o'neill emperor's new clothes (2003)

7/24/2019 O'Neill Emperor's New Clothes (2003)

1/22

Aristotelian Society and Wileyare collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings of the

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The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor's New ClothesAuthor(s): Onora O'NeillSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 77 (2003), pp. 1-21

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2/22

The

Inaugural

Address

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'S

CLOTHES

by

Onora O'Neill

ABSTRACT

Conceptions

of individual

utonomy

and of rational

played

arge

parts

n

twentieth

entury

moral

philosophy, et

i

how eithercouldbe basic o morality.Kant'sconception f au

ically

different.He

predicated

autonomy

neither of individual

sel

cesses

of

choosing,

but of

principles

of action.

Principles

of actio

autonomous

only

if

they

are law-like

in

form and could be uni

they

areheteronomous

f,

although

aw-like

n

form,

hey

canno

scope.

Puzzles

about

claims

linking

morality,

reason and

auton

reduced

y recognising

he distinctiveness

f Kantian

utonom

I

Introduction.

n

the last

half-centuryppeals

o

au

played

a

larger

and

larger part

in

ethical a

debate.

Yet

the advocates of

autonomy

still

disagre

it

is,

and

why

it is

important.

At times it seems

th

only

that

autonomy

has a

noble,

Kantian

pedigree

closely

to

morality.

They

are

certainly

right

that Kant links

autonomy

For

example,

he

claims

both

that

'Morality

is

thus

of

actions

to

the

autonomy

of the

will'

and that

'

the will is the sole

principle

of all moral laws and

keeping

with them.'2

However,

I

believe that ther

dence

for

strong

links between

morality

and

twen

conceptions

of

autonomy.

Recent

conceptions

of

aut

no

claim to be 'the sole

principle

of all

moral

laws

in

keeping

with

them',

and

their

claims

to Kantian

greatly

exaggerated.

We have

been

admiring

a

na

of

questionable legitimacy.3

1.

Kant, 1785,

4:439.

2.

Kant, 1787,

5:33.

3.

Differences

re

often

pointed

out;

yet

the

persistence

f

claims o

su ests

hat

man contem orar

rota onists

f

autonom

overloo

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3/22

2 ONORA O'NEILL

These

negative

claims

tell us

nothing

about Ka

omy,

or

about

its

supposed

links to

morality

and re

test the linksthat Kant thoughthe had establishedo

back to

the

Kantian

texts.

I

hope

that a short ca

those texts

will reveal

a

more

interesting

andscape

t

ited terrain so

energetically

charted

in

recent decad

II

Autonomy

as

Independence.

first

realised

quite

how

the arrayof differingconceptionsof autonomyin c

debates

had

become when

I

read

Gerald Dworkin'

Theory

and Practice

of

Autonomy.

Dworkin

offers

a

a dozen different

conceptions

of

autonomy,

which,

h

variously

been

equated

with

Liberty positive

or

negative)

..

dignity, ntegrity

independence,

esponsibility

nd

self-knowledge

..

s

critical eflection.. freedom rom

obligation

..

abse

causation...andnowledge f one'sowninterests.4

This

list

is

far

from

complete.

For

example,

Ruth

Thomas

Beauchamp

in

their

interesting

work

The

Theory of

Informed

Consent note

that

autono

equated

with a

quite

different

list

of

concepts,

inclu

privacy,

voluntariness,

elf-mastery,

hoosing

fr

one's

own moral

position

and

accepting esponsi

choices.5

Dworkin contends

that

despite

all

these

variations

tions of

autonomy

share

two features:

The

only

features

hat are held constantfrom o

another

are

that

autonomy

s a

feature

of

person

desirable

uality

o have.6

moral debatesas well as in the discussionof Kant;but the only t

completely

lear

about

autonomy

n these

contexts

s that it mean

to

different

writers'

76).

4.

Dworkin,1988,

6.

5. Fadenand

7.

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4/22

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'S

NEW

CLOTH

I

doubt whether either claim

is true.

It

is

certainly

all

conceptions

of

autonomy

view it as a feature of

original use of the term autonomy-literally self-le

antiquity

referred to a

property

not

of

persons,

bu

Autonomous

city-states

made their

own

laws;

c

given

laws

by

their mother cities.

And,

as

we have

Kant

ascribes

autonomy

not to

persons,

but

to the

accurately,

o determinations

of the

will

or

principle

some twentieth

century

writers-structuralists,

beh

dismiss the

very

idea that

autonomy

could be a feat

personsor of the will.

There is also

no

general agreement

that

autonom

able

quality

to have'.

On

the

contrary,many

disting

writers maintain that

there is

something

morall

about

autonomy.

Often

they

condemn

autonomy

than a

form of individual

independence

whose

m

may

be

morally

admirable,

corrupt

or

merely

trivia

III

Rational

Autonomy.Many

late

twentieth

century

pr

autonomy

have taken

this

point

and

do not

identi

with

mere

independence,

of the sort advocated

by

tialists.

