operational reservations: considerations for a total army force

8/12/2019 Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force

1/86

OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL

ARMY FORCE

John D. Ellis

Laura McKnight Mackenzie

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS


2/86

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTERfor

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIPand

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for serviceat the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduateswho are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a think factory for commandersand civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engagein discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achievingnational security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes nationalsecurity and strategic research and analysis to inuencepolicy debate and bridge the gap between militaryand academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Developmentcontributes to the education of world class seniorleaders, develops expert knowledge, and providessolutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Instituteprovides subject matter expertise, technical review,and writing expertise to agencies that develop stabilityoperations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency programsupports the United States Army War Colleges lines of

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-beingeducation and support by developing self-awarenessthrough leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategicleaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdomgrounded in mastery of the profession of arms, andby serving as a crucible for educating future leaders inthe analysis, evaluation, and renement of professionalexpertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,conserves, and exhibits historical materials for useto support the U.S. Army, educate an internationalaudience, and honor Soldierspast and present.

U.S. Army War College

SLDRSenior Leader Development and Resiliency


3/86

i

STRATEGICSTUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army WarCollege and is the strategic-level study agent for issues relatedto national security and military strategy with emphasis ongeostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategicstudies that develop policy recommendations on:

Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combinedemployment of military forces;

Regional strategic appraisals;

The nature of land warfare;

Matters affecting the Armys future;

The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concerntopics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department ofDefense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topicsof special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedingsof conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within theArmy to address strategic and other issues in support of Armyparticipation in national security policy formulation.


4/86


5/86

iii

Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

John D. EllisLaura McKnight Mackenzie

June 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) andU.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy fullacademic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiedinformation, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresentofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them tooffer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter-est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not becopyrighted.


6/86

iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 AshburnDrive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army WarCollege External Research Associates Program. Information onthis program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil , at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army WarCollege (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded freeof charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report mayalso be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placingan order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quotedor reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriatecredit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army WarCollege Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to updatethe national security community on the research of our analysts,recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming confer-ences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also providesa strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If youare interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on theSSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-631-X


7/86

v

FOREWORD

Drawdowns in Army funding and in the overallnumbers of Soldiers have called attention to the rightsizing of the three Armiesthe Active Component,the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Assenior leaders of all three components weigh the vari-ous options and discuss the merits of an OperationalReserve, it is important that they and civilian poli-cymakers consider the necessary reforms that mighthave impact on implementing the Army Total ForcePolicy directed by the Secretary of the Army.

The authors examine the tenets of the Army To-tal Force Policy, the details of what exactly the termOperational Reserve means, and the potential ob-stacles that are currently in place to disrupt successfulreform. The monograph includes questions for senior

leader policy considerations, examples of potentialconcerns, and recommendations to help mitigate ob-stacles in achieving a suitable and workable TotalArmy end state. The authors note that the signicantchanges created by the Reserve Components eventualintegration will demand concomitant signicant orga-nizational cultural change by all three components.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publishthis timely thought piece discussing the eld reali-ties of such an endeavor. It is hoped that this mono-graph will inspire both senior and junior leaders torecognize the necessity of that cultural shift commenc-ing in the near future.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


8/86


9/86

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JOHN D. ELLIS is a current U.S. Army Reserve colo-nel, serving as the Deputy Commander of the 9th Mis-sion Support Command at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. In hiscivilian capacity, he is a joint training system special-ist working as a contractor for Camber Corporationin the U.S. Pacic Commands Training and Exercisedirectorate. Colonel Ellis is a graduate of PrincetonUniversity and the U.S. Army War College.

LAURA MCKNIGHT MACKENZIE is a retired U.S.Army colonel who served in both the active and re-serve components, beginning her career as a MilitaryPolice ofcer in Cold War Europe and ending as theJ-5/7 (Director of Strategic Plans, Policies, Joint Train-ing and Exercises) for the Kansas National Guard.

Colonel (Ret.) Mackenzie has a bachelors degreefrom the University of Notre Dame and mastersdegrees from Drake University and the U.S. ArmyWar College.


10/86


11/86

ix

SUMMARY

As the Army Reserve Componentsthe Army Re-serve and the Army National Guardassume an op-erational mission as the force drawdowns in over-seas contingency operations occur, the Army seniormilitary and civilian leadership should consider theramications and realities of such a mission in what isexpected to be a relatively peaceful time. This mono-graph explores some of the considerations regardingthe implementation of the Army Total Force Policy,identies potential obstacles, and makes recommen-dations to better engage the three Armies in a suc-cessful and meaningful reform effort. Throughout, theauthors call for signicant cultural shifts in thinkingabout how the Reserve Components are used andintegrated into a Total Force.


12/86


13/86

1

OPERATIONAL RESERVATIONS:CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TOTAL ARMY FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The Battle Update Brieng for the theater-levelcommand post exercise was going well. The CurrentOperations Ofcer, an active duty major, was con-dent that he had all of the information needed by theDeputy Commanding General, an Army Reserve (AR)major general.

Sir, we have the three detachments of the 999thMP Company located here, here, and here, he said,indicating three different sectors on the map. Theirprimary mission is to secure the main supply.

Whoa there! interrupted the general. I happento know that unitReserves, yes?

Yes, sir.When was it mobilized? On whose authority?It was mobilized for this exercise, sir. We mobi-

lized it. It worked well, because the company is al-ready located there in the AO [area of operations].

Well, there are a couple problems here, Major.One, we cant simply mobilize a Reserve unit with-out proper authority. Two, I happen to know this unitand know that one detachment is in Kuwait, one is inDjibouti, and one is in Kyrgyzstan. How can they justshow up on your map?

But sir, they are assignedto us.Then you should know where they are, and it

aint there, the general said, pointing to the map.Well, it is just for the purposes of the exercise, sir.

Then I suggest you learn the proper way to mo-bilize and integrate Reserve forceswe need to trainas we ght.


14/86

2

B-b-but, sir, our Reserves are supposed to beoperational. . .

*****

That incident actually occurred in mid-2012 (al-though the unit designation and locations have beenchanged).1 As illustrated here, there is often a largedisconnect between what Active Component (AC)and Reserve Component (RC) leaders believe aboutwhat Operational Reserve forces can and cannotaccomplish, and how they can be used by ActiveComponent forces.

Importantly, this disconnect has manifested itselfin a dichotomy between the Department of Defense(DoD) intentions for an Operational Reserve (OR) andthe realities experienced by the RC. While there has

been tremendous progress in the last 5 years, it is pru-dent to review the results and challenges of the Armyseffort toward institutionalizing the OR.

Indeed, the very denition of OR is not univer-sally understood, a fact uniformly acknowledged bythe senior leaders interviewed for this project. This ismainly because its abstract denition lends itself to be-ing dened as whatever one wishes. This monographwill examine the various denitions and expectationsrelated to the OR and explore how the concept cameinto being. It will also touch briey on recent argu-ments that the federal budget can no longer supportan OR.

