The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 16 | Number 4 | Article ID 5453 | Aug 15, 2020

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Okinawa Demands Democracy: The Heavy Hand of Japaneseand American Rule

Maedomari, Hiromori

Translated and Introduced by Joseph Essertier

Introduction

In “Okinawa Demands Democracy” MaedomariHiromari patiently details the cruel politicaland economic injustices that burden Okinawanstoday, such as their pseudo-citizenship andsemi-colonial status, a status that arose fromthe U.S. military occupation of Okinawa (whichbegan with the horrific 1945 Battle ofOkinawa). His analysis reveals the way thatsuch injustices are an inevitable result ofTokyo’s subservience to Japan’s imperialmasters in Washington, and it demonstratesthat, as a result of the U.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty, none of the people of the Archipelago,in fact, enjoy full sovereignty. That samegovernment that repeatedly plunderedOkinawa during the past three quarters of acentury under the banner of fighting forfreedom and democracy has also repeatedlyviolated Japan’s sovereignty.

“Okinawa Demands Democracy” was publishedin the September 2018 issue of the politicalmagazine Sekai (“World”), just a few weeksbefore Okinawans elected Denny Tamaki asGovernor of Okinawa Prefecture. Okinawanopponents o f the new Henoko baseconstruction at Camp Schwab saw GovernorTamaki as an ally and/or representative whowould respect the will of the people. Buildingon that success, of putting him in office, suchbase opponents have subsequently maintained

their campaign and achieved other notablevictories. For example, although the turnoutwas not spectacular, at roughly half theregistered voters, 72.2 percent of theOkinawans who participated in the citizen-initiated referendum in February 2019 votedagainst the plan to relocate U.S. Marine CorpsAir Station Futenma to Henoko. They thenachieved success in the by-election of April2019 when Yara Tomohiro, the candidatebacked by Governor Tamaki, won, and also inthe July 2019 election when Takara Tetsumiwon a seat in the Upper House.

Undaunted by the accidental fire that burneddown much of Shuri Castle in October 2019, byinfections from SARS-CoV-2 early this year, bythe sharp decline in February in the number oftour groups coming from overseas, or by U.S.military personnel accidentally spilling 227,100liters of fire-extinguishing foam into residentialneighborhoods on April 10 without apologizing,agents of peace in Okinawa have continued towork on peace education and to engage in non-violent direct resistance. Only the SARS-CoV-2declaration of a state of emergency wascapable of putting a damper on the flame ofOkinawan peace building. And just recently, onJune 7, Henoko base construction opponentsretained their majority in the Okinawaprefectural assembly election. Maedomari’s“Okinawa Demands Democracy” gives us newawareness of the obstacles to peace and

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democracy, and the extent to which theOkinawans’ overcoming of those obstacles mayresult in greater security for people there, aswell as for millions of people in East Asia.

What have the Japanese government’seconomic promotion measures for Okinawayielded?

The Okinawan economy faces a wide range ofproblems, including a high unemployment rate,a high turnover rate, a high rate of businessclosures, long working hours, low wages, lowincome, low savings, a low employment rate, alow rate of job offers, a low rate of homeownership, and a high economic polarization ofsociety.

Okinawa has the lowest proportion ofsecondary industries (manufacturing), whichtend to pay higher wages and provide betterjob security, whereas it has the nation’s highestrate of dependency on the service industry,which is an industry with low yearly incomes.There are not many decent jobs for people whowant to work. Even if one finds a job, the wagesare low. Moreover, Okinawan workers rankfirst or second in terms of long working hours.Pay raises are tiny. And many workers changejobs due to anxiety about their future. The jobs-to-applicants ratio exceeds one, meaning thereare more jobs than job seekers, but fewerapplicants actually find jobs that they want andare satisfied with, and only 60% of workersgain full-time employment. With 44.5% of thework force (i.e., 300,000 people) composed ofnon-regular employees, their workingconditions are harsh. (This is compared to a38.2% national average in 2012). The ratio ofpeople who start their own business is fourth inJapan, but Okinawa comes in third place whenit comes to business bankruptcy and closurerates. We see a repetitive cycle of job losses,job departures, job changes, and re-employment. This cycle hampers pay raises andcreates an unstable employment environment.

Okinawan workers are out of breath.

As to those who commit themselves to thechallenge of finding work outside OkinawaPrefecture, they need to have a universitydegree if they want to get a position at a goodcompany in Tokyo. While the national averagefor advancement to university is more than halfat 55%, Okinawa’s rate is 39%, the lowest inJapan. (The rate of advancement to high schoolis also the lowest in Japan). Even whenOkinawan students manage to be awarded ascholarship and advance to university, it is notunusual for their scholarship to wind up beingused for family household expenses, with theresult that they cannot pay their tuition andmust withdraw from the university. Even if theyare able to get a job, many say, “I have a lowsalary, few holidays, constant overtime, and amphysically exhausted.” 26% quit within oneyear of being hired. 48.5%, or roughly half, quitwithin 3 years of being hired. And in the harshjob market, the chances of finding a job againare slim. Many of those who seek to acquirecomputer skills do not have a computer athome. Only 850 households out of every 1,000has a personal computer in Okinawa (comparedto a national average of 1,339 computers forevery thousand households). This is the lowestdistribution of computers in any region ofJapan.

The number of people who visit Okinawa hasbeen increasing rapidly from year to year. In2017 this number reached 9,580,000. For thelast three years, there has been a double digitincrease in the number of visitors. The numberof foreign tourists has exceeded more than 2million. On International Street (Kokusai Dōri),there is never a day without Chinese, Koreans,Taiwanese, or people from Hong Kong. Thenumber of times that cruise ships make portcalls has also been increasing, and with 3,000or 5,000 people per cruise ship coming toOkinawa, there are not enough taxis and buses.It has been revealed that due to the shortage oftaxis, many unlicensed taxi drivers are giving

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illegal rides to tourists. The total income fromtourism has increased from 32.4 billion yen atthe time that Okinawa was returned to Japan(1972), to 670 billion yen (in 2017), which is anincrease of twenty-fold. The tourist economygets a lot of attention now since it is a keyindustry that is triple the size of the militarybase economy.

And yet, 23,000 people are breathing hard,with an annual income from that touristindustry that is less than 1 million yen. Earningmore than 4 million yen per year is beyondtheir wildest dreams. That is the reality thatthey face. What in the world happens to theone-trillion-yen economic ripple effect ofincome from tourism that Okinawa Prefectureboasts about?!1 The industry is in a difficultspot, one in which the hotel occupancy rate hasstagnated due to the “lack of help,” in whichpositions cannot be filled for lack of applicants.

