on the cuon the cult of personality and its consequenceslt of personality and its consequences

8/10/2019 On the CuOn the Cult of Personality and Its Consequenceslt of Personality and Its Consequences

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On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences

Comrades! In the Party Central Committee’s report at the 20th Congress and in a number of speeches by

delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during Plenary CC/CPSU Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Soiet Union" sessions, #uite a lot has been said about the cult of the indiidual and about its

harmful conse#uences$

%fter Stalin’s death, the Central Committee began to implement a policy of e&plaining concisely and

consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of 'ar&ism()eninism to eleate one person, to

transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, a*in to those of a god$ Such a man

supposedly *no+s eerything, sees eerything, thin*s for eeryone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaior$

Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, +as cultiated among us for many years$ he

ob-ectie of the present report is not a thorough ealuation of Stalin’s life and actiity$ Concerning Stalin’s

merits, an entirely sufficient number of boo*s, pamphlets and studies had already been +ritten in his lifetime$

Stalin’s role of Stalin in the preparation and e&ecution of the Socialist .eolution, in the Ciil ar, and in thefight for the construction of socialism in our country, is uniersally *no+n$ eryone *no+s it +ell$

%t present, +e are concerned +ith a #uestion +hich has immense importance for the Party no+ and for the

future 1 +ith ho+ the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually gro+ing, the cult +hich became at a

certain specific stage the source of a +hole series of e&ceedingly serious and grae perersions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of reolutionary legality$

ecause not all as yet reali3e fully the practical conse#uences resulting from the cult of the indiidual, or"the great harm caused by iolation of the principle of collectie Party direction and by the accumulation of

immense and limitless po+er in the hands of one person, the Central Committee considers it absolutely

necessary to ma*e material pertaining to this matter aailable to the 20th Congress of the Communist Partyof the Soiet Union$

%llo+ me first of all to remind you ho+ seerely the classics of 'ar&ism()eninism denounced eery

manifestation of the cult of the indiidual$ In a letter to the 4erman political +or*er ilhelm loss, 5arl"

'ar& stated6 78rom my antipathy to any cult of the indiidual, I neer made public during the e&istence of

the 9st" International the numerous addresses from arious countries +hich recogni3ed my merits and +hichannoyed me$ I did not een reply to them, e&cept sometimes to rebu*e their authors$ 8redrich" ngels and I

first -oined the secret society of Communists on the condition that eerything ma*ing for superstitious

+orship of authority +ould be deleted from its statute$ 8erdinand" )assalle subse#uently did #uite theopposite$:

Sometime later ngels +rote6 7oth 'ar& and I hae al+ays been against any public manifestation +ithregard to indiiduals, +ith the e&ception of cases +hen it had an important purpose$ e most strongly

opposed such manifestations +hich during our lifetime concerned us personally$:

he great modesty of the genius of the .eolution, ;ladimir Ilyich )enin, is *no+n$ )enin al+ays stressed

the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organi3ational roles of the Party as a liingand creatie organism, and also the role of the Central Committee$



'ar&ism does not negate the role of the leaders of the +or*ing class in directing the reolutionary liberation

moement$

hile ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organi3ers of the masses, )enin at the sametime mercilessly stigmati3ed eery manifestation of the cult of the indiidual, ine&orably combated any"

foreign(to('ar&ism ie+s about a 7hero: and a 7cro+d,: and countered all efforts to oppose a 7hero: to the

masses and to the people$

)enin taught that the Party’s strength depends on its indissoluble unity +ith the masses, on the fact that

behind the Party follo+s the people 1 +or*ers, peasants, and the intelligentsia$ )enin said, 7<nly he +ho beliees in the people, he" +ho submerges himself in the fountain of the liing creatieness of the people,

+ill +in and retain po+er$:

)enin spo*e +ith pride about the olshei* Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people$ =e

called for the presentation of all the most important #uestions before the opinion of *no+ledgeable +or*ers,

before the opinion of their Party$ =e said6 7e beliee in it, +e see in it the +isdom, the honor, and theconscience of our epoch$:

)enin resolutely stood against eery attempt aimed at belittling or +ea*ening the directing role of the Partyin the structure of the Soiet state$ =e +or*ed out olshei* principles of Party direction and norms of Party

life, stressing that the guiding principle of Party leadership is its collegiality$ %lready during the pre(.eolutionary years, )enin called the Central Committee a collectie of leaders and the guardian and

interpreter of Party principles$ 7>uring the period bet+een congresses,: )enin pointed out, 7the Central

Committee guards and interprets the principles of the Party$:

Underlining the role of the Central Committee and its authority, ;ladimir Ilyich pointed out6 7<ur Central

Committee constituted itself as a closely centrali3ed and highly authoritatie group$:

>uring )enin’s life the Central Committee +as a real e&pression of collectie leadership6 of the Party and of

the nation$ eing a militant 'ar&ist(reolutionist, al+ays unyielding in matters of principle, )enin neer imposed his ie+s upon his co(+or*ers by force$ =e tried to conince$ =e patiently e&plained his opinions to

others$ )enin al+ays diligently sa+ to it that the norms of Party life +ere reali3ed, that Party statutes +ere

enforced, that Party congresses and Plenary sessions of the Central Committee too* place at their proper interals$

In addition to ;$ I$ )enin’s great accomplishments for the ictory of the +or*ing class and of the +or*ing

peasants, for the ictory of our Party and for the application of the ideas of scientific Communism to life, his

acute mind e&pressed itself also in this$ )enin" detected in Stalin in time those negatie characteristics +hich

resulted later in grae conse#uences$ 8earing the future fate of the Party and of the Soiet nation, ;$ I$ )eninmade a completely correct characteri3ation of Stalin$ =e pointed out that it +as necessary to consider

transferring Stalin from the position of Party" 4eneral Secretary because Stalin +as e&cessiely rude, did

not hae a proper attitude to+ard his comrades, and +as capricious and abused his po+er$

In >ecember 9?22, in a letter to the Party Congress, ;ladimir Ilyich +rote6 7%fter ta*ing oer the position of 4eneral Secretary, comrade Stalin accumulated immeasurable po+er in his hands and I am not certain

+hether he +ill be al+ays able to use this po+er +ith the re#uired care$:

his letter 1 a political document of tremendous importance, *no+n in the Party’s history as )enin’s

7estament: ( +as distributed among you" delegates to this" 20th Party Congress$ @ou hae read it and +ill

undoubtedly read it again more than once$ @ou might reflect on )enin’s plain +ords, in +hich e&pression is



gien to ;ladimir Ilyich’s an&iety concerning the Party, the people, the state, and the future direction of Party

policy$

;ladimir Ilyich said6

7Stalin is e&cessiely rude, and this defect, +hich can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among

us Communists, becomes a defect +hich cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of 4eneral Secretary$

ecause of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by +hich Stalin +ould be remoed fromthis position and by +hich another man +ould be selected for it, a man +ho, aboe all, +ould differ from

Stalin in only one #uality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater *indness and more considerateattitude to+ard the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc$:

his document of )enin’s +as made *no+n to the delegates at the 9Ath Party Congress, +ho discussed the

#uestion of transferring Stalin from the position of 4eneral Secretary$ he delegates declared themseles in

faor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he +ould heed ;ladimir Ilyich’s critical remar*s and +ould

be able to oercome the defects +hich caused )enin serious an&iety$

Comrades! he Party Congress should become ac#uainted +ith t+o ne+ documents, +hich confirm Stalin’s

character as already outlined by ;ladimir Ilyich )enin in his 7estament$: hese documents are a letter from Bade3hda 5onstantinona 5rups*aya to )e" 5amene, +ho +as at that time head of the Politburo, and a

personal letter from ;ladimir Ilyich )enin to Stalin$

I +ill no+ read these documents6

7); <.IS<;IC=!

7ecause of a short letter +hich I had +ritten in +ords dictated to me by ;ladimir Ilyich by permission of the

doctors, Stalin allo+ed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me$

his is not my first day in the Party$ >uring all these A0 years I hae neer heard one +ord of rudeness from

any comrade$ he Party’s and Ilyich’s business is no less dear to me than to Stalin$ I need ma&imum self(control right no+$ hat one can and +hat one cannot discuss +ith Ilyich I *no+ better than any doctor,

because I *no+ +hat ma*es him nerous and +hat does not$ In any case I *no+ it" better than Stalin$ I am

turning to you and to 4rigory inoie" as much closer comrades of ;ladimir" Ilyich"$ I beg you to protectme from rude interference +ith my priate life and from ile inecties and threats$ I hae no doubt +hat the

Control Commission’s unanimous decision in this matter", +ith +hich Stalin sees fit to threaten me, +ill be$

=o+eer I hae neither strength nor time to +aste on this foolish #uarrel$ %nd I am a human being and my

neres are strained to the utmost$

7B$ 5.UPS5%@%:

Bade3hda 5onstantinona +rote this letter on >ecember 2A, 9?22$ %fter t+o and a half months, in 'arch9?2A, ;ladimir Ilyich )enin sent Stalin the follo+ing letter6

7< C<'.%> S%)IB DC<PIS 8<.6 5%'B; %B> IB<;I;E6

7>ear comrade Stalin!

7@ou permitted yourself a rude summons of my +ife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her$ >espite

the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget +hat +as said, neertheless inoie and 5amene heard



about it from her$ I hae no intention to forget so easily that +hich is being done against me$ I need not stress

here that I consider as directed against me that +hich is being done against my +ife$ I as* you, therefore, thatyou +eigh carefully +hether you are agreeable to retracting your +ords and apologi3ing, or +hether you

prefer the seerance of relations bet+een us$

7SIBC.)@6 )BIB, '%.C= F, 9?2A

DCommotion in the hall$E

Comrades! I +ill not comment on these documents$ hey spea* elo#uently for themseles$ Since Stalin could

behae in this manner during )enin’s life, could thus behae to+ard Bade3hda 5onstantinona 5rups*aya 1

+hom the Party *no+s +ell and alues highly as a loyal friend of )enin and as an actie fighter for the causeof the Party since its creation 1 +e can easily imagine ho+ Stalin treated other people$ hese negatie

characteristics of his deeloped steadily and during the last years ac#uired an absolutely insufferable

character$

%s later eents hae proen, )enin’s an&iety +as -ustified$ In the first period after )enin’s death, Stalin still

paid attention to his adice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of ;ladimir Ilyich$ hen

+e analy3e the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the Party and of the country, +hen +e pause toconsider eerything +hich Stalin perpetrated, +e must be coninced that )enin’s fears +ere -ustified$ he

negatie characteristics of Stalin, +hich, in )enin’s time, +ere only incipient, transformed themseles duringthe last years into a grae abuse of po+er by Stalin, +hich caused untold harm to our Party$

e hae to consider seriously and analy3e correctly this matter in order that +e may preclude any possibilityof a repetition in any form +hateer of +hat too* place during the life of Stalin, +ho absolutely did not

tolerate collegiality in leadership and in +or*, and +ho practiced brutal iolence, not only to+ard eerything

+hich opposed him, but also to+ard that +hich seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary tohis concepts$

Stalin acted not through persuasion, e&planation and patient cooperation +ith people, but by imposing hisconcepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion$ hoeer opposed these concepts or tried to

proe his o+n" ie+point and the correctness of his o+n" position +as doomed to remoal from the

leadership collectie and to subse#uent moral and physical annihilation$ his +as especially true during the period follo+ing the 9Gth Party Congress, +hen many prominent Party leaders and ran*(and(file Party

+or*ers, honest and dedicated to the cause of Communism, fell ictim to Stalin’s despotism$

e must affirm that the Party fought a serious fight against the rots*yites, rightists and bourgeois

nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of )eninism$ his ideological fight +as carried

on successfully, as a result of +hich the Party became strengthened and tempered$ =ere Stalin played a positie role$

he Party led a great political(ideological struggle against those in its o+n ran*s +ho proposed anti()eninisttheses, +ho represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause of socialism$ his +as a stubborn

and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the rots*yite(inoieite bloc andof the u*harinites led actually to+ard the restoration of capitalism and to+ard capitulation to the +orld

bourgeoisie$ )et us consider for a moment +hat +ould hae happened if in 9?2H(9?2? the political line of

right deiation had preailed among us, or orientation to+ard 7cotton(dress industriali3ation,: or to+ard the

*ula*, etc$ e +ould not no+ hae a po+erful heay industry +e +ould not hae the *ol*ho3es +e +ouldfind ourseles disarmed and +ea* in a capitalist encirclement$



It +as for this reason that the Party led an ine&orable ideological fight, e&plaining to all its" members and to

the non(Party masses the harm and the danger of the anti()eninist proposals of the rots*yite opposition andthe rightist opportunists$ %nd this great +or* of e&plaining the Party line bore fruit$ oth the rots*yites and

the rightist opportunists +ere politically isolated$ %n oer+helming Party ma-ority supported the )eninist

line, and the Party +as able to a+a*en and organi3e the +or*ing masses to apply the )eninist line and to build socialism$

% fact +orth noting is that e&treme repressie measures +ere not used against the rots*yites, theinoieites, the u*harinites, and others during the course of the furious ideological fight against them$ he

fight in the 9?20s" +as on ideological grounds$ ut some years later, +hen socialism in our country +as

fundamentally constructed, +hen the e&ploiting classes +ere generally li#uidated, +hen Soiet socialstructure had radically changed, +hen the social basis for political moements and groups hostile to the Party

had iolently contracted, +hen the ideological opponents of the Party +ere long since defeated politically 1

then repression directed against them began$ It +as precisely during this period D9?AF(9?AG(9?AHE that the practice of mass repression through the 4oernment apparatus +as born, first against the enemies of

)eninism 1 rots*yites, inoieites, u*harinites, long since politically defeated by the Party 1 and

subse#uently also against many honest Communists, against those Party cadres +ho had borne the heayload of the Ciil ar and the first and most difficult years of industriali3ation and collectii3ation, +ho had

fought actiely against the rots*yites and the rightists for the )eninist Party line$

Stalin originated the concept 7enemy of the people$: his term automatically made it unnecessary that the

ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controersy be proen$ It made possible the use of the

cruelest repression, iolating all norms of reolutionary legality, against anyone +ho in any +ay disagreed+ith Stalin, against those +ho +ere only suspected of hostile intent, against those +ho had bad reputations$

he concept 7enemy of the people: actually eliminated the possibility of any *ind of ideological fight or the

ma*ing of one’s ie+s *no+n on this or that issue, een issues" of a practical nature$ <n the +hole, the only proof of guilt actually used, against all norms of current legal science, +as the 7confession: of the accused

himself$ %s subse#uent probing has proen, 7confessions: +ere ac#uired through physical pressures against

the accused$ his led to glaring iolations of reolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent

indiiduals 1 persons" +ho in the past had defended the Party line 1 became ictims$

e must assert that, in regard to those persons +ho in their time had opposed the Party line, there +ere oftenno sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation$ he formula 7enemy of the people: +as

specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such indiiduals$

It is a fact that many persons +ho +ere later annihilated as enemies of the Party and people had +or*ed +ith