They

often insist that

autonomous

action

m

be chosen

(so

to

some extent

independent),

but

ratio

They

have advocated one

or

another form of

ration

Rational

autonomy (unlike

autonomy

conceived

as

independence)might, it seems, be linked to moralit

The

principal

source for most

conceptions

of

ra

omy

is,

I

think,

not

Kant,

but John

Stuart Mill's On

explicitly repudiates

the

thought

that

mere,

sheer

i

or

choosing

is

morally important.

He ascribes

value

and reflective

choosing, by persons

of

well-develo

ality

and character.

He

claims that

A

person

whose desires and

impulses

are his

o

expression f his ownnature,as it has beendevelo

fied

by

his own

culture-

is said to

have

a

charac

desiresand

impulses

re

not

his

own,

has

no

char

than a

steam

engine

has a character.7

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5/22

4

ONORA O'NEILL

He

then

argues

that the

choosing

of

persons

with

viduality

and character benefits each

and

all,

and

s

tarians have reason to promote and protect the l

promote

reflectiveand

intelligentchoosing,

and

ther

ality

and

character:

In

proportion

o

the

development

f

his

individual

becomesmore valuable o

himself,

and

is

theref

being

morevaluable o others.8

However,

Mill

does

not

call

choosing

that

reflects

or character autonomous. So far as I can discov

speaks

of the

autonomy

of

persons

or of autonom

although

I

have found references to the

autonom

suspect

that

for Mill

the

term

autonomy

was

a ter

belonged

either

in

constitutional

discussions,

or

in

naturalistic

account

of

action,

and had no

place

in

h

ralistic account of action.10

Despite

this

divergence

n

terminology,

I

think t

centuryadvocates of rational autonomy are close t

they say

that what

is

ethically important

is not mer

mere

independence,

ut

specifically

rational

choosing

version

of)

rational

autonomy."

However,

unlike

recent admirersof rational

autonomy

are not Utilit

do not view

intelligent

and reflective

choosing,

or

th

respects

and

protects

it,

as valuable because

it is

means

to

human

happiness.

Some

of them

promot

'rational

autonomy'

not as

an instrumentalbut

as

a

human

good

or

value.

The

twentieth

century

writerswho follow

Mill in

c

some version of rational

autonomy

(rather

han

mer

pendence)

is

ethically

important,

also

disagree

abo

8.

Mill,

1859,

192.

9.

Mill, 1862,

Ch. 16.

10. Mill rejectedKant'sethicsbecausehe thoughtthat the Categ

was

not

action-guiding,

o

concluded

hat ethicsmust be based

on

would

have classified

s heteronomous ather han autonomous.

11.

Mill

no more

speaks

of

rational

utonomy

hanhe

speaks

of

aut

of

his

interpreters

se both

terms n

reporting

his

position.

For

exa



6/22

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'S NEW

CLOTHE

For

example, Harry

Frankfurt n

a

now

classic

pape

lished

in 1970

distinguished

between

routine

choosin

ing that reflects second-orderdesires,and arguedth

for

the latter

sort of

choosing

set

persons

apart

and

significant.

His

famous

example

contrasts the wa

who in

choosing

her

fix

is

driven

by

mere

desire,

wit

who also

has second-order desires

to

be

a

person

immediate

desires

(the

determined

addict who

both

and to

be an

addict,

the

admirable addict

who

wa

addicted and

struggles

with her first-order

desire).

choosing

has

been

variously characterisedby oth

choosing

that is well

informed,

or

fully

informed,

or

reflectively

endorsed,

in

short

as

choosing

that

mately

based

on desires

or

preferences,

follows cer

processes.

I will

not

linger

on

the

many ingenious

accounts th

of various

conceptions

of

rational

autonomy provid

per processes

for rational

choosing.

I

suspect

that

hard to

show that

rationally

autonomous

choosin

even

generally)

leads to

ethically

superior

choices.

ceptions

of

rationally

autonomy

allow

desires and

as well as rational

procedures

for

choosing,

to

deter

autonomously

chosen:

why

then

should we

suppose

autonomy

secures ethical

acceptability?

ndeed,

as

o

autonomy

often

point

out,

hunch,

tradition

and int

times do

better;

they

may

reach

ethically

sound

choosing

with rational

autonomy may

fail

to

do

so.

On reflection it should not surpriseus that pr

rational

autonomy,

whose theories

of

action build

conceptions

of

rationality

but

also

on

specific

accou

ation,

find

that

motivation

duly

reflected

in

ratio

omous

choices,

often with

ethically

disturbing

i

Choosing

that

is

rationally

autonomous is

likely

to

e

ever individuals

prefer,

and to veer

towards

egotisti

At

best,

rationally

autonomous

choosing

is

likely

t

with egotisticalmotivationtowards more 'enlighten

est.

Many

of the ethical

objections

raised

about

au

ceived of as

mere,

sheer

independence

hen

recur as

conceptions

of rational

autonomy.



7/22

6 ONORA

O'NEILL

And

there

is worse

to come.

Proponents

of ration

may hope

to show that certain rational

processes

generallyproduce more valuablechoices. But they

able to show even this much without

independen

identifying

valuable

choices. In Mill's

hands,

where

choices

is

settled

by

Utilitarian

arguments,

here

is

arguing

that some

ways

of

choosing

are

more

likely

to

produce

valuable

choices. But without an

indepen

of valuable

choices,

it is

unclear

how

we could

sh

or

another

way

of

choosing,

such as

those favoure

conceptions of rational autonomy, is more valuab

to

promote

rational

autonomy

as a

fundamental

ra

instrumental

alue

need

quite

differentsorts of

supp

not

myself

at

all

sure

where it could be

found.