So many problems in the Okinawan economyhave piled up that people’s hearts are close tobreaking. Nevertheless, these problems alsosymbolize the dream and the possibilities of theOkinawan economy.

Okinawa Prefecture attempts to lure companiesby describing their weaknesses as strengths.For example, regarding the high unemploymentrate, they say Okinawa is “the easiest place inJapan to hire workers.” The low wages are the“magnet that attracts companies.” The highturnover rate is a reflection of the “fluidity ofthe work force.” The frequent opening andclosing of businesses represents the “healthyappetite for starting businesses.” The lowpercentage of workers with high educationalattainments shows that there is “potentialdemand and room for growth in the field ofeducation and human resource businesses.”

The Okinawan economy, which used to bedependent on the U.S. military bases, has beentransformed into one that takes advantage ofreturned bases to create new centers forbusiness, commerce, and tourism. Further

return of U.S. military bases will providepotential demand for large-scale public worksprojects, and Okinawa will leap from themilitary-oriented “Keystone of the Pacific” tothe “business hub of East Asia” and the“international distribution hub of East Asia.”The upcoming Asia international distributionhub-ization of Naha Airport by All NipponAirways will set a precedent for such adirection.

These 160 islands that make up Okinawaprefecture are rich with bountiful nature andeach has its own distinctive character. They aregaining attention as bases for sightseeing,health, and medical tourism. The warm climateis attracting émigrés from aging societies as aplace for their last home, or so-called “resortending.”

Okinawa is gaining attention in the fields ofhealth, environment, finance, transportation,research, education, sightseeing, bases, andtrade. It is a place overflowing with people(including people from afar, young people, and“crazy people”) , th ings, money, andinformation. With these rich possibilities inmind, there is an urgent need to formulate afar-sighted economic development vision and amaster plan—10 years, 30 years, or 100 yearsdown the road.

With Okinawa in such a situation, the conflictbetween the Abe administration and theadministration of Okinawa Governor Onaga[Takeshi, 1950-2018] over the U.S. militarybases is having great repercussions.

Democracy challenged

“Is this country really a democratic state?”

“Is this country really a sovereign state?”

The citizens of Japan must once again, now, askthese questions. Of course, the citizens of

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Okinawa Prefecture must also ask thesequestions.

Why, for so many years and to such an extent,have the problems of the U.S. military bases inOkinawa been left unsolved and unattended to?Is it that the politics of this country areimmature? Are our state bureaucratsincompetent? Are our politicians ignorant andunenlightened? Is it because the mass media isnot functioning and craves lazy slumber amongpeople who lack knowledge and vision, and whodo not care about others?

In Okinawa there is a problem. It is called the“Okinawa problem,” but it is really the “Japanproblem.” Many questions and doubts,anxieties and distrust, discontent andindignation, injustice and unfairness,inequality, and wrath swirl around thisproblem.

Is Futenma really the most dangerous base inthe world? 2 Is moving the Futenma base toHenoko really the only way to remove thedanger of Futenma?3 How much does it cost tomove it to Henoko? Why is Japan coveringthose expenses instead of the U.S. military?What is the new base at Henoko supposed toprotect, and from what must the new baseprotect it? Why is the will of the people ofOkinawa ignored after their wishes have beenmade clear by elections? In the midst ofplanetary-scale global warming, why are [U.S.and Japanese government officials] going offthe deep end in a mad dash to destroy theprecious coral reef that absorbs carbon dioxide,and why is construction of the base their firstpriority? When and where is the ability of theU.S. Marine Forces to deter enemies going tobe exhibited? How many soldiers in theMarines are stationed in Okinawa in the firstplace? Why are residents on main islands inJapan so comfortable with twisting the arms ofOkinawans to put these bases in Okinawa? Whyare Japanese police being mobilized as guardsso that an American military base can be

constructed?

If Japan were a democratic state, one wouldexpect that the results of elections, i.e., the willof the people, would be respected and theresults would lead to an improvement in thesituation. Why is the will of Okinawans viewedso l ightly and why must it be run overroughshod despite the fact that it wasrepeatedly made plain for all to see in manypast mayoral, municipal, prefectural,gubernatorial, and national elections? Thiscomplete disregard for the will of the peopleafter an election has, time after time, resultedin Okinawans feeling discontented, dissatisfied,distrusting of elections, and fed up withpolitics.

If the will of the people is demonstratedthrough an election, and yet the results of thatelection are ignored and rejected, then it istime to admit that ours is in no sense ademocratic state. A country in which theminority is dominated by the majority, in whichthe tyranny of the many over the few ispermitted, is nothing other than a tyranny.

A government that oppresses and suppressest h e v o i c e s a n d t h e s c r e a m s o f t h edisadvantaged through the power and violenceof the police, the Coast Guard Stations, and theSelf-Defense Forces (SDF), and does not takeseriously the sovereignty of localities or localself-government is no different from pre-WarJapan and the heavy-handed fascist state ofthose days.

All of this is now happening in Okinawa. Andyet, the mass media have lost sight of the art offully communicating to the public even thefacts, let alone the truth, as they remain everattuned to the interests of the powerful bybroadcasting all day long the scandals ofcelebrities and politicians, and as they arecompelled to compete against each other injumping to the bea t o f in format ionmanipulation by the powerful.

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A government that is not “accountable” tothe people

One ability is clearly lacking among [civilservants working for] the government of thiscountry, i .e . , the pol i t ic ians and theadministration, and those who execute itspolicies, i.e., the bureaucrats: accountability,which is the “responsibility to explain.” TheKōjien Dictionary defines “accountability” as“the social obligation on the part of companiesand the government to explain their variousactivities to the public and to stakeholders. Theresponsibility to explain.”4

The question I raised at the beginning of thisarticle is a question I have consistently raisedfor the last 20 years, ever since the problem ofFutenma arose. Recently, too, I was invited tospeak at public hearings and I was summonedbefore the Diet as a witness at meetings suchas at the House of Representatives BudgetCommittee regional public hearing in 2017, theHouse of Councillors Budget Committee inMarch 2018, and the House of CouncillorsSpecial Committee on the Problems of Okinawaand the Northern Territories in June 2018. As Iwas answering their questions, I hurledquestions back at them.

