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EDITORBharat Verma

ASSOCIATE EDITORPriya TyagiCol Danvir Singh

EDITORIAL CONSULTANTS

Claude Arpi Author and a Senior Journalist

Lt Gen JS Bajwa

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

Brig Amar Cheema

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch

Gp Capt Balakrishna Menon

Air Marshal Narayan Menon

Prakash Nanda Senior Foreign Policy Analyst

Vice Admiral Rajeshwer Nath

Vice Adm BS Randhawa Former Chief of Material and Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition, Indian Navy

Amitabha Roychowdhury Associate Editor, Press Trust of India

Ramananda Sengupta Foreign and Strategic Affairs Analyst

Kanwal Sibal Former Foreign Secretary of India

Vice Admiral Anup Singh

FROM THE EDITOR

THE FAKE MILITARY COUP 3

MINISTER, MY MINISTER! DEFENCES ARE DOWN! 4

TALIBAN SET TO TAKE OVER PAKISTAN 6

INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW COMMENT

LESSONS FROM THE HENDERSON BROOKS REPORT

Lt Gen JS Bajwa 9

LET PRIVATE AEROSPACE MANUFACTURING FLOURISH

Gp Capt Joseph Noronha 15

ARTILLERY MODERNISATION

Special Correspondent 24

ROLE OF C-17 GLOBEMASTER III

Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja 31

IS THE IAF EQUIPPED FOR A TWO-FRONT WAR?

Gp Capt AK Sachdev 36

AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE NEWS

Priya Tyagi 44

EMPLOYING SPECIAL FORCES: A Response to Popular Fallacies

Saikat Datta 60

THE CULTURE BAGGAGE OF INDIAN MILITARY PHILOSOPHY

Lt Gen SC Sardeshpande 63

EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS IN COUNTER INSURGENCY ROLES

Gp Capt B Menon 66

FORCE PROJECTION AND RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES Need for Reassessment

Brig Deepak Sinha 73

TIERED BORDER DEFENCE AGAINST CHINA

Special Correspondent 77

WHY NOT HAVE ‘TECHNICAL SUPPORT DIVISION’ AT THE ARMY CORPS LEVEL?

Col JK Achuthan 82

INTERNAL SECURITY: The Maoist Dimension

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee 88

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329.2-Apr/Jun ‘14 INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW

The Fake Military Coup

FROM T

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With the political leadership clearly stating that there was

no coup attempt, babu Shashi Kant Sharma and others need

to be investigated and taken to task for creating a false alarm.

FROM THE EDITOR

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should order investigations by a retired Supreme Court Judge into

the fake military coup propagated by former Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma maligning and belittling the Indian Army.

It is becoming obvious that the babus in MoD, who are unable to deliver modern weapon platforms efficiently to the military, are hell bent on lowering the image of the Indian Army, which in turn is demoralizing the troops and acts as a disincentive for the young to serve their country.

This amounts to grave anti-India activity, weakening the sinews of the nation. With the political leadership clearly stating that there was no coup attempt, babu Shashi Kant Sharma and others need to be investigated and taken to task for creating a false alarm.

It is imperative that we visit the contours of the military coup executed by General Musharraf in Pakistan on 12 October 1999. All militaries particularly the Army are highly trained to conduct ruthless operations against their adversary. The speed and precision of movement with the weapons they wield make them formidable and unstoppable.

When the military coup took place in Pakistan, the Army under directions from Lt Gen Usmani, seized the air control tower to enable Musharraf to land, troops took over control of the state-run television, put the prime minister Nawaz Sharif under house arrest by encircling his residence, took over control of international airports and snapped the international phone lines. Thus, neutralizing the political leadership at one go and ensuring that the bureaucracy towed the line of the Pakistan Army.

When armies move, whether in operational area or in civil areas, they have studied all aspects of the situation, readied adequate firepower to neutralize dissent, and thought out the end game well in advance.

All military coups will have similar patterns, no matter which army conducts it.

Compare the above with the picture painted by former Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma, falsely implicating that the political leadership at the highest level was jittery. If the Indian Army was executing a ‘coup’, then the Shashi Kant Sharmas’ of this world would not have the luxury of inviting the former DGMO Lt Gen AK Chaudhary late at night to find out, ‘bataiye kya ho raha hai’ (tell me what is happening?), because in a coup mode the Indian Army and not the bureaucrat would be calling the shots. The former Army Chief Gen VK Singh would not be going to the Supreme Court for redressal of the age controversy. Instead he would be at the helm of affairs and conducting the operations personally to takeover New Delhi.

The movement of a mechanized infantry unit without ammunition from Hissar and a paratroopers detachment from Agra late at night on January 16, 2012 were conducting normal routine exercises unrelated to each other. In a huge army, there is continuous training of local units,


FROM T

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...India has a federal structure where all the state capitals will be required to be simultaneously brought under the Indian Army’s control. This is not so in Pakistan where only Islamabad has to be taken over.

which are neither projected to the DGMO or to the Army HQs. Also,every Brigade Commander upwards independently is authorized to mobilize his formation within an hour 24x7 and they don’t need permissions for war mobilization.

At the same time, there are always sufficient well-trained and armed troops available in the capital to take over a small city like New Delhi. It really does not require extra troops from outside with two permanent infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, engineers and signal regiments that

are stationed in the Capital. In fact, when a new Army Chief takes over, his battle hardened infantry battalion or one of the battalions from his regiment serve in the Capital as a personal honour: a battle hardened infantry battalion by itself is a very lethal force that can create mayhem. Furthermore, since this picture was painted by babu Sharma on 16 January 2012, a huge contingent of Indian Army had already moved into New Delhi for the 26 January Republic Day parade. Hence, no extra troops were required in any case.

Therefore, it is obvious that this great army is not in the business of military coups despite the wherewithal permanently at its disposal at New Delhi!

This was a false alarm purposely created to malign the Indian Army as the Army Chief and the Ministry of Defence were at loggerheads due to the General’s demand to rectify incorrect entry of his date of birth. Further, if the coup was actually taking place, the former Defence Secretary would not have had the luxury of leaking the information to a newspaper to create panic – he would have been effectively neutralised well in time because this is how a professional army executes its tasks. Despite the impediments created by politicians and bureaucrats in terms of paucity of young human resources and necessary equipment, the Indian Army remains extraordinarily professional in its approach of securing the nation’s borders.

The idea of a military coup, therefore, is preposterous and unthinkable in India!

A military coup is simply not feasible otherwise also as India has a federal structure where all the state capitals will be required to be simultaneously brought under the Indian Army’s control. This is not so in Pakistan where only Islamabad has to be taken over.

The continuous and gross neglect of the Indian Army and insulting behavior of the civil administration towards the military is, therefore, a matter of shame. It is time that the Army Chief asserts his dignity to restore the honour of this great army by demanding of the Prime Minister to institute an inquiry into the former Defence Secretary’s obnoxious behavior of creating the false alarm and heaping insults. The guilty must be taken to task.

This will help to quell the rising frustrations and anger within the rank and file of the Indian military.

Minister, My Minister! Defences Are Down!

In the past seven years Defence Minister AK Antony’s incompetence has ensured that India’s military capability rapidly shrinks.

Primarily, the tax-payer spends money on appointing the defence minister to make certain that India’s armed forces receive incremental modernisation and sufficient military capabilities


FROM T

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Antony, the most ‘honest’ defence minister will probably

be remembered for the unprecedented number of

scams that happened during his tenure and nothing more.

to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Union as well as to defend her increasing strategic interests.

In addition, he is solely responsible for the upkeep of the well-being and morale of the forces.

However, Antony, possibly the longest serving defence minister, belied expectations and instead created a huge obstacle course in modernisation of the armed forces and permitted maligning of the Indian Army by his defence secretary at various stages.

Antony, the most ‘honest’ defence minister will probably be remembered for the unprecedented number of scams that happened during his tenure and nothing more.

For all the professed honesty that Antony touted on taking over, should have made him clean up the rampant existing corruption in defence public sector units and ministry of defence.

Under his leadership it appears that the primary national objective is not to add military capabilities to ensure the nation’s security but to find ways to guarantee maximum kickbacks.

Frankly, nobody involved in the decision-making process is really concerned about the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft being inducted on time to shore up the rapidly declining firepower of the Indian Air Force; or about the Indian Navy receiving submarines in time; or with the tremendous collateral damage the nation suffers on its borders with Pakistan because the infantry is ill-equipped.

Despite similar levels of corruption, China never overlooks the primary objective of building military muscle. Frankly, no other country does except India.

The Defence Procurement Procedure document created by Antony and the babus of the MoD has become a huge obstacle course in procurement, which is difficult to fulfill by foreign vendors.

The defence minister is stuck in the trivial and frivolous with a clerical mindset merely to prove his so-called ‘honesty’ overlooking the primary aim of adding sufficient military muscle and firepower to the defence services.

The result is that the Air Force has stated that it is unable to successfully tackle the emerging China-Pakistan two-front threat.

The non-replacement of dwindling and ancient submarine fleet of the Indian Navy has not only left a gaping hole in underwater warfare, but is also taking toll of officers and sailors lives in peacetime. Imagine the large casualties that will occur during war.

In the army, the artillery lies empty, ground air defence does not exist, the 333 infantry battalions have not been modernised and lack mobility and sufficient firepower.

Unfortunately, the officers and the men of the military are not only deeply anguished, but also very angry.

Antony is unable to control the babus in the MoD and the result is unbridled corruption inside the ministry.

It is amazing that top classified documents of the air force found their way from MoD to an American agent via middleman Abhishek Verma. The American partner sent the documents back after differences occurred between him and Verma to the MoD. The MoD certified that these were highly classified documents.


FROM T

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Till date the honest defence minister has not investigated, or concluded and taken to tasks the babus who are responsible for the leakage. It appears that these documents are available for a consideration in MoD.

The bribe takers are Indians sitting in seats of power. They are never taken to task, but the foreign vendor who is forced to part with his money is automatically blacklisted on mere hearsay, thereby

derailing the military preparedness of the nation.

The defence minister appears to be passing his time at the cost of the tax-payer and as such is heavily dependent on the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy in turn is running riot by fighting cases in courts against its own military. It is overlooking all rulings in favour of the military by the Armed Forces Tribunal.

The former defence secretary Shashi Kant Sharma refused to settle legitimate ‘pay and pension’ demands of the veterans despite losing the case in every court. Today, he stands in contempt of court in the Supreme Court.

Further, despite stating that there was no attempt at a military coup, Antony has not ordered a retired Supreme Court judge to investigate the ‘fake military coup’ that Shashi Kant Sharma tried to create, to malign the Indian Army. Responsibilities need to be fixed as to why the MoD was hell bent on demoralising its own army.

Admiral D K Joshi, a highly upright officer with integrity, resigned as naval chief in protest because of the third rate equipment being supplied by the ministry, which was taking lives of officers and men during peace time.

This was in the best tradition of the military where the chief could not safeguard lives of his men and was totally disgusted with the defence minister’s incompetence in resolving the problems that the navy is facing.

The head that should have rolled was AK Antony for the mess he has created.

Taliban Set to Take Over Pakistan

In the near future, Taliban and Taliban like groups will impose Afghanistan type Taliban regime on Pakistan.

The civil war raging inside Pakistan in search of elusive ‘purity’ of philosophy is rapidly shrinking the space held by civil society. After expelling other religious minorities from Pakistan, the Islamic fundamentalists are determined to eliminate Ahmadiyas, cause heavy destruction of Shias and now, the Ismailis. Anybody who does not conform to the extreme Wahabi Sunni philosophy will be eliminated from the political canvas.

The elected civil government is in no position to take on the jihad factory which the Pakistan Army too is losing the war against. In fact, the Pakistan Army is so heavily infiltrated by Islamic fundamentalists that it stands fairly neutralised internally. In the coming years, it will be unable to dominate and maintain Pakistan’s territorial integrity unless it joins hands with Taliban and evolves into a Talibanised Army.

Two trends are discernible inside Pakistan — first, as the Western Forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Taliban style militias will hold sway causing destruction of the elected government

…the air force has stated that it is unable to successfully tackle the emerging China-Pakistan two-front threat.


FROM T

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and the democratic institutions. Second, to maintain unity and focus within the different jihadi groups, attacks on India will be enhanced and enlarged.

The jihad factory considers India as the next prize to be won to impose regressive laws such as the Sharia and Taliban style government. The dangerous divisive vote-bank politics within India in the last decade has created adequate groups of ‘sleeper cells’ and sufficient pockets of influence which are highly Talibanised in their thinking.

The ‘soft target’ India appears to be ripe to become the largest sanctuary of the jihad factory in Asia in times to come.

Some of the politicians and the policy makers in India are unable to look beyond and visualise the dangers lurking in its vicinity. Many in India, out of their so-called ‘liberal’ philosophy, maintain that Pakistan or Afghanistan for that matter have a right to live and practice their beliefs, which includes imposition of extreme philosophies. While one respects the rights of the people to run their house with their beliefs even if they are regressive and out of sync with the twenty-first century, the same ‘liberals’ forget that the Islamic fundamentalists are an expanding force based on a ‘spoke and hub’ principle.

They will export their philosophy ruthlessly to undermine India’s multicultural space and values. The jihad factory will expand, export terrorism and occupy sufficient destructive space inside the nation. India must gear up to grapple with the subversion that is creeping in.

In times to come, Sharif will need assistance not only from

the international community but from India as well.


FROM T

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At the initial stage, the Taliban game plan is based on the following: First, eliminate all opposition consisting of minorities or different sects of Islam.

Second, with the withdrawal of Western forces, capture large territories to re-impose old Taliban regime inside Afghanistan. Imagine the havoc a Taliban-like regime from Afghanistan to Pakistan can cause in our neighbourhood.

Third, pretend talks and negotiations with the elected government in Islamabad while at the same time undermine the democratic institutions, and the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan Army had to raise a special protection force of 25,000 personnel to guard its nuclear arsenal lest they fall into the hands of Taliban.

In the subsequent phase, the Taliban strategy will be to ensure the take over of entire Afghanistan and Pakistan; to maintain unity between differing groups; to avoid inter-gang

rivalry, task adequate groups to create mayhem inside India to unhook Kashmir thereby providing external focus to the jihadis. The aim will be to begin the unraveling of India, and maintain unity between different groups of the jihad factory at the same time. The activation of Masood Azhar group is in this direction.

Similarly, export Taliban-like forces into resource rich Central Asia and put Russia under pressure.

The Nawaz Sharif government is likely to sink unless it joins hands and accepts harsh conditions being imposed by Taliban in Pakistan. In times to come, Sharif will need assistance not only from the international community but from India as well. New Delhi still is in deep slumber oblivious to the fact that to safeguard its own interests, it will have to gear up to assist Pakistan in the near future.

B H A R AT V E R M A

The dangerous divisive vote-bank politics within India in the last decade has created adequate groups of ‘sleeper cells’ and suf cient pockets of in uence which are highly Talibanised in their thinking.


AFTER FIFTY YEARS THE HENDERSON Brooks – Bhagat Singh Report (herein after referred to as Report) has wormed

its way into the public domain through a foreign source. It is intriguing that a copy of the Report was accessed by a foreign journalist who was evidently treated to a ‘personal’ copy of a highly classified document. It may be asked whether the copy with Maxwell was a draft copy or one of the final copies. How was it accounted for? Our desperate desire to please the ‘white man’ is so very clear from this episode.

As has always been stated by the Army, this Report was ordered by the Chief of Army Staff to record the events of the 1962 War as they unfolded and analyse the details of the course of tactical level of operations to draw relevant lessons. Unfortunately, the Government of the day did not think it necessary to order a similar inquiry into the decision making process which involved the Ministries of Defence (MoD), External Affairs (MEA), Home Affairs (MHA), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Cabinet

Secretary and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). After all, the MoD or the Cabinet Secretary’s office would have had the secretarial responsibility at all meetings at the highest level of government decision making. The cover up by the Government of India (GOI) includes the arena where the National Security Strategy was formulated and the decision to firstly, draw firm lines depicting the International Boundary with China was taken and secondly, the decision to establish posts as far up to our then stated International Boundary was taken.

It is intended to study the military lessons that emerge at various levels from the War. At the same time, the aim is to assess how these have been incorporated in the military operations planning process in the current scenario to increase the level of preparedness against any misadventure by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Strategic Decision Making ProcessThe Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating

to India-China Boundary issue, published

The Government’s ‘White Paper’ relating to India-China Boundary issue, published between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial bilateral relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959 were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India; she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry and Artillery units and formation Head Quarters, raising

transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging.

“Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear…….when there is mutual fear men think twice before they make aggressions upon another” —Hermocrates as attributed by Thucydides

Lessons from the Henderson Brooks ReportLt Gen JS Bajwa

Lt Gen JS Bajwa, former Chief of Staff,

Eastern Command and Director General

Infantry.

INDIAN DEFENCE REVIEW COMMENT

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between 1951 and 1960, clearly indicated the adversarial relations between India and China. The increasingly acrimonious exchanges on the boundary question indicated that it could precipitate matters and result in armed clashes. The incident in Longju on August 25, 1959 and Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, were pointers to the determination and political will of China to stake her claims even at the cost of a war. This should have been the turning point for India;

she should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity. Raising of additional Infantry a n d A r t i l l e r y u n i t s a n d formation Headquarters, raising of Headquarters IV Corps, augmenting the transport fleet,

inducting additional helicopters and transport aircraft, constructing roads, and redeploying forces to meet possible contingencies should have been commenced in right earnest then. Such preparation was mandatory to support a strategic decision of the magnitude as was emerging. Probably Nehru’s domineering persona suppressed any urge for dissent or disagreement and therefore, his was always the last word to become ‘policy’.

In the current systemic context, due to India’s basic security stance of ‘restraint’, the armed forces are kept out of the decision making process. Though the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is briefed, as and when required, by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) or the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), decisions pertaining to military matters are taken without the presence of the COAS or COSC. As noted from the Report, it appears that the Army was only given instructions for undertaking specific operations including even tactical objectives as identified in the meetings at the highest level. Unfortunately, the system is prevalent even today under the guise of ‘civilian control’ of the Services. On the Chinese side, the PLA had a key presence in formulating Chinese strategy then and has a fairly prominent role in decision making even today.

Intelligence and SurveillanceThe IB was the sole intelligence agency

providing the Government all types of foreign

intelligence. At the field level, the Subsidiary IB (SIB) operated in the border areas and was reporting back directly to Delhi. In the 1950s, the pent-up anger of the Tibetans with regard to Chinese occupation of their country could have easily been exploited to cultivate sources providing HUMINT. We also could have exploited the knowledge of the locals from areas opposite Tawang who had escaped Chinese persecutions, to interfere with the build-up of the PLA. However, this was not done since Nehru had recognised Tibet as being an integral part of China and his political stance of non-interference in the affairs of another country clearly ruled out such an option.

In the present context, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence, the IB for Counter Intelligence, the State CID for criminal Intelligence within the State and Military Intelligence exclusively for intelligence for military consumption. With the Indo Tibetan Border Police also now deployed all along the Northern border they would have also established their own network for their task of policing the border.

In these far-flung areas, a quaint situation manifests in that with limited number of persons operating as an intelligence source it is often the case where the same source works for two or more agencies. He judiciously manipulates the information into bits as exclusive ‘bytes’ to his controller. With these inputs ‘serious’ intelligence assessments are generated by each intelligence agency which, in turn, form the basis for formulating national security strategy. Often, the source is compromised and allowed to operate only if he provides the other side information too; such double agents are a reality. Thus, it is axiomatic that all information is counter checked and verified. Induction of technology in through ‘spy’ satellites, monitoring electronic and cyber communications and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are now being co-opted to verify the HUMINT as also confirming inputs garnered through other technological means.

The creation of a Multi Agency Centre (MAC)

India should have begun preparing for an armed showdown to secure her territorial integrity...

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has been a positive step in the direction of intelligence sharing and to identify aspects that requires further inputs as also to optimise effort. This has created a more robust format of intelligence assessment. However, technology needs to be further exploited to compensate for the lack of HUMINT sources in the India-China context.

Military Planning ProcessAs understood from the Report, the Army

was not briefed of the political objective to be achieved by military means. Instead, they were merely given tactical objectives to be captured by the forces available. At no point does the Report mention of the Army asking for additional resources outside the services, for example, projecting a case for requisitioning civil aviation resources for move of men and material. Furthermore, while tactical objectives were being specified by Army HQ, commensurate resources were not made available even when XXXIII Corps was asking for it. Similarly, dates for commencement of operations were arbitrarily set. It is rumoured that the date for attack to recapture Walong was fixed such that its successful capture would be announced as a gift to the beleaguered Prime Minister (PM) on his birthday to lighten the prevailing gloom in the environment. It speaks volumes of the attitude of the some senior Commanders of that time who were trying to reach out to the political masters. The trend can be attributed directly as a fallout of the favours received by Lt. General B.M Kaul due his intimate connections with the PM and Defence Minister.

The Report brings out numerous occasions where command channels were blatantly bypassed. Often Army HQ completely sidelined HQ Eastern Command and passed orders directly to IV Corps. Similarly, it is noted the Army Commander Eastern Command and the Corps Commander also bypassed Division HQ and even Brigade HQ in passing orders. All limits were crossed when the IV Corps Commander spoke directly with the PM and the Defence Minister. India’s China war became private social ‘drawing room’ affair between the PM, the Defence Minister and Lt. General Kaul.

Ostensibly, in Counter Insurgency/Counter

Terrorist (CI/CT) operations there are times when the HQ has to reach out direct to the Division or even Brigade HQ to get inputs on an incident which is being flashed on the ticker of a 24x7 news channel. Improved communications and availability of mobile phones with high levels of penetration to even remote areas have led to an unhealthy trend in the form of ‘paid news’ by all and sundry. The military reporting chain is being short-circuited to respond to ‘Breaking News’ flashing on TV sets. The Army has to report authentically with every aspect needing to be verified. While the News Channels do not shoulder any such responsibility, the Army is pushed into breaking norms of functioning. There, in my view, is this questionable trend of placing TV sets in offices which are be beaming news round the clock. Military Intelligence, certain sections of the Military Operations Directorates may require them but not every office in the Service HQs. This trend must be reversed and curtailed expeditiously.

Network Centric Warfare, propounded as the future form of warfare, is a brazen technologically enabled form of bypassing channels in the command and control chain. It makes no sense for a soldier deployed in a section post getting information of the ‘goings on’ in the neighbouring Brigade defended area. It makes the Section, Platoon, Company and even Battalion Commander irrelevant in the orchestration of the lowest level tactical battle. A tactical engagement is not about physical casualties and capture of ground but of defeating the enemy in his mind. Contrary to our thinking, the Chinese have always emphasized on deception, subterfuge, cunning and guise in their war-fighting techniques. It thus needs to be appreciated that every target appearing on a conventional battlefield is not to be eliminated. Tactical acumen, deception, cunning, training, leadership and tactical operational plan - all have a bearing on the outcome of a tactical battle. The Army’s Battlefield Information System (BIS) is all set to severely disrupt this. The Battalion, Company, Platoon and Section Commanders will be forced only to react to

The Report brings out numerous occasions

where command channels were

blatantly bypassed...

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situations as being played out by the enemy instead of executing a pre-prepared operational plan. It replicates the situation similar to the one prevailing in 1962. We need to harness technology to suit our existing organisations, procedures and terrain rather than blindly induct technology for the sake of technology. The “shooter to sensor” concept has its origins in CT operations undertaken by the US in Afghanistan. In the Iraq War, even the resource-rich US Forces could not wallow in the luxury of “shooter to sensor” across the board for all forces. In a conventional war, India cannot ever muster such resources as would be required for executing such an impractical concept by any stretch of imagination.

The malady of breaking up coherent units and sub-units is a fallout of interference from higher HQ in the tactical operations arena.

In any Infantry battalion today no Commander can confidently claim to deploy a coherent section which has trained together and has a well-identified leadership. A similar situation exists with

regard to platoons too. Trying to implement a ‘buddy’ system remains an exercise on paper only. Colonial practices such as residential guards for Commanders aggravate the problem. This form must change and the task of providing guards for non-combat functions must be entrusted to Defence Security Corps.

Similarly, the Corps of Military Police (CMP) has been created for a specific role. However, ad hoc Garrison Military Police (GMP) is mustered as a local arrangement to augment the strength of the CMP. However, this results in CMP becoming the managers of the GMP who are doing their task. The GMP is mustered by pooling in manpower from garrison units which is highly detrimental to the structured cohesion of the sub-units of the battalion/regiment from where the manpower is mustered. The practice in the Army has always been to deploy coherent sub-units for any task unlike the police or para-military forces where employment is specified by physical numbers. The system followed by the Army is basically to retain the cohesiveness

of a sub-unit built around a clearly identified command and control hierarchy catering for a leadership element, communications, equipment and administrative support.

Execution of Operational PlansPlans were made off large-scale inch maps.

Remoteness of the areas and the level of cartography existing in the 1930s-1940s when the maps were prepared made them inherently inaccurate. Adequate time was not made available to battalions and formations to familiarise themselves with the ground where they were to undertake defensive operations. Interestingly, the Report has, at a number of places, mentioned of action by Chinese outflanking the defences held by Indian troops. It is indeed an indication of the familiarity with the terrain in the area of operations, level of training, cohesion of the units and the level of communications available with the PLA that enabled them to operate cross-country deep inside enemy territory with alacrity and ease. How did they get such detailed inputs of the terrain? Had they been carrying out physical reconnaissance all the while that India was complacently insisting that the “Chinese will not react”? This is intriguing and noteworthy.