IV

Kantian

Autonomy

in

Context.

Both

Kant's admi

detractors

agree

that Kantian

autonomy

is distin

view

it differs

markedly

both

from

mere,

sheer

indi

pendence

and from

conceptions

of

rational

autonom

inescapable

inks to

preference-led

and

desire-drive

motivation.

Kant's

views

on

autonomy

were

also innovativ

writer had made such

strong

claims

about the

mora

of

any

conception

of

autonomy. Jerry

Schneewind

correct when he

writes

at

the

beginning

of

his rece

Invention

of

Autonomy,

that 'Kant invented the

c

morality

as

autonomy.'13

But what

he

invented

h

little to do with twentieth

century

conceptions

o

either

as individual

ndependence

r as

rational

au

most

convincing

evidence that

Kant was

thinking

o

quite

different

s that

very

few of his

central

claims

omy

make much sense

if

we

equate

Kantian

auto

with individual

independence

or with

current

co

rationalautonomy.

On

the

surface,

Kant

may

seem to be

promoting

s

of rational

autonomy.

For

example,

in

the

Critiqu

Reason,

and

in

man

other

works,

he

redicates

a

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8/22

AUTONOMY:THE EMPEROR'SNEW CLOTH

reason and links the

autonomy

of reason to

moralit

for

example,

that 'the moral law

expresses

nothin

the autonomyof pure practicalreason.'

4

In some t

his late

essay,

The

Conflict

of

the

Faculties,

he

goes

and

equates

all

reasoning,

not

only practical

rea

autonomy,

remarking

hat

'the

power

to

judge

auto

that

is,

freely (according

to

principles

of

thought

in

called

reason.'15

Taken out

of context these claims could

be-and

read as

very strong

and

very

confused

versions of t

autonomy is some form of rational choosing. The

less

plausible

than

contemporary

accounts

of

ration

because

they

require

us to

read

Kant

as

makin

assertionsabout

the

links between

autonomy,

reaso

ity.

Rather than

dismissing

Kant's account of

a

bizarre on

this

account,

I

shall

consider a

reading

t

specific

claims about the

structure

of

autonomy seri

The

context of

Kant's account

of

autonomy

is

view of

action. Kant

looks

at action from

the

agent'

that

is,

from

a

practical point

of view.

He

depicts a

ing

a

power of

choice

(Willkar)

that

they

can

use

in

ways. Agents

exercise

their

power

of

choice

by

ado

another

determination

f

the will. In

doing

so

they

some

practical

principle

(or

rule,

or

law,

or

plan)

m

maxim.16

Maxims

specify

at

a

fairly general

level

so

the

way

agents

set about

leading

their

lives:

I

may

maxim to

build

a

mill,17

or

to save for

my

old

age,18

funds,19

to

avenge

insults,20

to

overcharge gullible

to

pursue

my

self-interest,22

or

not

to

make false

pro

heterogeneous

sample

includes maxims

that Kant

14.

Kant, 1787,

5:33.

15.

Kant, 1798,

7:27.

16.

Timmerman,

000,

39-52.

17.

Kant, 1787,

5:26.

18. Ibid.,5:20.

19.

Ibid.,

5:

28.

20.

Ibid.,

5:19.

21.

Kant,

1785,

4:397.



9/22

8

ONORA O'NEILL

morally

worthy

and others that

he

thinks of as

mora

able,

and some that he thinks

merely

optional

or at

of prudence.

In

speaking

of

agents'

maxims

or

determinatio

Kant

is not

making

a claim

about the efficient caus

The

principle

(law,

rule,

plan)

that an

agent ado

cause him or her

to do

anything

(how

could abstract

as

principles

laws,

rules or

plans)

be

efficient

causes?

principle

(law,

rule,

plan)

that is

adopted

is the for

action:

it

articulates

what

an

agent

chooses

to

do.

of action does not requireKant to deny that (from

standpoint)

action can be

causally

explained:

he

s

passages

that acts have efficient causes. But

in

choo

do we

do not

identify

the causes of our future actio

Determinations

of the

will are

a

promising

f

account of

reasons

for

action. Since

any

principle,

plan

that is or could be

adopted

as a determinati

must have

propositional

structure

and

content,

it

wi

reasoned assessment.

Moreover,

reasoned assessm

be confined to

judging

whether

proposals

for action

or

effective means to

given

ends: for Kant instrum

ality

need be

only

one

aspect

of

practical

reason.

He

his account of instrumental

reasoning

on

one side

concentrateon the basis of his distinction

between h

and

autonomous reasons

for action.

V

Kantian

Autonomy:Heteronomy

as a Clue. The cont

heteronomy

and

autonomy

is a useful

way

into

u

Kantian

autonomy.

