w hole o f nature, and we therefore have a sensation o f the W orld-Soul, o f the unity o f spirit and nature, o f the im m ateriality o f nature, ( p s § 389, Z ; Petry 2:9)

H egel believes that the N atural So u l bears w ithin it certain influences from its native climate and geography.’ 7 H egel w rites that “ In its su bstance, which is the N atural So u l, Sp irit lives w ith the universal planetary life, difference o f climates, the change o f the seasons, the various tim es o f day, etc. T h is natural life is only partly realized w ithin it, as certain turbid feelings [trüben Stimmungen]“ ( p s § 392; Petry 2:26). A s a result o f this, there are different form s o f So u l for different nations and peoples and races. H egel attem pts to characterize in general the Caucasian, N egroid and M ongoloid races, stating that “ It is in the Caucasian race that Sp irit first reaches absolute unity w ith itself,— It is here that it first enters into com plete opposition to naturalness [i.e., rises above the mere natural],

97. T h is conccption bears som e sim ilariry ro O etinger s views on the influence on the hum an soul o f pre-hum an eras and form s o f life. Sec Ernst Benz, The Theology o f Electricity, 55.

214 Magnum Opus


apprehends itself in its absolute independence, disengages from the d ispersive vacillation betw een one extrem e and the other, achieves self- determ ination, self-development, and so brings forth world history” ( p s § 393, Z ; Petry 2:57). Hegel points ou t, however, th a t given th a t all m en arc implicitly rational they possess equal rights, no m atter w hat level o f advancem ent their race may find itself a t ( p s § 393, Z ; Petry 3:45-47)*

Hegel goes on to discuss national differences, and his rem arks are interesting and perceptive, m uch like those o f K ant in his Anthropology

from a Pragmatic Point o f View (1798). Hegel discusses in greatest detail the Italians, Spaniards, French, English, and G erm ans. As is typical w ith G erm an au thors, his harshest rem arks are reserved for his fellow countrym en. Hegel, like K ant, accuses the G erm ans o f an extrem e formalism and o f an absurd preoccupation w ith rank and title ( p s § 394, Z ; Petry 2 :8 1-8 3). Hegel next has som e interesting things to say about character, for instance,“A Person w ithou t character will e ither fail to assum e detcr- m inateness o r shift from one direction to the opposite" ( p s § 395, Z ; Petry 2:9 1). H e holds th a t individual character is partly a p roduct o f the N atural Soul, and thus tem peram ent may be affected by the climate or position on the earth in to which one is born.

T he section on Feeling Soul is notable chiefly for its treatm ent o f extrasensory perception and anim al m agnetism , as well as m adness. We know th a t Hegel lectured on anim al m agnetism as early as 1805 in Jena. H egel m entions m esm erism as a cure for disease very briefly in the Philosophy o f Nature. H e states th a t "it is the finger-tips o f the m agnetizer [des Magnetiseurs] which fluidize the organism by conducting magnetism th roughou t the whole o f it. O nly sick persons can be m agnetized, and pu t to sleep by th is external means. Precisely considered, m agnetism is the collection o f the organism into its im plicit entirety" ( p .v § 373; Petry 3:207). In o th e r words, m agnetism can help to “re-integrate" an organism in w hich one o r m ore o f the parts is w orking against th e whole. As noted earlier, Hegel's trea tm en t o f anim al m agnetism in the Philosophy of Spirit falls under the “Feeling Soul" division o f Anthropology. As Petry notes, "T he trea tm en t o f anim al m agnetism is the m ost extensive and detailed exposition o f any one topic in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and one o f the mosr extensive expositions o f the whole Encyclopedia T h u s it was obviously a topic o f g reat im portance for Hegel. Before dealing in detail w ith Hegel's discussion o f anim al m agnetism — as well as o ther paranorm al phenom ena— I shall first briefly consider the background ro H egel’s inrerest in m agnetism : the history o f the subject, possible influences on Hegel, w hen he first form ulated his views, etc.

Franz A nton M esm er (17 3 3 -18 15 ) , a Sw abian physician, discovered that passing m agnets or m agnetized objects over the bodies o f patients often seem ed to have a curative e ffect.* So o n he found that he could achieve the sam e effect sim ply by passing his hands over his patients and

98. Petry, introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, vol. 1, Iviii.99. Paracelsus w as apparently the first to study the healing powers o f magnets.Recently the idea has bccome fashionable again. See Benz, Theology o f Electricity ^ -



lulling them into a trancelike state. T h is latter technique w as also referred to as m agnetism — though it w as often called m esm erism , solar- ism , and tellurism — and is today alm ost universally referred to as h yp notism . H egel refers to the relationship between the m esm erist and his subject as "m agicaT ( p s § 4 0 6 , Z; Petry 2:299). M esm er m ade h is techniques know n in Paris in the 1770s. In 178 4 a French royal com m ission led by none other than Benjam in Franklin investigated M esm er's claim s and declared them absolutely w ithout foundation. T h is did not stop patients (particularly w om en) from flocking to M esm er's salon. C elebrities like M ozart took an interest in M esm er’s w ork .100 By this tim e, M esm er had developed his ow n technology, chiefly represented by the baquet. A ccording to H egel, "T h is consists o f a vessel, w ith iron rods w hich are touched by the persons to be m agnetized, and constitutes the interm ediary betw een them and the m agnetizer" ( p s § 406, Z ; Petry, 2:297).

Scientific respectability, however, continued to elude M esm er. In 1812 things began to change. T h e Prussian governm ent took an interest in m esm erism and set up a com m ission to study it. T h e G erm an s proved m ore receptive than the French, and a num ber o f sym pathetic and open- m inded studies began appearing, m ost o f which M esm er did not live to see.101 Before long m esm erism becam e academ ically respectable. T h e re fore, H egel w as not risking censure by discussing it.

Sch ellin g w as the first am ong the G erm an idealists to develop an enthusiasm for m esm erism . In a letter to H egel dated Jan u ary 1 1 ,18 0 7 , Schelling discusses certain experim ents concerning m etal and water d ivin ing and pendulum s. H e recom m ends that H egel perform these experim ents him self, w riting that "It is an actual m agic incident to the hum an being, no anim al is able to do it. M an actually breaks forth as a sun am ong other beings, all o f which are his planets.''1* Schelling fo llow ed up w ith a letter dated M arch 22:

A s for the experim ents about which I w rote you recently, things are nonetheless continuing to progress and prove indeed correct. [T he Italian peasant dow ser Francesco] C am p ettis superior strength perm its its em ploym ent in a m anner excluding all illusion. T h in sheets o f tin — as likew ise broad and heavy plates o f m etal— revolve w ith the greatest regularity when placed on his index or m iddle finger. W h at is m ost profound in the m atter is the undeniably nonm echanical, m agical influence o f the w ill, o r o f even the m ost fleeting thought, on these experim ents. T h e pendulum — like the [divining) rod— behaves ju s t like a muscle activated by free

100 . Ibid., 2 1; Benz w rites:"It is interesting to note that som e M ozart com positions for glass harm onica were written for M esm er, w ho had introduced M ozart to this instrum ent at his house “10 1. Sec for example, C . A . F. Kluge, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus (Berlin : Salfeld, 18 11; 2nd ed. 1816, 3rd ed. 1818); C . C . W olfart, Mesmerismus oder System der Wethselwirkungen (A m sterdam : Bonset, 1966), and E rlaiiterungen zum Mesmerismus (Berlin : N ikolaischen, 1815).102. Q uoted in Petry, Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, vol. 2, 517.

2 16 Magnum Opus


w ill, ju st as m uscles on the other hand are veritable divining rods which oscillate now outw ard— extensors— and now inw ard— flexors."”

In the sam e letter, Schelling suggested to H egel that he consult an article by his brother K arl on anim al m a g n e t i s m . K arl Eberhard Schelling (178 3-18 54 ) w as trained as a physician. In Jen a in 18 0 1-2 he attended som e o f H egel’s classes. In 1805 he settled in Stuttgart as a gen eral practitioner, where he published a revised and expanded version o f his thesis “ Ü ber das Leben und seine Erscheinung.” In this w ork, K arl Schelling advanced a theory o f life that involved a W orld Sou l p artition ing itse lf into individual souls. H is treatm ent o f the aether, sleep, d isease, and death is also rem iniscent o f H egel's.1“ In 1821, H egel's sister C hristianne came under the care o f Schelling. Sh e had been forced to quit her jo b as a governess in 1814 due to a nervous disorder. For a short tim e she had even com m itted herself to an asylum . O n leaving it, she returned to Stuttgart. H egel, o f course, recom m ended that C hristianne be treated by Schelling, w ho apparently did so w ithout recom pense. It is likely that the treatm ents included“m agnetic” or m esm eric therapy.

H egel shared the Schelling brothers' enthusiasm for anim al m agnetism and the paranorm al. In an 1810 letter to van G h ert, H egel w rites:

I w as very interested to hear that you are occupying you rself w ith anim al m agnetism . To me this dark region o f the organic conditions seem s to m erit great attention because, am ong other reasons, ord inary physiological opinions here vanish. It is precisely the sim plicity o f animal magnetism which I hold to be m ost n otew orth y.. . . Its operation seem s to consist in the sym pathy into which one anim al individuality is capable o f entering w ith a second, insofar as the sym pathy o f the first w ith itself, its fluidity in itself, is interrupted and hindered. T h a t [sym pathetic] union [o f tw o organism s] leads life back again into its pervasive universal stream . T h e general idea I have o f the m atter is that the m agnetic state belongs to the sim ple universal life, a life which thus behaves and generally m anifests itse lf as a sim ple soul, as the scent o f life in general undifferentiated into particular system s, organs, and their specialized activities.1"'

H egel's letter is a response to van G h e r ts letter, dated Ju n e 2 2 ,18 10 , in w hich he described how he had been experim enting w ith anim al m agnetism on a relative for six m onths. Van G h e rt asks H egel to rem ind him about his (H egel's) th eory o f anim al m agnetism , “w hich you provided us w ith in the P h ilosoph y o f N atu re and w hich I have forgotten ."“” Van G h e rt w as H egel's student at Jen a in 18 0 4 -6 . A s we shall see, H egel’s view s on anim al m agnetism sum m arized in the quote

103. Q uoted in Butler, 78.104 . K arl Sch ellin g ,"Ideen und Erfahrungen über den tierschen M agnetism u s“ Jahrbücher für Medizin als Wissenschaft 2 (1807): 1 - 4 2 ; 158-90 .105. See Petry-, Hegels Philosophy of Spirit, vo l. 2, 562.106. Butler, 590; H offm eister * 16 6 . In the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel mentions van G hert's work on animal magnetism , along w ith that o f the alchem ist J . B. van H elm ont (ps 40 6 , Z ; Petry 2 :30 3-7 ).10 7 . Q uoted in Perry, Hegel's Philosophy o f Spirit, vol. 2, 560.



above are identical to the views later expressed in th e m ature Philosophy o f Subjective Spirit, proving th a t H egel’s in terest in the top ic dates back a t least to Jena and th a t his views on it rem ained fairly constant. Van G h e rt published tw o w orks on anim al m agnetism — Dagboek der magnetische Behandeling van M ejufvrouw B*** ( 18 14 ) , and Mnemosyne, o f aanteekeningen van merkwaardige verschijnsels van het animalisch magnet■ ismus ( 18 15 )— b o th o f w hich H egel read, adm ired , and m entioned in his lectures (e.g. p s § 4 0 6 ; Perry 2:303).

In an 1818 letter to V ictor C ousin , w ritten w hile H egel w as a professor in H eidelberg, H egel states that "I have w ritten a letter to H err [Adam K arl] Eschenm ayer on your behalf. A philosopher, he is above all a friend o f anim al m agnetism .""“ (In the sam e letter, H egel m entions that he will be m oving to Berlin the fo llow ing fall.) It is interesting to note that w hile in H eidelberg, H egel sat in on m esm eric and spiritualist s ittings (or “seances”) w ith his friend Franz Jo s e f Schelver."* W hile in Berlin , H egel borrow ed a book on the h istory o f w itchcraft and som nam bulism from his teaching assistant Friedrich W ilhelm C arove.110 D urin g the sam e period, he also excerpted an essay by D . G . K ieser on “second sight.’’1“

Hegel th inks th a t for m agnetism to take place it is necessary th a t the will o f the m agnetizer be stronger than th a t o f the patient. H egel writes th a t “T h e main feature o f th is magical relationship is th a t a subject w orks upon an individual inferior to it in respect o f freedom and independence o f w ill .. . . It is for th is reason th a t strong m en are especially adept a t m agnetizing female persons" ( p s § 4 0 6 , Z ; Petry 2 :2 9 9 -30 1). In explaining rhis phenom enon, Hegel introduces the concept o f the genius (G e m u i) :"B y genius we are to understand the determ ining particularity o f man, th a t which, in all situations and relationships, decides his action and his fate" ( p s § 405; Petry 2:239). T h e genius is the "control” function o f the individual.“* In certain circum stances a m ans genius can actually become someone else, as in m esm erism .

As I have already noted, Hegel regards the relationship betw een the m esm erist and subject as "magical.” Hegel explains th a t this w ord is applied to "a relationship o f inner to ou ter o r to som ething else generally, which dispenses w ith m ediation. A power is magical w hen its operation is no t determ ined by the connectedness, the conditions and m ediations o f objective relationships” ( p s § 4 0 5 , Z ; Petry 2 :22 7 ). In chapter 3, I briefly m entioned K. J. H . W indischm ann, a theologian w ho was engaged in the study o f magic, and w ith w hom H egel corresponded. As

108. Butler, 633; H offm eisrer *344-109 . H elm ut Schneider,"D reiecks-Sym bolik," 74.110 . H offm eister, vol. 2, 243.in . H egel, Berliner Schriften, ed. J . H offm eisrer (H am burg: Felix M einer, 1956), 6 9 1-9 2 .112 . A ccording to Petry,"In Hegel's day,'G enie' w as applied to Leonardo da V inci, M ichael Angelo, M ozart, etc .,'G en iu s' to the atm osphere o f a locality, tutelary spirits, D escartes' dem on, etc." See Petry, Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, vol. 2, 496.

218 Magnum Opus


I discussed in chapter 3, H egel was sym pathetic to W indischm anns studies o f m agic. Further on in the Philosophy of Spirit, H egel w rites that “ Absolute magic w ould be the magic o f sp irit as such. Sp irit also subjects general objects to a magical infection, acts m agically upon another sp irit" (ps § 4 0 5 , Z ; Petry 2 :2 2 9 ) ." ' In private notes w ritten in 18 2 0 -2 2 , H egel m akes reference to the occultist Jean Baptiste van H elm ont 1 5 7 7 - 16 4 4 , father o f the alchem ist and Rosicrucian Francis M ercury van H elm ont (sec chapter 1), in connection w ith w itchcraft and magic.

O n the surface, it appears that all H egel has in m ind by “magic," and by the “m agic" o f m agnetism , is sim ply psychological control. A s w e have seen, he speaks about m agnetism being m ade possible by the strong- w illed controlling the w eak-w illed. H egel also speaks in the sam e con text about various other kinds o f “ influence” that people can have on one another, none o f w hich seem s overtly “occult” or traditionally “magical." H egel states thar the m ost“unm ediated” kind o f magic that there is consists in the control that our m ind has over our body. Again, it seem s that there is nothing particularly "paranorm al" here. T h o se w ho m ight be em barrassed by H egel's interest in m esm erism w ill probably breathe a sigh o f relief: A t least he does not really believe in m agic! T h e y will be disappointed, however.

H egel refers to the relationship o f m other to child as a "m agic tie" ( p s

§ 4 0 5 ; Petry 2 :223). l n discussing the effects a m other can have on the unborn child , H egel distinguishes between organic (organische) and p sy chic (psychische) causes. H is use o f "psychic" seem s to be identical to our use o f the term to refer to a supernatural influence o f the m ind, as the follow ing lines bear out: “O ne hears, for exam ple, o f children com ing into the w orld w ith an injured arm , cither bccause the m other had actually broken hers or at least had knocked it so severely that sh e feared she had done so, or indeed on account o f her having been frightened by the sight o f som eone else’s broken arm " ( p s § 4 0 5 , Z ; Petry 2 :237). H egel evinces no skepticism about such reports. H e goes on to give exam ples o f clairvoyance, dow sing, “ rem ote view ing" (as it would be called today), and even o f a m an w ho could read w ith his stom ach! ( p s § 4 0 6 , Z ; Petry 2 :26 7 ). H egel allows that frauds do exist, but he seem s to regard his anecdotes as well-authenticated. In one am using exam ple, H egel tells how the arch-rationalist Friedrich N icolai, looking dow n his street one day, had a vision in which he seem ed to see not the actual houses that were there, but structures which had stood there at som e earlier time. H egel dryly notes that "T h e predom inantly physical basis o f the poetic illusion o f th is otherw ise entirely prosaic individual becam e apparent through its being dispelled by the application o f lecches to his rectum" ( p s § 4 0 6 ; Perry 2:269 ).

H egel thought that m esm erism (and, by im plication, other sorts o f "supernatural" phenom ena) w as now thoroughly understood, and that

113. In Six Mystical Points (Point 5, § 1), Böhm e w rites that "M agic is the m other o f eternity, o f the being o f all beings; for it creates itself, and is understood in desire.“



no new data w ere likely to arise ( p s § 40 6 ; Petry 2:303). H e believed th a t the U nderstanding (o r "finite thought") is incapable o f com prehending supernatural phenom ena precisely because, as he pu t it in his le tter to van G hert, "ordinary physiological opinions here vanish.” T he U nderstanding insists on a m echanistic explanation and refuses to believe in the existence o f any k ind o f unm ediated causal relationship— and that, recall, is exactly w hat a "magical" relationship is for Hegel. In o ther words, the U nderstanding is faulty because, am ong o ther things, it does not believe in magic. Hegel w rites th a t "In the experience o f anim al m agnetism . . . it is w ithin th is very region o f external appearances th a t the U nderstandings connection betw een causes and effects, w ith its condition o f spatial and tem poral determ inations, loses its validity, and in sensuous determ inate being itself, together w ith its conditionality, th a t the higher natu re o f Sp irit makes itself effective and becom es apparen t” ( p s

§ Ein Fragment zur Philosophic des Geistes, 18 2 2-25 ; Petry 1:99). Hegel w rites, further, th a t com prehension o f m agnetism and psychic phenom ena is impossible, "in so far as one presupposes personalities independent o f one ano ther and o f the conten t o f an objective w orld, and assum es spatial and m aterial jux taposition to be generally absolute" ( p s § 406; Petry 2:253).

In the introduction to the Philosophy o j Spirit, H egel w rites that "In recent tim es, especially in the case o f anim al m agnetism , the substantial unity o f the soul and the pow er o f its ideality have even becom e apparent as a m atter o f experience. T h is has discredited all the rigid d istin ctions draw n by the U nderstanding, and it has becom e im m ediately obvious that i f contradictions are to be resolved, a speculative consideration is necessary" ( p s § 379; Petry 1:15 ). H egel s "speculative consideration" consists in m aintaining that in psychic states Sp irit sinks dow n into identity w ith the "feeling subjectivity" o f the So u l. In other w ords, in psychic states such as precognition or telepathy a regression to a subrational, "natural” state is involved (th is w ould be m ost evident in the case o f a trance state).

By leaving behind intellect and individuality, w e lose ourselves in a prim ordial oneness w ith all th ings and are thus capable o f "rapping into" lines o f connection o f which w e are not ordinarily, consciously aw are.” 4 Phenom ena such as m ind-reading or rem ote view ing become possible in such a state. H egel is quick to point out, however, that p sychic states are not a "h igher” faculty or level o f Sp irit . In fact, they involve a descent into the lowest depths o f Sp irit. H ence H egel's suggestion that psychic phenom ena are much m ore prevalent in rural areas, under prim itive conditions, such as in the Scottish H ighlands ( p s § 40 6 , Z ; Petry 2:287). H egel also points out that, although psychic phenom ena are rem arkable, they are usually unreliable and useless. D ream s

114 . Sean K elly argues that here H egel has com e close yet again to Jun g ’s “collective unconscious'* and especially his theory o f “synchronicity" (Kelly, Individuation and the Absolute, 50 -52).

220 M agnum Opus


som etim es present porten ts, bu t also m uch else th a t is meaningless, and so they are no t reliable guides to action. T h e ability to levitate a teacup using the power o f m ind alone is rem arkable, bu t m uch m ore difficult th an simply lifting the cup w ith ones hand.

N evertheless, given the natu re o f dialectic, we m ight expect th a t in som e way the highest level o f Spirit will be a "return" to and sublation o f this, the lowest. Philosophy will "circle back" to psychic phenom ena. T h is is indeed the case. In the in troduction to the Philosophy of Spirit, H egel w rites th a t, in m agnetism , "spirit visibly liberates itself from the lim its o f tim e and space and from all finite connections, and the p h e nom ena have, therefore, som ething o f an affinity w ith philosophy" ( p s §

379 ; Petry 1:2 3). Hegel w rites later th a t space pertains to external natu re no t to the Soul, and th a t w hen external natu re is apprehended by th e Soul, "it ceases to be spatial, for it is no longer external e ither to itself o r us once the ideality o f the Soul has transform ed it. C onsequently, w hen free and understand ing consciousness sinks in to th a t form o f the Soul which is mere feeling, the subject is no longer bound to space" (ps § 4 0 6 , Z ; Petry 2 :2 7 7 ). Hegel goes on to speak similarly regarding tim e.

T h e im plication here is that in order to understand psychic states we m ust not regard the So u l as spatially distinct from the world. Further, in psychic states So u l and w orld overlap. T h is happens when w e sink into a certain prim itive m ode o f being, but it also happens when we achieve philosophical understanding, when the world really docs cease to be "external cither to itse lf or us once the ideality o f the So u l has transform ed it." Psychic states are a fleeting, unreliable, fundam entally subconscious and subrational w ay in which the subject-object division is overcom e and the w orld is made ou r ow n. In philosophy, we can achieve, consciously, a state in which we rise above space and tim e, and in which external relation or"otherness" is canceled. W ith philosophy, and in general w ith the hum an project o f rem aking the given, the world becom es no longer other but rather that which is understood and willed. H egel w rites that "It is true that the hum an Spirit is able to raise itse lf above knowledge concerncd exclusively with the singularity o f w hat is sensuously present, but it is on ly in the C onceptual cognition o f the eternal that this elevation is ab so lu te .. . . In the m agnetic state, however, there can be no m ore than a conditioned rising above knowledge o f w hat is im m ediately present" ( p s § 406, Z ; Petry 2 :28 1-83). In short, philosophy is a higher type o f magic. In Hegel's ow n w ords, philosophy is "absolute magic,""the m agic o f Sp irit as such."

