o'neill v cook appellants brief in 3rd circuit 7-30-12

12-1406

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

HUGH FRANCIS O’NEILL; ELIZABETH NETTIE BEAN

Appellants

v.

ELLIOTT COOK, Field Office Director of the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services, London, United Kingdom; PERRY RHEW, Chief,

Administrative Appeals Office of the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Director of the United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services; SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

DORNAN & ASSOCIATES PLLC Of counsel: Eamonn Dornan

1040 Jackson Avenue, Suite 3B

Long Island City, New York 10017

Tel: (718) 707-9997

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Case: 12-1406 Document: 003110972921 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS.................................................................................i

INTRODUCTION…………..……………………………………………….1

ARGUMENT………………………...………………………………….…..3

A. The District Court failed to address the meaning of the phrase

“enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being

admitted” in relation to 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(9)(C)(i)…………………………………………………...3

B. The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the

denial of an I-601 Application for Waiver for the same reasons it

had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the I-212 Application for

Admission……..………………………………………………….13

CONCLUSION………………………………………………….…………17


i

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases

Matter of Graciela Quilantan,

25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) ……………………………………5, passim

Matter of Areguillin,

17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980) ………………………………………………5

Pinho v. Gonzales,

432 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 2005)…………………………………………14

Sum v. Holder,

602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010)………………………………………….…8, 9

Bracamontes v. Holder,

675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012) ……………………………………….… 9

Federal Statutes

5 U.S.C. §701….….......................................................................................13

5 U.S.C.§702.................................................................................................13

5 USC §706….……......................................................................................13

8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(C)….................................................................... passim

8 USC §1182(a)(9)(A)….......................................................................passim

8 USC §1071(a)(13)..............................................................................,passim


1

I. INTRODUCTION

In its Counter-Statement of the Issues in the Brief for Respondents

(“Resp. Br.”), the Respondents submit two questions for the Honorable

Court’s consideration (i) whether the District Court correctly concluded that

it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision to deny

O’Neill’s I-601 application for a waiver and (ii) whether the District Court

correctly ruled that O’Neill is ineligible for permission to reapply for

admission to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) because he

failed to wait the ten years required to seek admission under the plain

language of the statute.

As regards the first question, the Respondents concede, at least with

regard to non-discretionary agency decisions, that the District Court had

subject-matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”). Resp.Br. p2.

The question for the Honorable Court, then, is whether or not the

denial by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)

and the Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) of the I-601 Application for

Waiver of Inadmissibility (“I-601 Application for Waiver”) filed by

Appellant Bean on behalf of her spouse, was a non-discretionary action.


2

The Appellants have asserted that the dismissal by USCIS and the

AAO of Bean’s I-601 Application for Waiver was not based on any exercise

of its discretion, but rather based on legal error flowing from its erroneous

dismissal of the I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission

into the United States after Deportation or Removal (“I-212 Application for

Admission.” Furthermore, in the circumstances, USCIS and the AAO

simply declined to adjudicate the I-601 Application for Waiver, and thereby

failed to exercise any discretion at all.

The District Court has, in fact, set out the reasons why it retained

jurisdiction with regard to the I-212 Application for Admission, namely,

where “important facts have been totally overlooked or seriously

mischaracterized” which creates an error of law. This jurisprudence should

have been applied with equal measure to a review of the I-601 Application

for Waiver.

In any event, the more pertinent issue is raised in the second question,

namely, whether the District Court correctly ruled that O’Neill is ineligible

for permission to reapply for admission to the United States under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) until 10 years have elapsed from the date of his last

removal. The Appellants submit that the District Court simply failed to

make any determination at all on that ground, even though this was the main

issue raised by the Appellants on review.


3

If, as the Appellants submit, the Government has made a legal error in

this regard, then the Government’s interference with their right to family life

is considerable, and the damage to the family unit is incalculable. The

foreclosure of administrative relief to deserving families is not the result

which Congress intended when it built avenues for humanitarian relief into

the Immigration and Nationality Act.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The District Court failed to address the meaning of the phrase

“enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being

admitted” in relation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i).

With regard to the question of O'Neill's admission to the United States

in February 2002 on his brother's passport, the Respondents posited the

counter-statement of the issue as follows: "Whether the District Court

correctly ruled that O’Neill is ineligible for permission to reapply for

admission to the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) because he

failed to wait the ten years required to seek admission under the plain

language of the statute."