But at Diet committee meetings, I distributedquestions to the Diet members in the form ofreference materials at the outset as if thesewere test problems: an “examination on theU.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” I asked them toanswer the questions.5 Of course, not one ofthem did.

For example, where on earth does the followingclaim come from? “The Futenma Base is themost dangerous base in the world.” Wheneversomething happens, this expression is repeatedby Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, theperson who fulfills the role of adviser to PrimeMinister Abe Shinzō’s cabinet.

Even only counting the number of accidentsduring the 45 years ending in 2017, after theso-called “return to the Main Islands” in 1972when administrative authority over Okinawawas transferred to Japan, there were 738accidents involving U.S. military aircraft inOkinawa. [See note for citation in Japanese].6

Looking at the number of incidents that haveoccurred at each of the bases, only 17 of thosewere at the Futenma Air Base—10 accidentsinvolving military helicopters and 7 accidentsinvolving fighter planes. But at Kadena AirBase, there have been 8 accidents involvinghelicopters and 500 involving fighter planes,for a total of 508 accidents. Kadena hasactually had 30 times more accidents thanFutenma. Chief Cabinet Secretary Sugaemphasizes that they will eliminate the dangerby moving Futenma with its 17 accidents toHenoko, but he has never discussed eliminatingKadena Air Force accidents and relocating thatbase somewhere else.

Why is that? The reason is clear. It’s because“Kadena is off limits.”7 And the solution to theproblem lies beyond the wall of difficultnegotiations with the U.S. government. If hetouched on that problem, there is no questionthat the Abe administration would fall apart.

From the well-known “Miyamori ElementarySchool Jet Crash” of 1959 in which 17 peoplewere killed, including 11 children, after thecrash of a fighter jet with its fuel tank filled tocapacity, to the 1968 Kadena Air Base B-52crash involving a giant bomber with a full bombload, the root cause of many tragedies has beenKadena Air Base.8

Nevertheless, in the case of fighter planes, theydo reach their destination at the base. (Out of607 accidents, 500 happened inside the base).But in the case of military helicopters, thereare many accidents outside the base, in whichthe helicopter is not able to reach itsdestination. Moreover, they cause many fatalaccidents. During the 45 years since the return

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of Okinawa (in 1972), 33 out of 131 helicopteraccidents occurred on the base, and theremaining 98 accidents outside the base. Ofthese outside-base accidents, 30 were onvacant land or similar locations, 16 were in thevicinity of residences, 14 on private airfields,14 on farms, and 14 on the sea. In the case ofthe remaining 10, where they occurred is“unknown.”

At Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, mainlyhelicopters are deployed. Based on what I haveseen of the helicopter accident reports, [I thinkthat one can conclude that] 75% of theaccidents in which the helicopter took off fromFutenma occurred outside the base. In otherwords, it is not Futenma base that is dangerousbut the U.S. military helicopters that take offfrom it that are dangerous. There is scantevidence that the “only way to eliminate thedanger of Futenma is to relocate it to Henoko,”as Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihideclaims. This is because even if Futenma isrelocated to Henoko, the U.S. militaryhelicopters that take off from Henoko willcontinue their training at helipads at 60 ormore places that have been set up throughoutOkinawa. If Chief Cabinet Secretary SugaYoshihide wants to “eliminate the danger,” theonly way to do that is, in fact, to prohibit U.S.military helicopter training in residential areasand to discontinue the flying of U.S. militaryaircraft.

About the Henoko U.S. mil i tary baseconstruction, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō says,“I want to carefully explain it to those of youwho are residents of Okinawa Prefecture andgain your understanding.” He says this at everyturn, but Prime Minister Abe himself hasneither explained it carefully to the residentsnor has he made any effort to gain ourunderstanding. In the case of the MoritomoGakuen scandal and the Kake Gakuen scandaltoo, Prime Minister Abe’s account of whathappened and his “careful explanation” haveleft many people feeling it was insufficient and

incomprehensible.

In this country there is an unwritten rule thatwhenever a problem cannot be solved it shouldbe postponed, and that if it still cannot besolved after the postponement, we shouldpretend that it never happened. The MoritomoGakuen and the Kake Gakuen scandals thatrocked the Diet are a typical example of thisphenomenon. The core question of whetherPrime Minister Abe was involved or not waspostponed, and in the end, people treat theissue as if there had never been an issue.

The heavy-handed politics of “militarydispatches and discrimination”

As to why the new base construction at Henokois necessary, Japanese politicians andadministrations are never accountable to thecitizens of Okinawa Prefecture and Japan.

Consider the case of the Abe cabinet. There is acabinet that does not fulfill its responsibility toexplain. Concerning the new base constructionat Henoko, they have strangely clung to theiroriginal position and used brute force, invokingthe power of the state to deal with citizens whoobject to it. By pouring out vast amounts ofpublic funds for unknown purposes, they forceon us absurd base construction projects.

The Abe administration’s style of rammingthrough unpopular U.S. base constructionpolicies stands out, even compared to previouspostwar Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)administrations. His style is symbolized by thef a c t t h a t , i n 2 0 0 7 d u r i n g h i s f i r s tadministration, he dispatched a Maritime Self-defense Forces minesweeper tender against themovement opposing the new base constructionat Henoko, and in 2014, during his secondadministration, he browbeat and attacked themovement by considering another deploymentof a Maritime Self-defense Forces minesweepertender to Henoko. Against the Abe-style

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statement “consistent with our ocean patrollingactivities, use anything that you have at yourdisposal,” Ishiba Shigeru, who was the Ministerof Defense during the first Abe cabinet, in factwarned Abe by saying, “We should be verycautious about dispatching the Maritime Self-defense Forces.”

Back in 2007, the Administrative Vice DefenseMinister was Moriya Takemasa. I was then thevice-chair of the editorial committee for a localnewspaper in Okinawa. Attempting to learnabout the background of this deployment of aMaritime Self-defense Forces minesweepertender, I telephoned Vice-Minister Moriya.

“Mr. Moriya, we have reached a historicalturning point. By deploying a minesweepertender equipped with cannons in Henoko whereeveryone there is an unarmed citizen, this isthe first time for the Self-Defense Forces toturn their cannons on citizens of Japan. Duringyour era, you are going to etch this deed intohistory.” Vice-Minister Moriya explained, “Iasked the Coast Guard to provide security, butthere was strong resistance from the citizens,so if I had forced security to [go there], somepeople might have drowned, and my request forsecurity was turned down. [The Coast Guard]said, ‘If you want to go that far, then use theSelf-Defense Forces,’ whereupon we lookedinto the possibility of dispatching to Henoko aminesweeper tender as a security base.”

