on the armies of ancient greece
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This article was downloaded by: [Moskow State Univ Bibliote]On: 20 December 2013, At: 19:43Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
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On the Armies of AncientGreeceRev. George Robert Gleig M.A.Published online: 11 Sep 2009.
To cite this article: Rev. George Robert Gleig M.A. (1857) On the Armies ofAncient Greece, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 1:1, 30-50
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071845709415742
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30 TIIE REV. G . R. GLEIa
Friday, 15th AIay, 1857.
COLONEL TIIE HOSOURABLE JAW3 LIXDSAY in the Chair.
ON THE ARJIIES OF AXCIEKT GREECE.
BY TIIE REV. GEORGE ROBERT GLEIG, X.A.,
CIIAPLAIS-GESEIUL TO TUE FORCES.
BEFORE I plunge into the lecture which I have undertaken to de- liver, I think it \ d l only be fair both to you and to myself if I state in few words some of the reasons which have induced me. to fix your attention to-day upon what some may perhaps consider a very old-world subject. It can be no secret to any one here present that we are on the cvc of great changes, and I hope of g e a t improrc- ments, in many points which bear upon the gcncral arrangcments of our arniy, I believe that before long the profession of arms will take its proper place i n public estimation-that young men intended for the service will themselves see, and thcir relatives be taught, that they must exercise their minds as well as their bodies before they enter it; and that officers haring received their commissions will be led topercehe.that they have undertaken the practice of a great art, which requires as much study as any other art or science with which common men are familiar. Now I am not going to give you my o m opinion upon any of these matters; but in one point I think you will all agree with me, that the preparatory education of young men intended for the army can no where be bctter carried on than at our great public schools. Sou may depend upon it that the moral discipline exercised in these places is of unspeakable benefit to all who go through it, and that even classical learning, though it be so much the habit to uudervalue it, lays no bad foundation for that special training which, when he attains to a certain age, I hope crery young man intended for the army will hcreafler undergo.
Among other subjects, thc mastery of which seems to be required from an accomplished soldier, there is one which cannot but be obvious to all-I mean Military History. It is a great mistake to suppose
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ON TEE ARXIES OF ANGLEKT GREECE. 31
that only those portions of military history which we find in i-rorks of modern date deserve the attention of the military student.' I tell you, on the contrary, that a boy a t one of our public schools, if he be under the guidance of a judicious tutor, will find in the Greek and Latin books which he is required to read, not merely the mwns of acquiring a knowledge of two Iangunges, beautiful in them- selves, and lying a t the root of a11 others idiich are spoken in Europe, but a vast deal of information which he mill find useful to him in his after-career. Therefore it is that I propose on the prcscnt occasion to talk to you about the constitution,'thc tactics, and the movements of the armies of the Greeks, and to illustrate my r-ieirs by describing to you one great military operation. And here- after, should circumstances enable me to do so, I may possibly go on with the snbject, leading you through the Roman armies to the modern armies; for the purposc of shen-ing you that thc principles gf the art of war never vary;- that they are the samc in all ages and in all countries, though tactics necessarily undergo changes with the changes of arms which the progress of time and invention has brought about.
So much for my introduction. I dare say that no scholar here present \rill be surprised hen I
say that the oldest writer upon military subjects with whom we are acquainted is Homer.
You will observe that, in so expressing myself, I take no part i~ha t - erer in the controversy which once upon a time taxed so severely the skill and ingenuity of the learned in this and other countries. I?or it is of very little consequence to the matter now under discussion whether we accept Homer as a veritable man, the son of Chritheis, the blind bard of Smyma, or look upon him as a mere myth ;-an abstraction like our o m Ossian, under the shndom of whose name traditionary poems long handed dolm from one generation to another were at last brought together and connected. I n either case there can be no doubt of the great antiquity of the Iliad, to which the best authorities, and among them the Arundelian marbles, assign a date of between eight and nine hundred years before the birth of Christ. It is past dispute that by n couutlcss majority of those who rend that glorious epic, either in translation or in the original, little else is
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32 TIIE EEV. G. I:. GLIXC.
looked for cseept thc imagery with which genius of the highcst order can inrest any subject with which it has to deal. All beyond is accepted as a description of tlic barbarous usagcs of z barbarous age, when men, going forth to battle, entered into it as Irish factions used to enter into their fights a quarter of a century ago; heaving fragments of rock onc at the other, or engaging in savage duels, d i c h ntxer terminated except by the slaughter of one, and somc- times of both the combatants. Tlic few who look deeper into things discover much more than this. They perceive that, SO early as eight or nine centuries keforc the Christian ma, war’ had bccoine with thc Greek nation conspicuously an art. They observe that 3 number of pctty and independent states or clans, all speaking thc same language, all descended originally from thc same stock and connected by similar institutions, enter into an alliance for tlic at- tainnient of an object common to the mholc; that they elect one chicf to command the allied forces, viliich consist of contingents or divisions, each having its own chief or gcncral at its head; that the several states supply-not men only, but also stores and means of transport, more or less a tens i re according to their respectiw re- sources; and that the expedition assembles, sails, and makes good its landing in the enemy’s country with as much regularity as a year or two ago the combincd fleets of France and England passed thc Black Sen 2nd discmbarkccl their armed cargoes on the beach near Eupa- toria. Reading on, they discover that the first thing done by thc invaders is to securc to themselves, in casc of n reverse, the means of n safe retreat ; that they draw up their vessels along the shore so ns to place them out of danger from the sca, nnd protect them against assaults from the land, by covering thcm with entrcnelinients. Meanwhile, with a riew to guard ap ins t the failurc of provisions, not only arc foraging partics sent out to sivccp in the eneniy’s cattle, but arrangements arc niadc for thc cstablishnicnt of regular markets, ivliicli arc to be supplied by vessels appointcd to p7ss to and fro betwen tlic cnmp at the mouth of the Scamander and the sea-ports in the neighbourhood. Again, when military operations begin, the troops arc not let loosc to shout and strugglc like a mob, but thc army is ninrshalled exactly in such order, as, looking to the \wapons which the men carried and the nature of the ground over which they u-crc
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0s TI113 J ~ I I J I I I X OF ASCII2ST GRCCCC. 33
to move, appears to competent judges of thc present day to liavc been the best that c0111d harc been adopted. There was no cavalry then with a Grceli army. The art of Lrcaking and managing 1101 ses
to be ridden was either not yct inrciited or had iiiade very little progress, at all events in Greece. But chiefs and officcrs of rank rode to battle in cliariots, wvhich they used more frequently to facili- tate their inovcments from place to phcc than for any other purposc. You know horn tlic Homeric chariots w r e managed. Two men rode in tach-one to guide the horses, the other to fight. When the pi-opcr moment to engage arrived, tlic v-arrior descended from his chariot and fought on foot. '#hen the weight of his armour or any otlier circunistance led liini to desire rest, he moved towards his chariot, .sliicli tlic charioteer had witlidrawn just out of reach of danger to himself and to the horses. A n d the charioteer, driving quiclily up, took him in and went away with him. It is worthy of remark too that charioteer and warrior never changed places. Indeed it mas the last order given by Aganiemnon before dis- missing his chiefs to their rcspectivc commands, that this division of labour sliould on no account be interfered with -that, if a warrior had the misfortune to have his cliariot captured or his charioteer killed, he should not pretend to take tho reins, but gct into any other which seemed to have rooin for him, and continuc the battle as before.