)enin during his life$ Some of these persons had made errors during )enin’s life, but, despite this, )enin

benefited by their +or* he corrected them and he did eerything possible to retain them in the ran*s of theParty he induced them to follo+ him$

In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should familiari3e themseles +ith an unpublishednote by ;$ I$ )enin directed to the Central Committee’s Politburo in <ctober 9?20$ <utlining the duties of the

Party" Control Commission, )enin +rote that the Commission should be transformed into a real 7organ of

Party and proletarian conscience$:

7%s a special duty of the Control Commission there is recommended a deep, indiiduali3ed relationship +ith,and sometimes een a type of therapy for, the representaties of the so(called opposition 1 those +ho hae

e&perienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soiet or Party career$ %n effort should be made

to #uiet them, to e&plain the matter to them in a +ay used among comrades, to find for them Daoiding the



method of issuing ordersE a tas* for +hich they are psychologically fitted$ %dice and rules relating to this

matter are to be formulated by the Central Committee’s <rgani3ational ureau, etc$:

eryone *no+s ho+ irreconcilable )enin +as +ith the ideological enemies of 'ar&ism, +ith those +hodeiated from the correct Party line$ %t the same time, ho+eer, )enin, as is eident from the gien

document, in his practice of directing the Party demanded the most intimate Party contact +ith people +ho

had sho+n indecision or temporary non(conformity +ith the Party line, but +hom it +as possible to return to

the Party path$ )enin adised that such people should be patiently educated +ithout the application of e&treme methods$

)enin’s +isdom in dealing +ith people +as eident in his +or* +ith cadres$

%n entirely different relationship +ith people characteri3ed Stalin$ )enin’s traits 1 patient +or* +ith people,

stubborn and painsta*ing education of them, the ability to induce people to follo+ him +ithout using

compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the +hole collectie 1 +ere entirely

foreign to Stalin$ =e discarded the )eninist method of conincing and educating, he abandoned the methodof ideological struggle for that of administratie iolence, mass repressions and terror$ =e acted on an

increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitie organs, at the same time often iolating all

e&isting norms of morality and of Soiet la+s$

%rbitrary behaior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others$ 'ass arrests anddeportations of many thousands of people, e&ecution +ithout trial and +ithout normal inestigation created

conditions of insecurity, fear and een desperation$

his, of course, did not contribute to+ard unity of the Party ran*s and of all strata of +or*ing people, but, on

the contrary, brought about annihilation and the e&pulsion from the Party of +or*ers +ho +ere loyal but

inconenient to Stalin$

<ur Party fought for the implementation of )enin’s plans for the construction of socialism$ his +as an

ideological fight$ =ad )eninist principles been obsered during the course of this fight, had the Party’sdeotion to principles been s*illfully combined +ith a *een and solicitous concern for people, had they not

been repelled and +asted but rather dra+n to our side, +e certainly +ould not hae had such a brutal

iolation of reolutionary legality and many thousands of people +ould not hae fallen ictim to the methodof terror$ &traordinary methods +ould then hae been resorted to only against those people +ho had in fact

committed criminal acts against the Soiet system$

)et us recall some historical facts$

In the days before the <ctober .eolution, t+o members of the Central Committee of the olshei* Party 1

5amene and inoie 1 declared themseles against )enin’s plan for an armed uprising$ In addition, on

<ctober 9H they published in the 'enshei* ne+spaper, Boaya hi3n, a statement declaring that the

olshei*s +ere ma*ing preparations for an uprising and that they considered it adenturistic$ 5amene andinoie thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the Central Committee to stage the uprising, and that the

uprising had been organi3ed to ta*e place +ithin the ery near future$

his +as treason against the Party and against the .eolution$ In this connection, ;$ I$ )enin +rote6

75amene and inoie reealed the decision of the Central Committee of their Party on the armed uprisingto 'i*hail" .od3yan*o and %le&ander" 5erens*y$$$$ =e put before the Central Committee the #uestion of

inoie’s and 5amene’s e&pulsion from the Party$



=o+eer, after the 4reat Socialist <ctober .eolution, as is *no+n, inoie and 5amene +ere gien

leading positions$ )enin put them in positions in +hich they carried out most responsible Party tas*s and participated actiely in the +or* of the leading Party and Soiet organs$ It is *no+n that inoie and

5amene committed a number of other serious errors during )enin’s life$ In his 7estament: )enin +arned

that 7inoie’s and 5amene’s <ctober episode +as of course not an accident$: ut )enin did not pose the#uestion of their arrest and certainly not their shooting$

<r, let us ta*e the e&ample of the rots*yites$ %t present, after a sufficiently long historical period, +e canspea* about the fight +ith the rots*yites +ith complete calm and can analy3e this matter +ith sufficient

ob-ectiity$ %fter all, around rots*y +ere people +hose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois

society$ Part of them belonged to the Party intelligentsia and a certain part +ere recruited from among the+or*ers$ e can name many indiiduals +ho, in their time, -oined the rots*yites ho+eer, these same

indiiduals too* an actie part in the +or*ers’ moement before the .eolution, during the Socialist <ctober

.eolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the ictory of this greatest of reolutions$ 'any of them bro*e +ith rots*yism and returned to )eninist positions$ as it necessary to annihilate such peopleJ e are

deeply coninced that, had )enin lied, such an e&treme method +ould not hae been used against any of

them$

Such are only a fe+ historical facts$ ut can it be said that )enin did not decide to use een the most seeremeans against enemies of the .eolution +hen this +as actually necessaryJ Bo no one can say this$;ladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings +ith the enemies of the .eolution and of the +or*ing

class and +hen necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods$ @ou +ill recall only ;$ I$ )enin’s fight +ith the

Socialist .eolutionary organi3ers of the anti(Soiet uprising, +ith the counterreolutionary *ula*s in 9?9Hand +ith others, +hen )enin +ithout hesitation used the most e&treme methods against the enemies$ )enin

used such methods, ho+eer, only against actual class enemies and not against those +ho blunder, +ho err,

and +hom it +as possible to lead through ideological influence and een retain in the leadership$ )enin usedseere methods only in the most necessary cases, +hen the e&ploiting classes +ere still in e&istence and +ere

igorously opposing the .eolution, +hen the struggle for surial +as decidedly assuming the sharpest

forms, een including a Ciil ar$

Stalin, on the other hand, used e&treme methods and mass repressions at a time +hen the .eolution +as

already ictorious, +hen the Soiet state +as strengthened, +hen the e&ploiting classes +ere alreadyli#uidated and socialist relations +ere rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, +hen our Party +as

politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically$

It is clear that here Stalin sho+ed in a +hole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of

po+er$ Instead of proing his political correctness and mobili3ing the masses, he often chose the path of

repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against indiiduals +ho hadnot committed any crimes against the Party and the Soiet 4oernment$ =ere +e see no +isdom but only a

demonstration of the brutal force +hich had once so alarmed ;$ I$ )enin$

)ately, especially after the unmas*ing of the eria gang, the Central Committee loo*ed into a series of

matters fabricated by this gang$ his reealed a ery ugly picture of brutal +illfulness connected +ith the

incorrect behaior of Stalin$ %s facts proe, Stalin, using his unlimited po+er, allo+ed himself many abuses,acting in the name of the Central Committee, not as*ing for the opinion of the Committee members nor een

of the members of the Central Committee’s Politburo often he did not inform them about his personal

decisions concerning ery important Party and goernment matters$



Considering the #uestion of the cult of an indiidual, +e must first of all sho+ eeryone +hat harm this

caused to the interests of our Party$

;ladimir Ilyich )enin had al+ays stressed the Party’s role and significance in the direction of the socialistgoernment of +or*ers and peasants he sa+ in this the chief precondition for a successful building of

socialism in our country$ Pointing to the great responsibility of the olshei* Party, as ruling Party of the

Soiet state, )enin called for the most meticulous obserance of all norms of Party life he called for the

reali3ation of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the Party and the state$

Collegiality of leadership flo+s from the ery nature of our Party, a Party built on the principles of democratic centralism$ 7his means,: said )enin, 7that all Party matters are accomplished by all Party

members 1 directly or through representaties 1 +ho, +ithout any e&ceptions, are sub-ect to the same rules

in addition, all administratie members, all directing collegia, all holders of Party positions are electie, theymust account for their actiities and are recallable$:

It is *no+n that )enin himself offered an e&ample of the most careful obserance of these principles$ here+as no matter so important that )enin himself decided it +ithout as*ing for adice and approal of the

ma-ority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee’s Politburo$ In the

most difficult period for our Party and our country, )enin considered it necessary regularly to cono*eCongresses, Party Conferences and Plenary sessions of the Central Committee at +hich all the most

important #uestions +ere discussed and +here resolutions, carefully +or*ed out by the collectie of leaders,

+ere approed$

e can recall, for an e&ample, the year 9?9H +hen the country +as threatened by the attac* of the

imperialistic interentionists$ In this situation the Gth Party Congress +as conened in order to discuss aitally important matter +hich could not be postponed 1 the matter of peace$ In 9?9?, +hile the Ciil ar

+as raging, the Hth Party Congress conened +hich adopted a ne+ Party program, decided such important

matters as the relationship +ith the peasant masses, the organi3ation of the .ed %rmy, the leading role of theParty in the +or* of the soiets, the correction of the social composition of the Party, and other matters$ In

9?20 the ?th Party Congress +as conened +hich laid do+n guiding principles pertaining to the Party’s +or* in the sphere of economic construction$ In 9?29 the 90th Party Congress accepted )enin’s Be+ conomicPolicy and the historic resolution called 7<n Party Unity$:

>uring )enin’s life, Party congresses +ere conened regularly al+ays, +hen a radical turn in thedeelopment of the Party and the country too* place, )enin considered it absolutely necessary that the Party

discuss at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to #uestions bearing on the

deelopment of Party and goernment$

It is ery characteristic that )enin addressed to the Party Congress as the highest Party organ his last articles,letters and remar*s$ >uring the period bet+een congresses, the Central Committee of the Party, acting as the

most authoritatie leading collectie, meticulously obsered the principles of the Party and carried out its policy$

So it +as during )enin’s life$ ere our Party’s holy )eninist principles obsered after the death of ;ladimir

IlyichJ

hereas, during the first fe+ years after )enin’s death, Party Congresses and Central Committee Plenums

too* place more or less regularly, later, +hen Stalin began increasingly to abuse his po+er, these principles+ere brutally iolated$ his +as especially eident during the last 9F years of his life$ as it a normal

situation +hen oer 9A years elapsed bet+een the 9Hth and 9?th Party Congresses, years during +hich our



Party and our country had e&perienced so many important eentsJ hese eents demanded categorically that

the Party should hae passed resolutions pertaining to the country’s defense during the 4reat" Patriotic ar and to peacetime construction after the +ar$

en after the end of the +ar a Congress +as not conened for oer seen years$ Central Committee Plenums

+ere hardly eer called$ It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic ar not a

single Central Committee Plenum too* place$ It is true that there +as an attempt to call a Central Committee

Plenum in <ctober 9?K9, +hen Central Committee members from the +hole country +ere called to 'osco+$hey +aited t+o days for the opening of the Plenum, but in ain$ Stalin did not een +ant to meet and tal* to

the Central Committee members$ his fact sho+s ho+ demorali3ed Stalin +as in the first months of the +ar

and ho+ haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members$

In practice, Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and trampled on the )eninist principle of collectie Partyleadership$

Stalin’s +illfulness is a is the Party and its Central Committee became fully eident after the 9Gth PartyCongress, +hich too* place in 9?AK$

=aing at its disposal numerous data sho+ing brutal +illfulness to+ard Party cadres, the Central Committeehas created a Party commission under the control of the Central Committee’s Presidium$ It has been charged

+ith inestigating +hat made possible mass repressions against the ma-ority of the Central Committeemembers and candidates elected at the 9Gth Congress of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE$

he commission has become ac#uainted +ith a large #uantity of materials in the B5;> archies and +ithother documents$ It has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to

false accusations, and" to glaring abuses of socialist legality, +hich resulted in the death of innocent people$

It became apparent that many Party, Soiet and economic actiists +ho in 9?AG(9?AH +ere branded7enemies: +ere actually neer enemies, spies, +rec*ers, etc$, but +ere al+ays honest Communists$ hey

+ere merely stigmati3ed as enemies"$ <ften, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged

themseles Dat the order of the inestigatie -udges/falsifiersE +ith all *inds of grae and unli*ely crimes$

he commission has presented to the Central Committee’s Presidium lengthy and documented materials

pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the 9Gth Party Congress and against members of theCentral Committee elected at that Congress$ hese materials hae been studied by the Presidium$$

It +as determined that of the 9A? members and candidates of the Central Committee +ho +ere elected at the

9Gth Congress, ?H persons, i$e$, G0 per cent, +ere arrested and shot Dmostly in 9?AG(9?AHE$ DIndignation in the

hall$E hat +as the composition of the delegates to the 9Gth CongressJ It is *no+n that H0 per cent of the

oting participants of the 9Gth Congress -oined the Party during the years of conspiracy before the.eolution and during the Ciil ar, i$e$ meaning before 9?29$ y social origin the basic mass of the

delegates to the Congress +ere +or*ers DL0 per cent of the oting membersE$

8or this reason, it is inconceiable that a Congress so composed could hae elected a Central Committee in

+hich a ma-ority of the members" +ould proe to be enemies of the Party$ he only reasons +hy G0 per centof the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 9Gth Congress +ere branded as enemies of

the Party and of the people +ere because honest Communists +ere slandered, accusations against them +ere

fabricated, and reolutionary legality +as graely undermined$

he same fate met not only Central Committee members but also the ma-ority of the delegates to the 9Gth

Party Congress$ <f 9,?LL delegates +ith either oting or adisory rights, 9,90H persons +ere arrested on



the *iller of 5iro, )eonid" Bi*olaye, +as assisted by someone from among the people +hose duty it +as

to protect the person of 5iro$

% month and a half before the *illing, Bi*olaye +as arrested on the grounds of suspicious behaior but he+as released and not een searched$ It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that +hen the Che*ist

assigned to protect 5iro +as being brought for an interrogation, on >ecember 2, 9?AK, he +as *illed in a car

7accident: in +hich no other occupants of the car +ere harmed$ %fter the murder of 5iro, top functionaries

of the )eningrad B5;> +ere gien ery light sentences, but in 9?AG they +ere shot$ e can assume thatthey +ere shot in order to coer up the traces of the organi3ers of 5iro’s *illing$

