office of export control policy and cooperation na-242 ecco seminar june 2002 adam m. scheinman...

Office of

Export Control Policy and Cooperation

NA-242

ECCO Seminar June 2002

Adam M. ScheinmanDirector(202) 586-2331

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OFFICE OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION (NA-20)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Linton Brooks

Deputy Administrator

Nonproliferation Research & Engineering

Robert WaldronAssistant Deputy Administrator

NA-22

International NuclearSafety & Cooperation

James TurnerAssistant Deputy Administrator

NA-23

Nonproliferation & International SecurityStephen Black, Acting

Assistant Deputy AdministratorNA-24

Nonproliferation PolicyTrisha Dedik, Director

NA-241

Export Control Policy and Cooperation

Adam Scheinman, DirectorNA-242

International SafeguardsRon Cherry, Director

NA-243

Materials Protection &Emergency Management

Jack CaravelliAssistant Deputy Administrator

NA-25

Fissile Materials DispositionEd Siskin, Acting

Assistant Deputy AdministratorNA-26

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NA-242: Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for USG

Functional Overview

Domestic Controls International Controls

•Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists•Foreign Travel

•Foreign Visits &Assignments•CRADAs•NCI/IPP

•Part 810Authorizations

•Munitions•Dual-Use

•Iraq - Oil-for-Food

•NSG•Zangger Cmtee

•Wassenaar Arrgmt.•Iraq Action Team

•Add’l Protocol•MTCR/AG

•Russia/NIS•Middle East/SAsia

•East Asia•Latin America

•Southern Europe

DOE Complex Industry Multilateral INECP

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OVERVIEW

• Licensing: DECATS Export Controlled

Information Technology Transfer Surplus Material Industry Export Control Iraq – Oil for Food

• Multilateral: Purpose, Strategies &

Mission Nuclear Supplies Group Non-Proliferation Treaty

Technical Projects• International Nuclear

Export Control Program (INECP)

Licensing

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Licensing Team Areas of Responsibility

• Industry Part 810 authorizations Dual-use export licensing Nuclear-related munitions

licensing Assurance requests for NRC

exports

• Nuclear safety

• Export Controlled Information

• Iraq - Oil for Food

• Foreign national visas

• DOE Complex Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists Foreign travel by DOE scientists

and engineers Foreign national visits and

assignments International agreements (IPP, NCI,

MPC&A, etc.) Nuclear software Transfer of surplus property “Deemed exports” DOE publications “Pit-out” reviews

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Purpose: • Counter spread of weapons of mass destruction

• Serve domestic and international export control and nonproliferation training needs

• Provide an on-site awareness training of export control requirements

• Test user’s knowledge of export control

• Serve as early warning proliferation indicator

DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System

(Under Development)

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System Requirements:• Secure web-based client-server system

• Online documentation and help

• Usable at multiple DOE sites

• Incorporate site-specific data into the system contacts list procedures policies test modules manuals on-line

• Ability to edit core content without programming skills


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Reporting Requirements:• Individual user information

• Site statistics: Tool access and usage reports Training completion reports Annual reminders for refresher training Access to employee information for update of site training

records

• DOE compliance reports: Number of sites participating in Awareness Training Percent of employees who have completed training Percent of employees who failed training


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Favorable Features:• Consistent information to all sites:

Eliminates duplication of effort Allows easy dissemination of latest information and features

• Enhances sites that lack own training capabilities

• Compliance reporting capability

• Training scheduled to user’s convenience reaches a wider audience

• Documentation of material presented

• Leverages infrastructure resources


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Current Status:• Preparing for implementation

• Pending cyber security approval

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Export Controlled Information (ECI)

Export Controlled Information (ECI) - Technical information whose export requires a license

• ECI should be protected if uncontrolled dissemination would adversely affect U.S. national security or nonproliferation objectives

• DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance commitments to: U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals Scientific and technological advance Benefit to U.S. industry Benefit to U.S. taxpayer Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements

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ECI (continued):DOE reviews technical documents to identify ECI whose release

must be controlledECI review may require::

For publications:• Edit sensitive data• Limit distribution

For presentations:• Edit sensitive data• Limit audience

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ECI (continued):

NA-242 initiatives to control release of ECI under FOIA: Proposed legislation similar to DOD’s enacted in 1984 DOE would gain authority to withhold ECI But even now DOE may require FOIA requestor of ECI to

disclose citizenship and, if foreign, to obtain export license And if FOIA requester is U.S. citizen, DOE should advise of

export licensing requirements for ECI transfer out of the country

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Technology Transfer Control

Objectives:• To identify materials, equipment, and technology of

proliferation concern

• To prevent transfers to proliferants

• To protect against inadvertent transfers

• To weigh proliferation and security concerns against value of scholarship, technology advance, and economic benefit

• To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers

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Mechanisms of Transfer:• Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports

• Technical exchanges and communications

• Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent assignments

• Publications and presentations

• Visits and assignments to DOE sites

• Foreign travel by DOE personnel

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Transfer Control Principle:• Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control review is

a must

Control Measures:• Export control review of all proposed transfers, exchanges,

publications, presentations, visits and assignments, and foreign travel

• Export control requirements placed in all transfer agreements

• DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers

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Tools for Export Control Review:• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lists – Trigger and Dual-Use

• Export control regulations – Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• DOE/NNSA Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation Sensitive Countries List Sensitive Subjects List Technology experts and export control personnel

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Surplus Property

Transfer of Surplus Property:• Equipment and materials must be made useless for nuclear

purposes• Transfer agreement must include strict nonproliferation conditions• There is a presumption of destruction for NSG Trigger list items

and for weapons components• For items deemed too valuable to destroy:

Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

May require modifying equipment to render it useless for nuclear purposes

Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or export

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Dual-Use Export Licensing:• Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the

lead• Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement• EAR sections of note:

15 CFR Part 738, Special country policies 15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy – CCL-based controls 15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy – Catch-all controls based on

end-user and end-use 15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses 15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear

Referral List of items requiring DOE/NNSA review)

Industry Export Control

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Munitions Licensing:

• Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls

• Authority

Arms Export Control Act 1976

• International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121

• DOE reviews nuclear-related cases Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment

• Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without time limits or escalation


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NRC Exports:

• Special or general licenses required for nuclear facilities, components, fuel, and source or byproduct materials

• Authority

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

• 10 CFR Part 110 – implementing regulations

• DOE/NNSA participates in Executive Branch review of NRC export licenses and obtains foreign government peaceful use assurances

• DOE provides general license request confirmations


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• NA-242 reviews about 4,000 applications annually for exports to Iraq from various countries under the UN Oil for Food program

• Cases referred to DOE/NNSA from US UN Mission in New York

Review responsibility shifted to the IAEA Action Team as of June 1, 2002

• LLNL performs reviews; NA-242 recommends to approve, deny, or hold

Iraq - Oil for Food

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• Maintain DOE/NNSA Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation

• Export control training seminars for industry, academia, and federal government agencies

• Maintenance of Proliferation Information Network System (PINS)

• Review and approval of “deemed exports,” dual-use, and nuclear-related munitions cases

• Individual validation licensing for overseas activities

• DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System through NA-242 web site coming soon

U.S. Export Controls Activities

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continued:• Review technology transfer cases referred to DOE/NNSA by

the Departments of Commerce and State.

• Participation in the DOC Bureau of Industrial Security Operating Committee on export policy and the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP)

• Review of Foreign Access Tracking System database (foreign visitors to DOE/NNSA and contractors)

• Review of Foreign Travel Management System (foreign travel by DOE and contractor personnel)

• Participation in Export Control Coordinators Organization (ECCO) seminars

U.S. Export Controls Activities

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AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE

• Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise necessary to support NA-242 initiatives

• Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness into security briefings for new personnel

• In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI applicability review are done for all foreign national visits and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor personnel

• Target professional societies and groups of industry for nonproliferation awareness training

• Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops and Seminars

Multilateral

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Multilateral Team – Areas of Responsibility

• Multilateral Regime Support Nuclear Suppliers Group NPT Export Committee

(Zangger) International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR) in FY’03 NPT Review Conference –

2005 Working Groups

• Other Issues Export Control Workshops Bilaterals IAEA Action Team IAEA Additional Protocol

• Technical Projects Stockpile Stewardship Economic Globalization Characterization of DOE Complex Nuclear Propulsion Machine Tools SNET List Review Technical Review Group Commercialization of DOE lab

technology (CRADAs) Plutonium Isotope Separation

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Purpose:• International export control regimes prevent nuclear

proliferation by:

– delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as diplomacy, to help;

– causing proliferants to accept less capable and more costly options; and

– Establishing international guidelines and principles for nuclear suppliers with the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Multilateral

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Strategies:

• Strengthen the multilateral supplier regimes through continued U.S. technical leadership

• Promote adherence to multilateral nuclear supplier arrangements in support of USG nonproliferation policy

• Cooperate with the U.S. interagency, DOE and NNSA offices, and like-minded multilateral partners to promote peaceful nuclear trade and nonproliferation objectives

• Ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices and contractors are fully apprised of all multilateral commitments and obligations

Strategies

Multilateral

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Mission:• Initiate studies on rapidly developing technologies and

initiatives before problems arise Technical studies: Accelerator Production of Tritium; Naval

Reactor Technologies Multilateral negotiations: Conversion technologies; Plutonium

Isotope Separation Policy studies: Globalization study

• Pursue an active role in preventing proliferation.

• Protect U.S. national security interests and peaceful nuclear trade.

• Conceptual change from “export control” to “supplier policy.”