The problem for the Respondents is that the District Court made no

such ruling, but rather failed, as do the Respondents, to examine the "plain

language of the statute" with regard to the meaning of the phrase "enters or

attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted" at 8 U.S.C. §


4

1182(a)(9)(C)(i) which was the central question on review. The District

Court found, instead, that "because O'Neill is inadmissible, he is ineligible

for a waiver of inadmissibility" which is a legal nonsense. The Respondents

in their brief follow the same approach as the Administrative Appeals Office

("AAO") and the District Court to this central issue, which is to avoid any

analysis of the statutory language.

Having litigated the matter thus far, it is indeed remarkable that the

agencies, the lower court, and now the Respondents all have failed to

address this straightforward question with any particularity. Either O'Neill

was "admitted" to the United States in February 2002, pursuant to 8 USC

§1071(a)(13), or he was not.

The term ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’, with respect to an alien, is

defined at 8 USC §1071(a)(13) as “the lawful entry of an alien into the

United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”

Emphasis added. The Appellants submit that it is the inspection by an

immigration officer which renders an entry lawful, and which therefore

defines an "admission."

If O'Neill was "admitted" then he is not subject to the provisions of 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) and he is entitled to file an I-212 Application for

Admission along with an I-601 Application for Waiver within the 10 year


5

period of inadmissibility. If his admission was not effected, then he is

subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), and is permanently inadmissible, but

may file an I-601 Application for Waiver after 10 years have elapsed.

The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") in Matter of Graciela

Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010), affirmed its holding on this point

in Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980), and settled the issue

that "admission" denotes only "procedural regularity" in an entry, not

compliance with substantive legal requirements. Accordingly, an alien

seeking to show that he or she has been “admitted” to the United States

pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)

(2006), need only prove "procedural regularity" in his or her entry, which

does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration authorities or be

admitted in a particular status. This would include a failure by the

immigration authorities upon inspection to detect that O'Neill had entered on

a passport which was not his own.

The BIA in Matter of Graciela Quilantan had requested supplemental

briefing from both parties on two issues; (i) whether, for purposes of

adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act, the term “admitted” (as

defined in section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act to mean “lawful entry” into the

United States) required that an applicant, at the time of the claimed


6

admission, be lawfully privileged or entitled to enter the United States; (ii)

whether, in enacting section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act in section 301(a) of

the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575

(“IIRIRA”), Congress intended to continue to allow aliens who physically

presented themselves for questioning and were permitted to pass through the

port of entry to have satisfied the “inspected and admitted” requirement of

section 245 of the Act.

The BIA found that there was no dispute with regard to the question

of admission:

"On appeal, both parties agree that the term “admitted” in

section 245(a) of the Act demands only procedural regularity in

an entry, not compliance with substantive legal requirements,

and they urge us to adopt that interpretation."

Accordingly, as the Respondents have agreed in other fora that an

"admission" only demands procedural regularity, they should be estopped

from arguing that O'Neill's admission was not lawful in this case because it

did not comply with substantive legal requirements i.e. because the entry

was allegedly procured by fraud, a finding which USCIS in any event failed

to make.

The BIA in Matter of Graciela Quilantan outlined the history of the

"admission" doctrine and concluded that those, like O'Neill, who presented


7

at a port of entry, even on the basis of fraud, were nevertheless admitted for

the purposes of the statute:

"[I]nterpreting the term “admitted” in section 101(a)(13)(A)

of the Act to require an entry to be in compliance with

substantive legal requirements, rather than only with procedural

regularity, would effectively render null section 237(a)(1)(H)

of the Act, which provides a waiver of deportability that is

expressly available to aliens who obtained admission by fraud

or misrepresentation. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.

528, 538-39 (1955) (noting that a “cardinal principle” of

statutory construction is not to destroy parts of a statute, but

rather to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word). The

fact that Congress retained section 237(a)(1)(H) when it

amended former section 101(a)(13) demonstrates that Congress

understood that an “admission” could occur in the absence of

compliance with substantive legal requirements. [Citations

omitted and emphasis added].

Similarly, the sanctions found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) are

directed at individuals who have entered without inspection ("EWI"),

namely, individuals who have not been admitted or paroled, or who have

entered at other than an open, designated port of entry.

The distinction was explained by Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright in a Memorandum to Diplomatic and Consular Posts “DOS

Advises on Unlawful Presence/Three & Ten Year Bars":

"INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)1 renders permanently inadmissible any

alien who was unlawfully present in the U.S. for more than a

year in the aggregate, and who subsequently entered or

attempted to enter the U.S. without inspection. This provision

1 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)


8

primarily affects aliens who attempt to circumvent an

ineligibility under 9A by slipping across the border illegally."2

(Emphasis added).