Since there were no roads the field, artillery and mortars which had very limited range per force had to be deployed well forward to be in a position to provide defensive fire support. Mules and air drop of mortars and Howitzers were resorted to. As a matter of interest, a Howitzer of one of the units dropped at Hathungla was retrieved recently a few years ago after a detailed search. Dropping a weapon with crew is only the beginning of the problem. Mortar/Howitzer tubes without ammunition are mere worthless junk of metal. For meaningful fire support, ammunition for any operations requires a constant stream flowing forward. The limited range of these mortars/Howitzers made the concentration of fire from a number of fire units, as is the practice, non-existent. Similarly, due to these limitations, the weapons could not undertake any counter bombardment to neutralise enemy artillery. Thus, the PLA artillery was targeting Indian troops in their hastily prepared defences without interference.

In every operation, the Report highlights the paucity of availability of reserves...

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Of late, there has been much hype on the possible induction of Ultra Light Howitzers (ULH) of 155mm calibre from USA. To exploit the light weight of this weapon which gives it the ability of being carried under slung a medium-lift helicopter; deployment areas for the guns need to be prepared in peacetime. Arrangements have to be made to stock ammunition in secure, hardened bunkers/caves dug into mountain sides, particularly, in areas where the road is not likely to reach in the next half decade/decade. Gun positions can be prepared at additional locations with ammunition dumped ab initio to cater for contingencies of side-stepping the ULH to areas so prepared without being handicapped for want of ammunition and need to divert utility helicopter resources during the battle. To do so would entail purchase of larger quantities of ammunition than in normal circumstances.

In every operation, the Report highlights the paucity of availability of reserves. Mountains are suited for defensive operations due to the attackers’ express need for opening an axis for maintenance to progress operations in depth. Well-prepared, stocked and defended localities can hold out numerous enemy attacks that will severely constrain the momentum and progress of any attacker’s plans. The enemy, in his preparation for an attack will seek maximum information of the defender’s deployment and location of his automatic and support weapons. The layout of a defended locality can be obtained by patrols and military appreciation, though actual position on ground of sub-units, his automatic weapons and support weapons may be concealed and measures for limited deception undertaken. Uncommitted reserves, however, can create a decision dilemma for the enemy, since he will not know the strength and location of the force. Considering the nature of


the terrain and the high altitude of the tactical battle areas, pre-locating reserves well forward, duly acclimatised, was an essential aspect of the operational planning but was not done by the formations. Knowing the difficulties imposed along our Northern borders, in a future war, allocating uncommitted reserves to Brigades, Divisions and Corps as reserves, ab initio, maybe a more pragmatic option that will be need to be actively considered vis-a-vis holding a strategic reserve in the form of the Mountain Strike Corps (refer to IDR Oct-Dec 2013).

Air SupportFrom the Report, it appears that in meetings

at the Government level, where the Chief of the Army Staff was invited to attend, the

Air Chief and Naval Chief were not invited. This reflects the level of strategic thinking and planning at the highest echelons of the Government. The potential of the three services to

further the interest of the country was not comprehended. The coordination of effort between the Army and the Air Force at the Eastern Command HQ level also seems to be just marginal. In the high level meetings, of the Command HQ, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was represented by ‘an officer’ whose rank or appointment has not been specified. Consequently, his contribution could only be limited to indicating availability of serviceable assets and the ‘meteorological’ forecast of the next 24 hours. The incident where the Eastern Army Commander was left stranded at Tawang by IAF pilots when the helicopters took off without him is militarily ridiculous. The pilots acted as though they were the staff of a commercial airline and not a combat force in a live battle situation.

Close air support, communication flight support and casualty evacuation are essential ingredients of tactical operational planning. To

base a plan on such support which is available based on priorities dictated by another service compels the Army to make plans from within its own resources. As a result air assets are not fully exploited. Dedicated air resources for operations can only be planned for when assets such as attack helicopters, armed helicopters, utility helicopters are under the command of the Army. It is a moot point as to why the Air Force needs to control all flying assets in the air space from the ‘nap-of-the-earth to outer space’. Army Aviation ought to control all air assets over the Tactical Battle Area.

Comprehensive National PowerAs the scope of the Report did not include

commenting on the planning process at the higher levels, future conflicts and wars will require all elements of national power to be employed at appropriate stages. At the political level, the CCS and at the bureaucratic level, the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretary will need to be organised so as to orchestrate the deployment of various elements of power to synergise their potential with the sole aim to secure national interests.

The act of the then Government in not maintaining any minutes of meetings was to escape accountability. The decision making process in the Government is as it is because it is an elaborate enactment choreographed to defuse accountability and responsibility. The Opposition in Parliament, too, failed abysmally in forcing the issue of augmenting the strength of the Armed Forces and ensuring that they were suitably equipped in order to be prepared for a military conflict. As a result, the PM had to shoulder all responsibility for errors of commission and omission of others.

The Report, unwittingly, has given the Nation an opportunity to introspect. No scapegoats at this juncture will redeem what, we as a Nation, collectively lost. Simply drawing lessons from these failures without rancour or recrimination will enable us to emerge wiser and stronger.

The Report, unwittingly, has given the Nation an opportunity to introspect...

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IS AEROSPACE MANUFACTURING THE next sunrise sector of the Indian economy? The signs are promising. Years of robust

economic growth (notwithstanding the current slowdown) coupled with increasing demand for aviation services from the country’s teeming millions mean that a massive expansion of aerospace activities is probably imminent. Airbus Executive Vice President of Strategy and Marketing Kiran Rao says, “India has one of the world’s greatest aviation growth potentials” and is a “strategically important market.” His words are not just marketing hype. A joint report by the global consultancy KPMG and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) published in March 2014 states, “India has the potential to become the third largest aviation market by 2020 and the largest by 2030.”

Several factors also favour the development of a vibrant domestic aerospace manufacturing sector. India has a well-educated, highly-motivated and talented workforce and rising prowess in Information Technology (IT). And it has a strong and growing low-cost manufacturing base. According to analysts, the country offers cost advantages of between 15 and 25 per cent in manufacturing.

Till now aerospace demand has been overwhelmingly met by imports but it is only a question of time before the Indian industry

Let Private Aerospace Manufacturing FlourishGp Capt Joseph Noronha

Clearly the aerospace needs of India, civilian as well as defence, are growing. The public sector which has so far been tasked to meet these needs has failed to deliver. What’s more, as aerospace production becomes more complex, the public sector is likely to fall even further behind in the race. Vested interests have long fostered the myth that private sector companies are less likely to uphold the national interest than the PSUs. The private aerospace industry has been kept in a stranglehold and not allowed to realise its potential. Isn’t it strange that reputed

more trustworthy when it comes to defence matters? Yet Boeing is a reliable partner in America’s defence, Airbus in Europe’s and Embraer in Brazil’s. The government must realise that both public and private sectors are national assets; both are necessary to achieve self-reliance in the shortest possible time.

grabs emerging opportunities with both hands. And while businesses will naturally seek mainly civilian openings, at least to begin with, aerospace manufacturing cannot be neatly divided into military and civilian. The continuing liberalisation of defence procurement, together with huge offset requirements, makes the manufacture of military aerospace components and equipment particularly attractive. However, many hurdles remain to be crossed.

The Sad State of Indian AerospaceTo begin with, the country’s aerospace

knowledge base is still small. Hardly any universities offer degrees in aviation technology. India’s leading industrial houses such as Tata Sons, Mahindra & Mahindra, Reliance Industries and Larsen & Toubro might so easily have become Tier 1 suppliers of integrated aerospace assemblies - like Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, both of which are closely associated with global aerospace giants. Yet only a handful of private businesses have ventured into aerospace manufacturing. Over the last five or six years, for instance, a few Tata companies and Mahindra & Mahindra’s aerospace division have been acquiring competence in producing parts like the aircraft fuselage and tail section, besides aeronautics design, aerospace technology and electronics. While M&M owns an Australia-

Group Capt Joseph Noronha, former

MiG-21 pilot.

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based aerospace company that produces small civil aircraft, Hyderabad-based Tata Advanced Systems has a joint venture with Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation to manufacture Sikorsky S-92 helicopter cabins and other airframe components in India.

However, such items are the easiest part of the aerospace production chain; other components

such as engines and flight avionics are far more complex. Despite the stated intention of the government to integrate private parties in aerospace, its policies actually favour the public sector. The

private sector on the whole is a peripheral player, restricted to low-tech items and components.

India still has to import most of the raw materials necessary for aerospace manufacturing and lacks adequate capability in new material technologies. Partnerships with leading international aerospace entities can help Indian companies acquire competence in cutting-edge technologies like the production of composites. However, the short-sighted government policy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) limits overseas Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to just 26 per cent stake in domestic aerospace manufacturing. Even critical sectors such as telecom and banking have much higher limits. This naturally makes the OEMs unwilling to partner Indian companies in advanced aerospace manufacturing. The OEMs are content to order some low-tech items and

services merely to meet their offset obligations.

Defending the IndefensibleIndia’s aerospace manufacturing sector is

highly fragmented. Various public and private sector organisations are blissfully unaware of what the others are doing. For instance, the activities of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) are confined to the defence sector while National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and a few civilian companies are mainly limited to the civil sector and are probably ignorant of the progress being made in defence aerospace. This results in wasteful duplication of effort. On the other hand, the world’s largest aerospace entities such as Airbus, Boeing and Embraer are active in civilian as well as military aerospace, sharing the capabilities and knowledge of their various divisions and synergising their efforts thus yielding benefits to all.

In 2001, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) realised that defence production could not meet the country’s needs so long as all its eggs were in the public sector’s basket. Defence production was deregulated and ostensibly thrown open to private companies. But on the ground little has changed regarding many critical defence items and practically nothing when it comes to aerospace. Besides being cold-shouldered for most aerospace deals, the private sector faces a disadvantageous taxation regime that lowers its competitiveness vis-à-vis public sector and foreign companies. For instance, an overseas company executing a defence supply contract enjoys various

Despite the stated intention of the government to integrate private parties in aerospace, its policies actually favour the public sector...

Sikorsky S-92 helicopter


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tax concessions. But an Indian private manufacturer producing the same item may end up paying more than 30 per cent extra tax.

The much-hyped self-reliance in defence aerospace remains a distant dream. One reason is that licensed production or assembly is often passed off as indigenisation. Another is that equipment purchased from Indian suppliers used to be reckoned as indigenous, even if it contained 80 to 90 per cent foreign components. The indigenous content of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), for instance, is just about 60 per cent. However, with the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013 now in force, import content in the products supplied by sub-vendors does not reckon towards indigenous production. This is an important step to make organisations like HAL more accountable and committed to genuine indigenisation.

Finally, infrastructure and government support - both essential ingredients of success - are sorely lacking. Neither is there clear government backing for private aerospace manufacturing nor policy direction. Recipients of most transfer of technology deals are invariably Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU), even though a private concern may be more competent to absorb and employ the technology. All major deals are signed directly with foreign producers and the public

sector continues to get bulk orders, ostensibly under Transfer of Technology terms. There appears to be lack of commitment to authentic indigenisation involving the private sector.

Due to these shortcomings, and despite the best of intentions, defence aerospace manufacturing has not really taken off. Overall defence imports are inching upwards towards 75 per cent, instead of falling towards the desired 30 per cent and most critical aerospace items have to be imported. Many believe that HAL is at least partly responsible for this state of affairs.

HAL’s Mixed Report CardSince Independence, state-owned behemoth

HAL has been practically synonymous with Indian aerospace. It has 19 Production Units and ten Research & Design Centres at eight locations across the country. It has an impressive product track record - 15 types of aircraft manufactured with inhouse R&D and 14 types produced under licence mainly for the Indian Air Force (IAF), its largest customer. It has built up comprehensive skills in design, manufacture and overhaul of fighters, trainers, helicopters, transport aircraft, engines, avionics and system equipment. It also delivers life-cycle and product support services.

Tejas Light Combat Aircraft

HAL thrives primarily due to its monopoly and government patronage, rather than any inherent

excellence...


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However, to say that HAL is unable to meet the needs of the IAF is an understatement. Practically every IAF project it undertakes is subject to massive cost and time overruns and unmet operational requirements. Moreover, since it is under the rigid control of generalist

bureaucrats, who are more interested in meeting short-term targets than in fostering d e s i g n c o m p e t e n c e a n d technological growth, it has not succeeded in providing leadership and momentum to

Indian aerospace. The exclusion of commercial expertise keeps it perpetually behind the times. This partly explains why India, despite its impressive advances in space exploration, telecom, and IT and software services, has made very little progress in aerospace manufacturing.

HAL thrives primarily due to its monopoly and government patronage, rather than any inherent excellence. It is happy with being indispensable. A sense of complacency is generated by a plethora of captive orders from the defence forces. While its domestic sales are steadily increasing, exports - a more accurate measure of competence - are few and far between. Competition serves to make any

industry more efficient but HAL has never faced serious competition. In fact, it appears reluctant to compete with the private sector.

Licensed production, that HAL hankers after, stifles original thinking and innovative design skill. It also hugely increases costs. For instance, a Sukhoi 30MKI fighter comes for about $55 million if imported from Russia. However, the price of the same aircraft when assembled by HAL soars to $68 million. As a result, HAL has neither been able to build a genuine expertise base nor the technological infrastructure necessary to design and produce advanced combat aircraft.

To cap it all, though HAL is embroiled in the development and production of many different types of military aircraft, it wants more. Its fighter production facilities are fully committed to the Su-30MKI and the Tejas LCA, so much so that satisfactory product support for the Su-30MKI fleet is reportedly lacking. HAL is also in various stages of manufacture or development of the Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), the Rudra Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) and the Dornier-228 light transport plane. Many

Sukhoi Su-30MKI

Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer Aircraft ALH Dhruv

The much-hyped self-reliance in defence aerospace remains a distant dream...


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of these projects are experiencing significant delays. Yet HAL is angling for another slice of the defence aerospace pie - the Avro replacement project.

Replace in Time to Save NineIn industry circles, the HS-748 Avro

replacement deal is emerging as a test case of the government’s sincerity about involving the private sector in defence aerospace manufacturing. The twin-turboprop Avros

with a payload capacity of 5.1 tonnes were acquired from Britain’s Hawker Siddeley from 1964 onwards and later produced under licence by HAL. About 56 aircraft remain in service, well past their useful life. They are in urgent need of replacement in order to pre-empt emerging flight safety issues. A global tender valued at about $2.5

billion for the supply of 56 new aircraft was issued in May 2013. These aircraft are to be bought from a foreign OEM who must tie up with one or more Indian private sector partners

and nominate an Indian Production Agency (IPA). While 16 aircraft will be bought off-the-shelf from the selected vendor, 40 must be produced in India. The Request for Proposal (RFP) was sent to eight foreign manufacturers - Airbus Military (Spain), Alenia Aermacchi (Italy), Boeing and Lockheed Martin (United States), Antonov (Ukraine), Ilyushin (Russia) and Embraer (Brazil).

However, an objection was later raised on the grounds that the PSUs (read HAL) were supposedly being denied an opportunity to submit their own proposals. This flew in the face of the fact that HAL is heavily overloaded with existing commitments. Besides, since the idea is to encourage the private sector to make a beginning in the aerospace industry, the Avro replacement deal seems tailor-made for the purpose. It is a typical entry-level project, neither strategic nor requiring advanced technology. Chandrajit Banerjee, Director General, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has warned that revisiting the programme at this advanced stage will not only stall the project but

HAL-LCH HAL-LUH

Dornier 228 NG

Structural discrimination against the private sector needs to be addressed without delay...


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also discourage private industry from investing in future defence projects. The deadline having been twice extended any decision now awaits the new government.

Time to Go PrivateClearly the aerospace needs of India, civilian

as well as defence, are growing. The public sector which has so far been tasked to meet these needs has failed to deliver. What’s more, as aerospace production becomes more complex, the public sector is likely to fall even further behind in the race.

Vested interests have long fostered the myth that private sector companies are less likely to uphold the national interest than the PSUs. The private aerospace industry has been kept in a stranglehold and not allowed to realise its potential. Isn’t it strange that reputed firms like Tata, Birla and M&M have been given the cold shoulder because HAL is supposedly more trustworthy when it comes to defence matters? Yet Boeing is a reliable partner in America’s defence, Airbus in Europe’s and Embraer in Brazil’s. The government must realise that both public and private sectors are national assets; both are necessary to achieve self-reliance in the shortest possible time.

While structural discrimination against the private sector needs to be addressed without delay, the purpose is not served by junking HAL.

Synergising efforts is imperative to overcome the hurdles on the road to the indigenisation of defence aerospace manufacturing. HAL has excellent infrastructure and manufacturing facilities and a highly experienced personnel base. The private sector can contribute advanced t e c h n o l o g y , f i n a n c i a l management and marketing skills. Quality assurance is another critical area where it is better paced to deliver. And the Public - Private Partnership (PPP) model of joint ventures can leverage the potential of both sectors.

However, as the Avro replacement deal highlights, private enterprise is unlikely to be attracted by small piecemeal contracts. Huge investments are needed to set up a new indigenous production line, train workers, and establish supply chains, and the proposed order of 56 aircraft seems insufficient to reap the benefits of economies of scale. Unless the government makes a long-term commitment and provides some assurance of follow-on orders, what rational entrepreneur would be willing to invest in an expensive venture of this kind?

Indian aerospace firms are already strongly competitive albeit at the lower end of the value chain in offering quality products at reduced

Avro HS748

No country today dreams of manufacturing

aerospace assemblies all by itself...


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cost. However, HAL’s 2,400 suppliers, for instance, are all of Tier 3 category. They need to be encouraged to move up the value chain and become Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers. Aerospace and defence Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are a promising way to achieve this. SEZs save time and expense by accommodating many vendors

in close proximity where they can interact and synergise their efforts to set up a precision engineering and manufacturing ecosystem. Their nearness also helps to save time and money that would otherwise be wasted

in moving materials and components from one place to another. The SEZ site can be strategically chosen to make use of low cost of land, infrastructure, power and water. Raw materials development capability also needs to be gradually built up in the close vicinity.

Take the Outstretched Foreign Hand

Aerospace is a highly specialised industry with only a handful of global players. Analysts believe that India’s private aerospace industry

may be some years away from being able to undertake complete assembly and systems integration of a medium transport aircraft like the Avro. However, it needs to make a start. And foreign collaboration is the quickest and best way to energise the sector.

Globalisation and liberalisation have created a network of interdependence across the global aerospace scene that is mutually beneficial. Joint ventures with foreign corporations can help the domestic aerospace industry in rapidly building aerospace knowledge and introducing state-of-the-art manufacturing processes, thus catalysing growth. However, the lurking suspicion of the ‘foreign hand’ needs to be overcome first.

For Indian private aerospace manufacturing to flourish, the FDI limit needs to be raised to at least 74 per cent. Chronic opponents of FDI will immediately object, “What about indigenous industry? What about security in this sensitive sector?” Truth be told, the domestic aerospace industry is in no position to achieve modern production standards without foreign investment, expertise and

Aerospace products are highly engineered and all production processes must be meticulously certi ed...

Dassault Rafale


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Aerospace is a highly specialised

industry with only a handful of global players...

high-end technologies. Security concerns can be rationally addressed by including necessary clauses in the initial licence - including the right to take over a facility if the terms and conditions are breached. Actually when it comes to assurance of uninterrupted supply, especially in an emergency, indigenous production under licence is far superior to pure imports.

If properly leveraged, the government’s Defence Offset Guidelines can also provide major impetus to the private aerospace manufacturing sector. In November 2013, Air Marshal P.P Reddy, Director General (Inspection & Safety) disclosed that the service is likely to procure equipment and platforms worth $150 billion over the next 15 years. Since the Guidelines specify that any foreign defence contract valued at Rs 3,000 million or more will entail an offset obligation of between 30 and 50 per cent, the total value of offsets accruing can only be imagined. For instance, the deal with Dassault Aviation to acquire 126 Rafale Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) may generate $10 billion through offsets. Offset obligations can be met either through direct purchase, investment or technology transfer. The government needs to ensure that they are not frittered away but

are used by industry, especially the private sector, to acquire innovative aeronautical technologies and gain expertise in the vital areas of aerospace design, development, and precision manufacturing. This would satisfy the primary aim of the Guidelines “to foster development of internationally competitive enterprises”.

Finally, it goes without saying that aerospace products are highly engineered and all production processes must be meticulously certified. From the smallest screw to the largest integrated assembly, each part needs to be traceable and everything must precisely meet specifications and stringent quality controls. Otherwise safety could easily be compromised. That is why no country today dreams of manufacturing aerospace assemblies all by itself. Even the world’s leading conglomerates such as Airbus and Boeing source components and sub-assemblies from several countries. They find it cheaper, faster and more efficient to obtain items from locations that have specialised in their production and in rigid quality control. Why should India’s private aerospace industry be any different?

From aggressive, devious neighbours to well-armed internal insurgents, the list of those taking aim at our nation is long. Our morally bankrupt political system and blinkered bureaucracy only compounds the mess.

As the editor of Indian Defence Review, Bharat Verma lives by a simple philosophy: ‘Don’t give me a list of problems, give me solutions.’

Solutions are what he offers in this sequel to Fault Lines, a compilation of his writings since then.

From ways to counter China’s imperial ambitions, to why a splintered Pakistan is in India’s interest.

Why we need to develop not just cutting edge defence industries but also have an offensive orientation against those gunning for our democracy.

Because at the end of the day, national interest is supreme.

In this riveting series of columns, Verma takes a 360 degree look at the strategic and military challenges facing India today, and suggests ways and means to overcome them.

India Under FireEssays on National Security

Bharat Verma

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ISBN: 978-1-940988-06-1, Hardbound, PP 152 Avialable as an eBookLANCER

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTILLERY IN battle needs no emphasis. What the artillery can achieve in contact battle

has been highlighted in the two world wars and more recently, nearer home during the Kargil conflict where 100 Bofors guns broke the back of well-entrenched Pakistani forces on high mountain peaks. But the latter also highlighted woes of the crying need for modernisation of our artillery. Fortunately, India had imported 400 pieces of this excellent gun before the firm was banned. Despite the Rs 60 crore Bofors scam and the freeze on spare parts, India’s holdings could be cannibalised to give the enemy a bloody nose.

No worthwhile modernisation has taken place since then though the artillery is in the

Artillery Modernisation

Artillery modernisation in India implies the largest modernisation of this arm and needs to be given as much, if not more, importance commensurate with the manoeuvre arms it supports. The relevance is more in the Indian context because of the mountainous terrain where it needs to support infantry operations plus in counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations.

all. It is precisely in these sorts of operation that the new precision of artillery will become more telling and relevant. India has a long way to go in modernising its artillery. Presently, the artillery modernisation plan appears to be stymied. There is an urgent need to provide it an impetus considering the enhanced threat posed to us along a two and a half front.

process of procuring and developing gun systems, ammunition (including propellants and fuzes), support systems and networking systems in terms of software and hardware which incorporate state-of-the-art technology. Ironically, though Transfer of Technology (ToT) for the Bofors gun had taken place right at the beginning, the indigenous version is being developed now after a gap of two decades.

Concept of FirepowerAlthough artillery was reportedly used in the

Battle of Plassey (1757) and the Regiment traces its origins to the Bombay Artillery formed in 1827, artillery has actually traversed through two centuries of evolution. In recent times, a distinct shift in concept of application from

neutralisation to degradation and destruction has taken place. This shift has come about with the enhanced capability of the artillery in terms of reach, delivery of larger calibre and more lethal munitions, enhanced precision system as also greater battlefield transparency. With these enhancements, the artillery is able to strike deep with precision and thus has the capability to degrade and destroy targets effectively. The reach of the artillery is now clearly beyond the

Bofors

Special Correspondent

Exhibitor registration and information: Mr. Jocelyn de VIREL [email protected] - tel.: + 33 (0)1 56 59 15 05

www.euronaval.fr


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tactical battlefield, well into the operational depth with enhanced precision and lethality.

Transformation VisionThe vision for transformation of the artillery

includes modernisation of all guns for contact battle, rockets and missiles for degradation and engagement of targets in operational

depth, enhanced target acquisition and battlefield transparenc y through introduction of cutting edge ground, aerial and space-based sensors and integrated and synergised utilisation of firepower

and Surveillance And Target Acquisition (SATA) through automated systems – Artillery Command, Control and Communication System (ACCCS), Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS) and Battlefield Management System (BMS).

ProcurementsHardly any artillery guns have been procured

since 1980s. The stock of Bofors guns has also dwindled from the 400 imported to below 200. Presently, the artillery inventory is grossly inadequate, both in terms of quantity and quality. The Russian 122mm D30 towed Howitzer has gone obsolete already. The 105mm Indian Field Gun (IFG) of 17-km range has been operational for the past 30 years and

there are some 200 cannibalised Bofors guns in the kitty. The modernisation plan has factored in the latest technological developments and is aligned towards the acquisition of modern equipment. To say that there have been slippages in procurement would actually be an understatement but efforts are on to meet the revised timelines. Besides modernisation through procurement of state-of-the-art weapon systems, the army is also working on bolstering its inventory control through indigenous development of gun systems and munitions, aimed at opening up multiple avenues for intake of modern equipment.