It is interesting to com pare H egel's understanding o f m agic with Bohm e’s. In Six Mystical Points (1620), Bohm e w rites that "M agic is the m other o f eternity, o f the being o f all beings; for it creates itself, and is understood in d e s ire .. . . It is in itse lf nothing but a w ill, and this will is the great m ystery o f all w onders and sccrcrs, but brings itse lf by the im agination o f the desireful hunger into b e in g .. . . In M agic are all form s o f the Being o f all beings.’’ 11* A s w e have seen, H egel holds merely



th a t magic is action o f one th ing on ano ther th a t is unm cdiated (so, for example, th e control o f the m ind over the body is "magical," because there is no th ird th ing acting as interm ediary). T h is is obviously a much th inner conception o f magic than w hat Böhm e has explained. N evertheless, there is a parallelism betw een Böhm es magic and w hat I have called the “high magic" o f the dialectic itself.

N ote th a t Böhme says th a t magic "creates itself.” As we have seen, the speculative philosopher does no t create o r invent the dialectic; instead it unfolds itself before him (and th is is why there is no distinction betw een form and conten t). Further, Böhme claims th a t in th is self- creating magic are “all form s o f the Being o f all beings," which should rem ind us o f the Logic. Böhme also refers to the "first Magia" as "G od in his triad.’’114 T h is is a reference to the initial dialectic o f sour-sweet- bitter, o f G od in H im self. Böhme is treating his ow n proto-dialectic o f the"source-spirits" as a kind o f high magic. Finally, and m ost strik ing o f all, Böhm e refers to magic as th a t "which makes w ithin itself w here there is nothing; which makes som ething ou t o f nothing."117 T h is comes close to Hegel's treatm ent o f magic as an unm ediated act, an act em ploying no m edium o r m atter or "raw material." T he dialectic o f the Logic is precisely such a creation o f som ething (Etwas) ou t o f no th ing (Nichts). O n B öhm es term s, Voegelin’s trea tm en t o f H egel as a magician becomes quite plausible.

115. Sue Mystical Points, Point 5, §§ 1-6 .116 . Ibid.117 . Mysterium Pansophicum,“ D cr Erste Text," in N icolcscu, an .

222 Magnum Opus


Chapter Seven 223

" T h e Rose in the Cross o f the Present "

H egel's Ph ilosophy o f O bjective and A bsolute Sp irit

Between Eternal Birth, Restoration from the Fall and the discovery o f the Philosophers Stone there is no difference.

—Jakob Böhme, D e Signature Rerum

j. Introduction

A ccording to H egel, O bjective and A bsolute Sp irit constitute a man- made w orld that stands in opposition to mere nature. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, H egel states,'A fter the creation o f the natural universe, man appears on the scene as the antithesis o f nature; he is the being w ho raises h im self up into a second w orld” (N isbet, 4 4 ; v ie , 50). O bjective Sp irit is the Absolute Idea as em bodied in hum an history, culture, and social institutions. Absolute Sp irit is the Absolute Idea expressed in art, religion, and philosophy. Absolute Sp irit is the highest form in which the Idea realizes itself. In O bjective Sp irit, we seek to approach the A bsolute through social institutions and practices, but these arc not the proper m edium for its em bodim ent. In art we strive to represent the Idea sensuously, and it attains greater "objective presence" than it does through social practices. In religion we strive to make ou rselves at one w ith the Idea, which is again approached in representational or im agistic form . Bur these media are not adequate either. For H egel it is not enough sim ply to change the w orld or to change our selves. W e m ust interpret the w orld , and ourselves. A n d the proper medium for this interpretation is philosophy. T h e philosopher recognizes Idea in the world and "returns” it to the pure aether o f thought, w hile all the time rem aining a being in the world. Philosophy is the highest form o f Absolute Sp irit, for in it the self-thinking thought o f Absolute Idea (or G o d ) is finally realized in the world.

2. Hegel’s Philosophy o f Religion: The Influence o f Mysticism

K arl Löw ith w rites that "F o r an understanding o f H egel’s system , his philosophy o f religion is even m ore im portant than his philosophy o f the state. It is not ju s t one com ponent o f the w hole system , but its sp iritual center o f gravity."1 H egel's theology is essentially B ö h mean in its

1. K arl Löw ith , From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, trans. David E . G reen (N ew York: Colum bia University Press, 1964), 47.


developm ental conception o f G o d . T h e Logic represents G o d "in H im self." G o d expresses H im se lf through the form s o f nature, but only returns to H im se lf and achieves self-know ing through Sp irit , through hum an know ing. T h e philosopher thus serves to "actualize" or "com plete" G o d . Because G o d qua A bsolute Idea (G o d in H im se lf) is conceived o f as abstract and lacking realization in the world, it fo llow s that G o d s progressive w orld ly incarnation involves a progressive increase in “concreteness" or "em bodim ent." In the Lectures on the Philosophy oj Religion, H egel states that "Sp irit is in the m ost concrete sense. T h e absolute or highest being belongs to it” ( lp r 1 :14 2 ) . T h is aspect o f H egel’s thought is strikingly sim ilar to O etinger s theory o f Geistleiblichkeit, d iscussed in chapter 2. In the Lectures, H egel refers to G o d as "the absolute substance," but then goes on, ju s t as in the Phenomenology, to identify substance w ith subject ( l p r 1 :3 7 0 ) . W h at th is means is sim ply that G o d becomes absolute substance as Sp irit. Sp irit is the “m ystical b o d y "o f G o d on earth /

In the Philosophy of Right, H egel states that "T h e content o f religion is absolute truth , and consequently the religious is the m ost sublim e o f all d ispositions" (K n o x, p r § 2 7 0 ; 16 5 -6 6 ) . Speculative philosophy, H egel insists, is not hostile to religious belief: "nothing is fu rth er from its intention than to overthrow religion, i.e., to assert that the content o f religion cannot for itself be the truth." In other w ords, religion on its ow n, w ithout the "assistance” o f ph ilosophy is absolute truth . H egel states that "religion is precisely rhe true content but in the form o f rep resentation, and philosophy is not the first to offer the substantive truth . H um anity has not had to aw ait ph ilosophy in order to receive for the first tim e the consciousness or cognition o f truth" ( l p r 1 :2 5 1) . H um anity, then, can receive the truth through religion alone, w ithout the need for ph ilosop h y."R elig ion is fo r everyone,” H egel claim s, unlike philosophy w hich is for the few ( l p r 1 :18 0 ) . P h ilosoph y and religion have the sam e content. H egel explicitly identifies the m om ents o f the Idea— Being, Essence, C on cep t— w ith the H o ly Trinity. T h e fact that religion expresses truth in the form o f representation does not mean that H egel denigrates or rejects it. N evertheless, H egel holds that in p h ilosophy the truth is expressed in a m ore adequate form , the form o f pure thought.

H egel believed that the truth has always been an unconscious possession o f m ankind. It has expressed itse lf in different form s, at different tim es, and through different th inkers. T h e philosopher "recollects” this unconscious w isdom and expresses it in a fully adequate form . T h is interpretation is supported by H egel's rem arks in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. H egel refers to religions as "sprouting up fortuitously, like the flowers and creations o f nature, as foreshadow ings, im ages, representations, w ithout [our] know ing w here they com e from or w here they are going to" (l p r 1 :19 6 ; v p r 1 :10 6 ) . H egel states that "R elig ion is a begetting o f the divine spirit, not an invention o f hum an beings but an

2. S ee O 'R eg an , The Heterodox Hegel, 274 -75 .

224 Magnum Opus


effect o f the divine at w ork, o f the divine productive process w ithin hum anity” ( l p r 1:130 ; v p r 1:46).

H egel does not, however, regard all religions as equally adequate expressions o f eternal truth. H e claim s that C hristian ity is the “Absolute R eligion” (e.g., l p r 1:112 ; v p r 1:29). H egel claim s that "G o d has revealed H im se lf through the C hristian religion; that is, he has granted m ankind the possib ility o f recognizing his nature, so that he is no longer an im penetrable m ystery” (N isbet, 4 0 ; v ie , 45). C hristian ity has penetrated the m ystery o f G o d by revealing his nature as triune. H egel takes issue w ith theologians and clergy w h o hold that m ankind cannot know G o d , or w h o consider the attem pt to know G o d as im pious or hubristic. H egel claim s not only that such know ledge is possible, but that it is our highest duty to obtain it (N isb et, 36; v ie , 4 0 ; also l p r 1:88). "G o d does not w ish to have narrow -m inded and em pty-headed children," H egel states (N isb et 42; v ie , 47)*

For H egel, know ing G o d is our highest duty because G o d only fully exists in the com m unity o f w orshippers. H egel holds that “G od's Sp irit is essentially in his com m unity; G o d is Spirit only insofar as G o d is in his com m unity" ( l p r 1:164 ; vpr 1:74). A n d :“ T h e concept o f G o d is G od 's idea, [namely,] to becom e and make H im se lf objective to him self. T h is is contained in G o d as Sp irit: G o d is essentially in H is com m unity and has a com m unity; H e is objective to H im self, and is such truly only in self-consciousness [so that] G od 's very ow n highest determ ination is self-consciousness." Beforehand, G o d is “ incomplete,” Hegel says ( l p r 1:186 -8 7 ; v p r 1:96). H e refers to the com m unity o f worshippers as the cultus."In the cultus " H egel writes, “the form al consciousness frees itse lf from the rest o f its consciousness and becomes consciousness o f its essence; the cultus consists in the consciousness that G o d knows H im self in the hum an being and the hum an being know s itse lf in G o d ” ( l p r 1:181; v p r 1:90). Hegel refers to the cultus as involving "the mystical attitude, the unio m ystica" ( l p r 1:180; v p r 1:89). H e describes the cultus in his lecture m anuscript as “the eternal relationship, the eternal process [o f knowing] in which the subject posits itse lf as identical with its essence" ( l p r 1:193; vpr 1:102).*

H egel's claim that G o d is dependent on the cultus, and his view o f the union o f G o d and m an in the cultus, are strikingly sim ilar to M eister E ck h arts m ysticism . In fact, the only place H egel quotes E ckhart is in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion:“ T h e eye w ith which G o d sees me is the eye w ith w hich I see H im ; m y eye and H is eye are one and the sam e. In righteousness I am w eighed in G o d and H e in me. I f G o d did not exist nor w ould I; i f I d id not exist nor would H e. But there is no need to kn ow this, for there are things that are easily m isunderstood (and that can be grasped only in the concept)” ( l p r 1 :3 4 7 - 4 8 ; v p r 1 :2 4 8 ). A s noted before, this is actually a "quilt quotation” made up o f lines from several o f E ck h arts serm ons (certainly the reference to "the concept” looks suspiciously like an H egelian interpolation).4 In serm on 12—

3. T h e w ords "o f know ing" were inserted by H egel in the margin.4 - See O ’R egan,“ Hegelian Philosophy o f Religion and Eckhartian Mysticism."

"T h e Rose in the C ross” 225

Copyrigh

which seems to be one o f the texts Hegel was draw ing from — Eckhart rem arks th a t “W hen all creatures pronounce H is name, G od comes into being.”

In the w inter o f 18 2 3-2 4 , H egel w as actively discussing E ckh arts ideas w ith Franz von Baader.4 Baader h im self has left us a record o f w hat w as perhaps the first o f the occasions on which they m et: "I w as often w ith H egel in Berlin . O nce I read him a passage from M eister Eckhart, w ho w as only a name to him . H e was so excited by it that the next day he read me an entire lecture on Eckhart, and at the end said: 'T h ere , indeed, w e have w hat w e w ant!'[D a haben w ir esja , was wir wollcn)"6 In 18 2 3 -2 4 , H egel w as, o f course, preparing his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in which the Eckhart reference appears. A s I have said, H egel offers only one quote from Eckhart and discusses him very briefly, so the "entire lecture on E ckhart” m entioned by Baader probably refers to the entire H egelian discussion o f religion in which the E ckhart passage occurs, and w hich Baader apparently m istook (not surprisingly) for a lecture on Eckhartian m ysticism .

A s further evidence o f the "Eckhartian ism " o f H egel's philosophy o f religion, consider the follow ing quotations. In the Encyclopedia H egel states that "G o d is G o d only insofar as he know s H im self: this self- know ledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man’s knowledge o f G o d , which becom es man's self-know ledge in G o d ” (p s § 56 4 ; W allace, 298). E lsew here, H egel rem arks that "In so far as the individual man is at the sam e tim e received into the unity o f the divine essence, he is theobject o f the C hristian religion, w hich is the m ost trem endous dem and th a t may be m ade upon him" ( p n § 2 4 7 , Z ; Petry 1 :2 0 5 - 6 ) . Finally, R osenkranz quotes a fragm ent from H egel’s m anuscripts (probably w ritten no t later than 18 0 4 ) in which Hegel states th a t "the history of G od is the history o f the whole race."7 Hegel's philosophy o f religion is from the beginning indebted to E ckharts mysticism.

H egel does no t consider his views to be so "m ystical” o r "speculative'’ as to be alien to the ordinary believer, however. In fact, he holds th a t his way o f looking at G od and religion are m uch closer to real religion than to w hat was called in his tim e "rational theology" ( lp r 1 :12 9 ; v p r 1:45)* W e have seen th a t Hegel does no t believe religion to be dependent on philosophy, bu t he does claim the reverse, th a t philosophy depends on religion. H e w rites th a t "It is the distinctive task o f philosophy to transm ute the content th a t is in the representation o f religion in to th e form o f thought; the conten t [itself] cannot be distinguished” ( l p r 1:333; v p r

1:235). T h e philosopher first encounters the conten t o f absolute tru th in religion. Indeed, H egel holds th a t before C hristianity arrived on the scene it w ould have been im possible for philosophy to present absolute tru th in a fully adequate or com plete form.

5. Ibid., 250.6. See N icolin , Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen, 261. It is, o f course, not true that Eckhart w as "only a name" to Hegel in 18 2 3-2 4 . A ccording to H . S . H arris, H cgcl m ay have been fam iliar with Eckhart as early as 1795 (Toward the Sunlight, 230).7 . Rosenkranz, Hfgeh Leben, 138.

226 Magnum Opus


T h e philosopher depends, then, not only on the com m unity but specifically on the religious com m unity. Speculative philosophy cannot be done in a vacuum : it requires a certain social and historical context. A ll his life H egel claim ed to be a pious Lutheran. T h e tem ptation is to take th is claim as d isingenuous, as the heretical ph ilosop h er a ttem p ting to cover his tracks to avoid the fate o f Fichte and m any others. O nce it is realized, however, that H egel's philosophy o f religion originates ou t o f the Eckhartian , Böhm ean, O etingerire-influenced Lutheranism o f W ü rttem b erg , his claim can be seen as sincere. H egel’s brand o f Lutheranism would have been nothing unusual to his fellow Sw abians.6

3. Hegel's Philosophy o f H istory: The Influence o f Isaac Luria and Jewish Eschatology

H egel's philosophy o f w orld history' is shaped entirely by his com m itm ent ro C hristian ity. In the last chapter I described how H egel believes that in studying nature we assum e that our object m ust have an un derlying rational structure. H egel takes the sam e approach w ith history. H e states that "w orld h istory is governed by an ultim ate design, that is a rational process— w hose rationality is not that o f a particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason— this is a proposition w hose truth we m ust assum e; its p ro o f lies in the study o f w orld h istory itself, which is the image and enactm ent o f re a so n .. . . W orld h istory is m erely a m anifestation o f this one original reason; it is one o f the particular form s in w hich reason reveals itself, a reflection o f the archetype in a particular elem ent, in the life o f nations" (N isb et, 28; v ie , 30 ). H egel claim s fu rther that w e are com pelled to ask w hether "beneath the superficial din and clam our o f history, there is not perhaps a silent and m ysterious inner process at w ork, w hereby the energy o f all phenom ena is con served" (N isb et, 33; v ig , 36).

In the context o f the philosophy o f w orld history, H egel uses the term World Spirit ( Weltgeist). In the Encyclopedia Logic he describes the W orld Sp irit along the lines o f Plato’s dem iurge as a "m aster w orkm an” constructing itself through history ( e l § 13; G eraets, 31). H e likens the W orld Sp irit elsewhere to the "true M ercury (= H erm es],’’ w ho is "the leader o f nations" (N isbet, 31; v ig , 3 3 ) ."T h e w orld Spirit," H egel states, "is the spirit o f the world as it reveals itse lf through the hum an consciousness; the relationship o f men to it is that o f single parrs to rhe w hole w hich is their substance. A n d this W orld Sp irit corresponds to rhe D ivine Spirit, which is the Absolute Spirit. Since G o d is om nipresent. H e is present in everyone and appears in everyone's consciousness; and this is the W orld Sp irit" (N isbet, 5 2 -5 3 ; v ig , 6 0 ).

Perhaps the m ost fam ous concept in H egel's philosophy o f w orld h istory is that o f the "cunning o f reason" (List der Vernunft). T h is is the "m echanism ” w hereby the W orld Sp irit m akes use o f the shortsighted

8. To be sure, Hegel held some views that w ould be "heretical" even by the standards o f Sw abian speculative Pietism . For instance, he rejected belief in personal im m ortality and held instead that human beings only achieve a measure o f im m ortality insofar as they achieve wisdom and see into the eternal (see l p r 3:304 ; v p r 3:227-28).

"T h e Rose in the Cross" 227


passions and aim s o f particular men to bring about its universal p u rposes (see N isbet, 89; v i g , 105). T h e 'cu n n in g o f reason" bears som e sim ilarity to S m ith s "invisible hand,” and o f course, to the concept o f divine providence. H egel h im self draw s attention to the latter parallel. "C h ris tians," he says, “are initiated into the m ysteries o f G o d , and th is also su pplies us w ith the key to w orld history. For w e have here a definite k n ow ledge o f providence and its plan” (N isb et, 4 1; v i g , 46 ). W h at can H egel mean by this claim ? H o w does C hristian ity supply a key to w orld h istory i T h e answ er is surprising, and it involves yet another connection to a heterodox C hristian thinker. I w ill deal w ith H egel's debt to this thinker, Joach im de Fiore, in section 3. It is to Joachim that w e m ust trace H egel's notorious doctrine o f the “end o f history." T here are orher influences on H egel's eschatology, however. In this section I w ill first look to the influence— direct and indirect— o f m ystical Judaism .

O etinger remarks in one o f his works th a t "God is in H im self w ithout space, bu t in the revelation o f his hiddenness, he is H im self the space o f all things.’N T his idea, th a t som ehow in God's "hiddenness" H e is the space o f all things, is derived from the Kabbalistic speculations o f Isaac Luria.

T h e "new Kabbalah" o f Luria, who lived from 1534 to 1572, quickly spread through Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, m ostly by w ord o f m outh and through the w orks o f follow ers (Lu ria h im self w rote little). Scholem w rites that "T h e influence o f the Lurianic K abbalah, which from about 1630 onw ards becam e som ething like the true theologia mystica o f Ju daism , can hardly be exaggerated."10 A s we w ill see, there is a strong correspondence betw een the theosophy o f Böhm e and Lurianic Kabbalah. Scholem acknowledges this correspondence.11 T h e w ritings o f Luna's fo llow ers circulated in Europe w idely betw een 1572 and 1650. It seem s likely that Böhm e cither obtained som e o f these w orks, or w as instructed directly by a Lurianic K abbalist. Luria (som etim es spelled "Loria") w as born in Jerusalem , but w hen still a boy his m other took him to live in Egypt after his father's death. In Safed , Luria studied w ith the fam ous K abbalist M oses C ordovero. A fter C ordovero's death, Luria gathered a group o f disciples around him self.

T hen and now, many Jew s have attacked Luria for his unorthodox views. T h e m ajor reason for th is seem s to be his trea tm en t o f Ein-Sof, th e "infinite,” which m any K abbalists identify w ith G od. For Luria, the crucial question is this: H ow can th e world exist a t all if we gran t the existence o f G od as Ein-Sof i If G od is tru ly infinite, no space is left over for creation. T hus, given th a t the w orld exists, it m ust have come about th rough G od's self-limitation o f H is infinite nature. T h is self-lim itation is called by Luria the tsimtsum (frequently transliterated by G erm anspeaking scholars as zimzum), which m eans "concentration" or "contraction." T hus, for Luria, G od, th e infinite, allows the finite to com e to be

9 .“G o « ist in sich selbst ohne Raum , aber in der O ffenbarung seiner V erborgenheit ist er selbst der Raum aller D inge" (Sämmtlichc Schriften, vol. 1 , 29: see Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 100).10 . Scholem , Major Trends, 284.11 . Ibid., 237.

228 M agnum Opus


w ithin him self. (T h is is, o f course, in essence identical to H egel's view o f the infinite and finite: the true [Wahrhafte] infinite contains the finite w ithin itself.) Lu ria ’s view is radical because it denies that the w orld com es to be through G od 's revelation or em anation. Instead, it is p recisely through G o d 's lim itation and concealm ent (O etinger's Verborgenheit) that a w orld com es into being.“ Scholem describes the tsimstum as a “w ithdraw ing into oneself.''"

Recall from chapter 5 that the Sephirah o f Din is equivalent to a "contracting” force in G o d . T h e K abbalah identifies D in w ith ‘‘fire,""wrath," and "severity."14 D in is the opposite o f Hesed, "m ercy" or the “expanding" power. Din and Hesed balance each other: severity o f judgm ent is balanced by m ercy; sharp distinction, cutting-off or closedness are balanced by unity, em brace, or openness. B ö h m es w ord fo r Din is the "S o u r"— it is an indraw ing, a pulling away, a shutting o ff and negation o f all else. It is significant that B öhm es account o f the source-spirits begins w ith the Sour, w ith the contracting elem ent. Som e follow ers o f Luria describe the tsimtsum in term s o f D in. In Sch olem s w ords, "W h en the prim al intention to create cam e into being, Ein-Sof gathered together the roots o f D in, w hich had been previously concealed w ith in H im , to one place, from w hich the pow er o f m ercy had departed. In this w ay the pow er o f Din becam e concentrated."