D'oement in the hall$E

'ass repressions gre+ tremendously from the end of 9?AL after a telegram from Stalin and %ndrey"

hdano, dated from Sochi on September 2F, 9?AL, +as addressed to )a3ar" 5aganoich, ;yachesla"

'oloto and other members of the Politburo$ he content of the telegram +as as follo+s6

7e deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that comrade Bi*olay" @e3ho be nominated to the post of

People’s Commissar for Internal %ffairs$ 4enri*h" @agoda definitely has proen himself incapable of

unmas*ing the rots*yite(inoieite bloc$ he <4PU is four years behind in this matter$ his is noted by allParty +or*ers and by the ma-ority of the representaties of the B5;>$:

Strictly spea*ing, +e should stress that Stalin did not meet +ith and, therefore, could not *no+ the opinion of

Party +or*ers$

his Stalinist formulation that the 7B5;> is four years behind: in applying mass repression and that there is

a necessity for 7catching up: +ith the neglected +or* directly pushed the B5;> +or*ers on the path of mass arrests and e&ecutions$

e should state that this formulation +as also forced on the 8ebruary('arch Plenary session of the CentralCommittee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE in 9?AG$ he Plenary resolution approed it on

the basis of @e3ho’s report, 7)essons flo+ing from the harmful actiity, diersion and espionage of the

Mapanese(4erman(rots*yite agents,: stating6

7he Plenum of the Central Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE considers that allfacts reealed during the inestigation into the matter of an anti(Soiet rots*yite center and of its follo+ers

in the proinces sho+ that the People’s Commissariat of Internal %ffairs has fallen behind at least four years

in the attempt to unmas* these most ine&orable enemies of the people$

he mass repressions at this time +ere made under the slogan of a fight against the rots*yites$ >id the

rots*yites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our Party and to the Soiet stateJ e should recallthat in 9?2G, on the ee of the 9Fth Party Congress, only some K,000 Party" otes +ere cast for the

rots*yite(inoieite opposition +hile there +ere G2K,000 for the Party line$ >uring the 90 years +hich passed bet+een the 9Fth Party Congress and the 8ebruary('arch Central Committee Plenum, rots*yism+as completely disarmed$ 'any former rots*yites changed their former ie+s and +or*ed in the arious

sectors building socialism$ It is clear that in the situation of socialist ictory there +as no basis for mass

terror in the country$

Stalin’s report at the 8ebruary('arch Central Committee Plenum in 9?AG, 7>eficiencies of Party +or* and

methods for the li#uidation of the rots*yites and of other t+o(facers,: contained an attempt at theoretical



report, the proocateurs +ho had infiltrated the state(security organs together +ith conscienceless careerists

began to protect +ith the Party name the mass terror against Party cadres, cadres of the Soiet state, andordinary Soiet citi3ens$ It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of

counterreolutionary crimes had gro+n ten times bet+een 9?AL and 9?AG$

It is *no+n that brutal +illfulness +as practiced against leading Party +or*ers$ he releant" Party statute,

approed at the 9Gth Party Congress, +as based on )eninist principles e&pressed at the 90th Party Congress$

It stated that, in order to apply an e&treme method such as e&clusion from the Party against a CentralCommittee member, against a Central Committee candidate or against a member of the Party Control

Commission, 7it is necessary to call a Central Committee Plenum and to inite to the Plenum all Central

Committee candidate members and all members of the Party Control Commission: only if t+o(thirds of themembers of such a general assembly of responsible Party leaders found it necessary, only then could a

Central Committee member or candidate be e&pelled$

he ma-ority of those Central Committee’s members and candidates +ho +ere elected at the 9Gth Congress

and arrested in 9?AG(9?AH +ere e&pelled from the Party illegally through brutal abuse of the Party statute,

because the #uestion of their e&pulsion +as neer studied at the Central Committee Plenum$

Bo+, +hen the cases of some of these so(called 7spies: and 7saboteurs: +ere e&amined, it +as found that alltheir cases +ere fabricated$ he confessions of guilt of many of those arrested and charged +ith enemy

actiity +ere gained +ith the help of cruel and inhuman tortures$

%t the same time, Stalin, as +e hae been informed by members of the Politburo of that time, did not sho+

them the statements of many accused political actiists +hen they retracted their confessions before the

military tribunal and as*ed for an ob-ectie e&amination of their cases$ here +ere many such declarations,and Stalin doubtless *ne+ of them$

he Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated

7cases: against the members of the Party’s Central Committee elected at the 9Gth Party Congress$

%n e&ample of ile proocation, of odious falsification and of criminal iolation of reolutionary legality is

the case of the former candidate for the Central Committee Politburo, one of the most eminent +or*ers of the

Party and of the Soiet 4oernment, comrade .obert" i*he, +ho had been a Party member since 9?0F$

DCommotion in the hall$E

Comrade i*he +as arrested on %pril 2?, 9?AH on the basis of slanderous materials, +ithout the sanction of

the State" Prosecutor of the USS.$ his +as finally receied 9F months after the arrest$

he inestigation of i*he’s case +as made in a manner +hich most brutally iolated Soiet legality and +asaccompanied by +illfulness and falsification$

Under torture, i*he +as forced to sign a protocol of his confession prepared in adance by the inestigatie

-udges$ In it, he and seeral other eminent Party +or*ers +ere accused of anti(Soiet actiity$

<n <ctober 9, 9?A? i*he sent his declaration to Stalin in +hich he categorically denied his guilt and as*ed

for an e&amination of his case$ In the declaration he +rote6 7here is no more bitter misery than to sit in the

-ail of a goernment for +hich I hae al+ays fought$:



% second declaration of i*he has been presered, +hich he sent to Stalin on <ctober 2G, 9?A?$ In it i*he"

cited facts ery conincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that this proocatory accusation +as on one hand the +or* of real rots*yites +hose arrests he had sanctioned as 8irst

Secretary of the est Siberian .egional Party Committee and +ho conspired in order to ta*e reenge on him,

and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of materials by the inestigatie -udges$

i*he +rote in his declaration6

7$$$ <n <ctober 2F of this year I +as informed that the inestigation in my case has been concluded and I +as

gien access to the materials of this inestigation$ =ad I been guilty of only one hundredth of the crimes +ith+hich I am charged, I +ould not hae dared to send you this pre(e&ecution declaration$ =o+eer I hae not

been guilty of een one of the things +ith +hich I am charged and my heart is clean of een the shado+ of

baseness$ I hae neer in my life told you a +ord of falsehood, and no+, finding both feet in the grae, I amstill not lying$ 'y +hole case is a typical e&ample of proocation, slander and iolation of the elementary

basis of reolutionary legality$$$$

7$$$ he confessions +hich +ere made part of my file are not only absurd but contain slander to+ard the

Central Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE and to+ard the Council of People’s

Commissars$ his is" because correct resolutions of the Central Committee of the %ll(Union CommunistParty Dolshei*sE and of the Council of People’s Commissars +hich +ere not made on my initiatie and

+ere promulgated" +ithout my participation are presented as hostile acts of counterreolutionary

organi3ations made at my suggestion$

7I am no+ alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life and to my really grae guilt against the Party and

against you$ his is my confession of counterreolutionary actiity$$$$ he case is as follo+s6 Bot being ableto suffer the tortures to +hich I +as submitted by $" Usha*o and Bi*olaye 1 especially by the former,

+ho utili3ed the *no+ledge that my bro*en ribs hae not properly mended and hae caused me great pain 1 I

hae been forced to accuse myself and others$

7he ma-ority of my confession has been suggested or dictated by Usha*o$ he rest is my reconstruction of B5;> materials from estern Siberia for +hich I assumed all responsibility$ If some part of the story +hich

Usha*o fabricated and +hich I signed did not properly hang together, I +as forced to sign another ariation$

he same thing +as done to 'oisey" .u*himoich, +ho +as at first designated as a member of the resere

net and +hose name later +as remoed +ithout telling me anything about it$ he same also +as done +iththe leader of the resere net, supposedly created by u*harin in 9?AF$ %t first I +rote my o+n" name in, and

then I +as instructed to insert ;alery" 'e3hlau*’s$ here +ere other similar incidents$

7$$$ I am as*ing and begging you that you again e&amine my case, and this not for the purpose of sparing me

but in order to unmas* the ile proocation +hich, li*e a sna*e, +ound itself around many persons in a greatdegree due to my meanness and criminal slander$ I hae neer betrayed you or the Party$ I *no+ that I perish

because of ile and mean +or* of enemies of the Party and of the people, +ho hae fabricated the proocation against me$:

It +ould appear that such an important declaration +as +orth an e&amination by the Central Committee$

his, ho+eer, +as not done$ he declaration +as transmitted to eria +hile the terrible maltreatment of thePolitburo candidate, comrade i*he, continued$

<n 8ebruary 2, 9?K0, i*he +as brought before the court$ =ere he did not confess any guilt and said asfollo+s6



7In all the so(called confessions of mine there is not one letter +ritten by me +ith the e&ception of my

signatures under the protocols, +hich +ere forced from me$ I hae made my confession under pressure fromthe inestigatie -udge, +ho from the time of my arrest tormented me$ %fter that I began to +rite all this

nonsense$$$$ he most important thing for me is to tell the court, the Party and Stalin that I am not guilty$ I

hae neer been guilty of any conspiracy$ I +ill die belieing in the truth of Party policy as I hae belieed init during my +hole life$:

<n 8ebruary K, i*he +as shot$

DIndignation in the hall$E

It has been definitely established no+ that i*he’s case +as fabricated$ =e has been rehabilitated posthumously$

Comrade @an" .ud3uta*, a candidate(member of the Politburo, a member of the Party since 9?0F +ho spent90 years in a sarist hard(labor camp, completely retracted in court the confession forced from him$ he

protocol of the session of the Collegium of the Supreme 'ilitary Court contains the follo+ing statement by

.ud3uta*6

7$$$ he only plea +hich the defendant" places before the court is that the Central Committee of the %ll(

Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE be informed that there is in the B5;> an as yet not li#uidated center +hich is craftily manufacturing cases, +hich forces innocent persons to confess$ here is no opportunity to

proe one’s non(participation in crimes to +hich the confessions of arious persons testify$ he inestigatie

methods are such that they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those+ho already stand accused$ he defendant" as*s the Court that he be allo+ed to inform the Central

Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE about all this in +riting$ =e assures the Court

that he personally had neer any eil designs in regard to the policy of our Party because he has al+aysagreed +ith Party policy concerning all spheres of economic and cultural actiity$:

his declaration of .ud3uta* +as ignored, despite the fact that .ud3uta* +as in his time the head of theCentral Control Commission1 +hich had been called into being, in accordance +ith )enin’s conception, for

the purpose of fighting for Party unity$ In this manner fell the head of this highly authoritatie Party organ, a

ictim of brutal +illfulness$ =e +as not een called before the Politburo because Stalin did not +ant to tal* to him$ Sentence +as pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he +as shot$


%fter careful e&amination of the case in 9?FF, it +as established that the accusation against .ud3uta* +asfalse and that it +as based on slanderous materials$ .ud3uta* has been rehabilitated posthumously$

he +ay in +hich the former B5;> +or*ers manufactured arious fictitious 7anti(Soiet centers: and

7blocs: +ith the help of proocatory methods is seen from the confession of comrade .o3enblum, a Partymember since 9?0L, +ho +as arrested in 9?AG by the )eningrad B5;>$

>uring the e&amination in 9?FF of the 5omaro case, .o3enblum reealed the follo+ing fact6 hen

.o3enblum +as arrested in 9?AG, he +as sub-ected to terrible torture during +hich he +as ordered to confessfalse information concerning himself and other persons$ =e +as then brought to the office of )eonid"

a*os*y, +ho offered him freedom on condition that he ma*e before the court a false confession fabricated

in 9?AG by the B5;> concerning 7sabotage, espionage and diersion in a terroristic center in )eningrad$:



D'oement in the hall$E ith unbelieable cynicism, a*os*y told about the ile 7mechanism: for the

crafty creation of fabricated 7anti(Soiet plots$:

7In order to illustrate it to me,: stated .o3enblum, 7a*os*y gae me seeral possible ariants of theorgani3ation of this center and of its branches$ %fter he detailed the organi3ation to me, a*os*y told me

that the B5;> +ould prepare the case of this center, remar*ing that the trial +ould be public$ efore the

court +ere to be brought K or F members of this center6 'i*hail" Chudo, 8yodor" Ugaro, Pyotr"

Smorodin, oris" Po3ern, Chudo’s +ife )iudmilla" Shaposhni*oa and others together +ith 2 or Amembers from the branches of this center$$$$

7$$$ he case of the )eningrad center has to be built solidly, and for this reason +itnesses are needed$ Social

origin Dof course, in the pastE and the Party standing of the +itness +ill play more than a small role$ 7’@ou,

yourself,’ said a*os*y, N+ill not need to inent anything$ he B5;> +ill prepare for you a ready outlinefor eery branch of the center$ @ou +ill hae to study it carefully, and remember +ell all #uestions the Court

might as* and their ans+ers$ his case +ill be ready in four or fie months, perhaps in half a year$ >uring all

this time you +ill be preparing yourself so that you +ill not compromise the inestigation and yourself$ @our

future +ill depend on ho+ the trial goes and on its results$ If you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blameyourself$ If you manage to endure it, you +ill sae your head and +e +ill feed and clothe you at the

4oernment’s cost until your death$’:

his is the *ind of ile thing practiced then$


en more +idely +as the falsification of cases practiced in the proinces$ he B5;> head#uarters of the

Serdlo Proince 7discoered: a so(called 7Ural uprising staff: 1 an organ of the bloc of rightists,

rots*yites, Socialist .eolutionaries, and church leaders 1 +hose chief supposedly +as the Secretary of theSerdlo Proincial Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, %ll(Union Communist Party

Dolshei*sE, Ian" 5aba*o, +ho had been a Party member since 9?9K$ Inestigatie materials of that time

sho+ that in almost all regions, proinces and republics there supposedly e&isted 7rightist rots*yite,espionage(terror and diersionary(sabotage organi3ations and centers: and that the heads of such

organi3ations as a rule 1 for no *no+n reason 1 +ere 8irst Secretaries of proincial or republican Communist

Party committees or Central Committees$

'any thousands of honest and innocent Communists hae died as a result of this monstrous falsification of

such 7cases,: as a result of the fact that all *inds of slanderous 7confessions: +ere accepted, and as a resultof the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and others$ In the same manner +ere fabricated the

7cases: against eminent Party and state +or*ers 1 Stanisla" 5osior, ;las" Chubar, Pael" Postyshe,

%le&ander" 5osare, and others$

In those years repressions on a mass scale +ere applied +hich +ere based on nothing tangible and +hich

resulted in heay cadre losses to the Party$

he icious practice +as condoned of haing the B5;> prepare lists of persons +hose cases +ere under the -urisdiction of the 'ilitary Collegium and +hose sentences +ere prepared in adance$ @e3ho +ould send

these e&ecution" lists to Stalin personally for his approal of the proposed punishment$ In 9?AG(9?AH, AHA

such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party, Soiet, 5omsomol, %rmy, and economic +or*ers