One hundred and eighty pieces of 130mm/39-calibre M-46 Russian guns have been upgraded to 155mm/45-calibre by Soltam of Israel. The Army had successfully tried and selected BAE Systems M-777 ultra light artillery guns from the US more than a year ago, including the ‘maintainability evaluation trial’ on behest of the MoD but procurement has been delayed over an anonymous letter alleging bribes. This is a malady that time and again has set back procurements by not only months and years. Many a time it has resulted in the cancellation of a deal with the present Defence Minister’s penchant to cancel deals at the drop of a hat rather than permit the much-needed modernisation and punish those against whom the charge of bribery has been levelled and

The vision for transformation of the artillery includes modernisation of all guns for contact battle…

M-46 Field Gun


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proved. The practice in foreign countries is not blacklisting but punishing individuals involved and imposing severe financial penalties on the company so that acquisitions and modernisation of the armed forces does not suffer.

Incidentally, with the planned shutdown of the M777 facility of BAE Systems in the near future and the stalemate in India, the deal may be off altogether. This may have been at the behest of OFB-DRDO in light of development of the indigenous 155mm gun but cancellation of the M777 deal would imply setting back modernisation plans of the artillery by yet another few years.

Additionally during 2012, tenders had been floated for 1,580 towed guns of 155mm/52-calibre, 100 tracked guns of 155mm/52-calibre and 180 wheeled and Self Propelled guns of 155mm/52-calibre but the deal for procurement of 180x155mm/52-calibre wheeled Self Propelled (SP) guns was also cancelled after completion of trials though the wheeled Self-Propelled gun is ideally suited for the plains and the semi-desert terrain. The only significant advancement in gun acquisition has been the upgrade of 180 pieces of 130mm/39-calibre M46 Russian guns to 155mm/45-calibre (enhancing the range from 26 to 39 kms) by Soltam of Israel. The plan to upgrade 480 of these guns again was halted with Soltam getting blacklisted after upgrading 180 pieces. The Mountain Strike Corps, approved and to be raised over the next seven years, would need fielding of

requisite artillery coinciding with the progress of its raising.

The Indigenous mm GunA s m e nt i o n e d a b ov e, t h e T ra n s f e r

of Technology of the Bofors was available with the OFB. However, the Bofors was not indigenised with the OFB blaming the army for not forwarding such a demand, which by itself does not stand to logic as numerous developments have been done in the past by the DRDO and OFB without prior reference to the armed forces. However, reportedly the technology was being utilised for the production of spare barrels, breech block and certain other critical parts of the gun. The technology was also utilised for production of ammunition. With a view to open an alternative avenue for procurement of the 155mm gun system, OFB has, in recent times, been given the opportunity to develop the gun indigenously in keeping with the long term aim of achieving self-reliance. The private sector is being extensively urged to source components and sub-systems for this. The initial trials had caused barrel bursts during firing but improved metallurgy should help get over the problem. In the long term, it should be possible to meet the 155mm gun requirements indigenously.

Surveillance and Target Acquisition

The purpose of all surveillance is to direct enemy assets for subsequent destruction.

M777 Howitzer

Presently, the artillery inventory is grossly inadequate, both in

terms of quantity and quality…


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Sensors, therefore, must have total synergy with the associate firepower vectors. This is the essence of all firepower employment philosophy. The aim is to shorten the OODA loop so as to overtake the enemy’s OODA cycle. The thought of bifurcating surveillance from firepower assets is indeed misplaced and would place any army at a disadvantage in future wars. In the fields of surveillance and target acquisition,

the artillery already has UAVs, BFSR and the LORROS. Additionally, plans exist to acquire sensors for persistent aerial surveillance. The artillery is also looking for upgrades in existing equipment to include

the electronic theodolite, inertial navigation system, sound ranging systems and lighter Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) system.

The army’s artillery philosophy includes having a credible capability of various UAV systems to ensure battlefield transparency,

target acquisition, direction of own artillery fire, target designation and post strike damage assessment across the frontage and depth of the tactical, operational and strategic areas of operations. UAVs have immense potential for operations in conventional as well as counter insurgency/counter terrorist operations, plus in disaster management roles. The stand-off capabilities of UCAVs to undertake surgical strikes in depth are immense. UCAVs are very much on the artillery’s wishlist and should materialise in the near future, depending upon the budget and priorities accorded.

Information SystemsThe ACCCS was the first information system

to have been introduced into the Indian Army and it has been a landmark achievement for the artillery in its quest for network centricity. The system has greatly enhanced the artillery’s capability to deliver highly accurate and responsive firepower. Fielding of the equipment has brought forth many challenges which are being addressed quite successfully. Some of these challenges relate to the types of communication equipment being used, as also integration of with other networks. At the moment, innovative methods are being used to address these challenges since their eventual resolution lies in final fielding of the Tactical Communication System (TCS) and other components of army’s Tactical Command, Control and Communication (TAC C3I) system, particularly the BSS, Battlefield Management System (BMS) and the Command Information and Decision Support System (CIDSS) all of which will take considerable time. Most of the ‘new generation’ guns available worldwide are equipped with integrated fire control and communications systems which enable them to function as autonomous units. All the new generation guns which are under procurement or being developed too are envisaged to have these capabilities. This, however, does not take away the capability to also control them at the battery level, which is required and provides inherent flexibility to the system.

Artillery DivisionsThe Indian Army has successfully employed

the concept of Artillery Divisions, formations to support Strike Corps operations. In vogue for

Various Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Pictured are (front to back, left to right) RQ-11A Raven, Evolution, Dragon Eye, NASA FLIC, Arcturus T-15, Skylark,

Tern, RQ-2B Pioneer and Neptune

X-45A UCAV

In keeping with the long term aim of achieving self-reliance the private sector is being extensively urged to source components and sub-systems…


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developed in advanced armies, MRSI impact capability, potential for larger rockets to have greater range and payload (more than that of conventional artillery) and the potential to engage air targets. On the other hand, what can be considered as negatives in the case of MLRS are easily detectable contour trails once rockets are fired, expensive munitions, time consuming reloads, back blasts, high technology involved has more chances of system failure and relatively limited range of munitions are compared to artillery.

The artillery and rocket systems have two very different purposes on the contemporary battlefield. The MLRS is slightly more versatile since it has the future potential for engaging air targets, even incoming munitions and a larger rocket can have more range and impact than a shell as there is a limit to the effective area of an artillery shell. The rocket is, therefore, a

However, in the pursuit of self-

reliance it would be prudent not to rely

solely on the OFB…

MLRS Firing a Basic M26 Rocket

Brahmos

the past few years, this concept has been highly successful. It has provided a flexible, responsive and effective organisation at theatre level to plan, coordinate, employ and exploit firepower to optimise effectiveness. The concept has been a force multiplier, adding a new dimension to the concept of employment of artillery, rockets, missiles and long range guns with a variety of ammunition including precision guided ammunition grouped in the Artillery Division. It has also provided the capability to concentrate firepower for the conduct of tactical degradation operations as well as fire support to the formations as part of the overall theatre plan.

Gun versus RocketsThe gun versus rocket debate has been

ongoing in all armies including in India albeit there is very little difference between the effectiveness of rockets and conventional artillery. Conventional artillery like the Multiple Rocket Launching System (MLRS) too has acquired a fair amount of mobility. Both are capable of finding a suitable firing point, setting up quickly, releasing an accurate and concentrated payload over a period of time and then dispersing from the area before being detected and hit with counter-fire.

At the same time, armies are considering the two systems side-by-side looking at the advantages and disadvantages of both. Advantages of artillery guns are cheap ammunition, the ability to use GPS rounds for accuracy, faster reloads, high rate of fire, ability to sustain fire over long periods, Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) capability and a large variety of ammunition and calibre available. At the same time, issues with the artillery guns are long barrel needed restricting movement, heavy weight of barrel and breach given the need for pressure containment, high recoil that must be absorbed and the tone of blast can easily be detected by counter bombardment devices.

In case of the MLRS, the plus points are high first hit probability, large projectile with large explosive force than an artillery shell, quick initial deployment; quick getaway, potential to ‘fire’ rockets as UAVs fitted with camera to locate and then destroy target – as being


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useful multi-role platform, capable not only of ground bombardment but also hitting aerial targets and incoming munitions. At the same time, artillery is far better in providing sustained fire on a ground target, and particularly when used in larger numbers field guns can have a devastating impact with their fire deflating the enemy’s resources. Given the recent technological leaps with regards to aiming devices and self-propelled artillery vehicles, the accuracy of artillery does not really require very expensive rounds. Both systems clearly have advantages and disadvantages. Like any weapons system they must be deployed for the tasks most suited to them.

The FutureMuch of the developments in artillery

technology the world over are related to

Smerch 300mm Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher

Pinaka

munitions and allied equipment. We are in the process of procuring and developing gun systems, ammunition including propellant and fuzes, support systems and networking resources in terms of software and hardware which incorporate state-of-the-art technology. Indigenous efforts should be able to provide modern surveillance equipment, UAVs and communication equipment. There has been progress with regards to the acquisition and indigenous production of surveillance and target acquisition equipment (UAVs and gun locating radars), rocket artillery (Smerch, Pinaka) and missiles (BrahMos) but these are only in limited numbers and nowhere near the envisaged requirement.

At present, laser designated precision ammunition is held by our artillery. There are plans to induct more precision ammunition like sensor fuzzed munitions, terminally guided munitions and trajectory correctable munitions - acquisition of which will depend upon the pace of procurement. However, in the pursuit of self-reliance it would be prudent not to rely solely on the OFB. Simultaneously, we must speedily form Joint Ventures (JVs) between India and foreign firms that have been dealing with gun systems development or have the potential to do so.

Artillery modernisation is a major programme in the Indian Army and needs to be given as much importance if not more in comparison with the manoeuvre arms it supports. The relevance is more in the Indian context because of the mountainous terrain where it needs to support infantry operations plus in counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations. Unquestionably, artillery units will continue to be used to support the infantry to the benefit of all. It is precisely in these sorts of operation that the new precision of artillery will become more telling and relevant. India has a long way to go in modernising its artillery. Presently, the artillery modernisation plan appears to be stymied. There is an urgent need to provide it an impetus considering the enhanced threat posed to us along a two and a half front.


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THE AMERICAN STARS AND STRIPES have eclipsed the Russian bear in the Indian Air Force’s transport fleet with

the acquisition of the C-17 Globemaster III and the earlier acquisition of the C-130J Super Hercules. The deal for ten C-17 aircraft worth over $4.1 billion was finalised in 2009-2010 and aircraft delivery has commenced, with the last aircraft to fly in by the end of 2014. The IAF has plans to order six more aircraft bringing the total to 16, which would make it the largest operator of the fleet after the USAF.

The C-17 has transformed the IAF from a tactical to a strategic force. The acquisition of the C-17 Globemaster III, a truly strategic airlift aircraft, duly supported by the C-130J, can rapidly airlift and sustain sizeable forces across the region and even beyond. In addition to commitments in the region or other parts of the world, the requirement for the movement of a large body of security forces - military, para-military and police within the country for deployment on short notice, is also likely to increase. With its emerging status and new responsibilities associated with it, to ensure peace and stability in the region and globally, if called for, the nation is well

national security interests.

Ever since the mid-1980s, the transport fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has primarily comprised of 17 IL-76 aircraft, the strategic airlifter, and 100-odd of the workhorse, AN-32. With the induction of the C-17 and the C-130 aircraft, the IAF has finally been able to shrug off its dependence on Russia, as the requirement for today is for technologically better, easier to maintain and a larger number of aircraft due to the constantly evolving strategic scenario around India. Just two pilots and one other crewmember can operate the C-17 Globemaster

Role of C-17 Globemaster IIIAir Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja

Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja, former Air

Officer Commanding in Chief of Training

Command

C-17 Globemaster III


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III, whereas the comparatively smaller IL-76

needs a crew of six. In load-carrying capacity

too, the comparison is in favour of the former,

as it can carry a maximum payload of 74 tonnes against the capacity of 43 tonnes of the IL-76, thus substantially enhancing the overall airlift capability. At its maximum all-up weight, the C-17 can take-off from airstrips as short as 7,000 feet (2,134m), covering 2,420 nautical miles without refuelling, thus providing the IAF transcontinental range, and land at an airfield of just 3,000 feet (914m). With in-flight refuelling, the range becomes considerably higher.

The fleet of C-17, which is regarded as the most advanced military transport aircraft in

the world today, is ideally suited not only for power projection in any part of the world but also for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations and emergency

evacuation of citizens from areas in turmoil in foreign lands. Given India’s aspirations to be a superpower, the IAF understood the requirement to enhance its fleet of strategic airlift aircraft on its inventory and successfully convinced the political decision-makers to acquire the C-17.

C- Globemaster III - HistoryAs is a popular tradition of the Americans

for a male offspring to bear the name of his father and grandfather, the C-17 Globemaster

III too, carries the name of its two ‘ancestors’, namely the Douglas C-74 Globemaster and the Douglas C-124 Globemaster II. The C-17 is a large military transport aircraft developed for the USAF from the 1980s to 1990s by McDonnell Douglas. Boeing, which merged with McDonnell Douglas in the 1990s, continues to manufacture the aircraft for export, following the end of deliveries to USAF. The aircraft, designed for strategic airlift missions, transporting troops and cargo over large distance to all corners of the world, also performs certain additional roles that include tactical airlift, medical evacuation and airdrop missions. The first C-17 entered service in July 1993, over two decades ago; yet it continues to be the most advanced and capable strategic airlift aircraft in the world.

The C-17 is a high-wing, four-engine, T-tailed jet aircraft with commendable performance. With dimensions of 53m in length, a wingspan of 52m and a tail height of 17m, the aircraft is large and heavy. Yet it has the manoeuvrability of a light aircraft, made possible by advanced aeronautic design features. The secret of the aircraft’s impressive performance, both on the ground and in the air, is its four, fully reversible Pratt and Whitney engines, each producing 18,343 kg (40,440 lb) thrust. The thrust reversers that direct the flow of air upward and forward, to avoid ingestion of debris, can reverse the aircraft up a two per cent slope.

Long term planning has always been the forte of the IAF...

IL-76


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Lesson in Air PowerWith so much being talked about the C-17

aircraft providing enhanced strategic airlift capability to the IAF, it is apt to take a brief lesson in air power. The importance of airlift as a core competency has varied from time to time. Today, however, there is no doubting the essential need to possess adequate airlift capability, resident within an air force, to ensure that an overall responsiveness is available at all times; this responsiveness is perhaps more important to the land forces at the commencement of operations. From a purely theoretical perspective, airlift is one of the key modes to provide the force with the capability of concurrent access for parallel operations, into a theatre, and subsequent sustainment movements.

One of the most important functions of airlift in a developing tactical situation is its synergy with Special Operations, which cannot be successfully completed without adroit airlift capabilities that can be brought to bear upon the adversary, in a reliable and steady manner. At the tactical level, airlift provides the Special Forces with increased speed of response thereby largely controlling the overall pace of the operations.

Airlift capability, whether fixed wing or rotary wing, tactical or strategic, is an important

component of air power in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It is extremely important to possess such a potential for an immediate airlift to respond in times of natural calamities, or terrorist attacks; such a quick response may achieve strategic effects of its own. The importance of airlift is further accentuated with the current trend of nations to be involved in operations away from their own mainland because of redefined security perceptions initiated by rapidly changing geo-political scenarios.

Airlift, thus, is the capability to bring the land and other support forces to the front, at a speed better than any other mode. The speed of response and enhanced reach have to be tailored to ensure adequate persistence as a built-in feature; persistence will be affected by the availability of heavy lift resources for follow-on actions, which in turn affect the power projection capabilities. Depending upon the circumstances, such airlift would have to be tactical or strategic, hence the need to possess heavy airlift capabilities is highlighted.

The C- in the Indian ContextThe existing Indian security environment

has evolved over the years and is a blend of its history, geography, culture, politics, amongst

AN-32

The C-17 is a high-wing, four-engine, T-tailed jet aircraft

with commendable performance...


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other issues. The new millennium has redefined India’s strategic boundaries with its emergence as a regional power (notwithstanding the present day economic and political crisis facing the country). While India does not have any extra-territorial aspirations and continues to believe in peaceful co-existence, it is vital that it possesses a powerful instrument of national power, capable of deterring any adversary and maintaining peace and growth.

The Doctrine of the IAF that is in vogue today was revised in 2012 and adopts an

all-encompassing approach towards the security paradigm that surrounds the nation today, to ensure optimal utilisation of air power assets to achieve national security objectives. The vision, as stated in the Doctrine is for the IAF, “to acquire strategic reach and capabilities across the spectrum of conflict that serves

the ends of military diplomacy, nation building and enable force projection within India’s strategic area of influence”.

Long term planning has always been the forte of the IAF. It has displayed foresight in anticipating the national security needs and has built its capabilities accordingly. IAF capabilities have been not only to project military force but

also to influence statecraft. The speedy aerial reinforcement of forces in Srinagar in 1947-1948, the evacuation of King Tribhuvan of Nepal in 1950 and his subsequent restoration to the throne leading to the Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty, are two of the early examples just after gaining independence. In more recent times, the air landed operations in Maldives, the airlift of Indian citizens from Kuwait and Iraq, the disaster relief operations post-Tsunami in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Maldives and Sri Lanka and the relief material provided to USA after Hurricane Katrina show the diverse range of operations and trans-continental reach of the IAF.

The C-17 fleet in the IAF will greatly enhance the military airlift capabilities and facilitate power projection to distant parts of the world. Operating from air bases in diverse terrain regions – from the Himalayan air bases at elevations of above 10,000 feet, to sea-level bases in the islands, the aircraft is proving its mettle by regularly flying missions to places such as Port Blair, Leh and Thoise in India and to foreign deployments in Tajikistan and Rwanda. The ability of the aircraft to operate from short, austere airfields would be crucial when it comes to providing humanitarian assistance in times of natural disasters or emergency evacuation of Indian citizens abroad.

The strategic role of the C-17 is augmented

The eet of C-17, which is regarded as the most advanced military transport aircraft in the world today, is ideally suited for power projection...

C-130J Super Hercules


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with the availability of the C-130J Super Hercules aircraft inducted just before the C-17 fleet in the IAF. Although the acquisition of the C-130 was primarily for Special Operations, it is also being utilised in the strategic role. The recent landing at Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) in Ladakh and earlier landings at Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) in the Arunachal sector are a shot in the arm of the strategic airlift capability of the nation.

ConclusionThe strategic impact of the use of air power

revolves around two main issues, namely, the ability to deliver concentrated firepower at a selected point in depth or delivering combat troops at the decisive point. While the former role is accomplished by combat aircraft, it is the strategic transport aircraft such as the C-17 that deliver combat troops across large distances overcoming the traditional friction that land forces, and to some extent the naval forces, have to contend with.

To make a distinction between strategic and tactical can be a matter of perspective and assessment. What may be tactical to the USA may be strategic in Indian perception yet there are commonalities in matters pertaining to tactical and strategic airlift capabilities. Aircraft development has ushered in major improvements in airlift capacity; this

The strategic role of the C-17 is augmented

with the availability of the C-130J Super

Hercules aircraft...

is particularly applicable in the Indian context where overall strategic airlift assets have generally been minimal unlike some other nations with significant airlift resources.

The expected growth of the Indian economy in the coming years notwithstanding the slowdown of the last couple of years means that the capability to project power is necessary; the C-17 has transformed the IAF from a tactical to a strategic force. The acquisition of the C-17 Globemaster III, a truly strategic airlift aircraft, duly supported by the C-130J, can rapidly airlift and sustain sizeable forces across the region and even beyond. In addition to commitments in the region or other parts of the world, the requirement for the movement of a large body of security forces - military, para-military and police within the country for deployment on short notice, is also likely to increase. With its emerging status and new responsibilities associated with it, to ensure peace and stability in the region and globally, if called for, the nation is well equipped with the C-17 fleet, to be capable of swift response and power projection to safeguard national security interests.


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IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS OR SO, THE challenge of being militarily engaged by China and Pakistan simultaneously has

exercised government and public attention visibly. On the other hand, since long, the three Services have always considered a ‘two-front war’ not just a possibility but highly probable. In February this year, the Indian Air Force (IAF) told a Parliamentary panel what the latter probably knew anyway - that it would be difficult for the IAF to manage a ‘two-front war’ although it had plans for doing so. As expected, the media played up this iteration by the IAF as ‘dropping a bomb’ and ‘an alarming admission’. No follower of military affairs is surprised though.

During the past decade, India’s defence preparedness has steadily and inexorably deteriorated despite the persistent clamour

Is the IAF Equipped for a Two-Front War?

During the past decade, India’s defence preparedness has steadily and inexorably deteriorated despite constant clamour by the defence forces for modernisation and upgradation to meet

with either one individually, nor done anything to liquidate the possibility of a two-front war. A combined and collusive threat from China and Pakistan would overstretch the Indian military machinery and, given the inordinately delayed modernisation in certain domains, could well be a recipe for an ignominious debacle reminiscent of the 1962 India-China War.

by the defence forces for modernisation and upgradation to meet assigned roles and tasks. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s anti-India stance and Chinese aggressive actions and iterations have neither helped to push away the trepidation of possible military conflagration with either one individually, nor done anything to liquidate the possibility of a two-front war. A combined and collusive threat from China and Pakistan would overstretch the Indian military machinery and, given the inordinately delayed modernisation in certain domains, could well be a recipe for an ignominious debacle reminiscent of the 1962 India-China War. The distended aerial battlefield encompassing the Western, Northern and Eastern perimeters of our extensive borders, and the air defence of our vast territorial expanse could burden the IAF

SU-30 MK-I

Gp Capt AK Sachdev

Gp Capt AK Sachdev, is a former IDSA Research Fellow.


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to a spine shattering level. In addressing the issue of preparedness of the IAF for a two front war, it is important at the outset to study the contending air forces.

Pakistan Air Force (PAF)The PAF is a professional service with pride

in its past and current capabilities. It believes that in 1965 and 1971, it came out superior to the IAF. It has a good exposure to modern aircraft and tactics through its relations with the West, especially the US. After the Pressler Amendment, the US placed sanctions and an arms embargo on Pakistan, forcing it to look towards Europe and China. The latter has been a willing supplier of aircraft and equipment to the PAF which currently has 22 combat squadrons comprising about 465 combat aircraft (around 50 JF-17s, 75 F-16s, 75 Mirage IIIs, 80 Mirage Vs and 185 F-7s).

The JF-17 is a Chinese design (co-produced in Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra in Pakistan, and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, China) and is claimed to be a fourth generation,

multi-role aircraft. The PAF plans to acquire a total of 250 to replace its Mirage IIIs and F-7s; some of these would be Block 2 aircraft with 4.5 generation features while some more would be Block 3 (entry into service 2016) which are expected to have fifth generation characteristics. The PAF is also said to have placed an order for 36 Chinese J-10 (4.5 generation) aircraft. The J-10 is expected to be inducted as the FC-20, an advanced PAF-specific variant of the Chengdu J-10. These aircraft are expected to be delivered by 2015 and, according to some reports, the FC-20 fleet may eventually be increased to 150 fighters. In addition, PAF is on the lookout for surplus F-16s from air forces using them and has recently acquired a squadron worth from Jordan. Thus, as far as combat aircraft are concerned, the PAF may be expected to be not far behind the leading edge of technology in the next five years or so.

To keep up with the IAF, the PAF is also in

China has ordered 70 IL-76 transport

aircraft and 30 IL-78 air-to-air refuellers…

J-10

JF-17 F-16


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Y-8

SAAB-2000 An AIM-120 AMRAAM

the process of acquiring Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVR AAM) for its fighter fleet. This is a lethal capability represented by the American AIM 120-C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) to arm

the F-16C. Another BVR AAM, the Chinese PL-12 is expected to arm the JF-17 in the future. The PAF is also acquiring four Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platforms - Swedish SAAB-2000 aircraft equipped with the

ERIEYE phased array radar. In addition, it is acquiring four Y-8 AEW platforms from China. These acquisitions will enhance the PAF’s air surveillance envelope, enable combat aircraft to operate more effectively in both defensive and offensive missions against India and improve survivability of ground-based air defence network (based on the Crotale missile system).

It may be mentioned here that one can come across sporadic writing in Pakistani

media expressing a hope that PAF would attain superiority over the IAF in the hazy future.

Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

The PLAAF, officially formed in 1949, remained insignificant for the first three decades of its existence. Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations strategy in 1978 brought in defence modernisation and set the PLAAF on a path to turn into a modernised air force with a strategic role and reach, capable of projection of air power through classic offensive missions. Currently, the PLAAF has a total strength of 398,000 personnel and is organised into an air command each in the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) located at Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu.

Recent development of several airfields in Tibet and adjoining Lanzhou and Chengdu MACs are of special concern to India. In addition, it commands one airborne corps


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J-7

Su-27 MiG-21

The IAF aims to achieve an effective

strength of 42 squadrons by 2022…

(representing strategic airlift). To meet perceived strategic offensive and defensive operational needs, the PLAAF is strengthening the development of a combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and early warning, air strike, air and missile defence, and strategic projection. It is concentrating on new generation fighters and ground-to-air missiles and radar systems, improving its early warning capability, command and communications networks, and raising its strategic early warning, strategic deterrence and long distance air strike capabilities.

At the beginning of 2000, the PLAAF had more than 3,500 combat aircraft; most were J-6/J-7 types (equivalent of MiG 19/21 respectively). Thereafter, it got Su-27 SK/UBK, Su-30 MKK and Su-30 MKK2 aircraft from Russia which were a quantum jump over the earlier holdings. From 2002 onwards, China produced J-10s and J-11s, which could be classified as fourth generation aircraft. It is now on a focused course to have an essentially fourth generation air force with the J-10/J-11 in air superiority roles complementing the Su-27/Su-30 fleet,

JF-17 in interceptor role and the J-20/J-31 as stealth multi-role types.