The monograph will look in-depth at the require-ments of both the DoDs directive to manage the RC

as an operational force and the Armys Total ForcePolicy (ATFP). A number of potential problems withATFP will be examined, and suggestions will be made


15/86

3

to mitigate those problems. An examination of theArmys Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is also

included, with recommendations on how to make themodel more useful for planning RC operations andtraining. Finally, we will examine the almighty budgetissue and its implications for the future of the RC.

Throughout the monograph there is a discussionof the various mindsets and organizational culturesthat permeate the AC, Army National Guard (ARNG),and Army Reserve (USAR). These have a tremendousimpact on the components ability to interact and willplay a pivotal role in determining the success of theArmys Total Force efforts.

This monograph will raise more questions than itwill provide answers. Although the report will endwith a list of recommendations, the most essentialtakeaway is that the Army must engage in robust dis-

cussions about the intent, challenges, and viability ofmaintaining the RC as a permanent operational force.Only then can prudent decisions be made about thefate of the OR.

BACKGROUND: THE SHIFT FROMSTRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE (OR)

Dating back to the militias that fought the Revolu-tionary War, the United States has beneted from thecontributions of citizen soldiers. Within the last cen-tury, Reservists (both USAR and ARNG) were usedextensively in World War I, World War II, and theKorean War.2

Following those conicts, the RCs were used less

and were considered to be a strategic reserveunitsand individuals to be called to duty only for the mostextreme national crises. Although some RC units and


16/86

4

individuals were called up for duty in Vietnam, over-all RC involvement was limited. The Cold War was

conducted almost exclusively with active duty units,with only occasional RC training missions to Europeand Korea.3

The role of the RC began to change in 1990, whenboth USAR and National Guard (NG) units werecalled up for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERTSTORM. The majority of RC units deployed werecombat support and service support, but a number ofRC combat units were also mobilized. Despite someconcern about units that were not able to deploydue to training issues, those units that did deployperformed well.4

After their proven performance in Operations DES-ERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the RC demobilizedand reverted to being a strategic reserve. Overseas

training deployments increased somewhat,5

but RCunits were once again resourced against the assump-tion that they would not be called upon for service anytime soon.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11),the nation was galvanized and patriotism ourished.Both civilians and Soldiers asked, What can I do tohelp? Predictably, RC Soldiers and leaders wantedto help with the effort against al-Qaeda, ght for theircountry, and get in the game.

Post-9/11 RC mobilizations began with thousandsof RC Soldiers providing security at airports andcritical infrastructure in support of Operation NOBLEEAGLE. As AC forces headed to Afghanistan to beginOperation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Reservists

were also mobilized to ll training base slots in theUnited States.

As the United States expanded its operations inAfghanistan, RC forces began joining the AC over-


17/86

5

seas. While the early deployment of RC forces to OEFwas somewhat limited, RC deployments steadily in-

creased. RC contributions to Operation IRAQI FREE-DOM (OIF) were signicant from the start. RC unitswere a part of the initial assault into Iraq in March2003, and AC/RC deployments rose and fell in pro-portion throughout OIF. RC units blended with ACforces to provide a strong and balanced Americanforce in Iraq.6

In total, over 800,000 RC Soldiers of all servicesserved in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, over 533,000were ARNG and USAR.7Of particular note were thecontributions of civil affairs, water purication, mailhandling, psychological operations, military history,and Enemy Prisoner of War processing units, whichcame almost exclusively from the RC.8Because thosecapabilities were largely absent from the AC, it was

assumed that RC units would be included routinely infuture operational endeavors.9

As the frequency and scale of RC deploymentsincreased in both Afghanistan and Iraq, military andcivilian leaders began viewing the RC with a differentlens. The RC was recognized for having well-trainedunits, critical specialties, and motivated Soldiers whocould be used in a variety of missions and roles. Al-though there was not a formal plan to do so, the RCbecame an operational force; this meant they weremade more readily available for a sustained periodof time than had been planned under the strategicreserve construct. By 2005, Army planners began ac-knowledging that the RC would be used as an opera-tional, rather than just strategic, force.10

Later in 2005, the nation was reminded of its de-pendence on RC forces to respond to domestic emer-gencies; over 50,000 of the 72,000 responders to Hur-ricane Katrina were RC personnel. Much to the RCs


18/86

6

chagrin, however, the comprehensive NG and USARresponse was overshadowed by the AC. Despite the

presence of thousands of National Guardsmen inNew Orleans, the arrival of Lieutenant General Rus-sel Honore (the AC First Army Commander) and the82nd Airborne Division created such a media frenzythat many people believed that AC forces were theonly ones responding to the crisis. The presence ofNational Guardsmen and Reservists from multiplestates was ignored.11

The press did not seem to realize that the activeduty troops, limited by Posse Comitatus, were usedmainly for presence patrols in relatively secure areasof the city. National Guardsmen, with broader lawenforcement authority, provided backup to the belea-guered New Orleans Police Department, evacuatedthe Superdome, and patrolled the more dangerous

areas of the city.12

Ironically, the civilian media were not alone inportraying the AC as the main force involved in Ka-trina. The U.S. Army Military History Institute, in itssummary of the Armys response to the hurricane,published a glowing account of the ACs contribu-tions in The Army Response to Hurricane Katrina. TheNG received only three sentences in the entire article;the USAR received none.13 Even the Louisiana NG,which continued operations despite its headquartersbeing ooded, was ignored in the report.14There wasno mention of the RC Soldiers who responded, despitebeing victims themselves;15 the 17,000 rescues doneby RC troops;16 or the Louisiana National GuardsJoint Task Force Gator, which stayed on duty for

3 1/2 years after the hurricane to provide additionalsecurity in New Orleans.17The RC, it seemed from theArmys report, was still considered to be just a backupto the AC.


19/86


20/86

8

extensive involvement by the RC and recommendedthat the DoD formally create a sustainable and ade-

quately resourced OR.22

The CNGRs nal report gave almost 100 recom-

mendations in six major categories: (1) Creating aSustainable OR; (2) Enhancing the DoDs Role in theHomeland; (3) Creating a Continuum of Service; (4)Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available OR; (5)Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employ-ers; and (6) Reforming the Organizations and Insti-tutions that Support an OR.23Although many of thecommissions recommendations have yet to be actedupon, the CNGR report was a critical work in deningwhat was needed to operate and maintain the RC asan operational force.

Following a 9-month review of the CNGR report,the DoD issued Directive 1200.17,Managing the Reserve

Component as an Operational Force.24

The directivesstated purpose was establishing the overarching setof principles and policies to promote and supportthe management of the RC as an operational force.25The directive was considered a victory by RC lead-ers, and established the expectation of new policies,rules, funding mechanisms, and programs to institu-tionalize the OR.

Unfortunately, the directive did not come withplans or large pots of funding attached. A year afterthe directive was issued, the Government Account-ability Ofce (GAO) issued two reports to congres-sional committees that emphasized the need for moreplanning and funding: GAO-09-720,Army Needs to Re-evaluate Its Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve

Component Forces,26 and GAO-09-898, Army Needs toFinalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy forSustaining an OR Force.27


21/86

9

Over the next 4 years, some progress was made,but much remains to be done. In 2012, the Army is-

sued an Army Total Force Policy (ATFP) directivethat called for the AC and RC to be integrated into aTotal Force.28As with the DoD directive, however,implementation has been limited by a lack of plansand funding. Critical issues have yet to be addressed,and practical measures to institutionalize the OR arestill lacking.