+ere sent to Stalin$ =e approed these lists$



% large part of these cases are being reie+ed no+$ % great many are being oided because they +ere

baseless and falsified$ Suffice it to say that from 9?FK to the present time the 'ilitary Collegium of theSupreme Court has rehabilitated G,LG? persons, many of +hom hae been rehabilitated posthumously$

'ass arrests of Party, Soiet, economic and military +or*ers caused tremendous harm to our country and to

the cause of socialist adancement$

'ass repressions had a negatie influence on the moral(political condition of the Party, created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and so+ed distrust among Communists$ %ll

sorts of slanderers and careerists +ere actie$

.esolutions of the Manuary, 9?AH Central Committee Plenum brought some measure of improement to Partyorgani3ations$ =o+eer, +idespread repression also e&isted in 9?AH$

<nly because our Party has at its disposal such great moral(political strength +as it possible for it to suriethe difficult eents in 9?AG(9?AH and to educate ne+ cadres$ here is, ho+eer, no doubt that our march

for+ard to+ard socialism and to+ard the preparation of the country’s defense +ould hae been much more

successful +ere it not for the tremendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the baseless and false mass

repressions in 9?AG(9?AH$

e are accusing @e3ho -ustly for the degenerate practices of 9?AG$ ut +e hae to ans+er these #uestions6Could @e3ho hae arrested 5osior, for instance, +ithout Stalin’s *no+ledgeJ as there an e&change of

opinions or a Politburo decision concerning thisJ

Bo, there +as not, as there +as none regarding other cases of this type$ Could @e3ho hae decided such

important matters as the fate of such eminent Party figuresJ

Bo, it +ould be a display of naietO to consider this the +or* of @e3ho alone$ It is clear that these matters

+ere decided by Stalin, and that +ithout his orders and his sanction @e3ho could not hae done this$

e hae e&amined these cases and hae rehabilitated 5osior, .ud3uta*, Postyshe, 5osare and others$ 8or +hat causes +ere they arrested and sentencedJ <ur reie+ of eidence sho+s that there +as no reason for

this$ hey, li*e many others, +ere arrested +ithout prosecutorial *no+ledge$

In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for +hat sort of a sanction could there be +hen Stalin

decided eerythingJ =e +as the chief prosecutor in these cases$ Stalin not only agreed to arrest orders but

issued them on his o+n initiatie$ e must say this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearlyunderta*e and themseles assess this and dra+ the proper conclusions$

8acts proe that many abuses +ere made on Stalin’s orders +ithout rec*oning +ith any norms of Party and

Soiet legality$ Stalin +as a ery distrustful man, sic*ly suspicious$ e *no+ this from our +or* +ith him$

=e could loo* at a man and say6 7hy are your eyes so shifty todayJ: or 7hy are you turning so muchtoday and aoiding to loo* me directly in the eyesJ: he sic*ly suspicion created in him a general distrust

een to+ard eminent Party +or*ers +hom he had *no+n for years$ ery+here and in eerything he sa+

7enemies,: 7t+o(facers: and 7spies$: Possessing unlimited po+er, he indulged in great +illfulness and stifled

people morally as +ell as physically$ % situation +as created +here one could not e&press one’s o+n olition$

hen Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it +as necessary to accept on faith that he +as an7enemy of the people$: 'ean+hile, eria’s gang, +hich ran the organs of state security, outdid itself in

proing the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials +hich it falsified$ %nd +hat proofs +ere offeredJ



he confessions of the arrested, and the inestigatie -udges accepted these 7confessions$: %nd ho+ is it

possible that a person confesses to crimes +hich he has not committedJ <nly in one +ay 1because of theapplication of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness,

depriation of his -udgment, ta*ing a+ay of his human dignity$ In this manner +ere 7confessions: ac#uired$

he +ae of mass arrests began to recede in 9?A?$ hen the leaders of territorial Party organi3ations began

to accuse B5;> +or*ers of using methods of physical pressure on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded

telegram on Manuary 20, 9?A? to the committee secretaries of proinces and regions, to the centralcommittees of republican Communist parties, to the republican" People’s Commissars of Internal %ffairs and

to the heads of B5;> organi3ations$ his telegram stated6

7he Central Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE e&plains that the application of

methods of physical pressure in B5;> practice is permissible from 9?AG on in accordance +ith permissionof the Central Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE $$$ It is *no+n that all bourgeois

intelligence serices use methods of physical influence against representaties of the socialist proletariat and

that they use them in their most scandalous forms$

7he #uestion arises as to +hy the socialist intelligence serice should be more humanitarian against the mad

agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly enemies of the +or*ing class and of *ol*ho3 +or*ers$ heCentral Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE considers that physical pressure should

still be used obligatorily, as an e&ception applicable to *no+n and obstinate enemies of the people, as a

method both -ustifiable and appropriate$:

hus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Central Committee of the %ll(Union Communist Party

Dolshei*sE the most brutal iolation of socialist legality, torture and oppression, +hich led as +e hae seento the slandering and to the self(accusation of innocent people$

Bot long ago 1 only seeral days before the present Congress 1 +e called to the Central Committee

Presidium session and interrogated the inestigatie -udge .odos, +ho in his time inestigated and

interrogated 5osior, Chubar and 5osare$ =e is a ile person, +ith the brain of a bird, and completelydegenerate morally$ It +as this man +ho +as deciding the fate of prominent Party +or*ers$ =e also +as

ma*ing -udgments concerning the politics in these matters, because, haing established their 7crime,: he

thereby proided materials from +hich important political implications could be dra+n$

he #uestion arises +hether a man +ith such an intellect could1by himelf1hae conducted his inestigations

in a manner proing the guilt of people such as 5osior and others$ Bo, he could not hae done it +ithout proper directies$ %t the Central Committee Presidium session he told us6 7I +as told that 5osior and Chubar

+ere people’s enemies and for this reason I, as an inestigatie -udge, had to ma*e them confess that they

+ere enemies$:


=e +ould do this only through long tortures, +hich he did, receiing detailed instructions from eria$ e

must say that at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared6 7I thought that I +ase&ecuting the orders of the Party$: In this manner, Stalin’s orders concerning the use of methods of physical

pressure against the arrested +ere carried out in practice$

hese and many other facts sho+ that all norms of correct Party solution of problems +ere in"alidated and

that eerything +as dependent upon the +illfulness of one man$



he po+er accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin, led to serious conse#uences during the 4reat

Patriotic ar$

hen +e loo* at many of our noels, films and historical(scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the Patrioticar appears to be entirely improbable$ Stalin had foreseen eerything$ he Soiet %rmy, on the basis of a

strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so(called 7actie defense,: i$e$, tactics +hich,

as +e *no+, allo+ed the 4ermans to come up to 'osco+ and Stalingrad$ Using such tactics, the Soiet

%rmy, supposedly than*s only to Stalin’s genius, turned to the offensie and subdued the enemy$ he epicictory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soiets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in

this type of noel, film and 7scientific study: as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin$

e hae to analy3e this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance not only from the

historical, but especially from the political, educational and practical points of ie+$ hat are the facts of thismatterJ

efore the +ar, our press and all our political(educational +or* +as characteri3ed by its bragging tone6 henan enemy iolates the holy Soiet soil, then for eery blo+ of the enemy +e +ill ans+er +ith three, and +e

+ill battle the enemy on his soil and +e +ill +in +ithout much harm to ourseles$ ut these positie

statements +ere not based in all areas on concrete facts, +hich +ould actually guarantee the immunity of our borders$

>uring the +ar and after the +ar, Stalin adanced the thesis that the tragedy our nation e&perienced in the

first part of the +ar +as the result of an 7une&pected: attac* by the 4ermans against the Soiet Union$ ut,

comrades, this is completely untrue$ %s soon as =itler came to po+er in 4ermany he assigned to himself the

tas* of li#uidating Communism$ he fascists +ere saying this openly$ hey did not hide their plans$

In order to attain this aggressie end, all sorts of pacts and blocs +ere created, such as the famous erlin(.ome(o*yo %&is$ 'any facts from the pre+ar period clearly sho+ed that =itler +as going all out to begin a

+ar against the Soiet state, and that he had concentrated large armies, together +ith armored units, near the

Soiet borders$

>ocuments +hich hae no+ been published sho+ that as early as" %pril A, 9?K9 Churchill, through his

ambassador to the USS., Sir Stafford" Cripps, personally +arned Stalin that the 4ermans had begunregrouping their armed units +ith the intent of attac*ing the Soiet Union$

It is self(eident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling to+ard the Soiet nation$

=e had in this his o+n imperialistic goals 1 to bring 4ermany and the USS. into a bloody +ar and thereby to

strengthen the position of the ritish mpire$

%ll the same, Churchill affirmed in his +ritings that he sought to 7+arn Stalin and call his attention to the

danger +hich threatened him$: Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of %pril 9H and on the

follo+ing days$ =o+eer, Stalin too* no heed of these +arnings$ hat is more, Stalin ordered that nocredence be gien to information of this sort, so as not to proo*e the initiation of military operations$

e must assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of 4erman armed inasion of Soiet

territory +as coming in also from our o+n military and diplomatic sources$ =o+eer, because the leadership

+as conditioned against such information, such data +as dispatched +ith fear and assessed +ith reseration$hus, for instance, information sent from erlin on 'ay L, 9?K9 by the Soiet military DsicE attachO, Captain

DsicE ;orontso, stated6 7Soiet citi3en o3er $$$ communicated to the >eputy naal attachO that, according to

a statement of a certain 4erman officer from =itler’s head#uarters, 4ermany is preparing to inade the USS.



on 'ay 9K through 8inland, the altic countries and )atia$ %t the same time 'osco+ and )eningrad +ill be

heaily raided and paratroopers landed in border cities$$$$:

In his report of 'ay 22, 9?K9, the >eputy 'ilitary %ttachO in erlin, 5hlopo, communicated that 7$$$theattac* of the 4erman %rmy is reportedly scheduled for Mune 9F, but it is possible that it may begin in the first

days of Mune$$$:

% cable from our )ondon mbassy dated Mune 9H, 9?K9 stated6 7%s of no+ Cripps is deeply coninced of theineitability of armed conflict bet+een 4ermany and the USS., +hich +ill begin not later than the middle of

Mune$ %ccording to Cripps, the 4ermans hae presently concentrated 9KG diisions Dincluding air force andserice unitsE along the Soiet borders$$$$:

>espite these particularly grae +arnings, the necessary steps +ere not ta*en to prepare the country properly

for defense and to preent it from being caught una+ares$

>id +e hae time and the capabilities for such preparationsJ @es, +e had the time and the capability$ <ur

industry +as already so deeloped that it +as capable of supplying fully the Soiet %rmy +ith eerything

that it needed$ his is proen by the fact that, although during the +ar +e lost almost half of our industry and

important industrial and food(production areas as the result of enemy occupation of the U*raine, BorthernCaucasus and other +estern parts of the country, the Soiet nation +as still able to organi3e the production of

military e#uipment in the eastern parts of the country, to install there e#uipment ta*en from the +esternindustrial areas, and to supply our armed forces +ith eerything necessary to destroy the enemy$

=ad our industry been mobili3ed properly and in time to supply the %rmy +ith the necessary materiel, our +artime losses +ould hae been decidedly smaller$ =o+eer such mobili3ation had not been started in time$

%nd already in the first days of the +ar it became eident that our %rmy +as badly armed$ e did not hae

enough artillery, tan*s and planes to thro+ the enemy bac*$

Soiet science and technology produced e&cellent models of tan*s and artillery pieces before the +ar$ ut

mass production of all this +as not organi3ed$ %s a matter of fact, +e started to moderni3e our militarye#uipment only on the ee of the +ar$ %s a result, +hen the enemy inaded Soiet territory +e did not hae

sufficient #uantities either of old machinery +hich +as no longer used for armament production or of ne+

machinery +hich +e had planned to introduce into armament production$

he situation +ith anti(aircraft artillery +as especially bad$ e did not organi3e the production of anti(tan* ammunition$ 'any fortified regions proed to be indefensible as soon as they +ere attac*ed, because their

old arms had been +ithdra+n and ne+ ones +ere not yet aailable there$

his pertained, alas, not only to tan*s, artillery and planes$ %t the outbrea* of the +ar +e did not een hae

sufficient numbers of rifles to arm the mobili3ed manpo+er$ I recall that in those days I telephoned from

5ie to comrade 4eorgy" 'alen*o and told him, 7People hae olunteered for the ne+ %rmy units" and

are demanding +eapons$ @ou must send us arms$:

'alen*o ans+ered me, 7e cannot send you arms$ e are sending all our rifles to )eningrad and you hae

to arm yourseles$:


Such +as the armament situation$



In this connection +e cannot forget, for instance, the follo+ing fact6 Shortly before the inasion of the Soiet

Union by =itler’s army, Colonel(4eneral '$ P$" 5irponos, +ho +as chief of the 5ie Special 'ilitary>istrict Dhe +as later *illed at the frontE, +rote to Stalin that 4erman armies +ere at the ug .ier, +ere

preparing for an attac* and in the ery near future +ould probably start their offensie$ In this connection,

5irponos proposed that a strong defense be organi3ed, that A00,000 people be eacuated from the border areas and that seeral strong points be organi3ed there6 anti(tan* ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc$

'osco+ ans+ered this proposition +ith the assertions that this +ould be a proocation, that no preparatorydefensie +or* should be underta*en at the borders, and that the 4ermans +ere not to be gien any prete&t

for the initiation of military action against us$ hus our borders +ere insufficiently prepared to repel the

enemy$

hen the fascist armies had actually inaded Soiet territory and military operations began, 'osco+ issuedan order that 4erman fire +as not to be returned$ hyJ It +as because Stalin, despite the self(eident facts,

thought that the +ar had not yet started, that this +as only a proocatie action on the part of seeral

undisciplined sections of the 4erman %rmy, and that our reaction might sere as a reason for the 4ermans to

begin the +ar$

he follo+ing fact is also *no+n6 <n the ee of the inasion of Soiet territory by =itler’s army, a certain4erman citi3en crossed our border and stated that the 4erman armies had receied orders to start their"

offensie against the Soiet Union on the night of Mune 22 at A o’cloc*$ Stalin +as informed about this

immediately, but een this +arning +as ignored$

%s you see, eerything +as ignored6 +arnings of certain %rmy commanders, declarations of deserters from

the enemy army, and een the open hostility of the enemy$ Is this an e&ample of the alertness of the chief of the Party and of the state at this particularly significant historical momentJ