The J-20, based on the F-22 Raptor, first flew in January 2011 while the J-31, China’s second modern aircraft based on the F-35, was flight tested in October 2012.The J-20 and the J-31, talked of as fifth generation aircraft, are expected to join the PLAAF between 2017 and the end of this decade. The extent of second generation characteristics that these aircraft actually emerge with is yet to be seen as Chinese technological levels in the power plant and leading edge stealth technology appear to be far behind the US.

The power plant problem has partly been solved through buying more Su-35 from Russia. Deliveries of 24 Su-35s and an unknown number of spare engines are expected to start in 2015, while the J-20 is slated to be operational in 2017. Some experts feel that the J-20 would finally be powered by the Su-35 engine (117S


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the PLAAF, China has ordered 70 IL-76 transport aircraft and 30 IL-78 air-to-air refuellers. In addition, China continues to upgrade its H-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the late 1950s Soviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant that possesses greater range and is armed with a long-range cruise missile. China has converted some of its old H-6 bombers (essentially Russian Tu-16s) to the air-to-air refuelling role for many of its indigenous aircraft, increasing their combat range. China is also developing an AWACS capability on the IL-76 airframe while the Y-8 is being modified for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) roles. China’s aviation industry is developing a large transport aircraft (referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft.

Ongoing development of long range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), including the BZK-005, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) will provide capability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations. In the area of air defence capabilities, the PLAAF is focussing on long range systems designed against aircraft and cruise missiles. Currently, it holds the Russian S 400 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system (400 km range) and is indigenously working on the domestic HQ-9 SAM (200 km plus range).

Thus, the PLAAF would be a large force containing technologically advanced aircraft and equipment and with a formidable offensive and defensive capability. The overall PLAAF threat needs to be seen in the context of gradual militarisation of Tibet and the building of infrastructure there. The rail head at Lhasa, connecting it to Xining (the capital of Qinghai province) over a distance of 1,956km is of immense strategic importance and a major threat to Indian defence. There are now 14 airfields in Tibet which can support operations in the Himalayan region. Their significance to any PLAAF operations against India is self-evident. Air-to-air refuelling capabilities have added further potency to PLAAF capabilities. Needless to say, hostilities with just China alone would be a major challenge for the IAF

F-22 Raptor

Shenyang J-31

H-6 bombers

engine, a derivative of the Russian AL31 which is the engine on one of the J-20 prototypes). If that be the case, the J-20 would be a formidable aircraft. Meanwhile, current holding of PLAAF is about 1,265 (around 200 J-10 variants, 125 J-11s, 40 Su-27s, 180 J-8s, 370 J-7s, 70 JH-7s, 100 Su-30s, 120 Q-51 ground attack aircraft and 60 H-6 bombers) . Thus, the combat aircraft strength is nearly double that of the IAF.

In keeping with the strategic perceptions of


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and when supplemented by a simultaneous Pakistani aggressive action, the resultant two-front war could be a major test of the IAF’s confidence in itself as a professional force.

IAF ReadinessSo how does the IAF stand in comparison?

During the 1960s, the IAF was authorised to build up to a 64 squadron force, including ten transport squadrons and a heavy bomber squadron. Subsequently, the figure was pruned down to 45 squadrons. However, it actually was able to build up to just 39.5 squadrons and is currently at a 34 squadron level. The gradual descent to this number has been an agonising tribulation for the IAF with the MiG-21 valiantly continuing to fight on beyond its constructive years. Indigenous production of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft Tejas has already taken more

than three decades and is perhaps still a few years shy of operationalisation in the IAF. Even when it does get its operational clearance, it is unlikely to be greeted by the IAF with amiable cordiality. The Medium M u l t i R o l e C o m b a t Aircraft (MMRCA) deal is taking its own time and incredibly, could not be signed during the FY 2013-2014 as funds ran out. The current strength of combat aircraft is around 650. The IAF fervently awaits the signing of the 126 aircraft MMRCA deal.

Hoping to overcome almost a decade of neglect, the IAF aims to achieve an effective strength of 42 squadrons by 2022. This is expected to be done with the ongoing induction

The IAF’s answer to the two-front war conundrum

currently appears to be the Su-30…

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HQ-9 SAM


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of 272 Su-30s, future plans for induction of 126 MMRCA Rafale as soon as the deal can be signed and the Tejas LCA whenever the Indian defence industry can get its act together and the T-50, the fifth generation fighter being jointly developed by Indian and Russia. Twelve C-130J Super Hercules and ten C-17 Globemasters are expected to provide strategic airlift capability. The IAF has a fairly good integrated air defence

set up and has been making all endeavours to become a strategic air force. Speaking at an IAF base recently, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of Air Staff said, “The IAF is on a trajectory of modernisation and is

transforming into a strategic aerospace power with full spectrum capability.” So how well is the IAF equipped to deal with a two-front war?

A Two Front WarThe above appraisals of the two neighbouring

air forces are not comprehensive inasmuch as they do not catalogue their total assets and aircraft exhaustively. However, it is evident that each one is a force that cannot be ignored or derided. Despite the fact that the combat strength of PAF is only about two-thirds of the IAF’s, its aircraft are not very inferior to the latter’s, and its pilots well-motivated and competent. Moreover, the territorial expanse which is to be defended and over which PAF

would be required to support friendly land forces is much smaller than India’s. This factor could be seen as a disadvantage for the IAF as it would have to spread its resources thinly as compared to the PAF.

However, if the PAF and the IAF were to be compared as adversaries, the IAF still enjoys significant advantages over the PAF. It has larger numbers of high performance aircraft, operates more BVR-capable platforms; its aircraft deploy better on-board sensors and electronic warfare systems and its pilots are more proficient in advanced air combat tactics - especially operations in a BVR environment. The IAF possesses superior combat support aircraft, better infrastructure and a continually improving integrated air defence network. However, the IAF’s steadily falling numbers could become critical in the event of a large-scale or protracted war with Pakistan.

With the PLAAF, the numbers game is reversed as it has an overwhelming superiority in numbers of combat aircraft. China’s use of its military on the ground in the ‘disputed territories’ to remind India of its territorial agenda is a continual irritant. It is not difficult to envisage a scenario wherein manned and unmanned flights over Indian territory would supplement the transgressions on the ground. When that does happen, India’s political will is likely to come under trial as there appears to be

C-130J Super Hercules

The Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has also asked for 40 nuclear capable strike aircraft for the IAF…


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no decisive rules of engagement laid down for such contingencies. The gradual militarisation of Tibet and the build up of infrastructure there is another area of concern for India. The PLAAF’s air-to-air refuelling capabilities render operational ranges threatening and menacing for India.

The IAF’s answer to the two-front war conundrum currently appears to be the Su-30, a truly air dominance fighter permitting multiple offensive missions due to its speed, firepower, manoeuvrability and extended range. The Su-30 gave a good account of itself in Exercise Live Wire last year; one of the major aims of the exercise was practicing the IAF’s capability for a two-front war. As part of the exercise, Su-30s flew 1,800-km long missions taking off from an airfield in Assam in the East and flying to the Western front with air-to-air refuelling en route. With such extended ranges possible, the IAF has the choice to build or develop air bases all around the country (as opposed to the earlier ones close to the border with Pakistan). Thus, we now have Su-30s located at Thanjavur (South), Chhabua (North East) and Pune (West). There is the issue of numbers though; the planned strength of 272 will still be far short of the number of aircraft with similar capabilities that China can deploy.

Another worr ying factor is the poor serviceability of the Su-30 fleet in recent months. With 12 hard points for armament, the Su-30 can also carry the air launched BrahMos cruise missile which may be expected to be used against strategic targets such as dams, power stations and industrial clusters. The Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has also asked for 40 nuclear capable strike aircraft for the IAF (their command and control is not in the public domain yet). In all probability, this task will devolve upon the Su-30 fleet. Clearly, these two roles of the Su-30 render it the keystone of the two-front war. However, by itself, the Su-30 may not be an adequate deterrent or war winner in a two-front war scenario.

Political and bureaucratic obstructionism is the

‘third front’ that the defence forces have

been constantly ghting against…

ConclusionAs can be seen, the PLAAF would be a

formidable opponent while the PAF, although on a lesser level, would still be a tough antagonist. The probability of complicity between China and Pakistan is very high. There is also the possibility that Pakistan jumps in just to exploit a situation arising out of hostilities between China and India. After all, Pakistan has still not stopped thinking and talking about the 1971 War. Should the two engage India militarily at the same time, the IAF would indeed be inadequate to the roles and tasks assigned to it.

The Su-30, discussed earlier, needs to be supplemented by the MMRCA at the earliest. Even if the inordinately delayed deal was to be signed today, it is only the first 18 aircraft that come off the manufacturer’s assembly line. The rest will have to be assembled in India in a facility yet to be set up. The first Indian aircraft may take a year to emerge and the total figure of 126 may take three to five years. The Tejas, despite the hype raised about its Initial Operational Clearance in December, is still far from operationalisation. In any case, it cannot compare with the Su-30 or the MMRCA or with the frontline Chinese aircraft pitted against the IAF.

The apathy of the Ministry of Defence and indeed, the government, towards the needs of the defence services to be equipped and prepared to meet the mandate given to them is a cause of concern today. Tomorrow, it could lead to humiliation at the hands of our neighbours. This political and bureaucratic obstructionism is the ‘third front’ that the defence forces have been constantly fighting against during the last decade and more; if the IAF fails to touch the sky with glory in a possible two-front war, military historians would undoubtedly ascribe its ignominy to this third front.


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M I L I T A R Y A V I A T I O NF- Lightning II for South Korea

AS PART OF ITS FX FIGHTER JET ACQUISITION PROGRAMME, SOUTH KOREA HAS taken a decision to procure the F-35 Lightning II fifth generation combat aircraft built by Lockheed Martin Corporation. After Israel and Japan, Korea is the third country to procure

the F-35 through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme of the government of the United States of America. As per the defence procurement agency of South Korea, contract for the stealth fighter aircraft is to be concluded later this year, reportedly in the third quarter. Deliveries however, are scheduled to commence in 2018. “This decision strengthens and extends our long-standing security partnership while enhancing regional stability across the greater Asia Pacific theatre,” said Orlando Carvalho, Aeronautics Executive Vice-President, Lockheed Martin.

Airbus A- Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) for Singapore

The Republic of Singapore Air Force has opted to acquire six Airbus A-330 MRTT flight refuelling aircraft under a new contract with the European aerospace major Airbus Defence and Space. The announcement was made during the Singapore Air Show in March 2014. Singapore is the sixth nation to select the Airbus A-330 MRTT, the others being Australia, Saudi Arabia, the United

Aerospace and Defence NewsPriya Tyagi

F-35 Lightning II

A330 MRTT Refuelling F-18Priya Tyagi


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Arab Emirates and the UK. India is also processing a case for the acquisition of six such platforms for its Air Force and the contract is expected to be awarded in the current financial year. A variant of the commercial Airbus A-330, a total of 17 A-330 MRTT aircraft are currently in service around the world.

India to Provide Helicopters to Afghanistan

As per the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Salman Khurshid, India as agreed to provide helicopters to war-torn Afghanistan in the near future. Apparently, this decision of the Government of India comes in response to a request from the President of Afghanistan for the supply of lethal weapons. Salman Khurshid added, “I think this decision is consistent with our approach towards building capacity and providing training to Afghan forces.” However, the number or type of helicopters to be provided to Afghanistan was not spelt out. “We have also been giving them some logistical support and we hopefully will be able to upgrade and refurbish their fleet of transport aircraft,” said the Minister of External Affairs. With Afghanistan set for Presidential elections ahead of the withdrawal of US troops, India extended its full support for a reconciliation process involving people of the war-torn country. “India will also continue to assist the Afghan National Security Forces, which will play an important role in this year of political and security transition”, said Salman Khurshid while he was in Kandahar.

Six C-J Super Hercules for the Indian Air Force

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) of the Government of India has granted approval for a $1.2 billion contract for the acquisition of six C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft through the Foreign Military Sales programme of the US Government. The first aircraft is slated for delivery by 2016. The aircraft will be configured for special mission operations as part of the Eastern Air Command and will be based out of Panagarh in West Bengal. This fleet will augment the Special Operations capability of the five such aircraft based in Hindon near Delhi delivered by Lockheed Martin as part of contract concluded in 2008. These six aircraft will cater to requirements in Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well as in the North East region of the country. The contract includes six spare Rolls-Royce AE2100-D3 engines, eight Bae Systems AN/ALR-56M advanced radar warning receivers and AN/ALE-47 counter-measures dispensing systems, eight ATK AN/AAR-47 missile warning systems, eight AAQ-22 Star SAFIRE III Special Ops suites by FLIR Systems, eight Rockwell Collins ARC-210 radios and 3,200 flare cartridges.

Air Defence Missiles from MBDA for the IAFThe IAF is close to inking a deal with European missile company MBDA for 384 ASRAAM imaging

infrared homing Air-to-Air Missile as the new close combat missile for the Jaguar replacing the now obsolete Matra Magic R550. The ASRAAM was chosen by the IAF some time ago against the Rafael

External Affairs Minister Shri Salman Khurshid calls on President of Afghanistan HE Mr Hamid Karzai

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Advanced Systems Python-5 of Israel; the latter had been separately selected as the secondary close combat heat seeking missile for the LCA Tejas. The ASRAAM was demonstrated to the IAF at an RAF facility, UK in 2011 in the intended over-wing pylon configuration. The ASRAAM has a proven ability to be launched upwards to significant altitude and crucial for the Jaguar fighter bomber, since its mission profile largely necessitates flying at low altitudes. MBDA is understood to have won the competition also because it became apparent that integrating the Python-5, a heavier missile, would have required modifications that the IAF was not prepared to commit time to. A contract for the ASRAAM is expected to be signed within this financial year.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for India With the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security clearing a deal for 15 additional IAI-Malat

Heron-I Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), the MoD is likely to sign a contract with Israel soon, making India the largest operator of the type. With over 40 already in service with the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy, and the Army looking to contract an unspecified number of longer-range variants of the Heron in the future, the numbers are on a steady upswing and not without reason. With the 40-odd airframes already in service undergoing endurance and sensor upgrade, the Heron-I, having proven to be a deeply useful tri-service platform, has enmeshed well with Indian backbone technologies across the spectrum. IAI-Malat

MBDA ASRAAM

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will, at Defexpo 2014, also pitch the long-range Heron TP drone for possible consideration as a loitering platform for extended border airborne surveillance and patrolling in the Northern and Western sectors. The Army currently operates Searcher Mk 2 drones but is on the lookout for higher performance systems given the increasing demands on unmanned surveillance.

More AWACS for the Indian Air Force The Centre for Airborne Systems (CABS) at Bangalore has opened a global competition to supply

six aircraft that will be suitably modified as part of the competition to support the AWACS role.

This programme will run parallel to the ongoing AEW&C programme of DRDO’s based on the Embraer ERJ 145 Business Jet. The Indian Air Force currently operates three Il-76-based PHALCON AWACS jets from Agra, with talks in progress for two more identical systems. The DRDO’s last tryst with a conventional AWACS system ended in tragedy when the modified HS748 Avro based test aircraft crashed in Southern India in January 1999 killing eight scientists and crew onboard. The accident shelved the programme indefinitely, resurfacing many years later first as the DRDO-Embraer platform, and now the new proposed AWACS. DRDO will be looking to draw interest from vendors include Boeing, Saab, Airbus, UAC, Bombardier and Dassault Aviation.

The DRDO hasn’t specified the aircraft type it requires but stated it requires vendors to design, structurally modify, certify and supply six aircraft platforms for the AWACS role. In addition, the winning vendor will be required to design and manufacture the AWACS ten-metre antenna dome, attachment (pylon) structure and dome installation.

Cooperation between Air Forces of Japan and IndiaDuring Japanese Prime

Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent visit to India, both countries agreed to boost security ties in the face of China’s growing assertiveness. This move is significant especially after China declared an air-defence identification zone in a disputed East China Sea area that overlaps with Japan’s zone and includes uninhabited islands that have been claimed by both

The Defence Minister, Shri AK Antony and the Defence Minister of Japan, Mr Itsunori Onodera

DRDO AEW&CS aboard an Embraer EMB-145 at Aero India 2013


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nations. China’s move has been viewed as an attempt to unjustly infringe on the freedom of flight over the high seas by her and neighbouring states like Japan have been unnerved by this.

Both Japan and India, which have territorial disputes with China, are increasing ties as tensions escalate in Northeast Asia. Prior to the visit, Japan and India moved to expand ties and introduce exchange programmes between the Air Forces of Japan and India when the Japanese Minister of Defence Itsunori Onodera and his Indian counterpart AK Antony discussed the issue of dialogue between air force officials from the two sides.

Predator Demonstrates Electronic Attack Capabilities General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) and Northrop Grumman demonstrated the

Predator B/MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System’s (UAS) electronic attack capability during a US Marine Corps training course. The demonstration evaluated the capability of a UAS to conduct electronic warfare missions alongside other unmanned aircraft, according to GA ASI. During the

demonstration, two Predators were operated, one with Northrop’s Pandora Electronic Warfare (EW) system, and a GA ASI-owned Predator with a jamming pod. Northrop Grumman’s payload was successfully integrated with the Predator B avionics and the command and control architecture. “Our collaboration with the Marine Corps and Northrop Grumman demonstrates the operational flexibility of the Predator B from being primarily a counter-insurgency aircraft to a platform that can address a broader spectrum of operational requirements,” said Frank W. Pace, President - Aircraft Systems, GA ASI.

Boeing KC-A Readies for Testing

Boeing has begun assembling the fourth and final KC-46A flight-testing aircraft, the manufacturer’s next-generation aerial refuelling tanker replacement for the current fleet of KC-135 with the US Air Force. As per Boeing, the aircraft, a commercial derivative of the Boeing 767, will complete its first flight without the aerial refuelling systems in the near future. That flight will be followed by the first flight of the fully equipped test aircraft in early 2015. “All four test aircraft are moving through production to support our transition to ground and flight testing later this year,” said Maureen Dougherty, Boeing Vice-President and KC-46 Tanker Programme Manager. First delivery to the US Air Force is scheduled for early 2016.

USAF B- Bomber Contract for Boeing As per an announcement by the Pentagon, Boeing has been selected for the award of the $750

million five-year contract for work on the US Air Force fleet of B-1 bombers. The contract includes integrated engineering services such as computer network support, technical analysis, flight safety analysis, and potential enhancement work, according to the US Department of Defense digest of major contracts. Also included in the contract are four one-year options and a one-year base period.

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SAR Helicopters from AgustaWestland

AgustaWestland, a Finmeccanica company, has been awarded a contract for 16 AW101 helicopters as also support and training, valued at approximately €1.15 billion, to meet the Norwegian All Weather SAR Helicopter (NAWSARH) requirement. The contract also includes an option for six more aircraft. The AW101 emerged once again as the best solution to meet the stringent requirements stipulated by the Selection Committee. The AW101 benefits from three-engine safety, a full ice protection system for flight in known icing conditions, long range and endurance, a proven 30-minute “run dry” gearbox as well as multiple redundancy features in the avionic and mission systems. Aircraft deliveries to the Royal Norwegian Air Force will commence in 2017 and continue through to 2020. The aircraft will be assembled at AgustaWestland’s Yeovil facility in the UK. The aircraft will be equipped with an advanced SAR equipment package including a multi-panel AESA surveillance radar system from Selex ES that provides 360° coverage, four-axis digital Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), two rescue hoists, searchlight, electro-optical device and a fully integrated avionics and mission system.

Marketing of Combat JetsEmerging countries in need of modernising

their weaponry are rushing to buy state-of-the-art fighter jets, sparking a fierce marketing battle among the global aerospace majors. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian hinted that India and the Persian Gulf nations will pick French fighters soon. BAE Systems also announced that the Eurofighter Typhoon combat jet was no longer being considered for adoption as the next-generation fighter by the United Arab Emirates. The UAE plans to buy 60 new fighters to replace its ageing fleet, a deal estimated to be worth as much as $10 billion. The French Rafale and America’s Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet remain in the running.

Meanwhile, Brazil said that it will grant Sweden’s Saab exclusive negotiating rights as it works to select its next-generation fighter. The Saab JAS 39 Gripen is now the front-runner in this race. Brazil plans to replace 36 fighters by 2023 at a total cost of $4.5 billion. French

SAR Helicopter Anders Anundsen, Minister of Justice and Public Security, and Daniele Romiti, CEO of

AgustaWestland

MBDA’s ASRAAM firing from Typhoon

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President Francois Hollande visited Brazil to pitch the Dassault Rafale fighter. In response to Brazil’s decision last week, Dassault pointed out that the Gripen uses many parts from other countries, especially the US. In fact, the F/A-18 had been seen as the leading candidate in that race.

M- Trainer Aircraft from Alenia AermacchiIn March this year, at its plant in Venegono Superiore in Italy, Alenia Aermacchi rolled out the

first M-346 advanced trainer aircraft out for the Israeli Air and Space Force. The M-346, a derivative of the Yak-130, is equipped with fully digital flight controls and avionics designed to provide lead-in training for Israeli fighter pilots. The Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) is looking to use the M-346 to replace its fleet of TA-4 Skyhawk trainer aircraft. Poland recently became the fourth customer for the M-346, following Italy, Singapore and Israel. First delivery to the IMOD is expected in the middle of this year. Currently, the M-346 is in service with both the Air Forces of Italy and Singapore.

EADS Re-christenedWith the dawn of the New Year, EADS has been rechristened as the Airbus Group which will

have under it Airbus, Airbus Defence and Space (earlier Airbus Military) and Airbus Helicopters (earlier Eurocopter). Airbus will focus on the commercial aircraft business and Airbus Defence and Space will integrate its Cassidian, Astrium and Airbus Military segments of business, while Airbus Helicopters will deal with the rotary wing regime. Announced in July 2013, the decision to rebrand was received mixed reaction from the rotorcraft industry. Eurocopter was widely considered as a global brand with no adverse connotations as a result of the reference to Europe.

The rebranding was perhaps more relevant to the defense side of the Airbus Group’s business. The legal name will also be changed by 2015 from Airbus Group NV to Airbus Group SE (Societas Europaea). It is not clear as yet as to how the renaming of Eurocopter will affect the future of the “EC” helicopter designations of current Eurocopter variants, for example, whether an EC135 will become an AH135.

China’s Bomber Can Nuke US Bases: Chinese State Media

As per a report, Chinese state media is once again claiming Beijing’s military prowess, M-346 Trainer Aircraft from Alenia Aermacchi

China’s H-6K strategic bomber


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emphasising the fact that China’s new H-6K strategic bomber can attack US military bases in South Korea as well as the Japanese mainland using long range nuclear cruise missiles.

With a range of between 1,500 and 2,000 km, the CJ-10 meets the requirements of the PLAAF to possess the capability to launch strategic missile attacks against US military facilities and those of its allies in the Western Pacific,” states the report. The article also lauds the fact that the H-6K can target the Japanese mainland without even leaving Chinese airspace, in addition to Russian cities in the Far East, all major cities in India, as well as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, “in a potential war against Southeast Asian neighbours over territories in the South China Sea.” This is just the latest example of aggressive and bellicose rhetoric emerging out of China.

L A N D S Y S T E M SIndia’s Prithvi-II Missile Tested Successfully

End March 2014, India successfully test-fired its nuclear-capable Prithvi-II Surface-to-Surface missile from a military base in Odisha. The indigenously-developed ballistic missile with a maximum range of 350 km was fired from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur in Balasore district about 230 km from Bhubaneswar. “It was a perfect launch. It met all mission objectives,” test range Director M.V.K.V Prasad told IANS.

Prithvi is India’s first indigenously-built ballistic missile. It is one of the five missiles being developed under the country’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. The battlefield missile, with flight duration of 483 seconds and a peak altitude of 43.5 km, can carry a 500-kg warhead. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) of the Indian Army conducted the test as part of a regular training exercise. The missile has features to deceive anti-ballistic missiles and uses an advanced inertial guidance system with manoeuvring capabilities and reaches its target within a few metres of accuracy. It has a higher lethal effect compared to equivalent missiles in the world. Scientists say the accuracy has already been demonstrated in the past in the development flight trials.

US to Downsize its Military As per reports in the media, the US plans to shrink

the size of its military to its smallest force since pre-World War II level. The proposal outlined by Chuck Hagel and several Pentagon officials, would be aimed at reducing defense spending in the face of government austerity measures, after a pledge by President Barack Obama to end US involvement in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The plan would leave the military capable of defeating any enemy but too small for long foreign occupations and would involve greater risk if US forces were asked to carry out two large-scale military actions simultaneously, the paper cited quoting Pentagon officials. Over all, Hagel’s proposal, the officials said, is designed to allow the American military to fulfil President Obama’s national security directives - to defend American territory and the nation’s interests overseas and to deter aggression and to win decisively if again ordered to war. Hagel’s plan would most significantly reshape America’s land forces active-duty soldiers as well as those in the National Guard and Reserve.

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Laser-Based Weapons to Join Israel’s Missile Defense SystemIntercepting and destroying projectiles in mid-air is costly business. Rockets like the Qassams

and Katyushas fired into Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas cost around $1,000 each. The counter-missiles that the Iron Dome, Israel’s rocket defense system, uses to destroy incoming rockets are far more expensive at about $40,000 each. This disparity and the accompanying prioritisation of what gets defended, means the Iron Dome ignores anything smaller than rockets and artillery shells.