The chariots, however, though presenting n formidable army, were used only by men of rank. The masses were o r g i n i d into two, aud only two, kinds of infantry-one light and irrcgular, carrying horn- bom, sliort darts, and sIings ; the other rcgultir, and heav;l--armecl with spears. Short swords or knives seein also to hare been irorn by all, and the spearmen, besides incasing their trunks in armour, carried shields on their left arms. TIE shields and armour of the chiefs were gorgeous, M the description of that of Achilles show. The cuirasses of the infantry were mere platcs of h s s , from which depended a sort of quilted petticoat rcacl~ing to the knee. The feet were shod with sandals, and the legs were bare. KO Greek helmet had a t any time a visor. The light infantry wore no armour escept on the head, but n-cre equipped in jerkins and kilts of s1;in or leather.
In the plain before Troy, the Greek ariny seems to harc mored to D
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the attack in three lines. The light infantry corered tlic advance, but retircd behind the line of charicts as the opposing armies began to close. This scenls to have been dsnc for the two-fold purpose of affording to them some protection mhila discharging their missiles, and of keeping them from dispersing; for the heavy infantry, with le~elled spears, formed the third line. But it is not necessary to go further into tliesc details, on which indecd I hare touched for the single purpose of drmving your attention to the fact, that, eren from the pages of R Greek poet, the soldier may learn something, which, if he have been, during pupilage, in the hands of R skilful tutor, shall not prove altogether uselcss to him tvlicn studying his profession.
In times long posterior to that of which I am now speaking, d i c n the patriarchal had given ~ a y to other forms of government, ei-e-ery freeman in n Greck state, not incapacitated from age or infirmity, was liable to military service. From eighteen to forty a11 indeed were obliged to serve, when the occasion arose, and all sened gratuitously. But in Athens the youth betmen eighteen and twenty was, like the man \rho liad passed forty, kept at home to p a r d the city. After twenty he took his pnrt in the campaign. After sixty he might hang up his arms in the temple of Athcnac if he chose, and pass the remainder of his days in peace. The Spartans, as a general rule, were more chary of the health of their young men. They trained them indced to habits of great endmancc, but never, except when hard- prcsscd, sent them to take pnrt in operations in the field till they had attained the thirtieth year of their age. Both states, as indeed was the case throughout Greece, branded their soldiers in order to hinder them from deserting; but of such brands, as they irere impressed on the arm or on the hand, no man mas ashamed; they mre honour- able distinctions. Hence St. P,lul's well k n o m eqression, (' I bear in my body the marks [that is, the brands, sttjmatu] of the Lord Jesus." They were inflicted upon me to disgrace me; but they are my glory, for they mark me as a soldier e ~ n unto death of the sorereign to whom my fealty is pledged. Slaves, on the contrary, irere branded on the forehead.
Greece is not n country adapted for ca~alry, and it was long before any of the state mounted any poi.tion of its troops. Kcither is it accurately known by whom the art of equitation was introduced
TIIE REV. c;. It. GLEIC
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ox T ~ E AI:JITES OF x i c I E r r cmixx. 35
among them. Tlic Amazons, the Centaurs, Ilclleroplion, and Xcptonc all get credit for haying first broken-in horses for the saddlc; if indeed it bc aclniissiblc to speak of saddles in ages wlien such things had no existence. For the equipnients of cavalry among the ancients w r c rxtremely rude, down ercn to the times of Lrican. That m-riter describes the l\lassyliana of his day, as not only dcatitntc of saddles, but as guiding their horscs by the snitches or whips lyliicli they carried in their hands.
The Kuniidians of Jugurtha’s time, the Lybians, and the Scythians so late as thc Roman Empire, had no bridles, but ninnaged their horses by the nierc inflexion of their voices. Virgil tells us that the inhabitants of Pclctlironiurn, 3 town in Thessdy, wcrc the in- ventors of bridles. Pliny attributes the in\-ention to an indiridual called Pelcthronius. These arc merc traditionary tales, with the accumacy of mhich i r e are not much concerned. But ivlioer-cr may be desirous of tracing thc progress of equitation in classic Greecc will do m-ell to study the subject at the British i\luseum, wlierc the marbles which adorn the x-alls will show him graceful figures, sonic bestriding bare-backed steeds, others scatcd upon skins. IIc will observe also that there are no stirrups ; for young men long ago wcrc in the habit of leaping from thc ground to their horses, or they trained their horses to stoop ivhilc thcy mere mounted. For thc aged, accommodation as provided by placing stones at con- venient intemals along thc sides of the roads.
