On the Devsirme System and Balkan Slavery

Lindy YoungTo deny that the Balkans have had a history characterized by war and violence would be nave. Permanently outside of greater global politics, the Balkans have long been torn at by all sides and viewed as Europe's backwater. Like many less modern regions, the international community new little of the Balkans other than the unimpressed and dismissive tales of travelers.1Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation

Their lot then manifested itself in the 14th century through a military invasion by the Ottoman Empire. Assimilation into the empire was generally favorable for the region, with the local Slavic people being allowed relatively lenient social and religious freedoms. However, the choice to remain faithful to their native religions (namely Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism) was not without recourse. Non-Muslim villages soon became subject to the Devsirme system, a blood tax; at regular intervals, young Christian boys were taken to be directly indoctrinated into Ottoman society. Trained from any early age, they were used in the facility of political advisers, religious leaders, or troops for the elite Janissary corp. This system of empirical subjugation, then, has become one of the most simultaneously studied and misunderstood topics of Ottoman history. All entities within the system benefited in some way, but as expected this benefit was far from evenly distributed. Further, the balance of power was less concrete than originally planned, and with the waning of the Sultan's power, the new Devsirme class would soon rise up to fill the gap. Here lies the critical misunderstanding of the system: while it was created to control the Slavic natives, the subjugated soon became the subjugators. This rising class would, over the centuries of the Devsirme system's existence, come to be the unofficial rulers of the Ottoman Empire. Further, the fluctuating reversal of power between the Ottomans and the Slavic peoples of the Balkans would help form the racial and religious tensions that would become the epicenter of the war crimes committed during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Exertion on All Sides Following the defeat of a unified Slavic force at Kosovo Polje on June 28, 1389, Ottoman rule of the Balkans became largely unopposed until the 19th century. The Bosnian populations openly accepted Islam and to this day are largely Muslim (Bosniak is the generally accepted term for this population, with Bosnian Muslim being largely redundant due to the inherent religious insinuations), but all other Slavic groups retained whatever form of Christianity they followed.2Gjelten, Tom. Sarajevo Daily, A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege

This set the stage for the Devsirme system; while the Slavic peoples were allowed to freely keep and practice their native religions, doing so made them eligible for conscription into the system. At its core, the Devsirme system was a method of control. As a sprawling empire conquering a region infamous for its myriad ethnic groups and constant wars, the Ottomans faced an imposing dilemma concerning the most efficient way to tame the Balkans. Direct rule by Ottoman officials would result in nearly constant regional upheavals and revolts, and as stable control of the Balkans already posed a daunting task, this traditional system would be impossible to implement. What the empire needed was a tool with which to govern the region while ensuring a quasi-peaceful relationship with the local peoples. Leadership by Slavs taken and trained through the Devsirme tax proved to be an incredibly effective means to this end. In the initial stages, incentivising cooperation within the devsirme system was the Ottoman's plan for its success. Rather than leave the local people out of the new imperial government and inviting constant uprisings, they devised a system wherein regions would be ruled by one of their own. This was thought to reduce tension between the largely decentralized agricultural populations and their new Ottoman rulers.3Karahasan, Dzevad. Sarajevo, Exodus of a City

As the empire was interested not in a brief conquering but in long-term control, the most stable and easily maintainable system would be chosen. Thus the Devsirme system was chosen based on its ability to offer some small semblance of self-rule; although the Balkans were ultimately at the mercy of the Sultan's will, the fact that this will was carried out by local Slavs (regardless of their current cultural or religious affiliations) greatly eased the transition. While far from any true representation, governors from Slavic stock would largely be more openly accepted by the Balkan peasants.While there was no officially written statement on regional bias or selection, the system still instilled a great sense of hostility in the locals, particularly manifesting in anti-Islamic sentiment due to the religious divisions. However, villages selected to fill the regional quotas would often remain loyal to the Turks for the sake of their children. Fear of retribution against the boys in Ottoman hands helped to greatly reduced the risk of open rebellion. Beyond this, converted children, unable to return to their former lives, would often lend aid to their home villages in other ways; monetary aid in the form of public works could often be expected4Shaw, Stanford J. The Aims and Achievements of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans

, further enticing loyalty through the possibility of a higher quality of life. As the Balkan populations at the time were largely based in agricultural village lifestyles, the vast monetary aid a vizier could return to his village would be a massive boon, drastically improving the poor infrastructure.This, more than anything, has lead to a rather perplexing history of praise from the subjected peoples. This cycle of emotional damage suffered from the abductions followed by years of prosperity from the now wealthy children can be found both in historical references and modern prose. Yugoslav author Ivo Andric's The Bridge on the Drina perfectly exemplifies this trend of psuedo-apologism. While much of Bridge focuses on the hardships faced by the Balkans throughout the second millennium, from Ottoman conquering to the ravages of World War I, the positive effect of the Devsirme is shown far beyond the negative.5Andric, Ivo. The Bridge on the Drina

Whether this is partly based in what remembrances of the system are most visible today is unclear, but the possibility cannot be ignored. The physical works given back by the viziers taken, typically stoneworks such as walls and the aforementioned bridge are more often than not still standing as testament to Ottoman engineering. It would be easy to argue then for the positive effects outweighing the negative, but historical documents from the time siding with this viewpoint are scarce at best, leading on to believe that this is more just biased justifications than historical opinion.The physical collecting of the children would have rarely been a peaceful affair; while openly refusing the blood tax was almost wholly unthinkable due to the threat of Ottoman troops, losing part of the next generation was still a painful process for the small villages targeted. As most of the region was inhabited by rural agrarian societies, the problem was far more acutely painful than it would be to urban areas. Familial groups often had close ties from generations largely staying within the same area, and the loss of boys meant less labor potential in the next generation, a great loss for such societies. In order to ease the transfer of the children from their justifiably bereft families to the Ottomans, a particular class called the Voynuks carried out the acquisition and return trip. These men were themselves Slavic, specifically Bulgarian6Ahmed Akgunduz, Osmanli Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri

, and while the forcible taking of children will often be met with anger and grief no matter the circumstance, using locals as officiators helped relieve some tension. While Bulgarians had often (and to some extent still are) seen as being distinctly different from some of the Balkan populations like Serbs, they were still a much more relatable group than the wholly foreign Ottomans.The boys taken were indoctrinated throughout their childhood, converted to Island, and enticed with massive social upward mobility or military power. Based on natural aptitudes, they would be sorted into various sectors, whether as political advisers of the palace, religious leaders, or soldiers of the Janissaries. With such possibilities open to them, loyalty was easy to attain. Being raised by Ottoman handlers from young ages, even as early as pre-adolescance, helped further ensured complete subjugation by conditioning them during their most formative years. The prominent belief since the inception of the system was that the boys, if taken at a young enough age, would lose all meaningful connections to their villages, culture, and religion.7Kunt, Metin Ibrahim. Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment

That this was not entirely possible was an unavoidable problem recognized by the Ottomans, but the diminishing returns caused by generations of the new Devsirme class interacting was not entirely foreseen.Now we can see the full web of the Devsirme system's control. The villages subject to the tax would bear through and remain loyal to the Ottomans both for the sake of the boys taken and for the promise of eventual gain. The boys, stripped (to varying degrees, less so as time progressed) of their local ties, pledged loyalty both for the promises of powerful positions within the Ottoman government and due to the fact that they now lived, worked, and were educated in the capital, had little other choice. Finally, the empire itself gained not the loyalty of the newly conquered regions but also highly skilled advisers or military forces, and by paying only a monetary price in the form of the boys' rearing and eventual salaries. All three groups were to no small extent dependent on the continued cooperation of the others, and here lay both the genius and the eventual downfall of the Devsirme system. The mutually beneficial nature of the tax ensured that all were likely to remain faithful, and in the early years this benefit still swung in favor of the Ottomans, lulling them into a false sense of solidification as the true benefactors. Religion and Identity