%nd +hat +ere the results of this carefree attitude, this disregard of clear factsJ he result +as that already in

the first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our %ir 8orce, our

artillery and other military e#uipment$ Stalin" annihilated large numbers of our military cadres anddisorgani3ed our military leadership$ Conse#uently +e could not preent the enemy from marching deep into

the country$

;ery grieous conse#uences, especially +ith regard to the beginning of the +ar, follo+ed Stalin’s

annihilation of many military commanders and political +or*ers during 9?AG(9?K9 because of his

suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations$ >uring these years repressions +ere instituted againstcertain parts of our military cadres beginning literally at the company( and battalion(commander leels and

e&tending to higher military centers$ >uring this time, the cadre of leaders +ho had gained military

e&perience in Spain and in the 8ar ast +as almost completely li#uidated$

he policy of large(scale repression against military cadres led also to undermined military discipline,

because for seeral years officers of all ran*s and een soldiers in Party and 5omsomol cells +ere taught to7unmas*: their superiors as hidden enemies$


It is natural that this caused a negatie influence on the state of military discipline in the initial stage of the+ar$



%nd, as you *no+, +e had before the +ar e&cellent military cadres +hich +ere un#uestionably loyal to the

Party and to the 8atherland$ Suffice it to say that those of them +ho managed to surie, despite seeretortures to +hich they +ere sub-ected in the prisons, hae from the first +ar days sho+n themseles real

patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the 8atherland$ I hae here in mind such generals" as6

5onstantin" .o*ossos*y D+ho, as you *no+, had been -ailedE %le&ander" 4orbato 5iril" 'erets*oD+ho is a delegate at the present CongressE 5$ P$" Podlas Dhe +as an e&cellent commander +ho perished at

the frontE and many, many others$ =o+eer, many such commanders perished in the camps and the -ails andthe %rmy sa+ them no more$

%ll this brought about a situation at the beginning of the +ar that +as a great threat to our 8atherland$

It +ould be +rong to forget that, after our" seere initial disasters" and defeats" at the front, Stalin thought

that it +as the end$ In one of his declarations" in those days he said6 7)enin left us a great legacy and +e’elost it foreer$:

%fter this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct military operations and ceased to do anything+hatsoeer$ =e returned to actie leadership only +hen a Politburo delegation isited him and told him that

steps needed to be ta*en immediately so as to improe the situation at the front$

herefore, the threatening danger +hich hung oer our 8atherland in the initial period of the +ar +as largely

due to Stalin’s ery o+n faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party$

=o+eer, +e spea* not only about the moment +hen the +ar began, +hich led to our %rmy’s serious

disorgani3ation and brought us seere losses$ en after the +ar began, the nerousness and hysteria +hichStalin demonstrated +hile interfering +ith actual military operations caused our %rmy serious damage$

Stalin +as ery far from understanding the real situation that +as deeloping at the front$ his +as natural

because, during the +hole Patriotic ar, he neer isited any section of the front or any liberated city e&cept

for one short ride on the 'o3hais* high+ay during a stabili3ed situation at the front$ o this incident +ere

dedicated many literary +or*s full of fantasies of all sorts and so many paintings$ Simultaneously, Stalin +asinterfering +ith operations and issuing orders +hich did not ta*e into consideration the real situation at a

gien section of the front and +hich could not help but result in huge personnel losses$

I +ill allo+ myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact +hich illustrates ho+ Stalin directed

operations at the fronts$ Present at this Congress is 'arshal Ian" agramyan, +ho +as once the head of operations in the South+estern 8ront =ead#uarters and +ho can corroborate +hat I +ill tell you$

hen an e&ceptionally serious situation for our %rmy deeloped in the 5har*o region in 9?K2, +e correctlydecided to drop an operation +hose ob-ectie +as to encircle the city"$ he real situation at that time +ould

hae threatened our %rmy +ith fatal conse#uences if this operation +ere continued$

e communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in our" operational plans sothat the enemy +ould be preented from li#uidating a si3able concentration of our %rmy$

Contrary to common sense, Stalin re-ected our suggestion$ =e issued the order to continue the encirclement

of 5har*o, despite the fact that at this time many of our o+n" %rmy concentrations actually +erethreatened +ith encirclement and li#uidation$



I telephoned to 'arshal %le&ander" ;asiles*y and begged him6 7%le&ander 'i*hailoich, ta*e a map: 1

;asiles*y is present here 1 7and sho+ comrade Stalin the situation that has deeloped$: e should note thatStalin planned operations on a globe$

D%nimation in the hall$E

@es, comrades, he used to ta*e a globe and trace the front line on it$ I said to comrade ;asiles*y6 7Sho+ him

the situation on a map$ In the present situation +e cannot continue the operation +hich +as planned$ he olddecision must be changed for the good of the cause$:

;asiles*y replied, saying that Stalin had already studied this problem$ =e said that he, ;asiles*y, +ould not

see Stalin further concerning this matter, because the latter didn’t +ant to hear any arguments on the sub-ectof this operation$

%fter my tal* +ith ;asiles*y, I telephoned to Stalin at his dacha$ ut Stalin did not ans+er the phone and'alen*o +as at the receier$ I told comrade 'alen*o that I +as calling from the front and that I +anted to

spea* personally to Stalin$ Stalin informed me through 'alen*o that I should spea* +ith 'alen*o$ I stated

for the second time that I +ished to inform Stalin personally about the grae situation +hich had arisen for us

at the front$ ut Stalin did not consider it conenient to pic* up the phone and again stated that I shouldspea* to him through 'alen*o, although he +as only a fe+ steps from the telephone$

%fter 7listening: in this manner to our plea, Stalin said6 7)et eerything remain as it is!:

%nd +hat +as the result of thisJ he +orst +e had e&pected$ he 4ermans surrounded our %rmy

concentrations and as a result the 5har*o counterattac*" lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers$ his is

Stalin’s military 7genius$: his is +hat it cost us$


<n one occasion after the +ar, during a meeting bet+een" Stalin and" members of the Politburo, %nastas

Ianoich 'i*oyan mentioned that 5hrushche must hae been right +hen he telephoned concerning the5har*o operation and that it +as unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted$

@ou should hae seen Stalin’s fury! =o+ could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! =e is after

all a 7genius,: and a genius cannot help but be right! eryone can err, but Stalin considered that he neer

erred, that he +as al+ays right$ =e neer ac*no+ledged to anyone that he made any mista*e, large or small,

despite the fact that he made more than a fe+ in matters of theory and in his practical actiity$ %fter the PartyCongress +e shall probably hae to re(ealuate many of our" +artime military operations and present them

in their true light$

he tactics on +hich Stalin insisted 1 +ithout *no+ing the basics of conducting battle operations 1 cost much

blood until +e succeeded in stopping the opponent and going oer to the offensie$

he military *no+s that as late as the end of 9?K9, instead of great operational maneuers flan*ing our"

opponent and penetrating behind his bac*, Stalin +as demanding incessant frontal counter("attac*s and there("capture of one illage after another$

ecause of this, +e paid +ith great losses 1 until our generals, upon +hose shoulders the +hole +eight of

conducting the +ar rested, succeeded in altering the situation and shifting to fle&ible(maneuer operations$

his" immediately brought serious changes at the front that +ere" faorable to us$



%ll the more shameful +as the fact that after our great ictory oer the enemy, +hich cost us so dearly, Stalin

began to do+ngrade many of the commanders +ho had contributed so much to it$ his +as" because Stalinruled out any chance that serices rendered at the front might be credited to anyone but himself$

Stalin +as ery much interested in assessments of comrade 4rigory" hu*o as a military leader$ =e as*ed

me often for my opinion of hu*o$ I told him then, 7I hae *no+n hu*o for a long time$ =e is a good

general and a good military leader$:

%fter the +ar Stalin began to tell all *inds of nonsense about hu*o$ %mong it +as" the follo+ing6 7@ou

praised hu*o, but he does not desere it$ hey say that before each operation at the front hu*o used to behae as follo+s6 =e used to ta*e a handful of earth, smell it and say, Ne can begin the attac*,’ or its

opposite, Nhe planned operation cannot be carried out$’: I stated at the time, 7Comrade Stalin, I do not *no+

+ho inented this, but it is not true$:

It is possible that Stalin himself inented these things for the purpose of minimi3ing the role and military

talents of 'arshal hu*o$

In this connection, Stalin ery energetically populari3ed himself as a great leader$ In arious +ays he tried to

inculcate the notion that the ictories gained by the Soiet nation during the 4reat Patriotic ar +ere all dueto the courage, daring, and genius of Stalin and of no one else$ Must li*e a" 5u3ma 5ryuch*o, he put one

dress on seen people at the same time$


In the same ein, let us ta*e for instance our historical and military films and some of our" literary creations$

hey ma*e us feel sic*$ heir true ob-ectie is propagating the theme of praising Stalin as a military genius$)et us recall the film, he 8all of erlin$ =ere only Stalin acts$ =e issues orders in a hall in +hich there are

many empty Chairs$ <nly only one man approaches him to report something to him 1 it is %le&ander"

Pos*rebyshe, his loyal shield(bearer$

D)aughter in the hall$E

%nd +here is the military commandJ here is the PolitburoJ here is the 4oernmentJ hat are they

doing, and +ith +hat are they engagedJ here is nothing about them in the film$ Stalin acts for eerybody, hedoes not rec*on +ith anyone$ =e as*s no one for adice$ erything is sho+n to the people in this false light$

hyJ o surround Stalin +ith glory1 contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth$

he #uestion arises6 here is the military, on +hose shoulders rested the burden of the +arJ It is not in the

film$ ith Stalin’s inclusion, there +as no room left for it$

Bot Stalin, but the Party as a +hole, the Soiet 4oernment, our heroic %rmy, its talented leaders and brae

soldiers, the +hole Soiet nation 1 these are the ones +ho assured ictory in the 4reat Patriotic ar$

Dempestuous and prolonged applause$E

Central Committee members, 'inisters, our economic leaders, the leaders of Soiet culture, directors of

territorial(party and Soiet organi3ations, engineers, and technicians 1 eery one of them in his o+n place of +or* generously gae of his strength and *no+ledge to+ard ensuring ictory oer the enemy$



&ceptional heroism +as sho+n by our hard core 1 surrounded by glory are our +hole +or*ing class, our

*ol*ho3 peasantry, the Soiet intelligentsia, +ho under the leadership of Party organi3ations oercame untoldhardships and bearing the hardships of +ar, and deoted all their strength to the cause of the 8atherland’s

defense$

<ur Soiet +omen accomplished great and brae deeds during the +ar$ hey bore on their bac*s the heay

load of production +or* in the factories, on the *ol*ho3es, and in arious economic and cultural sectors$

'any +omen participated directly in the 4reat Patriotic ar at the front$ <ur brae youth contributedimmeasurably, both at the front and at home, to the defense of the Soiet 8atherland and to the annihilation of

the enemy$

he serices of Soiet soldiers, of our commanders and political +or*ers of all ran*s are immortal$ %fter the

loss of a considerable part of the %rmy in the initial +ar months, they did not lose their heads and +ere ableto reorgani3e during the course of combat$ <er the course of the +ar they created and toughened a strong,

heroic %rmy$ hey not only +ithstood our" strong and cunning enemy’s pressure but smashed him$

he magnificent, heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the ast and of the est during the fight

against the threat of fascist sub-ugation +hich loomed before us +ill lie for centuries, indeed" for millennia

in the memory of than*ful humanity$

Dhunderous applause$E

he main roles and the main credit for the ictorious ending of the +ar belong to our Communist Party, to the

armed forces of the Soiet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soiet people uplifted by the Party$

Dhunderous and prolonged applause$E

Comrades, let us reach for some other facts$ he Soiet Union -ustly is considered a model multinational

state because +e hae assured in practice the e#uality and friendship of all of the" peoples liing in our great8atherland$

%ll the more monstrous are those acts +hose initiator +as Stalin and +hich +ere rude iolations of the basic

)eninist principles behind our" Soiet state’s nationalities policies$ e refer to the mass deportations of

entire nations from their places of origin, together +ith all Communists and 5omsomols +ithout anye&ception$ his deportation +as not dictated by any military considerations$

hus, at the end of 9?KA, +hen there already had been a permanent change of fortune at the front in faor of the Soiet Union, a decision concerning the deportation of all the 5arachai from the lands on +hich they

lied +as ta*en and e&ecuted$

In the same period, at the end of >ecember, 9?KA, the same lot befell the 5almy*s" of the 5almy*

%utonomous .epublic$ In 'arch, 9?KK, all the Chechens and Ingushi +ere deported and the Chechen(Ingush%utonomous .epublic +as li#uidated$ In %pril, 9?KK, all al*ars +ere deported from the territory of the

5abardino(al*ar %utonomous .epublic to fara+ay places and their .epublic itself +as renamed the

%utonomous 5abardian .epublic$

U*rainians aoided meeting this fate only because there +ere too many of them and there +as no place to

+hich to deport them$ <ther+ise, Stalin" +ould hae deported them also$

D)aughter and animation in the hall$E



Bo 'ar&ist()eninist, no man of common sense can grasp ho+ it is possible to ma*e +hole nations

responsible for inimical actiity, including +omen, children, old people, Communists and 5omsomols, to usemass repression against them, and to e&pose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of indiidual

persons or groups of persons$

%fter the conclusion of the Patriotic ar, the Soiet nation proudly stressed the magnificent ictories gained

through our" great sacrifices and tremendous efforts$ he country e&perienced a period of political

enthusiasm$ he Party came out of the +ar een more united$ Its cadres +ere tempered and hardened by thefire of the +ar$ Under such conditions nobody could hae een thought of the possibility of some plot in the

Party$

%nd it +as precisely at this time that the so(called 7)eningrad affair: +as born$ %s +e hae no+ proen, this

case +as fabricated$ hose +ho innocently lost their lies included6 comrades Bi*olay" ;o3nesens*y,%le*sey" 5u3netso, 'i*hail" .odiono, Pyotr" Pop*o, and others$

%s is *no+n, ;o3nesens*y and 5u3netso +ere talented and eminent leaders$ <nce they stood ery close toStalin$ It is sufficient to mention that Stalin made ;o3nesens*y 8irst >eputy to the Chairman of the Council

of 'inisters and 5u3netso +as elected Secretary of the Central Committee$ he ery fact that Stalin

entrusted 5u3netso +ith the superision of the state(security organs sho+s the trust +hich he en-oyed$

=o+ did it happen that these persons +ere branded as enemies of the people and li#uidatedJ

8acts proe that the 7)eningrad affair: is also the result of +illfulness +hich Stalin e&ercised against Party

cadres$ =ad a normal situation e&isted in the Party’s Central Committee and in the Central CommitteePolitburo, affairs of this nature +ould hae been e&amined there in accordance +ith Party practice, and all

pertinent facts assessed as a result, such an affair as +ell as others +ould not hae happened$

e must state that, after the +ar, the situation became een more complicated$ Stalin became een more

capricious, irritable and brutal$ In particular, his suspicion gre+$ =is persecution mania reached unbelieable

dimensions$ 'any +or*ers became enemies before his ery eyes$ %fter the +ar, Stalin separated himself from the collectie een more$ erything +as decided by him alone +ithout any consideration for anyone or

anything$

his unbelieable suspicion +as cleerly ta*en adantage of by the ab-ect proocateur and ile enemy, eria,

