of citizens, refugees, green cards and border guards ... · of citizens, refugees, green cards and...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border GuardsExplaining Immigration Flows and State Responses
Christian Breunig and Adam Luedtke
Department of Political Science - University of TorontoNiehaus Center for Globalization & Governance - Princeton University & University of Utah
Prepared for presentation at the IPES ConferenceCollege Station, November 13-14, 2009
![Page 2: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Motivation
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Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State
Immigration scholars debate three key areas:
• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?
• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?
• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?
![Page 4: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State
Immigration scholars debate three key areas:
• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?
• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?
• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?
![Page 5: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State
Immigration scholars debate three key areas:
• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?
• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?
• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?
![Page 6: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Research MotivationImmigration Flows and the Role of the State
Immigration scholars debate three key areas:
• Can the receiving state control/regulate immigration flows? Dopolitical/economic conditions in the receiving state affect levels ofimmigration? How so?
• Are there systematic differences between causal determinants (andthe extent of state control) for inflows of foreign workers versus thosefor asylum-seekers/refugees?
• Do the immigration inflows (and policies) of one state affectneighboring states? How and to what extent?
![Page 7: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy
• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.
• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?
• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.
Hypothesis: Institutions
Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows
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The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy
• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.
• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?
• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.
Hypothesis: Institutions
Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows
![Page 9: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy
• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.
• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?
• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.
Hypothesis: Institutions
Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows
![Page 10: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
The ArgumentAn Institutional Theory of Immigration Policy
• If any factor in the receiving state matters, it is likely to be politicalinstitutions - specifically, constraints on pure majoritarian democracy.
• Typically, the median voter is relatively xenophobic compared toimmigration policy outputs (immigrant inflows). What can explainthis gap?
• If political systems connect pure majoritarian preferences with policyoutputs, then immigration policy is more restrictive (smaller inflows).But if political systems constrain majoritarianism, then governmentscater to their pro-immigration ”clients” and ignore populistxenophobia.
Hypothesis: Institutions
Institutional constraints enable immigrant inflows
![Page 11: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Alternative ExplanationsPolitical Ideology and Economic Factors
Alternative 1: Government Ideology
Left parties enable immigrant inflows
Alternative 2: The Economy
Economic opportunities determine immigrant inflows
• High unemployment rates deters foreign workers (and possiblyasylum-seekers) from coming to a particular country.
• GDP growth attracts foreign workers and asylum-seekers to aparticular country
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Alternative ExplanationsPolitical Ideology and Economic Factors
Alternative 1: Government Ideology
Left parties enable immigrant inflows
Alternative 2: The Economy
Economic opportunities determine immigrant inflows
• High unemployment rates deters foreign workers (and possiblyasylum-seekers) from coming to a particular country.
• GDP growth attracts foreign workers and asylum-seekers to aparticular country
![Page 13: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
DataImmigration Flows - 1987-2005
Year
For
eign
Wor
kers
05000
100001500020000
1990 2000
AUS AUT
1990 2000
BEL CAN
1990 2000
CHE DEU
1990 2000
DNK
ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL
05000100001500020000
ITA0
5000100001500020000
JPN
1990 2000
NLD NOR
1990 2000
NZL PRT
1990 2000
SWE USA
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DataImmigration Flows - 1987-2005
Year
Asy
lum
See
kers
02000400060008000
10000
1990 2000
AUS AUT
1990 2000
BEL CAN
1990 2000
CHE DEU
1990 2000
DNK
ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL
0200040006000800010000
ITA0
2000400060008000
10000JPN
1990 2000
NLD NOR
1990 2000
NZL PRT
1990 2000
SWE USA
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Methodology IEstimation and Specification
y = βX + ρWy + ε
where:
• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers
• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate
and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:
• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations
• the outcome variable y
• a spatial lag ρ
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Methodology IEstimation and Specification
y = βX + ρWy + ε
where:
• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers
• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate
and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:
• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations
• the outcome variable y
• a spatial lag ρ
![Page 17: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Methodology IEstimation and Specification
y = βX + ρWy + ε
where:
• y is (1) foreign workers or (2) asylum seekers
• X includes Political Constraints (Heinsz 2002), Government Ideology(Left Cabinet Seat Share), Lagged Unemployment Rate and LaggedGrowth Rate