To understand how the Devsirme system became so successful, one must understand the greater history of the Balkans. Much of the Southern Slav peoples had long been Christian, though often belonging to different sects. Cyril and Methodius, two ninth century apostles, are largely responsible for the spread of Christianity among the Slavs of the Balkans, as well as developing the early forms of Church Slavonic. Centuries later the 1054 East-West schism within Christendom reached even the Balkans, setting up the final pre-Ottoman groups of Catholic (primarily Croatian) and Orthodox (most other Slavic groups, particularly Serbian).8Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts, A Journey Through History

These various religious groups had become strongly tied to their national identity, blurring the lines between what identified one's place in society more prominently, nationality or faith. To some they were even one in the same, as with the previously mentioned Bosniaks.Here lay the first major cultural decision created by the Devsirme system: religious assimilation, or independence at the price of possible conscription? While this may seem like an already difficult choice to some modern audiences, the context of the situation makes it all the more decisive. Within the Balkans, religious identity far surpassed any other within society. Despite the multiple ethnicities (along with their respective nations), a person's religion defined their position in the public eye. The city of Kosovo has long served as a microcosm of the Balkans region, in at least the function of the disparate peoples inhabiting the area. The middle ages showed a Kosovo strictly divided by ethnic (and its often respective majority religion) lines, rigidly laying out residents into their own sections. While the residential areas were held in this planned framework, mercantile and political sectors were specifically placed in neutral zones, open to all equally. These areas of daily contact created a melding zone for the city's cultures.9Karahasan, Dzevad

With religion being the only universal trait between the numerous ethnic groups, one's beliefs quickly became the unifying power between these groups. To simply change one's religion, then, was simply out of the question for most people with little exceptions outside of the Bosniak populations. While there were those cases outside of Bosnia, the vast majority of the occupied Slavs opted to keep their native beliefs. The monetary taxes required to do so, as well as the inherent eligibility for conscription, was then well worth the cost. Rule under the Ottomans, while certainly more restrictive in the broader sense, was hardly noticeable in the daily life of a peasant. To submit to Ottoman rule in the face of massacre by the Turkish military was an easy choice. Common people retained virtually every aspect of their life prior to Ottoman rule; while taxes slightly rose, the Ottoman raya system was far kinder to the average peasant when compared to the various systems of serfdom popular throughout Western Europe at the time.10Sugar, Peter F. Major Changes in the Life of the Slav Peasantry Under Ottoman Rule

To submit to religious conversion, though, cut much deeper. Giving up small physical conveniences were nothing; to give up one's religion was to give up one's entire identity. Conversion was to turn your back on your family, your village, your entire historical culture. That this was a reasonable price to pay for inclusion into the Ottoman society and a possibility of upward social mobility was seen as uncouth, and not until the mid-seventeenth century did voluntary conversion to Islam gain popularity amongst the native Slavs.11Radushev, Evgeni. 'Peasant' Janissaries?

The Ottoman leadership, already experimenting with the millet system, easily realized the importance of religious beliefs within the Balkans, particularly in their function as a projection of one's social identity.12Barkey, Karen. Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model

They expertly used the religious division between Islamic and Christian faiths to simultaneously separate and drive together the disparate cultures. With the ethnically Slavic boys now converted (and fathering proper Islamic sons themselves), they had essentially made living bridges between the cultures, mediators with common ties to both groups. The system also served to relax their own internal religious issues; namely, to sate the ghazis, frontier warriors of the faith that strongly believed in the choice between either forced conversion or death.13Shinder, Joel. Early Ottoman Administration in the Wilderness: Some Limits on Comparison

The system offered both forced conversion and submission to an Islamic power, quelling the ghazi drive for conversion. Here the Devsirme system found a true balance. By forcefully converting this relatively small portion of the population, they helped connect their physically and culturally distant government to the newly subjugated Balkans, and did so with an admittedly minor impact as far as the region's overall religious populations were concerned. There were no mass forced conversions nor religious based slaughters of villagers from refusal to convert; though the system was painful for the families affected, the religious freedom and rate of forced conversion was exceptionally fair when taken into the historical context. It is rather odd to see such religious lenience towards Christian populations not long after the mass violence caused by the crusades against largely Muslim peoples, and is testament to the liberal measures taken by the Ottomans towards the multiple religious and ethnic groups under their control.