Most signicantly, the question has again arisen ofwhether it is feasible to maintain a permanent OR. Astroops are pulled out of Afghanistan and the DoDs fo-cus shifts to maintaining stability in the Pacic region,does the country still have the resources to maintainan OR force? Is an OR needed when the United Statesreturns to a relatively peaceful status? While the fullanswer to these questions lies beyond the scope of this

monograph, we will examine some recent indicatorsof an uncertain future for RCs.

WHAT IS OPERATIONAL?DIFFERINGDEFINITIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

As the opening vignette suggests, there is somedegree of confusion regarding what is meant by anOR. Indeed, as late as March 2013, one senior ACcommander remarked, Nobody knows what thatmeans!29

Joint Publication 1-02 includes the following as theofcial, albeit unhelpful, denition: ORAn emer-gency reserve of men and/or materiel establishedfor the support of a specic operation. (JP 5-0)30The

CNGR report cited a working denition (draft) fromthe Joint Staff, dated October 15, 2007:


22/86

10

The total Reserve component structure which operatesacross the continuum of military missions performingboth strategic and operational roles in peacetime, war-time, contingency, domestic emergencies and home-land defense operations. As such, the Services orga-nize, resource, equip, train, and utilize their Guard andReserve components to support mission requirementsto the same standard as their active components. EachServices force generation plan prepares both unitsand individuals to participate in missions, acrossthe full spectrum of military operations, in a cycle or

periodic manner that provides predictability for thecombatant commands, the Services, Service members,their families and civilian employers.31

The key aspects of this denition include: acrossthe continuum of military missions (available for es-sentially all types of roles), calls upon the Services toresource their RCs as they would their AC units, and

making employment of the RC predictable. In otherwords, this denition calls for the RC to do anythingand everything to the same standard as the AC, andcalls for the Services to prepare the RC to do any-thing and everything, and to do it on a specied timeschedule.

The CNGR report took issue with the Joint Staff

denition, stating:

. . . does not answer the basic questions policymak-ers face: What missions will the National Guard andReserves perform in their strategic and operationalroles? How will DoD resource and equip the reservecomponents for these missions so they will be a readyforce capable of operating both overseas and in thehomeland? And what can combatant commands,

the services, service members and their families, andcivilian employers expect in terms of predictabledeployments?32


23/86

11

For its part, the CNGR did little to dene the term.

A denition can be gleaned from the proposed reformobjectives, calling for improving the ability of the NGand Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as a partof a total integrated force and:

a force that is ready, capable, and available for pre-dictable overseas rotations, responses to emergenciesin the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability

to surge when required.33

DoD Directive 1200.17, which mandated the OR,included the following denition:

RCs as an operational force. The RCs provide opera-tional capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S.defense requirements across the full spectrum of con-

ict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a fullrange of missions according to their Services forcegeneration plans. Units and individuals participate inmissions in an established cyclic or periodic mannerthat provides predictability for the combatant com-mands, the Services, Service members, their families,and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units andindividuals train or are available for missions in ac-cordance with the national defense strategy. As such,the RCs provide strategic depth and are available totransition to operational roles as needed.34

This ofcial denition describes a reserve forcethat can integrate seamlessly with AC forces to con-duct a variety of missions, tempered by predictabilityfor the RC. One wonders if the predictable aspect

was an afterthought put in to appease those stakehold-ers (civilian employers, family members, and even theSoldiers themselves) who do not particularly like the


24/86

12

alternativeundened deployments with undenedtime requirements.35

Regardless of DoDs ofcial denition and goal ofpredictability, there is still no agreement on what theOR should be or how it should be employed. Thereappear to be at least two denitions: one each fromthe AC and RC perspectives. The AC vision of op-erational embodies deployment for combat-relatedmissions, largely in support of AC forces.36 The RCdenition of being operational includes the idea ofsupporting the AC for overseas combat missions butalso encompasses other real world missions.

One NG Adjutant General (TAG) described opera-tional forces as performing any and all missions thathave real world projects and impact, including non-traditional missions. Being operational is more thandeploying.37 Other RC leaders agreed, saying that

participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, stabil-ity, and domestic response operations helps to traintheir units and maintain their mission-capable edge.

With two fundamentally different views of whatthe OR should do, it is little wonder that confusionexists regarding what each component expects of theother. Recent initiatives to align forces with regionalcombatant command theaters may serve to furthercomplicate the notions of what support of AC forcesactually means.

Is it important to dene the term OR more clear-ly? Yes. A clear denition will provide a better senseof what is expected of the RC and allow a commonframe of reference for force structure and resourcingdiscussions. Until all components agree and under-

stand what the OR should be, animosity and turfwars will continue to plague the Army.


25/86

13

Perhaps the true issue is the fact that there are threeArmies: the AC, the NG, and the Army Reserve.

Each one views issues rst from its own parochial per-spective, then perhaps acknowledges the views of theother two. Although the Army Total Force Policypro-vides a start in reconciling this disparity, policy alonecannot eliminate cultural boundaries. More importantwill be the willingness of senior leaders in all threecomponents to discuss and agree on what the ORshould be and do, then actively seek practical meth-ods to integrate the force. One of these methods mustinclude attacking the cultural mindsets manifested bythe leaders in each component.

WHY AN OR?

The question of why there should be an OR was

never really asked. The Deputy Chief of the ArmyReserve stated that operationalizing the RC was theright thing to do.38That was pretty much all there wasto it. In fact, this justication was repeated by seniorleaders in numerous venues. There did not seem to beanyone in the higher reaches of leadership who ad-vocated any other point of view or potential thoughtregarding how this was to be achieved or what thisactually meant. (Perhaps that is why few alternativeviewpoints were raised).

The CNGR rightly explained that the OR conceptsprang out of necessity due to increased frequency ofRC use for both overseas contingencies (in Iraq andAfghanistan) as well as for homeland-based emer-gencies.39 The CNGR went to say that the future se-

curity environment would be difcult to discern, butit would be certain to require RC elements workingin close conjunction with AC forces in order for theUnited States to achieve its strategic objectives.40


26/86


27/86

15

beyond 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks of springtraining.

Granted, General Odierno followed his statementby saying:

We need the Guard. We need them. Weve proven thatover the last 12 years and the Army Reserve. Weregoing to continue to build an Army that is built on theTotal Army concept.42

But what will that Army look like? Will it endup having an OR, or will the RC revert to being astrategic reserve?

FUTURE OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

At this time, there is no way to accurately predictwhether the Army will maintain the RC as an opera-tional force or return them to being solely a strategicbackup. Budget cuts will force large changes to theArmys force structure and determine the destiny ofthe OR.