W e read in classic authors of war-chariots furnished with scythes at tho aslc-trees. These w r c thc invention of thc barbarians. The Greeks tried, but soon laid them aside, for thcy proved as dan- gerous to friend as to foe. If the nerw of the driver failed, or his horses became unmanageable, they iwrc just as apt to dash round and sweep through the ranks behind as to press on, carrying de- struction into the ranks in front of tliem. And so in after-times it fared with elephants iind carucls,-with the former especially, irliich, though rery foimidable when first seen, gradually lost their terrors. They also w r c used for a while in the Grcek, or rather in the Nacedonian, armies ; but n short cxpcriencc made manifcst the Lict, that in battle they could not be depended upon. When ironndcd or frightened, they ran wildlj- over the field; and the Greeks, seeing
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36 TIIE IiEV. G . 1:. GLEIG
this, made usc of tlienl at last only as we use tlicm in tlic East, occasional beasts of bnrthcn.
Among all tlic Greek states, the niost u-arlike tlirougliout, :ind thc first to s~-stcmatise licr military resources, was Sparta. TVc find her, about fivc centuries bcforc Christ, mistress of the idiole of Laconia, ivith n territory vhicli is corcrcd on threc sides by tlic sea, and a capital protected on tlic north by an almost impassablc frontier. She oircd her military, not less than her civil constitu- tion to Lycnrpis, and it was admirably adapted to the political circumstnnccs of the age. As I have already said, every man from eightccn to sixty was liablc to military Eerviec. Tlic pith of tlic various districts and villages were enrolled into enomoties, or coin- panics, each consisting of twcnty-five, or thirty-two, or thirty-six men. Tliesc drilled and practised their military exercises togethcr, under tlic cnotonznrclt, who was promoted to coiiiniand becausc of liis strength, activity, and skill, and who took his post on the left in tlic front rank d i e n the company fornied linc, and moved wit11 the lending file on the march. Tlie linc \\-as ncrer less tliaii three, nor niorc tlian six, dccp; and it changed front by wheeling and eountcr- marching, vcry much as a company or sub-division docs among onrsches. It was tile nucleus of thc ~rholc military system of Sparta-for all the additions made to it were but multiplications of itself. For csamp!e, the pcntcko:o,.tos, thc loclizis, aucl the moru, were, -thc first, tn-o enomotics; tlic second, two or four peiitetosti; and tho third, four or more lochi; that is to,say, four hundred, six Iiundrcd, sometimes ninc hundred men. So also, while e d i e ~ o ~ z o t y had its eiiotnotarch, or subaltern, cncli pcntikostos had, over and above tlicsc siibaItcrns, its pentizoster, or captain ; each lochtcs its lochage, or major; and each niora, or battalion, its polymarch. From thc 110b- nzurch orders were passed on to tlic cizotoniarch,-just as aniong ourselves captains take up the word from officers commanding bnt- talions, and execute battalion movcments by rightly handling thcir companies.
Yon need not be told that, in ciril lifc, the framc of the young Spartan was systematically hardened by escrcise. Tlie drill of tlic soldier, liliewisc, consisted almost more in the 1)ractice of gyninastics tlinn in anything elsc. IIis lance or spear exercise was vcry siniplc.
But I am anticipnting.
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0s THE -1RJIIES OF ASCICST GRl:ECE. 37
IIe extended and closcd his files according as thc necessity of en- larging or contracting thc front of thc line presented itself; and lie was trained to march in cadciicc to tIic sound of a flute, irhicll in war as well as in peacc modulated his tread. Thc 0 t h states of Greecc did not attain to anything likc the snnic regularity till niucli latt-r ; and, 2s they proved to be little niorc tllan inere copyists from thc Spartans, I should but rcpcat what I li:r\-c said already wcrc I to speak of tliem in detail.
A Spartan army was a l x ~ y s commanded in tlic field by the king -or, in thc event of his non-age or incapacity, by n lientcnant chosen to act for Iiini. In Atliens, where troops wcrc raiscd by tribes, eacli tribe furnished its oirn general, and all the generals were possessed of the sanic degrcc of authority. Kow, as there ~ c r c tcn tribes-and, therefore, ten generals, this was pronc to lead to
mcill'ition and difficulty-for only in couiicils of war could opera- tions bc decided upon. It not unfrcqucntly happened that rotes were equal, till at Inst n po~y?nni*ch, or Prcsiclcnt of tlic Board of General Officers, was chosen, wlio, in cascs of this sort, garc thc casting votc, and assumed ahsolutc authority over the rest. Such was the conduct of Bliltiades in that hour of peril, irlien thc hosts of Darius si-.-armed upon tlic Grcek shorc, and the battlc of hIarathon, with tlic rapid march back to Athens at its closc, sat-cd Europe from the barbarism with wliicli it was threatcncd.
Till Greece camc into hostilc collisioii with Persia, the wars of her various stxtes \wrc upon the smallest possible sealc. Argos, for example, quarrelled with Corinth, or Spartn fell out with her nest neiglibour-and tl:c army of thc one invaded t l x territories of the other, burning dlages, laying waste fields, and fighting battles, wlien the forces from either side mct. This was their suimnier's occupation, at idiicli season, uiider n gcnial cliniatc, therc \\-as no great liardsliip in sleeping out ; and it does not appear that their longest marches ercr carried tlic troops more tlian forty or sixty miles from home. In winter tlic nrmics brolx up, tlic iiien returning to
their villages and cities. The preparations for a campaign of this sort verc of t?ie simplest kind ; no commissariat was orgnnised, be- cause none \\.as necessary, but each soldier, carrying with him n few days' provisions, IWS ready for n-hatevcr might befal. A littlc
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38 TIIC RCV. G . It. GLCIG
fdtcd mcat, cIiecse, olives, onions, and ilricd fruit constituted the food of tIic soldier during tlic campaign. Thcsc Iic bestowed in 3 casket of ~yickw-n-ork, in othcr ivords in a basket, d i i ch lie slung :it his back. Thc basket Iiad a pcculiar shaped mouth, and was called the gulion-whcnce mcn with w r y long necks got the nick- ~inmc of gulionchenes.