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the Israeli defense manufacturer that made the Iron Dome system, has a cheaper solution: lasers. Dubbed ‘Iron Beam’, Rafael unveiled the new laser defense system at the Singapore Air Show, a major technology exposition held in mid-February. A more comprehensive demonstration of the technology is planned for the Eurosatory defense technology exposition this June. Iron Beam will not replace the Iron Dome; lasers work best by locking onto a target and burning through it as it moves, and rockets are currently faster than lasers at downing incoming attacks. Instead, Iron Beam is likely work in a similar fashion as its US counterparts, by tracking drones, mortar shells and other slower projectiles.

Indigenously Produced Artillery Three major Indian gun programmes were on display at the DefExpo, with two of them

at an advanced stage of procurement. The most immediate of these is the development of a 155-millimetre (mm), 45 calibre gun by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), based on the design and manufacturing technology provided by Swedish Bofors in the late 1980s. This technology has been used as a springboard by the OFB for upgrading the original 39-calibre Bofors gun into a far more powerful and versatile 45 calibre gun that can engage targets more than 38 km away, compared to the

27-km range of the original Bofors gun. The OFB says Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur, is establishing production for 18 guns a year in 2015 and doubling that capacity in 2016. Defence ministry sources said the initial order for 114 guns could be enhanced to 414 guns if the gun realises the promise it is currently showing.

India to Develop Smaller Missile

As per a top official of Brahmos Aerospace, India plans to develop a smaller missile with advance

Iron Dome radar One of Israel’s Iron Dome batteries, which will work in tandem with the Iron Beam laser system

Indigenously made ‘Dhanush’ 155mm 45 calibre towed howitzer at Defexpo 2014


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technologies under the Vision 2050 Programme. The proposed missile with advanced technology would be smaller in size and low weight but would have better capability. The second programme would focus on increasing the speed of the missiles. “In supersonic missiles, we have taken leadership across the globe. Now we want to be a leader in hypersonic missiles”, said Brahmos Aerospace CEO and Managing Director A. Sivathanu Pillai. Elaborating, he said the concept was, “with minimum power, we can make maximum damage to enemy. That is the new concept which we are working on.”

US Defence Equipment in Afghanistan: Post WithdrawalThe United States has stated that it is considering transfer of its leftover military hardware from

Afghanistan to Pakistan post- withdrawal. Washington has rejected concerns that this may alter strategic dynamics of the region. The statement came amid a political firestorm in Afghanistan over reports that the US had planned to transfer some of its excess equipment to Pakistan. The US Embassy contradicted an earlier statement by the International Security Assistance Force that the US-led forces in Afghanistan were not in the process of transferring any military equipment, including Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Defence Secretary Lt. General (Retd.) Asif Yasin Malik also claimed that Pakistan would be receiving some of the leftover military hardware from the US once its forces leave Afghanistan. The Washington Post had earlier reported that discussions between American and Pakistani officials have been going on for months about the disposal of military hardware that the US does not want to pay to ship home. Pakistan is particularly interested in the US army’s MRAP vehicles, which the Pentagon officials say will have limited strategic value after the withdrawal of US forces.

N A V A L S Y S T E M SNew Anti-ship Missile from Lockheed Martin

A US military research program to develop an advanced anti-ship missile to replace the ageing Harpoon is nearing the end of its demonstration phase and the programme to develop and deploy the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) should switch over to the US Navy by early 2016. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced plans to award a two-year $175 million follow-on contract to Lockheed Martin Corporation which has been developing LRASM for the last five years.

The DARPA LRASM contract is in response to a gap in Navy anti-ship missile technology identified

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in 2008. The standard Navy anti-ship missile is the sub-sonic Harpoon which has been in the inventory since 1977. The new anti-ship missile is being designed to be launched from the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System on Navy surface warships, as well as from the US Air Force B-1B Lancer supersonic bomber and from the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet carrier-based fighter-bomber. Submarine-launched versions are under consideration.

Sea-faring Cargo Drones from Rolls-Royce Rolls-Royce has floated a new shipping concept that could bring the world of international

cargo into the modern age of sea-faring drones. What Rolls-Royce has proposed are massive, self-piloting cargo vessels capable of being driven remotely either individually or in groups. With the new ships on the water, a single captain could be responsible for dozens of 12,000-foot barges. Hundreds of these hulking drones could be piloted from a single control centre, with no risk of danger to their land-based captains. Rolls-Royce is not the only one to propagate this concept as the EU has recently committed $4.8 million for the study of unmanned maritime navigation. The study will conclude in 2015 and will report on how safe and reliable such a system might be. However, some groups have their reservations and have expressed concerns regarding the safety of drone cargo fleets.

India-China Navies to Exercise JointlyAt the end of the sixth Defence Dialogue held in New Delhi recently, a statement issued end

February 2014 by the Chinese Ministry of Defence stated that China and India will organise a joint training for their navies apart from holding the fourth edition of joint military exercise this year. With improving relations, the two countries are exploring the possibility of having joint exercises between the air forces and the navies, besides the armies which have held three exercises so far and agreed to hold the fourth one in India this year. “The two armed forces agreed to strengthen their high- level strategic communication, continue defence cooperation, and push forward military ties to a new high,” said Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun.

The announcement regarding training jointly by the two navies however, came as a surprise for Indian officials who said that while the issue was discussed during the two-day meeting between Defence Secretary R.K Mathur and Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army Wang Guanzhong, they were not aware of any understanding in this regard.

Lockheed Martin successfully launched the first LRASM Boosted Test Vehicle from a MK 41 VLS launcher at White Sands Missile Range


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China to Build Aircraft Carriers IndigenouslyAs per a report in the South China Morning Post, the PLA Navy has begun work on the country’s

second aircraft carrier and has plans to build a total of four. The PLAN unveiled its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning in 2011, having acquired the vessel from Ukraine over a decade ago and refurbished locally. In 2012, the Chinese successfully completed the first landing of a combat aircraft, a J-15, on the Liaoning.

China has since then incorporated the carrier into her overall military strategy. “If China had only one aircraft carrier, it would not conform to China’s status as a world power, or to the demands imposed by the length of the coastline. Considering China’s ocean environment, two aircraft carriers are not enough to safeguard marine interests. If China has three aircraft carriers, they can maintain a sustained combat capability - maintenance, safeguarding and patrol respectively,” Chinese military expert Du Wenlong told the Chinese state media arm, the People’s Daily. As per the US Naval Institute, a four-carrier navy would allow the Chinese to keep at least one carrier on patrol at all time.

Japan’s Interest in Indo-US Naval War-gamesJapan is desirous of being a part of the joint naval exercise that India and the US hold every

year. It is understood that on account of Chinese objections, Japan, a close ally of the US has so far been kept out of the joint exercise for six years. The US apparently does not have any objections over Tokyo’s participation in the war games and the two countries are awaiting approval from the Indian side. The Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera made it clear that the proposed tri-lateral Malabar-series exercise was not aimed against any specific country and was important for the security of sea lanes in the region.

Malabar-series exercises are held between India and the US but in 2007, Japan and Australia had also taken part in it outside the Indian Ocean near the coast of Okinawa in Japan. China was apparently not happy over the event and is understood to have sought explanation from the

J-15 fighter on Liaoning aircraft carrier


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participant countries about it. After objections by China, India decided against making the war-game multi-lateral and since then, it has been kept as a bilateral affair between the navies of India and the US.

Assets with the Indian Coast Guard As per the plans made public recently, the Indian Coast Guard will possess an impressive fleet

of 200 ships and 100 aircraft by 2020. “We have been and will continue inducting new ships, vessels and aircraft into our inventory,” Coast Guard Regional Commander (Northeast) and Inspector General K.C Pande told reporters during the concluding session of a coastal security awareness campaign. “We are steadily progressing in the right direction,” he said, adding that orders had been placed for more than 100 ships and aircraft. The current inventory has over 100 ships and boats, 14 Air Cushion Vehicles (ACVs) and over 60 aircraft including the Dornier Do 228 maritime surveillance aircraft.

US Navy’s Triton UAS for Big-Time SurveillanceNorthrop Grumman and the US Navy have completed the ninth flight trial of the Triton

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), an improvement upon its predecessor in the Air Force, the Global Hawk. With its 130-foot wingspan equal to that of a Boeing 757 airliner, the Triton will provide high-altitude, real-time Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) from a sensor suite that supplies a 360-degree view at a radius of over 2,000 nautical miles, allowing monitoring from higher and farther away than any of its competitors. It will be able to support missions up to 24 hours.

Under an initial contract of $1.16 billion in 2008, the US Navy has ordered 68 of the MQ-4C Triton drones with expected delivery in 2017, as opposed to the initially anticipated date of December 2015. Thus far, Triton has completed flights up to 9.4 hours at altitudes of 50,000 feet.

Dornier Do 228 maritime surveillance aircraft Air Cushion Vehicles (Hovercraft)

Triton Unmanned Aircraft System


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N U C L E A R A N D S P A C EFighters to Launch Nano-satellites

Large size rockets are overkill for small satellites and as such are not the preferred option as these turn out to be far too expensive. Several aerospace companies are now working on air-launch systems for satellite payloads that invariably of low weight and small size. Boeing is exploring concepts for something similar for very small satellites referred to as nano-satellites. The company is to modify an F-15 Eagle to hoist a rocket up to launch altitude. This program is called Airborne Launch Assist Space Access or ALASA for short. The concept has been around for a few years, but now Boeing has been selected to build an operational prototype launch system. The idea is that using an aircraft to launch the satellite will substantially increase the affordability and versatility of space access for small payloads, reducing launch costs to around $1 million for a 100-pound payload to low Earth orbit. Boeing is to design the system and conduct test launches within the next 11 months,

Threat from Debris in Space As per the European Space Agency, debris in space emanating from man-made objects is about

to reach levels such that future space missions could become impossible. Scientists believe that on account of the debris, swathes of space will become inaccessible. “If the current launch rate continues, then collisions will soon be 25 times higher than now. This would make space flight in low Earth orbits almost impossible,” ESA stated. “There are already 17,000 trackable objects larger than a coffee cup, which threaten working missions with catastrophic collision.”

When asked as to how long it will take for the debris to render space unusable, researchers say there are already certain orbits used for communication and military satellites that could become unusable within a decade or two. The worst affected are 800-965 km polar orbits because these already contain many of the 5,000 or so satellites launched since the space age began. To tackle the problem, the space agency is designing a hunter-killer space probe to track down and destroy defunct satellites and halt the growth of the burgeoning cloud. ESA said removing between five

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and ten large satellites from space each year would be enough to stop the debris cloud growing.

India’s Mars Mission India’s ambitious maiden inter-planetary voyage Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM), launched in

November last year, has covered over 21 million kilometres and is expected to reach the Red Planet’s orbit on September 24, 2014.

The MOM probe was travelling with a helio-centric velocity of 29 km per second and radio signals sent from ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC) ground station near Bangalore takes 142 seconds to reach the spacecraft and return, ISRO said. “MOM team switched ‘ON’ and checked all the five scientific instruments onboard the MOM in February 2014. The health parameters of all these instruments are normal,” ISRO said. The agency has performed six orbit raising manoeuvres around the Earth following the launch of the mission on November 05 last year from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre at Sriharikota. If India succeeds in sending its mission to Mars’ orbit, it would become only the sixth in the world after the US, Russia, Europe, Japan and China to have achieved this feat.

India, Russia Deal for Two KNPP ReactorsIndia and Russia have held wide-ranging talks on nuclear, space, energy and economic

cooperation and agreed to finalise the long-pending deal for the third and fourth reactors of Kudankulam power plant soon. Chairing the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC) meeting here, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin deliberated on a range of issues to further enhance cooperation in key areas. Sources said the progress made in Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) was assessed by both sides. It was hoped that by April-May, the nuclear power plant will achieve full capacity.

Russia is opposed to the project coming under the ambit of the Nuclear Civil Liability Law of India and wants it to be covered under the inter-governmental agreement on the issue. The first unit of KNPP started generating power from last year. India has tried to assuage Russian concerns

MOM Joining of two Segments of PSLV-C25


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by making proposals on the liability limiting it to suppliers default in cases of equipment failure in the event of an accident.

ISRO’s Mission to the SunAs per the Chairman of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), K Radhakrishnan, his

organisation has lined up over a dozen missions, including its first probe on the Sun. Though the mission to probe the Sun was already on the cards, the agency now has a clear picture of its plan and has put a timeframe within which it hoped to undertake it. Nicknamed ‘Aditya’, the proposed mission to the Sun had been planned between 2017 and 2020. Apart from ‘Aditya’, space habitat studies were also being planned in these three years. Before that, ISRO would focus on ASTROSAT, a project aimed at design, development, fabrication and launch of an astronomical observatory for studies of cosmic sources and Chandrayaan II between 2014 and 2017.

Growing Nuclear Arsenal of Pakistan Given the rapid increase of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a former CIA analyst suspects the country

has a commitment to provide a nuclear bomb to Saudi Arabia. “One of the great unknowns is whether they (Saudi Arabia) have already got a deal with the Pakistanis for a bomb. That is one of the mysteries of the contemporary Middle East and South Asia,” said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst who is currently with the Brookings Institute, an eminent American think-tank.

“Why does Pakistan have the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world? Why are they producing more bombs than the Indians by double or triple? Is there some external partner who they have a commitment to?” he asked at a panel discussion on Obama administration’s foreign policy organised by the Brookings Institute. Riedel said Saudi Arabia is deeply disappointed with President Barack Obama. “In the beginning, they were very optimistic like everyone else about Obama. But the Saudis are disillusioned and this has been demonstrated in their refusal to take their seat in the UN Security Council.”

India-US Civil Nuclear Deal The much-awaited India-US Energy Dialogue has failed to push the stalled civil nuclear deal

forward, even as the US urged India to align its nuclear liability law with the international convention on the issue. However, Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia, co-chairing the dialogue from the Indian side, said the hurdles to the successful implementation of the civil nuclear agreement had to be removed within the framework of existing laws.

Senior officials involved in the talks said that India’s nuclear liability law was based on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and, therefore, it had the option of not ratifying the international liability regime set come into effect later this year. A major difference between the international liability regime and India’s liability law is the issue of whether the plant operator is allowed legal recourse against a supplier; the Indian law allows this. Second, Indian law also allows the operator legal recourse if the supplier causes damage intentionally.

Artist’s impression of Aditya-1


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IN HIS ARTICLE ON ‘SPECIAL OPERATIONS Forces: Understanding the Dynamics of Change’ (refer IDR Jan-Mar ’14 Vol.

29.1) Brigadier Deepak Sinha (Retd.) makes an excellent case for setting up a uniformed Special Operations Command (SOCOM). While this is an idea whose time has come, Brigadier Sinha’s article suffers from two major factual inaccuracies that lead to wrong conclusions. It is perhaps necessary to address those inaccuracies and also correct a few misconceptions that have a great bearing on the future and efficacy of Special Forces (SF) in India.

In his article Brigadier Sinha argues that the SF of various Western democracies such as the US and the UK are deployed, “with the tacit approval of the state” they are operating in. This is, in fact, incorrect. It is only partly true the US and British SF have operated in some countries on a range of missions with the ‘tacit approval’ of the target countries. But there is a large body of Special Operations conducted by the SFs of not only the US, but also of countries such as Israel and South Korea which are done without the tacit approval of the targeted/host country.

In the raid carried out by the Israeli SF, the Sayeret Matkal on July 04, 1976, was not with any tacit approval of Uganda, the target nation which had housed Jewish hostages after a hijacked Air France fight was diverted there. Similarly, the aftermath of the massacre of Israeli Olympic participants in the Summer Olympics held in Munich, Germany in 1972 led to a series of covert raids by Israeli SF in

EMPLOYING SPECIAL FORCESA Response to Popular Fallacies

Saikat Datta

In his article on ‘Special Operations Forces: Understanding the Dynamics of Change’ (refer IDR

Brigadier Sinha’s article suffers from two major factual inaccuracies that lead to wrong conclusions. It is perhaps necessary to address those inaccuracies and also correct a few misconceptions that

Lebanon as reprisal attacks. Brigadier Sinha’s incorrect assumption also misses out on the role of SF at sea, which is also governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and poses a separate set of legal and jurisdictional challenges. However, several nations such as South Korea, the US and the UK have launched Special Operations from sea without seeking any tacit approval from the target nations.

Interestingly, Brigadier Sinha also argues that a distinction needs to be drawn between Special Operations and covert missions. According to him, “covert missions that require credible deniability and total non-attributability (sic) have been undertaken; the responsibility for their conduct has rested with the national intelligence agencies.” This again is an inaccurate assessment, as the available literature on Special Forces and Special Operations clearly establishes. During the Cold War, British SAS troops would be regularly inserted into East Germany for covert missions. These would be cleared by the Director, Special Forces and they would primarily be inserted into East Germany for surveillance and reconnaissance missions that were primarily aimed at gathering intelligence or conducting extraction missions of high value defectors. This would be just some of the broad range of missions conducted by the SF and would remain deniable, if detected. In fact, it is interesting to note that an essential part of the SAS training is to conduct evade and escape training capsules for their troops to ensure that their missions remain deniable even if they are captured.

Saikat Datta is the National Security Affairs Editor, The Hindustan Times and co-author of the book, India’s Special Forces - The History and Future of India’s SF.


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It is high time that India’s Special

Forces get the place that they deserve…

The role that the US SF played in the Second Gulf War is also of great importance. They conducted key missions to hunt for Scud missiles long before the war commenced. Under the command of General Stanley McChrystal, the US SF also undertook several covert missions as he sought to amalgamate the intelligence and Special Forces elements into a single, dedicated task force. This was the hallmark of the initial days of Operation Enduring Freedom when US SF went into Afghanistan to establish partnerships with the Northern Alliance and set up air strikes. Once again, these were covert operations and completely deniable till hostilities began formally. Similarly, Israel has carried out a series of covert missions in its neighbourhood that were aimed to be deniable and were only known once the success of the missions became apparent.

Therefore, to merely use the deniability factor of a covert mission to draw a distinction between Special Forces and other troops working under the command of national intelligence agencies, is not only a fallacious argument, the conclusions drawn therefore, are also patently wrong. It is also to be noted that when covert operations require military intervention, or intervention by military personnel, then it will always be SF that are called upon to do so albeit under a different command structure. The key to such missions is capability and efficacy, rather than the nature of the role or the command structure.

The third argument that Brigadier Sinha puts forth is to add the conventional airborne troops to the proposed Special Operations Command. If this were to happen, then India would be the first to make such a folly. Not only would this be a mistake, it would also be a deliberate attempt to erase India’s recent military history. The author rightly argues that airborne troops are meant primarily for Out Of Area Contingencies (OOAC). But the OOAC needs conventional structures to achieve their missions. When India intervened in the Maldives in Operation Cactus, all conventional units were pressed into service. These included large elements of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN).

It is critical to understand the nature of

OOAC operations. Troops need to be mobile and easily deployable but are also required to be overwhelming in their response. This is a crucial factor to achieve the aims of OOAC objectives. Imagine a scenario where a dedicated SOCOM is burdened with managing such large operations when their charter is to exactly the opposite. Perhaps a part of the demand to include OOAC troops into a SOCOM stems from a historical blunder that has dominated India’s SF. In 1967, when the first para-commando units were being formed, parachuting was considered a key skill for these troops. Naturally, with scarce resources at hand, the para-commandos were made a part of the Parachute Regiment, which housed the facilities required to impart these skills en masse. However, the nature of warfare has undergone a dramatic change. As warfare becomes more network-centric along with Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism, the need for dedicated SF has emerged as a key and decisive factor in a nation’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP) strategy.

In 1987, the Brigadier Nico Bahri Committee with Colonel Sukhi Mann (later Brigadier) and Colonel R.K Nanavatty (later Lt. General and Northern Army Commander) did the first comprehensive study of India’s SF and its capabilities. A key recommendation that emerged out of the Committee was to establish a separate Special Forces Regiment, recognising the history of the US SOCOM and the British SF.

Here, it is important to note the final key factual error that the author bases his faulty assumptions on. He states that parachute and airborne elements work in support of the SF during operations. This may be partially true but such situations are extremely rare and go against the nature of Special Operations. Intrinsically, the SF undertakes missions that are covert and perhaps, remain deniable. To introduce conventional troops like paratroopers in aid of SF would, therefore, defeat the very need for covert capabilities, secrecy and deniability.

Second, it is important to note that by their very nature, parachute regiments are conventional


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troops with a different means of delivery. In short, they are no different from the mechanised troops who use Armoured Personnel Carriers for mobility and tactics but are essentially infantry.

This is a key element that needs to be recognised dispassionately and keeping in view how militaries have developed across the world. An attempt to re-invent the wheel in India, due to reasons other than strategic,

would be foolhardy and would defeat the very purpose of having a SF capability.

It would also be factually incorrect to equate the Rangers, who are a part of SOCOM, with India’s parachute battalions. The Rangers do not necessarily have parachuting skills and operate

When covert operations require military intervention then it will always be SF that are called upon to do so...

as normal infantry in support of SF when required for a particular mission. On the whole, they are also known to conduct their operations, depending on the requirements of the military commanders on ground. Finally, the British SAS has always maintained its separate identity as a Regiment and its role has been separate from the British airborne forces. No airborne forces report to the Director, Special Forces, UK and in the US, the airborne troops do not report into SOCOM.

It is high time that India’s Special Forces get the place that they deserve, not only because they need that, but more so because India’s strategic aspirations and immediate needs require it. Delaying this any further will imperil India’s capability to deal with a rapidly changing and challenging environment.


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AS A CIVILIZATION, OVER THE PAST several thousand years, India has been a nation of an inward-looking,

self-satisfying, complacent people, happy with God’s liberal largesse and enjoying his boon through muscle flexing and resorting to use of force as a noble, glorious, seasonal sport among our own kings and clans. Proving one’s superior strength and prowess, establishing one’s fame and power, feeding one’s ego and primacy were all that went into war-waging and notional territorial expansion. These were coined into such grandiose expressions such as Chakradhipati and Samrat. Absence of a sense of integrated nationhood in the sub-continent apart, the geographical confines of chains of mountains and expanses of sea, which created a carapace of natural protection, resulted in a mental make-up of a delusional world of one’s own, keeping away the thought, interest and venture of looking out, going out of the carapace. Curiously though, trade and commerce, religion and moral flow ventured out amply to the West, North and South-east benignly, unhindered, without any trace of use of force. Military thought, conquest, use of force and even an offensive element of defence, creation of buffer zones outside the territorial confines (aggressive depth in defence?) and such reactive - proactive thoughts and usage have bypassed our history, thought and military heritage.

The Culture Baggage of Indian Military PhilosophyLt Gen SC Sardeshpande

The Gandhian philosophy of ahimsa has affected the Indian attitude towards war and use of force. Nehruvian distrust of India’s armed forces and military leadership has coloured the dispensation national defence and the armed forces get. Historical, intellectual, cultural and administrative neglect of the need for national defence cause deep concern. The people and their elected representatives have indifference to and inadequate knowledge of defence matters, their imperatives, demands and consequences. Bhutto said, “We will eat grass, but produce an atomic weapon”. This awareness and determination does not sink in our Indian thought. Indian attitude resonates to its cultural ethos – waiting for something to happen, somewhere, somehow, some time and somebody to take care, without designing things.

Indians have never gone out of the national (natural) boundaries to resist intrusion or undertake retaliation. Within the territorial confines all our actions against the opponents have been reactive, never proactive. And again, within the nation there have been alliances, friendships and helping hands among rulers and dynasties (Chanakya’s teaching) but at national level there have been none. In fact, many of our kings sought help from and invited outsiders to fight their battles. We learnt but little from the waves after waves of invaders and intruders, their social solidarity, superior methods of warfare, advanced weaponry and organisational skills. We lost out to the invader’s cavalry even as we so diligently flaunted our elephantry. Why did we lose our cavalry spirit? Cavalry spirit is not merely mounted excellence; it is aggressive spirit, mobile mind, flexible opportunism and riding the storm. Up to the twelfth century at least in South India the horse as a mount in our temple sculptures is an exception; it is amply depicted as drawing chariot (chariotry) but never as cavalry. The stirrup was absent till the thirteenth century advent of the Khiljis. The same situation applies to paintings and a few historical writings of the period.

The USA has its predominant in uence in a very large part of the world through its

money and muscle…


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Kings and countries expanded their territory, secured them and entered into alliances to protect their lands and people. The British brought Tibet, Burma, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Iran under their influence to secure India as the jewel in their crown. Post World War II, the USSR grabbed Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Central Asian Republics (though subsequently it lost them). The Chinese have added Tibet, Sinkiang, parts

of Mongolia, Manchuria and now the East and South China Sea islands. The USA has its predominant influence in a very large part of the world through its money and muscle. India, on the other hand, has lost Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Afghanistan

and Myanmar. Today, tiny island nations such as Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius are shooting away from it.

The Gandhian philosophy of ahimsa has affected the Indian attitude towards war and use of force. Nehruvian distrust of India’s armed forces and military leadership has coloured the dispensation national defence and the armed forces get. Historical, intellectual, cultural and administrative neglect of the need for national defence cause deep concern. The people and their elected representatives have indifference to and inadequate knowledge of defence matters, their imperatives, demands and consequences. Bhutto said, “We will eat grass, but produce an atomic weapon”. This awareness and determination does not sink in our Indian thought. Indian attitude resonates to its cultural ethos - waiting for something to happen, somewhere, somehow, some time and somebody to take care, without designing things.

In summary, we continue to be neglectful of national defence, armed forces and war preparedness. Our historical, ethical, military experience has no awareness or precedent of crossing our borders, of counter offensive, proactive actions and aggressive intent, in the context of defending our nation. Author Pawan Varma says, “Historically, Indians have a mediocre record of defending themselves

against foreign invaders. (They) have never pursued military conquest outside the extended periphery of the subcontinent.” And Stephen Cohen states, “India is uniquely unassertive towards others.”