As General Odierno stated during the AmericanEnterprise Institute symposium:

So what we should be looking at is whats best for ourfuture. So for me its maintaining the right balance offorces. Weve already taken 80,000 out of the activecomponent. Were going to take a signicant amountmore out of the active component, based on sequestra-tion. And were going to have to take a little bit out ofthe Guard and Reserve. Itll be a much less percentage.So the overall percentage of our Reserve componentwill be much higher thanwill be higher than the ac-

tive component, where before, the active componentwas higher than the Reserve component. I think thatsthe right balance. And weve got to look at how were


28/86

16

going to employ them, not just rhetoric about certainparts of the force[emphasis added].

. . . So I think weve been working with them verycarefully through all this. We will continue to workwith them. And my job is to make sure we developthe best Army possible for the future. And thats whatwere going to do.43

Regardless of budget issues and limited support

from AC leaders, the RC has continued the push forthe OR. At the Reserve Ofcers Associations (ROA)2013 National Security Symposium, General FrankGrass, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), stated:

We need to continue to engage in the operational mis-sions of our services. . . . We have to look like the Armyand the Air Force, and we have to have missions that

get us into the ghtso we can continue to grow lead-

ers that can be ready at a moments notice anywherein the world [emphasis added].44

The last portion of the CNGBs statement is criti-cal to understanding why the RC wants to remainoperational. Without real world missions to con-tinue training RC Soldiers and leaders, the experience

gained in a decade of war will be lost. The RC leadersght to maintain the OR cannot be viewed simply aswanting to justify their services existence. Rather, op-erational missions are key to maintaining experiencedleaders and procient units.

Interestingly, attendees at the ROA symposiumdiscussed the possibility of having a partial OR, withsome units being operational and others being re-sourced at lower, less readily deployable levels.45Thisidea hearkens back to the mid-1990s tiered resourcing


29/86

17

when RC units had expectations of their deployabilitybased on pre-assigned categories. Tiers were devel-

oped by considering the type of unit and how likely itwas to be needed for deployment, how well the unitmet its readiness standards, and other factors. In timesof budget restrictions, such a tiered system is certainlymore achievable than expecting every RC unit to beresourced as an operational asset.

With the wars coming to a close and operational re-

quirements drawing down, however, there is morefriction developing between the AC and RC. Strugglesfor resources, relevancy, and mission assignmentscolor interactions between the components. The AC,seemingly for budget savings and efciency, has be-gun to resume missions that were routinely conductedby the RC for the last decade. Many ARNG and USARunits are being off-ramped from future missions for

which they had already begun training. The AC hastaken back ARNG commitments to the NATO Koso-vo Force (KFOR) missions,46 the Multinational Forceand Observers peace-keeping mission in the Sinai,Egypt47and in the Pacic, AC forces are replacingRC units that have traditionally conducted certainengagement-focused exercises.48

This concerns RC leaders, who fear that withoutreal world missions to perform, the RC will, in theeyes of the AC, once again become irrelevant. As oneARNG general stated, Without operational missionsfor us [RC forces], a reserve component death spiralis likely.49

In reality, budget restrictions will likely deter-mine the extent to which the RC is maintained as an

operational force. Tellingly, Congress failed to act ona proposed resolution that would have afrmed con-gressional support for a permanent OR.50 Likewise,the 2013 Army Posture Statementnever mentioned an


30/86

18

OR.51In February 2013, General Odierno testied tothe Senate Armed Services Committee that . . . the

reduction in overseas deployments which has sus-tained our reserve readiness over the past 12 yearsmay result in us being unable to maintain our OR.52None of these bode well for proponents of a fullyOperational Reserve.

The future of the OR is still a question. Because theanswer may involve maintaining at least a portion ofthe RC as an operational force, the remainder of thismonograph will examine the realities of using the OR.First, we will examine the DoD and Army directivesthat outlined the goals and policies for establishing apermanent OR and Army Total Force. Then we willexamine some of the problems and challenges associ-ated with maintaining an operational RC. It is hopedthat these discussions will assist policymakers in their

decisions about the future of the RC.

DOD DIRECTIVE 1200.17MANAGING THERESERVE COMPONENTS AS ANOPERATIONAL FORCE

The OR was formally recognized in October 2008when the DoD issued Directive 1200.17, Managingthe Reserve Components as an Operational Force.53 Thedirective was a straightforward document that estab-lished the overarching set of principles and policiesto promote and support the management of the Re-serve Components (RCs) as an operational force.54The directive dened DoD policies (essentially endstates), then assigned responsibilities and specic pro-

gram taskings (ways) to the DoD Under Secretaries,Assistant Secretaries, and Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments. Most signicantly, the directive stated:


31/86

19

It is DoD policy that:a. The RCs provide operational capabilities and

strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirementsacross the full spectrum of conict. . . .

b. The Active Component (ACs) and RCs are inte-grated as a Total Force based on the attributes of theparticular component and individual competencies.55

Other policies in the directive included: Homeland Defense and Defense Support to

Civilian Agencies (DSCA) are Total Force mis-sions.

The RCs provide connection to and commit-ment of the American public.

The continuum of service is utilized to enhanceand sustain the all-volunteer force with exibleservice options. . . .

Utilization rules enhancing predictability andprudent use of the RCs are implemented togovern frequency and duration of activations,while acknowledging that expectation man-agement is critical to the success of the manage-ment of the operational force.56

Voluntary duty (per Titles 10 and 32 U.S. Code)is encouraged to meet mission requirements.

RCs are resourced to meet readiness require-ments, and tracking mechanisms are in place toprovide visibility of resourcing efforts.

Outreach services for RC members, theirfamilies, and employers are establishedand available from pre-activation throughreintegration.57

In an enclosure to the directive, DoD assigned spe-cic responsibilities and outlined numerous program


32/86

20

expectations. Importantly, the rst tasking was to en-sure that DoD policies support the planning, orga-

nization, and utilization of the RCs to provide opera-tional capabilities and strategic depth across the fullspectrum of conict.58 Two signicant points wereaddressed here: The RC was to perform both opera-tional and strategic roles, and the RC was to be used inmissions across the full spectrum of conict. Insteadof being considered only as a backup for large-scalecombat operations, RC units were also to be used fornoncombat and nontraditional missions; peacekeep-ing, stability operations, etc.

Another signicant responsibility assigned to theUnder Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readi-ness was ensuring that:

total force policies encourage optimum integration

of AC and RC personnel to provide the most ef-cient training opportunities to all personnel, allow forshared use of resources, and provide the most opera-tional benets and mission capability.59

Additionally, the ofce was charged with ensur-ing that total force assignment policies encourage theconsideration of RC members to serve in key senior

leadership positions throughout DoD.60

The responsibilities delegated to the Assistant Sec-retary of Defense for Reserve and Personnel Affairsincluded developing policies for managing the RCsas an operational force, which is a necessity in an eraof persistent conict and global engagement; poli-cies that promote use of total force capabilities in sup-port of domestic disaster without interference with

core defense missions;61and sufcient guidance . . .to guide Service implementation of the continuum ofservice concept.62


33/86

21

Finally, the Secretaries of the Military Depart-ments were directed to implement the provisions of

this Directive and manage their respective RCs asan operational force such that the RCs provide opera-tional capabilities while maintaining strategic depth. . . across the full spectrum of conict.63

The directives enclosure detailed ve pages of re-quirements to ensure that DoD provided an RC forceavailable for missions in accordance with the nationaldefense strategya rather broad goal. The OR forcewas also to have capabilities useful for domesticdisaster response and meet operational readinessrequirements as identied by the President and Secre-tary of Defense [SecDef]. In other words, the SecDefwas calling on the RC to conduct business as usualwith respect to being able to respond to homeland di-sasters as well as to ght in ongoing wars or conicts.