Heteronomy

is not a term we

life,

so

may

not seem

a

promising

clue. However-

Kant offers a

helpfully simple

account of what

h

writes:

If thewillseeks helaw thatis to determinet any

in

the

fitnessof its maxims or its own

giving

of

u

heteronomy

lways

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10/22

AUTONOMY: THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHE

The

differencebetween heteronomous

and

autonom

is a

differencebetween

the sorts of

principlesadopte

nations of the will. Heteronomous choosing an

autonomous

choosing

are both a

matter

of

seeki

adopting

or

willing,

some

principle

(law,

rule,

pl

adopting

some

determination

f

the will. The differ

them is

not

that

those

who

choose

heteronomously

agents,

or not

capable

of

any

independence

in

act

they

have

no

rational

capacities,

or

that

they

c

choose,

adopt

or

will

laws

or

principles.

Heteronom

is choosing. Agents with the power to choose (Will

able both of autonomous and

of

heteronomous

ch

difference

between them

is

that

agents

look in differ

in

choosing autonomously

and

choosing heterono

two

types

of

principle

are drawn or derived from

di

of

assumption.

Kant

frequently

contrasts

heteronomous and

principles

by

saying

that the former take

their

justi

elsewhere,

whereas

autonomous

principles

take their

from

nowhere else. Yet here we

may

well

lose

pati

justifications

must

begin

somewhereelse: isn't the

w

justification

to

derive

authority?

And

if a

principle

c

derivative,

why

would that

make

it

morally

special

to

especially

arbitrary?

Why

should a

principle

th

non-derivative

(whatever

that

means)

have

any

s

alone be fundamental to a

conception

of

reason?

ended

up

with

something

worse than

the

fantasy

th

autonomy

is the basis of

morality?

Have we not des

pop

existentialism o

postmodernism?

Kant's

examples

of

principles

or laws

adopted b

choose

heteronomously

are

extremely

varied.

He

agents may

defer to the

dogmas

of a

Church,

to t

rulers,

to

immediate inclination or

to

the will

of th

The common core

to

all these

examples

is

that the he

chooser

makes

some

arbitrary,

hence

unreasoned,

m

ing

a determinationof the will, whereas the autono

does not.

A

heteronomously

chosen

principle

is

'

imputing

authority

to

something

or

other,

for whos



11/22

10

ONORA

O'NEILL

authority

either no

reasons,

or

(at most)

incomplete

given. Any

reason

to

act

on

such

principlesreflects

t

assumption,and heteronomous reasons for action

always

conditional

upon

it. Kant

puts

the

point

as f

Wherever n

object

of the will has

to be laid downa

prescribing

he rulethat determineshe

will,

there

h

other

than

heteronomy;

he

imperative

s

conditio

or because ne wills his

object,

one

ought

o act

n

su

way;

hence t can nevercommand

morally,

hat

s,

c

So

the

common

core of

all sorts of

heteronomo

that it is not fully reasoned. It depends on arbitra

authority

to

something

or

other: a

desire

or

a

dogm

of Church

or

State. Kant

often

depicts

those wh

impute authority

to such

assumptions

metaphorical

ting

to alien or

foreign

authorities.

Kant's numerousaccounts of heteronomous

willin

damental differencesbetween

lacking

individual

ut

ing

rational

autonomy

and

lacking

Kantian

autonom

wholly lack individualautonomywill not be able to c

heteronomously

or

autonomously.

In Kantian

voca

beings

lack the

power

of

choice,

so lack free

w

incapable

of moral choice or

action.

Having

a

pow

is a

precondition

for

heteronomous

as well as fo

autonomous

choosing,

so

cannot be

equated

w

autonomy.

Kant

speaks

of

beings

without

a

pow

who cannot act either

heteronomously

or

autonomo

ing no more than animalcapacitiesto choose, an a

tum as

opposed

to arbitrium iberum.27

A

person

with

power

of

choice

can

choose ei

omously

or

heteronomously. Agents

who choose

ously,

so

defer

to

arbitrarily

selected standards and

can

give

at most conditional reasons

for

their action

not,

however,

be

wholly

capricious,

and

often em

other version

of what Kant

calls

heteronomou

example, they may choose not to follow immediat

but

to

live with an

eye

to

long-term personal adv

tism),

or to the

generalhappiness

(Utilitarianism)

or

26.

Kant 1785

4:444.



12/22

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'SNEW CLOTH

of

a

supposed

moral

sense,

or to some

conception

f

Kant

would view twentieth

century

proponen

autonomyas endorsing arious orms of heteron

They

do not

admire

mere,

sheer

wilfulness;

he

rationally

utonomous

gents

can offer

reasons

o

they

also

accept

hat thesereasonsare

always

ess th

Heteronomoushoosers

ultimately

aveto

fall back

authority

o desireor

ideology,

publicopinion

or ce

that

be.

Although

heteronomous hoosersmake an

arbit

according ertaindesires,demandsand dogmast

reasons or

action,

hey

may

have

quite

a lot

of mor

heteronomoushoicesare often

expressed

n

moral

action

(the

shopkeeper

who is

honest for the sake

tation,

the

self-interestedhooser

whose

interests

altruistic

hoices).

But n other

situations eterono

may

act

in

capricious,

elf-centred r

even

malign

mon or

gardenheteronomy

s

reflected

n

livesthat

morally conformist,

but

without luck

may

unacceptable.