Awareness, ethos, philosophy and attitude find place in doctrine, approach and resolve. Our military doctrine (cold start) appears to tackle the superficial layer of the present and not the deeper and more relevant issues of our history, attitude, ethos and philosophy. In fact, we have apparently a wishful, if also a transplanted philosophy of war, or use of force to put it in better words.

War aims at deterring the opponent, containing his depredation, and evicting him from our soil. It needs wherewithal (armed forces, weaponry, warlike material), infrastructure (for movement, quartering, stocking, maintenance and deployment) and determination and will to use the armed force to the hilt. Determination and will are the most important factors at each of the stages. And it is history, attitude, philosophy and ethos which help develop that will and determination. This is where we stumble, the stumbling blocks being credibility and national military philosophy.

Today, after over six decades of freedom, there is talk of raising a Strike Corps against Chinese threat in Arunachal. China has, in the process of deterring India, containing its defence efforts and throwing it out of their territory (as they claim it), built up its wherewithal, infrastructure and displayed beyond doubt, its will and determination to use military force all along its border with India and in partnership with Pakistan. The new (Communist) regime in China has shed the erstwhile Chinese despondent, decaying shell and changed its-total stance attitude, and ethos into resurgent aggressive and ruthless mood, challenging the whole world in justifying and asserting its historical role as the Middle Kingdom, the fulcrum of the world. Obviously it is ready to pay a price. Determination to assert itself and readiness to pay the price are its salient contents of its will. It is against such an opponent that Indian response is pitched.

Ta rd i n e s s, u n c e r t a i n t y , i n d i f f e re n t

The Chinese have added Tibet, Sinkiang, parts of Mongolia, Manchuria and now the East and South China Sea islands…


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determination and weak will are all contributors to the low credence of what the government causes media to report, as a serious student of our defence matters sees them. Will this Strike Corps prove to be a deterrent? When, in what manner, to what extent? Is the infrastructure ready to sustain the employment, deployment and maintenance of such defensive and offensive troop levels? How is the nearly two week acclimatisation period being tackled in terms of mobilisation time factor? Are the troops going to be barracked in high altitude all the year round in order to reduce acclimatisation period? What is the financial implication of such quartering arrangement? Won’t building of infrastructure, including the proposed Misamari-Tawang rail line (IMR, Nov. 2013) in the difficult and restrictive mountainous terrain give an indication of likely area of counter strike and help China to thwart or contain it? Is India’s science and technology geared up and competent to sustain troops at such altitude? Where are the targets for hurting the Chinese in the Tibetan wilderness? How is the strike being supported and sustained by a weak and weakening air force with its fleet depleting regularly? While hundreds of such questions raise their shaking heads, the Prime Minister tells the Generals that there is likely to be a cut in defence expenditure! What credibility is this to the tom-tommed Strike Corps? Are we really serious about our defence arrangements?

In any case the projected plans indicate a timeframe of two decades. By then the Chinese, God forbid, may decide to occupy Tawang-Sela and sit tight there. Then what? As it is they are not trying another Foot Hills sojourn. They will only undertake border incursions, skirmishes and occupation of certain newsy features like Nathula, Tawang, Chushul, DBO, for instance. Even as prickly will be places like Sumdorong, LumIa, Kibithoo, Barahoti, Demchok. So then, how is this offensive-defensive strategy envisaged in the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps going to function, in what time frame, with what objectives and tasks?

On August 15, 1947, India became a free nation; free not only from foreign masters but also from many of its own chains. We chose a

noble constitution, secularism, equality, did away with blind faith, realised the implications of nationhood, banished (at least on paper) casteism. In short, we chose a new life system, a suiting thought system, a collateral politico social system. We have now to give up our erstwhile neglectful attitude towards national defence, change our philosophy of looking at and practicing military necessities, develop new calls on our own sense of responsibility towards national defence, come out of our self-imposed restrictive defence shell, cultivate an effective share of aggressive, assertive determination and will towards defending our lands and change our military doctrines accordingly. Without nurturing ourselves, our intellect and our attitude in that direction the raising of Strike Corps and employing it will be that much less credible and fruitful. There has to be a radical change in our thinking, philosophy, culture and tradition. National defence and use of force demand these changes, demand suitably evolved doctrines, mindset, strategic, behavioural development and strong will.

If we do not change and amend our past mindset and adopt new thinking like the Chinese have done long ago then the Strike Corps will at best act as a deterrent of sorts for some time, and will, in all likelihood, get involved in containing ingress like any defensive component, with little scope for offensive employment. Raising and employing the Strike Corps has little meaning if the Indian Air Force complement too does not add to its strength and develop an ability to inflict unacceptable destruction on the opponent.

And how is the Strike Corps going to contend with the repeated border skirmishes the Sino- Pak partnership has established as a military strategy, a seemingly new genre of war in the sub-continent? The glee and euphoria over the Strike Corps drives us back into our cultural heritage of self congratulating and feeling easy and comfortable that we have done a great job to find the right answer to stymie the enemy. The enemy is unlikely to be impressed. So is any serious student of the conflict that is threatening to engulf us.

Historically, Indians have a mediocre

record of defending themselves against foreign invaders…


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IN S U R G E N C I E S H AV E B E E N I N existence since the beginning of history and are as old as human conflict. They

are, in essence, movements organised to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. All available options including psychological, political and religious are used to alienate the population from the state. The degree of organisation and an established leadership cadre with a proper command hierarchy is what distinguishes insurgents from armed mobs.

At the start of all insurgencies, there has been a marked asymmetry of military power as well as resources, between the state and the insurgents. In several cases, this asymmetry continued to exist right up to the overthrow of the state with the functioning of the state being undermined from within.

Conventional Warfare and Counter Insurgency

The aim of military forces engaged in a conventional conflict is to destroy the military capabilities of the opponent or to gain control of territory, or both. Enemy forces, infrastructure, communication links, economic and industrial assets and even the leadership as well as non-combatants become targets. Maximum use of available force is done to achieve a speedy victory while minimising damage to own assets and population.

The aim of the insurgents is to dismantle the control of the state over an area and more

specifically, over the population of that area. Once this is done, the insurgents become the de facto state. This is achieved by subverting the authority of the state by political and mass agitations, destroying the infrastructure and then blaming the state for the lack of it, using armed action to ‘liberate’ both the area and the population and then assume the full functions and powers of the failed state. Provoking the state to use excessive force which results in damage and casualties to non combatants, is a method effectively used by all insurgents.

Counter insurgency operations aim to degrade the military capabilities of insurgents and either eliminate or win over their cadres with minimum destruction of infrastructure and loss of life in areas of operation. Military action is extremely selective. Unfortunately the training, ethos and equipment of regular military forces as well as the thought processes of military commanders often run counter to these tenets with disastrous results. Use of weaponry has to be decided upon not with their effectiveness against opposing forces alone but after considering the far reaching ramifications of their use against what are, more often than not, one’s own people.

This difference is why counter insurgency operations differ from conventional military operations. The military aspect is possibly the least important and is limited to facilitate the other organs of the state to restore normalcy. In conventional warfare, destruction of opposing

Employment of Helicopters in Counter Insurgency RolesGp Capt B Menon

Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,

insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

Group Captain B Menon, former fighter pilot, IAF


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regular forces and boots on the ground in enemy territory result in military victory. Whether it will guarantee achievement of all the aims for which the war started, is another story. It is clear that weaponry alone cannot prevail. At home, our experience in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir, in the North East and in our heartland are also pointers to this.

History of Helicopters in Counter Insurgency Operations

Experts estimate that about 80 different insurgencies are active around the world. Malaya, French Indochina, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, South Africa, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Congo, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Xinjiang, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Chechnya have all seen the use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft in operations against insurgents in the past. Usage was limited in most cases because of the shortage of helicopters in the inventories of most military and para military forces barring perhaps the US and the Soviets, and not because their unique capabilities were not apparent.

In Malaya, Indo-China, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Indonesia South Africa and Algeria in the 1950s

and 1960s, reconnaissance and surveillance, troop insertion and extraction, resupply and Casualty Evacuation (Casevac) and hot pursuit of insurgents by heli-borne troops were the main roles. A few air-to-ground strike missions providing fire support to ground forces were also flown. All these were generally daytime operations due to the limited capabilities of helicopters at that time.

In Vietnam, about 12,000 helicopters were deployed in total and gave unprecedented air mobility to the US and South Vietnamese military forces. Helicopters specially modified for the air-to-ground combat role began to be used. Night operations using helicopters became feasible. Losses were also huge, amounting to over 5,000. It is another matter that despite employment of the most modern and complex weaponry, wrong strategic assessments resulted in defeat in the end, once again proving that strategy prevails over tactics all the time.

The Soviets inducted dedicated combat helicopters (Mi-24) into counter insurgency in

A recent development has been the use of

UAVs integrated with helicopters…


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Afghanistan in 1980 and they proved to be the most reliable form of fire support to ground forces in that difficult terrain. Operating with the Mi-8 armed troop transport helicopter, they provided vital mobility and firepower. The Afghan insurgents regarded the Mi-24 as their biggest threat, a back-handed compliment to its lethality. This led to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplying Stinger man-portable Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) to the insurgents. Some reports indicate that after initial increase in losses to Stingers, their effectiveness against helicopters, especially gunships, had waned. However defensive measures degraded weapon

delivery accuracies and i n c r e a s e d c o l l a t e r a l damage, further alienating the population. Overall, the attack helicopter proved to be very effective in counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Helicopter

losses between 1979 and 1989 were close to 350, more than half of which were before the advent of the Stingers. One option available to insurgents is to neutralise this threat by ground attacks on the helicopter bases. This has been tried with some success in almost

all insurgencies and bigger conflicts such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. There is an assessment that ready availability of helicopters in both Vietnam and Afghanistan, led to increase in impatience and aggressiveness in their use by military commanders in the counter insurgency environment which calls for time-consuming patience and avoidance of excessive force. This is one aspect we have to be careful about when using not only helicopters but also other highly lethal weaponry in counter insurgency scenarios.

Usage Of HelicoptersHelicopters have important roles in counter

insurgency operations in areas of intelligence acquisition, surveillance and reconnaissance, Casevac, logistics resupply, transportation of combatants and non combatants, troop induction and extraction and in air-to-ground strike plus psychological operations such as voice and radio broadcasts and leaflet dropping. It is safe to assume that local insurgents will not have sophisticated air defence with early warning and acquisition radars, SAMs other than a few man portable systems and air assets.

Advantages The ability to operate from unprepared

Indian Air Force commanders have opposed using offensive air power against our own people…


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surfaces without being dependent on sizable infrastructure such as runways is unique to rotary wing aircraft. This enables them to be located close to areas of interest and reduces reaction time despite having slower speeds. Helicopters have the ability to fly slow and low and to hover during surveillance, reconnaissance, psychological operations and for re-supply, troop induction and extraction, Casevac and for accurate delivery of firepower especially when using unguided munitions. Hover capabilities permit trained troops to exit by rappelling, eliminating the danger of land mines in Landing Zones being triggered by the weight of the helicopter resting on the ground.

The ability to loiter for extended periods of time over areas of interest is an advantage over fast jet fixed wing aircraft. Helicopters have the option to provide air mobility to ground forces to a degree unmatched by fixed wing aircraft. A recent development has been the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) integrated with helicopters. The former are ideally suited for reconnaissance, surveillance and for real time data collection because of their longer endurance, generally higher speeds and greater

loiter times when compared to helicopters. They can even be controlled from helicopters directly or with the helicopter providing a data link to extend the range of the ground station. They can free up scarce helicopter assets by taking over the above roles. They are also lethal in air-to-ground strike roles as insurgents in a lot of countries are discovering.

DisadvantagesBy their very nature, helicopters are complex

and aerodynamically unstable platforms as compared to fixed wing aircraft. Their ability to tackle extreme conditions of weather is generally less than that of fixed wing aircraft . Performance degradation with altitude (especially in the high and hot conditions prevalent in the mountains) is more rapid than with fixed wing aircraft. Speeds and altitudes are lower than that of fixed wing aircraft, putting them at risk against ground fire to a greater degree. Lower speeds result in increased response times unless they are based close to areas of operations. This increases the

Effective command and control plus coordination

are aspects that are at times de cient in our

joint operations…


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vulnerability of bases to attack by ground forces especially in counter insurgency scenarios where forces are operating deep in areas where the control of the state is tenuous. Because of their very design, rotors and power transmission systems are exposed and extremely vulnerable to damage from light and medium automatic weapons. Unlike fixed wing aircraft, such damage is often catastrophic. Although their ability to land vertically and hover are assets, they are extremely vulnerable during these

phases. Due to limitations in weight carrying capability, fitting heavy armour on aircraft in general and helicopters in particular is usually not a workable idea. Providing protection against small calibre automatic weapons up to 23mm for crew members, fuel tanks

and some critical areas has been done in certain types, especially gunships. Simple weapons like Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) with shaped charge warheads have proved to be lethal even against armoured gunships like the Mi 25/35. These weapons are readily available to even poorly equipped insurgents. Existing armour on gunships does not provide sufficient protection. As of now evading them is the only effective defence if helicopters have to operate within their lethal envelopes. However due to short ranges, time available to evade is limited. Such a crude use-and-throw weapon operated by someone with very little training but high on motivation can neutralise a sophisticated system. Medium calibre machine guns are also a serious threat.

Vulnerabilities to ground weapons have forced helicopters to fly higher outside the kill envelopes of these weapons or to operate by night when the ground defenders have problems of target acquisition. Both these tactics degrade weapons delivery accuracy especially when using unguided weapons. This brings up the problem of collateral damage which may be acceptable to some extent in an all out war, but is totally counter-productive in counter insurgency situations.

The Indian ScenarioIn the past we have used fixed wing aircraft

in an offensive role in the North East briefly in the early 1960s and extensively in logistics support roles from then onwards. Indian forces used both Mi-8 transport and Mi-25 attack helicopters in counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka and in support of UN ‘peacekeeping’ missions in Africa.

As of now, we have been using very limited numbers of medium transport helicopters in the support, reconnaissance, surveillance, air mobility and Casevac roles. Numbers are few, for example 12,000 ground para military forces being supported by just eight IAF helicopters in Central India. The decision to increase the numbers to 14 is touted as a great effort! These have been augmented by UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance. The sensor packages in the UAVs are reportedly having difficulties in picking up insurgents under forest cover. Although real time data generation is possible, the complaint is that the data reaches the ground para military commander late. We have a habit of degrading our capabilities, inhouse itself because of turf wars!

IAF helicopters are armed for retaliatory fire with light automatic weapons only. Indian Air Force commanders have opposed using offensive air power against our own people. We had done that with fixed wing fighters in the mid 1960s in the North East and like almost all countries realised that except in very high intensity operations bordering on civil war or full armed conflict, such options are counter-productive. The call for use of helicopters in fire support roles is possibly born out of political desperation to try anything and without appreciating the limitations and dangers of offensive use of air power in counter insurgency operations.

Insurgents will love to destroy an IAF helicopter and capture the crew not because it significantly degrades the capabilities of one of the largest air forces in the world (which it does not), but because it acts as a morale booster for their cadres and a propaganda tool for their perceived fight against ‘an oppressive state’. It also helps in attracting recruits and garnering both national and international sympathy.

An area of contention between the IAF and

In an ideal world, we would have state-of-the-art helicopters and Precision Guided Munitions in huge numbers…


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para military forces has been the sanitising and securing of drop zones for helicopters. The former wants neutralisation of insurgents in the area whereas the latter contends that the need to induct ground forces into hostile areas is because the areas have insurgent activity in the first place. A ground force which finds it difficult to clear road lines of communication along a five-metre wide road for, say, ten kilometres because almost all the ambushes have been of security forces moving along roads because they lack the mobility, terrain knowledge and at times the infantry skills to move cross-country unlike the insurgents – can find it difficult to say the least to sanitise areas of around two by two kilometres surrounding a helicopter Landing Zone. Saturating the area with suppressive fire from the air as is done in war zones leads to collateral damage and further alienation.

Beset with all these constraints of low intensity insurgency operations, the best use of helicopters in our context of relatively low and medium intensity insurgencies is as follows:

Enhancing mobility of ground forces by reducing their dependence on road links.

Logistics re-supply.

Reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor areas of interest on a real time basis. This is where UAV integration works.

P rov i d e a i r b o r n e c o m m a n d a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n l i n k s b a s e d o n helicopters. However the idea of ground forces at platoon levels being controlled from the air by the brass sitting in the relative safety of helicopters proved disastrous in Vietnam and we need not re-invent the wheel.

Timely Casevac. This is a potent morale booster also.

These roles require the following measures:

A substantial increase in numbers of troop transport and cargo helicopters with simple and not sophisticated night operations capability.

Troops need training in helicopter operations.

Lack of heli-lift and real time surveillance availability has been a reason for troops getting trapped in insurgent ambushes.

For Special Operations such as targeting the leadership elements, specially equipped helicopters and Special Forces from military assets could be used.

Better helicopter or UAV mounted sensors with all weather capabilities are needed to fully exploit these sensor capabilities and these missions could be done by Air Force assets.

Increased numbers of less sophisticated medium altitude UAVs for routine reconnaissance and surveillance. These will free up more helicopter assets for other tasks.

Some helicopters for Communications, UAV control and command post roles. These could be standard cargo helicopters communication kits.

We should increase helicopter assets in support roles rather than go overboard and use gunship firepower as a substitute for boots on the ground in the present state of insurgency. If insurgency is allowed to escalate into a civil war like conflict, the very survival of the state will dictate the use of all available resources without constraints. We would then have already lost the counter insurgency war.

Effective command and control plus coordination are aspects that are at times deficient in our joint operations, both military and civil. Specialised training and area familiarisation of crew and troops is required to fully exploit the potential of helicopters. Commanders with a pure law and order maintenance background and no concept of counter insurgency and ignorant of application of air power cannot be successful in conducting counter insurgency operations involving elements of air power.

Using helicopters crewed by pilots who are not trained in operating in militarily hostile

The history of insurgencies shows that

military domination alone cannot win this war…


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environments risks lives and mission success. Involvement of the military in internal security duties itself is an admission of failure of the state apparatus but has become commonplace now. Equipment constraints with an ageing helicopter fleet and replacements mired in controversies means that the services will not willingly allocate scarce assets for counter insurgency.

Laying down priorities is imperative in our case. The dangers posed by insurgency have to be weighed against the military threat from hostile neighbors, some of them involved in supporting the insurgencies themselves. This has to be done at the highest political levels and thereafter decisions taken on allocation of

resources. Raising the numbers of helicopters from eight to 14 is at best a token gesture. In an ideal world, we would have state–of-the-art helicopters and Precision Guided Munitions in huge numbers. In such an ideal world, we would not have neglected the root causes of insurgencies and allowed them to fester for decades to start with!

Past record has proved that only ground forces operating with restraint can overcome insurgency. All other weapons systems can at best support these troops and not supplant them. The history of insurgencies shows that military domination alone cannot win this war. There is truth in the axiom that ‘those who forget history are condemned to repeat it’.


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ALL SKILLED PROFESSIONALS, BE they cardiac surgeons, car mechanics or carpenters, always have their own

personalised tool kits from which they can choose the appropriate instrument with which to successfully complete their task. Similarly, “our national security system is the toolbox with which we navigate through an ever-changing international environment: It turns our overall capabilities into active assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic international system and makes it possible to exploit its opportunities.”2 From within this toolbox, nation states aspiring to be regarded as regional or global powers, fully understand the necessity for an effective strategic force projection capability in time critical contingencies. This will provide them the requisite muscle when other diplomatic initiatives aimed at protecting national interests are not as effective as they need to be. This inescapable and essential requirement is best met by a suitably organised and capable Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF).

So what exactly does force projection imply? The US Department of Defense defines power projection as being, “the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”3

FORCE PROJECTION AND RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCESNeed for Reassessment

As India’s regional and global aspirations grow with its increasing economic clout, it will be forced to build up its capacity to project power in its national interest to ensure that the region is not destabilised by outside elements that may be inimical to it. The establishment of an effective and responsive RDF towards this end is inescapable. To be able to do so requires that India take a long hard look at its requirements and reassess its capabilities. It needs to quickly put in place structures that will ensure that its RDF is able to provide what is required of it so that in the words of Rahul Gandhi, “We stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”1

As Dr. Ladlow puts it, “Military power projection has been divided into nine different aspects based on the political goals being sought and the level of force employed. Four of these relate to the employment of ‘soft’ military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping), and five are primarily concerned with “hard” military power (showing the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).”4

RDF Capabilities and TaskingWhile it would appear to be a no brainer

that RDF capability required to meet the hard military power options would be established based on the logical and reasonable view that such a capability needs to be developed based on what would be considered to be the nation’s area of interest, the contingencies that it may be required to tackle and the threat perception that would need to be neutralised. However, invariably, this is not the case and such a capability tends to be established based on legacy structures and assets already available with some minor alterations or some additional capabilities being incorporated. This results in two major flaws with consequences that are fairly easy to visualise. Firstly, it implies that we have a force that is looking for a mission that it can accomplish and not the other way around which means there will be situations

Brig Deepak Sinha

Brig Deepak Sinha is a second generation

para trooper and author of “Beyond

the Bayonet: Indian Special Operations

Forces in the 21st Century.” He is

currently a consultant with the Observer

Research Foundation.


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in which intervention is not a viable option because the capability available cannot meet the requirement. Secondly, RDF tasking tends to be treated not as the primary responsibility but as just another contingency that may arise resulting in the existing command and control hierarchy being neither attuned nor flexible enough to be able to respond as required. Unfortunately, this is the case in our context as well and needs corrective action at the earliest.

Before focusing on our RDF requirements, available capabilities and actions that require to be initiated to make them an effective tool of national security it would be worthwhile to understand how the RDF is organised and

tasked. These forces are not homogeneous units but a Task Force consisting of a variety of specialised u n i t s w i t h s p e c i f i c operational capabilities and mission profiles that are complementary and are

utilised in a variety of combinations depending on the strategic and tactical requirement. Their synchronised and synergistic operational employment is aimed at ensuring successful mission termination. Primarily, these forces consist of units that act as ‘tripwire’ elements capable of immediate response to developing situations within a nation’s area of interest. These are followed by ‘heavier forces’ that are transported into a safe zone within the area of interest by air, sea or surface transport where they reorganise themselves for deployment as required. There may, however, be situations where they may be required to establish themselves against opposition to be able to proceed with their mission. It is for one contingency within such a scenario that there is a necessity to have amphibious capabilities as well.

The tripwire elements tend to be lightly equipped airborne units capable of speedy mobilisation and deployment at the target area within a matter of hours. As first responders, their primary mission is to provide boots that can stabilise the developing situation on the ground, real time accurate intelligence and assessment of the prevailing ground situation

and provide a firm base for follow-up forces and logistic echelons. In addition they may also be required to provide asset protection or recovery and undertake direct action missions to neutralise elements inimical to our national interest. These forces are limited by the quantum and type of equipment and personnel and logistics that they can carry or be supplied with based on available air assets, the prevailing air defence environment and the ground tactical situation. All these factors including distance of the target area directly impact their mission profile and threat neutralisation capabilities. The heavier follow on forces are based on infantry and supporting arms and services units suitably modified, equipped and trained for either employment in the amphibious role or for air movement. These are normally based on a standard Infantry or Mechanised Division or Brigade group.

In 1990, for example, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, rapid deployment by the US to Saudi Arabia was carried out sequentially with the first troops to arrive being a Brigade of the 82nd Airborne which got there in less than three days after the decision to go was made. Within a week, the combat elements of a full division were on the ground, complete with air-landed light armor. In three weeks, combat-loaded M1 tanks of the Army’s 24th Mechanised Division began rolling out of fast sea-lift ships at Dhahran. And in two months the entire XVIII Airborne Corps, to include an airborne, an air assault and a mechanised infantry division, plus Corps troops and a Special Forces group, were on the ground.5 Whether the US capability continues to be maintained is a moot point as there have been some public pronouncements in recent months that go on to suggest that some of this transportation capacity, especially in terms of Fast Sea Lift ships, had been greatly degraded.

RDF in the Indian ContextWhat then should be our consideration

with regard to the RDF capabilities we need to maintain? We do need to keep in mind that a substantial portion of our trade, especially energy requirements, are wholly dependent on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and our core business interests along with Indian

Our ability to in uence events within the Indian Ocean littoral region should be considered satisfactory…


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communities have been rapidly growing globally. Ideally, our areas of interest and areas of influence should coincide which would require us to effectively intervene wherever our national interests are at stake. This however, is impractical, given our military, economic and developmental constraints as also our influence on the global stage. Thus, in practical terms, our ability to influence events within the Indian Ocean littoral region and our immediate neighbourhood should be considered satisfactory. In addition, the ability to work as a part of a Multi-national Force, whether under UN flag or otherwise, also needs to be maintained to meet contingencies such as providing support to Indian Peacekeepers as was required in Sierra Leone during OP Khukri. For example, keeping in view the forthcoming withdrawal of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, contingencies that may require intervention within the Central Asian Region in conjunction with other affected states in the area needs to be given serious consideration and capacities developed accordingly.