Failure of the Ottoman State

While the Devsirme system was unarguably set up in such a fashion as to form a long-term social construct, the Ottoman Empire itself was not as lucky. The steady siphoning of power from the Sultan to the Devsirme class itself can be traced back at least to the mid-sixteenth century, when following the death of the current Sultan members of the Janissary corp used the political chaos to win the rights to marry, and later on to enlist their own sons into the corp.14Radushev, Evgeni

This has been previously forbidden explicitly to remove the possibility that the Janissaries could begin consolidating power into their own families; to little surprise, this is immediately what they began to do, and the events serve as a landmark for the rise of the Devsirme class as a whole into power.15Prousis, Theophilus. Class Lectures Notes, EUH 3320

This consolidation soon shifted power away from Istanbul and into the hands of the Devsirme, particularly the Janissaries. Having been given the ability to include their own family into the ranks, their numbers were soon bolstered beyond what the traditional Ottoman forces could effectively control, expanding from 13,000 members to 38,000 by 160016Barkey, Karen. Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire

. Now essentially unshackled from the centuries of formerly strict control, they were able to move freely and conduct themselves essentially unopposed while not directly involved in foreign or domestic wars. Thus the seventeenth century became one characterized by rebellions within the Ottoman Empire. With the Janissaries now under their own power, they soon began to seize peasant lands in the Balkans and rule the villages themselves, with taxes being redirected to their own units instead of Istanbul.17Barkey, Karen.

With imperial forces powerless to stop the now massively swelled Janissary troops, little could be done but let them have their way with the outlaying Balkan territories. Steadily amassing power throughout the largely rural areas, this would soon transform into regicide and wide-spread rebellion amongst the peasant populations, now spurred on by Janissary support and the instability of the greater international community that the empire now faced.The Janissaries, through small manipulations over the centuries, had morphed from the Sultan's most loyal troops to his own successors. Any direct action against them would be to threaten one's safety; in 1622 the current Sultan Osman II was openly assassinated by the Janissaries, and within a year popular thought held the class as largely innocent.18Tezcan, Baki. The History of a 'Primary Source': The Making of Tughi's Chronicle on the Regicide of Osman II

That open regicide could be met without reprimand truly shows just how far the Sultanate had fallen. So thorough was this replacement of power that even within the Turkish courts, Balkan languages soon became the speech of choice: The better sort use the Slavonian tongue... the vulgar speake the Turkish language.19Mazower, Mark. The Balkans: A Short History

The rapidly weakening central government began straining for military resources to the point of crippling many outlying regions of the empire, garnering massive resistance from the peasant populations. The nineteenth century saw a rapid increase in organized revolts, particularly within the Balkans. With a mass uprising of Serbs in 1804 and a similar event with Greek citizens in 182120Anscombe, Frederick F. The Balkan Revolutionary Age

, the region was quickly becoming almost uncontrollable. Seeing the futility of the current structure, the Ottomans instituted sweeping reforms in an attempt to modernize the empire's visibly aged system, collectively known as the Tanzimat and spanning nearly four decades from 1839 to 1876. While mildly helpful, the Tanzimat ultimately caused almost as many problems as it solved; one particularly troubling effect was an increase in nationalism as the various groups within the empire (and specifically the Balkans) underwent a resurgence of national identity. One of the largest surges of nationalism occurred in the Bulgarian populations, long viewed as outsiders by the Slavic groups within the Balkan peninsula itself.21Petrov, Milen V. Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864-1868

This stratification of previously healthily interacting national/ethnic groups would serve as a harbinger for the events of the late 20th century, as will be discussed in more detail later.This was also immediately preceded by the Vaka-i Hayriye, which formally dissolved the Janissary corp after a failed rebellion in 1826.22Petrov, Milen V.