Time passed-and, by n process which is visiblc in all Darts of tlic world where small states adjoin, Sparta and Athcns gradually o\-crshado~~-cd their ncighbonrs, and became rivds in thc arts both of pencc and war. Sparta continued to the last n strictly military nation. Athcns became more n naval than 3 military power ; yet slic by no nicans neglected licr army. On tlic contrary, an Atlicnian oficcr prows to bc the first p a t military reformer, prior to the :Ip1)camncc of tlic Mnccdonians on the stngc. About the ycnr G.C. 390, Ipliicratps addrcsscd hinisclf to rcmcdy the defects ~ ~ - h i c h up to this time had bcen apparent in the equipment and evolutions of light troops. Ireretofore tlicsc people, indifferently drilled, and arii!ed only with knives, short darts, and bow, served rather to ilistract and annoy than seriously to cliecl; or restrain the well- disciplincd battalions to wvhich they wcrc opposcd. For they wcrc collected in a Iiurry, and. let loose upon the cncniy with such wenpons and appointments as happcned to be available for thcir peaceful occupation as shepherds. Iphicratcs took thcm in hand, lengtlicncd both thcir javelins and sirords, of which he stored up supplics for them in tlic city, and protcctcd thcir legs from scratollcs a id bruiscs by casing tlicm in leathern leggings.
Gcntlemen, it is curious to observe how, in small things as wcll as in great, tlie customs of society go round in a circle. We had, some years ago-we still, I belicrc, have in use among us-boots named after two illustrious conim:inders, Wellington and Blnclicr. In Athcns, for many days aficr the time of Ipliicrates, lcatlicm leggings w r e known as Iphicratides.
It is not neccssary that I should speak of tlic causes ~J i ic l i Icd-to tlic altcrnatc war3 and alliances idiich conncctcd Grcccc with the Persian empire, and ended at last in the ovcrthrow of the latter. Tlic Grecks, straitcncd at home for rooni, and much addietcd to ~oniiiicrcc as iwll as piracy, settled colonies, as you arc awrc, lit ;i
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OR TIIE ARMIES OF AXCIEST GREECE. 39
rcry early date, along the Ehorw of Asia Minor, ~vliich, supported by t h mother-country, maintained through many ages an uneasy independence upon the larger states and provinces which surrounded them. TI& became a. hnrd task to achieve, after Persia, undcr the successors of the great Cyrus, had absorbed the vast empires of Babylon and Egypt ; and that of Sardis would not ham been accom- plished at all, had not Athens and Sparta, but especially the former, cutered freely into the struggle. Indeed, it ivas as much by policy as by war that the colonies held their own a t all, for they not un- frequently kept the conqueror at a distance by paying tribute, and supplying him, as allies, with troops, which he found of extreme value to him in his operations elsc~~lierc. I t was this intercourse with Pcrsin ~ d i i c h led to the raising in Greece of corps of cnvmlry, wliich seem a t first to ham bcen universaliy equipped with helmets and cuirasscs, and to hm-e carried, as offensive wq-~ons , darts and crooked swords. They m r c divided, like the infmtry, into troops and squadrons, and liad generals of the special arm placed over them, wvho, however, took their general orders, as among ourselves, from the strutegos, or commander-in-chief. But we d l , if you please, pass lightly over d i n t may be called the transition state of the Greeli armies. If you desire to satisfy yourselves as to what they liad become; and what they were able to effect, and did effect, ere yet, under Philip of Naccdon and his Eon Alexander, they had attained the perfection of their organisation-read the history of the Pcloponnesian war, as Thucydides has recorded it, and the Anabasis, or Retreat of the Ten Thousand, by Scnophon. Read these narratives, too, not for the mere sake of storing your minds with the knowledge of things passed, but that you may learn lcssons which, should it fall to the lot of any of you a t any time to command armies, may prove of the greatest possible use to you in tile hour of need. For I do not besitate, even in this presence, to give it as my opinion, that noivliere in military history are more instructive lessons to be learned in the art of war, than in the simple and intelligible story of the mowments of the force which, after the fall of Clearehus, cnmc under the pidance of Xenophon, and marched and fought its way from the Zab to Trapesus or Trebizond.
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40 TIIE 1:EV. G . It. GLEID
The Pcloponncsian war, in its results, broke the strength of Greece. I t produced, indeed, its heroes and its statesmen-Tolmides, Simon, Archidamus, and, above all, Pericles, the very model of a \rise commander, whose spccelics, as Thucydides has prescrwd them, cannot be too much studied, either by the soldier or the poli- tician. But it ruined Athens, and left S p r t n dizzy; while, to the north of both, a people was growing into power, of whom as yet little note had been taken. I refer to the itlacedonians--a mixture of Greeks and barbarians-idiose history is too much mixed up with that of the surrounding tribes to admit of analysis here j and which the most painstaking writers find it no czsy matter to gire, except with a perplesity of order which sorely tries the patitwx of tlieir readers. For, the monicnt we touch them, we find ourselrcs coinpelled to notice Thracians, Illyrians, Tkcssalians, and many more, to speali of whom, without 3 carefully cxvcutcd map before us, would inrolvc us in a perfect labyrinth of words. It will be suffi- cient, therefore, for our general purpose, to state, that AIacedonin proper sccms to liavc been cnrly occupied by n colony of Argires ; that by virtue of their descent from thc leaders of that colony, Philip, and Alesander, liis illustrious son, claimed to bc regarded as Greclts; and tliat, for ninny generations before the birth of the former, we find Yaccdon mised up with Greek affairs, sometimes as an ally, Fonietinies as an enemy, and still more frequently as n bone of contention. Let us take n rapid glance at its condition, when Philip ]lad established his sovcreignty over i t ; and contrast that with the state of Greece, and cspccially of Athens and of Sparta, as their fiital intestine strifes had produced it.