Thus, in our context, we need to ensure that we have air assets capable of covering approximately 4,000 km with standard payloads without refueling, apart from being capable of carrying out mid-air refueling. With regard to the Airborne Task Force (ABTF), keeping in view likely tasks and expected threats a mechanised and anti-tank heavy parachute battalion group with its standard components of artillery, combat engineers, communications, air defence and logistic elements would meet the requirement. In addition inclusion of a Special Forces Team will further enhance flexibility. This air assault element must be based on the new generation of recently acquired air assets, the C-17s and the C-130s. In some scenarios, this force will not have the ability to sustain itself and hold the firm base it establishes, in all likelihood an airfield, for longer than 12 to 18 hours. The ability to launch a follow up ABTF along with a Brigade level controlling headquarter within 12 hours thus becomes essential. This implies that keeping in view routine administrative and training commitments an airborne Brigade of three battalions along with one Special Forces battalion must form part of the RDF.

As regards the ‘heavy element’ of the RDF, the option exists to have a suitably tailored infantry division along with utility and helicopter assets nominated and trained for the role. Another option could be to have one armour heavy independent Mechanised Brigade and one independent Infantry Brigade group organised and trained for an amphibious role nominated as a part of the RDF. The latter option would require maintenance of a permanent tri-services controlling headquarters that could assume control over an expeditionary force, if required. Our Sri Lanka experience during OP Pawan does clearly point to such a requirement. In addition, this force must also be able to support own operations in other contingencies in conventional war and disaster management contingencies in any sector within the country including the island territories. This could also include internal stabilisation operations. In view of their being required to operate in high altitude areas there will be a requirement for some elements to be pre- located in high altitude areas to ensure that they are fully acclimatised for operations at short notice.

In terms of availability of assets, especially within the IAF and the IN it is fortuitous that earlier perspective plans have ensured that required air assets to be able to drop two ABTFs simultaneously is presently available or will be so by end of 2014 with the induction of additional C130s and C-17s. The ability of the IN to move up to one infantry Brigade with a regiment worth of armour for amphibious operations has been in place for some time and is likely to be enhanced within the decade with the induction of additional indigenous Landing Platform Docks (LPD)6 and Landing Ship Tanks (LST)7. As regards the army capability while amphibious and airborne capability are already in place there is an urgent need to reassess the organisational and equipment profile of these units. For example, in respect of the Parachute Brigade, there is an urgent need for a Path Finder and Intelligence and Surveillance component being added. The

It is likely that economic strength, rather than military prowess, will

be the real measure of state power…


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parachute battalions need to shed the BMPs and replace them with wheeled All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV) such as Land Rovers which should be able to mount the next generation of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, 0.50 Calibre Heavy Machine Guns and Air Defence Launchers. The artillery needs 105mm or 155mm Light Guns while

the engineer component also requires an additional increment to be able to get occupied airfields functional.

However, the most urgent and important issue that needs to be faced would be with regard to over-all c o m m a n d a n d c o n t ro l

structures. To ensure a responsive and effective deployment there is little choice but to adopt one of the controlling options suggested earlier. Ideally, the RDF should function either under the special Operations Command that is likely to be established at some future date or function directly under the Chief of Defence Staff as and when established.

ConclusionWe live in extremely difficult and testing

times. Our neighbourhood confronts some of the most challenging and complex issues that

directly impact the stability of the region. A rising and more nationalistic China, growing Islamic fundamentalism along with the gradual shift in economic power to the Asia-Pacific region only add to the problems that policy planners in the region need to deal with. While it is likely that economic strength, rather than military prowess, will be the real measure of state power, especially in the increasingly integrated world that we live in, military force will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in ensuring nations are able to maintain an autonomous foreign policy.

As India’s regional and global aspirations grow with its increasing economic clout, it will be forced to build up its capacity to project power in its national interest to ensure that the region is not destabilised by outside elements that may be inimical to it. The establishment of an effective and responsive RDF towards this end is inescapable. To be able to do so requires that India take a long hard look at its requirements and reassess its capabilities. It needs to quickly put in place structures that will ensure that its RDF is able to provide what is required of it so that in the words of Rahul Gandhi, “We stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”8

The most urgent and important issue that needs to be faced would be with regard to over-all command and control structures…

Notes1 Op Cit; Walter C Ladwig III.

2 Bliddal, Henrik; Reforming Military Command Arrangements : The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force; http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/; 2011

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>

4 WALTER C. LADWIG III; India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi

become a Conventional Great Power? Asian Survey Vol 50 Issue 6, Nov 2010 ;pp 1162-1182

5 Robert Killebrew; Deployment: The Army Rapid and American Strategy: An Analysis; December 9, 2013

6 Defense News, 12 Dec 2013; http://www.d e f e n s e n e w s . c o m / a r t i c l e / 2 0 1 3 1 2 1 2 /DEFREG03/312120012/India-Construct-4-LPDs

7 Warfare Sims.Com ; Indian Amphibious Capability, May 2009; http://www.warfaresims.com/p=647

8 Op Cit; Walter C Ladwig III.


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A DECADE AGO THE US DEPARTMENT of Defense (DoD) and the global strategic community had warned

that China would begin flexing muscles 2010 onwards and that India should settle the border disputes with China before this; but little was done to even plug gaps in our defences. Improvement of border infrastructure has not really taken off despite colossal Chinese military upgrades in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) including nuclear missile deployments and massive exercises by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Chinese Airborne Corps in proximity to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese aggression has been on the rise, nibbling away at Indian territory consistently. The gap between the capabilities of the PLA and the Indian military has been widening. There is a need to take stock and rapidly institute a tiered border defence against China to safeguard our territorial integrity and meet the challenges of the mounting threat.

Current Scenario: Border Defence

With unity of command having been compromised, our border defence has been woefully inadequate. Reportedly, some 400 sq.km. of territory has been lost in Ladakh over and above the Aksai Chin. Responsibility of border defence is divided between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), with the Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) deployed in sensitive areas without placing them under the command

Tiered Border Defence Against China

a regional power. If India fails to respond adequately, she will be projected as a ‘Soft State’ susceptible to coercion. Simultaneously, the Chinese aim would be to keep India embroiled in

of the Army. This facilitates smuggling of narcotics, fake currency, goods and even illegal immigration with indicators that some of these activities are institutionalised. Chinese goods are being smuggled into India also through the India-Myanmar border. Not only is the ULFA hierarchy located at Ruli on Chinese soil but China is also pumping in weapons and communication equipment through the Kachen rebels in Myanmar to the PLA in Manipur and onwards to the Maoists in India. Deployment of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in sensitive areas of Ladakh without placing them under the command of the local Army formation is a folly that has been capitalised by the Chinese who have made deep intrusions without qualms.

Border Infrastructure Despite the Border Road Organisation

(BRO) being directly under the MoD, border infrastructure has been severely neglected. In February 2014, NDTV reported that out of the 26 border roads sanctioned in recent years, only one has been completed. China, on the other hand, has developed excellent infrastructure that permits quick mobilisation and vehicular movement. This includes construction of a ten-kilometre road in Pangong Tso area. In 1970, at Nathu La, the Chinese could ply a five-tonne vehicle vis-à-vis a one-tonne vehicle of ours. Today, over four decades later, the status remains the same. Lack of development of border infrastructure on the Indian side is the main reason why the Chinese could intrude

Special Correspondent


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freely and our security forces are unable to react effectively and in time.

Intrusions Similar is the story with our poor response to

Chinese intrusions. Criticism and shame had to be faced in wake of deep intrusions such as the one at Raki Nala in Depsang during April 2013 when even the MEA admitted that the intrusion was five to seven kilometres beyond the line of Chinese claim. It is a wonder how a 1.2 million strong army could permit 20 Chinese soldiers to sit 19 km deep inside Indian territory for 25 days. Ironically, Chinese troops had reportedly intruded into the same area on earlier occasions albeit this time the media got wise.

Such intrusions have been occurring at many places along the LAC despite the 1993 India-China Agreement on Maintenance of

Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-

China Border Areas, 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas, and the 2012 Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs.

Now, even after signing the China-drafted Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) in 2013, the Chinese intruded into Depsang and Chumar on December 19 and 20. Then, in the first week of January 2014, intrusions took place in the Takdip area where incursions had been spotted in December 2013 as well. Now, China has proposed a Code of Conduct to be introduced along the border. Obviously China wants to play at signing agreement after agreement without changing her aggressive stance. Chinese occupation of the Depsang plains in conjunction with her presence in Gilgit-Baltisatn would threaten India’s deployments in Siachen and sever the approach to Karakoram Pass. India has also lost substantial territory in the India-China-

Myanmar tri-juncture area; China is also staking claims to the Tatu Bowl, loss of which would enable the Chinese to easily roll down the plains. POK is already a strategic objective of China that provides her access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, to Afghanistan and the CARs.

Prospects of ConflictMuch has been talked of about the possibilities

of future Sino-Indian conflict from the Chinese gameplan to place India in the vice-like grip of a python to gobble up what the former wants, active defence to short swift offensive even using tactical nuclear weapons to force India to surrender territory, acupuncture warfare and the like. China’s ‘active defence’ doctrine is a transformation from Mao’s large scale people’s land-centric war to high intensity, short duration localised war under informationised conditions. In this context, the chances of conflict remain.

Despite the progressing economic relations, China’s focus in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remains a cause for concern. China has been making every possible effort to find her way to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and Pakistan along the land routes. Her strategic interests clash with the US and her allies in the Asia-Pacific; China desperately needs another oceanic front and a strong India is hardly to her liking. Besides, for Chinese Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) to operate effectively in the IOR, China needs land-based air and missile support. This is one reason why China is deploying missiles in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan and developing or planning to develop ports in countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Seychelles in the IOR.

Not only has China colluded with Pakistan on a conventional and nuclear front but also in the sub-conventional field by waging a collusive asymmetric war against India including through irregular forces and proxies. With China’s aggression on the rise, the collusive China-Pakistan threat has multiplied exponentially with both countries following a policy of ambiguity, denial and deceit, what with repeated Chinese intrusions, claim to entire Arunachal

China’s focus in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) remains a cause for concern…


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Pradesh as “South Tibet” and now demanding a Code of Conduct for forward troops, indicating the futility of the recently signed Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA).

On balance, the prospects of Sino-Indian conflict remain. What appears certain is that China’s aggressive stance and the initiation of conflict will be aimed at undermining India’s status as a regional power. If India fails to respond adequately, she will be projected as a ‘Soft State’ susceptible to coercion. Simultaneously, the Chinese aim would be to keep India embroiled in fighting internal/regional conflicts. In doing so, China maybe expected to virtually abrogate any agreements such as Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement and Confidence Building Measures and BDCA leading to incremental build up and conflict.

Should the US get more involved in the Middle East or in new and likely hotspots such as Ukraine and the CAR, Chinese adventurism in India can be expected to escalate. The US may have announced the Asia Pivot in recent months but China already has in place a globally deployable military force with nuclear/non-nuclear allies/proxies in North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria as a countermeasure even if one discounts China not resorting to the employment of large scale nuclear force.

The simple fact is that, if and when it suits her national interests, China will not hesitate to take physical action against India such as opening multiple land routes to the Indian Ocean to cater to her long term energy requirements. This is likely even while China’s power projection in the IOR remains constrained in the absence of credible air cover till aircraft carrier groups with accompanying airpower can be deployed. For the time being, her power projection in the IOR will, in all likelihood, be under the guise of what may be termed as ‘military operations other than war’.

Some Western strategists even feel that to shock India into territorial concessions, the PLA may consider a savage campaign including limited nuclear exchange. Although crossing the nuclear rubicon may be unlikely, we certainly cannot rule out the possibility altogether.

What we should be ready for is the opening of multiple fronts as it has occurred before. Land-based enveloping actions of yesteryears will be replaced by vertical envelopment through helicopter-based RRF. Physical activation of the LAC will be preceded by full spectrum satellite surveillance, cyber attacks on the military, non-military networks and critical infrastructure, laser and plasma attacks. Conflict may be simultaneous at the operational, strategic and tactical levels that maybe intense but short with the use of PGMs to maximum effect.

Defence Against ChinaTo advocate a tiered defence against China is

no surprise as tiered defence is probably most effective against anything. In World War I, even the Maginot Line had obstacles thrown in ahead besides artillery barrages to stop the advancing enemy. The term ‘offensive defence’ has been in vogue since long. Besides the most simplistic explanation could well be that one cannot defend one’s house by simply barricading it, and that there must be elements outside to patrol the streets. The second issue is that of employing asymmetric approaches particularly in cyberspace and employing proxies in the sub-conventional segment of the conflict spectrum.

It is well known the PLA has invested in border villages, making inroads through smugglers, agents and Special Forces personnel besides using its soldiers in the garb of civilians in development projects in countries surrounding India particularly Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar in proximity of the LAC. What is important in planning the tiered defence against China is to carefully develop each tier taking into account Chinese concepts and attack methodology, realities of warfare in the twenty-first century and optimising advancements in technology to help buttress defence.

Significantly, China flight tested its new hypersonic vehicle in January 2014, which travels at a velocity at least five times faster than sound. China favours a pre-emptive strike as an option to break the enemy will to

In the prevailing environment of

global con ict, the rst tier of defence

must necessarily be deep inside enemy

backyard…


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fight with damaging strikes, increasing ground operations simultaneously. We need to bridge such asymmetries.

First Tier In the prevailing environment of global

conflict, the first tier of defence must necessarily be deep inside enemy backyard; application of asymmetric approaches in reverse of what China has been waging against us for many years, which China terms as ‘unrestricted warfare’. Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare does not just span the use of proxies but is based on the three main pillars of the Military (atomic, conventional, bio-chemical, ecological, space, guerilla and terrorist warfare), Trans Military (diplomatic, network, intelligence, psychological, tactical, smuggling, drug and virtual warfare) and the Non-Military (financial, trade, resources, economic aid, regulatory, sanctions, media and ideological warfare).

Divorcing conventional defence from these forms of ongoing warfare would be foolish. Our first tier of defence as a country against China

should, therefore, be aimed at not only negating her aggressive m ov e s i n e a c h o f t h e s e segments but also optimising such moves in India’s favour. As far as sub-conventional conflict is concerned, China has numerous faultlines and

her buffer provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet are on the boil. While China, in conjunction with Pakistan, has been using her advanced sub-conventional potential against India, the latter has been relying on rather ineffective diplomacy and conventional force. Basing a policy against sub-conventional threats on idealism as a stand-alone factor only provides an inward looking policy which is more expensive in the long run and adversely affects our national security and development. In coping with asymmetric threats, establishment of offensive cyber warfare, space warfare and electro-magnetic capability including Directed Energy Weapons are vital as well.

Second Tier The second tier of defence would be at the

LAC itself. India needs to ensure that she does

not present a weak front anywhere along the LAC. There should be unity of command with everything placed under the command of the Army. Sensitive areas such as Depsang and Chumar in Eastern Ladakh should be held by Ladakh Scouts who are the ‘sons of the soil’ rather than the ITBP. Similarly, the same pattern should follow along the rest of the LAC in Himachal, Sikkim, Arunachal and Meghalaya.

Existing levels of Scouts units in these regions need to reviewed considering the role they have in conflict across the LAC and subsequently fighting the enemy inside own territory cutting off the thrust lines, should such a need arise. The first tier must have continuous trans-border surveillance in place. This must consist of satellite cover, UAVs, MAVs and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS). Comprehensive battlefield transparency must be in place integrating space, areal and ground equipment such as LOROS, BFSR, HHTIs, UGS, Surveillance cameras and NVDs.

Modern electronic surveillance involves detection of movement, and is largely based on seismic, acoustic, inductive sensors, and infrared sensors - all of which should be optimised. Considering the length of the unsettled border, construction of a border fence akin to the Indo-Pak border is not feasible. However, it would be prudent to cater for the laying of obstacles, mines and IEDs on imminence of hostilities but fire or aerially lay mines on axes of enemy advance, as required. The forces deployed along the LAC (as also subsequent tiers and offensive reserves) need to be provisioned with the wherewithal for information dominance and assurance, ability to paralyse the enemy’s C4I2 infrastructure, stand-off weapons to pre-empt enemy attack, adequate mix of DEW, PGMs and ASATs, ability to disrupt enemy logistics/sustenance and mix of hard and soft kill options. Fielding of the Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS) and Battlefield Management System (BMS) must be expedited. Development of border infrastructure needs to be fine-tuned to cater for all types of day or night movement.

Third Tier This essentially comprises the second

Reportedly, some 400 sq km of territory has been lost in Ladakh over and above the Aksai Chin…


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layer of units and sub-units in support of the troops deployed along the LAC. There would be requirement of scouts, home guards, civil defence forces operating in the gaps in addition to extensive network of army patrols. Obstacles can be laid ab initio or as required along the assessed and actual thrust lines of the enemy. Areas that the PLA could possibly use for third dimension aerial envelopment (between the second and third tiers and behind the third tier) would need to be identified and measures instituted to negate their use; obstacles, fire plans and earmarking of reserves.

Mountain Strike Corps Mountain-based operations are time

consuming and more significantly, manpower intensive. In addition to the aerospace dimension, land-based conflict should be expected more in areas conducive to the deployment of mechanised forces; examples being Eastern Ladakh, North Sikkim and Chumbi Valley. Offensive operations essentially require uncommitted troops. To this end, there is a definite need to deploy an exclusive Mountain Strike Corps in Ladakh considering the collusive China-Pakistan threat including China’s strategic designs in the POK-Ladakh

region. A second Mountain Strike Corps needs to be deployed to cater to Chinese claims to so-called “South Tibet” for appropriate response when required.

ConclusionChina is fast emulating Nazi Germany;

her actions indicating her belief that she has achieved the level of CNP to extract whatever territorial gains she wants from her neighbours without challenging the US or daring it to intervene despite its declining economic strength. The 12 per cent hike in China’s defence budget points towards rising aggression. There is no reason to be overawed by China’s economic and military might but our forward infrastructure development needs to be undertaken on critical operational priority to ensure rapid mobilisation and switching of forces. In addition, we must strive to remove the asymmetry vis-à-vis China in aerospace, cyber and electro-magnetic domains as well as in rapid aerial deployments. The vital deterrent to irregular warfare must be established on priority. There is no reason that we cannot take on future challenges.

There is no reason to be overawed by China’s economic

and military might…


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“Neng su sheng ze su sheng, bu Neng su sheng ze huan sheng” (Win quickly if possible; if not Win with delay!)

—Mao’s Directive to Marshall Peng Dehuai before giving the ‘Go Ahead’ to launch the PLA

Forces against General Douglas MacArthur’s Command in Korea during October 1950)

IT I S A N A G E O L D T R U T H T H AT successful military operations are always ‘Intelligence Driven.’ When we analyse the

success, effectiveness and minimum number of casualties suffered by the present day US Army, or the Israel Defence Forces, or the British Army when committed in war – they all have given prime importance to thorough intelligence domination of the battlefield. Coming closer home, the PLA does the same in both the offensive and defensive, with the difference that it always insists on gaining its laid down objective irrespective of the number of casualties. Unfortunately, the Indian Army appears to have lost sight of this axiom of war. Only a part of the blame can be attributed to the Ministry of Defence bureaucracy, which is by nature, ‘reactive’ and tacitly surrenders the ‘initiative’ to our enemies. A bigger share of the blame should come on to the Army’s own think-tanks and policy formulation groups, as they have not dwelt adequately on increasing force effectiveness without having necessarily to go in for force expansion, a costly affair in our context.

Why not have ‘Technical Support Division’ at the Army Corps Level?

Col JK Achuthan

The essence of successful conventional defensive battle is in maintaining elasticity and cohesion; thereafter debilitating the enemy’s combat power to the danger zone of exhaustion and over-reach, then in launching own counter-offensive after minimum pause or by use of the ‘indirect

and end up with the destruction of his main force and irrecoverable loss of his territory. This is where the infusion of TSD at the Corps level will make a great difference in our calculations. The TSD does not have active Combat Formations under it yet it plays the role of a force multiplier by effectively employing Tactical Reserves and deciding the right timing and objective for such Counter Strike. Its main aim and battle effort is to look deep into enemy territory and discern correctly his pattern of operations almost to a predictable certainty.

The importance of accurate intelligence and timely analysis is both tactical and strategic at the Corps formation level, which is the cutting edge of actual battle anticipation and direction. At this crucial level, one cannot afford to make the mistake of relying purely on inputs received from the national level as these have to be actually corroborated at the ground level in the context of actual threats faced or tasks assigned.

In January 1951, after the successful taking of Seoul and reaching the 37th Parallel, when pressurised to resume the offensive by Kim Il Sung and his Soviet Adviser, Marshall Peng Dehuai had the courage to send this telegram to Chairman Mao, “I am the Commander in Chief here. Please tell Comrade Stalin”. The Marshall, a successful veteran of the Chinese Civil War and the Sino Japanese War, was apprehensive of another Inchon type amphibious landing at the rear of his successful armies. The lesson learnt is that there is no point stating at the end of the war that “Intelligence was lacking”, as an excuse for poor performance or lack of success. Intelligence is one commodity that has to be generated at the Army Corps level both before war and during operations, to avoid being surprised and to optimise the effectiveness of one’s battle plans.

Structure of Intelligence Gathering and Analysis at Army Corps Level

At a Corps headquarters, the capacity to


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look deep into enemy territory round the clock up to a depth of 200 km should be considered sacrosanct. This will permit any ‘holding’ type role be performed with deploying only 33 per cent of combat resources thus freeing the balance of combat potential for flexible and offensive responses. Having such a capability in today’s times will essentially entail:

Shadow enemy operations planning group.

Enemy targets - acquis i t ion and prioritisation group.

Live feed all weather day and night satellite imagery and air photo analysis group.

Joint air strikes planning group and close air support provisioning unit.

Humint analysis, open source data analysis, interpretation and interrogation group.

All weather Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) aerial surveillance sub-unit.

Airborne Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) surveillance sub-unit.

Aerial reconnaissance and insertion stealth aviation sub-unit.

NBCW protection and reaction sub-unit.

Intelligence Special Operations executive, reconnaissance and guidance sub-unit.

Deception warfare and captured enemy equipment holding and re-use unit.

Cross border intelligence, sabotage and counter-infiltration SCOUTS units/recce regiments.

Communications intelligence monitoring unit (Static & Mobile).

Electronic warfare unit (Mobile).

Corps counter bombardment unit.

Corps rear area security air defence units (Mobile).

The Technical Support Division (TSD) should basically be a lean formation designed to ensure Intelligence Driven Operations - in order to minimise own casualties, enable quick metamorphosis of fixed deployments for effective redeployed offensive/defensive roles,

protection of the jugular logistics axes of the combat divisions so that there is no need to look back thereby placing the Corps Commander in an advantageous position as far as ‘reading’ of the battlefield is concerned.

Therefore, the temptation to convert it into an administrative support/Combat Reserve Division should be resisted. Specifically, the TSD should not have the following Units/formations placed under it for command and control. These should be assigned to a Sub-Area HQ which will become a Logistics Support Division in wartime:

Corps Second Line Transport Units.

Corps Animal Transport Units.

Corps Electronics and Mechanical Engineer Units.

Corps Ordnance Units.

Corps Medical Units.

Corps Supply Units.

Corps Engineer Units.

Corps Signal Units.

The TSD should have a trimmed staff and HQ organisation. It should be essentially function oriented so that the Corps Commander does not commit scarce operational resources based solely on ‘hunch’ considerations or find himself always in a reactive frame of mind, as had unfortunately happened to the Indian Army in the 1962 War and in the 1965 and 1971 Chamb debacles. Even our executed ‘strike’ operations in the West were poor examples of achievable goals with the available resources. The concept of JSTARS-supported offensive operations of the US Army is worth emulation, with local modifications. Having TSD for our Army Corps will enable smooth implementation of the Air Land Battle rolling offensive doctrine in the plains.

In 1999, India allowed itself to be caught by ‘surprise’ in Kargil, even after this textbook plan had been openly discussed in the first chapter of Ravi Rikhye’s classic book ‘The Fourth

Intelligence is one commodity that has to be generated at

the Army Corps level both before war and during operations...


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Round’ a decade earlier! The next such major regional shock to happen could be the unilateral diversion of the waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo to Qinghai Province, before this River begins its descent from the Tibetan Plateau. The Chinese have already made the area of Eastern Xizang a ‘no go’ area for foreigners by declaring it as a National Park. Our look deep capability is going to get tested here if we have to save ourselves from a fait accompli.

Lack of Domain Specialisation in our Army

The Indian Army has allowed itself to go into such a mental decline that it has become an antediluvian monster wallowing in intellectual

poverty and lacking domain specialists. This is organic complacency at its best. If we allow other governmental manifestations to do the thinking for us, the consequences would

be paid by us with blood and honour, for the years wasted. We are a mighty force when seen from the outside but are needlessly allowing ourselves to be outwitted by cunning, determined and intelligent foes.

The Army has come to lack farsightedness, daring spirit at higher levels, R&D and applications oriented entrepreneurship; it is now characterised by a standard textbook approach and SOP mania for all situations. Thus, it is often caught on the back foot by technological developments; changes in the international, regional and the country’s domestic power plays; management and cost driven compulsions; and meeting the demands of modern public opinion and national aspirations. Today, it does not have a say in the Army related project management aspects of each of the DRDO laboratories which are truly national assets as they enjoy unlimited funding and delegated sanctioning powers even more than the IAS bureaucracy, all in the name of ‘defence’. The trial wings of each arm of the service are so rich in experience but this gets wasted as there are no co-located R&D workshops and pilot Project Manufacturing Establishments under the Army’s control.