Multilateral

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Multilateral

Role of NA-242:• Multilateral Regime Support

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) NPT Export Committee (Zangger) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY’03

• Technical Team Projects Stockpile Stewardship, Globalization, Characterization of the

Complex, etc.• Other Issues

Export Control Workshops Bilaterals IAEA Action Team

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Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

NA-242 Participation:

• Consultative Group (working to revise the NSG Guidelines and improve the structure and effectiveness of the regime)

• U.S. Chair (Richard Goorevich, NA-242) to chair the Consultative Group during the 2002-2003 term.

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Membership (40 countries):Argentina Germany Portugal Australia Greece RomaniaAustria Hungary RussiaBelarus Ireland SlovakiaBelgium Italy SloveniaBrazil Japan South Africa

Bulgaria Kazakhstan (new) SpainCanada Korea, Republic of SwedenCyprus Latvia SwitzerlandCzech Republic Luxembourg TurkeyDenmark Netherlands UkraineFinland New Zealand United

KingdomFrance Norway United States

Poland

INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORTNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

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• Conversion Technologysuccessfully completedled by NA-242

• Plutonium Isotope Separationon goingNA-242 provides technical lead

• Full Scope SafeguardsU.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine

issue• Next NPT Revcon – 2005 & international outreach

U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue

NTP Exporters (Zangger) Committee

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Team Projects

Examples of NA-242 / Multilateral Team Projects:

• Technical Review Group (TRG) Phase IIStockpile StewardshipCollaboration with the UK on Machine Tools, Technical

Review Group (TRG) Peer Review, and SNET List Review

Economic Globalization and Nuclear Technology SupplyNuclear PropulsionCharacterization of the DOE Complex

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Other

• Hosted the 2001 NSG Plenary - Aspen, Colorado

• Implementation of NSG Information Sharing System (NISS) upgrade.

• Bilateral discussions on technical supplier issues and export controls (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Baltic States)

• Promote broader international adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol

Focus on export/import reporting requirements

Team Projects

International Nuclear Export Control Program

(INECP)

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International Export Control Program (INECP) Team – Areas of Responsibility

• Developing effective export control licensing processes

• Developing industry compliance by ensuring exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology are aware of national and international requirements

• Helping customs officials to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities

• Providing tools of export control Information technology Publications and handbooks Communication systems Dual-use material analyzers Remote inspection systems

Provide training and assistance to Russia, FSU and others by:

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Mission:

• Provide training and assistance to develop national systems of nuclear export control worldwide.

Approach:

• Three tiered approach:

U.S. Interagency (State Department lead)

Government-to-Government

Technical interactions

International Nuclear Export Control Program (INECP)

INECP: Promoting Effective Nuclear Export Controls Worldwide

Transparent and standardized national

licensing system

Industry awareness and

outreach

Ability to detect and prevent illicit

shipments

Maturing CooperationExpanding Assistance

Future Priorities

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• Leverage off Department of Commerce Export Control Assistance Program

• Assist with implementation of nuclear-related legal and parliamentary requirements

• Provide training to government and industry in U.S. and international nuclear export control and nonproliferation processes and norms

• Provide tools Automated information systems for licensing and exports Publications, handbooks, and technical guides Communication systems

INECP – Export Control Licensing Process

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(continued):

• Assist in strengthening controls on transfer of:

Surplus/decommissioned equipment – especially NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use List items

Technology

INECP – Export Control Licensing Process

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• Industry Outreach Partner with Department of Commerce

Assist in identifying potential exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology

Provide training to exporters in national and international export control laws, policies, regulations, norms

• Internal Compliance Encourage nuclear exporter compliance through training and

assistance

Assist exporters in establishing internal compliance programs

INECP – Internal Compliance/Industry Outreach

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• Partner with U.S. Customs international assistance programs and export control and border security program

• Assist in the prevention of illicit exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology

• Provide and sponsor training to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities

• Provide tools and equipment Remote inspection systems, handbooks, and publications

Dual-use material analyzers

Communication systems and databases

INECP - Enforcement

Looking Ahead

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Looking Ahead

• Following 9/11, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has moved to the fore of the U.S. national security agenda

• NA-242 funding will rise in FY03

• New program areas: Add missile technology dual-use export reviews in FY03 Add CBW in FY04 Broaden reach of INECP – South Asia, Middle East, East and

Central Asia, the Caucasus, major transshipment states Proliferation Research and Analysis Project – anticipate

emerging proliferation threats and identify chokepoints Support U.S. Customs role in enforcing domestic export controls

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Looking Ahead – Other Ideas

• Continue to work toward ECI exemption from FOIA

• Propose mandatory check-off block in FACTS to ensure that visited offices conduct “deemed export” review

• Propose mandatory check-off block in FTMS to ensure DOE and contractor travelers conduct export control review

• Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding NA-242 guidance

• Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE and contractor employees as part of security briefing

• Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to raise export licensing and nonproliferation awareness

office of export control policy and cooperation na-242 ecco seminar june 2002 adam m. scheinman...

Documents

international export

nuclear technology

doe scientists

fissile materials

tool access

refresher trainingaccess

employee information

number of sites