While under the guise of modernization (which was a problem desperately needing to be addressed itself), many of the reforms were aimed at removing as much power as possible from the still present Devsirme class and re-centralizing power within the government proper. While moderately successful, at least in the sense of forcefully removing the Janissaries from power, the Tanzimat was far too late in creation to meaningfully affect the empire's health; roughly half a century later the Ottoman Empire would cease to exist.

The Question of Slavery

By far the mostly hotly debated topic within the greater historiography of the Devsirme system is that of slavery. Was the system truly slavery? Beyond this, is there a point at which slavery becomes beneficial and justifiable for the slave, and if so where is the line drawn? Almost more of a philosophical argument than a historical one, it comes to no surprise that some find themselves questioning their predispositions when faced with the moral dilemma of the Devsirme system.Whether or not the system was slavery on the surface is easy enough to answer. A blood tax characterized by forced kidnapping and subsequent brainwashing of children into a foreign power could hardly be considered anything but slavery. The problem arises when the modern observer compares it to what they typically consider traditional slavery. What comes to mind is usually a system far crueler than anything faced by the children raised as viziers or within the Janissary corp; compared to the preconceptions of how imperial slavery functions, the Ottoman system seems more of a blessing than slavery. This cannot be allowed to cloud one's judgment, as at its core the system is the same.What is less clear cut is whether this apparent case of paradoxically beneficial slavery actually holds up to scrutiny. While the system was universally hated upon institution, it seems to have become gradually accepted by the Slavic populations as a means to a better life. Towards the end of the empire in the late 17th century onward through the empire's existence into the early 20th, voluntary conversion to Islam became an increasingly popular as a way to gain acceptance into Ottoman culture, often leading to a measurable increase in quality of life.23Minkov, Anton. Conversion to Islam in the Balkans

The growing trend towards the end of the empire seems to show an increasingly large gap between the tradition of keeping one's religion and the economic & social gains of petitioning for conversion. As the Devsirme system had begun its systematic deconstruction by Ottoman officials directly before these periods of mass voluntary conversion24Minkov, Anton

a disturbing pattern appears to be developing. Though the empire did not remain intact long enough to make a true judgment, it is fully possible that the imperial government, seeking a system of control and cohesion to replace the Devsirme system, turned to further incentivization of official conversion. Could this have been the ultimate goal? The increasing peasant revolts throughout the southern Balkans necessitated a new way to control the region as peacefully as possible. The Devsirme class had proven its capability to overthrow their supposed masters, so clearly a similar system was out of the question. Creating a larger drive for peasants to convert and fully incorporate themselves into Ottoman society would drastically increase cohesion between Istanbul and the outlying regions of the empire, helping to settle unrest and pacify the Slavic populations as a whole. Though certainly less appealing to the Ottomans due to the massive flux of converts into their culture (and a religion typically against converts as a whole), it would serve as a much simpler and more peaceful option than direct military control.With the spectacular failure of physical slavery, this massive increase in conversion can easily be seen as a methods of direct subjugation through culture. With the Devsirme abolished and uprisings appearing at an alarmingly rapid pace, a means of reestablishing control as quickly and subtlety as possible was necessary. Mass voluntary conversions of the possibly rebellious peasant populations, driven by a desperate need for improvement of life, can easily be seen as the solution to just such a problem. Whether this final system can be given the title of slavery is much less likely, but it was no less effective at cementing the Slavic people under the Ottoman yoke for the short remainder of the empire's life.Echoes of the Past