and the following extension for capturing cross-country diffusion:
• a connectivity matrix W denoting linkages among observations
• the outcome variable y
• a spatial lag ρ
![Page 18: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects
Identification of “Neighbors”:
• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)
• being a potential alternative “target country”
Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:
E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ
• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries
• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects
• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact
![Page 19: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects
Identification of “Neighbors”:
• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)
• being a potential alternative “target country”
Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:
E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ
• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries
• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects
• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact
![Page 20: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Methodology IIIdentifying Neighbors and Interpretation of Effects
Identification of “Neighbors”:
• close geographic proximity (Capitals < 900km)
• being a potential alternative “target country”
Interpretation depends on feedback mechanism:
E (y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ
• show the distribution of outcomes across all countries
• focus on a specific country and display domestic and diffusion effects
• construct a counterfactual change in immigration flows to a specificcountry and illustrate the impact
![Page 21: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Findings – Equilibrium Effects
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Foreign Workers
Equilibrium Effects for Political Constraints
Den
sity
AU
S
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
DN
KF
INF
RA
DE
U
GR
C
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZ
L
NO
R
PR
TE
SP
SW
E
CH
EG
BR
US
A
3350 3360 3370 3380 3390 3400
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Asylum Seekers
Equilibrium Effects for Political Constraints
Den
sity
AU
S
AU
T
BE
L
CA
N
DN
KF
IN
FR
AD
EU
GR
C
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZ
L
NO
R
PR
TE
SP
SW
E
CH
E
GB
R
US
A
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Findings – Equilibrium Effects
−1100 −1090 −1080 −1070 −1060 −1050
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Foreign Workers
Equilibrium Effects for Unemployment
Den
sity
AU
S
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
DN
K
FIN
FR
A
DE
U
GR
C
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZ
L
NO
R
PR
TE
SP
SW
E
CH
EG
BR
US
A
−130.0 −129.5 −129.0 −128.5 −128.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Asylum Seekers
Equilibrium Effects for Unemployment
Den
sity
AU
S
AU
TB
EL
CA
N
DN
K
FIN
FR
AD
EU
GR
C
IRL
ITA
JPN
LUX
NLD
NZ
L
NO
R
PR
T
ES
P
SW
EC
HE
GB
R
US
A
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Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000
Political Constraints − Germany 2000
Foreign Workers
−14−8−7−6−5−30152020
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Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000
Political Constraints − Germany 2000
Asylum Seekers
02367151617213357
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Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000
Unemployment − Germany 2000
Foreign Workers
−1055−3−102347
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Findings – Scenario 1: Germany 2000
Unemployment − Germany 2000
Asylum Seekers
−128−10
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Findings - Scenario II: Immigration to Germany doubles
Inflow Doubles − Germany 2000
Foreign Workers
−59−42−370
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Findings - Scenario II: Immigration to Germany doubles
Inflow Doubles − Germany 2000
Asylum Seekers
0679
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Discussion and Conclusions
Empirically, we find:
• political constraints and unemployment rate contribute toimmigration inflows
• the first more important for asylum seekers and the latter for foreignworkers
• occurrence of two diffusion processes: spill-over and competition
Theoretically, we propose:
• institutional constraints shield policy makers from anti-immigrationsentiment resulting in higher immigrant inflows
• Left parties are not “softer” on immigration than Right
• diffusion processes need to be model and theorized explicitlyalready in progress: estimating y = βX + ρWy + φyt−1 + ε withdifferent W
![Page 30: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Discussion and Conclusions
Empirically, we find:
• political constraints and unemployment rate contribute toimmigration inflows
• the first more important for asylum seekers and the latter for foreignworkers
• occurrence of two diffusion processes: spill-over and competition
Theoretically, we propose:
• institutional constraints shield policy makers from anti-immigrationsentiment resulting in higher immigrant inflows
• Left parties are not “softer” on immigration than Right
• diffusion processes need to be model and theorized explicitlyalready in progress: estimating y = βX + ρWy + φyt−1 + ε withdifferent W
![Page 31: Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards ... · Of Citizens, Refugees, Green Cards and Border Guards Explaining Immigration Flows and State Responses Christian Breunig](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022050309/5f717c4fda8aa80099623251/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Connectivity Matrix
Country ISOCODE Connections
Australia AUS JPN NZLAustria AUT DNK DEU ITA LUX CHEBelgium BEL DNK FRA DEU IRL LUX NLD CHE GBRCanada CAN USADenmark ‘ DNK AUT BEL FIN DEU LUX NLD NOR SWEFinland FIN DNK NOR SWEFrance FRA BEL DEU IRL LUX NLD CHE GBRGermany DEU AUT BEL DNK FRA LUX NLD CHE GBRGreece GRC ITAIreland IRL BEL FRA NLD GBRItaly ITA AUT GRC CHEJapan JPN AUS NZLLuxembourg LUX AUT BEL DNK FRA DEU NLD CHE GBRNetherlands NLD BEL DNK FRA DEU IRL LUX CHE GBRNew Zealand NZL AUS JPNNorway NOR DNK FIN SWEPortugal PRT ESPSpain ESP PRTSweden SWE DNK FIN NORSwitzerland CHE AUT BEL FRA DEU ITA LUX NLD GBRUnited Kingdom GBR BEL FRA DEU IRL LUX NLD CHEUnited States USA CAN