This criteria does not apply to O'Neill who gained entry after

inspection at a designated port of entry. The sanctions at 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(9)(C)(i), on the other hand, provide that "[a]ny alien who, by fraud

or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought

to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into

the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”

The few circuit courts which have had the opportunity to address this

question have followed the same reasoning as the BIA. In Sum v. Holder,

602 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) the Ninth Circuit Court considered the

concept of admission in the context of a waiver of inadmissibility under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(h) and stated as follows3:

“Addressing this issue of first impression in this circuit, we

conclude that the plain meaning of the term “admission” in §

1101(a)(13)(A), and thus the term “previously been admitted”

in § 212(h), refers to a procedurally regular admission and not a

substantively lawful admission. The First Circuit came to the

same conclusion, having construed the term “previously . . .

admitted” in § 212(h). Onwuamaegbu v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d

405, 409 (1st Cir. 2006). The BIA also interpreted the term in

2 Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, Cable to Diplomatic and Consular Posts, April 4, 1998 at par. 36,

www.aila.org AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 98040490 (posted Apr. 4, 1998) 3 It should be noted that the only prior Ninth Circuit decision to address this issue was vacated by the panel.

In Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated by 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (order), a

panel of the Ninth Circuit court took the opposite approach and interpreted "admission" in § 1101(a)(13)(A)

to describe a substantively lawful entry into the United States.


9

the context of § 212(h). In re Ayala, 22 I&N Dec. 398, 401

(BIA 1998) (en banc). Neither decision approached the

question, as we do, from the starting point of the meaning of

“admission” in the definition section of the statute, §

1101(a)(13)(A), but the result is the same.”

See also Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 2012)

["Admission" and "admitted" are defined as "with respect to an alien, the

lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Clearly, neither term includes an adjustment of status; instead, both

contemplate a, physical crossing of the border following the sanction and

approval of United States authorities.]

Accordingly, in light of Sum v. Holder, supra, and Matter of Graciela

Quilantan the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) would similarly be

rendered null if O'Neill was considered to be an EWI under 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) based on a fraudulent entry, when the proper sanction is

found at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). O'Neill could only be an EWI subject

to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) if his admission was deemed to have been

vitiated by fraud, but the Circuit Courts and the BIA are clear that once the

procedures are complete, namely the admission after inspection by an

immigration officer, then the lawfulness of the entry has been established.

Neither the District Court nor the Respondents have articulated otherwise.


10

The BIA in Matter of Graciela Quilantan further clarified that it is

only when an alien makes a false claim to U.S. citizenship that s/he has not

been inspected:

"Thus, the controlling law is Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec.

308, which held that an alien who physically presents herself

for questioning and makes no knowing false claim to

citizenship is “inspected,” even though she volunteers no

information and is asked no questions by the immigration

authorities, and that such an alien has satisfied the “inspected

and admitted” requirement of 245(a) of the Act. See also

Matter of G-, 3 I&N Dec. 136, 138 (BIA 1948) (holding that an

alien who physically presents himself for questioning,

regardless of whether he is asked any questions, has been

“inspected”).

For their part, the Respondents blithely state that “O’Neill did not wait

the ten years to seek admission to the country that Congress has required in

the plain language of 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).” Resp. Br. 7. To the

contrary, the plain language of 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) requires that, for

O’Neill to be subject to the permanent bar, he must have sought to reenter

the United States without being admitted. In failing to address the central

question of his admission, and in failing to cross-appeal, the Respondents

should be deemed to have waived any opportunity to dispute the Appellants’

argument that O’Neill was admitted.


11

Finally, the Respondents make only one half-hearted attempt to

address the Appellants' argument on this point:

"O’Neill contends that the District Court’s denial of I-212 is in

error because he had been 'admitted' on his brother’s passport

and therefore lawfully entered the United States. See

Petitioners’ Brief at 18, 26. O’Neill’s argument utterly lacks

merit because he misrepresented his true immigration status to

gain admission. Indeed, O’Neill does not dispute that he used

his brother’s Irish passport and identity to enter the United

States. Id. at 7, 18. This act forecloses his argument: an alien

who fraudulently procures his admission to the United States is

inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i)."

Resp.Br. 12.