In striking contrast, even officers at the rank of Major and Lt Col with 10 to 15 years service work as Project Management Heads in the Pentagon in the US system and squeeze the best out of America’s private sector in terms of meeting time deadlines, integration of system with systems, innovative product advancements and cost competitiveness, so as to capture the global arms market. The time has come for us to trim our DRDO and OFB/Defence PSUs, and adopt the US style competitive bid system for project funding and hardware manufacturing involving our private sector on equal terms, so that our defence exports exceed our imports.

The role and focus of the Army’s Military Secretary branch should shift from primarily doing selections for higher ranks to genuine HRD promotion. After an officer completes six years of service, he should be streamlined for any of the following domain specialisations for which he has shown aptitude, and thereafter, he should be earmarked for two tenures in that field before completion of 20 years of service:

Affiliation to a particular army Corps zone.

Learning a particular foreign language which will be of use in that Corps zone.

Affi l iation with a particular R&D establishment/Defence Production Unit.

Affil iation with a particular mass communication/propaganda set up.

Affiliation with a particular national intelligence agency/investigative agency.

Affiliation with a particular CSIR Laboratory /National Institute of Excellence.

Affiliation with a particular defence think-tank in India or abroad.

Repeated foreign assignments to a particular country.

Specialisation in particular management fields as applicable to the Army.

Country studies specialisation.

Defence budget and finance management, exports and imports of warlike equipment.

The Army has come to lack farsightedness, daring spirit at higher levels, R&D and applications oriented entrepreneurship...


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Sourcing for particular types of weapons, equipment and ordnance in the world market and working in similar products development establishments in India.

The open minded thinking and emphasis on gaining ‘domain knowledge’ will liberate the stress-induced mindset of the majority of gifted and intelligent officers of our Army, so that they aspire to be greater than mere career minded automatons. They will have to prove their worth and create reputations by publishing articles and papers thereby contributing to product development in the most productive phase of their careers, when they are still driven by sincerity of purpose to make a mark. In this endeavour, we have a lot to learn from the Navy who have the best of domain specialists in the Indian Armed Forces at present.

In order to improve technology absorption and technical excellence in our combat arms units, there is the need to consider posting Engineers/Signals/Electronics and Mechanical Corps officers to combat units after they have put in eight years of service for a full tenure of two and a half years. This ‘criteria posting’ should be made compulsory for holding selection grade command appointment in their respective Corps.

The glaring aspect of lack of linguistics capability training should be addressed by putting selected Staff College Course qualified officers through a full time foreign language Diploma course within three years of their doing the Staff Course. These officers are the best lot that the Army system can produce, and they should be equipped with international level sets of skills especially of the languages spoken by our adversaries and collaborators. Only then can their vistas get broadened and their employability for Foreign Postings become worthwhile. They will be able to contribute inputs into the Army system which are not run of the mill type.

‘Theory’ of Optimisation of Resources available in an Army Corps Zone

In a defensive Corps zone, at least one-third of the resources available at combat unit and above should be held back as Reserves to

influence the subsequent stages of a battle after the enemy has achieved a penetration or even break-in. Alternatively, these same resources should become available for limited offensive actions or carrying out large scale spoiling attack actions. Only by having one-third troops in reserve can a higher commander achieve tactical balance and flexible response. Today, we find that the Indian Army’s senior commanders are frittering away resources while in a defensive posture by pushing everything available forward - be it in the p l a i n s, m o u nt a i n s or even the deserts because they want to cater for every enemy contingency ab initio. So on the defender’s side there is always a shortage of troops, and inadvertently the best possible scenario is created for the attacker.

A deep study of the reverses suffered in the 1962 India-China War and the battles of Chamb-Jaurian in 1965 and the 1971 War with Pakistan clearly reveal that the major cause of defeat was non-adherence to this fundamental maxim of offensive defence which, as per the attacker’s calculation, predictably led to escalation into panic situations and loss of morale on our side. When will the Army learn the perils of adopting the ‘defeatist’ Forward Policy, even after the shameful experience of 1962? It is agreeable when a politician utters the words that not an inch of Indian territory will be allowed to be occupied by our enemies, as this is meant for public consumption and boosting the morale of the general public; but if a senior general repeats these words, it will make Clausewitz laugh in his grave.

The essence of successful conventional defensive battle is in maintaining elasticity and cohesion; thereafter debilitating the enemy’s combat power to the danger zone of exhaustion and over-reach, then in launching own counter-offensive after minimum pause or by use of the ‘indirect approach’ offensive stratagem to topple/unhinge the enemy’s balance and make him reel back, and end up with the destruction

The Army’s dependence on RAW and its

predecessor IB for external military intelligence has

proved to be its Achilles’ heel during war...


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of his main force and irrecoverable loss of his territory. In the Korean War, China committed 320,000 troops in two Army groups but could only achieve a stalemate whereas by committing a mere 30,000 troops mainly under 46 Corps, they were able to gain victory over us in 1962, without losing a single Chinese soldier as Prisoner of War.

This is where the infusion of TSD at the Corps level will make a great difference in our calculations. The TSD does not have active

Combat Formations under it yet it plays the role of a force multiplier by effectively employing Tactical Reserves and deciding the right timing and objective for such Counter Strike. Its main aim and battle effort is to look deep into enemy territory and discern

correctly his pattern of operations almost to a predictable certainty. This is the finesse the US Army has achieved and demonstrated during the last 15 years at Army Corps level force groupings, and the Israeli Defence Force and British Army at lesser force levels.

In a conventional threat scenario, the US Army does not have to earmark a large size force for a defensive role and almost 80 per cent of its combat power in a Corps zone is regenerated for offensive action, thanks to the high expertise and calibre of its TSD resources to orchestrate the re-forming of combat power. This is the secret of the ‘thought process’ behind the seemingly unstoppable US war machine. Imagine the transformation that will come to the Indian Army over the next four to six years, if by having a full-fledged TSD, the difference between Holding Corps and Strike Corps gets blurred due to our exploiting fully the ‘Inflexibility-Time lag’ syndrome suffered by the enemy. The role play would be like that of a large Hermit Crab approaching a lurking Giant Squid.

Cohesive Approach at Army HQs for Offensive Capabilities Technical Support

He who depends on himself and constantly develops his strength will never have to bite the dust when the crunch comes, goes an old

saying. The Army’s dependence on RAW and its predecessor IB for external military intelligence has proved to be its Achilles’ heel during war. That is the way the Indian system works. Therefore, let us learn at least from experience to insulate our dependence on inputs for military decision making from such national channels, which should only be seen as a complementary or even as sweetened pills. The military advice to the political leadership should be of prognostic nature and not of ‘reactive’ nature, as is the case at present. This requires careful orchestration of the Army’s inherent capabilities and internal strengths. In the pre-Independence times, the Commander-in-Charge of the Indian Army had extensive intelligence gathering and analysis assets both to inform the Viceroy’s Council as well as to the UK War Department separately. If we have not built up on this legacy, we have nobody else to blame, especially if we do not succeed in operations.

In today’s circumstances, there is the urgent need to create the new post of a Principal Staff Officer to the Chief called Operational Technical Support General (OTSG). He should have the following Heads of Army HQs Departments reporting to him, in order to strengthen coordination of war support capability enhancement in Technical and Specialised fields:-

Director General Military Intelligence.

Director General Signal Intelligence.

Director G eneral Electronics and Mechanical Engineers.

Director General Army Air Defence.

Director General Weapons and Equipment.

Director General Army Trials and R&D Establishments and Central Workshops.

Director General Military Training.

The OTSG should be leading the Army’s war efforts during peacetime in order to get a clear picture of the enemy’s intentions, short-term plans and long term strategy. He should be mandated to formulate the required counter strategy for consideration of the Army’s decision making body. He should be the leading

The Army needs to concentrate on modernising its internal processes to world standards...


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interface of the Army with the DRDO, MoD bureaucracy, Foreign Policy establishment, defence hardware production department and civilian intelligence establishments. This sort of constant interactions, if it leads to better understanding and working relationships, would help the Army to get superior dividends which would benefit the Operations Branch by giving it ‘lead time’ and better resources.

ConclusionThe tendency to create more bureaucratic

structures at different Army levels should be avoided, in the holistic effort to multiply the Army’s flexibility and operational response at the cutting edge - which is the Army Corps level. This should meet the needs of the period of ‘apparent peace’, period ‘prior to hostilities’ and period of ‘active operations’. The Indian Army should further introspect and metamorphosize to be ready to fight future wars under modern conditions’, with the caveat of not increasing manpower strength. The Revolution in Military Affairs which has happened in the militaries of the First World in the last twenty years also has ramifications in our sub-continent in the present context ; we should not be caught napping.

Instead of blindly going for more and more costly imported platforms, the Army needs to wrest the responsibility for its own modernisation from the MoD civilian manifestations, who, though not being stakeholders are nevertheless

very well entrenched as they can continue to control all expenditures in our name. For this change in outlook to fructify, the Army needs to concentrate on modernising its internal processes to world standards, and gain expertise and ‘lead managers’ in not only its own spheres but also in all supporting spheres of work within the MoD. This is essential for gearing up for effective responses to contingencies and to develop assured war winning capability.

Let us do an annual ‘Planning Exercise’ in January on how to fight the wars in our regional context five years hence. This would throw up relevant and feasible challenges to work upon with achievable u r g e n c y . C o n v e r t i n g defensive assets to dual use offensive capabilities is the essence of the principle of war of economy of effort. This requires new thinking to develop our capabilities, so as to assure a Corps Commander credible battlefield transparency, to enable ‘risk taking’ ventures to be undertaken with high guarantee of success. The Corps commanders should be involved in the annual planning exercise in January at the Army HQs level. The military machines created by Shivaji and Aurangzeb and their underlying thinking should serve as ready historical guidelines.

The tendency to create more bureaucratic

structures at different Army levels should be

avoided...

References1. History of Self Defence Counterattack Operations

on the Sino Indian Borders – Jiang Siyi and Li Hui (Beijing Military Sciences Press, 1994).

2. Chinese Warfighting – The PLA Experience since 1949 – Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2010).

3. War in High Himalayas – The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962 – Maj Gen DK Palit (C Hurst & Co Ltd, London, 1991).

4. Chamb Battles: Recollections of Pakistani Commanders – Internet.


A Persistent Query

ONE IS OFTEN CONFRONTED WITH the query, “How can the Maoist problem be solved? After all, we have

done so much to control it and yet nothing seems to work!” This question is rooted to a perception among the policy makers that there is a popular demand to stamp out the Maoist rebellion, and that it is possible to achieve that end in a matter of few years through application of some formulae.

As with all simplistic questions, this one too is difficult to answer. Indeed, the simplicity of the query itself betrays a superfluous understanding of the fundamental characteristics of the Maoist rebellion. Resultantly, notions of certain ‘formulae’ that would supposedly bring remedy in quick time are entertained. Factually, to chart a course towards ultimate relief from this violent rebellion, policy makers have to de-link it from their election cycle and appreciate the conditionalities and complexities that overarch the gamut of the problem. Therefore, in our quest to find the appropriate answer to the query, it is proposed to discuss two propositions. First, that the Maoist rebellion is a ‘phenomenon’ which may not be ‘defeated’ in the true sense of that expression; second, the goal should be to ‘address’ this phenomenon in a manner as to ease it into irrelevancy and subsume it over time within a benevolent, fair realm.

An Adverse Phenomenon The Maoist rebellion is a phenomenon,

an adverse one of course, in which bands of armed local inhabitants, led by firebrand ‘area commanders’, assume a role that should truly lie within the constitutional mandate of the state. The role of the third element of this phenomenon, the far-ensconced communist ideologues, is limited to legitimising the rebellion with a political, if rabid, cause for the rebels to indulge in societal mayhem. The rhetoric of installing a ‘people’s government’ over the country through armed revolution apart, their interim objective is to impose their ‘system’ over such territories where the state administration has nothing more than a notional presence. In this, the Maoists have succeeded in establishing a fair degree of control, mainly over economic activities in areas remote, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped but endowed with mineral and forest wealth; the void of state administration makes it relatively simple to do so.

Of course, the Maoists neither possess the constitutional authority duly acquired through sanctified means nor are they bound by constitutionally farmed rules. They do not suffer accountability to the people and enforce their arbitrary diktats by the barrel of gun. The phenomenon, therefore, is unconstitutional and anti-state. No doubt, the Maoists are outlaws;

INTERNAL SECURITYThe Maoist Dimension

the constitutional mandate of the state. The role of the third element of this phenomenon, the far-ensconced communist ideologues, is limited to legitimising the rebellion with a political, if rabid, cause for the rebels to indulge in societal mayhem. The rhetoric of installing a ‘people’s government’ over the country through armed revolution apart, their interim objective is to impose their ‘system’ over such territories where the state administration has nothing more than a notional

over economic activities in areas remote, sparsely inhabited and undeveloped but endowed with mineral and forest wealth; the void of state administration makes it relatively simple to do so.

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee, former Chief of Staff, Central Command & former Commandant OTA Chennai.

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee

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if the nationhood is to be preserved, they must not be permitted to challenge state power and have their way.

However, the narrative cannot be separated from its context. In the past, these remote areas had been administered more as a exception than as a rule. The situation changed with the commencement of industrial ventures in the early part of the twentieth century, when these mineral-rich areas turned into pivots of economic development. Thereafter, what little administration the state undertook to perform, it was with the purpose of brokering natural resources rather than elevating the local tribal and neo-tribal inhabitants’ lives. Even in the post-Independence period, the polity has shown little interest in local affairs due to the short voter lists, while the state functionaries have brazenly ridden roughshod over the simple, voiceless folk, divesting them of their traditional land rights and snatching away what little forestry they possessed. With accelerating industrialisation over the past fifty years, as more and more areas went under mining, mass displacement of the people rent their society; living as a tribal and neo-tribal became a curse. As alienation gained ground, the ever-tormented rural folk, who had been consigned to ‘exist’ in the feudal societies, found a common cause and joined in to provide impetus to the rebellion.

Maoists have taken advantage of that long trail of systemic atrocities. They have occupied a vacuum that the state had perpetually left out of its administration. Furthermore, they have assumed the responsibility of protecting the people’s concerns, a mandate which the state had failed to fulfil while penetrating these areas just to gather natural resources. Notably therefore, Maoists have not really usurped but occupied vacant systemic space to assume an unattended role - that of arbitrators of the people’s concerns such as fair wages, land alienation, displacement and compensation and relief from highhandedness of revenue and police officials. Besides, Maoists have implemented their own version of equitable land distribution, irrigation rights and fair trade of nature’s produce in areas under their control – a case of constitutionally ordained missions

being implemented by unconstitutional methods. Obviously, these steps have allowed Maoists to earn the people’s support.

On another plane, the Maoists have, with pretended seriousness, ‘ordered’ activation of the few health centres and schools there are, asking the paramedics and teachers to either attend to duty or pay absence fees. They have also undertaken to ‘monitor’ government projects particularly where the money bag is fat. Under their threat, various schemes of employment guarantee, rural roads, mother-child care (Aanganwadi) and mid-day meal are spared from comprehensive loot ; the Maoists partaking a share in the misappropriation that remains mandatory yet to keep the systemic wheel lubricated. Even on this plane, people are inclined to prefer the rebel’s arrogance and greed to crass unscrupulousness of state-functionaries, contractors and mining conglomerates.

Resultantly, people living in Maoist-influenced areas do not view Maoist control as an aberration; neither do they long to be released from their rebellious clutch. To the locals, Maoists are their youngsters who live among them, observing the same culture, not adding to but solving some of their difficulties particularly in securing better income from their trade and safety from official harassment. Conversely, the State is represented just by occasional visitations of the police, patwaris and prospectors. The State’s other public service departments have never made appearance in any case – earlier because of the State employee’s propensity to avoid work, and presently on the excuse of Maoist threat. Furthermore, whenever the State functionaries did appear, they made a nuisance of themselves – labour unpaid, hospitality forced upon, bribes demanded, chicken eaten, women harassed. Obviously, people are least bothered by the Maoist’s unconstitutional acts – extortion and murder of persons they do not relate to.

In summation, the rebellion is a phenomenon that has engulfed entire societies in the affected

The Maoists are outlaws; they must not be permitted to

challenge state power and have their way…

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areas. Thus, there are rebels everywhere – the uniform clad People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in the jungles, the armed militia in remote settlements, couriers, levy collectors and informants in villages and towns, and profiteering traders all over, right up to the capital. Then there is the multitude of farmers, students, teachers, state-employees, business houses, contractors and politicians who are, in some manner or the other, linked to the rebellion either to fill their pocket or to stimulate their ambitions. Among the plethora of ‘rebels’ of different shades whom will the state triumph over? How will it control in quick time an omnipresent phenomenon that has been wantonly permitted to gather momentum over two decades?

Addressing the PhenomenonThere is concurrence that the Maoist rebellion

is anti-state and that it must be addressed with alacrity. The point to note is that the goal should not be set at defeating or destroying the Maoist rebellion if one does not intend to tear the society apart. Therefore, there are certain considerations to factor into the State’s strategy to

deal with the rebellion. This is a call of rationality that has the best chance of diluting, and then liquidating the rebellion over time. One may evaluate these considerations:

The Maoists do not seek secession nor are their demands, formally at least, any different from what the constitution guarantees to the Indian citizens. Yes, they wish to change the system of governance, not by democratic means but by the unconstitutional use of violence. That makes them anti-nationals albeit politically oriented ones with substantial ideological following. In dealing with this kind of movement, the state has to be extremely circumspect with regard to inevitability of state high-handedness, adversarial propaganda, social polarisation and international scrutiny.

Barring occasional forays to attack the state administration, Maoist activities are so far confined to those areas where state administration has never existed. Truly, the Maoists have taken control of the vacuums left

by the state but are yet far away from displacing the state authority where it exists. There is, therefore, no imminent threat of collapse of the state.

There seems to be little of serious concern amongst the public leaders and of course, the public themselves, regarding an early deliverance from the Maoist clutch. No one in particular seems to be highly disturbed by it. Villagers continue to live as they did before maybe a deal better under Maoist protection. The state-functionaries, under the threat of Maoist ‘punishment’, spend a better part of the allocations, after institutionalised graft is satiated, on development works. Traders, transporters, contractors and miners continue to thrive while paying ‘levy’ to the rebels which comes cheaper than the bribes they had to pass onto various government functionaries and local dons. In fact, the situation permits the traders and transporters to fix exorbitant rates, contractors to violate contractual stipulations and miners to denude areas many times more than the allotted blocks. Many unemployed have found sources of income through a gigantic industry of illegal mining, theft of explosives, gun running, rebel logistics and information network. Some entrepreneurs have ventured into tailoring, printing, supply of bottled water, batteries and medicines for the rebels. Politicians depend on the rebels to garner votes and yet go unaccountable on the pretext of Maoist threat. Even top industrialists and ‘class enemies’ of the communists continue to thrive in ‘Maoist-affected’ areas by their offerings of fiscal inducements. At worst, if one does land up on the wrong side of the Maoists, relief can always be bought in exchange of a ‘reasonable’ consideration – after a good deal of friendly haggling. There is acquiescence all around! Yes, among those who should seek deliverance, there appears to be no pressing need to decimate the Maoists, propensity of official lip service notwithstanding.

A pressing need to be rid of the Maoists emanates from the centrality of mineral extraction in national development. Therefore, the Central and State governments, goaded by economic and industrial demands, have had to take up the cudgels to displace the rebels

Maoists have taken advantage of a long trail of systemic atrocities…

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from resource-rich areas where the latter’s writ prevails. The governments propose to do so by the much publicised strategy of ‘clear-hold-develop’. It is in their violent opposition to that effort of the state that the Maoists come across as a real threat to the nation. To implement that strategy, therefore, the state has to find adequate forces to ‘clear’ Maoist-affected areas, then to ‘hold’ these areas against return of the rebels and finally build-up the capacity to design and execute appropriate development schemes. Obviously, the state does not have that kind of wherewithal; neither can it gear up in quick-time. But while capacity build-up may yet be achieved, the main hurdle will still remain in the irascibilities of the state-apparatus which, as discussed, have caused the rebellion to break out in the first place. To be subsumed, therefore, the phenomenon requires to be addressed with forbearance, in all sincerity, over a sustained period and by all stakeholders.

After it is neutralised, the issue of substitution of the Maoist’s control, also needs to be addressed. The method and time-frame in which the state would expand its governance over the vast remote lands needs to be considered. It is important to see that no scope is left for other predators in the garb of political netas and societal mai-baaps to walk in and carry on their exploitative trade, and so cause the germination of another uprising.

The above discussion validates the proposition that the Maoist rebellion offers no scope for a quick defeat; it needs to be single-mindedly addressed over a period for it to be rendered irrelevant and finally merged into the national mainstream.

Challenges to SurmountIn the overall context, effective counter-

Maoist measures would be contingent upon extension of effective governance to fill up the vacuums left so far and following up with amelioration of people’s ire. In that, the baggage of corruption and political opportunism at the cost of just governance has to be jettisoned before the rebellious stranglehold can be weakened. Thanks to popular disenchantment with the Maoist whip, that tide of perception seems to be rising. There is fruition of legislative,

administrative and judicial measures to that end. However, it would be a long haul yet.

The immediate challenge is to find adequate police forces to clear and control a landmass that covers one-fifth of the country, particularly when the locals are wont to excuse themselves from offering support. Clearly, the armed counter-measures would be progressed by the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) under the overall coordination of the state police. But there are just eighty-odd battalions of various police forces deployed in an area so vast. The strength is expected to be raised to 102 in next three years, whereas even by conservative estimates, 150 are needed. That would take in three to four years to build-up while imposing serious fiscal burden on the State. Even then, it would be tough to control the fluid spread of the rebellion over areas so vast and difficult. Resolution of these contradictions is, therefore, a challenge.

Similarly, the civic part of the counter-measures would pose herculean challenges to the state institutions. Even if funds are raised for the purpose, the State would have to create the requisite establishments to plan and execute the range and spread of needed development works. Furthermore, the culture of opportunism and callousness that prevails in the State departments would have to be purified before an egalitarian socio-economic transformation may be envisioned. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon.

An Awakening Recently, policy makers seem to have got

over their dithering afflictions in countering the rebell ion. Towards this end, four concurrent measures are articulated - security, development, entitlement, and governance. Focus has been directed at developmental capacity building in the State governments. 106 affected districts have been earmarked for security and development; work in 30 of these districts has commenced.

Under the security-related initiatives, steps

The Maoists do not seek secession nor

are their demands any different from what the

constitution guarantees to the Indian citizens…

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have been taken to strengthen the police forces under three centrally funded schemes, with the states pitching in to the extent possible – namely, the ‘Security Related Expenditure’, ‘Special Infrastructure Scheme’ and ‘Scheme for Construction of Fortified Police Stations’. Affected states are proceeding with recruitment to fill up existing vacancies in the police ranks. Besides, each state has been asked to raise up to four special counter-insurgency

police battalions. This process is required to be protected against abuse and tuned to the capacity to absorb expansion. Progress is, therefore, gradual. States have also organised counter-insurgency training of their police forces under the aegis of the army. However, establishment of counter-insurgency schools in all states is yet make the desired

headway mainly because internal bickering and land issues while some ad hoc training units perform that role.

On the development front, councils composed of the Collector, Police Chief, Forest Officer and a citizen’s representative have been formed in the affected districts to plan and monitor various projects. These projects are centrally funded under the ‘Backward Region Grant’, ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’, ‘Grameen Sadak Yojna’, ‘National Rural Health Mission’, ‘Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojna’, and ‘Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan - Ashram School’. Besides, there is the ‘Integrated Action Plan’ that is specifically dedicated to the improvement of living conditions in 82 rebellion affected districts. Finally, to improve the state administration’s access to Maoist affected areas, a ‘Road Development Plan’, providing for compensation to contractors working in such areas, has been dedicated to 34 districts. However, as discussed earlier, these initiatives would take time to fructify, and even more time to gain the people’s faith in the State administration – the caveat of continuous and concerted thrust being the key.

The State has woken up to the sense of entitlement among the local citizenry. Thus have been legislated the ‘Forest Rights Act’, activation of Schedule V of the Constitution, extension of ‘Panchayati Raj Act’, the ‘Land Acquisition Act’ and recently, the ‘Food Security Act’. The judiciary too has been active in protecting the local interests in matters of land alienation and human rights. These are landmark initiatives that would dilute the Maoist cause when implemented in the right spirit. The fourth element of the strategy, governance, too has received boost to turn it from a neo-colonial to a democratic realm. ‘Good governance’ is a byword, even if its translation to practical terms remains contingent to a profound cultural reorientation.

Finally, there are as many as four committees to review these initiatives - the Home Minister’s ‘Standing Committee of Chief Ministers’, Home Secretary’s ‘Review Group’, the ‘Task Force’ of Special Secretary (Internal Security) and Secretary, Planning Commission’s ‘Empowered Group of Officers’.

A Tide FavourableA rebellion, to be seen as distinct from

terrorism or downright nihilism, has to remain within certain bounds of probity even when engaged in acts contrary to social and legal norms. Contrarily, as the pressure on their activities mounts, the Maoist rebels are increasingly indulging in extortion and barbarism, proving themselves no better than those anti-people elements that they wish to eliminate. At some juncture, when the common man feels tormented, this could spell the Maoist doom. If managed effectively, such a situation would allow the State to find its feet in winning the people’s endorsement. Indeed, in most instances the world over, successful suppression of rebellion has been occasioned by high-handedness of rebels that drove the common people to join the State in countering it. The Indian state would be wise to seize that imminent opportunity.

The immediate challenge is to nd adequate police forces to clear and control a landmass that covers one- fth of the country…

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one partnership. endless possibilities. · 2019. 5. 25. · 2 indian defence review 29.2-apr/jun...

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