The Service Secretaries were ordered to ensureappropriate level of full-time support personnel . . . tomeet readiness requirements of the RCs; implementthe continuum of service construct; and programand execute resources where required to support atrain-mobilize-deploy construct. The directive fur-ther mandated that funds for training and equipmentmust be provided to coincide with the Services forceplanning cycle . . . and stipulated that each ServiceSecretary would ensure resources are provided formedical and dental requirements, equipping needs,facilities, training requirements, and even legal as-sistance to support activation of military personnel.64What the directive did not say was what would hap-pen if those funds were unavailable.

In summary, the DoD was directed to integrate theRC and AC to form a seamless organization ready andable to do all things required, and to do them efcient-


34/86

22

ly and effectively. Unfortunately, the directive wasissued with the apparent assumption that resources

were bountiful. Left unanswered was the question ofwhat to do if resources were limited. Five years later,that question still awaits an answer.65

ARMY DIRECTIVE 2012-08. ARMY TOTALFORCE POLICY

In September 2012, 4 years after the DoD directedthe Services to use total force policies, the Secretaryof the Army issued Army Directive 2012-08,Army To-tal Force Policy (ATFP). The purpose was to integratethe Armys AC and RC as a Total Force, which wasan integrated operational force to provide predict-able, recurring and sustainable capabilities . . . to fulllnational military needs.66

The Army Total Force Policy has been hailed as asignicant step in the evolution of the all-volunteerforce . . . .67 The authors of this monograph concurthat ATFP is a step forward but warn that the ATFPhas ramications that were either overlooked or notunderstood by its writers. The ATFP directive con-tains numerous requirements for the RC that are un-realistic and unachievable. Further, there is a seeminglack of recognition that budget constraints will limitexecution of a signicant portion of ATFPs goals forboth the AC and RC.

Regardless of the challenges, the success or fail-ure of the ATFP will be determined mainly by theexpectations and mindset of the leaders who mustimplement the policy. Are the components willing to

educate themselves on the capabilities and limitationsof their partners? Are the components willing to setaside parochial attitudes and consider the concerns of


35/86

23

the other components? Are the components willing toalter their operations to meet the requirements of the

ATFP? Are they willing to change their organizationalcultures to replace component-oriented identities witha vision of the Total Army?

To determine if achieving the goals of ATFP iseven possible, this section will examine the most criti-cal and challenging portions of the Total Force policyand suggest ways to mitigate the potential problems.

The ATFP directive opened with several blanketstatements that afrmed current methods of operatingas policy but added the title Total Force:

As one Total Force, the Active Army, Army NationalGuard, and U.S. Army Reserve provide operating andgenerating forces to support the National MilitaryStrategy and Army commitments worldwide.68

The Army will ensure that the Total Force is orga-nized, trained, sustained, equipped, and employed tosupport combatant commander requirements as forcepackages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.69

The remaining policy statements were more sub-stantive and will require signicant changes to theway the AC and RC interact. Although the analysisraises more questions than it provides answers, it iscritical that Army leaders understand these questionsand develop answers to ensure the success of theArmy Total Force.


36/86

24

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ARMYTOTAL FORCE POLICY

Integration of Tactical-Level Forces.

The ATFP directive stated:

3.c. As appropriate, the Army will integrate AC andRC forces and capabilities at the tactical level (divisionand below), consistent with the Secretary of Defenses

policies for use of the Total Force. . . . This will includesome predeployment collective training of tactical-level organizations, including those organizations thatwill routinely deploy as multi-component forces (forexample, sustainment brigades and other multifunc-tional support brigades).70

This tasking can be interpreted in several ways.

For those who support integration of the threeArmies, this is a green light to plan together, traintogether, and even form standing multicomponentunits (vice those that were formed only out of neces-sity within combat theaters). For those who opposepeacetime activations of the RC, execution could belimited to some combined training, only when RCunits are slated to deploy. This interpretation would

also limit intercomponent activity to those units thatare, of necessity, comprised of multiple components(i.e., the type of brigade level units that usually residein the AR). The goal of this statement, while perhapswell intended, is so broad that it can be interpreted inopposing ways.


37/86

25

Training Integration.

The objectives of the Army Total Force Policyin-tegrated Total Force packagessuggest avoiding theseparate but equal approaches that most of the RCcurrently uses. In the struggle to provide unit-basedcapabilities, the RC has been largely separated fromthe AC, as it trains separately from the units it isintended to support.

The Army School System (TASS), for example,encompasses myriad AC, NG, and USAR schools.Under TASS, most state NGs operate their own Re-gional Training Institute; course offerings include of-cer commissioning programs, the NoncommissionedOfcer Education System (NCOES), and Military Oc-cupational Specialty (MOS) qualication courses. TheUSAR also operates its own schools, with the same

type of offerings (minus ofcer commissioning).While TASS has done well in limiting overlap in MOScourses, there is signicant redundancy in ofcer andNoncommissioned Ofcer (NCO) professional devel-opment courses.71

More signicantly for the ATFP, most post-InitialEntry Training is usually conducted through sepa-rate AC and RC programs of instructions (POIs). Inthe past, RC POIs were structured around the RCtraining model, which provided for a weekend battleassembly each month and a 2-week annual trainingperiod per year. The number of slots for RC studentswas limited in AC schools, particularly when an RCequivalent was available. Likewise, AC participa-tion in RC schools was limited because the POIs were

markedly different.72The Army is developing the OneArmy School System to address this, but challengeshave arisen in developing POIs that are appropriate


38/86

26

for both RC Soldiers (with limited training time) andAC Soldiers (who can train for as long as needed to

achieve prociency).73

Likewise, collective training rarely blends the ACand RC. RC collective training is normally conductedat the units annual training. Few units develop train-ing plans to include the units they are expected to workwith when mobilized. It would behoove RC leaders toseek out their AC counterparts and nest their train-ing plans together. The widely different planning timeframes from the RC to the AC would need to be ad-dressed (i.e., many RC units lock in their AT trainingsites and objectives 2 years in advance; few AC unitshave any idea what they will be doing in 2 years), butsurely progress can be made in conducting multicom-ponent training.

Multicomponent Units.

It may be that the only wayor perhaps the onlyacceptable wayto meet the intent of the DoD Direc-tive is to establish multicomponent units. Indeed, re-cent pronouncements seem to indicate a fondness forthese constructs by the highest levels of Army leader-ship.74

Multicomponent logistic support brigades werewidely and successfully used in OIF. Ironically, whenthose multicomponent units redeployed and the RCelements demobilized, the components went theirvarious ways. It would benet the Army to reestablishthose unit/component relationships and continue todevelop them with peacetime training opportunities.