The deployment of a minesweeper tender—wasthat Vice-Minister Moriya’s idea or decision, orwas it Prime Minister Abe’s idea or decision?This is unclear. But it is an undeniable fact thatPrime Minister Abe gave a positive response inthe Diet to the “dispatch” (hahei) of aminesweeper tender to Okinawa.

For some reason Prime Minister Abe is, in aheavy-handed way, challenging Okinawa to aduel. The residents merely wish to show theiropposition to the construction of military bases,but Abe is physically coercing the residents bydispatching soldiers of the Self-defense Forces,

sending riot police reinforcements, andtightening security.9 And that is not all.

“Starvation tactics” through budget cuts

In the 2014 election for the governor ofOkinawa, Prime Minister Abe ostentatiouslycarried out a cut in the Okinawa-relatedgovernment budget. This was when incumbentGovernor Nakaima Hirokazu was backed by theruling LDP party and the New Komeito Partybut was defeated by Onaga Takeshi (who hadbeen the mayor of Naha City) and when Onagaopposed the new base construction in Henokowith his “All Okinawa” campaign that aimed foran “economy that does not depend on thebases” (datsu kichi keizai).10 As if chokingOkinawa with velvet gloves, Abe cracked hiswhip and cut the government’s budget little bylittle, and attacked Governor Onaga’sadministration by way of starvation tactics.

For many years there has been a strange trendin which the [central] government’s Okinawa-related budget increased just as anti-basegovernors emerged (Yara Chōbyō, Taira Kōichi,and Ōta Masahide), and decreased when pro-base governors emerged (Nishime Junji,Inamine Keiichi, and Nakaima Hirokazu). Thisis a strange trend indeed.

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The trend has been particularly pronouncedafter budget revisions. The Ōta MasahidePrefectural Administration opposed the forceduse of bases and rolled out a struggle in thecourts that went all the way to the supremecourt. But the budget was greatly increasedwith a budget rev is ion , and the Ōtaadministration enjoyed the largest recordedbudget, at 470 billion yen.

In response to base opposition the governmentincreases the budget, and in response toacceptance of the bases the governmentdecreases the budget . Th is s t rangephenomenon is proof that this country’sgovernment is incapable of providing any kindof logical explanation to Okinawans about whyU.S. military bases in Japan are necessary. “Ifthe majority of the citizens of Japan feel thatthe U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is necessary,then the government should fairly distributethe burden of the U.S. bases to the rest ofJapan.” Such were the words of GovernorOnaga Takeshi, who even once served as theLDP Okinawa Prefecture Federation ChiefSecretary. But none of the governors in thiscountry have raised their hand to volunteertheir region to substitute for Futenma as base

site.

Even if people approve of the U.S. militarybases and view them as a “deterrent,” they donot want to host the U.S. military in their ownregion. The burden of the U.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty is forced on Okinawa, while the benefitsof it are shared with everyone in the country. Inresponse to the claim that “Okinawa receiveseconomic stimulation measures in exchange forits hosting the bases,” Governor Onaga oncecaustically retorted, “If you want to go to suchlengths, then let’s be prepared to follow this toits logical conclusion. We’ll pass on theeconomic stimulation measures, and you canhave the bases.”

There is no end to the suffering from U.S.military bases. There have been manyaccidents caused by emergency landings, suchas in December 2016 when a U.S. MarineCorps Osprey had to make a crash landing inthe northern part of Okinawa’s Main Island,and was seriously damaged;11 and in [October]2017 when a CH-53E heavy-lift transporthelicopter had an emergency crash landing andwent up in flames also in the northern part ofthe Main Island.12 And there were many otheremergency landing incidents on other islands.A part from a helicopter landed on the roof of anursery school in the vicinity of the FutenmaAir Base, and six days later [in December2017], right in the midst of the uproar, anotherserious accident happened in which a windowfell from an in-flight CH-53 helicopter onto theplayground of an elementary school.13

There have been many incidents involving U.S.soldiers, such as the (2016) rape and murder ofa 20-year-old woman by a man who was acivilian employee of the U.S. military who hadoriginally been a soldier in the Marines.14 Thenumber of incidents caused by U.S. soldiersduring just the 45 years from 1972 whenadministrative authority of Okinawa wastransferred to Japan until 2017 is 5,967. Amongthem, 580, or roughly 10% of the total, have

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been murder, mugging, rape, and arson, i.e.,“felonies.”15 While there are on average 130cases in Okinawa per year in which someone isvictimized in an incident in which theperpetrator is a U.S. soldier, the governmentgets its way with abusive language such as,“Bear it, since you are the recipient ofeconomic stimulation measures.”

During the last 10 to 20 years, traffic accidentscaused by people affiliated with the U.S.military have been on the increase. Comparedto earlier years when 40 accidents or sooccurred, we see a major increase, to between130 to 200 accidents per year.

The number of victims of sexual violence withinthe U.S. military is on the rise these days. (SeeFigure 2). Concerning crimes by U.S. soldiersthat occur in Okinawa, it is pointed out that the“proportion of crimes is lower than theproportion of crimes committed by Okinawanresidents,” but here they are talking about theincidence of crimes that occur outside the base,and reports on the number of incidents insidethe U.S. military bases are not published. Onecould view the crimes occurring outside of thebases as the overflow of crimes from inside thebases. When it comes to regions that areburdened with U.S. military bases, one mustalways pay attention to the crime statistics ofthe Department of Defense.

According to the statistics of the Veteran’sAdministration, only about 25% of sexual

assaults are recognized. Thus it is clear thatthree out of four women victims have notreported the sexual violence to the authorities.The rape and murder that was committed in2016 by the former U.S. Marine representsonly the tip of the iceberg, in terms ofreflecting the increase in sexual assaults onU.S. military bases.

What in the world are the U.S. military in Japanand the U.S. military in Okinawa protecting,and what are they protecting it from? For theresidents of Okinawa Prefecture, greater thanany emergency military threat is the threat ofU.S. military crimes in times of peace and thethreat of being hurt by U.S. military exercises.