The Athenian and Spnrtan citizens of 430 years B.C. Tere ever ready to brave dangcr for their country's good. Tliey served her as soldiers ~ t h o u t pay, and s e n d her nobly. The Athenian, and, though to a less extent perhaps, the Spnrtan citizen of 3G0 B.C, had entirely cliaiigcd Iiis nature. He loved case and the pursuits of literature and philosopliy, nud stayed at home, trusting the honow a ~ l d defence of his country to hired mercenaries. Tliesc were gathered in from every state throughout the fcdcration j and, like the Condotticri of the middle ages, were ready to transfer tlieir allcgiancc from one payninster to anotlicr as often as occasion re-
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OX TI1E ARMIES OF ASCIEST GREECE. 41
quircd. The Ten Thousand, of whose cxploits I havc clscirlicrc spoken, partook in some degree of this character, for they \\-ere tempted into thc service of +US the Pcrsian by the offer of large p ly in the meandiilc, and thc promise of preferment after he should have dethroned his brother. Philip, on the other hand, found him- self sowreign of a people rude, brave, hardy, proiiipt for war, but destitutc of nditary organization. IIimself endox-ed Jrith military p i u s of the highest order, lie set about remedying this Iattcr defect; and, notwithstanding the prcssurc of constant war wit11 his ncighbours, he acconiplishd his purposc. IIeretoforc, the force of the country had consisted cither of mounted men - substantid landed proprietors, T Y ~ O took the field incased in coats of mail, and armed with swords or spears, as the case might be-or of the rural population, shepherds and herdsmen, who carried vAic r shields, old swords, slings, bows and arrows, and occasionally, not often, short lances. The towns on the sea-coast-having been peopled many of them by Greek colonists - could muster their trained bands, whom they equipped, like tlic IIoplita? of Athens, 11-ith spears. but these were few in number; and everywhere else foot- semicc, being accounted little honourable, was takcn up only by the poorest of the people.
IIc cnrolled the poor and hardy 3Iacedonian Inndwehr into sections, companies and battalions, brigades and dil-isions, and, by the armament which he gave tlieni, rendered tlieni supcrior even to the Greek Hoplitm. These Iattcr, you d l recollect, carried pikes sisteen feet in lengtll, which they wielded with the right hand, while on the left arm hung 8 squarc and l i e a ~ y slrield. Philip equipped his heavy inhntry with pikes, nic:isuring not Iess than 21 feet in length, d i i ch they were trained to wield with both hands, and ~diich, on ground fittcd for their use, proved irresistible. The defensive arms of the pha- Zangife consisted of a. light circular shield, about two feet in din- meter; of a breast-piece, leggings of tin, and ? broad-brimnicd hat, called the causia. A man so equipped could of course do little acting singly,-a dense column of such men, on open groiind, could scarcely be broken. I t is worthy of remark, that each plialangitc wore also a short sc.ord.
Philip entirely revolutioniscd this s t ab of things.
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42 TIIE REV. G. It. CLEIG
The telling-off of the Phalanx appears to liavc differcd very little from that of the heavy infantry of Atliens and Sparta. The lochus in ?Jacedon mustcrcd 1G men; tlic synfugma, 16 lochi, or 256 men; the pentdosiarcky, of 2 lochi, or 512 men. This latter represents a battalion, of which the strength \\-as doubled by Alcsander, whenhe reorganized his army at Suza. But the entire tactics of the force depended upon the unit irhence i t sp:ang. On the march, tlic column increased or eontractcd its front so as to adapt itself to the width of the road. It could form for battle only on an open spacc, and then it stood in n line of sixteen deep. The five front ranks levelled their spears; tlir, thrce nest intcrlaccd tlwirs ovrr tlie shoulders of the ranks in front of them; tlic cight in rear stood with shouldered pikes, prepared either to give the weight of their pressure to the advance, or to face about and meet danger, should it threaten from behind. When the hour of trial came, the Greek hoplitm, with ,111 their courage, found the sixteen-foot lance useless, when opposed to the Nacedonian pilie-the formidalh sarissa.
An army composed esclusively of phalangi would, hoivevcr, have prox-ed unn-ieldy ; so Philip supplied d i a t was wanting, by adding to it two sorts of infantry besides, and two sorts of cawlry. The supplementary infantry consisted, first, of regiments of Iypaspists, who carried one-handed pikes and shields, lilx the Grceks; and, next, of light troops-bowmen, slingcrs, javelin-men-all carefully drilled to skirmish, and inured to the scvcrcst exercise. Iris cavalry were either licavy or light. Tlie heavy irore coats of mail, and brass or tin leggings. Their weapon of attack was the xyston, or short thrusting-pike, and the sword. The light cawlry carried lances, about sixteen feet long, and, like the Cossacl;~ of modern Xussia, were cmploycd chiefly a t the outposts, or to scotir the country. The orgnnization of both \\-as as perfect as that of the infantry, and started from the same unit, i-iz. the lcchus. The squadron appears to liave nunibcred sometimes 1S0, sometimes 250, horses.
A 3Iacedoninn arniy, thus arrangcd, provcd, under Philip’s guid:unec, irresistillc. But Philip’s wars, like tliosc of tlie Athenians and 3I~:cedoninns, wcrc, coinp::~itivcly spealiing, 011 :I smnll scale;
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OX TIIE AIlJIIES OF INCIEST GIIEECE. 43
:ind hence, tliougli we discover the beginnings of other and not less important arrangenicnts in his military sj-stern, we must look to the reign of his successor in order to satisfy oirrselvcs fully as to their nature and cstcnt.