+ho murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soiet people$ he eleation of ;o3nesens*y and5u3netso alarmed eria$ %s +e hae no+ proen, it had been precisely eria +ho had 7suggested: to Stalin

the fabrication by him and by his confidants of materials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters,

and in the form of arious rumors and tal*s$

he Party’s Central Committee has e&amined this so(called 7)eningrad affair: persons +ho innocently

suffered are no+ rehabilitated and honor has been restored to the glorious )eningrad Party organi3ation$ ;$

S$" %ba*umo and others +ho had fabricated this affair +ere brought before a court their trial too* place in)eningrad and they receied +hat they desered$

he #uestion arises6 hy is it that +e see the truth of this affair only no+, and +hy did +e not do something

earlier, during Stalin’s life, in order to preent the loss of innocent liesJ It +as because Stalin personally

superised the 7)eningrad affair,: and the ma-ority of the Politburo members did not, at that time, *no+ allof the circumstances in these matters and could not therefore interene$



hen Stalin receied certain material from eria and %ba*umo, +ithout e&amining these slanderous

materials he ordered an inestigation of the 7affair: of ;o3nesens*y and 5u3netso$ ith this, their fate +assealed$

Similarly instructie is the case of the 'ingrelian nationalist organi3ation +hich supposedly e&isted in

4eorgia$ %s is *no+n, resolutions by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soiet Union, +ere

made concerning this case in Boember 9?F9 and in 'arch 9?F2$ hese resolutions +ere made +ithout prior

discussion +ith the Politburo$ Stalin had personally dictated them$ hey made serious accusations againstmany loyal Communists$ <n the basis of falsified documents, it +as proen that there e&isted in 4eorgia a

supposedly nationalistic organi3ation +hose ob-ectie +as the li#uidation of the Soiet po+er in that republic

+ith the help of imperialist po+ers$

In this connection, a number of responsible Party and Soiet +or*ers +ere arrested in 4eorgia$ %s +as later proen, this +as a slander directed against the 4eorgian Party organi3ation$

e *no+ that there hae been at times manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in 4eorgia as in seeralother republics$ he #uestion arises6 Could it be possible that, in the period during +hich the resolutions

referred to aboe +ere made, nationalist tendencies gre+ so much that there +as a danger of 4eorgia’s

leaing the Soiet Union and -oining ur*eyJ

D%nimation in the hall, laughterE$

his is, of course, nonsense$ It is impossible to imagine ho+ such assumptions could enter anyone’s mind$

eryone *no+s ho+ 4eorgia has deeloped economically and culturally under Soiet rule$ Industrial production in the 4eorgian .epublic is 2G times greater than it +as before the .eolution$ 'any ne+

industries hae arisen in 4eorgia +hich did not e&ist there before the .eolution6 iron smelting, an oil

industry, a machine(construction industry, etc$ Illiteracy has long since been li#uidated, +hich, in pre(.eolutionary 4eorgia, included GH per cent of the population$

Could the 4eorgians, comparing the situation in their republic +ith the hard situation of the +or*ing massesin ur*ey, be aspiring to -oin ur*eyJ In 9?FF, 4eorgia produced 9H times as much steel per person as

ur*ey$ 4eorgia produces ? times as much electrical energy per person as ur*ey$ %ccording to the aailable

9?F0 census, LF per cent of ur*ey’s total population is illiterate, and H0 per cent of its +omen$ 4eorgia has9? institutions of higher learning +hich hae about A?,000 students this is H times more than in ur*ey Dfor

each 9,000 inhabitantsE$ he prosperity of the +or*ing people has gro+n tremendously in 4eorgia under

Soiet rule$

It is clear that, as the economy and culture deelop, and as the socialist consciousness of the +or*ing masses

in 4eorgia gro+s, the source from +hich bourgeois nationalism dra+s its strength eaporates$

%s it deeloped, there +as no nationalistic organi3ation in 4eorgia$ housands of innocent people fell ictim

to +illfulness and la+lessness$ %ll of this happened under the 7genius: leadership of Stalin, 7the great son of the 4eorgian nation,: as 4eorgians li*e to refer to him$


he +illfulness of Stalin sho+ed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but

also in the international relations of the Soiet Union$



he Muly Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the deelopment of conflict +ith

@ugoslaia$ It +as a shameful role +hich Stalin played here$ he 7@ugosla affair: contained no problems+hich could not hae been soled through Party discussions among comrades$ here +as no significant basis

for the deelopment of this 7affair$: It +as completely possible to hae preented the rupture of relations

+ith that country$ his does not mean, ho+eer, that @ugosla leaders made no mista*es or had noshortcomings$ ut these mista*es and shortcomings +ere magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin,

resulting in the brea*off of relations +ith a friendly country$

I recall the first days +hen the conflict bet+een the Soiet Union and @ugoslaia began to be blo+n up

artificially$ <nce, +hen I came from 5ie to 'osco+, I +as inited to isit Stalin, +ho, pointing to the copy

of a letter recently sent to @ugoslaian President 'arshal Moseph" ito, as*ed me, 7=ae you read thisJ:

Bot +aiting for my reply, he ans+ered, 7I +ill sha*e my little finger 1 and there +ill be no more ito$ =e +illfall$:

e hae paid dearly for this 7sha*ing of the little finger$: his statement reflected Stalin’s mania for greatness, but he acted -ust that +ay6 7I +ill sha*e my little finger 1 and there +ill be no 5osior: 7I +ill

sha*e my little finger once more and Postyshe and Chubar +ill be no more: 7I +ill sha*e my little finger

again 1 and ;o3nesens*y, 5u3netso and many others +ill disappear$:

ut this did not happen to ito$ Bo matter ho+ much or ho+ little Stalin shoo*, not only his little finger buteerything else that he could sha*e, ito did not fall$ hyJ he reason +as that, in this instance of

disagreement +ith our" @ugosla comrades, ito had behind him a state and a people +ho had had a serious

education in fighting for liberty and independence, a people +ho gae support to its leaders$

@ou see +hat Stalin’s mania for greatness led to$ =e completely lost consciousness of reality$ =e

demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to indiiduals in the USS., but in relation to+hole parties and nations$

e hae carefully e&amined the case of @ugoslaia$ e hae found a proper solution +hich is approed bythe peoples of the Soiet Union and of @ugoslaia as +ell as by the +or*ing masses of all the people’s

democracies and by all progressie humanity$ he li#uidation of our" abnormal relationship +ith @ugoslaia

+as done in the interest of the +hole camp of socialism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the +hole+orld$

)et us also recall the 7affair of the doctor(plotters$:


%ctually there +as no 7affair: outside of the declaration of the +oman doctor )idiya" imashu*, +ho +as probably influenced or ordered by someone Dafter all, she +as an unofficial collaborator of the organs of state

securityE to +rite Stalin a letter in +hich she declared that doctors +ere applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment$

Such a letter +as sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there are doctor(plotters in the

Soiet Union$ =e issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soiet medical specialists$ =e personally issuedadice on the conduct of the inestigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons$ =e said

that academician ;$ B$ " ;inogrado should be put in chains, and that another one of the alleged plotters"

should be beaten$ he former 'inister of State Security, comrade Semyen" Ignatie, is present at this



Congress as a delegate$ Stalin told him curtly, 7If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors +e +ill

shorten you by a head$:

Dumult in the hall$E

Stalin personally called the inestigatie -udge, gae him instructions, and adised him on +hich

inestigatie methods should be used$ hese methods +ere simple 1 beat, beat and, beat again$

Shortly after the doctors +ere arrested, +e members of the Politburo receied protocols +ith the doctors’confessions of guilt$ %fter distributing these protocols, Stalin told us, 7@ou are blind li*e young *ittens$ hat

+ill happen +ithout meJ he country +ill perish because you do not *no+ ho+ to recogni3e enemies$:

he case +as presented so that no one could erify the facts on +hich the inestigation +as based$ here +as

no possibility of trying to erify facts by contacting those +ho had made the confessions of guilt$

e felt, ho+eer, that the case of the arrested doctors +as #uestionable$ e *ne+ some of these people

personally because they had once treated us$ hen +e e&amined this 7case: after Stalin’s death, +e found itto hae been fabricated from beginning to end$

his ignominious 7case: +as set up by Stalin$ =e did not, ho+eer, hae the time in +hich to bring it to anend Das he conceied that endE, and for this reason the doctors are still alie$ %ll of them hae been

rehabilitated$ hey are +or*ing in the same places they +ere +or*ing before$ hey are treating top

indiiduals, not e&cluding members of the 4oernment$ hey hae our full confidence and they e&ecutetheir duties honestly, as they did before$

In putting together arious dirty and shameful cases, a ery base role +as played by a rabid enemy of our

Party, an agent of a foreign intelligence serice 1 eria, +ho had stolen into Stalin’s confidence$ =o+ could

this proocateur hae gained such a position in the Party and in the state, so as to become the 8irst >eputy

Chair of the Council of 'inisters of the Soiet Union and a Politburo memberJ It has no+ been establishedthat this illain climbed up the 4oernment ladder oer an untold number of corpses$

ere there any signs that eria +as an enemy of the PartyJ @es, there +ere$ %lready in 9?AG, at a Central

Committee Plenum, former People’s Commissar of =ealth 4rigory" 5amins*y said that eria +or*ed for

the 'usaat intelligence serice$ ut the Plenum had barely concluded +hen 5amins*y +as arrested andthen shot$ =ad Stalin e&amined 5amins*y’s statementJ Bo, because Stalin belieed in eria, and that +as

enough for him$ %nd +hen Stalin belieed in anyone or anything, then no one could say anything that +as

contrary to his opinion$ %nyone daring to e&press opposition +ould hae met the same fate as 5amins*y$

here +ere other signs, also$ he declaration +hich comrade %$ ;$" Snego made to the Party’s Central

Committee isinteresting$ DParenthetically spea*ing, he +as also rehabilitated not long ago, after 9G years in prison camps$E In this declaration, Snego +rites6

7In connection +ith the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, )arenty"

5artelishili()arentie, I hae entrusted to the hands of the representatie of the Committee of State

Security a detailed deposition concerning eria’s role in the disposition of the 5artelishili case and

concerning the criminal moties by +hich eria +as guided$

7In my opinion, it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it tothe Central Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include in the inestigation documents$



7<n <ctober A0, 9?A9, at a session of the <rgani3ational ureau of the Central Committee of the %ll(Union

Communist Party Dolshei*sE, 5artelishili, Secretary of the ranscaucasian .egional Committee, made areport$ %ll members of the e&ecutie of the .egional Committee +ere present$ <f them I alone am no+ alie$

7>uring this session, M$ ;$ Stalin made a motion at the end of his speech concerning the organi3ation of the

secretariat of the ranscaucasian .egional Committee composed of the follo+ing6 8irst Secretary,

5artelishili Second Secretary, eria Dit +as then, for the first time in the Party’s history, that eria’s name

+as mentioned as a candidate for a Party positionE$ 5artelishili ans+ered that he *ne+ eria +ell and for that reason refused categorically to +or* together +ith him$ Stalin proposed then that this matter be left open

and that it be soled in the process of the +or* itself$ +o days later a decision +as arried at that eria

+ould receie the Party post and that 5artelishili +ould be deported from the ranscaucasus$

7his fact can be confirmed by comrades 'i*oyan and 5aganoich, +ho +ere present at that session$:

he long, unfriendly relations bet+een 5artelishili and eria +ere +idely *no+n$ hey date bac* to the

time +hen comrade Sergo <rd3honi*id3e" +as actie in the ranscaucasus$ 5artelishili +as the closestassistant of Sergo$ he unfriendly relationship impelled eria to fabricate a 7case: against 5artelishili$ It is

characteristic that 5artelishili +as charged +ith a terroristic act against eria in this 7case$:

he indictment in the eria case contains a discussion of his crimes$ Some things should, ho+eer, be

recalled, especially since it is possible that not all delegates to the Congress hae read this document$ I +ishto recall eria’s bestial disposition of the cases of 'i*hail" 5edro, ;$" 4olube, and 4olube’s adopted

mother, aturina 1 persons +ho +ished to inform the Central Committee concerning eria’s treacherous

actiity$ hey +ere shot +ithout any trial and the sentence +as passed e& post facto, after the e&ecution$

=ere is +hat the old Communist, comrade 5edro, +rote to the Central Committee through comrade

%ndrey" %ndreye Dcomrade %ndreye +as then a Central Committee SecretaryE6

7I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the )efortoo prison$ )et my cry of horror reach your

ears do not remain deaf, ta*e me under your protection please, help remoe the nightmare of interrogationsand sho+ that this is all a mista*e$

7I suffer innocently$ Please beliee me$ ime +ill testify to the truth$ I am not an agent proocateur of the

sarist <*hrana$ I am not a spy, I am not a member of an anti(Soiet organi3ation of +hich I am being

accused on the basis of denunciations$ I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the Party and the4oernment$ I am an old olshei*, free of any stain I hae honestly fought for almost K0 years in the ran*s

of the Party for the good and prosperity of the nation$$$$

7$$$ oday I, a L2(year(old man, am being threatened by the inestigatie -udges +ith more seere, cruel and

degrading methods of physical pressure$ hey Dthe -udgesE are no longer capable of becoming a+are of their

error and of recogni3ing that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible$ hey try to -ustify their

actions by picturing me as a hardened and raing enemy and are demanding increased repressions$ ut let theParty *no+ that I am innocent and that there is nothing +hich can turn a loyal son of the Party into an enemy,

een right up to his last dying breath$

7ut I hae no +ay out$ I cannot diert from myself the hastily approaching ne+ and po+erful blo+s$

7erything, ho+eer, has its limits$ 'y torture has reached the e&treme$ 'y health is bro*en, my strength

and my energy are +aning, the end is dra+ing near$ o die in a Soiet prison, branded as a ile traitor to the8atherland 1 +hat can be more monstrous for an honest manJ %nd ho+ monstrous all this is! Unsurpassed



bitterness and pain grips my heart$ Bo! Bo! his +ill not happen this cannot be, I cry$ Beither the Party, nor

the Soiet 4oernment, nor the People’s Commissar, )$ P$ eria, +ill permit this cruel, ireparable in-ustice$ Iam firmly certain that, gien a #uiet, ob-ectie e&amination, +ithout any foul rantings, +ithout any anger and