VI

Kantian

Autonomy

and

Self-Legislation.

The

limitati

onomous

reasons

are

easily

seen

and

constantly

ot

chooses

heteronomously y

adopting

a

principl

achieve

omething

or which

he

offers

only

conditi

Butcanweexpectmore?Kantthinksso. He claim

omous

choosers

adopt principles

of action

that

ditionalon

any

arbitrary ssumption

r

posit.

In the

he

puts

the matteras follows:

Autonomy

of

the will is the

property

f

the will

a

law

to itself

(independently

f

any

property

of

t

volition).29

In

this

and

many

similar

passages,

we

meet the

aspect

of

Kant's

account

of

autonomy.

What is a

28.

Kant, 1785, 4:442-3;

see

Kant, 1787, 5:39-41,

for a

more

differ

cation of

heteronomous ethical

ositions.



13/22

12

ONORA O'NEILL

the will

by

which it is a law

to itself

(independently

erty

of the

objects

of

volition)'?

How can

the

will

a

mination simply on the basis of 'the fitness of its

its own

giving

of

universal

law'? Kant's claims hav

reflexivity

that

is

often

perplexing

and

hard,

but

impossible,

to

sort

out.

A

common

approach

to

Kantian

autonomy

hark

etymology

of the word

autonomy,

and

identifies

auto

ling

with

some

conception

of

self-legislation.

What s

assign

to

Kant's use of

this

venerable

phrase?

Far the

lar way of looking at the matter is to interpretself-l

legislation

done

by

a

self

or

subject.

On this individ

ing

we

picture

each of

many

wills as

legislating

for al

tions

immediately

arise.

First,

why

should the

legis

of

my

will

and

your

will

point

in

the same direct

why

should

we think that the

'legislative

action'

o

will must

point

in

a

morally acceptable

direction,

an

such

'legislative

action'

convince

us

that the

'princi

omy is the sole principleof morals.'

3

If Kantian

pictured

merely

as

legislation by

individual

selves,

nation

of

differentwills

remainsa

mystery

and the m

ance of

autonomy

is

just

as

obscure as

it is in

co

individual

autonomy

that

make

no

mention

of

sel

Unsurprisingly,many passages

in Kant's

writings

ar

nonsense,

or

at

the

very

least

to

implausibility,

f

w

conception

of

autonomy

with

'legislation'

by

although this readingremainsvery popular.

Could this

problem

be resolved

if

Kantian

autono

tured as

legislation

by

co-ordinated

ndividual elves

strategy

of

Rousseau's

famous account

of

self-legisl

the

problem

of

possible

divergence

between numer

lating

wills

is

resolved

by positing

an

extraneous so

vergence.

On Rousseau's

view 'The

general

will is

al

common

good'31

and

'The

general

will

is

always

always tends to the public

utility.'32

30.

Kant, 1785,

4:440.

31.

Rousseau

1755

8.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


14/22

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'S NEW

CLOTHE

Of

course,

Rousseau did not think that individ

will as

the General

Will demands. On the

contrary,

genceof particularwills on the General Will is a con

vergence

of 'corrected'

wills,

not

necessarily

or ev

mirrored in real time

by

the

will

of

each or

the w

Kant would see

it,

Rousseauian

self-legislation

s a

fo

onomy:

it

assigns authority

to a

conception

of the

g

and

defines

'corrected'

wills

as

pointing

in

this direc

the

problem

of

divergence

were

solved

by

this

stra

sonally

think that Rousseau defines the

problem

out

ratherthan solving it-we have not been shown a

think

that the

supposed point

of

convergence

defi

or is

morally significant.

Rousseau's

account of

l

co-ordinated elves

resolves

indeterminacy

and

disa

positing

the

authority

of the

general

will

or of the

g

for

Kant

this is

heteronomy.

VII

Kantian

Autonomy:

Law-Like

and

Lawless

Willin

alternative

nterpretation

of the idea of

self-legislati

ter

sense of Kant's

claims,

and avoid

conflating au

heteronomy?

It

may

seem that we are

faced

with

a

we view

self-legislationsimply

as a

matter of

choosi

for

oneself

(independently,

or even

using

some ratio

then the

very

distinction

between

heteronomy

a

autonomy

is erased.

If

we view

self-legislation

as

choosing

or

willing principles

with a

certainsort

of

c

we

apparently

all into

heteronomy

by

arbitrarilyasc

weight

to that

content or aim.

As

is

apparent

from countless

passages,

Kant th

essential feature of

autonomous

willing

is

that

it h

of

law,

so is

expressed

in

law-like

determinationsof

contrasts law-like

choosing

with

choosing

determin

will

are

literally

lawless. But

what,

we

may

wonder,

lem with lawless

choosing?

Why

shouldn't we embr

extreme forms of

lawlessness

or lack of

structurebot

and action?

Isn't

any

claim

that

thought

or action

m

re uirements

law-like



15/22

14

ONORA

O'NEILL

dispense

with all

and

any requirements

or

structu

the claims of

law-like form

surely

need

arguing.

It is fascinatingto find Kant engagingwith the po

of his

day-the

advocates of

spiritual

enthusiasm

merei-to

show

why

the

postmodernist fantasy

o

with

all

authorities,

with all

reasons,

with all

princ

for

organisingthinking

or

action,

is

deceptive.