When Ncsandcr came to the throne, hc found a school established for the training of officers, which lie enlarged and perfected. The sons of the chicf meri of the country came to the capital as soon as t h y had reachcd military age, and were talicn into tlie personal senice of the king. They discharged the duties of pagc, gentleman- usher, and master of the ceremonies. They mounted guard O V C ~
tlie palace. They had tlic ablest masters to instruct them in the arts, and especially in the art of war. They rode with the king \Then lie went hunting, and formed his bodyguard in war. IIe was :iccustorned to employ thcm one by one on services the most delicate :is well as the most hazardous; and, according as they acquitted tl~emselx-es to his satisfaction, they were promoted.
Philip liad raised Pella from the rank of an obscure town to that of n first-rate city. Irere stood the mr-office, with its staff of ad- ministration, working at least as busily as the gentlemen in P d Mall, and at the IIorsc Guards. Irere were the great arsenals, wlierein arms, carriages, and wagoiis m r e fabricated, and everything necessary to render an army efficient in the field stored up and ready to be issucd. Tlic barracks irere commodious and extensive, with drill-grounds, and spaces for training convenient to them. Into these, recruits were introduced as they came up from the conntry -cax-alry on one side of the arsenal, id in t ry on the other. They w r c instructed in their duty as members of depbt battalions, and tlicnce sent off by draughts to fi11 up vacancies in t+ ranks that 11-ere in the field. 3foreowr, Pliilip had begun, and Alesander per- fected, n complete ordnance corps. He had not only his battering mms, but ballist3 and other cngincs for throwing stones and darts; sonic heax-y, and tlicrefore siritable for siege PKU-POSCS ; otliers light, which accompanied cavalry and infantry into thc field. Bcsidcs a11 these, lie 11ad liis land-transport corps, wit11 its train of; carts, pack-horses, and beasts of burden, over wIiicli military ofliccrs presided. In n word, Iluccdon 11ad bceii rendered by I’liiIip some-
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thing wry likc a Iargc camp. Alcxandcr took it owr in 'this condition, and rendercd pcrfcct ivr-hntcrcr his fLithcr hnd left ewn slightly incomplete. But it was not upon thc resourccs of his own country alone that this extraordinary man relicd. Grcecc stood toiynrds Ilim w r y much in .the relation in diicli the Confederation of tlic Eliine stood, in 1811, towards the first Pl'apolcon. Tlioiigli nominally independent, tlio states supplicd him with troops wlien re- quired, and adoptcd his policy both in pcacc and vm, howcvcr distasteful to their feelings might bc the tone in which they were cspresscd.
Let us contcnt oursclvcs vith a brief glancc at tlic carly carccr of hlcsandcr. . IIe found Iiimsclf, on acccding to thc thronc, thc heir of a po~icy iv1iic1i suited with liis adventurous clinmctcr. lIis father had b t p n to .innlie prcparations for the invasion of Pcrsin, and 'lie determined to go on with it. ' Cut difficulties met him. Greccc, instigated by I'ersi:i, and hersclf iinpnticnt undcr the yokc, endeavoured to free lierself from her Macedoninn conncction; Tliracc, lllyrin, Thcbes, opcnly rebellcd. Ire overcame all the opposition ; hc crossed 31ount Hcnius, defeated the Triballi, pnsscd tlic Danube, owrthrew tlic Gctz, carried Thebes by assault, and completely ovcraiced Athens. I t is in onc of tlicsc campaigns,-in liis opcra- tions against the Illyrians, that wc find llim for the first time making nsc of his siege train; driving the defenders of n town from tlic parapcts, with stones and darts, and assailins tlic walls wit11 his battering rams. But morc important opcrations had been detcrniined upon, and for these the mistnlicn contempt of his' youth, entertained by Darius king of Pcrsin, enabled him at Iiis leisure to make rcady.
I t as in tlic winter of 335-334 EX., that Alexnncler niadc his find preparations. IIis grand depGt hc'of coursc cstablislicd at PoIio, the situation of irhich was admirable, on two rircrs, both navigable for light craft, and i d i i n iiftccn milcs of the ~Xgcan. IIc appointcd 12,000 regular infantry, with 1,500 cavalry, nndcr onc OP his best officers, to overaivc Grcccc during his absence, and to guard the coast from dcsccnts on thc pnrt of thc enciny. IIc selected to follom him on Iiisgrcat esiiedition only 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry;-
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ON THE Al~JIIES OL.’ AFCIEST GKKECE. 45
&cly considering that mere nunlbers do not constitute thc strength of arniics, which ougllt always to be proportioned’ to tlicir probable means of subsistcncc. But his troops ~ e r c conipletc in everything that tends to reuder an arniy efficient, and a fleet of lG0 triremes, 11-itli many vesscls of smaller size, prcpared to more parallel xith them as long as circumstances ~ o u l d allow; for he had wisely rletcrmined to move by tlic coast road. IIow Darius camc to ovcr- look or neglect thesc preparations, warned as he had bccn by his Greek gcncral Xcmnon, it, is difficult for 11s to conccivc. IIe as imnicasureably superior to Alcsander by SKI, hax-ing the \\-hole P1iccnici:m flect at his disposal. He might have blocl<cd up thc IIcllcspout mid s m p t the &-can had he bccn so disposcd, and the entire coast-linc both of Ilaccdon and Greccc lay open to perpetual attacks and alarms, against which Alexander’s army of rescrvc could 11a~e offcrcd but ineffcctual opposition. But there was j d o u s y bctwccn his Greek and I‘crsian oficcrs, nliich prodncrd its customary results. The foreigners \rere snspccted of sccking ends of their oyFn, and the more cautious policy of the nntircs \\-as adopted.