The Abe administration pushing Okinawain the direction of “base dependency”

One of the policies that the Onaga PrefecturalAdministration worked on building, that wouldallow the people of Okinawa to extricatethemselves from the suffering caused by U.S.military crimes and U.S. military exercises, wasa “post-base economy.” It was said in the pastthat Okinawa Prefecture had an “economy thatrelies on the 3Ks.” The “3Ks” were kichi(bases), kōkyō jigyō (public works projects),and kankō keizai (tourism related). Back in1965, as much as 30.4% of the gross income ofOkinawa Prefecture was made up of base-related income, but this had dropped to 15.5%by 1972 when Okinawa was “returned to Japanproper.” By 2014 the level of dependence onbase-related income had dropped further, toone third what it was in 1972, down to 5.7%.

The tourist economy meanwhile dramaticallyincreased in scale from approximately 440,000tourists entering Okinawa Prefecture beforethe return (to Japan) to 9,500,000 in recentyears. Partly as a consequence of the incomefrom tourism and the boost from the increase inforeign tourists, there was a 20-fold increase intourism income from 32.4 billion yen in 1972 to

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approximately 670 billion yen in 2017.

The Abe Administration shook up the OnagaPrefectural Administration even as the OnagaAdministration aimed to shift away from themilitary base economy toward the vitality of aprivatized economy. According to documentsfrom the Okinawa Prefecture ContractorsAssociation, which depends heavily on publicworks, after Governor Onaga took up his post,expenses for public works commissioned by the“Okinawa General Office of the Cabinet Office,”i.e., expenses for general public works,dropped drastically. Instead, expenses forpublic works from the Okinawa Defense Bureaugreatly increased, and expenses for defense-related projects surpassed those of generalpublic projects for the first time (See Figure 3).

Looking at materials in “The State of theConstruction Industry” (Kensetsu gyō nogenkyō) that the Okinawa PrefectureContractors Association distributed during thesix years from 2010 to 2015, the 2013-fiscal-year Cabinet Office budget rapidly increasedfrom 26.9 billion yen to 53 billion yen; therewas a decrease of 22.5 billion yen during the2014 fiscal year; and it was nearly cut in half to30.5 billion yen. In the 2015 fiscal year therewas a further decrease of 6.3 billion yen (i.e., to24.2 billion yen). On the other hand, betweenthe fiscal year 2013 and 2014, the fiscal budgetof the Okinawa Defense Bureau doubled (to31.6 billion), and in the end, actually exceededthe budget of the Cabinet Office.

The following are some other numbersconcerning the overall picture of public worksin Okinawa. When one looks at the publicationsof the West Japan Construction Surety Co., Ltd.entitled, “Trends in Public Works Constructionin Okinawa Prefecture,” the Government’sbudget for Okinawa decreased and theOkinawa Defense Bureau’s budget for 2017increased to 140.9 billion yen, out of a totalbudget of 382.6 billion yen, which was a 12.8%increase over the previous year—a bigincrease.16 2017 was a year when the publicconstruction works expenses of the CabinetOffice, Okinawa Prefecture, and municipalitieshad decreased.

In response to the Okinawa Prefectural[Government]’s aiming for an “economy notd e p e n d e n t o n t h e b a s e s , ” t h e A b eadministration, without hesitation, developed apolicy of increasing base dependency bydecreasing the general budget and greatlyincreasing the defense budget. Looking at thebudget data makes it easy to see what the Abeadministration did. The data shows that theygreatly loosened the foothold of GovernorOnaga’s Prefectural Government and took aheavy-handed approach that silenced theopposition (Figure 4).

The explanation that the Administration gaveabout the reasons for the increase in thedefense budget was “it is not intentional. It isdue to orders for base-related constructionprojects that had not been actualized duringthe previous budget year.” If that is true, thenthe Administration would need to explain whythe budgets of the Cabinet Office and OkinawaPrefecture had to be dramatically cut, but they

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did not provide an explanation about that. TheWest Japan Construction Surety Co., Ltd. thatprovided the data that aroused criticismwithheld such data for some reason in thefollowing budget years. The way they handledthese questions is inexplicable.

“Realignment subsidy” trap

In March of this year [i.e., 2018] after the NagoCity election, a problem arose concerningprovisions for the “U.S. Military BaseRealignment Subsidy” in connection with thenew U.S. military base in Henoko. In theelection for the Nago City mayor in February,the incumbent Inamine Susumu (1945-), whoopposed the Base, lost the election. ToguchiTaketoyo (1961-), whom everyone expectedwould tolerate the new base construction, wonthe election. With that in the background, theAbe administration decided to once more startup the Realignment Subsidy that had beensuspended during the previous mayor’s term.

The Realignment Subsidy is money that isdistributed to municipalities “for cases inwhich, after having considered the level ofimpact that the ‘ real ignment ’ [baseconstruction] has on the residents’ lives, it isrecognized that the subsidy will promoteharmonious and certain real ignmentimplementation.” The new mayor Toguchi[Taketoyo, who took office on 8 February 2018]has not made clear whether he agrees ordisagrees with the new Henoko base, eitherduring the election campaign or after he tookoffice, saying that he “will closely observe whathappens in the court dispute between Okinawaand the Government.” Nevertheless, theGovernment has decided to provide [Nago City]this Realignment Subsidy.

An editorial in the Okinawa Times, a localnewspaper , prov ided the fo l lowingcommentary:

The Defense Ministry explainedtheir decision to restart the subsidybecause “the previous mayorclearly stated his opposition torelocating the base to Henoko. Thenew mayor, on the other hand, isneither in favor nor opposed to therelocation.” Mayor Toguchiemphasized that he would “act inaccordance with the law. That doesnot constitute acceptance in anysense.” About the 15 billion-yensubsidy of 2017, the plan of theDefense Ministry is to carry thatamount over to 2018 and makethose funds available. The fact thatthey restarted the subsidy meansthat the Bureau recognized that Mr.Toguchi was “instrumental in thesmooth and sure implementation”by not making it clear whether hewas in favor or against the baserelocation. In their view, they hadgained the cooperation of NagoCity.

Their making the Realignment Subsidy fundsavailable looks like an “act of bribery,” i.e.,using tax money to stimulate [the Mayor’s]cooperation in the Realignment project evenbefore he had made his position on the matterclear. Taking such funds is akin to the act of“accepting a bribe,” by deciding to go alongwith the Base in exchange for money. This isthe kind of country we live in today, one where[government officials] can openly get away withthis kind of thing.