This assertion repeats the error of fact made by the AAO, which the

District Court identified but failed to address:

"First, although the AAO correctly stated that there had been

no appeal of the 1-601 decision, the AAO intimates that the

decision to deny the 1-601 was a substantive one based on the

application of§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), a statutory provision never

identified in the USCIS decision."

Emphasis added.

O’Neill has never been found by USCIS to be inadmissible under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), which addresses fraud or misrepresentation, and

USCIS is the agency charged with such a finding. A48. There is no doubt

that he will be found to be inadmissible under this section, whenever USCIS

properly addresses this ground, but for the purposes of judicial review this

finding was not before the AAO. That the AAO erroneously determined that


12

O'Neill had been found by USCIS to be inadmissible under this ground was

plain error by the AAO which the District Court failed to address4. A7.

O'Neill readily concedes that he is inadmissible under 8 USC

§1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), as an alien seeking readmission within 10 years of an

order or removal, but that he is nevertheless entitled to the exception at 8

USC §1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) which permits him to apply for readmission with

the Attorney General’s consent by filing an I-212 Application for

Admission. O’Neill submits that his admission on his brother's passport in

February 2002, was a lawful admission as defined at 8 USC §1071(a)(13),

such that he is not subject to the statutory bar at 8 USC §1182(a)(9)(C)(i) as

an alien who has been ordered removed and who "enters or attempts to

reenter the United States without being admitted.” The District Court was

asked to address this issue, and specifically why O'Neill was deemed by

USCIS not to have been admitted, but declined to do so.

4 The Appellants also disagree with Respondents’ statement that the facts in this case are not in dispute, in

that the characterization of some of the “facts” as rehearsed by the Respondents amount to legal

conclusions which have not been arrived at by any decision-maker. For example, respondents state that on

January 10, 2004 "O’Neill again illegally re-entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program on a

new passport under his own name." To the contrary, O'Neill lawfully re-entered the United States under the

Visa Waiver Program on a passport under his own name, and there has been not yet been any

administrative determination that this entry was procured by fraud or misrepresentation.


13

B. The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the

denial of an I-601 Application for Waiver for the same reasons it

had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the I-212 Application

for Admission.

The APA provides generally for judicial review of a federal agency’s

failure to act and, in the court’s discretion, to “compel agency action

unlawfully withheld” or to hold unlawful the findings of administrative

agencies which were “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or

limitations, or short of statutory right” contrary to the APA. 5 U.S.C. §

706(1) and (2)(C). The only limitations in the APA to a District Court’s

jurisdiction to review agency action is where (1) judicial review is precluded

by statute; or (2) the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.

5 U.S. C. §701(a).

The Respondents state in their summary argument that “O’Neill

ignores the fact that the decision whether to grant or deny a waiver of

inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) is committed to the discretion of the

Government, and the INA expressly prohibits any court from reviewing a

decision or action of the Government to grant such a waiver.” Resp.Br. 7.

However, the District Court found that the decision of the AAO to deny

O’Neill a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) was based on

error:


14

“AAO intimates that the decision to deny the 1-601 was a

substantive one based on the application of §1182(a)(6)(C)(i), a

statutory provision never identified in the USCIS decision.”

A008. Emphasis added.

Unfortunately, the District Court then failed to address the AAO’s

factual and legal error, and found that "USCIS's decision to deny the 1-601

in the interest of conserving resources, therefore, was an appropriate

exercise of agency discretion" such that the lower court "lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review the decision under the APA." A012. But, of course,

the District Court had APA jurisdiction where a decision, discretionary or

otherwise, was based on factual and legal error.

The District Court had asserted jurisdiction with regard to the

Appellants' APA claim in relation to the I-212 Application for Admission.

The lower court referred to Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir.

2005), which holds that an agency action must be non-discretionary for

courts to retain jurisdiction under the APA. A013. However, the District

Court also asserted jurisdiction under the "legal authority standing for the

proposition that a court may retain jurisdiction over an agency decision

where 'important facts have been totally overlooked or seriously

mischaracterized,' creating an error of law." A016. The District Court found

that the AAO did, in fact, mischaracterize the record below and the District


15

Court assumed that the erroneous characterization was "so substantial as to

create an error of law, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the court." A017.

Unfortunately, the lower court failed to apply the same consistency to the I-

601 Application for Waiver, to where the error regarding the I-212

Application for Admission flowed.