Alexander distributed his 30,000 infmtry into s i s divisions, or tiiscis, adopting in this rcspcct an organisation almost identical with our own. His cavalrj hc distributed into four bripdcs, of ii-hich the light or lancer-brigade numbered 900 horses. Thc rest made up two llcnvy brigades and D corps of Greek ausiliarics. I cannot quitemakc out wlicther at this stagc of his cnrccr he had establishcd a bridge equipment. I am strongly inclined to belicre that he must haw done so, because hc liacl scrernl rivers to cross erc the campaign could be opened, which would probably require bridging, Howerer this may bc, it is ccrtain that at n 1:itcr date a bridgc-trnin attcndcd upon nll his morcments. Itcad Arriau’s account of his advance U ~ O U India, and if nny’doubts upon this matter should liavc rcstcil upon your minds they \rill at oncc be dispcllcd. ~llcsnndcr niorcd qmn the IIyd:ipses, carrying with him liglit vcsds mounted upon carriages, wliicli, for thc snkc of convenience upon the march, v e r ~ divided, some into two, others into three pieces. JXow what ivrrc tllcsc vessels but pontoons? Whcn hc approached the banks of the river, hc halted the carriages undcr the screen of a thick wood, put
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the vcsscls together and Iaunclicd them rait-wise-pretty much as our own engineers 1auncli their pontoon-bridges on tho waters of the Aiedn-ay, or wherever else they may be called upon to make ril-ers passable for troops. In like manner Alexander’s engines for throm- ing stones and darts took their places on the flank of columns, or in the intervals bct\wcn one brigade and another, mliere the nature of the country would not admit of parallel movements. His battering rams, vingons, and bagprrage-horscs inarchcd in the rear of his columns on the ndvancc-in their front, if Iic was practising n retreat. And besides that, the drivers m r c all armed; a regular giiard protected tlicni. Will any body say that lessons in the art of war arc not to be learnt from the history of mcn and of times drllich seem to have left no point that is necessary to the orginisation and management of armies unattended to, which provided not only for the maintenance and support of forces in the field, but cared for a11 necessary means of supply-in their recruiting-in their treatment of recruits-in their vise establishment of dcpbts and magazines-in the staff of officials which they kept to manage the accounts of the army, and held personally responsible for the due pcrforniancc of the duties which the government had assigned to eacli--mhicli had their military rccords carefully preserved, and books illustrative of tactics and strategy elaborately compiled? But we r i l l return to Nexandcr.
Having completed his operations both for offensive and dcfensivc war, Alexander began his march from Pella. He moved leisurely, in order that there might be time for the fleet to meet him at the mouth of the IIellespont. He made a brief halt at Amphipolis, establishing his head quarters in the town. He arrived nest a t Abdcra, and there passed the r k e r Xestus. IIc then entered Thmcc, crossed the Iicbrus and Jiclas, and traversing the Chersonescarrivcd at Scstos. The Strymon, the Kcstus, the IIebrus, and the 1\Lclas are nonc of them very largc rivers; but, as rllesandcr moved 11-ith car- riages of various kinds, and as the banks of some of them arc steep, we inay fairly assume, that if he did not find tlieni bridged he bridged them.
The Macedonian fleet liad already arrived at Sestos, and the troops were coniinnndcd to embark forthn-itli. While this was doing,
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ON TIIE I~RMIES OF Ah-CIEh'T GREECE. 47
Alexander paid his mll-known risit to the site of Old Ilium. I lc accomplished this feat, so to speak, alone ; crossing tlic strait in the admiral's trireme, which he steered with his own hand. Ire was ambitious to be the first, of the Nacedonioii host to tread the Asiatic shorc, and lie succeeded. ..l3ut, tliough full of romance, hc WE, a t tlic samc time, onc of the most Lir-sighted and sagacious generals that cver Ii;-cd. IIaring offered his sacrifices, as n Iiero, to thc manes of thc dead, he hurried back to Abydos, d i e re liis army had begun to assemble, that he might resunic thc occupations of n great commander. Here a grand rcyiew took place, at the closc of which the army n-as distributed into two wings or columns. Of thc right column, Alexander himself took command; the left he placed nnder thc immediate orders of his friend Parmcnio. The muster- roll slioived that tlic army \-ins thus composed : Of tlic JIacedonians, pirtly Phalangi, partly Hypispists, thrrc wcrc present under arms 12,000. Of Greek allies, armed and equippcd likc the Hypaspists, 7,000. Of mercenaries, 5,000. rill tliesc wcre fit for closc combat. The light troops, chiefly Triballi And Illyrians, armed n-ith slings, darti, and short spears, mustered 5,000, and there i-ierc 1,000 archers. Of cavalry, t r o brigades n-ere heavy Naceclonian horsc each 1,500 strong. Two othcrs, one of Grecian horsc, GOO, thc other of Thracians and Paonians, 900. Thc most perfect grada- tions in the order of command prevailed c;*crywliere.
i\Ieanwhile the Persians Iiad not been ~~rholly regardIess of thc storm diicli threatened. They declined indeed to be gnided by tllc counsels of Memnon the Greek, and so threw away their superiority by sea; but, under Arsytcs, n Phrygian satrap, they collected a con- siderable army at a placc called Zclcia, and waited the issue of ex-ents. They were greatly superior to Alesandcr in cavalry, which tlic lowest estimate puts don-n at 20,000. And Xemnon, who serrcd under Arsytcs, strongly urged that advantage should bc taken of this circumstance. I?e recommended his chief to woid n general action, to retire bcforc Alesnnrler, laying waste the country as hc i-ient; to beat up tlic Macedoninn out-posts, harrass their conroys, and strike at their baggage ; and to attcmpt morc serious diversions from thc sea by landing in Itxcdon, and compelling Alexander to
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48 TIlE EEV. 0. E. CLICIG
return for thc dcfencc of his own country. h i t Arsytes was tlic civil go\-ernor, or pasha, of the district. His personal asscts dc- pciidcd on tlic amount of producc which it rcared, and hc rcfused to sacrificc his o m resources for thc snkc of tlic empire. IIc accord- ingly advnnccd to thc Granicus, along the right bank of which lie took post. Here hc determined to giw battlc, having, as Arrian states, under his comninnd 20,000 CsceIlcnt horse, and 20,000 or 25,000 good infantry, a11 of them merccnarics, cliicfly Greeks.