Despite the fact that [acting in accordance withthe law] “does not constitute acceptance” ofthe government’s new base construction inHenoko (the words of Mayor Toguchi), heaccepted Realignment Subsidy funds, and suchfunds assume his acceptance and cooperation,so this amounts to a full-on “RealignmentSubsidy fraud” where the Mayor has theDefense Ministry wrapped around his littlefinger. In the case that the Ministry distributes

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the Realignment Subsidy funds even withoutMayor Toguchi’s acceptance, the Mayor saysthat he has not accepted the new baseconstruction, and the Ministry is backstabbedby the Mayor, could the Ministry demand thatthe funds be returned? How would Japan’sBoard of Audit interpret this way of disbursinga subsidy?

How Nago City spends the RealignmentSubsidy funds is also a concern. Mayor Toguchipledged during his election campaign that hewill use it to “make pre-school tuition free ofcharge” and to “make school lunches free ofcharge.” At the Nago City council meeting inJuly 2018, members of the rul ing andoppos i t ion part ies debated how theRealignment Subsidy funds should be spent.Local media reported that city assemblymembers from the opposition agonized over thefact that “it is difficult to oppose a policy thatbenefits the citizens.” Mayor Toguchi, however,has not been accountable to the citizens; he hasnot explained to them that the free lunches andthe free pre-school education were beingprovided to the children as compensation forthe city accepting the base. He had a duty asthe mayor to explain to the citizens, to theeligible voters, the pros and cons of goingalong with the Base construction before usingthe Realignment Subsidy funds.

To what extent is it permissible to use theRealignment Subsidy funds, which are part ofthe new Henoko base construction at CampSchwab, for tuition and lunch waivers for thechildren of citizens of the “Nago City UrbanDistrict” along the coast on the west side of thecity where children would hardly be hurt at allby the new base? The Henoko residents are theminority, and they are forced to live with thenew U.S. military base and to suffer from it.Meanwhile, the citizen majority, those from theurban district, reap benefits from the “subsidyfunds” after deciding among themselves to goalong with the Base. The same sort of relationholds between Japanese citizens, who are the

majority, and Okinawans. Japanese enjoy theillusion of “U.S.-Japan Security benefits” [orAmpo, i.e., the benefits reaped from thestationing of U.S. troops in Japan] by imposingthe vast majority of U.S. military bases onOkinawa.

The trap of the “loophole economy”

Not all of the Okinawa Economic Stimulationfunds that the Government gives to Okinawaare enjoyed by Okinawa. The OkinawaPrefectural Industry Development Associationhas requested that local companies be givenpriority in the case of orders for constructionby major public offices.17 To take an examplefrom the 2013 budget for constructioncommissioned by the Okinawa General Bureauof the Cabinet Office, 84% of the orders were tocompanies in Okinawa Prefecture. That’slooking at the number of orders. But if oneinstead looks at the amount of money spent,Okinawa’s percentage decreases to 51.6%,meaning that half of the apportionedgovernment budget flowed back to companiesbased in mainland Japan. This is the problem ofthe “loophole economy”: Much of thegovernment’s Economic Stimulation Budgetthat has flowed to Okinawa has actually woundup flowing back to the mainland of Japan, justlike water flowing through a colander.

In the case of the budget of the OkinawaDefense Bureau for 2013, too, 87.2% of theorders went to local companies, but inmonetary terms, that number falls to 70.7%.Looking at it another way, orders to companiesoutside Okinawa Prefecture totaled only 12.8%,but in monetary terms, 29.3%, or one third of itflowed to companies outside the Prefecture.With other (non-defense) national governmentand municipal public works taken intoconsideration, 17.8% of the orders for the sameyear went to companies outside the prefecture,but 43.9%, or nearly one half, of the totalactual amount went to mainland companies.

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There was a slight improvement during the2015 fiscal year: mainland companies got14.7% of the number of orders, and 23.8% (i.e.,one quarter) of the total amount.

Some are of the view that “Okinawa isflourishing thanks to the bases,” but thecompanies that are actually making the bigbucks are the big general contractors fromoutside the Prefecture and other outsidecompanies.

In the case o f the new Henoko baseconstruction, too, big general contractors frommainland Japan gain entrance while localOkinawan companies are only subcontracted orsub-subcontracted to by the big companies.90% of the orders for construction and projectsrelated to environmental impact assessmentsthat were made before the construction began,went to companies that had revolving-doorarrangements with the Ministry of Defense.

People from mainland Japan get the impressionthat Okinawa has a good economy due to factthat around 500 billion yen is spent on Okinawaannually in the form of budgets related to theU.S. bases and the Okinawa EconomicStimulation Budget, but actually there is theproblem of the “investment-capital back flow”of the “loophole economy” due to the poorquality of the “yield.”

Miyata Hiroshi, who worked as a regulator,which is the highest non-career post at theCabinet Office Okinawa General Bureau, says,“some people say that Okinawa Prefecture hasreceived handouts from the government in theform of a whopping 300 billion yen every yearfrom the special budget, but for the residents ofthe Prefecture, this is a humiliating thing tosay. Okinawans pay more than 300 billion yenin taxes to the central government. Since 2015,on the contrary, the amount of tax paid to thecentral government has exceeded [the amountthat Okinawa has received].” (See Figure 5).He emphasizes that “it is not true that they justtake take take, and do not give back. In fact,

Okinawa has become a prefecture that givesmore than it receives.”

The whiff of change of the new 10Kseconomy

During the years between when Okinawareverted to Japanese sovereignty and 2018,during which some land on which U.S. militarybases stood has been returned to Okinawans,the economy of Okinawa has shifted more andmore away from an economy that is dependenton the bases to a base-independent economy.The background to this is the emergence inrapid succession of success stories, where plotsthat formerly had been used as U.S. bases wereused in new ways by Okinawans. A summary ofsuch successes appears in Figure 6—the extentto which land plots that had formerly been usedas U.S. bases have been used effectively.

The Makiminato Housing Area [in Urasoe City,Okinawa Island] that was part of a U.S. baseright in the middle of Naha City, was massivelytransformed into the “Naha City Shintoshin

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Area” [or Naha City New Urban Area] after itwas returned. Before it had been returned, itseconomic effectiveness was 5.2 billion yen, buta f ter i t was re turned , i t s economiceffectiveness increased 32 times, to 163.4billion yen.18 Even the military base facilities ofNaha City were redeveloped as the OrokuKanagusuku Area after they were returned, andthe economic effectiveness of that plot of landhas already increased 14 times, from a 3.4million-yen base economy to 48.9 million yen.