Like

ists,

Kant

sees

clearly why

people

imagine

hat

'lawl

is

not

merely

feasible but

attractive;

but

he

also sees

atens. He

depicts

the

pleasures

of the

advocates

of

la

ing with pointed irony:

First

genius

s

very

pleased

with its

bold

flights,

i

off

the thread

by

which

reasonused

to steer t.

So

otherswith ts

triumphant ronouncements

nd

gre

and

now

seems o

have set

itself

on a

throne,

whic

graced

by

slow

and

ponderous

eason,

whose

ang

it

always

employs.

Then

ts maxim s

that reason'

giving

s invalid- we common

human

beings

all th

while hose

favoured

y

beneficent ature

all

it

illu

Kant

believes

that

this

heady

liberation

ends not

m

fusion,

but in

cognitive

and

practical

disaster:

Since

reasonalonecancommand

alidly

or

everyo

of

language

must soon arise

among

hem;

each

on

his own

inspiration.34

Communicationbreaks

down

and

superstition

rides

ity

and civil

society

fail.

Attempts

to

achieve

unlim

in

thinking

and

acting prove

self-defeating.

Lawles

mines

thinking

and

acting

because

it

undercuts

the

v

ity

of

offering

others reasons

for

believing

or

for

ac

As Kant

sees

it,

any

reasoned

use of

human freed

ing

and

in

acting

must

be

law-like

rather than lawle

Freedom n

thinking

ignifies

he

subjection

f reas

except

thosewhich t

gives

tself;

and

its

opposite

s

a

lawlessuse of

reason

inorder,

as

genius upposes

than one

can

under

the

limitationof

laws).

The n

quence

of declared awlessnesss that

if

reason

wi

33.

Kant 1786

8:145.



16/22

AUTONOMY:THE

EMPEROR'S

NEW

CLOTH

itself to the laws

it

gives

itself,

it has to bow und

laws

given

by

another;

or without

any

law,

nothi

nonsense-can

play

its

game

for

long.

Thus th

consequence

f

declaredawlessness

n

thinking

o

from all the limitations f

reason)

s that freedo

ultimately

e forfeited

nd-because

it is

not misfo

gance

which s to

blame or it-will be

trifled

way

the

proper

enseof the

word.35

Only

law-like

thought

and

action

offers others wit

live,

think and interact

proposals

that

they

can follo

or action, so could potentiality evaluate as reason

Whateverelse

reasons

are,

they

must

befollowable b

hence

the sorts of

things

that we

can offer and

refus

challenge.

This is

why practical reasoning

cannot cu

law-like

determinationsof the will.

If

we are cavalie

likeness,

we no

longer

deal

in

reasons

for

acting

or

believing.

Needless to

say,

the demand

that

we act on law-li

is

an

extremely

weak

constraint,

that is

met both

by

ous and

by

autonomous

action.

Those whose

princi

are

heteronomous

through

and

through

act on la

ciples.

Even

if

Kant

is

right

in

diagnosing

lawlessne

and action as

catastrophic,

heteronomy might

be th

option

for

conducting

our

thinking

and

acting. Per

Kant,

morality

is at

most a

system

of

hypothetical

Perhaps

all reasons for

action are

ultimately

conditi

VIII

Kantian

Autonomy:

A

Law

to

Itself.

If

Kantian

au

possibility,

there must be

two sorts of

law-like

pri

reasons

for

thinking

that heteronomous

principl

offer insufficient

reasons

for action.

Kant's constant

practical

philosophy,

from the first

Chapter

of the

onwards,

is

that

morally

important

principles

must

law-likeinform, but universal n scope.Since hetero

ciples

arbitrarily

ake

for

granted specific

desires,

co

interests,

or

specific

institutions

or

cultures,

they

areThis content downloaded from 130.132.173.156 on Fri, 19 Feb 2016 17:12:14 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions


17/22

16

ONORA O'NEILL

of

being principles

for all.

By

contrast,

law-like

pr

are

capable

of

being principles

for

all,

that have uni

are Kantianlyautonomousprinciples.

Kant connects

the demands

of

scope

and

law

insisting

that

It is

requisite

o

reason's

awgiving

hat it should

n

pose only itself,

becausea rule

s

objectively

nd

un

only

when it holds

without

he

contingent, ubjec

that

distinguish

ne rational

being

rom

another.3

Kantian autonomyis not a matter of persons being

(although,

of

course,

Kant holds

that

persons

are

in

a

degree,

since

they

have

a

power

of

choice).

Rat

autonomy

is a

matter

of

adopting

law-like

principles

pendentof

extraneous

assumptions

hat can hold

only

not

for

other

agents.

Kant

often

encapsulates

this

re

phrases

such as a

'lawgiving

that

needs

to

presuppo

or in

compressed

referencesto the notion of 'a

law

own'

or

'non-derivativeawgiving'.Principles hat m

dard are not

merely

law-like,

but

'hold without the

subjective

conditions that

distinguish

one rational

another'.