Tlic Granicus, though fanious in story-first bccausc it is corn- vlcxnorated in the Iliad, and nest as tlic sceuc of the battle which I am going to describe-is an inconsidcrablo stream. It takcs its rise in Mount Ida, and f l o w northward into tlic Propontis, or Sea of AIarmora. It is fordable in many placcs ; hut tlic riglit bank is steep, and tliercforc offered considcrablc advantages to thc force by wliicli it x-ns that day occupied. It \ras to corer thcsc fords tliat tho Persians drcx up with thcir left resting upon the declivities of Nount Ida and thcir riglit cia l'nir.
Alcsandcr haring rcvicwed his troops at Abydos, restcd thcrc that night, and at an early hour nest morning b q p i his marcli. IIis scouts liad madc hini aware of tlic proximity of the enemy; hc therefore mowd with caution, and slow-ly. Iic halted thc first day at n place callcd Pcrkotc; the nest beside tlic little river Praktidd, and the third at Hemotus. Clouds of light cavalry coi-ercd his niorcments, ~rliich Iic supportcd with licnvy liorse in tlic proportion of onc squadron of ciiirassicrs t o four of lancers. IIis last march froiii IIcrmotiis to the Granicus he pcrformcd in pcrfcct re a d' incss to cngngc on the first alarm. He appears to l i a ~ c comc in sight of the Granicus about tmo in tlic aftcrnoon. Pnrmenio, desirous that the troops should cntcr fresh into battlc, advised a halt till nest morning. But dlcsander, satisfied that n general action w ~ s a11 in his favour, and against thc Pcrsians, refused to listen to tlic advice. He was apprchcnsivc that tlic encmy might withdraw from tlicir position in thc night, and resolved to deliver battle immediately.
Now obscrvc tlic skill with nhich his dispositions arc madc. While lic is arranging his columns of attack, archers, supported by
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ON TEE ARMIES OF AXCIERT GREECE. 40
light horse, push on to the river, skirmish with the enemy, and try the fords. An attempt is also niade to clcar the opposite bank by shooting stones and darts from ball&=, and so far succeeds that the Persian cavalry fall back behind the sheIter of the high ground of which they are masters. AIcanwhilc, tho i\Iacedonian army forms : the Phalangi take post by double battalions, each 1000 strong, in the ccntre, keeping an interval betwecn each double battalion. The Hypaspists, or lighter infantry, form to the right and left of the Phalangi, someirhat in advance. Thesc are flanked by the light cavalry or Iancers, supported by squadrons of Iiea-ry horsc; and on the riglit of the wliole linc, opposite the principal ,ford, is the niass of the heavy cavalry. The light infantry, consisting of slingers, bowmen, and javelin men, estend up toirards the base of 31ount Ida, and threaten tho enemy’s left.
It is not necessary to describe the battle or to speak of its results. The country was open, and there mas no smoke, as among us, to confound the vision. All these formations were therefore clearly seen by the Persians; and the Persian horse, as soon as the Nace- donians began to more, closed up to their own front again and stood ready to receive the shock. It was given by Alexander’s heavy horse, a squadron of his body-guard leading, which the light cavalry or lancers supported, and beside whom, and thercfore sheltered in some degree from the force of the current, a division of IIypnspists pushed forrrard. The resistance was very determined-so great indeed that for a while no man could succeed in forcing his way up the bank-for Memnon was there with the flower of the Persian cavalry, of which a portion rode down to meet the BIacedonians in the water, irhile the rest plied thcm with javelins from the heights above. But all this wliile the JIacedoninn slingers and bommen mere pushing round among the rocks of Bfount Ida; and by and by volleys of stones and arroris fell upon the Persians who covered the nearest ford. Then Alexander himself plunged in at the hend of a second squadron of the body-guard. Then by sheer strength of man and horse the Persians m r c pushed aside, and steady, yet rapid, the phalanx descended into thc riwr, crossed, and made the opposite bank its own.
The Persian horsc was repulsed; but it was still numerous; and 15
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50 ON TIIE AI<MIES OF ANCIERT GREECE.
there were 20,000 excellent infmtry in line, which liad suffered no loss. Against tllese, Alexander at once led his whole strength. While the pliala11x took then1 in front, the cuirassiers fell upon their flanks, and entirely routed. them; for the lancers and Grcek allies sufficed to keep the Persian cavalry from rallying. And here was manifested the imnicasurcable superiority in an open plain of the llaccdonian ti\-o-handed pike over tlie one-handed lance of the Greeks. The Greek line codd make no impression whatever upon the dense forest of pikes wliich breasted i t ; and the slaughter id&li ensued, when the IToplyti broke nnd endeavoured to flee, was terrible.
Alexander’s loss \\*as computed a t about 1,200 killed and wounded. It is said that of the Persian infantry scarce 2,000 escaped. The speed of their liorses carried the mass of their cavalry out of danger.
Such is the page of militdry history which I proposed to unroll for your consideration to-day. I think ‘that it is wanting neither in interest nor in substantial wlue. I t shows that war has been treated 3s an art, not by moderns only; that there are other fountains whereat the military student may drink, withrefreshment to himself, besides the despatches of the Duke of Wellington and the Commen- taries of Jomini and of the Arch-duke Charles. And hence that he who recommends the foundations of n profession to be laid on n broader base than any cramming-school can furnish proposes to the youths who may be ambitious of achieving military renown no useless labour.
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