To achieve the intended goals of integrating train-ing and developing multicomponent units, plannerswould be well advised to examine the successes and


39/86

27

challenges of multicomponent endeavors in the past.75Planners should also interview the leaders of units

who have trained with the other components, as wellas those who have trained with other services. Con-sideration must be given to the vastly different plan-ning timelines and training schedules of the AC andRC, and units must cooperate in altering their plans toaccommodate each others needs.

The issues facing multicomponent units are numer-ous and complex. As the Army moves toward region-al alignment of its RC forces, more multicomponentunits will be formed. For a more detailed discussion ofthe challenges facing an RC unit that has already beenintegrated into an AC headquarters (the USARs 9thMission Support Command), an appendix is included:Integration Experiences of a Reserve Component Unit As-signed to an Army Service Component Command.

Uniform Predeployment Readiness andProfessional Development Standards.

The next requirement contained in the ATFPdirective was:

4. Army Commands and Army Service Component

Commands will ensure that the procedures and pro-cesses for validating the predeployment readiness ofassigned forces are uniform for AC and RC units andSoldiers. Army commanders will be responsible forcertifying personnel readiness and individual train-ing for assigned personnel. Standards for qualicationand professional development will be the same for ACand RC personnel.76

Effecting this portion of the ATFP may be themost difcult of all. There are three potential problem


40/86

28

areas: achieving uniform readiness validation pro-cesses, determining which commanders/headquar-

ters will certify readiness, and requiring identical pro-fessional qualication standards for AC and RC.

First, it is impractical to require that the same pro-cedures and processes be used to validate predeploy-ment readiness. While AC units have at least 250 daysper year to train and test their skills, RC units normal-ly have only 39 days per year. RC units are authorizedadditional training days before deployment, but thenumber is limited by the DoD 1-year mobilizationpolicy.77 It is unlikely that RC units can be validatedon the same range of skills as their AC counterparts.

RC brigade and division level headquarters are al-ready challenged by the requirement to validate theirhighest-level collective skills, rather than testing theskills they are most likely to use in the theater and

mission to which they are deploying. While AC unitsmight have the time to validate on multiple sets ofskills, RC units do not.

One OEF-bound RC brigade combat team, for ex-ample, was tested on leading a brigade-sized attack,despite the fact that brigade-sized attacks were vir-tually unheard of for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Be-cause of the time consumed by that task, the unit wasunable to train on what it would be doing in theater:synchronizing numerous squad and platoon-sized ac-tions across a large area.78As the sending units NGTAG suggested, it would have been worth taking therisk of not training on brigade-sized maneuvers in or-der to focus on the missions they knew the unit wouldhave to perform.79

An additional challenge to implementation of theuniform validation procedures mandate is thatthere is no existing standard procedure for RC valida-


41/86

29

tions. Procedures vary widely from one mobilizationstation to another, from the USAR to the ARNG, and

even from one states ARNG to another. For example,some TAGs have aggressively sought to validate theirown units, while others leave it up to the mobiliza-tion stations. Many times, RC units are validated ina piecemeal fashion, with different headquarters andorganizations validating different skills. For example,an ARNG contingent from 35ID that is deployingto Kosovo in January 2014 will be validated at threedifferent training sites: Fort Hood, TX; Salina, KS;and Hohenfels, Germany.80 Each sites training teamwill likely use different procedures and even dif-ferent standards to determine that the unit is readyto deploy.

This policy measure will also prove to be difcult inthat multiple headquarters (i.e., Army Commands or

Army Service Component Commands) could claim tohave primacy for validating units. In the case of unitswith multiple headquarters (i.e., regionally alignedRC units), who dictates the standards? For example,the USARs 9th Mission Support Command (MSC)the headquarters for the Pacic Army Reserve at FortShafter, HIis operationally aligned with and as-signed to U.S. Army Pacic (USARPAC), the activearmys Army Service Component Command for U.S.Pacic Command. However, resourcing for the 9thMSC comes from U.S. Army Reserve Command (US-ARC), which denitely has a vote in deciding whattraining it will buy. This is signicant, especially ifUSARPACs validation standards are more expensivethan what USARC can afford to provide. While this

particular unit may be presently viewed as an out-lier, this same type of relationship will be duplicatedthroughout the RC as it aligns and assigns forces toregional combatant commands.


42/86

30

Finally, it is naive to suggest that RC Soldiers canmeet identical standards for professional develop-

ment and qualication. Already, many RC Soldiersare hard pressed to leave their civilian employers forextended Army schooling.81 Increasing requirements(i.e., the expectation that Before the transition to eldgrade, captains should have achieved at least half ofthe credits necessary to earn a masters degree)82willplace a further burden on RC Soldiers, their families,and their civilian employers.

Additionally, resource constraints will make it dif-cult for the RC to meet the same standards for quali-cation and professional development. For example,funding restrictions have reduced the number of seatsavailable at Ofcer Educational System (OES) andNCOES courses. Some schools have, of necessity, pri-oritized AC Soldiers and limited the numbers of seats

available for RC students.83

RC students often haveto wait longer to obtain a seat and therefore attendprofessional development courses later in their ca-reers than AC Soldiers. In addition, some RC courses(i.e., Intermediate-Level Education and the U.S. ArmyWar College) may take a signicantly longer time tocomplete, since the instruction can be spread out overyears instead of months.84RC leaders, who already getfar less time leading their troops than their AC coun-terparts, are at a distinct disadvantage when resourceslimit leader development schools.

A common answer to the problemto use Distrib-uted Learning (dL) computer classes to replace resi-dent schoolsrequires RC Soldiers to dedicate count-less hours of personal, unpaid time to complete the

necessary schooling. Soldiers must complete lengthyonline Structured Self-Development courses as pre-requisites to attending NCOES courses.85 Although


43/86

31

strides have been made in compensating Soldiersfor dL hours,86 the majority of these courses are still

completed by RC students on Love Time (unpaidhours). Ironically, RC Soldiers can earn retirementpoints for completing Army e-Learning courses thatwill enhance their civilian qualications (i.e., informa-tion technology certication courses, business leader-ship, and project management)87but earn nothing formandated military courses.

Few will argue that a computer-based course canprovide the same depth and training experience thata resident course can. For example, a Soldier who istraining to become a nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCO can learn technical information online, but a dLcourse cannot provide the experience of suiting up inprotective gear and performing the job in a contami-nated environment. Similarly, U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine CommandPamphlet 525-8-2states:

. . . use of dL is not typically as satisfying for leader-ship courses and does not provide the social benetsor professional relationships as that encountered inresident PME [Professional Military Education].88

While dL lls some training gaps, it cannot solve

all of the challenges of achieving identical AC/RCqualication standards.

Streamlined Procedures for Mobilizing the RC.

The next portion of ATFP stated:

5. The Army will streamline the voluntary and invol-

untary call to active duty of RC personnel and units torapidly expand and sustain Total Army capabilities.