Not a century after the Ottoman's fall, they would again be at the center of a conflict with the Slavic peoples of the Balkans, though this time as the victims. The breakup of Yugoslavia, a country itself formed from the remains of the fallen Ottoman Empire's territory, would see some of the most violent and horrific crimes against humanity seen since the World Wars. Genocide, rebranded as ethnic cleansing and largely ignored by the international community for far too long, became the hallmark of the Yugoslav Wars. Bosniaks, Turks, and Muslim populations in general where the sole target of these cleansings, with Serbian and to a lesser degree Croatian nationalist elements perpetrating the crimes.While the involvement of rampant nationalism has been the subject of a growing historiography following the wars' end, the ties to the Devsirme system have been largely ignored. The starkly religious divisions between the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA) make little sense without this seemingly obvious historical context. While the previously mentioned ties between nationality and religious affiliation within the Balkans seems like a simple explanation, it is more of a complicating factor than root cause.The irredentist movement common amongst the various Serbian nationalist groups made their point clear: Kosovo, as a historical part of the 14th Serbian kingdom, rightfully belonged to the Serbian people. The region was not only now overwhelmingly inhabited by Albanians, most of whom were Muslim,25Hall, Derek R. Representations of Place: Albania

but had also been taken from the Serbian kingdom by the Ottomans upon their initial conquering of the region. This created a dangerous situation within the region, all centered around centuries of historical anti-Islamicism stemming from the Ottoman Empire and, arguably, generations of Serbs lost to the Devsirme system.Relations between the local Albanian and Turkish populations had a history of political oppression by the Serbian government, but mostly chose to either peacefully protest, emigrate to Turkey, or simply suffer through.26Artisien, Patrick F. R. A Note on Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: A Balkan Perspective

Within the chaos of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the local government chose to declare itself independent not only from Yugoslavia but from Serbia as well. Seizing the excuse of reclaiming territory actually owned within half a millennium, the Serbian military soon began the process of ethnic cleansing, systematically murdering or forcefully evicting all Muslim peoples from the land. The intense focus on removal of Muslim peoples within both the Serbian military and political spheres points at something far beyond the hatred of an other. The now infamous Serbia Strong video27Serbia Strong translation (God is a Serb), YouTube video, 3:46, posted by TheIronTyrant, Dec. 18, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-EQJA8Ahac

perfectly exemplifies the deep historical hatred driving the military actions. A music video for Serbian politican (and later president of the Serbian Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina) Radovan Karadzic, it makes clear mention to the removal of Fascists and Turks from Serbian land; the former referring to the Croatian Ustashi which served as a puppet state for Nazi Germany during WWII, and the later a direct attack at the ancestors of their now century old enemy the Ottoman Turks. That it later mentions The Wolves are coming only solidifies the ties to hatred started during the days of the Devsirme system, as the White Wolves were a Serbian paramilitary force known for committing atrocious war crimes against Turks. The military actions of the JNA and Serbian armed forces went far beyond what was necessary for the stated goal of retaining Serbian territory. Much like the Imperial German military's abuses of power within German Southwest Africa.28Hull, Isabel V. Absolute Destruction

As in the African case, active military actions continued long after victory had been clearly achieved, and resulted in the same slaughter of an entire group through nothing more than unchecked military power. Where the JNA and Serbian forces differ from the Germans is in their clear intention for this to occur.That little was done by the international community to stop these crimes is ironically a symptom of the Ottoman's rule. As previously mentioned the Balkans had long been considered the backwater of Europe, geographically closer than Greece but culturally seen as far removed from centers of civilization. The Ottomans did little to improve this image, and so the besieged populations of their descendants received only paltry groups of ill equipped peace keepers from the UN.29Barnett, Michael. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism

The conflict was seen as no more than, in Otto von Bismarck's famous words, Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.This then is the final legacy of the Devsirme system. At once both slavery and salvation, it served as a paradoxical tool that simultaneously subjugated and raised up the Slavic peoples of the Balkan peninsula. Now with the closing of the 20th century, its history is used only as a justification for the genocide and removal of multiple ethnic groups throughout the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Within a decade, more blood had been shed in the name of vengeance than the empire likely caused over the course of centuries, at least in regard to the Serbian population it ruled over. Few reputable historians would deny the Devsirme system as anything but slavery of the Balkan peoples; none would agree that anything like the crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were justified acts of revenge. Despite the centuries of slavery and subjugation imposed on the Slavic peasants, the Turkish descendants of the Ottoman Empire have become the Devsirme system's final victims.

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