Scholem describes tsimtsum, in connection w ith D in, as "an act o f ju d g m ent and self-lim itation."1* Given th a t D in is the origin o f evil, G od's contraction is the roo t o f all evil.“ Luria's follower Israel Sarug, w ho helped spread the m aster's ideas in the late sixteenth century, speaks of Ein-Sof before the tsimtsum in a way which is even m ore strikingly Böh- mean. As Scholem p u ts it, Sarug held th a t “In the beginning, Ein-Sof took pleasure in its ow n autarkic self-sufficiency, and th is pleasure' p ro duced a k ind o f shaking’ (ni'anua) w hich was the m ovem ent o f Ein-So/ w ith in itself.”17 Scholem notes th a t Sarug's influence was felt in Italy, H olland, Poland, and G erm any.1*

Luria holds th a t each new act o f creation o r m anifestation in the w orld is the result o f a sim ultaneous contraction and expansion.1’ T h is pair o f forces generally goes under the nam es o f histalkut ("regression,” o r contraction) and hitpashtut ("egression," o r expansion).” T h is is, o f

12. See Scholcm , Kabbalah, 129; and Major Trends, 261. T h ere are striking analogies between Luria's tsimstum, the "clearing" in which beings com e to be, and H eideggers notion o f the Lichtung, the clearing in which Bcinfc itself com es ropresence. See M artin Heidegger, “ T h e End o f Philosophy and the Task o f Thinking," in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stam baugh (N ew York: H arper and Row. 1972).13. Scholem , Major Trends, 261.14 . Ibid ., 237.15. Scholem , Kabbalah, 130; see also Major Trends, 263.16. See Scholem , Major Trends, 263.17. Scholem , Kabbalah, 132.18. Scholem , Major Trends, 257.19. Ibid., 261.20. Scholem , Kabbalah, 131.

"T h e Rose in the C ross“ 229

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course, very sim ilar to G o eth es theory o f expansion and contraction, discussed in chapter 2. In chapters 4 and 5, 1 also discussed these concepts in connection w ith H egel s"B 6h m ean m yth" o f the fall o f Lucifer. Scholem states that "T h is double-facedness in the process o f em anation is typical o f the dialectical tendency o f Lurianic Kabbalah."*1

G o d s contraction in the tsimtsum does not create the w orld by itself, however. Luria and his follow ers envision the Ein-Sof as an infinite sphere, in which a sm aller sphere o f em pty space com es into being through the tsimtsum; this is the place o f creation. Into this space G o d injects a ray o f light (Lu ria seem s to identify the divine substance with light). A t this point the theory becom es rather murky, but it seem s that the light differentiates itse lf into the classical ten Sephiroth. T h ese are depicted as concentric circles o f light, filling the spacc w ith in G o d (see figure 8). T h e circle and the straight line (the line o f light entering the spherical space) becom e key sym bolic form s for Lurianic K abbalah. T h e circle is a “natural form ." T h e circular form characterizes all o f creation (for instance, the orbits o f the planets, the endless cycle o f the seasons, the m enstrual cycle, etc.). T h e line com es to represent hum anity. It is a willed form that represents a divergence from the natural. A s I have said, the light that com es from Ein-Sof first takes the form o f a line, before it is “deform ed” into spherical states. T h u s, in identifying man w ith the line (a topic to which I shall return to shortly), Luria is linking hum anity w ith the divine nature.

Indeed, the first definite form that appears in the sphere o f creation is that o f Adam Kadmon, prim ordial m an. Adam Kadmon exists in a realm above the four worlds o f classical Kabbalah: Atsiluth, Beriab, Yezirah, and Asiah (see H egel's discussion o f these w orlds in chapter 5). Adam Kad- tnon mediates the light o f Ein-Sof to the four w orlds: “ From his eyes, m outh, ears and nose, the lights o f the Sephiroth burst forth.”“ O b viously, this account has to be taken in a non-tem poral sense. Adam Kadmon is an A ristotelian final cause: he is logically prior to the rest o f creation, and sim ultaneously the end tow ard which creation is m oving (a point to which I shall return shortly). Adam Ha-Rishon is A dam o f the Bible, w ho is the (im perfect) earthly em bodim ent o f Adam Kadmon. An analogy can be draw n betw een this doctrine and H egel’s thought. L u rianic Ein-Sof and its Sephirotic structure corresponds to the A bsolute Idea, w hich is abstract, w ithdraw n “ into itself." Adam Kadmon is Sp irit, which in its purest form (A bsolute Sp irit) participates in the divine nature. Adam Ha-Rishon is Sp irit as developing in h istory: from the "fall o f man” and the loss o f the im m ediate relationship to G o d , to the recovery o f that relationship in its true form , in thought. (Lu ria ’s account o f the restoration from the Fall is som ew hat different from H egel's, as I shall explain shortly.)

T h e light o f the Sephiroth stream ing from Adam Kadmon was collected in separate “vessels,” but the vessels containing the differentiated light

21. Ibid.» 131.22. Scholem, M ajor Trends, 265.

230 Magnum Opus


8. The Lurianic Sephiroth. From Brucker, Historia Critica Philosovkiat, vol. 2,1742. Reprinted by permission of the Robert W. Woodruff Library, Special Collections and Archives, Emory University, Atlanta.Georgia.


from the seven lower Sephiroth proved incapable o f holding the light and shattered . T h e shards o f these vessels arc the source o f m atter. T his ca taclysm completely scram bled the divine cosmic structure, resulting in the em ergence o f an im perfect m aterial order: noth ing in nature is how it ough t to be, all is im perfect. It is on th is po in t— the account o f the "breaking o f the vessels”— th a t Luria’s cosmology is particularly obscure. It all sounds like a cosmic accident, bu t according to Luria it was all predestined. I f th is is the case, then G od's contraction and the subsequent creation o f the im perfect universe are events th a t had to occur; in some way G od needed them to happen. T h e picture again looks Bohm ean. Indeed, Scholem rem arks th a t‘’Luria is driven to som eth ing very m uch like a m ythos o f G od giving b irth to Him self; indeed, th is seem s to me to be the focal point o f th is whole involved and frequently ra ther obscure and inconsistent description.”2’

Before going on to the rest o f Luria's doctrine, it w ould be helpful to

23. Ibid.. 271.

2}2 M agnum Opus

consider w hat H egel knew about Luria's K abbalism as described thus far. In chapter 5 , 1 briefly discussed H egel’s treatm ent o f K abbalism in his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy. W e cannot be sure that H egel had any direct know ledge o f Lurianic K abbalah, but w e know that he had at least three indirect sources. B oth Böhm e and O etinger w ere deeply indebted to Lurianic Kabbalah (Böhm e implicitly, O etinger explicitly). But H egel's principal source o f in form ation seem s to have been B rü ckers Historia Critica Philosophiae. Brucker’s account o f K abbalah is alm ost entirely Lurianic in its orientation. A s a consequence, the account H egel gives o f the Kabbalah in his Lectures is also decidedly Lurianic, even though H egel never m entions Luria, as Brucker does. Instead, H egel m entions one o f Brucker’s Lurianic sources, A braham C ohen Irira (som etim es H errera) and his w ork Porta coelorum ( The Cate o f the Heavens). H egel cites th is text directly, so it may possibly be that he actually read it in addition to reading about it in Brucker. Irira (d. A m sterdam 1635 or 1639) w as a Spanish Je w w hose tw o m ajor w orks, the aforem entioned Gate o f the Heavens, and Beth Elohim ( 'The House o f God) w ere translated in the late seventeenth century from Spanish into H ebrew and exercised considerable influence. Porta coelorum w as one o f the texts published— in Latin translation— in Rosenroth's Kabbala Denudata, which w as so w ell-know n in H egel's tim e that he very likely read it in preparing his rem arks on the K abbalah.

H egel deals w ith the Ein-Sof and the origin o f creation as follow s: "T h e em anation connected [w ith Ein-Sof] is the effect o f the first cause by the lim itation o f that first infinite w hose boundary it is. In th is one cause all is contained eminenter, not formaliter but causaliter” ( l h p 2:396; Werke 19 :4 2 7 ) . T h is is obviously a description o f Lurianic tsimtsum. H egel goes on to say that "T h e second elem ent o f im portance is the Adam Kadmon, the first m an, Keter, the first that arose, the highest crow n, the m icrocosm , the m acrocosm , w ith which the w orld that em anated stands in connection as the efflux o f light” (l h p 2 :396 ; Werke 19 :4 2 7 ) . A gain, this is Luria’s K abbalah: Adam Kadmon as the first and highest created being, as close to the divine nature, and as m ediating the divine light to the rest o f creation. Adam Kadmon w as subsequently m entioned by H egel several tim es in his Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion (see l p r 1:382 n. 4 1 ; 3:99, 288; v p r 1:278 ; 3:36 , 2 13 ). H egel goes on to m ention the ten Sephiroth in general (not individually) and discusses the four lower worlds o f Atsiluth, Beriah, Yezirah, and Asiah (for H egel’s treatm ent o f these, see chapter 5).

Scholem notes th a t w hereas Kabbalah before Luria had been concerned mainly w ith the beginning o f tim e— w ith creation— Luria, to a great extent, shifted the focus o f K abbalists to the end o f tim e .14 T his may seem surprising in light o f Luria’s highly original account o f creation. Recall th a t Luria’s doctrine o f the “breaking o f the vessels” involves a predestined "scrambling” o f the cosmic order: the physical w orld th a t results is a flawed and im perfect expression o f the divine

24. Ibid., 245.


order. T h e story cannot end there, o f course. Luria insists that the world m ust be made whole, that the physical w orld m ust be com pleted or brought to perfection. T h is w ould “com plete" the cosm ic process begun in G od 's tsimtsum by m aking the finite w ithin the infinite a faithfu l image o f the infinite. T h is idea is called by Luria Ttkkun (the term is, again, not original w ith Lu ria but his use o f it is certainly original). Tikkun is the cosm ic restoration at the end o f tim e.

A ccording to Scholem , Luria held that all th ings arc interrelated. In other w ords, he held the idea o f internal relations later made fam ous by H egel.-” T h e nature o f the lowest regions o f being is intim ately linked to the highest, and ju st as the highest can affect the low est (as in the tides, or the influence o f the stars on the personality) so too the low est can affect the highest.*“ T h u s it is possible for created beings ro benefit or to harm the cosm ic order. Scholem w rites that Luria believed that "T h e process in which G o d conceives, brings forth and develops H im se lf docs not reach its final conclusion in G o d . C ertain parts o f the process o f restitution are allotted to man.”27 T h e “cosm ic assignm ent” o f men on earth is to perfect them selves, to realize the nature o f Adam Kadmon in Adam Ha-Rishon and thereby to “ lift” the fallen, created w orld up to its pure, initial state o f being in the light o f G o d (th is is not conceived o f literally, o f course, as a transform ation o f m atter into light).

M an's task is to perfect h im self and to build a social, cultural, and m oral w orld in which m aterial being is used for ends sanctioned by divine law. Sch olem w rites that "B y fulfilling the com m andm ents o f the Torah, man restores his ow n spiritual structure; he carves it out o f h im self, as it were. A n d since every part corresponds to a com m andm ent, the solution o f the task dem ands the com plete fulfillm ent o f all the 613 com m andm ents.”“ A s a consequence, o f this view, Sch olem notes that Luria tended "to extrem e conservatism " in his attitudes tow ard custom and law.1* A fter all, these laws and custom s had their origin in the covenant o f the Jew ish people w ith G o d . W h at can the real purpose o f this covenant have b een ? Luria th inks that the L aw is essentially an instruction m anual for the restoration and com pletion o f the divine order.*0 T h u s i f the Tikkun is to com e to pass it is crucial that the Law m ust be strictly observed.

For Luria, the appearance o f the M essiah is sim ply the achievem ent o f Ttkkun. L ike the Pietist J . A . Bengel, whom I shall discuss in the next section, Luria even went so far as to give the specific year in which the Tikkun w ould be consum m ated: 1575. Sum m ing up Luria’s position, Scholem states that "it is man w ho adds the final touch to the divine countenance; it is he w h o com pletes the enthronem ent o f G o d , the K in g

2$. Ibid ., 254.26. Scholem discusses this idea in connection w ith Kabbalism as a w hole (seeibid., 27, 223).27. Ibid ., 273.28. Ibid., 279-29. Scholem , Kabbalah, 4 2 6 -2 7 .30. See Scholem , Major Trends, 268, 2 7 5 -7 6 .

“ The Rose in the Cross” 233


and the m ystical creator o f all things, in H is ow n K ingdom o f H eaven; it is he who perfects the M aker o f all th ings!”5'

T h e sim ilarity o f these ideas to H egel’s is clear. H egel holds that the true infinite (the A bsolute Idea) "contains" the finite: nature is a "reflection” or "specification ''o f the Logos; it is a n 'o th e r” to Idea yet at the sam e rime is contained w ithin its com pass. N evertheless, nature is an im perfect expression o f A bsolute Idea; it is the "fallenness'’ o f Idea. In Sp irit , a natural being, man, rises above nature and com es, through philosophy, to realize its true, eternal being as one w ith the A bsolute Idea (Adam Ha- Rishon, or earthly m an, realizing his identity w ith Adam Kadmon). M an is the being w ho "takes over" nature and transform s it according to the ideal, even bending his ow n passions and inclinations to conform to the "universal." W e "return" to the pure light o f A bsolute Idea not only through philosophy— through the appropriation o f the created w orld in thought— but through obedience to the edicts o f the divine State, which is the guardian o f the custom s and laws o f Ethical Life.

Hegel's doctrine o f O bjective Sp irit is not only sim ilar to Luria's K ab balah but to Kabbalistic eschatology in general. Specifically, we m ust look at the K abbalists' treatm ent o f the tenth and final Sephirah, Malkhut or Shekhinah. Malkhut ("K ingdom ," som etim es "G lo ry ”) is conceived o f as fem inine— in contrast to the "m ale” Tiferet and Yesod (the "organ" o f Tiferet)— and is often referred to under the alternate name o f Shekhinah o r "D ivin e Presence." I f one looks at a draw ing o f the Tree o f Life, Malkhut seem s alm ost like an extension o f the Tree, a sort o f appendage. T h is is not accidental, for Malkhut represents the divine presence in the world: with Malkhut the Sephiroth have reached dow n into the w orld o f space and tim e. In chapter 5, 1 discussed how som e K abbalists take the Ein-Sof or Infinite to be identical to the Ayin, o r N oth in g. Scholem m aintains that Ayin is a kind o f prim al unity that transcends the subject-object d istinction .’1 N evertheless, although Ein-Sof/Ayin is neither subject nor object, its telos is to develop into a true or absolute subject. A ccording to the K abbalists, "G o d w illed to see G od," to becom e fully m anifest to H im self; to achieve perfect self-know ledge or self-relation. “ T h e " I " o f G o d is identified by m any K abbalists w ith Malkhut o r "K ingdom /'

Let us look more closely at what it m eans to identify Malkhut, G od 's "I," w ith Shekhinah. Shekhinah is the "D ivin e Presence.” Scholem w rites that Shekhinah is "the personification and hypostasis o f G od 's 'indwelling' or 'presence' in the w o r ld .. . . In the literal sense, G od's indwelling or Shekhinah m eans H is visible or hidden presence in a given place, his im m ediacy.”* Scholem speculates that Shekhinah/Malkhut is fem inine because it w as thought o f as a "vessel* that receives all the other Sephiroth” T h u s, i f

31. Ibid.. 273-74.32. Ibid ., 221.33. H alevi, A Kabbalistic Universe, 7.34. G ershom Scholem , On The Mystical Shape o f the Godhead: Basic Concepts inthe Kabbalah, ed. Jonathan C hipm an and trans. Joachim N cugroschcl (N ewYork: Schocken Books, 1991)* >4i~47-35. Ibid., 160.

234 Magnum Opus



the Sephiroth arc conceived as the aspects or m om ents o f G od 's being, all the m om ents are contained w ithin Sheklrinah. Yet, the Shekhinah is conceived o f as being in the world. T h u s, the final and— perhaps it would not be m isleading to say— highest m om ent o f G o d ’s being is G od's "indw elling" or "presence” in the w orld o f space-tim e. Scholem w rites that "T h e last Sephirah perform s a different function from all the other Sephiroth: it is one w ith all the others and yet separate, because it p erform s a m ission on their b eh alf to the w orld , like a princess com ing from afar."56 T h e parallel to H egel is this: Shekhinah is like O bjective Sp irit ; it is a "realization" o f A bsolute Idea in the world; it is "one" w ith Absolute Idea, yet the Idea, as form al and eternal, is also separate from it . '7

"O bjective Sp irit" for H egel, o f course, refers to the realm o f social institutions and practices. S o far, however, Shekhinah sim ply sounds like the burning bush. C onsider, however, the follow ing lines from Joseph G ikatilla (thirteenth century):

(In the days o f the Patriarchs] the Shekhinah w as in suspenso (literally, "hanging in the air"), and found no resting place for its feet on earth, as in the beginning o f C reation . But then came M oses, o f blessed mem ory, and all o f Israel together w ith him built the Tabernacle and rhe vessels, and repaired the broken channels, and put the ranks in order, and repaired the ponds, and drew live water into them from the H ouse o f W ater D raw ing, and then brought the Shekhinah back to its dw elling am ong the low er ones— into the Tent, but not upon the ground as in the beginning o f Crearion. A n d the hint o f this is: "L et them m ake m e a sanctuary, that I may dw ell am ong them ” [Exod. 25:8]. W e find that the Shekhinah was like a guest, m oving from place to place, and o f this it is said "and I shall dwell am ong them” and n o t"I shall dw ell below " but "among them "— i.e., like a lodger. Until D avid and So lom on cam e, and placed the Shekhinah on solid ground in the Tem ple o f Jerusalem .''

T h e im plication o f this passage seem s ro be that Shekhinah— the living presence o f G o d , containing all the attributes o f G o d — came to be in the Tem ple o f Jerusalem , the religious, cultural, and m oral center o f the people o f A braham .

Scholem quotes a popular K abbalistic epigram : "Israel form s rhe lim bs o f the Shekhinah T h is appears to identify the nation o f Israel (m eaning the Jew ish people, its culture and traditions) w ith G o d s presence in the world. In Jew ish G n ostic circles in late antiquity the Shekhi- nah becam e hypostatized, that is, G o d s presence in the w orld cam e to denote a specific historical locus or conjunction o f factors. From this arose the identification o f Shekhinah w ith the keneset Tisrael ("the com

36. Ibid., 168.37. It is also interesting to note that Bôhm e, as discussed in chapter 1 , viewed “G o d s W isdom " as feminine, and saw the highest m om ent o f G o d s W isdom . Body (the seventh source-spirit) as a tangible presence. Scholcm notes that Philo o f Alexandria treated G o d s W isdom as fem inine in form (ibid., 142).38. Q uoted in ibid., 178.39. ib id .. 175-


m unity o f Israel'’ ) .* T h ese Jew ish G n ostics held to a doctrine o f the “exile o f the S h e k h in a h according to w hich G o d s presence in the w orld is like the "divine spark” that exists in the terrestrial w orld and m ust be helped to ignite and fill rhe fallen w orld w ith divine presence. T h is is the m ission o f the keneset Yisrael. (T h u s it appears that Luria's view s about the role o f man in redeem ing the w orld w ere present in germ inal form in earlier K abbalah.) U nlike C hristianity, Jew ish K abbalism sees redem ption as occurring w ithin tim e and w ith in the w orld . A s Scholem puts it, "R edem ption is expressed as the end o f the exile o f the Shekhinah,' the restoration o f the D ivine unity throughout all areas o f existence.''41 T h u s, w e find in the Kabbalah som ething very m uch like H egel's concept o f the “end o f h istory": the "end“ o f the w orld and o f man is realized in tim e and on earth through the "presence o f G o d " com ing to be in hum an institutions, in "O bjective Spirit."

H ow ever, one m ight object that one crucial "H egelian" elem ent is m issing from this K abbalist account o f "O bjective Sp irit": no indication has been given thus far that G o d needs to becom e present in the keneset Yisrael. In H egel, however, A bsolute Idea— G o d "in his eternal essence"— is abstract and form al, lacking full realization or actualization. T h u s, G o d , to be G o d , m ust realize H im se lf in Sp irit. D o the K a b balists m aintain som ething sim ilar i Recall w hat w as said earlier about G o d ’s achievem ent o f "self-consciousness" or "ego” ( " I” ) after em erging from the state o f Ein-Sof = Ayin, the Bein g-N oth in g beyond subject and object. T h is conception (held by som e, but by no means all, K abbalists) clearly im plies that G o d develops and that the final stage o f perfection involves self-reflection. A s Scholem w rites, "the Zohar identifies the highest developm ent o f G od 's personality w ith precisely that stage o f H is unfolding which is nearest to hum an experience, indeed which is im m anent and m ysteriously present in every one o f us."‘ J T h is is the evidence needed to m ake the H egelian parallel stick: G o d , to be G o d , does require his hypostatization in the keneset Yisrael.

The influence of these Kabbalistic ideas on Hegel is almost entirely indirect, by way of Bohme and the Swabian Pietist movement. In the next section I will discuss the eschatology that Hegel inherited from his homeland, and its origins not only in Kabbalism but in the Christian mystical tradition.

4. Joachim ite Mysticism and the End o f History

In an article on the influence o f Bohm e on H egel, D avid W alsh raises an interesting question: W h y w ould H egel believe that history has to have a structure (let alone an end) in the first p lace?4’ W alshs answ er is to point to the influence o f Bohm e, though I th ink he would agree w ith me in identifying the ultim ate source as Joachim de Fiore ( 1135 -12 0 2 ).

40. Scholem , Kabbalah, 31.4 1. Ib id ., 335. It should be pointed out, as with everything in the Kabbalah, that th is position w as held by many but nor all Kabbalists. T h ere is seldom universal agreem ent about anything am ong Kabbalists.42. Scholem , Major Trends, 2 16 - 17 .43. W alsh ,“ T h e H istorical D ialectic o f Spirit," 15.

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Joachim w as born in Calabria, the son o f an official in the Sicilian court. A s a young man he made a pilgrim age to the H o ly Land , which led him to decide to devote h is life to G o d . A fter a b rie f stint as a herm it on M t. Etna, Joach im entered the Benedictine m onastery o f C orazzo , w here he soon rose to the rank o f abbot. In the 118 0 s, he fought to have the m onastery incorporated into the C istercian order. T h is brought Joach im into contact w ith Pope Lucius III , w ho suggested to Joachim that he com m it his unusual view s to w riting. By the tim e the m onastery w as welcom ed into the Cistercian order in 1188 , Joachim and a group o f fo llow ers had already broken o ff and founded their ow n house at San G iovanni de Fiore (som etim es w ritten "F lora" or “ Flore" or "F loris"). T h ey w ere prom ptly repudiated by the C istercians. By the tim e o f his death, Joachim had becom e a celebrity, corresponding w ith and advising the great m en o f his age.