+ithout the fearful tortures, it +ould be easy to proe the baselessness of the charges$ I beliee deeply that

truth and -ustice +ill triumph$ I beliee$ I beliee$:

he old olshei*, comrade 5edro, +as found innocent by the 'ilitary Collegium$ ut, despite this, he +as

shot at eria’s order$


eria also handled cruelly the family of comrade <rd3honi*id3e$ hyJ ecause <rd3honi*id3e had tried to preent eria from reali3ing his shameful plans$ eria had cleared from his +ay all persons +ho could

possibly interfere +ith him$ <rd3honi*id3e +as al+ays an opponent of eria, +hich he told to Stalin$ Instead

of e&amining this affair and ta*ing appropriate steps, Stalin allo+ed the li#uidation of <rd3honi*id3e’s

brother and brought <rd3honi*id3e himself to such a state that he +as forced to shoot himself$


eria +as unmas*ed by the Party’s Central Committee shortly after Stalin’s death$ %s a result of particularly

detailed legal proceedings, it +as established that eria had committed monstrous crimes and eria +as shot$

he #uestion arises +hy eria, +ho had li#uidated tens of thousands of Party and Soiet +or*ers, +as notunmas*ed during Stalin’s life$ =e +as not unmas*ed earlier because he had utili3ed ery s*illfully Stalin’s

+ea*nesses feeding him +ith suspicions, he assisted Stalin in eerything and acted +ith his support$

Comrades6 he cult of the indiidual ac#uired such monstrous si3e chiefly because Stalin himself, using all

conceiable methods, supported the glorification of his o+n person$ his is supported by numerous facts$

<ne of the most characteristic e&amples of Stalin’s self(glorification and of his lac* of een elementarymodesty is the edition of his Short iography, +hich +as published in 9?KH DsicE$

his boo* is an e&pression of the most dissolute flattery, an e&ample of ma*ing a man into a godhead, of

transforming him into an infallible sage, 7the greatest leader, sublime strategist of all times and nations$:

8inally, no other +ords could be found +ith +hich to lift Stalin up to the heaens$

e need not gie here e&amples of the loathesome adulation filling this boo*$ %ll +e need to add is that they

all +ere approed and edited by Stalin personally$ Some of them +ere added in his o+n hand+riting to thedraft te&t of the boo*$

hat did Stalin consider essential to +rite into this boo*J >id he +ant to cool the ardor of the flatterers +ho

+ere composing his Short iographyJ Bo! =e mar*ed the ery places +here he thought that the praise of his

serices +as insufficient$ =ere are some e&amples characteri3ing Stalin’s actiity, added in Stalin’s o+nhand6

7In this fight against the s*eptics and capitulators, the rots*yites, inoieites, u*harinites and5ameneites, there +as definitely +elded together, after )enin’s death, that leading core of the Party$$$ that

upheld the great banner of )enin, rallied the Party behind )enin’s behests, and brought the Soiet people onto

the broad paths of industriali3ing the country and collectii3ing the rural economy$ he leader of this coreand the guiding force of the Party and the state +as comrade Stalin$:



hus +rites Stalin himself! hen he adds6

7%lthough he performed his tas*s as leader of the Party and the people +ith consummate s*ill, and en-oyed

the unresered support of the entire Soiet people, Stalin neer allo+ed his +or* to be marred by theslightest hint of anity, conceit or self(adulation$:

here and +hen could a leader so praise himselfJ Is this +orthy of a leader of the 'ar&ist()eninist typeJ

Bo$ Precisely against this did 'ar& and ngels ta*e such a strong position$ his al+ays +as sharplycondemned also by ;ladimir Ilyich )enin$

In the draft te&t of Stalin’s" boo* appeared the follo+ing sentence6 7Stalin is the )enin of today$: his

sentence appeared to Stalin to be too +ea*$ hus, in his o+n hand+riting, he changed it to read6 7Stalin is the+orthy continuer of )enin’s +or*, or, as it is said in our Party, Stalin is the )enin of today$: @ou see ho+ +ell

it is said, not by the nation but by Stalin himself$

It is possible to offer many such self(praising appraisals +ritten into the draft te&t of that boo* in Stalin’s

hand$ =e sho+ers himself especially generously +ith praises regarding his military genius and his talent for

strategy$ I +ill cite one more insertion made by Stalin on the theme6 7he adanced Soiet science of +ar

receied further deelopment,: he +rites, 7at Comrade Stalin’s hands$ Comrade Stalin elaborated the theoryof the permanent operating factors that decide the issue of +ars, of actie defense and the la+s of

counteroffensie and offensie, of the cooperation of all serices and arms in modern +arfare, of the role of big tan* masses and air forces in modern +ar, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed

serices$ %t arious stages of the +ar, Stalin’s genius found correct solutions that too* into account all the

circumstances of the situation$:


8urther, Stalin +rites6 7Stalin’s military mastership +as displayed both in defense and on offense$ Comrade

Stalin’s genius enabled him to diine the enemy’s plans and defeat them$ he battles in +hich comrade Stalin

directed the Soiet armies are brilliant e&amples of operational military s*ill$:

his is ho+ Stalin +as praised as a strategist$ ho did thisJ Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist butin the role of an author(editor, one of the main creators of his o+n" self(adulatory biography$ Such,

comrades, are the facts$ <r should be said, rather, the shameful facts$

<ne additional fact from the same Short iography of Stalin6 %s is *no+n, the =istory of the %ll(Union

Communist Party Dolshei*sE, Short Course +as +ritten by a commission of the Party Central Committee$

his boo*, parenthetically, +as also permeated +ith the cult of the indiidual and +as +ritten by a designated

group of authors$ his fact +as reflected in the follo+ing formulation on the proof copy of the Shortiography of Stalin6 7% commission of the Central Committee, %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE,

under the direction of comrade Stalin and +ith his most actie personal participation, has prepared a =istoryof the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE, Short Course$:

ut een this phrase did not satisfy Stalin6 he follo+ing sentence replaced it in the final ersion of the Short

iography6 7In 9?AH, the boo* =istory of the %ll(Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE, ShortCourse appeared, +ritten by comrade Stalin and approed by a commission of the Central Committee, %ll(

Union Communist Party Dolshei*sE$: Can one add anything moreJ




%s you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the +or* created by a group into a boo* +ritten by Stalin$ It

is not necessary to state ho+ and +hy this metamorphosis too* place$

% pertinent #uestion comes to our mind6 If Stalin is the author of this boo*, +hy did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the +hole post(<ctober historical period of our glorious

Communist Party solely into an action of 7the Stalin genius:J

>id this boo* properly reflect the efforts of the Party in the socialist transformation of the country, in theconstruction of socialist society, in the industriali3ation and collectii3ation of the country, and also other

steps ta*en by the Party +hich undeiatingly traeled the path outlined by )eninJ his boo* spea*s principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports$ erything +ithout the smallest e&ception is

tied to his name$

%nd +hen Stalin himself asserts that he himself +rote the Short Course, this calls at least for ama3ement$

Can a 'ar&ist()eninist thus +rite about himself, praising his o+n person to the heaensJ

<r let us ta*e the matter of the Stalin Pri3es$


Bot een the sars created pri3es +hich they named after themseles$

Stalin recogni3ed as the best a te&t of the national anthem of the Soiet Union +hich contains not a +ord

about the Communist Party it contains, ho+eer, the follo+ing unprecedented praise of Stalin6 7Stalin

brought us up in loyalty to the people$ =e inspired us to great toil and deeds$:

In these lines of the anthem, the +hole educational, directional and inspirational actiity of the great )eninist

Party is ascribed to Stalin$ his is, of course, a clear deiation from 'ar&ism()eninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the Party$ e should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central

Committee has already passed a resolution concerning the composition of a ne+ te&t of the anthem$ +hich

+ill reflect the role of the people and the role of the Party$

D)oud, prolonged applause$E

%nd +as it +ithout Stalin’s *no+ledge that many of the largest enterprises and to+ns +ere named after himJ

as it +ithout his *no+ledge that Stalin monuments +ere erected in the +hole country 1 these 7memorialsto the liing:J It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on Muly 2, 9?F9 a resolution of the USS. Council of

'inisters concerning the erection on the ;olga(>on Canal of an impressie monument to Stalin on

September K of the same year he issued an order ma*ing AA tons of copper aailable for the construction of this impressie monument$

%nyone +ho has isited the Stalingrad area must hae seen the huge statue +hich is being built there, andthat on a site +hich hardly any people fre#uent$ =uge sums +ere spent to build it at a time +hen people of

this area had lied since the +ar in huts$ Consider, yourself, +as Stalin right +hen he +rote in his biography

that 7$$$he did not allo+ in himself$$$ een a shado+ of conceit, pride, or self(adoration:J

%t the same time Stalin gae proofs of his lac* of respect for )enin’s memory$ It is not a coincidence that,despite the decision ta*en oer A0 years ago to build a Palace of Soiets as a monument to ;ladimir Ilyich,

this palace +as not built, its construction +as al+ays postponed and the pro-ect allo+ed to lapse$



e cannot forget to recall the Soiet 4oernment resolution of %ugust 9K, 9?2F concerning 7the founding of

)enin pri3es for educational +or*$: his resolution +as published in the press, but until this day there are no)enin pri3es$ his, too, should be corrected$

Dumultuous, prolonged applause$E

>uring Stalin’s life 1 than*s to *no+n methods +hich I hae mentioned, and #uoting facts, for instance$ from

the Short iography of Stalin 1 all eents +ere e&plained as if )enin played only a secondary role, eenduring the <ctober Socialist .eolution$ In many films and in many literary +or*s the figure of )enin +as

incorrectly presented and inadmissibly depreciated$

Stalin loed to see the film he Unforgettable @ear of 9?9?, in +hich he +as sho+n on the steps of anarmored train and +here he +as practically an#uishing the foe +ith his o+n saber$ )et 5limenty

@efremoich ;oroshilo", our dear friend, find the necessary courage and +rite the truth about Stalin after

all, he *no+s ho+ Stalin had fought$ It +ill be difficult for comrade ;oroshilo to underta*e this, but it

+ould be good if he did it$ eryone +ill approe of it, both the people and the Party$ en his grandsons+ill than* him$

DProlonged applause$E

In spea*ing about the eents of the <ctober .eolution and about the Ciil ar, the impression +as createdthat Stalin al+ays played the main role, as if eery+here and al+ays Stalin had suggested to )enin +hat to

do and ho+ to do it$ =o+eer, this is slander of )enin$


I +ill probably not sin against the truth +hen I say that ?? per cent of the persons present here heard and

*ne+ ery little about Stalin before the year 9?2K, +hile )enin +as *no+n to all$ =e +as *no+n to the +hole

Party, to the +hole nation, from children all the +ay up to old men$


%ll this has to be thoroughly reised so that history, literature and the fine arts properly reflect ;$ I$ )enin’srole and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soiet people 1 a creatie people$

D%pplause$E

Comrades! he cult of the indiidual caused the employment of faulty principles in Party +or* and ineconomic actiity$ It brought about rude iolation of internal Party and Soiet democracy, sterile

administration, deiations of all sorts, coer(ups of shortcomings, and arnishings of reality$ <ur nation bore

forth many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit$

e should also not forget that, due to the numerous arrests of Party, Soiet and economic leaders, many

+or*ers began to +or* uncertainly, sho+ed oercautiousness, feared all +hich +as ne+, feared their o+nshado+s, and began to sho+ less initiatie in their +or*$

a*e, for instance, Party and Soiet resolutions$ hey +ere prepared in a routine manner, often +ithout

considering the concrete situation$ his +ent so far that Party +or*ers, een during the smallest sessions,

read prepared" speeches$ %ll this produced the danger of formali3ing the Party and Soiet +or* and of

bureaucrati3ing the +hole apparatus$



Stalin’s reluctance to consider life’s realities, and the fact that he +as not a+are of the real state of affairs in

the proinces, can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture$

%ll those +ho interested themseles een a little in the national situation sa+ the difficult situation inagriculture, but Stalin neer een noted it$ >id +e tell Stalin about thisJ @es, +e told him, but he did not

support us$ hyJ ecause Stalin neer traeled any+here, did not meet city and *ol*ho3 +or*ers$ =e did not

*no+ the actual situation in the proinces$

=e *ne+ the country and agriculture only from films$ %nd these films dressed up and beautified the e&isting

situation in agriculture$ 'any films pictured *ol*ho3 life such that farmhouse" tables groaned from the+eight of tur*eys and geese$ idently, Stalin thought that it +as actually so$

;ladimir Ilyich )enin loo*ed at life differently$ =e al+ays +as close to the people$ =e used to receie

peasant delegates and often spo*e at factory gatherings$ =e used to isit illages and tal* +ith the peasants$

Stalin separated himself from the people and neer +ent any+here$ his lasted ten years$ he last time he

isited a illage +as in Manuary, 9?2H, +hen he isited Siberia in connection +ith grain procurements$ =o+

then could he hae *no+n the situation in the proincesJ

<nce, Stalin" +as told during a discussion that our situation on the land +as a difficult one and that the

situation in cattle breeding and meat production +as especially bad$ 8rom this" there came a commissioncharged +ith the preparation of a resolution called 7'easures to+ard the further deelopment of animal

husbandry in *ol*ho3es and so*ho3es$: e +or*ed out this pro-ect$

<f course, our proposals at that time did not coer all the possibilities$ =o+eer +e did chart +ays in +hich

animal husbandry on *ol*ho3es and so*ho3es could be boosted$ e proposed to raise liestoc* prices so asto create material incenties for *ol*ho3, 'S machine(tractor station" and so*ho3 +or*ers in deeloping

breeding$ ut our pro-ect +as not accepted, In 8ebruary 9?FA it +as laid aside entirely$

hat is more, +hile reie+ing this pro-ect Stalin proposed that the ta&es paid by *ol*ho3es and by *ol*ho3

+or*ers should be raised by K0 billion rubles$ %ccording to him, the peasants +ere +ell off and a *ol*ho3

+or*er +ould need to sell only one more chic*en to pay his ta& in full$

hin* about +hat this implied$ 8orty billion rubles is a sum +hich these +or*ers" did not reali3e for all the products +hich they sold to the State$ In 9?F2, for instance, *ol*ho3es and *ol*ho3 +or*ers receied 2L,2H0

million rubles for all products deliered and sold to the State$

>id Stalin’s position, then, rest on data of any sort +hateerJ <f course not$ In such cases facts and figures

did not interest him$ If Stalin said anything, it meant it +as so 1 after all, he +as a 7genius,: and a genius

does not need to count, he only needs to loo* and can immediately tell ho+ it should be$ hen he e&presseshis opinion, eeryone has to repeat it and to admire his +isdom$

ut ho+ much +isdom +as contained in the proposal to raise the agricultural ta& by K0 billion rublesJ Bone,

absolutely none, because the proposal +as not based on an actual assessment of the situation but on the

fantastic ideas of a person diorced from reality$

e are currently beginning slo+ly to +or* our +ay out of a difficult agricultural situation$ he speeches of

the delegates to the +entieth Congress please us all$ e are glad that many delegates hae delieredspeeches to the effect" that conditions e&ist for fulfilling the si&th 8ie(@ear Plan for animal husbandry



early"6 not in fie years, but +ithin t+o to three years$ e are certain that the commitments of the ne+ 8ie(