They

are

potentially principles

for

all,

an

for those who

uncritically

assume

the

authority

of

or a

particulardogma,

some local institutions

of

po

who

can at

most

converge

on heteronomous

princi

The idea of a

'lawgiving

that

needs

to

presuppo

is

I

think the

key

to

Kant's

distinctive

understan

legislation.

As he

presents

the

matter,

it is the

princi

or

legislating,

and

not

the

agent,

that

'presuppose

For Kant

the

term

self-legislation

cannot mean th

some terrificacts of the self

(or

terrific acts

of

the

that are

morally

important,

or

definitive

of

morali

that there are some

principles

of action that are n

from

supposed,

but

ultimately arbitrary

'authoriti

these

are

morally

important.

The

element

self

in

t

self-legislation

s

reflexive

rather than

individualisti

certain

justifications

of

principles

rather

than to cert



18/22

AUTONOMY:THE EMPEROR'S

NEW

CLOTH

'legislators'.

Kant takes himself

to be

giving

an

ac

sort

of

law-giving

that is

reason's

own,

and

not a

lawgivings that are an agent's own. His understa

legislation places

the

emphasis

on the

notion

of

legisl

than

on

any

notion

of

the

self. Kantian

autonom

lawgiving

rather

than the

lawgiving

of

individual

ge

that

might

mean).

Reason's

lawgiving

is not

merely

a

matter of

ado

another law-like determinationof the will:

heterono

does

as much. Kantian

autonomy

is

expressed

in

ad

ciples, willings, reasoningsthat are both law-like in

form

and

do not derive

that law-likeness

from

arbit

tions that are

open

to some but not to others.

Heteronomous

reasoning, by

contrast,

relies

assumptions

about the basis of

morally significa

which

may

be available to some and not to others.

ous

principlesmay

be

widely

shared:those who

tak

the

authority

of Church

or

state,

public

opinion

or

lo

will

generally

have

plenty

of

company.

Unlike

postm

tures,

heteronomous

practical

reasoning

does not e

prehension

or

cognitive

shipwreck.

Its defect is

intelligibility

coasts on

arbitrary

assumptions

that

cannot

share,

so

cannot

provide

reasons for action

f

Heteronomous reasons do not

aspire

to be

a

law-giving

f

its ownon the

part

of

pure

and,

as

s

reason which]s freedom n thepositive ense.37

Hence, in Kant's view, heteronomous reasons ar

defective,

incomplete

or

'private'

reasons. Reasons

principle

ollowable

by

their

presumed

audiences;

fu

claims

and

demandsmust be followable

by

all and

a

That is

why they

must be

law-like,

or have the f

Heteronomous

reasons

are

law-like

in

form but

pres

shared desire or

belief,

or other

cultural or institu

of

agreement.

They

may provide in-group

reasons

to

who have deferred(heteronomously) o the same'a

they

offer no basis

for

reasoning among

those who

suppose

allegiance

to

the

same

desire or

dogmaThis content downloaded from 130.132.173.156 on Fri, 19 Feb 2016 17:12:14 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions


19/22

18

ONORA O'NEILL

hence no

basis

for

reasoning

with the world at

large,

fully 'public'

reason,

hence

in Kant's

view no suffici

moralityor forjustice. This too is perhaps quite a

tion of

practical

reason: but it is not covert

heteronomy.38

Correspondingly,

he

phrase

'a

lawgiving

of its o

ene

Gesetzgebung)

is

no mere awkwardness of

expresses

the

requirement

that

anything

that can

self-legislation

of

practical

reason must be a not

onl

(gesetzgebend)

but also non-derivative

eigen).

It is

for living by principlesthat could be described as l

reason,

so fit for all

(regardless

of their

particular

a

ogy,

desires or

culture),

that

underpins

Kant's disti

the

metaphor

of

self-legislation

and that links his

c

autonomy

to fitness for universal law. It

is this

allows him to claim

that

autonomy

and

universalisa

alternative

formulations of the

Categorical Impera

able

from

one another and

equally,

indeed

equival

mental to

morality.

As

Kant

puts it,

The

principle

f

autonomy

s,

therefore:o choose

way

thatthe maxims f

your

choiceare ncluded s

in

the samevolition

9

As Kant sees

it,

combining

a

formal requirement

l

with a

scope requirement universality)

allows us to d

substantive

constraints,

which he views as basic

morality. Morality

is

fundamentally

a matter of

principlesof action that could not be adopted by

not be universal laws. If

we

adopt

only

law-like de

of

the will

that could

be universal

aws,

we

must

ado

ciples

that

(we

judge)

all

and

any

others too

could

a

must

reject many tempting

and

interesting principl

Kantian

autonomy

bypasses

the

problem

of

possibl

38.

Indeed,

Kant sometimes

presents

t as the

basis of all

reasonin

practical easoning,ncludinghatpartof practical easoninghatsu

'To make use of one's reason

means no

more

than to ask

oneself,

supposed

o assume

omething,

whether ne couldfind t feasible o

or

the

ruleon whichone assumes t into a universal

rinciple

or th

Kant, 1786,

8:146n.



20/22

AUTONOMY:

THE EMPEROR'SNEW

CLOTH

of individual

choices,

which would have

to be res

legislation

were a

matter

of

each

individual

legisl

The key to Kant's thought is the explicit identific

legislation

or

autonomy

with

adopting only

law-li

that can 'hold without the

contingent,

subjective

co

distinguish

one rational

being

from

another'.