A s Voegelin sees it, Joach im s great innovations w ere to conceive o f history as having an eidos, a form al structure, and to "im m anentize the eschaton," to hold that the end o f tim e w ill take place in tim e.44 Joachim held that history was not sim ply a series o f contingent events. H istory consists o f certain definite stages m oving tow ard a final end. Joach im s im m anentization o f the eschaton is no m ore paradoxical than Hegel's end o f h istory : tim e w ill continue, but there w ill be no new 'ages," the story o f man w ill com e to an end, even though m en w ill live on. Both Joachim and H egel hold that at a certain point all the different form s o f hum an life and society and culture w ill have revealed them selves, all m eaningful struggles w ill be over. A n yth in g that happens afterw ard is sim ply m ore o f the sam e. B oth Joachim and H egel hold that the final phase o f history involves the com ing into being o f certain “ highest" or m ost perfect w ays o f life. It is unclear, however, w hether they believe that these advances have to endure, or w hether certain form s out o f the past m ay reappear, tem porarily, from tim e to tim e.

Joachim 's eidos o f h istory is the C h ristian Trinity. E rn st Benz w rites that in Joach im , "D evelopm ent and progress are not understood in hum an te r m s .. . . T h e y are, rather, considered as steps in the p rogressive self-realization and self-revelation o f the divine T rin ity in the h istory o f m ankind."4* Joach im speaks o f the “A ge o f the Father,'"'Age o f the Son," an d “A ge o f the H o ly S p ir it" (the w o rd he norm ally uses to refer to each is status, although he som etim es em ploys tempus and aetas; regtium or "K in gd om ” w as often em ployed by h is fo llow ers). Each age is seen as representing an advance in sp irituality and in freedom , and each is dom inated by a different archetype: the laym an, the priest, and the m onk. T h e final stage o f history, the final level o f hum an spirituality, is literally an age o f m onks. O ne com m entator w rites that "F o r Joachim h istory w as the story o f the gradual trium ph o f sp irit over flesh, o f contem plation over literal-m indedness. T h is trium ph w as inseparable

4 4 . Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1952), 1 19 ,12 0 .45. Ernst Benz, Evolution and Christian Hope, trans. H einz G . Frank (G arden City, N .Y .: Doubleday, 1966), 37.



from the h istory o f m onasticism .’’ In the third age, organized religion sim ply en d s— the church "w ith ers aw ay” — and is replaced by a highly individualistic form o f w orsh ip .4" T h e piety and contem plativeness o f the individual arc w hat is im portant, not the sacram ents o f the p riesthood. M en w ill no longer be able to lead inauthentic lives and expect salvation: no longer w ill they be able to sin w ith abandon and receive absolution.

Joachim made frequent use o f im ages to convey his ideas. Joachim saw the stages o f the developm ent o f man's spirituality and redem ption as unfolding like the grow th o f a tree, finally bearing fru it in the third age. Som e o f the other images he em ployed included circles, eagles, and a ten-stringed psaltery. H e used interlocking circles to represent the three ages. Figure 9 show s the Tetragram m aton, the four-letter name o f G o d , interpenetrating the circles o f the three ages, perhaps indicating that the being o f G o d or o f G o d ’s presence is som ehow bound up w ith the ages them selves. Joachim believed that the third age would begin in 1260. (Eschatologists cannot resist calculating the exact date o f the end o f tim e; w e have already seen this w ith Luria, and we shall see it again with Bengel and O etinger.)

Joach im s characterization o f the third age as a tim e o f pious, contem plative, m onastic "inwardness," and his prediction that the organized C hurch would dissolve would seem to make him a "proto-Protestant.’’ W hile Joach im h im self w as careful to avoid official censure, his follow ers were anything but cautious. For instance, G erard o f B orgo San D onnino, w ho published his m ajor w ork, Liber introductorious in Evangelium aeternum, in 1249 , declared that Joachim ’s prophecies were a new G ospel that nullified the authority o f the church and Scripture. A nother ou tgrow th o f Joachim ite prophecy were the notorious Flagellants, who believed that their self-torture w as a necessary prelim inary to the arrival o f the A ge o f the H oly Sp irit.

T h e origins o f Joachim ’s thought are the topic o f m uch speculation. Em m a Ju n g, for exam ple, sees an influence o f C atharism and m ystical Judaism : “Jo ach im s idea springs from a conception already extant in Ju daism . . . o f a kingdom to be established on earth by the M essiah at the end o f time.’’4 A s to the m atter o f Joach im and H egel, the sim ilarity betw een the tw o w as pointed out to H egel h im self in an 18 10 letter from the occultist K . J . H . W indischm ann.4* H egel h im self never m entions Joach im . N evertheless, in addition to Voegelin, such contem porary scholars as C la rk Butler, Laurence D ickey, A ntoine Faivre, H enri de

46. See K arl Low ith , Meaning in History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1949). 151-47- Em m a Ju n g and von Franz, Grail Legend, 318.48. H offm eister *>155. T h e parallel has been developed by O 'R egan (The Heterodox Hegel) and C lark Butler, “ H egelian Panentheism as Joachim ite C h ristianity,” in N ew Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, ed. D avid Kolb (A lbany: State Universiry o f N ew York Press, 1992).

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9. T h e T h ree A ces o f Joach im de Fiore. From his Book o f Figures (Liber figurarum, tw elfth ccntury). R eprinted by perm ission o f the President and Fellow s o f C o rpus C h risti College, O xford , M S 255A , fol 7 verso.


Copyrighted image


Lubac, M ichael M urray, and C yril O 'R egan have argued for a Joachim ire influence on H egel.40

T h e Joachim ire influence is m ost apparent in Hegel's treatm ent o f the Trinity. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel deals in detail with the Trinity as constituting the “m om ents" o f G o d (universality, diremption, and reconciliation).50 In the 1831 version o f the lectures, H egel introduces a new twist: he begins calling Father, Son and H oly Sp irit the"K ingdom [Rcicfc] o f the Father," "K ingdom o f the Son,” and “ Kingdom o f the Spirit." T h is use o f "K ingdom " for the persons o f the Trinity was employed widely by followers o f Joachim . T h is alone, o f course, does not necessarily prove a Joachim ite influence. However, Hegel's treatment o f the Trinity is, like Joachim s, tem poral: he holds that the reconciliation o f the diremption in G o d takes time; only at a certain point in human history is this accom plished. In the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel notes that "W h at underlies divine Providence at the level o f thought will soon prove to be the Concept" ( e l §

147, Z; Geraets, 222). O nce it is realized that the Concept, as the crowning conception o f the Logic, contains three moments which correspond to the Christian Trinity, the sim ilarity to Joachim is striking: both Hegel and Joachim see the hand o f G od , Providence, playing out in history according to the pattern o f the Trinity. Hegel does not repeat Joachim's treatment o f the Age o f the Father or o f the Son, but there is a striking correspondence between Hegel's K ingdom o f the Spirit and Joachim s.

T here is a strong sim ilarity between Joachim ’s conception o f spirituality in rhe third age and the Pietist movement that arose in G erm any centuries later. Both involve a rejection o f the church as an interm ediary between ordinary men and G o d and the claim that the lay com m unity o f w orsh ippers can achieve salvation and knowledge o f G o d unaided. H egel explicitly identifies his K ingdom o f the Sp irit w ith the com m unity o f worshippers ( l p r 3:371; v p r 3:287). H e refers to the com m unity as "existing Sp irit” and refers to Sp irit as"G o d existing as com m unity" ( l p r 3:331; v p r 3:254). Both men conceive the third stage as one o f reconciliation, o f higher spirituality or fully adequate knowledge, and o f the actualization o f human freedom. Further, as O 'Regan notes, both H egel and Joachim make the unusual move o f locating the eschaton in time, Joachim believing that it is at hand, H egel believing that it has already happened. Both H egel and Joachim have C h rist play a crucial role on the way to the achievement o f the third age, H egel insisting that the universality o f hum an freedom (realized fully in the third age) was first revealed through Christianity.

H egel's "Joachim ite" treatm ent o f the T rin ity in the Lectures dovetails w ith his Bôhm eanism . T h is is the case specifically w ith respect to the K ingdom o f the Father. N o t only is there a T rin ity o f Father-Son-Spirit,

49. See Butler,"H egelian Panentheism "; Dickey, Hegel; A ntoine Faivre, "Ancient and M edieval Sources o f M odern Esoteric M ovements,” Modern Esoteric Spirituality, H enri de Lubac, La Spiritualité de Joachim de Fiore (Paris: Sycam ore, 19 7 9 -8 1), vol. 2, 359 -77 ; M ichael M urray, Modern Philosophy 0 /H istory (T h e H ague: N ijhoff, 1970), 8 9 -113 ; O 'R egan , The Heterodox Hegel.50. Sec Peter C . H odgson, introduction to Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press, 1985), vol. 3, 50.

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“The Rose in the Cross" 24»

there is also a secondary Trinity im m anent w ithin the Father. H egel identifies the K ingdom o f the Father w ith the pure, eidetic realm o f the Logic, thus th e“ T rin ity o f the Father" corresponds to the three divisions o f the Logic?' In the 1831 Lectures H egel speaks o f th e"T rin ity o f the father" (or, as O 'R egan calls it, the "im m anent T rin ity” ) as involving, “ the elem ent o f pure ideality and universality, in the silent abode o f the thinking spirit.” H e goes on to say that in this abode, “G o d is im m ediately present to H im se lf through H is differentiation, w hich, however, is not yet ex ternalized at th is stage. It is by virtue o f this [inner] m ovem ent that G o d is sp irit. T h u s the doctrine o f the Trin ity pertains to this sphere, although it is preferentially term ed the K ingdom o f the Father” ( l p r 3:362; v p r

3:281). T h u s, in the "im m anent T rin ity" G o d is closed w ithin H im se lf ("not yet externalized"). H egel uses this language explicitly: in the 1824 lectures he states that "G o d is the true G o d , Sp irit , because H e is not m erely Father, and hence closed up w ithin H im se lf' ( l p r 3:219; v p r

3:150). In the Philosophy of Spirit H egel states that "G o d the Father is for H im self, shut up w ithin H im self, abstract, and consequently not yet the G o d o f Sp irit and o f truth” ( p s § 384, Z ; Petry 1:63). H egel also refers to G o d in this sphere as “ loving H im se lf” ( l p r 1 :12 4 -2 5 ; 4 1) . T h u s, there is a clear parallel to B öhm es "im m anent T rin ity” o f G o d "in H im selfT the Sour, Sw eet, and Bitter (see chapter 1).” In Six Mystical Points, Böhm e refers to "G o d in his triad” as “the first Magia."**

T h e "im m anent T rin ity” is not an innovation o f the Lectures; it is to be found in the Jen a Triangle fragm ent in which the “triangle o f triangles" represents the process o f G o d ’s com ing to consciousness o f H im self. T h ere are three triangles in all, w ith the triangle o f triangles being the figure m ade up by the set o f the three. T h e first triangle is described by H egel as fo llo w s:"In this First, which is at the sam e time only O ne side o f the absolutely unique Triangle, there is on ly the G od h ead in reciprocal intuition and cognition w ith H im self.” T h is is even m ore strikingly Böhm ean than w h at H egel says in the Lectures. D avid W alsh w rites: "H egel suggested, as Böhm e also did, that the first T rin ity o f G o d in h im self is not sufficient for the divine self-revelation."“ T herefore a second triangle appears, "G o d the Son.” H egel w rites: "In the Son , G o d is cognizant o f H im se lf as G o d . H e says to H im se lf I am G o d . T h e w ith in -itse lf ceases to be a negative."

T h e separated m om ent o f that which stands opposed to the G odhead m ust be "transfigured” and brought into unity w ithin G o d . H egel w rites that "the So n m ust go right through the E arth , m ust overcom e Evil, and in that he steps over to one side as the victor, m ust awaken the other, the self-cognition o f G o d , as a new cognition that is one w ith G o d , or as the Sp irit o f G o d : w hereby the m iddle becom es a beautiful, free, divine

5 1. See O ’Regan, Heterodox Hegel, 9 1 , 10 8 ,1 1 1 . H odgson speaks o f it as a"pre- worldly Trinity," thus calling to m ind the eternal characrer o f the Logic. H od gson, introduction to l p r 3:50.52. O 'Regan also recognizes the parallel to Böhm e (Heterodox Hegel, 10 9 ,13 0 -3 1) .53. N icolescu, Science. Meaning and Evolution, 229.54. W alsh. Boehme and Hegel, 321.


m iddle, the U niverse o f G od." T h is heralds the arrival o f a new triangle, o f the H oly Sp irit. A s we saw in chapter 3, th is fragm ent is the "b lu eprint" for H egel's system . T h e nature o f his Logic is expressed here very clearly: the first "triad" o f the system (in the later Logic, Being-Essence- C oncept) is the “ Idea o f G od ." T h is Idea is expressed (m ade real) in the triads o f the So n (Philosophy o f N ature: M echanics, Physics, O rganics) and Sp irit (Subjective, O bjective, and A bsolute Sp irit). I noted in chapter 3 that this fragm ent seem s to be influenced by Böhm e, Baader, O etinger, and Eckhart. I can now add Joachim to the list. In the Lectures H egel speaks only o f a Trin ity im m anent w ithin the Father, but we know from the Philosophies o f N ature and Sp irit that the Son and Sp irit m ust be triadically structured as well.

I f we ask how H egel could have encountered the ideas o f the C a labrian m onk, the answ er is that, like so much else, those ideas w ere a part o f the W ü rttem berg cultural m ilieu to w hich he, Schelling, and other Sw abian intellectuals w ere exposed. Joach im enjoyed a revival during the R eform ation , w hen h is ideas w ere used as a w eapon against the papacy by the fo llow ers o f Luther. A s w e have seen, Joachim ism is rem arkably "P rotestan t" in sp irit. Ernest Renan m arveled that the R eform ation did not begin w ith Joach im in the th irteenth century.” Joach im ite enthusiasm w as very strong in the insular culture o f W ü rttem berg, w here it becam e intertw ined w ith indigenous m ystical and H erm etic currents. Joachim 's thought is not itse lf "H erm etic”— and it is even questionable w hether it should be term ed“m y stic a r— but it was co-opted by H erm eticists like Böhm e, A ndreae, Baader, and O etinger.

A s Laurence D ickey notes, O ld W ürttem berg belonged to the tradition o f w hat G erh ard Ladner has called "C h ristian reform ." D ickey w rite s :"T h is tradition . . . took ethical and eschatological elem ents from w idely divergent sources in the history o f C hristian thought and form ed from them an anthropology o f fallen and restored man that allowed fo r— indeed, dem anded— man’s participation in civil life as well as in his ow n salvation. T h e thrust o f the tradition w as to show that through ethical activism man could transform the w orld in accordance with G o d ’s w ishes and, by doing so, make significant 'progress' not only tow ard transcending his ow n fallen nature, but tow ard establishing the K ingdom o f G o d on earth as well."“ D ickey argues that Joachim ism was one o f the influences on W ürttem berg "C h ristian reform ."57 H e notes that the W ürttem bergers viewed them selves as a "m illennial people," chosen by G o d to realize the K ingdom o f H eaven on earth .“

D ickey w rites further that the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in W ürttem berg "constituted an age o f apocalyptic expectation."*9 N ow h ere w as this m ore evident than am ong the P ietists. Ernst Benz w rites o f the atm osphere o f W ü rttem berg Pietism : "From all sides,

55. Sec Dickey, Hegel, 45.56. Ibid ., 12.57- Ibid., 34.$8. Ibid., 36.59. Ibid., 44.

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one watches for the ‘signs o f the times,' one attem pts to perceive in the great historical events the fulfillm ent o f N ew Testam ent p ro p h ec ies .. . . A t the sam e tim e, the image o f the ‘G olden age,’ the realization o f the K ingdom o f G o d , the K ingdom o f a T h ou san d Years, the com pletion o f the final phase o f w orld history , . . appears m ore and m ore strongly in the spiritual considerations o f the com m unity."00

T h e Joachim ism o f the Pietists appears to have been influenced by the R osicrucian m ovem ent. T h e influence o f Joachim on the Rosicrucian m anifestos has been discussed by a num ber o f scholars, and J . V. A ndreae h im self actually m entions Joach im .“ J . M ontgom ery has called A ndreae "the single m ost im portant influence on the church history o f the W ürttem berg territory for over tw o hundred years."' P hillip Jak o b Spener ( 16 35 -17 0 5 ), som etim es called the "father o f G erm an Pietism ," explicitly acknow ledged his intellectual debt to A n d reae/ ' Spener divided the history o f C hristian ity into three ages, corresponding to the Trinity, and claim ed that the third age would involve the “ D ivine Light" penetrating and dispelling darkness.64

Perhaps the m ost strik ing exam ple o f Joachim 's influence on Pietism , however, is that o f J . A . Bengel ( 16 8 7 -17 5 2 ). R obert Schneider has ch aracterized Bengel as "the philosopher o f history w ho anticipated the w ork o f Schelling and Hegel."'- Bengels m aternal great-grandfather was M atthias H afen reffer ( 15 6 1-16 19 ) , chancellor o f the U niversity o f T ü bin gen and one o f Andreae's teachers. H aving lived through the w ars o f Louis X I V as a young boy, Bengel had seen much violence and grew up hoping for a tim e o f perpetual peace. U nlike m any such hopefuls, however, Bengel did not look for signs o f progress. Instead he prophesied that corruption, violence, and blasphem y w ould only increase until the forces o f the A ntichrist burned them selves out. Bengel held that w orld history is an organic unity, in which revelation is playing itse lf out by degrees. A s Ernst Benz puts it, for Bengel

history is a series o f alliances betw een G o d and the elect saved from the fall. T h is history o f salvation is realized in a spiritual evolution through these alliances, until the final battle betw een the Kingdom o f Light and the K ingdom o f D arkness. In Bengel, these suggestions becom e even stronger as he also w ishes to see a chronological conform ity betw een the periods. H is book Weltalter, a title that one finds again, significantly enough, in Schelling, represents an attem pt

60. Benz, Mystical Sources, 34.6 1. See J . V. Andreae, Tunis Babel sive Judiciorum de Fratermtate Rosaceae Crucis Chaos (A rgentorati: Sum ptibus haeredum Lazari Z e tzn eri, 16 :9 ), I4~*5- For scholars w ho have noted the Joachim -Rosicrucian connection see for example, Dickey, Hegel, 63-6 5; Roland Edighoffer," Rosier ucianism from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Centuries,” Modern Esoteric Spirituality; J . M on tgom ery, The Cross and the Crucible, 5 7 ,17 3 ,19 8 -9 9 .62. Dickey. Hegel. 6 1; J . M ontgom ery, The Cross and the Crucible, ix.63. O n the relationship o f Andreae to Pietism , see Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 36 -37 .64- H an ratty .'H egel and the G n ostic Tradition: II,“ 319.65. Robert Schneider, Geistesiihnen, 38.

"The R o se in the C ro ss” 243


at a chronological fixation o f the divine plan o f redem ptive history, w ith the aid o f the varied num erical data from O ld and N ew Testament prophetic books .66

T h rou gh a com plex and eccentric interpretation o f the B ook o f R evelation, Bengel determ ined that the M illennium would begin in the year 18 3 6 . 18 0 9 would m ark the return o f C h rist and the inception o f the "K in gd om o f a T h ou san d Years" (Tausendjahre Reich). Benz notes that H egel's "cunning o f reason" is clearly anticipated by Bengel in his account o f how this K ingdom shall com e into being:

V iew ed from outside, h istory is the place o f the expansion o f the private egotism o f individuals and groups. T h o se w ith pow er act as they intend; each one w ishes to attain his objective by his ow n action. B u t from the m om ent an act has taken place, the actor ceases to be the m aster o f his actions. T h e act not only produces the repercussions its instigator desired, but also has boundless and unforseen consequences, leading to unim aginable and often com pletely unexpected prim ary and secondary re su lts .. . . [In Bengel, this ideaj is contained in a theological interpretation o f history in its totality, which sees in every event, in the last analysis, an elem ent o f the divine plan o f redem ption .*7

Bengel and his follow ers, w ho called them selves "T h e Free” (Die Freien), proclaim ed the perennial ideal o f the "invisible church," a conception w hich is sim ilar to Joach im s inform al "com m unity o f the faithful," which w as supposed to characterize the third age.** A s discussed earlier, the invisible church is a perennial them e o f G erm an m ysticism , and also an im portant concept for both the Freem asons and the Rosi- crucians (w ho also spoke o f an "invisible college”). In a letter from H egel to Schelling o f Jan u ary 1795» H egel w rites: "R eason and Freedom rem ain ou r w atchw ord, and our rallying point the Invisible Church."6* R obert Schneider holds that H egel's use o f the term invisible church, as well as the phrase "K in gd om o f G o d ” (see the follow ing section) is evidence o f the influence o f P ietist theology .70 A s we have seen, D ickey argues that the "Protestan t civil p iety" o f O ld W ürttem berg involved, am ong other things, the goal o f establishing the kingdom o f G o d on earth through a transform ation o f ethics. R ob ert Schneider, in fact, refers to the "k ingdom o f G o d " (Das Königreich Gottes) as the "consum m ate idea" o f Sw abian P ietism .71 In addition ro Bengel, P. M . H ah n also preached a doctrine o f the invisible church.

66. Benz, Mystical Sources, 35.67. Ibid., 37.68. See H an ratty ,"H egel and the G nostic Tradition: II,” 313.69. Butler. 32; H offm eister #8. H arris w rites:"It seems to me virtually certain that for H egel, at any rate, the'invisible C hurch ' originally referred to the cosm opolitan ideal o f Freem asonry as envisaged by Lessing in Ernst und Falk” (Toward the Sunlight, 105). H arris also seems to suggest that th e 'in visib le church" should be understood as equivalent to O bjective Sp irit (Nigfet Thoughts, 4 11).70 . Robert Schneider, Geistesahnen, 4 1.7 1. Ibid., 146.