@ear Plan +ill be accomplished successfully$


Comrades! If +e sharply critici3e today the cult of the indiidual +hich +as so +idespread during Stalin’s

life, and if +e spea* about the many negatie phenomena generated by this cult D+hich is so alien to the spirit

of 'ar&ism()eninismE, some may as*6 =o+ could it beJ Stalin headed the Party and the country for A0 yearsand many ictories +ere gained during his lifetime$ Can +e deny thisJ In my opinion, the #uestion can be

as*ed in this manner only by those +ho are blinded and hopelessly hypnoti3ed by the cult of the indiidual,only by those +ho do not understand the essence of the reolution and of the Soiet state, only by those +ho

do not understand, in a )eninist manner, the role of the Party and of the nation in the deelopment of the

Soiet society$

<ur" Socialist .eolution +as attained by the +or*ing class and by the poor peasantry +ith the partial

support of middle(class peasants$ It +as attained by the people under the leadership of the olshei* Party$)enin’s great serice consisted of the fact that he created a militant Party of the +or*ing class, but he +as

armed +ith 'ar&ist understanding of the la+s of social deelopment and +ith the science of proletarian

ictory in the fight +ith capitalism, and he steeled this Party in the crucible of the reolutionary struggle of the masses of the people$

>uring this fight the Party consistently defended the interests of the people and became its e&perienced

leader$ he Party" led the +or*ing masses to po+er, to the creation of the first socialist state$ @ou remember

+ell the +ise +ords of )enin6 that the Soiet state is strong because of the a+areness of the masses that

history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people$

<ur historical ictories +ere attained than*s to the Party’s organi3ational +or*, to the many proincialorgani3ations, and to the self(sacrificing +or* of our great nation$ hese ictories are the result of the great

drie and actiity of the nation and of the Party as a +hole$ hey are not at all the fruit of Stalin’s leadership,

+hich is ho+ the situation +as pictured during the period of the cult of the indiidual$

If +e are to consider this matter as 'ar&ists and as )eninists, then +e hae to state une#uiocally that the

leadership practices +hich came into being during the last years of Stalin’s life became a serious obstacle inthe path of Soiet social deelopment$ Stalin often failed for months to ta*e up some unusually important

problems, concerning the life of the Party and of the State, +hose solution could not be postponed$ >uring

Stalin’s leadership our peaceful relations +ith other nations +ere often threatened, because one(mandecisions could cause, and often did cause, great complications$

In the past fe+" years, after" +e managed to free ourseles of the harmful practice of the cult of theindiidual and too* seeral proper steps in terms of both" internal and e&ternal policies, eeryone has been

able to see" ho+ actiity has gro+n before our ery eyes, ho+ the creatie actiity of the broad +or*ing

masses has deeloped, and ho+ faorably all this has acted upon economic and cultural deelopment$

D%pplause$E

Some comrades may as* us6 here +ere the members of the PolitburoJ hy did they not assert themseles

against the cult of the indiidual in timeJ %nd +hy is this being done only no+J 8irst of all, +e hae toconsider the fact that the members of the Politburo ie+ed these matters in a different +ay at different times$

Initially, many of them bac*ed Stalin actiely because he +as one of the strongest 'ar&ists and his logic, his

strength and his +ill greatly influenced Party" cadres and Party +or*$



It is *no+n that after )enin’s death, especially during the first years, Stalin actiely fought for )eninism

against the enemies of )eninist theory and against those +ho deiated$ eginning +ith )eninist theory, theParty, +ith its Central Committee at the head, started on a great scale +or* on the socialist industriali3ation

of the country, on agricultural collectii3ation, and on cultural reolution$ %t that time Stalin gained great

popularity, sympathy and support$ he Party had to fight those +ho tried to lead the country a+ay from thecorrect )eninist path$ It had to fight rots*yites, inoieites and rightists, and bourgeois nationalists$ his

fight +as indispensable$

)ater, ho+eer, Stalin, abusing his po+er more and more, began to fight eminent Party and 4oernment

leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soiet people$ %s +e hae already sho+n, Stalin thus

handled such eminent Party and State leaders as 5osior, .ud3uta*, i*he, Postyshe and many others$

%ttempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent’s falling ictim to therepression$ his characteri3ed the fall of comrade Postyshe$

In one of his e&changes" Stalin e&pressed his dissatisfaction +ith Postyshe and as*ed him, 7hat are youactuallyJ:

Postyshe ans+ered clearly, 7I am a olshei*, comrade Stalin, a olshei*$:

%t first, this assertion +as considered to sho+ merely" a lac* of respect for Stalin$ )ater it +as considered aharmful act$ entually it resulted in Postyshe’s annihilation and castigation as an 7enemy of the people$:

In the situation +hich then preailed, I often tal*ed +ith Bi*olay %le&androich ulganin$ <nce +hen +e

t+o +ere traeling in a car, he said, 7It has happened sometimes that a man goes to Stalin on his initation as

a friend$ %nd +hen he sits +ith Stalin, he does not *no+ +here he +ill be sent ne&t 1 home or to -ail$:

It is clear that such conditions put eery member of the Politburo in a ery difficult situation$ %nd, +hen +e

also consider the fact that in the last years Central Committee Plenary sessions +ere not conened and thatsessions of the Politburo occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then +e +ill understand ho+ difficult

it +as for any member of the Politburo to ta*e a stand against one or another un-ust or improper procedure,

against serious errors and shortcomings in leadership practices$

%s +e hae already sho+n, many decisions +ere ta*en either by one person or in a roundabout +ay, +ithoutcollectie discussion$ he sad fate of Politburo member comrade ;o3nesens*y, +ho fell ictim to Stalin’s

repressions, is *no+n to all$ Characteristically, the decision to remoe him from the Politburo +as neer

discussed but +as reached in a deious fashion$ In the same +ay came the decision regarding 5u3netso’s

and .odiono’s remoals from their posts$

he importance of the Central Committee’s Politburo +as reduced and its +or* +as disorgani3ed by thecreation +ithin the Politburo of arious commissions 1 the so(called 7#uintets,: 7se&tets,: 7septets: and

7nonets: =ere is, for instance, a Politburo resolution from <ctober A, 9?KL6

7Stalin’s proposal6

79$he Politburo Commission for 8oreign %ffairs D’Se&tet’E is to concern itself in the future, in addition to

foreign affairs, also +ith matters of internal construction and domestic policy$

72$he Se&tet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the State Commission of conomic Planning of the

USS., comrade ;o3nesens*y, and is to be *no+n as a Septet$



7Signed6 Secretary of the Central Committee, M$ Stalin$:

hat sophistry"!


It is clear that the creation +ithin the Politburo of this type of commissions 1 7#uintets,: 7se&tets,: 7septets:

and 7nonets: 1 +as against the principle of collectie leadership$ he result of this +as that some members of the Politburo +ere in this +ay *ept a+ay from participation in reaching the most important state matters$

<ne of the oldest members of our Party, 5limenty @efremoich ;oroshilo, found himself in an almost

impossible situation$ 8or seeral years he +as actually depried of the right of participation in Politburosessions$ Stalin forbade him to attend Politburo sessions and to receie documents$ hen the Politburo +as

in session and comrade ;oroshilo heard about it, he telephoned each time and as*ed +hether he +ould be

allo+ed to attend$ Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but al+ays sho+ed his dissatisfaction$

ecause of his e&treme suspicion, Stalin toyed also +ith the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that ;oroshilo+as an nglish agent$


It’s true 1 an nglish agent$ % special tap +as installed in his home to listen to +hat +as said there$


y unilateral decision, Stalin had also separated one other man from the +or* of the Politburo 1 %ndrey

%ndreyeich %ndreye$ his +as one of the most unbridled acts of +illfulness$

)et us consider the first Central Committee Plenum after the 9?th Party Congress$ Stalin, in his tal* at thePlenum, characteri3ed ;yachesla 'i*hailoich 'oloto and %nastas Ianoich 'i*oyan and suggested that

these old +or*ers of our Party +ere guilty of some baseless charges$ e cannot rule out the possibility thathad Stalin remained at the helm for another seeral months, Comrades 'oloto and 'i*oyan probably

+ould not hae deliered any speeches at this 20th" Congress$

Stalin eidently had plans to finish off the older members of the Politburo$ =e often stated that Politburomembers should be replaced by ne+ ones$ =is proposal after the 9?th Congress to elect 2F persons to the

Central Committee Presidium +as aimed at the remoal of old Politburo members and at bringing in less

e&perienced persons so that these +ould e&tol him in all sorts of +ays$

e can assume that this +as also a design for the future annihilation of the old Politburo members and, in

this +ay, a coer for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts +hich +e are no+ considering$

Comrades! So as not to repeat errors of the past, the Central Committee has declared itself resolutely againstthe cult of the indiidual$ e consider that Stalin +as e&tolled to e&cess$ =o+eer, in the past Stalin

undoubtedly performed great serices to the Party, to the +or*ing class and to the international +or*ers’

moement$

his #uestion is complicated by the fact that all this +hich +e hae -ust discussed +as done during Stalin’s

life under his leadership and +ith his concurrence here Stalin +as coninced that this +as necessary for the



defense of the interests of the +or*ing classes against the plotting of enemies and against the attac* of the

imperialist camp$

=e sa+ this from the position of the interest of the +or*ing class, of the interest of the laboring people, of theinterest of the ictory of socialism and communism$ e cannot say that these +ere the deeds of a giddy

despot$ =e considered that this should be done in the interest of the Party, of the +or*ing masses, in the name

of the defense of the reolution’s gains$ In this lies the +hole tragedy!

Comrades! )enin had often stressed that modesty is an absolutely integral part of a real olshei*$ )enin

himself +as the liing personification of the greatest modesty$ e cannot say that +e hae been follo+ingthis )eninist e&ample in all respects$

It is enough to point out that many to+ns, factories and industrial enterprises, *ol*ho3es and so*ho3es,

Soiet institutions and cultural institutions hae been referred to by us +ith a title if I may e&press it so 1 of

priate property of the names of these or those 4oernment or Party leaders +ho +ere still actie and in good

health$ 'any of us participated in the action of assigning our names to arious to+ns, rayons, enterprises and*ol*ho3es$ e must correct this$

D%pplause$E

ut this should be done calmly and slo+ly$ he Central Committee +ill discuss this matter and consider itcarefully in order to preent errors and e&cesses$ I can remember ho+ U*raine learned about 5ossior’s arrest$

5ie radio used to start its programs thus6 7his is .adio 5osior$: hen one day the programs began +ithout

mentioning 5osior, eeryone +as #uite certain that something had happened to him and that he probably had been arrested$

hus, if today +e begin to change the signs eery+here and to rename things, people +ill thin* that these

comrades in +hose honor the gien enterprises, *ol*ho3es or cities are named also met some bad fate and

that they hae also been arrested$


=o+ is the authority and the importance of this or that leader -udgedJ <n the basis of ho+ many to+ns,

industrial enterprises and factories, *ol*ho3es and so*ho3es carry his name$ Is it not about time that +eeliminate this 7priate property: and 7nationali3e: the factories, the industrial enterprises, the *ol*ho3es and

the so*ho3esJ D)aughter, applause, oices6 7hat is right$:E his +ill benefit our cause$ %fter all, the cult of

the indiidual is manifested also in this +ay$

e should, in all seriousness, consider the #uestion of the cult of the indiidual$ e cannot let this matter get

out of the Party, especially not to the press$ It is for this reason that +e are considering it here at a closedCongress session$ e should *no+ the limits +e should not gie ammunition to the enemy +e should not

+ash our dirty linen before their eyes$ I thin* that the delegates to the Congress +ill understand and assess properly all these proposals$

Dumultuous applause$E

Comrades! e must abolish the cult of the indiidual decisiely, once and for all +e must dra+ the proper

conclusions concerning both ideological(theoretical and practical +or*$ It is necessary for this purpose6



8irst, in a olshei* manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the indiidual as alien to 'ar&ism(

)eninism and not consonant +ith the principles of Party leadership and the norms of Party life, and to fightine&orably all attempts at bringing bac* this practice in one form or another$

o return to and actually practice in all our ideological +or* the most important theses of 'ar&ist()eninist

science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all material and spiritual good of

humanity, about the decisie role of the 'ar&ist Party in the reolutionary fight for the transformation of

society, about the ictory of communism$

In this connection +e +ill be forced to do much +or* in order to e&amine critically from the 'ar&ist()eninist ie+point and to correct the +idely spread erroneous ie+s connected +ith the cult of the indiidual

in the spheres of history, philosophy, economy and of other sciences, as +ell as in literature and the fine arts$

It is especially necessary that in the immediate future +e compile a serious te&tboo* of the history of our Party +hich +ill be edited in accordance +ith scientific 'ar&ist ob-ectiism, a te&tboo* of the history of

Soiet society, a boo* pertaining to the eents of the Ciil ar and the 4reat Patriotic ar$

Second, to continue systematically and consistently the +or* done by the Party’s Central Committee during

the last years, a +or* characteri3ed by minute obseration in all Party organi3ations, from the bottom to the

top, of the )eninist principles of Party leadership, characteri3ed, aboe all, by the main principle of collectieleadership, characteri3ed by the obserance of the norms of Party life described in the statutes of our Party,

and, finally, characteri3ed by the +ide practice of criticism and self(criticism$

hird, to restore completely the )eninist principles of Soiet socialist democracy, e&pressed in the

Constitution of the Soiet Union, to fight +illfulness of indiiduals abusing their po+er$ he eil caused by

acts iolating reolutionary socialist legality +hich hae accumulated during a long time as a result of thenegatie influence of the cult of the indiidual has to be completely corrected$

Comrades! he 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soiet Union has manifested +ith a ne+

strength the unsha*able unity of our Party, its cohesieness around the Central Committee, its resolute +ill to

accomplish the great tas* of building communism$

Dumultuous applause$E

%nd the fact that +e present in all their ramifications the basic problems of oercoming the cult of the

indiidual +hich is alien to 'ar&ism()eninism, as +ell as the problem of li#uidating its burdensomeconse#uences, is eidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party$


e are absolutely certain that our Party, armed +ith the historical resolutions of the 20th Congress, +ill leadthe Soiet people along the )eninist path to ne+ successes, to ne+ ictories$


)ong lie the ictorious banner of our Party 1 )eninism!

Dumultuous, prolonged applause ending in oation$ %ll rise$E

on the cuon the cult of personality and its consequenceslt of personality and its consequences

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