The Respondents assert that the "District Court correctly determined

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review USCIS’s denial of

O’Neill’s I-601 waiver application." Resp. Br. 9. In its background analysis

of his inadmissibility, the Respondents erroneously state that

"O’Neill…does not dispute that he fraudulently procured admission while

fraudulently re-entering the United States under a false name using his

brother’s passport." To the contrary, O'Neill nowhere concedes that he

"fraudulently procured admission" or "fraudulently re-enter[ed] the United

States" and that is a determination which must be made by the appropriate

agency, in this case USCIS. However, it is academic whether his entry

might be deemed to be fraudulent or not. As discussed above, the crux of

his argument is that he nevertheless effected an admission, whether or not

the use of his brother's passport was fraudulent.

The Appellants had also properly challenged what the Respondents

describe as the “denial of [O'Neill's] application for a waiver of


16

inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).” O'Neill had never made any such

application on that ground, having never been found to be inadmissible

under that ground in the first instance.

Accordingly, the Appellants submit that, in denying the I-601, USCIS

did not exercise any discretion at all but, rather, refused to render a decision

based on its erroneous dismissal of O'Neill I-212 Application for Admission.

As the District Court found "[I]n USCIS's judgment, it would 'serve no

purpose' to allow the 1-601 to proceed; consequently, USCIS denied the 1-

601." Clearly, the error by USCIS in denying the I-212 Application for

Admission infected its decision not to adjudicate the I-601, which cannot be

deemed to be an exercise of its discretion.

The Respondents attempt to cure the absence of decision-making by

USCIS by stating that the agency "balanc[ed]..the positive and negative

factors" in its exercise of discretion. However, this is projecting onto the

agency a process which is clearly absent from the record, and is tantamount

to testifying on behalf of the agency.

Finally the Respondents intimate that relief is unavailable because

“O’Neill is a serial violator of United States immigration laws and therefore

is inadmissible.” The Appellants have never disputed that O'Neill is


17

inadmissible on a number of grounds, but that does not preclude him from

relief.

The Appellants submit that O’Neill is more than just a serial violator;

he is the husband of a U.S. citizen, and father to two U.S. citizens, who have

been forcibly separated from their father. The decision of the District Court

means that the family effectively has been put on notice that they will

remain separated for the entirety of the children’s formative years, if not

longer, because the law does not permit O’Neill to reunite with them until at

least 10 years have elapsed. If the immigration law at 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(9)(C)(i) was intended to deny any humanitarian relief to O'Neill and

his family, then it must be crystal clear that he is subject to its provisions.

Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth above, the Appellants respectfully request

(a) that this Honorable Court find and determine that the AAO’s

determination constituted a legal error and should be quashed, or

alternatively (b) that this matter be remanded to the District Court with

instructions to compel the AAO to follow the law by carrying out its

obligations under the INA as set out herein.


18

Dated: July 30, 2012

Long Island City, New York

Respectfully submitted,

DORNAN & ASSOCIATES PLLC

By: /s/Eamonn Dornan

EAMONN DORNAN, ESQ



Tel: (718) 707-9997

Fax: (718) 228-5940

Attorneys for Appellants

Hugh Francis O’Neill and

Elizabeth Nettie Bean


19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Eamonn Dornan, hereby certify that the within Appellants Reply

Brief filed through the CM/ECF system was sent electronically to the

registered participant as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

on July 30, 2012 to the following electronic address:

"Nazarov, Ari (CIV)" [email protected]

and mailed on the same day one copy by priority mail in care of the

United States Postal Service to:

Ari Nazarov

Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Immigration Litigation

District Court Section

P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044



EAMONN DORNAN, ESQ



Tel: (718) 707-9997

Fax: (718) 228-5940




Dated: New York, New York

July 30, 2012


20

Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(a)

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because:

this brief contains 3,704 words,

excluding the parts of the brief

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii)

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:

this brief has been prepared in a proportionally

spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2000 in

14- point Times New Roman.

Certificate of Compliance with Digital Submission

3. This brief complies with the electronic filing requirements set forth at

L.A.R. 31.1(c):

1) any required privacy redactions have been made (none were

required in this case);

2) the text of the Digital Form and the hard copies of the within Brief

and Appendix are identical, and

3) a virus check has been performed on the Digital Form utilizing

Norton Antivirus 2003.

Dated this 30th

day of July, 2012



EAMONN DORNAN, ESQ



21


Tel: (718) 707-9997

Fax: (718) 228-5940





o'neill v cook appellants brief in 3rd circuit 7-30-12

Documents

application foradmission

waiver of inadmissibility

united kingdom perry

immigration services

unitedstates citizenship

immigration services

field office director

aao of beans