According to Okinawa Prefecture’s tentativecalculations, the economic output of CampKuwae (i.e., Camp Lester), which is scheduledto be returned in the future, will increase 8times from 4 billion yen to 33.4 billion yen onceit is returned. It is expected that the economicoutput of Camp Zukeran (i.e., Camp Foster) willincrease 10 times from 10.9 billion yen to 106.1billion yen, and that of Marine Corps AirStation Futenma will increase 32 times from 12billion yen to 386.6 billion yen. It is anticipatedthat the return of the Naha Port Facility willresult in 107.6 billion yen in economicrepercussions compared to 3 billion yen inincome from rent today.

With such a situation, it is fair to say that the“base economy” is “uneconomical” forOkinawa. Okinawa Prefecture has made publicthe results of an investigation that found that,in fact, “the existence of the bases leads to 1trillion yen in losses annually.” It is expectedthat having U.S. military base lands returnedand using this land where once stood militarybases in new ways will lead to major profits andan accelerated rate of hiring.

The movement to break away from the base-dependent economy in Okinawa has beenaccelerating, boosted by successes occurringone after another. The late Prime MinisterHashimoto Ryūtarō (1937-2006) admittedinformally that the Special Action Committeeon Okinawa (SACO) of December 1996, inwhich 11 U.S. military facilities in Okinawa

would be returned, was informed by the “BaseReturn Action Program” that was developed bythen Governor Ōta Masahide (1925-2017) inearly 1996, which put together a plan to regainall the U.S. military bases in Okinawa by 2015.In addition to the new 3Ks [“salary, holidays,and hope,” or kyūryō, kyūjitsu, kibō], a new10Ks economy has been proposed. [The new,additional Ks, i.e.,] health, environment,finance, education, research, transportation,and commerce [kenkō, kankyō, kin’yū, kyōiku,kenkyū, kōtsū, kōeki] hold forth the possibilityof developing new Okinawan mainstayindustries.

Big changes continue to unfold, from already-existing tourism to excursion-style tourism, the“MICE” industry (meetings, incentive travel,conferences and exhibitions), and medicaltourism; from aircraft-centered tourism tocruise lines; new concepts of constructingtheme parks along the lines of OkinawaChuraumi Aquarium; and transitions such asthat from the low-margin, high-turnover type tohigh value-added tourism.19

The offense and defense surrounding thegubernatorial election

On 18 November 2018 the Ok inawagubernatorial election will be held, somethingthat happens once every four years.20 The topissue at stake in the 2018 gubernatoriale lect ion wi l l be that of the new baseconstruction in Henoko. Landfill work in theHenoko area of the sea has already begun, withan eye to new base construction. No matterwho becomes the governor of Okinawa, thenew base construction for Henoko will berammed through, as long as the Abeadministration holds onto power. As for thedemocracy of this country, we have acentralized government and a central-controlstate that does not respect local sovereignty.One searches in vain for any sense of crisisamong the citizens of Japan concerning that

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lack of respect.

The issue of the new Henoko base constructionthat the Abe administration is forcing on us isall about the Marines’ new seaborne baseconstruction scheme that the Marines plannedin the late 1980s. But this construction projectwas postponed back during the days of theVietnam War due to the particular conditionssurrounding U.S. federal government financingthen. And now what is pushed on us is theconstruction of a new U.S. base paid for withJapanese citizens’ blood tax, on the pretext of“getting rid of the danger of the world’s mostdangerous base, Marine Corps Air StationFutenma.”

The U.S. secured the privilege of being able tofreely install bases on the scale that they wish,in the places they wish, for as long as theythrough the conclusion of the U.S.-JapanSecurity Treaty and the deal that was madethrough the Treaty of San Francisco that cameinto effect in 1952. The new occupation policyafter the [San Francisco Treaty] Peace, whichhas been called the “bases-anywhere-in-Japansystem” (zendo kichi hōshiki), allows for themaintenance of huge U.S. military bases withinthe interior of Japan even now 70 years afterthe War, with Japanese citizens picking up thetab for 75% of the costs of stationing troops onthose bases.

Under the combined weight of U.S.-JapanSecurity Treaty and the U.S.–Japan Status ofForces Agreement, U.S. troops are allowed toenter and exit Japan freely without regulationof their disembarkation or embarkation; theirtaxes are reduced; Japan covers over half theirutility bills; when they commit crimes they arenot handed over until they are charged with acrime; and not only is the compensation thatthey pay to victims discounted but the Japanesegovernment supplements such compensationwith the taxes of Japanese citizens.

Right in the middle of the metropolis of Tokyothere exists a giant base for another country’s

military, and although Japan is put in asubservient posit ion with respect toWashington even in the air space of theMetropolis, none of the citizens of Japan areconcerned about this, and they approve of thisU.S. privilege. We cannot even keep track ofhow often occupying troops are forgiven for theviolation of our laws. U.S. military aircraft areguaranteed free passage through the air spaceof our territory. And they get a free pass whenthey fly at low altitudes in residential areas.

Even if U.S. military aircraft cause accidents inour territory, our police do not have the right toinvestigate, we cannot protest even when theyignore our request to U.S. military authoritiesto investigate, and when they start doing flightdrills after an accident whose cause has notbeen determined, all we can do is nod ourheads.

How long do our Nation’s government officialsplan to continue that kind of “relationship ofequality between Japan and the U.S.”? Whenwill they proudly pound their chest and say thatthis country is a “sovereign state”?

Okinawa is the “‘canary in the coal mine’ ofdemocracy” in this nation. Over the course ofthe 70 years since the end of the War, evenwhile we were overburdened with the U.S.military bases, we have obeyed the rules of thiscountry, sought out help, and asked that theburden of the bases be lessened. WhenOkinawa ceases to raise their voices, whentheir voices no longer trouble you, that willmark the end of democracy in this country.

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The cover of Maedomari’s Hontō wa kenpōyori taisetsu na “Nichibei chii kyōteinyūmon” ([Introduction to the U.S.-JapanStatus of Forces Agreement: Actually MoreImportant than the Constitution],(Sōgensha, 2013).

All notes below have been added by thetranslator.

This is a translation of Maedomari Hiromori’s article “Okinawa ga tou minshu shugi,” whichappeared in Sekai, September 18, 2018, 107-120.