44/86

32

While the intention is clear, the practical methodsto effect this policy have not taken shape. Indeed, it

appears the same rules regarding 1,095-day limita-tions and other prohibitive policies remain in effect.The approval authorities for moving from one compo-nent to the next remain in effect from previous years.To achieve this goal, planners must examine the myr-iad after action reports of RC mobilizations over thelast decade. They must extract and analyze the successstories, while developing ways to address and correctsystemic problems. Finally, the DoD must reconsiderits rules and prohibitions regarding mobilization, anddetermine whether they can be changed to streamlinethe mobilization process.

Equipment.

ATFPs equipping guidance was:6. The Armys equipping strategy will ensure the pro-curement and equipping processes enable the TotalForce to perform missions of the Department of theArmy.

This policy seems to suggest, again, no necessary

changes in practice to what is already occurring. Thechallenge will arise when wartime budget supple-ments are gone and equipment budgets are slashed.

The Army made tremendous progress over the lastdecade in equipping RC units with modern equipmentthat is compatible with what their AC counterpartshave. The ARNG generals who were interviewed forthis project agreed that the ARNG has more and better

equipment than ever before.89Their fear is that, withdecreased budgets and a potential return to strategicreserve status, RC units will once again be relegated tousing obsolete and inadequate equipment.


45/86

33

In the current budget environment, it is unrealisticto think all RC units can be equipped at the same lev-

els they were under the large wartime budgets of thelast decade. At a minimum, however, the Army mustcontinue to equip those RC units that are most likelyto deploy. This may not be enough to satisfy RC lead-ership, but the RC must accept that future budgetswill not bring all units to 100 percent of requirements.

Integrated Personnel and Pay Systems; Continuumof Service; Joint Opportunities.

The last signicant policy issue in the ATFPdirective was:

7. The Army will employ an integrated personnel man-agement and pay system that contains standardizedbusiness processes and authoritative data for militarypersonnel enabling access to secure and reliable data.Personnel policies shall incorporate Total Force valuesand facilitate continuum of service and opportunitiesfor joint experiences.90

Two critical taskings are included here: Integrat-ing the AC and RC personnel and pay systems, and

changing personnel policies.

Integrating Personnel Systems.

This is clearly a pie in the sky objective for per-sonnel, and pay systems are nowhere close to stan-dardization. Indeed, the AC and RC systems com-prise a myriad of subsystems and networks that have

difculty communicating with each other, let aloneoperating in a coherent fashion to support Soldiersfrom multiple components.


46/86

34

Instead of trying to integrate existing systems, themost feasible method of achieving the ATFPs objec-

tive would be to develop an entirely new personneland pay system. Of course, integration was alreadyattempted by the DoD when it tried to implement theDefense Integrated Military Human Resources Sys-tem (DIMHRS).91 The system, which was supposedto have integrated the various component human re-source functions and subsumed over 90 subsystems,was plagued by problems and delays. When the DIM-HRS experiment was nally cancelled, Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen told theSenate Armed Services Committee, This programhas been a disaster.92DIMHRSs billion-dollar failureleft the Army with its antiquated human resource sys-tems and little hope for integration in the foreseeablefuture.93

The AC, USAR, and ARNG still have largely sepa-rate personnel systems. Some computer integrationhas been done through the use of the Electronic Mili-tary Personnel Ofce (eMILPO), but its capabilities arelimited. All DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data)and Service-members Group Life Insurance forms areuploaded into the eMILPO system and tracked regard-less of component. But that is the full extent of its AC/RC interconnectivity. RC Soldiers retirement points,awards, and evaluations cannot be recorded, limitinge-MILPOs ability to track a continuum of service.94

Continuum of Service and Joint Opportunities.

Little progress has been made in developing a con-

tinuum of service. This concept (also known as Sol-dier for Life,) would allow Soldiers to move moreeasily between the various Army components (Active,Reserve, and Guard) to meet the individual Soldiers


47/86

35

personal needs and desires. Continuum of servicepolicies would provide a baseline system of credit so

Soldiers would remain competitive for promotion andbe eligible for retirement from any component. Thisgoal, while admirable, has not prompted any changesto current policies.

Indeed, the RC also has to contend with the 1,095-day rule, which essentially prohibits active duty ser-vice for operational support for greater than 3 yearsin a 4-year period95clearly violating any spirit of acontinuum of service concept. As with many other as-pects of having the OR, one must question whetherthere is truly a desire to implement the continuum ofservice. Without major changes to the personnel sys-tems, this concept will remain merely a good idea.

There is also much work to be done in creatingjoint opportunities for RC Soldiers. While joint oppor-

tunities are available for those Reservists who wish todeploy or take a full-time tour, part-time joint billetsare scarce. Other than gurehead positions at largeheadquarters, there are few opportunities availablefor rank-and-le drilling RC Soldiers to work with theother services. Ironically, the most numerous joint po-sitions seem to lie in the domestic response arena; eachstate has a multiservice team of Emergency Prepared-ness Liaison Ofcers (EPLOs) to work with the NG inplanning and responding to domestic emergencies.96Thankfully, there is hope that part-time joint billetswill increase with the coming regional alignments ofRC units to geographic commands. The authors rec-ommend that specic effort be dedicated to identify-ing and publicizing those billets to increase the joint

service experience level of the RC.


48/86

36

Cultures and Mindsets.

Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to becoming aTotal Force will come from the cultures and mindsetsof the different componentsnot just the leadership,but also the rank and le.

It is clear the ATFP was written to help combatthe traditional perceptions that the RC comprised thejunior varsity or the B-Teamterms that still getused today by even junior and mid-grade ofcers andNCOs in the AC. These perceptions tend to rankle RCSoldiers, especially if they have come from a wealthof experience in combat operations or from years ofAC service (both are very common in the RC). In re-sponse, many RC Soldiers have adopted an inatedview of their own capabilities and insist that they arejust as procient as the AC. The RC sometimes fails to

acknowledge that is it physically impossible to achievethe same level of expertise with only a fraction of thetraining time.97

Senior leaders in both components have recognizedthe strong performance of the RC in the recent wars.But while the overall acceptance and integration of RCunits have improved, the reality is that the AC poli-cies and procedures still treat the RC as second-classcitizens. We see in the areas of training and personnelreadiness, as well as operational integration withincommands, a disjointed view of the RC. The situationcalls for a mass change in organizational cultureonethat may not be effected for decades.

Another cultural change needed is the recognitionthat each of the three Armies within Total Force

has valuable, unique contributions to make. The ACwould benet from recognizing RC Soldiers civilianskills and domestic emergency response expertise.98


49/86

37

The RC would benet by more gratefully accept-ing the ACs training assistance, rather than chang

against perceived paternalistic attitudes.To gain acceptance by AC leaders, the RC needs to

remove the chip from its shoulder and stop takingoffense every time a suggestion is made to reduce RCfunding or manning. Leaders in all components needto recognize that their force must share in the pain ofsequestration and budget cuts. The our force is morevaluable and therefore should not be cut argumentsare often rooted in a defensive us versus themmentality and serve no valid purpose in workingout problems.