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It is through Böhm e and O etinger that Joach im ism and m illenarianism in general arc incorporated into the H erm etic tradition, and sign ificantly, it is Böhm e and O etinger w ho are probably the ch ie f sources o f H egel’s Joachim ism . F. E rnest Stoeffler m akes reference to O etin gers “ ram pant chiliasm ," which “surpassed even that o f B e n g e l W hile B en gel had put great stress on how we can know that the m illennium is approaching (e.g., through his theories o f biblical exegesis), O etinger took B en gels calculations for granted and focused instead on precisely w hat the end o f tim e would bring. T h e picture that O etinger paints o f the "G olden A ge" at the end o f tim e is essentially indistinguishable from utopian socialism :

In any kingdom , true happiness has three conditions [all o f which w ill be satisfied in the m illennium ]: first, that despite all m ultiplicity, w hich is not against order, and despite all differences o f rank, the subjects have equality am ong each other, as w e have learned from the distribution o f Israel w here the equal share o f land rem inded everybody not to pride h im self above others. Everybody is to find his happiness in the happiness o f his neighbor, his jo y in the jo y o f all the other people, and by that everybody is to be a free lord am ong others; secondly, that they have a com m unity o f goods and not take delight in goods because they are a property; thirdly, that they dem and nothing from each other as an obligation. Because, i f everything would be available in abundance, there w ould be no need o f governm ent, property, and o f no liabilities forced and extorted by governm ent.7*

O f course, such a utopian conception is com pletely antithetical to the spirit o f H egel’s Philosophy 0/Right (in the preface to which H egel explicitly rejects utopianism ).74 Nevertheless, it m ust be rem embered that in his youth, H egel, like so many others o f his generation, was infatuated with the utopian ideals o f liberty, equality, and fraternity proclaim ed by the French revolutionaries. A s H egel him self discusses, it is natural for young people to be idealistic and to dream o f rem aking the world. It is generally assum ed that H egel’s youthful idealism was awakened by the revolution, but Ernst Benz suggests a different hypothesis:“G erm an democratic ideas do not rest solely on the ideology o f the French Revolution, but find roots in the C hristian conscience o f Sw abian Pietism ."’' Benz is suggesting that the source o f H egel’s idealism is the dream o f the "G olden A ge" o f freedom and equality that he encountered in Bengelian, O etingerite, H ahnian, and other Pietist "schools." It would have been hard to have avoided encountering these currents in late eighteenth-century Stuttgart. H egel— and Schelling and H ölderlin— may have responded so quickly and enthusias

72. Stoeffler, German Pietism, 117 .73. Q uoted in Vondung,"M illcnarianism , H erm eticism , and the Search for a Universal Science," 12a.7 4 . It should be mentioned that O etinger w as in no w ay a revolutionary. H e believed that his G olden Age w ould be brought about by G o d , not man.Until that tim e, he advocated obedience to authority and viewed existing social institutions positively. See H ayden-Roy, "A Foretaste o f H eaven“ 52-53.75. Benz, Mystical Sources, 44 .


tically to the French Revolution because they saw in it the im m inent fu lfillment o f ideals to which they were already com m itted, ideals transm itted to them by Sw abian Pietism .7*

O etinger believed that at the end o f tim e, not only w ould all men live in perfect harm ony but science would be transform ed. N o longer would there be a m ultitude o f disconnected sciences; a new “superscience" w ould arise that w ould un ify all know ledge. O etinger s N ew Science, as we m ight call it, is a version o f pansophia. Benz describes O etinger’s science as it w ill exist in his utopia: "T h e com ing together o f these g ifts o f the spirit occurs in a central vision exalting the faith o f the K ingdom s subjects to the level o f knowledge, o f an intellectual intuition. T h ey will participate in a central kn ow ledge.'T h e description o f th is know ledge o f the future already constitutes a direct foreshadow ing o f the idealistic idea o f know ledge such as w e find in different form s in Schelling, H egel, and Baader.” O etinger describes his N e w Science in the follow ing rapturous language:

It w ill be very easy to understand: G o d w ill present all things in an intuitive form ; and we will see his reckonings in an architectural vision, in detail and in its totality, in the physical as in the m oral; but above all we w ill have a very clear know ledge o f the history o f nations. W h at the H oly Revelation only outlined, w ill be recounted in all detail, draw n out o f the abyss, set beside every kind o f state or constitution and seen under the righteous en lightenment o f the know ledge o f G o d , o f the soul, and o f the hum an body. T h ere will be no m ore than one basic w isdom . Jurisprudence and m edicine w ill be inseparable from theology; history w ill be the public theatre o f G od 's w ays and o f providence, o f all the phrases o f S o lo m o n .. . . It w ill be the source o f all know ledge. T h e law w ill com e from theology, and m edicine w ill be no m ore than an em blem atic theology. W e w ill see in souls and in bodies the im print o f the being from w hom all things have com e forth.™

A side from the claim that this know ledge w ill be had in "intuitive form," this passage seem s alm ost like a prophecy o f H egel's system . A s we have noted, H egel's philosophical project aim s at a perfected form o f life that w ill transform all aspects o f man and his world: religious life, art, ou r understanding o f history, o f science, o f governm ent. H egel's Lee- tures on the Philosophy o f History can be seen as an attem pt to make good on O etinger s prediction that the N ew Science w ould include a theodicy, an attem pt to show that “ h istory [is] the public theatre o f G o d ’s ways and o f all providence." For H egel as for O etinger, science and philosophy becom e identical w ith theology. H egel takes up "w h at the H oly R evela

76. H ayden-Roy, in her study o f the influence o f W ürttem berg Pietism on H ölderlin , w rites th at'C h iliastic excitem ent w as widespread am ong all ranks o f the W ürttem berg Pietists at the tim e H ölderlin w as studying at the Stift, and the French Revolution added to their conviction that they were draw ing near to the fullness o f tim e" (“ A Foretaste o f Heaven," a i6).77 . Benz, Mystical Sources, 40.78. O etinger, Sämtliche Schriften, vol. 6, 47.

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tion only outlined," the triune structure o f the divine; he "recounts it in all detail” and "sets [it] beside every kind o f state or constitution,” in order that w e m ay "see in souls and in bodies the im print o f the being from w hom all things have com e forth."

W h ile the influence o f Bengel and O etinger on H egel's thought is highly probable, in the case o f Schelling it is certain. Schelling describes h istory as a "successively developing revelation o f G od .” v In Die Weltalter Schelling states that "T h e peace o f the G olden Age [das Goldne Zeitalter] w ill be made know n first through the harm onious unification o f all sciences."40 In his System of Transcendental Idealism (180 0 ), Schelling sets forth w hat he calls "the only true interpretation o f h istory” :

H istory' as a w hole is a progressive, gradually self-disclosing revelation o f the absolute. H ence one can never point out in history the particular places w here the m ark o f providence, or G o d H im self, is as it w ere visible. For G o d never exists, i f the existent is that which presents itse lf in the objective world; i f He existed thus, then we should not; but H e continually reveals H im self. M an, through h istory', provides a continuous dem onstration o f G o d s presence, a dem onstration, however, which only the w hole o f h istory can render com plete.’"

In the sam e w ork, Schelling, like Joach im and his fo llow ers, divides h istory into three epochs, m aintaining that in the th ird epoch G o d is finally “actualized.”

5. H e g e l an d P ru ss ia n R o s ic ru c ia n ism

T h e m ajor difference between H egel and the Sw abian m illennialists is that H egel believes the end o f tim e has already arrived. Indeed i f it were not already finished we could not know it. To be sure, Hegel's theory o f history is sim ilar to Jo ach im s in being Trinitarian, but unlike Joachim , H egel does not em ploy the T rin ity as a device for m aking predictions about the future; he merely uses it to m ake sense o f the past (M arx, not H egel, is the true m odern disciple o f Joach im ).

It w as in Berlin that H egel lectured on his philosophy o f history, and in Berlin that he published h is Philosophy of Right. H egel came to Berlin in 1818, after having taught for ju st tw o years at H eidelberg. T h is was the crow ning m om ent o f his career, and he rem ained in Berlin until his death on N ovem ber 14 , 1831. T h e call to Berlin w as a recognition o f H egel’s im portance as a thinker. In Berlin H egel w as a celebrity and enjoyed considerable influence. H is lectures were attended by hundreds o f people from all w alks o f life: "veterinary surgeons, insurance brokers, civil servants, operatic tenors and com m ercial clerks were rushing to his

79- Schelling,"Philosophie und Religion" (18 04 ), Werke, vol. 4 , 47.80. Schelling, Die Weltalter (18 13), Werke, vol. 4 , 582. T h is and the preceding line from Sch ellin gs'P h ilo so p h ie und Religion" are quoted and discussed in Vondung,"M illenarianism , H erm ericism , and the Search for a Universal S c ience," 124 .81. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, an .

" T h e R o se in th e C ro ss ” 247


lectures.""; I f w e look at H egel’s interests during the Berlin period it is clear that he view ed his new post as a pulp it from which to proclaim the nature o f the legitim ate state (the Philosophy o j Right), the actualization o f G o d in the w orld (the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion), and the c lim ax o f the story o f m ankind (the Lectures on the Philosophy of World H istory). H egel w as no O etinger: he was not the herald o f a new age and o f utopia; he w as M inerva's w ise old ow l proclaim ing that the K ingdom o f G o d is already spread upon the earth, and men need only see it.**

In the preface to the Philosophy o f Right H egel attacks utopianism , at one point em ploying a now -fam ous m etaphor: “ T o recognize reason as the rose in the cross o f the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the a c tu a l. . (K n o x, 12; p r , 27). In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion o f 1824 , H egel em ploys the sam e m etaphor, stating that "in order to pluck reason, the rose in the cross o f the present, one m ust take up the cross itse lf" ( l p r 2:248n 4s).

Su ch com m entators as K n ox, L öw ith , Lasson , H odgson, and W ood agree in attributing H egel's m etaphor to the Rosicrucians.*4 O ddly, h o w ever, none o f them show s how th is connection throw s any light on H egel’s teaching. Löw ith suggests that H egel not only refers to the R osicrucians but also to a device originated by Luther.** T h e problem w ith this suggestion is that Luther's device is a cross in a heart in a w hite rose, not a rose in a cro ss.* Furtherm ore, in a review essay published in 1829, H egel h im self identifies the reference as being to the Rosicrucians and suggests that only "ignorance” ( Unwissenheit) could explain som eone’s failure to recognize the allusion.*7 H e says nothing about Luther.

Earlier in the preface, H egel draw s an interesting contrast between people's attitude tow ard nature and their attitude tow ard the ethical world. "S o far as nature is concerned people grant that it is nature as it is w hich philosophy has to bring w ith in its ken, that the philosophers stone [der Ste in der W eisen] lies concealed som ew here w ith in nature itself, that nature is inherently rational, and that w hat know ledge has to investigate and grasp in concepts is this actual reason present in i t . . . in the sense o f the law and essence im m anent w ith in it” (K n ox, 4 ; p r , 16). T h e rose represents reason. S ince H egel uses the philosopher's stone to represent the reason inherent in nature and society, the philosopher’s stone is

82. R üdiger Safranski, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years o f Philosophy, trans. Esw ald O sers (Cam bridge: H arvard U niversity Press, 1991)» 259.83. M y allusion is to the G ospel o f T hom as, 114 . See The Other Bible, ed.W ilis Barnstone (San Francisco: H arper and Row, 1984), 307.84. K nox, 303 n34; Löw ith , Hegel to Nietzsche, 18; H odgson, l p r 2:248 n45.; A llen W ood, editorial note in H egel, Elements o f the Philosophy of Right, ed.A llen W . W ood and trans. H . B. N isbet (Cam bridge, U .K .: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1991), 391» n27.85. Löw ith , Hegel to Nietzsche, 18 -19 .86. O ne is tem pted to think that this im plausible hypothesis has suggested itse lf to scholars sim ply because they are on more fam iliar territory dealing w ith Luther.87-’ Ü ber die H egelsche Lehre oder absolutes W issen und m oderner Pantheism us.— Ü ber Philosophie überhaupt und H egels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften insbesondere," (1829), in Werke 11:466 .

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equivalent to the rose in the cross. G iven the reputation o f the Rosicru- cians as alchem ists, the equivalency o f these tw o m etaphors cannot have escaped H egel.“ T h u s there is an alchem ical-Rosicrucian m etaphorical subtext to the preface. H egel is again playing the role o f “world-historical alchem ist": having isolated the philosophers stone (reason) in the realm o f nature, he now turns to the ethical w orld and proposes to carry out a sim ilar operation there, to find the p h ilosophers stone in w hat is.

W h y does H egel place a clear and publicly acknow ledged reference to the Rosicrucians in the preface to the Philosophy of Right ? H egel seem s an unlikely Rosicrucian. T h e Rosicrucian m anifestos announced the aim o f a “G en eral R eform ation o f the Entire W orld.” Hegel's aim s, however, were not so grandiose, and by the tim e he arrived in Berlin his political philosophy had becom e distinctly conservative.

T h ere is m ore to the Rosicrucian saga than has been discussed so far, however. Som e time in the latter h a lf o f the eighteenth century the Rosicrucian m ovem ent w as revived in G erm any. T here is disagreem ent about exactly when this took p lace— som e say 1757, som e 1777# others give a different date entirely. By the late eighteenth century, however, the Rosicrucians were anything but reform ers. T h e new incarnation o f the R osicrucian brotherhood, christened the “G o ld and R o sy-C ro ss” (Gold- und Rosenkreuzer) w as a conservative organization, dedicated to com bating the influence o f the liberal Freem asons and Illum inati.89 T h e R o sicrucian revival in the eighteenth century appears to have been sparked initially by Sam uel R ich ter’s Die wahrhafte und volkommenc Bereitung des philosophischen Steins der Bruderschaft aus dem Orden des Gulden und Rosen Kreutzes ( 17 10 ) .^ R ichter (w ho w rote under the nam e Sincerus Renatus) w as a Silesian Pietist pastor w ho preached Paracelcism and Boh- m eanism from the pulpit. T h e order o f the G o ld and R osy-C ross was probably founded by H erm ann Fichtuld, w ho w as in correspondence w ith Oetinger.*’

T h e order w as opposed to the rationalism and m echanistic m aterialism so much in vogue in the France and England o f the Enlightenm ent. It w as dedicated to com bating rationalist attem pts to “ reform ” religion, to “ re-educate" the people, and to reshape or overthrow the state. T h e new Rosicrucians saw them selves as defenders o f the faith and o f public order, as the follow ing quote from one o f their num ber clearly indicates: “ It is one o f our forem ost duties to serve the state into which we have been placed by Providence— to serve it w ith all our pow er and capacity. W e m ust be obedient and loyal to the higher pow ers ordained by G od ,

88. C hristopher M acintosh argues that the m em bers o f the eighteenth-century G old-und Rosenkreuzer were deeply involved in alchemy. Each o f the ord ers lodges had its ow n alchem ical laboratory, for the use o f members. M acintosh, The Ro*e Cross, 75; 84-89. Epstein, Genesis o f German Conservatism, 105; see also H einrich Schneider, The Quest for Mysteries, 7 6 -7 7 . Epstein includes a long list o f secondary sources for the G old-und Rosenkreuzer (105).90. M acintosh, The Rose Cross, 30.91. Ibid., 4 6 -4 8 .


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and help to prom ote the public good even w hen it violates our private egotism.*” T h e G o ld and R osy-C ross gained considerable influence throughout G erm any, including H egel’s native Sw abia . Its m em bers included m any prom inent politicians, w riters, and scientists, including the physiologist Sam uel T h o m as von Sdm m ering, w hom H egel cites in his Philosophy of Nature (Werke 9 :4 5 1 )•

By far the m ost dram atic exam ple o f their influence w as during the reign o f Frederick W illiam II o f Prussia (17 8 6 -9 7 ). Frederick W illiam w as the nephew and successor o f Frederick the G reat. W hereas his uncle w as an ‘ enlightened" despot, interested in science, unm oved by superstition, and open to using the pow er o f the state to effect lim ited reform s, Frederick W ilia m w as a m ystic and an opponent o f Enlightenm ent. H e w as reputed to have visions, hear ghostly voices, and hold the occasional seance.91 Frederick the G reat had been a M ason, initiated into the order as a young m an. D urin g his reign the num ber o f lodges in Berlin increased to thirteen. Frederick h im self w as G ran d M aster o f a lodge called "At the S ign o f the T h ree G lobes.”* L ike his uncle, Frederick W illiam had also been a M ason, bur the o rd ers em phasis on rationalism and its m erely decorative m ystification did nor satisfy him .

D urin g the W ar o f Bavarian Succession in 17 7 8 -7 9 , Frederick W illiam encountered an officer in his uncles arm y by the nam e o f Joh an n R u d o lf von B ischoffsw erder ( 17 4 1- 18 0 3 ) . Bischoffsw erder, a Saxon by birth, had also flirted w ith M asonry, but his burning desire w as to be initiated into the secrets o f alchem y, » desire the M asons could not satisfy. O n C h ristm as Eve 1779 he w as initiated into a Rosicrucian lodge, w here he apparently found w hat he w as looking for. B ischoffsw erder is know n to have been conversant w ith K abbalistic and alchem ical w ritin gs.1'' In 1780, learning o f B ischoffsw erder s friendship w ith the prince, D uke Friedrich A ugust o f Braunschw eig-O ls, the ch ie f o f the Berlin G o ld and R osy- C ross, ordered him to entice Frederick W illiam into jo in in g their ranks. In the m eantim e, the prince had suffered an illness and Bischoffsw erder had nursed him back to health, apparently using a m ysterious elixir originating w ith the Rosicrucian brotherhood.* G ratefu l to Bischoff- sw erder and full o f m ystical enthusiasm , Frederick W ilhelm entered the Rosicrucian order on A ugust 8, 178 1, and w as given the secret name Brother O rm esus M agnus.

Presiding at the princes initiation cerem ony was the lodges founder, Joh an n C hristoph W o lln er ( 17 3 2 -18 0 0 ) . K lau s Epstein has described W olln er and Bischoffsw erder, w ho w ere close allies, as "the first se lfconsciously C onservative politicians in G erm an history, politicians in

92. Q uoted in Epstein, Genesis o f German Conservatism, n o .93. See H enri Brunschw ig, EnfiVferenmenl and Romanticism in Eighteenth-CenturyPrussia, trans. Frank Jellinek (Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1974)»165; cf. Epstein, Genesu of German Conservatism, 353.94- Brunschw ig, Enlightenment and Romanticism, 185.95. Epstein, Genesis o f German Conservatism, 354.96. G ilbert Stanhope, A Mystic on the Prussian Throne (London: M ills andBoon, 1912), 124.

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the honorable sense o f the term — men eager for pow er for the sake o f im plem enting their principles."*7 T h a t is to say, they w ere the first G e r man politicians w hose policies involved a conscious com m itm ent to rolling back the forces o f liberalism . W ollner, the son o f a Lutheran pastor, had m arried into the Prussian nobility over the objections o f Frederick the G reat, w h o refused to grant him a title. H e becam e a M ason in 1765 and rose quickly in the ranks to becom e a K nigh t o f the Strict O bservance (a rank associated w ith the alleged link betw een the M ason s and the K nigh ts Tem plar) in 1776. L ike Bischoffsw erder, h o w ever, he becam e disillusioned w ith the M asons and jo in ed the R o sicru cians in 1779 , w here he also attained a position o f considerable au th ority, serving as Oberhauptdirektor over tw enty-six Z irk e l." In the years leading up to Frederick W illiam s coronation in 1786, W olln er and B ischoffsw erder w orked hard to w in the prince over to their mystical philosophy and conservative politics, which w as not difficult.

W ollner's am bition w as to succeed the fam ous K arl Abraham Z e d litz , the Prussian m inister o f culture. H e succeeded in this on Ju ly 3, 1788, w hen Frederick W illiam , w h o had ascended the throne in the su m m er o f 1786, appointed him Stoats* und Justiz-M inister and C hef des Geistlichen Departements (m inister o f ecclesiastical affairs). W h ile W oll- n ers econom ic policy m ay have been progressive, he w as a zealous defender o f the traditional faith against rationalism . O n Ju ly 9 ,178 8 , ju st six days after acquiring his post, W olln er persuaded the king to enact the "E d ict C oncerning Religion," w hich com m anded orthodoxy o f the clergy. T h e "E d ic t o f C en sorsh ip" o f D ecem ber 19 ,17 8 8 , suppressed w ritings considered to be atheistic or otherw ise im pious. In 1792, W o lln er’s office published the Landeskatechismus, which defined the tenets o f relig ious orthodoxy and proscribed all rationalist approaches to"reform ing” religious practice or to "interpreting” scripture. W olln er is fam ous for his censorship o f Kant's Religion Within the Bounds o f Reason Alone (1793). D espite this, W o lln er’s “ Edict C oncerning R eligion” granted the d ifferent religious sects o f Prussia full freedom o f w orship, so long as they did not proselytize. Jew s, for instance, enjoyed full religious toleration under the term s o f the edict.

In 1797, the plans o f W olln er and B ischoffsw erder w ere abruptly crushed by the death o f the king and the ascension to the throne o f his son, Frederick W illiam III . T h e son had none o f the fa th ers mystical fervor or R osicrucian connections. H e w as no rationalist either, but, by all accounts, m erely a dullard w ithout any convictions o f his ow n. H e reigned for forty-three years. T h e rationalists w h o had laid low during Frederick W illiam I I s reign saw their chance: they filled up the vacuum that w as Frederick W illiam III , persuaded him to purge the R o sicru cians from the cabinet and to cancel m any o f the m easures enacted by W olln er and com pany. W o lln er and B ischoffsw erder retired into private life and died in obscurity.

97. Epstein, Gcmcjis of German Conservatism, 354.98. Ibid., 357.



T h is is the historical context required to understand w hat a reference to the "rose in the cross o f the present” w ould have m eant to readers— including censors— in 1821. Som e H egel scholars recognize this, but their treatm ent o f the historical m aterials has, in som e cases, been rather inadequate. For instance, K enneth W estphai th inks that H egel’s reference to the "rose in the cross o f the present" is a message to "the superstitious and reactionary king, Frederick W illiam III." W estphai inform s us th a t"T h e king belonged to the Rosicrucians, an anti-scientific cabalistic C h ristian sect devoted to the o ccu lt."* T h u s, H egel is denouncing th e"o th er-w o rld lin ess"o f the R osicrucian king, telling him he m ust recognize the rose in the cross o f the present.'00 T h e only p rob lem w ith th is, o f course, is that W estphai has his Frederick W illiam s w rong: w hen H egel published the Philosophy of Right in 1821, Frederick W illiam I I had been dead and the R osicrucians out o f pow er for tw en ty-four years! W estphai w ould m ake H egel a liberal D on Q uixote, dueling w ith nonexistent R osicrucian villains, m uch like the A m erican religious fundam entalists w ho see the Illum inati lurk in g under every bed. A fu rth er problem w ith W estphal's thesis is that w ith respect to th eir political views, the R osicrucians w ere not "other-w orld ly": in fact, they espoused the very sort o f anti-utopianism H egel articulates in his preface.