After serving as a chief editorial writer at the newspaper Ryukyu Shimpo, Maedomari,Hiromori (1960-) became a professor in the Department of Economics at OkinawaInternational University. His numerous awards include the Ishibashi Tanzan MemorialWaseda Journalism Award, 2004, for his investigative work on the Status of ForcesAgreement. He is the author of many books, including Okinawa to Beigun kichi ([Okinawa andthe U.S. bases], Kadokawa Shoten, 2011), and Hontō wa kenpō yori taisetsu na “Nichibei chiikyōtei nyūmon” ([Introduction to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement: Actually MoreImportant than the Constitution], Sōgensha, 2013). This book was reviewed in English byColin P.A. Jones in the Japan Times on 5 August 2013, see here(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/08/05/issues/sofa-an-unequal-treaty-that-trumps-the-constitution/#.Xt3vejNxc2w).

Joseph Essertier is an associate professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology, a scholar ofmodern Japanese literature, a contributing editor of the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, andan international human rights advocate.

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Notes1 Maedomari gives the exact amount as 1,014,300,000,000 yen.2 Douglas Lummis, “The Most Dangerous Base in the World(https://apjjf.org/2018/14/Lummis.html)”. C. Douglas Lummis, “Futenma: ‘The MostDangerous Base in the World’(https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/futenma-the-most-dangerous-base-in-the-world/),” TheDiplomat (30 March 2018)3 Yoshikawa Hideki, “An Appeal from Okinawa to the U.S. Congress. Futenma Marine BaseRelocation and its Environmental Impact: U.S. Responsibility(https://apjjf.org/2014/12/39/Hideki-YOSHIKAWA/4194/article.html)” (沖縄から米議会への訴え　普天閒基地移設と環境影響　米国の責任は)4 The Kōjien is an authoritative dictionary published by Iwanami Shoten.5 Maedomari discusses the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in John Junkerman,“Base Dependency and Okinawa’s Prospects: Behind the Myths: A Conversation withMaedomari Hiromori, Professor of Economics and Environmental Policy, OkinawaInternational University (https://apjjf.org/2016/22/Junkerman.html),” The Asia-Pacific Journal,Vol. 14, Issue 22, No. 2, November 15, 2016. He sums up the situation this way: "Japan wasrequired to provide land and facilities for US military forces, which it did by maintaining thebases on Okinawa. As long as the bases remained in Okinawa, the US was satisfied. So thebases have been retained in order to strike this kind of political balance."6 『沖縄の米軍及び自衛隊基地（統計資料集）』(Okinawa no Beigun oyobi Jieitai kichi tōkeishiryō shū [Collection of statistics on bases of the U.S. military and Japan Self-defense Forcesin Okinawa]) 2018年3月、沖縄県知事公室基地対策課 (Okinawa-ken chiji kōshitsu kichi taisakuka [Base Policies Division of the Okinawa Prefectural Governor Information Desk]), March2018, page 104．7 Just Kadena alone is a “keystone,” in Jon Mitchell’s view: see here(https://apjjf.org/2016/09/Mitchell.html).8 The Miyamori accident killed 17, and later, one more died due to the after-effects. See here(https://ryukyushimpo.jp/special/miyamori630.html).9 For those who have not seen with their own eyes the amazing commitment to non-violenceamong Okinawa protestors, see the writings of Douglas Lummis, such as where he writes,that the “riot policemen are not always that gentle. But the non-violent behavior of the sit-inners does have an effect on them.” (See here (https://apjjf.org/2019/01/Lummis.html).(https://apjjf.org/about:blank)) One could say that the protestors have won the respect of theriot police, if not that of Prime Minister Abe, who has not spent much time at the gate toCamp Schwab.10 Gavan McCormack, "‘All Japan’ versus ‘All Okinawa’—Abe Shinzo’s Military-Firstism(https://apjjf.org/2015/13/10/Gavan-McCormack/4299.html)," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13,Issue 10, No. 4, March 16, 2015.11 Justin McCurry, “U.S. grounds Osprey fleet in Japan after aircraft crashes off Okinawa(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/14/us-osprey-mv22-fleet-grounded-japan-okinawa-aircraft-crash-military),” The Guardian (14 July 2017). Jeff Schogol, “Second Ospreyincident on Okinawa

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(https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2016/12/16/second-osprey-incident-on-okinawa/),” Marine Corps Times (16 December 2016).12 “U.S. military chopper bursts into flames on landing in Okinawa(https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/10/edbc37dcb9c7-update1-us-military-chopper-bursts-into-flames-on-landing-in-okinawa.html),” Kyodo News (11 October 2017). There was acrash in California in 2018 as well: Tara Copp, “Marines: 4 Dead in CH-53 Crash(https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/04/04/ch-53-crash-kills-four-crew/),”Marine Corps Times (4 April 2018).13 “Object possibly from U.S. military plane falls on Okinawa nursery(https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/12/7001237ea2f9-object-possibly-from-us-military-plane-falls-on-okinawa-nursery.html),” Kyodo News (7 December 2017). “Window falls fromU.S. military chopper onto Okinawa school grounds(https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/12/e26fb7173005-part-of-us-military-chopper-falls-on-to-school-grounds-in-okinawa.html),” Kyodo News (13 December 2017). "Okinawashogakkō ni beigun heri no mado rakka jidō kara 10m hodo no bashō" [About 10 Meters fromthe Children Parts Fall from the Window of a U.S. Military Helicopter onto an OkinawanElementary School] 沖縄小学校に米軍ヘリの窓落下 児童から10ｍほどの場所, News Web Easy(13 December 2017). Video available from Channel 7 News here(https://newswebeasy.github.io/news/web/2017/12/13/沖縄-小学校に米軍ヘリの窓落下児童から10ｍほどの場所).14 Motoko Rich, “Former U.S. Marine Gets Life in Prison for Okinawa Rape and Murder(https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/world/asia/us-marine-okinawa-rape.html?searchResultPosition=1),” New York Times (1 December 2017)15 About the sexual violence, see for example, Jon Mitchell, “U.S. Marine Corps SexualViolence on Okinawa (https://apjjf.org/2018/03/Mitchell.html),” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.16, Issue 3, No. 4, February 1, 2018.16 In other words, the total budget for 2016 was about 341.6 billion yen.17 For more information, see the website of the Okinawa Prefectural Industry DevelopmentAssociation here (http://www.okikenkyo.or.jp/).18 This area was returned to Okinawa in 1987. See Okinawa-Information.com, "ShintoshinShopping Area, Naha Okinawa(http://okinawa-information.com/content/shintoshin-shopping-area-naha-okinawa)".19 For more information about Okinawa’s MICE, see Okinawa Prefecture’s webpage here(https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/bunka-sports/mice/seibi/h29mice_qanda1.html).20 The election was actually held on 30 September 2018 due to the death of the formergovernor, Onaga Takeshi.