Once we have shifted our

conceptions

of

self-legi

way

that a coherent

reading

of

the

Kantian texts

r

no

longer

so hard to see

why

he

thinks that

au

demand

of

practical

reason.

If

we think

of

reasons

received,exchangedor refused,acceptedor challen

reasons that cannot be followed

by

some

of

those

to

are offered

will be

defective

or

incomplete: they

of

ited,

incomplete

reasons

for

action.

IX

From Practical Reason to

Morality.

Practical

rea

demands that

principles

we offer

to others as

basic

action are indeed fit to be reasons for

others,

so a

autonomous.

Kant,

I

think,

assumes

that once

adequate

account of

practical

reason,

an

account of

not

be

far

away.

He writes

in

the

Groundwork

Th

principle

of

autonomy

is the sole

principle

of

moral

shown.'40

I

think

this

too

optimistic;

and

it is

certainly

a

tas

day. Although

I

hope

I

have

set out

why

the

Kant

of autonomyis fundamental o reasongiving,it woul

work

to

determine whether it is

the sole

principle

o

equivalent

to the other

formulations of

the

Catego

tive,

and to set

out

the

role

of other

considerati

reasoning.

This task

constitutes

the

programme

of K

and

political writings.

There he

aims

to

show

that

Autonomy

f the will is the

sole

principle

f all mor

duties

n

keeping

with

them;heteronomy

f

choice

hand,

not

only

does not

ground

any

obligation

t all

opposed

o the

principle

f

obligation

nd to the

m



21/22

20

ONORA O'NEILL

will. That

s to

say,

the

sole

principle

f

morality

o

pendence

rom all

matter

of the

law

(namely,

r

object)41

nd

at

the

same time

in

the

determin

through

he

mere

orm

of

giving

universal

aw

that

be

capable

of

42

In

the

fairy

tale

the

emperor processed

stark

naked

child

dared to

point

this

out. As

I

see

it,

the newe

autonomy

that have

played

so

large

a

part

in discus

ality

and

politics

since the

mid-twentieth

century,

a

penetratedthe innermostand outermost reaches o

professional

life

(especially

in

the

English

speakin

pretty scantily

clad. Neither

mere,

sheer

independ

called rational

autonomy

has much

to

commend

it,

t

no

doubt,

can be contrasted with even

nastier

pos

face

a

choice. Either

we

accept

some

contemporar

of

autonomy,

so must

conclude

that it is

at best

a

sometimes

suspect) aspect

of

the moral

life. Or

w

the Kantianconceptionof autonomyseriously,and

reason to

consider whether

it

just

might

be

'the sole

all moral

laws

and

of

duties

in

keeping

with

them'.

REFERENCES

Dworkin,

G., 1988,

The

Theory

and

Practice

of Autonomy Ca

bridge

University

Press).

Faden,

R. and

Beauchamp,

T.,

1986,

The

History

and

Theoryof

sent

(New

York: Oxford

University

Press).

Frankfurt,HarryG., 1971,'Freedomof the Will and the Conce

Journal

of Philosophy

68,

5-20.

Hill,

T.

E., 1992,

'The Kantian

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of

Autonomy',

in

Practical Reason

(Ithaca,

New

York:

Cornell

University

Pres

Kant,

I.,

1784,

An

Answer

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Question:

What

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Enlightenm

Philosophy,

rans.

Mary

J.

Gregor (Cambridge:Cambridge

U

1996),

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I., 1785,

Groundwork

f

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Metaphysicof

Morals

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J.

Gregor(Cambridge:Cambridge

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463.

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I., 1786,

What Does

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1996),

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41.

And,

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heteronomy,

romall

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'distin uish

ne rational

bein

from

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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


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THE

EMPEROR'S

NEW

CLOTH

Kant,

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Critiqueof

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n Practical

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J.

Gregor

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CambridgeUniversity

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1996),

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Kant,

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Metaphysics

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The

Conflictof

the

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in

Religion

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Rat

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Allen W.

Wood

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George

di

Giovanni

(Cambridge:

versity

Press,

1996),

7:5-116.

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On

Liberty,

n Utilitarianism nd other

Writings

nock

(Glasgow:

William

Collins

and

Sons,

1962),

126-250.

Mill, J.S.,

1862,

Considerations

on

Representative

Governme

Works

of

John Stuart Mill

(London:

Routledge,

1991),

29:

37

Rousseau

J.-J., 1762,

Social

Contract,

trans.

Victor

Gourevit

Cambridge

University

Press,

1997),

39-152.

Rousseau,

J.-J., 1755,

Political

Economy,

rans. Victor

Gourevit

CambridgeUniversityPress, 1997),3-38.

Schneewind, J.B.,

1998,

The

Invention

of

Autonomy

(Cambri

University

Press).

Skorupski,

J., 1989,

John

Stuart

Mill

(London:

Routledge).

Timmerman,Jens,

2000,

'Kant's

Puzzling

Ethic of

Maxims',

Har

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Wood, Allen, 1999,

Kant's

Ethical

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Cambridge:

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o'neill emperor's new clothes (2003)

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