T h e sam e blurring o f historical fact occurs in a m onograph on the preface by A driaan Peperzak. R eferrin g to the "rose in the cross o f the present,” Peperzak w rites:

In a veiled m a n n e r. . . H egel could be understood here to be directing h im self to the king and his reactionary advisers w ith the m essage that true philosophy . . . does precisely w hat they w ish : it legitim izes the reconciliation and satisfaction w ith the existing political reality by show ing that it is as beautiful as a rose— in spite o f its painful aspects. T h e fact that H egel is not on their side, h o w ever, but on the side o f the m odern, post-N apoleonic legal state . . . choosing in favor o f enlightened m inisters such as H erdenberg and A ltenstein, is clear from the m ain text o f the Philosophy of Right, but not from the Preface. T h is lack o f clarity and the appearance o f agreement with the Rosicrucians among the politicians are tricks em ployed in H egel’s rhetoric .101

But again, the Rosicrucians w ere sim ply not a political force in Prussia in 1821. T h u s H egel w ould have gained nothing by the "rhetorical trick” o f "appearing to agree w ith the R osicrucians"— far from it, in fact, since it w as the reigning k ing w ho had long ago purged his governm ent o f Rosicrucian influence. Further, as I have show n, the R osicrucians were not "paleo-conservatives,” b lindly reacting to all change and opposing all reform . C h ristop h er M acin tosh w rites th a t"W o lln er w as in m any ways

99. W estphai, “C ontext and Structure o f H egel’s Philosophy of Right “ 238.100 . Ibid., 239.101. Adriaan T h . Peperzak, Philosophy and Polities: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy o f Right (D ordrecht: M artinus N ijhoff, 1987), 109: m y italics.

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a product o f the A ufklärung."102 H e contributed articles to Friedrich N ic o la is Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, the ch ie f organ o f the G erm an Enlightenm ent, and w rote essays on agriculture and land reform . M o reover, m any o f th e'‘reactionary" views o f the Rosicrucians were shared by H egel. For instance, H egel opposed forces that w ould underm ine trad itional religion, particularly irreligious philosophies; he held that all c itizens ought to be required to subscribe to a religion; he held that it is the "suprem e d u ty" o f citizens to belong to the state, etc. T o be sure, H egel is m ore liberal than W ölln cr ct al: he believes in greater freedom o f religion and advocates greater freedom o f expression than did the R o sicru cians, but his sentim ents are decidedly paternalistic, pro-C hristian , p ro tradition, and anti-individualistic. (T h e claim that conservatism means opposition to all reform s, including conservative ones, is sim ply a caricature and a canard.)

Peperzak claim s that H egel only “appears" to agree w ith the R osicru cians in their opposition to utopianism and their advocacy o f the conservative view that society as it is, w arts and all, is at bottom "rational” and cannot and should not be otherw ise. G iven that H egel had nothing to gain from m erely appearing to agree w ith the Rosicrucians, w c m ust consider the possibility that he really does agree with them. T h u s, H egel’s m etaphor o f the "rose in the cross o f the present" is hardly a bone throw n to the king's censors, but rather a daring move: an expression o f sym pathy w ith the discredited advisors o f the previous m onarch. M y conclusion is that w hen, in 1821, H egel set dow n his m ature view s on political philosophy, prefacing them w ith an attack on utopianism and political rationalism , he considered the place in which he w as then w orking, Berlin , and found h im self feeling som e sym pathy w ith the conservative Rosicrucians w ho had dom inated the court o f the previous king.

A s w e have seen, in Berlin H egel allied h im self w ith Franz von Baader, the reactionary occultist and opponent o f Enlightenm ent. Baader w as reputed to have been a m em ber o f the G o ld and Rosy- C ross. T h is w ould certainly be a strange friendship for H egel to publicly cultivate i f he wanted to distance h im self from the forces o f "reaction" that w ere still alive in Prussia. D espite significant differences between H egel’s philosophy and Baaders, H egel w rote to Baader in 1824, concerning the latter s Fermenta Cognitionis,*I th ink wc are in agreem ent on the m ain issue. A few m isgivings concerning a sm all num ber o f points which you cite from my w ork probably w ould easily be rem oved." H e closes by saying, "P lease spare me an evening som etim e soon. Let me kn ow which evening this week you are free and could grant me the k in dness o f a visit. M ost respectfully, H egel.""”

102. M acintosh, The Rose Cross, 180.103. Butler, 5 7 2 -7 3 ; H offm eister *4 6 6 a. In 1822, Baader and Baron Boris von Ü xküll, a form er Hegel student, set out for S t. Petersburg to try and found an Academ y for Religious Science. Baader invited H egel along, but he declined (a good thing, since Baader and C’xkull were uncerem oniously expelled from Russia; see Butler, 568-69).



A s d ’H on d t has discussed extensively, H egel’s early life w as m arked by num erous associations with Freem asonry. T h e re is no evidence that H egel ever actually becam e a M ason , but he w as friends w ith m any well- know n M asons and, as we have seen in chapters 2 and 4 , he em ployed som e M asonic im agery in his w riting. H egel's correspondence w ith Schelling and H ölderlin contains M asonic allusions. Recall H egel's Ja n uary 1795 letter to Schelling: “ M ay the K ingdom o f G o d com e, and our hands not be idle!" T h e last line before H egel's signature reads,“ Reason and Freedom rem ain our w atchw ord, and ou r rallying point the Invisible C hurch/'"* In later years, however, H egel realized that the K ingdom o f G o d had already come. T h ere w as thus no need for busy hands, or for a rallying point. I f w e ju xtap ose these rem arks from 1795 w ith Hegel's “ rose in the cross o f the present" o f 1821, it is apparent that H egel has, in effect, sw itched allegiances from the ideals o f the radical, reform ing M asons to those o f the conservative R osicrucians.1"

T h e possib ility that H egel m ight actually have belonged to the R o sicrucians, or som e other m ystical sect, is tantalizing but, at present, devoid o f proof. N evertheless, in the sense in w hich Yates uses the term , H egel is a Rosicrucian. Yates w rites that " I should like to try to persuade sensible people and sensible historians to use the w o rd 'R o s ic ru c ia n .. . . T h e w ord could, I suggest, be used o f a certain style o f th inking w hich is historically recognizable w ithout raising the question o f w hether a Rosicrucian style o f th inker belonged to a secret sociery.‘,‘06

In his Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth-Century Prussia, H enri Brunschw ig discusses a certain character type prevalent in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century G erm an y: m en who hunger after w isdom , particularly esoteric w isdom or forbidden ideas, and who are consequently attracted to "secret societies" like the M asons. T h e y arc disillusioned, inevitably, by the M asons, w hose "m ysteries" prove nonexistent. Brunschw ig w rites that such men

believe that even i f the lodges do not possess the secrets, that is no p ro o f that the m ystery does not exist. S o they set to w o rk in iso lation. T h e y read Jak o b Böhm e or Franz von Baader; they listen to Baron Eckhartshausen and Ju n g-S tillin g in his old age, high priests w h o w rangle over each other s fo llow ers. T h e y canvass such

10 4 . Butler, 32; H offm eister *8.105. In his Lectures on the History o f Philosophy o f 1805, Hegel bitterly dism isses Freem asonry:"Just as the Freem asons have sym bols w hich are esteem ed for their depth o f w isdom — depth as a brook is deep when one cannot see the bottom — that w hich is hidden very easily seem s to men deep, or as i f the depth were concealed beneath. But when it is hidden, it m ay possibly prove to be the case that there is nothing behind. T h is is so in Freemasonry, in w hich everything is concealed to those outside and also to m any people within, and where nothing rem arkable is possessed in learning or in science, and least o f all in philosophy" (l h p 1:89; Werke 18 :1 10 ) .106 . Frances A . Y ates,"T he H erm etic Tradition in Renaissance Science," in Art, Science, and History in the Renaissance, ed. Charles S . Singleton (Baltim ore: Jo h n s H opkins Press, 1968), 263.

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recent scientific discoveries as electricity, m agnetism , and oxygen and com bine experim ents w ith them w ith the ideas o f the ancient m ystics in new system s based on a popularization o f theosophy.107

T h is is a description o f the sort o f men w ho identified them selves as "R osicrucians," and— aside from the interest in Eckartshauscn and Ju n g-Stillin g— it is a very apt description o f H egel.

I have argued that H egel is a H erm etic thinker. I have offered three kinds o f evidence. F irst I have argued that H egel displays the essential characteristic o f H erm eticism : the doctrine that G o d alone is not com plete, that H e lacks self-know ledge, and that H e therefore creates the w orld as the m irror in which H e recognizes H im self, specifically through the speculative activity o f the H erm etic adept, w ho by know ing G o d , allow s G o d to know H im self. H egel claim s to be such an adept, having replaced the love o f w isdom w ith the possession o f w isdom , ph ilosophy w ith theosophy. Second, I have argued that H egel w as interested in and influenced by strands o f thought associated w ith m ost, i f not all. H erm etic th inkers, such as alchemy, K abbalism , m esm erism , extrasensory perception, spiritualism , dow sing, eschatology, prisca thcolo- gia, philosophia perennis, Lullism , Paracelcism , Joachim ism , Rosicrucian- ism . Freem asonry, Eckhartean m ysticism , and doctrines o f occu lt“correspondences" and "cosmic sym pathies." T h ird , by presenting ample evidence o f Hegel's contacts w ith the H erm etic tradition throughout his intellectual career, I have show n that the parallels betw een H egel and the H erm etic tradition are not accidental.

H ave I proven my case? T h is question leads to another question: W h at arc reasonable standards o f evidence for asserting that a thinker belongs to or is influenced by an intellectual tradition? I ask the reader to evaluate the persuasiveness o f m y evidence by the standard used in a court case: p ro o f beyond a "reasonable" doubt, as opposed to the unreasonable “p aper” doubts philosophy professors are so facile in conjuring up. Im agine that H erm ericism is a crim e and H egel is on trial for it. T h is study could serve as a b rie f for the prosecution. Let the fo llow ing serve as m y final sum m ation.

H egel's w ritings contain num erous, and m ostly approving references to H erm eticism : to leading H erm etic figures such as E ckhart, Paracelsus, Bruno, and Bohm e, and to H erm etic m ovem ents or schools o f thought such as alchemy, K abbalism , Freem asonry, and Rosicrucianism . H is library included H erm etic w ritings by A grippa, Bohm e, Bruno, and Paracelsus. H e relied on histories o f thought that discussed H erm es Trism egisrus, P ico della M irandola, R ob ert Fludd, K n o rr von Rosen- roth, and the Kabbalah alongside canonical figures like P lato and D escartes. H e read w idely on m esm erism , psychic phenom ena, dow sing, precognition, and sorcery. H e believed in an "E arth Sp irit." H e corresponded w ith colleagues about the nature o f m agic. H e explicitly and

10 7 . Brunschw ig, Enlightenment and Romanticism, 187.



publicly aligned h im self w ith the latter-day Rosicrucians and w ith the w ell-know n occultist Franz von Baader.

H egel was, furtherm ore, exposed to H erm etic ideas and influences throughout his career. H egel w as likely first exposed to H erm eticism during his boyhood in Stuttgart, from 17 7 0 -8 8 . H is hom eland, the G ran d D u ch y o f W ürttem berg, w as a center o f H erm etic activity and interest. In W ürttem berg, m oreover, H erm eticism w as not confined m erely to secret societies. Su ch figures as O eringer, Bengel, and H ah n injected the ideas o f Joach im , E ckhart, Böhm e, and Sw edenborg, and o f such traditions as K abbalism , alchemy, and Rosicrucianism , into the P ietist m ovem ent, thereby influencing the society at large. T h e influence o f W ü rttem b ergs speculative P ietism on H egel's friends Schelling and H ölderlin is w ell-docum ented, and considering the parallels between som e o f H egel's ideas and those o f the speculative P ietists, it is reasonable to conclude that H egel too felt their influence.

R osenkranz calls the years 1793 to 180 1, w hen H egel w orked as a p rivate tutor in Berne and Frankfurt, the "theosophical phase” o f his developm ent. D u rin g this tim e, H egel studied Böhm e, E ckhart, and Tauler and associated w ith m any know n Freem asons. In Jen a , from 18 0 1-7 , H egel lectured at length, and approvingly, on Böhm e and Bruno. H e com posed several w orks, preserved only in fragm entary form , em ploying H erm etic language and sym bolism , including th e"B öh m e M yth," the Triangle fragm ent, and the triangle diagram , w ith its alchem ical and astrological sym bolism . H is lectures on the Philosophy o f N ature also display a know ledge o f alchemy. It is also likely that Schelling in troduced H egel to his Jen a associates, m any o f w hom were heavily interested in H erm eticism .

D u rin g H egel's years in Berlin , from 1818 until his death in 1831, his interest in H erm eticism becam e m ore intense and m ore explicit. It w as during these years that H egel developed his relationship w ith Baader. In the w inter o f 18 2 3 -2 4 H egel studied Eckhart w ith Baader and subsequently produced a lecture on religion that Baader took to be a statement o f Eckhartian m ysticism . D u rin g these years, H egel also began to acknowledge his H erm etic interests m ore explicitly in h is w ritings. T h e im age o f the rose in the cross o f the present in the preface to the 1821 Philosophy of Right publicly aligned him w ith the Rosicrucians, a fact that he made even m ore explicit in a review essay in 1829. T h e preface to the 1827 edition o f the Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences in Outline m akes prom inent m ention o f Böhm e and Baader. T h e 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion introduce a doctrine o f the “ im m anent T rin ity ” clearly inspired by B öhm es initial triad o f “source-spirits.” T h e 1831 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion em ploy Joachim ite term inology to speak o f the Trinity. In the section on Qualität in the posthum ous 1832 revised edition o f the first part o f the Science o f Logic, H egel m akes an explicit reference to Böhm e where the first edition has m erely an allusion. In sum , all the evidence indicates that H egel's H erm eticism w as no mere folly o f youth, abandoned w ith maturity. It w as a lifelong interest, which grew deeper and richer w ith the passing years.

256 Magnum Opus

Finally, H egel’s system itse lf is H erm etic in both form and content. In addition to presenting the essential H erm etic doctrines concerning creation and man's role in it, H egel also endorses the H erm etic ideas o f the prisca theologia and the philosophia perennis. H e structures his system using the H erm etic sym bolic form s o f the circle, triangle, and square. H e also states m ore than once that the term speculative m eans the sam e thing as "m ystical." I have show n that the Phenomenology o f Spirit serves as a kind o f initiation ritual, an initial stage o f purification that raises the m ind above the sensory and the m undane and prepares it for the reception o f w isdom . It is a H erm etic ascent to the A bso lu te— which is set forth in H egel's Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences. I have also d isplayed a Bdhm ean subtext to the Phenomenology's fam ous preface. T h e structure o f H egel's Encyclopedia describes the H erm etic circle o f creation and also show s the influences o f Lullism and pansophism . I have am ply docum ented the explicitly ontotheological nature o f Hegel's Logic, as w ell as its traces o f K abbalism , Bohm eanism , and Lullism . T h e Logic seeks to lay bare the m ind o f G o d before creation. A s a H erm eticist, however, H egel regards G o d before creation as incom plete. T o com plete him self, G o d m ust know him self, and the im m ediate self-cognition G o d possesses before creation is nor self-know ledge. Self-know ledge requires m ediated re-cognition. It requires that the se lf see itse lf reflected in another and recognize itse lf there. T h e Philosophy o f Nature portrays the spatio-tem poral w orld as a m irror o f G o d . I have dem onstrated its debts to alchemy, Paracelsus in particular. H egel show s us how the w orld o f N ature is shot through w ith intelligible anticipations o f Sp irit, how the very stones "cry our" for Sp irit. T h e Philosophy of Spirit and related texts, The Philosophy o f Right, The Philosophy of World History, and the lecture courses on the three m om ents o f A bsolute Sp irit, art, religion, and philosophy, set forth the "return" o f creation to the D ivine by m eans o f man, w h o brings about the actualization o f G o d through progressively m ore adequate em bodim ents, first in the form o f concrete institutions and practices, then in the realm o f culture, particularly art and religion, and finally, and m ost adequately, in H egel's system o f speculative philosophy, w hich is the W ord m ade flesh, the divine logos sp iritually em bodied in the pure aether o f thought. W ith this, the H erm etic circle reaches closure. A n d here too the "prosecution" rests.

"T h e R o se in the C ro ss" 257


259

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279

Index

Abgrund (A byss), 24 . 3 8 .82, 163 A bsolute Idea, ±, 1 6 ,88, 95, iS h i55->56,

1 6 0 , 1 6 5 ,1 7 7 ,1£ & 18 9 -19 0 , 223, 234-235

A b so lu te K now ing , 14, 96 , 3 8 ,120.127- 128. U l, 137. 1 4 1 , 145. »46. 211

A bsolute Sp irit, 13, 68, 9 5 ,1 0 ^ 112* 146, 14 8 ,16 4 , 2 11 ,2 13 , 223

Abulafia, A braham , 32, 179 A dam H a-R ish on , 230, 233 A dam K adm on, in Luria, 230 -233 A dam s, G . P., 6aether: A ristotle on, 118 ; Böhm e on,

i98n. Hegel on . 95, inz. » 7 . 19 6 -2 0 0 : in Kabbalah (ruah), 168,170: Plotinus on, u & K . E . Sehelling o n ,217

A grippa, C ornelius, 2* 30 -33 . $8. 7 0 .12 9 ,166, I&2, i S L 2 11; Hegel owned works of, 3 2 - 3 3 .195

A lbertus M agnus, 22 -23 . 206 alchemy, 1 - 2 , 3. 22. 30. 32. 3 6 .4 6 ,6 4 . 70.

8 0 ,18 4 , ISth 2 4 9 -250 ; albedo, 146. 20 ;. 211; in China. 2o6n. 73; citrinatis, 203; description o f doctrines of, 20 0 -2 0 9 : as influence on G oethe, S7- 6i. 207, 2 10 -2 11 ; as influence on H egel, 3 , 48. 10 3 .1 1& 123 ,132 , 14 3 - 14 6 .19 1- 19 6 , 20 9 -2 13 ; nigredo, 14 5 - 14 6 ,16 5 , 203. 211; rubedo, 165, 203

A naxagoras, 196 A ndreae, Jakob , 52A n d reae,]. V., 52 -53 . 6 2 ,2 2 1 8 3 ,18 3-18 4 ,

242-243anim al magnetism . See M esm er, F. A . Antonia, Princess o f W ürttem berg, 65 A pollonius o f Tyana, 22 Aquinas, S t . T hom as. See T hom as

A quinas, Saint A rians, i6n. 39A ristotle, liL LZt 3Q. 3».66. 87, 92n.

z!L iQ 2 . 1 18 , 128. H 7 , 14 1. i s o . 160 . 18 9 -19 1. 194. 19 6 -19 7 . 200. 230

A rndt, Johann, 36 A rnold, G ottfried , 36,A rn old o f Villanova, 148 Aiclepius, 22 Ashm ole, E lias, 53 Augustine, Saint, 28

Baader, Franz von, 2, 4 7 - 4 8 .8on. 171,134. »76. 246, 254: and Böhm e, ± z iaru Hegel, 4 , 2S. 4 8 .10 5 , n o , i^7- i s 8, 226, 242, 253

Bach, Joseph, 5Bacon, S ir Francis, 7n. n . 48 , 53, j& L

1ÉL6Bacon, Roger, 125 Bauer, F. C ., 5 Beach, E . A ., 83n. 1&8 Becco, Anne, 185 Beck, L W ., 18 ,3 0 . 3S. 63 Beiser, Frederick, 22 j 77n. 155 Bengel, J . A ., 3, 64, 2h. 72n. 12k 7 9 -8 1,

233, 238. 243- 145» 247 Benz, Ernst, ^ a*, 24n. & 23. 37n. 56,

7 9 -8 0 , 2 i£ , 237, 242-243» 245Berlin Academ y, 211 Bischoffswerder, J . R . von, 2 50 -25 1 Blake, W illiam , 42 Blau, Josep h , 29Böhm e, Jakob, 2. £. 13. 2 8 , 36 -50 . 6on.

54, 61, 70. 102- 103. 105- 107, 119- 120.12 2 -12 3 . 1 3 4 . 13 6 ,13 8 -14 5 . «66.172- 173. 18 6 .1S 2 , 206, 227- 228, 231, 2350. 32. 236, 2 4 0 -2 4 2 . 245» 249» 2S4 : Alles and Nichts, $o , 16 2 ,168; Begreiflichkeit, 42; "darkness and Ught," l o i developm ental concept o f G o d , 38-39 : Etwas, 162. i n : “ Flash"(Schrack), i L 8 2 , 170; follow ers of, 4 6 - 4 7 : historical significance of,37-38 : influence on H egel, 3 - 4 . 2± 4 8 - 5 0 . 59n. £ 2, 1 0 0 , 109-no.»32- 133. 138- 145. I57- 1Ö5, 167 . la i t 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 , 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 ; influence on


280 Index

Böhm e, Jako b (continued)N ew ton, 19m . n ; influence on O etinger, 6 4 -6 8 ,13 7 ; influence on Pietism , 6 j] influence on Schelling,79 -8 3 ; and Jesu s C h rist, 45; life of, 36 -37 , 4 6 ; Naturspracbe, 4 4 ; quale, 152I and Qualierung (Inquaherung),» $ 8 -15 9 .163; Ungrund, 38, 4 0 -4 3 .»37n. 47. 16 2 - 16 3 , 16 8 ; W orks, Aurora (Morgenrolfe* im Aufgang), 36, 39 -4 0 , 4 2 - 4 5 , i 6 i i — , Clavis, 4 4 . >£ü — » Mjrjferium Magnum, 4 0 - 4 1 . 48 ,16 2 , 19m . 11 ; — , Six Mystical Points, 42,221, 2 4 1. See also evil; “source spirits"

Bolland, G . J . P .J., 5 Bolos o f M endes, 201 Bonner, Anthony, 178 Bourignon, Antoinette, 47 de B o u r r o u i l l , 5 -6 Boyle, R obert, 70 Bracken, Ernst von, 7 4 ,74m 134 Bradley, F. H ., 14Braunschweig, D uke Ferdinand of, 57 Breckling, Friedrich, 47 Brinton, H . H ., 37n. 55 Broad, C . D ., 7n. 12 Brow n, R obert, 83 Bruaire, C laude, 15 Brücker, J . J . , 16 6 ,17 6 , 232 Bruno, G iordano, 2 - 3 ,1 3 , 26, 28-29 ,

u - 34. 46 , 65, 77. 85n. 4 , 10 3 ,12 2 ,12 9 , I35n. 4 0 ,16 6 ,18 2 ,18 4 ; H egel on, 33, 49. lÄfi; Schelling on, 83

Brunquell, Ludw ig, 63 Brunschw ig, H enri, 254 Burbidge, Joh n , 74. 74n. 138 ,130 Burger, H . O ., 63m 66 Burton, R obert, 182 Butler, C lark , 48 , 75. 75»». 146 . 8$n. h

238

Cam bridge P b ton ists, 16 6 ,19m . 11 Cam illo , G iu lio , i8q - iS i Cam panella, Tom m aso, 166 ,183 Cam pbell, Joseph , 130 C am petti, Francesco, 216 C ap k o v i, Dagm ar, 183 caput mortuum, 1 12 ,14 5 , 203; H egel on,

1 0 2 , 1 4 6 . 16 4 -16 5 , 209, 2 10 , 213 Carove, F. W ., 218 Cassirer, E rnst, 26 C erf, Walter, 92n. 25 Chapelle, A lbert, 15 Charlier, Joh n , 170circularity, 2 , 1 0 , 1 4 . 25, 10 0 - 10 2 , io6n.

73, 154- 155/ I fo - I fa . »70. «79, »80-181.196, 208, 212, 230, 231; in Böhm e, 43, 170

C lark . M alcolm , 15 C lem ent o f A lexandria, 28 Clem ent X I I , Pope, 54 C obenzl, C ou n t Johann , 57 Coincidence o f O pposites (Coincidentia

Oppositorum), 24 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 127* 13 5 ,137! in Schelling, 82

C olberg, E . D ., 47 collective unconscious, 103 C om enius, J . A ., 5 3 ,18 2 - 18 3 ,185 C oncept (Begriff), i6n . 4 0 , 49n. 114 ,

I36n. 4 2 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 , 1 6 5 ,!9on. 8, 2 10 , 212, 24 0 ; in W eigel. 36,4 a

concrete universal, 95 "contraction and expansion,” 60, 6on. 54,

6 6 ,17 3 , 2 2 9 -2 30 ; in Hegel and Schelling, 82

Copenhaver, Brian, 22 C oplcston , Frederick, 6 Cordovero, M oses, 16 8 -16 9 ,17 5 . 228 Corpus Hermeticum, 1 , 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 1-2 2 , 24.

46, 56. 6 9 .99«. 47. U 9n. 9. «38 correspondences, 2, 4 6 ,12 2 ,18 8 ,^ 193-195 C otta , C . F., 57 Cottier, M .-M ., 5n. 6 Coudert, A llison, 7 ,18 4 C ou sin , Victor, 218Creuzer, G . F., influence on H egel, 8sn. 3 Croll, O sw ald , 207 C udw orth , R alph , 166 cultus, 225"cunning o f reason,” n o , 142 , 210 ,

2 2 7-228

d'A lem bert, Jean Le Rond, 182 D ebus, A llan , 7 ,19 1 , 204 Dee, John , 2o6n. 73 Deghaye, Pierre, 62 D em ocritus, 196D escartes, Rene, 7n. 12, 53, 53n. 8, 6 5 ,18 1,

197, 2 i8 n .112 D esire (Begierde); Böhm e on, 45; Hegel

on, 13 9 -14 3 . «73» 177. 21« de W ette, W M . L ., i j z d 'H on dt, Jacques, 6 , 57. 74»*. 13 8 ,75. 75n.

14 4 . »30, 254 dialectic, Hegel on, 8 9 -9 0 , 9 9 ,12 0 ,14 5 ,

»54-»55, 16l »75. 2 11-2 12 ,2 2 1-2 2 2

Dickey, Laurence, 6 1-6 2 , 70 , 238, 242, 244

D ickson, D. R ., 53n. 12 D iderot, D enis, 166» 182, 211 D ierauer, Walter, 78 D ietrich o f Freiburg, 23 Dilthey, W ilhelm , 4


Index 281

D ivine Triangle. See H egel: W orks: Triangle fragm ent

D ivisch, Prokop, 68 D obbs, Betty Jo Teeter, 7 D o m , G erh ard , 207 Dove, K . R ., 15 dowsing, 2 .16 D um m ett, M ichael, 7n. 12 D u p ri, Louis, 15 D üsing, K laus, I35n. 40 D u ry.Joh n , 18 2 -18 3 ,18 5

Earth Spirit, 201; Hegel on, 2, 201, 2 13 -2 14

Eckerm ann, Peter, 78n. 160 Eckhart, M eister, 1 - 2 , 2 2 - 2 6 .27, 32, 35»

38- 39. 43» 63n. 70 , 74.8 2 ,1 19 ,12 2 ,13 3 , 136 ,16 3 , 205; as influence on Fichte, 74; as influence on H egel, 3 - 4 , 74.106, n o , 116 , 2 2 5 -2 2 7 , 242

Eckhartshausen, Baron K arl von, 254-255

Edighoffer, Roland, 52n. 3 Egidius o f V iterbo, C ardinal, 31 Egyptian M ythology/R eligion , 12, jui, 37,

„ 9 4 , 131E leusinun m ysteries, 11, 75, 86n. 10 ,12 3 ;

H egel on, 13 0 - 13 2 ,13 9 .14 8 E lu d e, M ircea, 201Emerald Tablet o f H erm es Trism egistus,

the, 13, 2 2 ,4 4 . 5 8 ,18 7 ,2 0 1 Em pedocles, 194encyclopedism , 12 ,17 7 - 18 6 ; and Hegel,

14 ,18 5 - 18 6 "end o f history,” doctrine of, 2 36 -2 4 7 ; in

H egel, 8 8 ,1 19 - 12 0 ,12 7 . 236, 247 ; in Joachim de Fiore, 228; in the Kabbalah, 235-236 . See also m illenarianism

Enlightenm ent, the (die Aufklärung). 56 -5 8 ,18 2 , 253; in G erm any, 58, 63,77

ennead, the, 10 0 - 10 1 Epstein, K laus, 56m 31, 249n. 89,

2 50 -25 1Erasm us, i8 in . 94. 204 Eschenm ayer, A . K ., 218 esotericism , I, 46evil, 3 5 ,17 3 ,17 7 ; H egel on, 10 8 ,142-143» „ 2 4 .Evola, Baron Ju liu s, 40 n . 74, 5 2 , 10 m . 57.

102n. 62. 148 , 2 0 0 -2 0 1, 2 0 1. 206

Fackenheim, Em il, 15 Faivre, Antoine, 7, 8n. 14 , 22^ 2 8 ,45n. 97,

46, 52-53» 56n. 29 ,83, 9 9 ,16 6 , 238 fall o f man, Böhm e on, 45, 73, &2 t *7® Febvre, Lucien, 70

Fessler.J. K . C ., 55Fichte, J . G ., 3 , 7 1 , 8 1 , 1 1 7 , 119» 134-135»

138, 227;"L etters to Constant," 55; as M ason, 55 ,7 4

Fichtuld, H erm ann, 249 Ficino, M arsillio , 2 8 ,3 1-3 3 ,19 6 Figala, K arin , 146, i64n . 29 Findlay, J . N ., 6 ,16 , 49n. 1 1 5 , 178n. 83 Fischer, G ottfried , 5 Flagellants, 238Fludd, Robert. 2, 5 3 ,7 0 ,16 6 ,18 2 - 18 3 .

208"folk religion," 7 2 -7 3 , 84 Force and its Utterance, 164 four elem ents, 10 1 - 10 2 ,1 17 , 1 2 2 ,19 1 - 19 6 ,

202, 210"four worlds," 174-175. 230, 232; Hegel

on. 175 Fowden, G arth , 9 - 1 0 . 123 Franck, Sebastian , 3 4 -3 6 ,54 Frankfort, H . A ., 94, 97 Frankfort, H enri. 94, 97 Franklin, Benjam in, 216 Frauenmystik, 23Frederick the G reat, K ing o f Prussia, 58.

2 50 -25 1Frederick-W illiam II, K in g o f Prussia,

250 -252Frederick-W illiam III, K ing o f Prussia.

2 5 1-2 52 freedom, H egel on, 140 Freem asonry, 2 -3 , 35, 53~ 5 6 ,113» 2*0,

244 , 249, 250; and G erm an Pietism , 64m 73; and H egel. 3, 73- 74» 105. 13 0 -13 1 , 254, 254n. 105; and H iram , legend of, 131; initiation into, 146; and Knights Tem plar. 54, 251; Scottish Rite. 54; S trict O bservance,54

French revolution, 75, 2 4 5-2 4 6 Frickcr, J . L., 6 8 ,7 0 , ig6n . 21 Friedenthal, R ichard, 58 Friedrich A ugust, D uke o f

Braunschw eig-Ö ls, 250 Fries, J . F„ 157

Gadam er, H .-G .. 64n. 75 G aier, U lrich, 78, 78n. 165 Geistleiblichkeit (corporealization); in

Böhm e, 4 2-4 3* >62,190; in H egel, 68, 9 5 ,12 2 ,19 0 , 213. 224; in O etinger, 66. 68, 9 5 .12 2 ,19 0 , 224 ; in Schelling, 81; in Schw enkfeld, 66

gem atria. 32 genius (Geniwj), 218 G eraets, T . F., 164 G erard o f Borgo San D onnino, 238 G ich te l.J. G ., 47


282 Index

G ikarilla, Jo sep h , 235 G nosticism , £* to, 25*165, l67n. 3 6 , 175,

135-236 G od w in , Joscelyn, 1S2 G oethe, J . W . von, S7-6i. 77. 79. 122.

207. 2 ion . 31* 2x1, 230; boranical theory, 6 c ; color theory, 60 1 Die Geheimnisse, 6 ü and H egel, 78n. 160. 83; as M ason, 5 5 -5 6 ,6 1; as m em ber o f Illum inati, 521 in d Schelling, 83; Sorrows of the Young Werther, 52

G öschei, K . F., 71 G o g e l,J. N .. 2 i G ospel o f T hom as, 248n. 83 G oth a, D uke Ernst of, 52 G ra il, Holy, 14 8 -14 9 Gray, Ronald, *8 ,61* 64n. 74, 2 0 1. an G roote, G erald , 26 G rotiu s, H ugo, 74 G ruppe, O. H** fii

H aberm as, Jürgen , 38n. 61 HafenrefFer, M atthias, 243 H a h n .J. M ., 63* 80 H ahn. P. M ., 6 2 ,6 4 , 6 8 -7 0 , 72n. 12^ 2

2 4 4 -2 4 5 ; influence on Schelling, 80 H aK an a, Rabbi N . ben, 166 H alevi, Z ’ev ben Sh im on, 168 H am ann, J . G ., a8n. 28* 221 influcncc on

H egel, 7 7 -7 8 , 78n. i£ q H anrarty, G erald . 25 H ardenberg, K arl von, 52 H arris, fcL S ., 6 , 12n . 30* 12. 4 8 -4 9 . 59n.

42. 7 1 -7 3 . 7 4 - 7 5 . 75n. 144, 7 7 , 82. 86n. 8* 82, 92n. 25, lo o . 10 5 - 10 6 , i07n . 76. I07n. 7 9 , 1 1 0 , 12 9 .132 . !4 o n . $4 . 142m 6o. 150m L-155. 1 0 4 -1 0 5 . i96n. 20. I 9 6 n . 2 2 i l£ 2 i «98n. 3 1 , i98n. 34 * 200. 200. 226n. 6

H artlib, Sam uel, 5 3 . 18 2 -18 1.18 5 H artm ann, Klaus, 14 - 15 Haselm ayer, Adam , £i H atab, L J . , 96-9 8 H äusserm ann, Friedrich, 111 H ayden-Roy, P. A ., 28, 246n . 26 H aym , R ., i07n . 26* U7n. 103 H egel, Christianne, 2 12 H egel, G . W . F.: on aufheben, 92m 261 in

Berlin, 3* io in . £2t ISO* 2 4 7 -2 4 8 , 253; in Berne, 3* 74, 8 4 , 10 6 .116 ; conservatism of, 253; early, four-part system of, U2i as esoteric writer, 137; in Frankfurt, 3 , 28* 105* in H eidelberg, 150, 247; as H erm etic thinker, 1 - 4 . 6* 1 0 - 1 4 . 1 0 1 - 1 0 4 ; in Jena, 3* 25m 13* i£ L > 12 - 13 4 .1 4 9 , J2 , 163, 209. 2 ion . QL. 215 ; lectures ofT”2 4 7 -2 4 8 ; M ythology o f Reason.

8 4 -12 3 ; “non-m etaphysical reading" of, 14 -17 ; in N urem berg, 150; periods o f H erm etic influence, 2-4.: religious views of, 16* i6n . 3 8 .10 4 . 227; Schelling, critique of, 135 -138 ; in Stuttgart, 22 Sw abianism of, 62* 20* xi6 ( i f f also W ürttem berg); “theosophical phase,” 3* 105* 116 : in Tübingen, 222 W orks,“ Böhm e M yth” (o f 18 0 4 -5 ) , 143-144 .173. 20 7 .230;— , Differenzschrift, 79, 86n. 8* 90; — , "D issertation," io in . $2± 1$2± *95. i96n. 2 ii — ."E arliest System Program o f G erm an Idealism,” 8 4 -9 6 , 104 ; — , "early theological writings," 7 1- 7 2 ; — ,"E leusis," 7 5 -7 6 .13 0 . ig8n. 35; — . Encyclopedia Logic, 85-86 , 10 0 - 10 1 . io6n . 7 3 , 1 2 0 . 13 5 ,13 9 ,14 7 , 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 .150. 167m 36* 168, 182* 180. 2oq. 240: — , Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Sciences, 9 4 , 150 .159 .185. 215, 226: — , Faith and Knowledge, 146 ; — ,’ First Philosophy of Spirit," 19 2 - 19 3 .199; — , Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, 2. 21. 2 9 .3 0 .33. 4 in. 28. 4 8 - 5 0 ,85n. 3 , 102* 102. » 2 .1 3 2 ,138, l it i , i s 7. 1 5 9 . 166, 246 ; — , Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion, 4* ±Sj 8$n. ^ 86n. 10* 12 0 - n in , iq&.I32n. 2 1* 13 5 ,136m 4 2 , 13 9 ,15 2 - 15 3 .163, 2 2 3-2 2 7 , 2 4 0 -2 4 1. 248; — ,Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 9 2-9 3n . 28* 9 5 ,113 , 223, 248;— , Logic, 2 . 1 4 , 1 6 ,8 l, 89, 95, 97n. ± 1* 1 0 1 . 10 5 .10 9 .1 19 .12 8 , m . 15 0 - 18 6 ,156, 18 7 -18 8 ,19 0 .19 8 , 222, 224: — , purpose of, 1 5 0 - 15 2 .2 10 ; — , “O n M ythology," 821 — . Phenomenology o f Spirit, 1^ 2 * 4 .14 , 2 8 ,34, 48. 5 9 ,9on. iA 9 2-9 3 . 97n. ±0. 98. 100* 1 0 5 .113, 122- 123, 127- 149. 16 0 ,178. 180, 188.1 9 0 .1 9 5 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 , 224; as G rail quest, 149. »_£3i — . Philosophy of Nature, 2 - 4 . 13*30* 48, 59n. 42* 89, 95, 98n. 45* 1 0 0 .10 m . Ü i2£* 10911.85, 12 8 ,14 0 . i4 2n . 60* 14 4 , 15m . 3* 155,15 8 ,18 7 -2 0 0 , 209. 215, 250; — , Philosophy of Right, 2 ,4 * 155, 213, 224.245. 2 4 7 -2 4 9 . 252; — . Philosophy of Spirit, 4 . 24n. 11, 89m 16 , 95, H7n. 102. »28 .14 0 . i4 2n . 55* I52i LZlt 20 9 -2 13 . 18 9 -19 0 . 2 12 -2 2 2 , 2 4 1: — , Realphilosophie, 8 5 - 8 6 ,192m 13; — , Science o f Logic, 4 . 48, 8 5 ,100 . i03n. 64, 10 9 .15 0 - 16 5 .17 6 - 17 7 : — . System of Ethical Life, 93n. 29: — , triangle diagram , 2* 105* 1 10 - 1 19 .13 2 ; — , Triangle fragm ent, 25n. 1 3 , 10 4 - 1 10 .

Copyrighted mater

Index 283

117 ,13 2 , 2 4 1; — ."W astebook," 102, io6n . 72; See also aether; Concept; Desire; speculative philosophy

H eidegger, M artin , 15 ,13 2 ,15 0 ,2 2 9 11.12

H eine, H einrich, 78H clm ont, F. M . van, 58, 7 0 ,16 6 - 16 7 .

18 4 -18 6 , 2 0 1 ,2 i7n . 10 6 ,2 19 H elm ont, J . B. van, 184. 219 H em sterhuis, Frans, 71 hen kai pan, 33, 7 7 , 10 2 ,135 , 203, 20$,

214H erder. J . G ., 6 9 11.10 2 , 7 1 ,7 7 - 7 8 ;

H erm eticism of, 69, 6 9 11 .10 3 ,19 7 ; as m em ber o f Illum inati, 57; as M ason, 55

H erm es Trism egisrus, r -2 , 2 2 -2 3 , *8, 35, 4 6 .5 3 ,5 6 ,6 9 .9 9 ,16 6 . 201

Hermetica. See Corpus Hermeticum H erm eticism , 39 ,9 8 -9 9 . io in . 57.

10 2 -10 3 , n o , 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , 123*145 , >92. 20 1; defined, 1 ,8 - 1 4 ; and Enlightenm ent, 58

H esiod, 2ion . 89 H eyd on ,Joh n , 53H ildegard o f Bingen, Saint. 2 3 ,4 3 ,63n.

7 0 ,2 0 5 H inrichs, H . F. W ., 190 H irsch , Immanuel. 5 H obbes, T hom as, 49, 74 H odgson, P. C ., 24 m . 5 1, 248 H ofirnann, E . T . A ., 211 H ölderlin , Friedrich, 33, 35, 62, 69, 75,

77- 78, 8 4 , 1 3 5 , 198n. 35, 2 14 . 246n. 76, 254

H om er, 152H um boldt, A lexander von, 48 H um e, D avid. 49, 74 H usserl, Edm und, 120 H yppolite, Jean , 90

Ibn al-’Arabi, M uhyi al-D in, i77n . 79 Iljan, Iwan, 15Illum inati, the, 5 6 -5 7 ,13 0 , 249, 252 im agination, 46, 9 3 ,17 6 ; Hegel on,

9 8 - 10 4 ,12 2 ; and memory, 46 Indian m ysticism , 85n. ^ I7 6 -I7 7 n . 77 infinite, the, Hegel on, 14 7 - 14 8 ,15 2 , 229,

234 ingentum, 99initiation, 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 2 3 . 1 2 9 - 13 0 ,146.

154 . See also Freem asonry: initiation into

internal relations, doctrine of: as H erm etic, 13 ,14 , 26, 205; in Luria,233

"invisible church,” 35, 55, 73. 244. 254- See also O bjective Spirit

Irira, A . C ., cited by H egel, 232 Ishm ael, Rabbi. 175

Jacobi, F. H ., 4 9 .7 U 77. 77n. 155.891*. 15.135m 40

Jaeschke, Walter, 15, io5n. 67 Jager, J . W., 70 Jam es, W illiam , 7n. 12 Joachim de Fiore, 22, 63m 7 0 ,6 5 , 228,

2 36 -2 4 7 ; influence on H egel, 2 38 -2 4 2 Job , B ook of. 72 Jo h n o f Rupescissa, 196 Ju n g , C . G ., in n . 8 9 ,2 0 0 , 20m . 46, 203,

2o6n. 72, 212, 220m 114 Ju n g , Em m a, 14 8 - 14 0 . 201. 238 Jun g-Stillin g, J . H ., 254 -255

Kabbala Denudata. See Rosenroth, K norr von

K abbalah, 1 - 2 , 1 3 , 2 8 , 1 0 - n , 37. 37n. 56. 4 in . 79. 43n. 86, 7 7 .1 19 - 12 0 ,12 2 , 16 5 - 17 7 ,18 1 ,18 4 . «86,191, 228-236 , 250; C hristian , 13, 29, 31, 46, 62, 65, 16 6 .17 6 - 17 7 , « 7 2 ,18 2 ,185. 203, 2o6n. 7 3 ;“dialectic” in, 175; Ein-Sof, 16 8 ,17 0 , 176, 228, 229 -230 , 234. 236; Hegel on, 10 3 ,16 6 - 16 7 ,17 6 - 17 7 ; as influence on G oethe, 5 8 .6 1 ,17 3 ; as influence on O etinger, 6 5 - 6 6 ,16 7 ,17 3 ; Keneset Israel, 174, 235-236 ; Shekinak, 43n. 86, 174, 234 -235 (see also O bjective Sp irit); Texts, Bahir, 16 6 , 175; — , M a ’arekiiet ha-Elohut, 169; — . Sefer Ha Zohar, 166, i6 7 n 4 0 ,1 6 8 , 1 7 4 , 2 3 6 ; — , Sefer Yezirah, 16 5 -16 6 . i67n 40 , 16 9 -17 0 ; — , Tikkun, Luria on, 233. See also A dam K adm on;"fou r w orlds”; Sephiroth

K an t, Immanuel, ^ 7n. 12, 34, 48, 56, 67,7 1, 74 , 78, 81, 8 3 ,10 0 ,1 17 ,1 19 - 12 0 ,165, 215, 251; Hegel's critique of, 153-154

Kaplan, A ryeh, i7on . 5 7 ,17 5 K arl-A ugust, D uke o f W eim ar, 57 K arl Theodor, Elector o f Bavaria, 57 Kelly, Sean . U7n. 102, 213, 22on.

114Kepler, Johannes, 188 K hunrath, H einrich, 146 . 2o6n. 73 K ieser, D . G ., 218 Kim m erle, H einz, 10 1 ,10 4 Kingdom o f a T housand Years (Tausend-

Jahre Reich), 244 K ingdom o f G o d , doctrine of, 54, 6 2 ,73 ,

242 , 2 4 3 -2 4 4 , 248, 254 K lettenberg, Susanna von, 58-59 Knebel, K . L. von, 210 Knigge. Freiherr Adolph von, 56


284 Index

K nights Tem plar, 54, 251 K nox, T . M ., i2n. 248 Kober, Tobias, 37 K ösrlin , N . F., 72n. 12 1 ,8 0 Kojeve, A lexandre, 1 2 0 ,1 2 9 ,14 m . 57,

I55n. 6 Kolb, David, 14 Krisceller, P. O., 7 ,19 1 Kuhlm ann, Q uirin ius, 47

Lactantius, 28 Ladner, G erald , 242 Langen, Augusr, 14$Langer, E . In . , 58 Lanz, Jakob, 57 Lasson, G eorg, io in . $7, 248 Lavarer, J . K ., 7n. 12, i45n. 71 de Lavinheta, Bernard, 181 Law, W illiam , 47l.ead. Jane, 46 Leeses, K urt, 8an. 184 Leiblichkeit. See Geistleiblichkeit Leibniz, G . W ., 7n . 12, 27, 3 6 ,6 5 ,6 9 , 74.

167, l&O. 18 4 -18 6 ; as Rosicrucian, 53, 18 4 -18 5

de Leon, M oses, 16 6 ,16 8 Leonardo da Vinci, 2i8n. 112 Lessing, G . E ., 7 7 ,13 0 ; Ernst and Falk, 55,

73, 244n . 69; as M ason, 55; Narfcun the Wise, 55, 73. 77n. 155» 122

Leutw ein, M agister, 72 Locke, John , 49. 74 Logos, 16, 25, i07n . 7 9 ,12 2 ,15 1 Löw ith , K arl, 223, 248 de Lubac, H enri, 238-239 Lucifer: Böhm e on, 4 4 .10 8 ; Hegel on,

14 3 - 14 4 ,17 3 , 230 Lull, Ram on, 1 - 2 , 1 3 , 22, 3 3 ,12 2 ,16 6 ,

17 7 -18 2 . 20 1, 206; Hegel on , 17 0 -18 0 ; names o f G o d , 178; parallels to H egel.178 -18 1

Luria, Isaac, 38n. 6 2 ,16 8 ,17 0 , 22 8 -2 34 ; on Adam K adm on, 230 -233; and H egel. 167, 229 -230 , 232, 234; influence on Böhm e, 229-232; influence on O etinger, 65, 232; Tikkun, 233; tsimtsum, 228 -230 , 232-233 . See also Kabbalah

Lütgert, W ilhelm , 5Luther, M artin , 29 -30 , 34~ 35, 7 h 78, 87,

242, 248, 248m 86

Machiavelli, N iccolö, 74 M acintosh, Christopher, 55, 58, 249m

88,252m acrocosm -m icrocosm doctrine, 1 2 . 6 i,

202; in Böhm e, 45; in H egel, 200: in Paracelsus, 205

magic, 2 ,12 , 3 1 - 3 3 , 1 1 3 - 1 16 , 19 1 ,19 7 , 200; in Böhm e, 42, i62n. 27, 219m 113, 2 2 1-2 2 2 ; Hegel on. 9 3 ,9 8 ,110 , 12 2 - 12 3 ,12 9 , 212, 216 . 2 18 -2 2 2

M aier, H einrich, 5 M aier, M ichael, 53 M aker, W illiam , 15 M artensen, H ans, 4 M arx, K arl, 247 M asonry. See Freem asonry M ayer, Paola, 134 M azet, Edm ond, 54 M cK night, Stephen, 7 ,19 1 M edici, C osim o de, 28 m em ory: art of. 34, 46, 9 9 ,10 3 ,12 2 ,

1 8 0 - 18 1 . 18 4 ,18 6 . See also recollection

m em ory magic. See m em ory: art o f M erkur, D an, 179m 86, l8 ln . 95 M esm er, F. A .. 2 .16 ,6 2 ,6 8 . 255; Hegel

on, 2 15 -2 18 ; Schelling on , 2 16 -2 17 M essina Colloquium on G nosticism ,

ion . 22m illenarianism , 18 3-18 4 , 2 36 -2 4 7 ; and

H erm eticism , 245- See also"end o f history," doctrine o f

Minerva, 74 . 74n. 139 M itscherling, Je ff, ion . 22 M nem osyne, 85m 4, 87, 90, lSo m odernity, Hegel on, 97 Molay, Jacques dc, 54 M ontaigne, M ichel de, 31 M ontesquieu, Baron, 7 1 ,7 4 M ontgom ery, J . , 243 M ook. H .W .,6 M ore, Henry, 16 6 ,19m . 11 M oses, 120M ozart, W. A ., 216. 2i8n. 112M üller, G ustav, loon . 55M urray. M ichael, 240m ysticism , 1 ,10 ,10 2 .12 9 .13 3 ,13 5 - 13 8 .

152. 179, 2 23-227 m yth, nature of, 9 4 -9 8 m ytho-poetic rhought, 9i~>23

national differences, Hegel on, 215 natural science, H egel's critique of, 97 N atural Sou l, 213 N eoplatonism . See Plotinus N eum ann, Erich, 9 4 .10 2 N ew ton, S ir Isaac, 7n. 1 2 , 18 8 ,19m . 11,

>97Nibelungenlied, 23N icholas o f C usa, 1 ,2 6 - 2 8 , 39 ,8 2 ,12 2 ,

13 5 - 13 6 ,18 1 ,18 3 , 205 N icolai, Friedrich, 219 , 253 N icolescu, Basarab, 4 1 - 4 2 N ietzsche, Friedrich, 51


Index 285

N ilsson , M . P., 131 N oack, Ludw ig, 5N ovalis (Friedrich von H ardenberg), 47.

78. «33- 134; as M ason, 55

O bcrberger, J . K ., 64 O bjective Sp irit, 2 ,6 8 ,1 17 . «64, 213, 223;

and “ invisible church,“ 244n . 69; parallels to Keneset Israel, 174 , 236; parallels to Shekinah, 234 -235

occultism , 1O etinger, F. C ., 1* 13, 48, 60, 6on . 48,

6on. 5 4 ,6 2 ,6 4 - 7 1 . 72n. u i , 78n. 165, J07n. 7 6 ,1 2 0 ,1 3 3 , 13 8 ,1 4 8 . 156 .16 2 ,176 .18 6 , 211, 2 2 7-2 2 8 , 238, 2 4 5 -2 4 7 , 2 4 8 -2 4 9 ; balm leaf experim ent,8 0 -8 1; Bible translations quoted by Schelling, 81; chiliasm of, 245; conservatism of, 245n. 74; on fire and water, I92n. 13; followers of, 6 8 -6 9 ; on Geist, 6 5 -6 6 ; generative m ethod, 67; and H egel, 68, 9 5 , 10 6 ,10 9 - 1 10 .1 19 , 143, i62n. 2 1 ,19 2 11 .13 , jy6n . 20, 2 i4n .97, 224. 242, 2 4 6 -2 4 7 ; influence on Schelling, 69, 7 9 -8 1, 79m 169, 247; on Intensum, 6 5 -6 6 . 6 8 ,12 2 ,13 7 ; on nature and spirit, 189m 6; theologia emblematica, 6 8 ,12 2 ;“truth is a whole," 6 7 -6 8 ,13 7 ; W orks, Aufmunternde Gründe . . . , 64 ; — . Biblisches und Emblematisches Wörterbuch, 66; — , öffentliches Denckmal der Lehrtafel, 65; — , Reden nach dem Allgemeinen Wahrheitsgefühl. . . , 65; — , Swedenborgs und anderer irdische. . . , 65; — , Theologia ex idea vitae deducta, 79; — , Die Wahrheit des Sensus Communis, 67; Txntrallerkenntnis, 67. See also Geistleiblichkeit; Sensus communis

O lym piodorus, 201 ontotheology, 15 - 16 ,15 0 O 'R egan , C yril, 6 . 1 4 - 1 5 , 5on. 1 18 ,94n.

12* 16 4 ,16 7 , «76n. 76 , 238n. 48, 240, 24 m . 52

ouroburos, 102» 203, 208

pansophia, 2, 22, 5 2 ,79n. 16 9 ,17 7 -18 6 ; in Oetinger, 246

pantheism ( Pantheismusstreit), 8 -9 , 24.33. 39. 48, 59.7 6 - 7 8 .1 19 . 135- 136.2 14

Paracelsus (T heophrastus Bom bastus von H ohenheim ), 2 ,1 3 .10 * 3 5 - 3 7 , 48, 53, 58.6 5 . 7 0 ,10 5 ,13 3 .13 8 .18 2 - 18 3 .197, 201, 2 0 3-2 0 6 , 2 1 1 -2 12 , 2i5n. 99, 249; H egel on, 49. 59n. 4 2 , 1 0 0 , 1 2 12 0 0 -2 10 ; on sulphur-m ercury-salt, 35, 4 1*132 , 204 , 212

Parzival. See W olfram von Eschenbach Patrizzi. Francesco, 18 3 ,185 Paulus, H . E . B ., 188 Peirce, C . S ., 7n. 12 Peperzak, Adriaan, 252-253 perennial philosophy, a, 5 3 ,10 3 ; Hegel

on, 8 4 - 9 0 ,10 0 ,12 2 , 224 Petry, J . M ., i92n. 12, 218 Philadelphian Society, 46 Philo o f A lexandria. 235m 37 philosophers stone (Stein der Weisen),

146. 148. 201- 204. 206, 208, 2 11-2 12 , 248-249

philosophia perennis. See perennial philosophy

philosophy, 87; as magic, 2 2 1-2 2 2 ; and religion, 15m 3 5 ,12 0 - ia m . 10 8 ,15 2 , 224. 226

phrenology, i45n. 71 Piaget, Jean , 138 Piarigorsky, A lexander, 131 Pico della M irandola, 2 , 1 1 , 28, 3 1-3 3 . i70.

181Pietism , 2 -3 , 5. 22, 47, 53n- 12, 58.

62-63 , 7 0 -7 2 . 7 in . 1 14 . 72 . 7 8 , 12 0 , 13 7 , «4 5 . «67n. 39, 227n. 8. 236. 240,2 4 2 - 2 4 4

Pimander, 28 Pinkard, Terry, 15Plato, 2 ,17 , 2 8 , 10* 7 1 , 9on. «96, 227;

Platonic dialectic, 89 Plocquet, G ottfried , 69, 71 Plotinus, 8n. 13 ,10 , 21, 2 3 ,17 2 ,18 9 , 204 Pöggler, O tto , 84 Poiret, Pierre, 47 Popkin, R ichard, 7 Pordage.John, 46 Postel, G uillaum e. i67n. 40 Pound. Roscoe, 55m 23 Pre-Socratic philosophers, 199 prisca theologia, 31, 52, 54 Proclus, Hegel on, 21, 33 ,4 9 , i«9. 122 psychic phenomena, 2; Hegel on,

2 13 -2 2 2 Pythagoras, 89

race, Hegel on, 2 14 -2 15Ram on o f Sabunde, 122recollection (Erinnern«#), 8 6 -8 7 . 98-99 .

122. i8o. 224 reflection, Hegel on, 120 Reform ation, 2 9 -30 Reinhold. K . L . 78; as M ason, 55 Renaissance, 8, 28-29 , 34 . 4 6 ,18 1- 18 2 Renan. Ernst, 242Renatus. Sincerus. See Richter, Sam uel Reuchlin, Johannes, 29, 62, 6 5 ,16 6 ,17 6 R e u ss ,J. F., 72n. 121


286 Index

Revealed Religion, 144-145 Ricci, Agosrino, 31 Richter, Samuel, 249 Ricger, R R von, 80 Romanticism, i, 88n. 14, 89,

133-135 “ Rose in the cross . . See

Rosicrucianism : im agery o f Rosenkranz, K arl, l , J2 ,25 n . 13, 48. 62,

78 ,93 , J 0 4 - 1 0 9 , 116, M7n. 1 0 3 , 12a, 151, 226

Rosenkreuz, C hristian , 5 1-5 2 , 86 Rosenroth, K norr von, 2 ,6 5 ,16 7 ,17 6 ,

18 4 ,2 32Rosicrucianism , 2, 35-36 , 5 1-5 3 , 99,

182-18 3, 24 4 ; G o ld and Rosy-C ross,248-255; and H egel, 24 8 -2 4 9 ,252-253 ; im agery of, 52

Rosier, G . F., 68 Rossi, Paolo, 182 Rosslyn C hapel, 75n. 145 Rothe, Johann , 37 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 49

Sainr-M artin , L C . de, 4 7 ,5 6 Salm , H ugo von, 54 Sartre, J.-P ., 138 Sarug, Israel, 229Schelling, F. W . J . , 1 - 5 , 7n. 12. 28, 35, 62,

6 4 , 70,7 2 , 73, 74n. 139, 77- 84,1 19 , 13 3 - 13 8 ,19 2 , 202, a n , 2 14 , 242, 243- 244. 246, 254; on art, 912 and Böhm e, 4 7 ,13 3 - 13 4 : Identity philosophy of, 79-83, 86n. 8, 9on. liL i37n . 47; influence on H egel, 79 -8 3 ; as M ason, 55; on medicine. 83, 205; philosophy o f nature of, 8 1-8 3 ,18 8 . 191» »95,197; transcendental idealism of, 79, 82; W orks, Bruno, 8 3 ,13 1; — , Exposition o f my System, 82; — , Freiheitschrift, 79 ; — , System of Transcendental Idealism, 88n. 14 . 247;— , Die Weltalter, 6 1 ,8 1 . 2 4 3 ,2 4 7

Schelling, Karoline, 83n. 191 Schelling, K . E ., 192, 217 Schelver, F. J . , 218 Schiller, J . C . F. von, 62, 7 1,8 3 ; Die

Freundschaft, 5 9 ,14 6 - 14 9 ; as M ason,55

Schipperges, H einrich, 205 Schlegel, A . W „ 133 Schlegel, Friedrich, 7 7 -7 8 , 88n. 14,

133-134 Schleierm acher, F. E . D., 78 Schneider, H einrich, 47, 52, 54, 56,

62-63, 64m 73 Schneider, H elm ut, io6n. 74. n o n . 88, ■

1 1 1 - 1 1 3 , u 6 ,1 17 m 101

Schneider, Robert, 5, 6 0 - 6 1 ,6 3 -6 4 . 67, 69n. 102, 7 0 - 7 1 , 72- 73, 79, 8 1 , 107n.7 6 ,14 3 .18 9 ° - 6, l96n. 21, 243-244

Scholem , G ershom , 38m 6 2 .4 6 , 790.16 9 ,16 5 ,16 8 - 17 3 ,17 5 ,17 7 , 228-229 , 231, 233, 235n. 37, 236

Schopenhauer, A rthur, 7n. 12 Schubart, C . F. D ., 78 Schuler, G isela, 84 Schwäbischen Magazin, 64 Schw eighardt, T heophilus, 53 Schw enkfeld, Caspar, 66 Self-Consciousness, 14 1 - 14 2 Sense-Certainty, 14 1 , 14 4 Sensus communis, 64n . 75, 6 7 ,12 2 ; as

influence on H ölderlin , 78 Sephiroth, 32x4 m . 7 9 ,16 6 .16 9 - 17 4 , 230,

234; Binah, 17 2 ,17 4 ; Da at, 17 2 ,17 4 ;Din (Gevurah), 6 7 , 1 7 2 - 1 7 4 .177. 229; Hesed (Gedulah), 6 6 ,17 2 - 17 4 , 229;Hod, 17 2 ,17 4 ; Hohkmah, 17 0 - 17 2 ,17 4 ; in Luria, 230 -232 ; Keter, 1 7 0 - 17 1 , 17 4 . 232; Malkhut, 16 9 ,17 4 , 2 34 -2 35 ; Nezah, 17 2 ,17 4 ; Tiferet, 17 2 ,17 4 ; Yesod, 172,

174Shaftesbury, A . A . C ., 74 Shakespeare, W illiam , 182 Sinclair, Isaak von, 75, 75n. 145 skull: as image in Hegel (die

Sclfädelstätte), 14 5 - 14 9 , 212; as M asonic image, 14 6 ; as vessel o f alchem ical transm utation, 14 5 - 14 6 , 206, 212. See also caput mortuum

Sm ith , A dam , 228 Söm m ering, S . T . von, 250 "source spirits” (Quellgeister), 4 2 - 4 3 ,6 1 ,

66, 7 4 .10 7 ,1 3 6 .14 7 ,16 0 - 16 1 ,16 3 ,16 9 , 172, 222. 229; Bitter, 4 0 - 4 2 ,10 7 - 10 8 , i53i Body, 40 , 4 2 - 4 3 ,16 4 , 235n. 37; H eat, 4 0 - 4 2 , 150; Love, 4 0 - 4 2 ,16 4 ; Sour, 4 0 - 4 2 , 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 1 4 4 , 150;Sw eet, 4 0 - 4 2 ,10 7 - 10 8 ; Tone (Sound), 4 0 ,42- 43, 107n. 79.164

Sparrow , Joh n , 37m 54, 46 Späth , J . J . , 167speculative philosophy, 82, 86, 95-9 6 ,

n o , 120 ; and m ysticism , 2, 8 6 ,10 4 ,13 8 ; and recollection, 8 8 -9 0

Spener, P. J . , 47, 53n. 12, 243 Sperber, Ju liu s, 53Spinoza, Baruch, 7n. 12 ,3 3 , 39, 74, 77,

77n. 155, 8 1 - 8 2 ,1 19 ,13 6 ,16 0 ,16 3 , i&Qj

214Spiritus, 196; in Böhm e, ii7 n . 102 ; in

H egel, in , 1 17 - 1 18 ,19 4 ,19 5 squareness, 2 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 1 1 7 , i2ät 181,

192


Index 287

Steffens, H einrich , 195, 20a, an Stephanos o f A lexandria, 201 Stoeffler, F. E ., 39. 47» 64, 245 Sto ics, 196, 205 Storr, G . C., 72, 7an. 121 Stuhlfauth , G ., u i Sw abia. See W ürttem berg Sw edenborg, Em anuel, 7n. 12, 58, 65,

8 jn . 191sym bolic form s, 9 8 -10 4 , in , 1 2 2 ,154 Synesius, 201

Tauler, Johannes, 3 ,63m 7 0 ,10 6 ,1 16 Tetragram m aton, 31, 238 Teutonic order, 35 Tbeologia Germanica, 3$ theosophy, 1, $ 3 , 137 -138 T hom as A quinas, Saint, 2 2 -2 3 T hom pson, C . J . S ., 165 H eck , Ludw ig, 4 7 ,13 3 - 13 4 triads, a, 16, 27. 36, 39. 4». 49» 6 5-6 6 .

86n. 1 0 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 10 6 - 10 7 ,1 17 - 1 18 ,122, 154- 155, 157» 161. !2L 175» »78- 179, 18 1,19 2 , 204 , 2o8n. 82, 2 10 , 212, 225, 237. 2 4 0 -2 4 2 , 247

Trism osin, Solom on, 203 Trithem ius, Joh n , 3m . 37 Tshugg, C. F. Steiger von. 74 Tuvcson, E . L., 8 -9

Understanding, 9 8 ,118 , i36n. 4 2 ,18 8 ,220

Ü xküll, Baron Boris von, 253m 103

Valentine, Basil, 58. ao in . 46 van den Broek, Roelof, ion . 22 van G h ert, P. G ., 13 2 - 13 3 ,15 9 , 2 17 -2 18 Verene, D . R , 86n. 7, &21.92. 99» >34n. 36,

I48n. 7 7 , 156n. 7 ,18 0 - 18 1 Versluis, A rthur. 4 4 , 154n4 "virgin earth," 59» 59«. 4 2 ,13 2 , 209, 212 Vischer, F. T ., 4Voegelin, Eric, 5n. 6 ,6 - 7 , 1 5 0 , 1 8 7 , 222,

237-238 Voltaire, 74

Vondung, K laus, 12, 69n. 103, 79m 169, »97. 247n. 80

W aite .A . E ., I79n. 88 W alker, D. P., 7 ,19 1W alsh, David, 6 - 7 , 8n. 13, 28n. 28, 37~ 39»

43n. 82, 44» 48, 48n. n a , 50, 59» 63. 74» 1 0 7 - 10 8 ,13 3 , 1 3 8 ,1 4 4 . 16 2 ,19 2 ,2 0 1-2 0 2 , 204, 241

Walter, Balthasar, 37 W ebster, Charles, 211 W eeks, Andrew , 3m . 36, 35, 37, 52,

205W eigel, Valentin. 35 -37 W eishaupt, A dam , 56 -57 W elling, G eo rg von, 58, 207 W estphal, K enneth, 252 W iedm ann, Franz, 70 W ierus, Johann , 33 W indischm ann, K . J . H ., 1 13 - 1 14 ,12 3 ,

130, 2 18 -2 19 , 238 W infield, R . D ., 1 5 , 14 m . 56 w itchcraft. 2 18 -2 19W olff, Baron C hristian von, 6 4 -6 5 ,16 6 W olfram von Eschenbach, 14 8 - 14 9 W öllner, J . C ., 2 50 -25 1 W ood, A . W ., 248W orld So u l (Anima Mundi), 32; Hegel

on, 16, 2 13 -2 14 W orld Sp irit (Weltgeist), 227 W ürttem berg, culture of, 6 1 - 6 3 ,7 0 - 7 1 ,

116 , 227, 2 4 2 -2 4 3 , 2 4 5 -2 4 6

Yates, Frances. 7. 28, 31, 34, 53» 85n. 4.17 8 - 18 0 .18 2 - 18 4 ,19 1, 254

Z ed litz , K . A ., 251 Z im m erm an , J . J . , 63 Z im m erm an , R . C ., 60 Z in zen d orf, C ount N ikolaus von, 58 zodiac, signs of, 32 Zoroaster, 28 Z o sim o s o f Panopolis, 201 Zu ich em u s, V iglius, i8 in . 94 Zusätze, 7n. it, 150

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Glenn Alexander Magee teaches in the Department o f Philosophy, Georgia State University.


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