Us versus Them has no place in a Total Force. Lead-ers and Soldiers in all components need to examinetheir mindsets and discard parochial attitudes. Untilcultures change, the Army will not change.

ATFPRealistic or Idealistic?

Is the Army Total Force Policy realistic or ideal-istic? Cynics would say it is yet another instance ofsenior leader intent not taking into account the prac-tical reality of what can (and cannot) be provided.Optimists and visionaries might respond that thepolicy represents a viable end state to which all Armyefforts should be directed. The true answer probablylies somewhere in between. Regardless, it is clear thatthe three Armies have much work to do in the areasof integrating training and operations, personnel, re-sourcing, andperhaps greatest of allexpectationmanagement and cultural change.


50/86

38

FORCE GENERATION

Mobilization of the RC is normally based on de-mand signals from the AC. When the AC anticipatesa critical shortage of forces to meet its operationaldemands, it turns to the RC to ll the gap. When theavailable AC forces are sufcient to meet the demand,RC involvement is considered unnecessary.

The conicts of the past decade created a strongdemand signal for RC forces, for both current and fu-ture operations in the Long War. To generate andensure the ow of necessary forces (both AC and RC),the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model wascreated and implemented in 2006. The ARFORGENmodel sought to provide a sustained ow of forcesfor current commitments and to hedge against unex-pected contingencies.99It was to increase predictabil-

ity to combatant commandersCentral Command(CENTCOM) in particularby cycling units throughthree force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Avail-able. This cycling process was to be the structuredprogression of unit readiness over time to producetrained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for opera-tional deployment. . . .100

While not perfectly executed, not tied in with per-sonnel policies, and expensive, it is this same essentialprocess the RC seeks to use for continuing its opera-tional support to the ACeven as we enter supposedyears of relative peace. Is ARFORGENs supply-ori-ented process needed when demand is lacking? Moreto the point, is RC support needed when the AC canalready meet its operational requirements?

Lacking a demand signal, it appears the RC is hop-ing to create demand by publicizing its capabilities,aggressively seeking nontraditional real world mis-


51/86


52/86

40

professional development will be the same for AC andRC personnel,103then the cost to ensure this undoubt-

edly will have to rise (especially if other factors, suchas healthcare, are added into the mix to make the com-ponents more equitable). If the supply of available RCunits remains at its current level (based on rotationsthrough the ARFORGEN cycle) but the demand forthem drops, is it cost-effective to maintain the RCunits at readiness levels that are not truly required?

RC leaders would point out the efciencies gainedby using part-time forces that can be rapidly trainedand assimilated into the war ght. These efciencieshave been cited in numerous venues (mentioned ear-lier), essentially stating that the RC comprises some-where around 50 percent of the total Army force butcosts only about 16 percent. Opponents would re-spond that because of the demand to get forces into

Iraq and Afghanistan, predeployment training wasdone to a good enough standardone that obvi-ously worked and allowed quick integration into thetwo operational areas.

Regardless of how many RC forces are ultimatelycommitted to operational missions, the Army needs todecide whether ARFORGEN is still the right systemto use for RC force generation. Proponents emphasizethe predictability and levels of readiness that ARFOR-GEN provides, while others go back to the question ofwhether a demand-based model is the best to use inpeacetime.

The ARFORGEN Model.

It appears the RC wants to continue using theARFORGEN model to prepare and mobilize its unitsfor operational missions, regardless of demand. The


53/86

41

Chief, National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass,recently stated, One of the best things the Army ever

did was adopt the ARFORGEN model. His enthu-siasm was apparently based on the model providingpredictability and stability for Soldiers. Everyone isin a cycle, he said. People do need a break.104

Ironically, many of the lower-ranking generalswho were interviewed for this project were consid-erably less enthusiastic about ARFORGEN. Whileall agreed the ARFORGEN model was a reasonableplanning tool, they expressed concern that its plan-ning timelines were disregarded more often than theywere followed. Numerous examples were given ofunits that deployed two and even three times in 5 or6 yearsa far cry from the 1 in 5 predicted by themodel.105If the model is not going to be followed, theyasked, why have it?

Soldiers question its use, too. Whereas all of thegeneral ofcers understood ARFORGEN was just aplanning tool, Soldiers in the eld tended to view itstimelines as a promise. When they had to deploy morefrequently than 1 year in 5, some Soldiers viewed it asa betrayal. They were willing to deploy and get thejob done but were disappointed the Army wasnt fol-lowing its own guidelines.106

There was also a marked lack of knowledge aboutthe length of ARFORGENs planning cycles. Only oneinterviewee even mentioned the steady-state 6-yearcycle that is supposed to be the norm for RC units inpeacetime. Instead, everyone spoke of a 5-year cycle:RC units would mobilize for 1 year and spend 4 yearsof dwell time. Few seemed to know the 5-year cycle

was intended only as a surgewhen demand ex-ceeded forces in the Available Force Pool.107


54/86

42

In order for ARFORGEN to be a viable planningtool, it is essential that Soldiers understand its rota-

tional cycles, guidelines, and limitations. For example,they should know the ARFORGEN regulation speci-es an exception to the rotational cycles for spe-cialized units belonging to an intensely managedstructure that must maintain a level of readiness thatallows them to be called upon for periods of high de-mand.108 In other words, certain units (i.e., civil af-fairs, aviation, and special operations units) are goingto mobilize and deploy more often than 1 year in 5.109IfSoldiers understood the possibility their unit might beon a compressed rotational cycle, there would likelybe fewer complaints about mismanagement of forces.

By and large, the Soldiers interviewed agreed a5-year cycle was reasonable for RC units (again, mostbeing unaware that the ARFORGEN plan called for

a 6-year steady-state cycle).110

All expressed concernthat the necessary readiness levels might be difcultto achieve if adequate resourcing were not providedin the Train/Ready years.

There were also RC-specic concerns about themodels lack of realism in trying to achieve a steadybuildup of readiness. For example, the ARFORGENmodel posits that changes of command will occur inthe RESET year.111 That is feasible for AC units thatare on a 3-year cycle, but not for RC units with a lon-ger cycle. RC command tours are usually limited to 2to 3 years, meaning a unit will see multiple command-ers and senior enlisted leaders over a 5-year ARFOR-GEN cycle. This does not bode well for continuity of a5-year training plan, as each commander will conduct

assessments with subjective criteria, regardless of theaim point guidance, and place different levels of fo-cus on an ever-changing mission essential task list.


55/86

43

Further, ARFORGEN calls for most individualtraining and professional development to occur in the

RESET year. It is unrealistic to expect that this trainingwill be sandwiched into only 1 year of a 5-year cycle.Many RC Soldiers are constrained by civilian employ-ment and scheduling issues prohibiting them fromattending OES and NCOES schools in a given year.Also, new personnel will join the RC unit throughoutthe training cycle; those joining in the later years willneed to be trained, especially if they have not been ableto get a RESET year to become individually procient.

To answer some of the questions about the viabil-ity of a 5-year training cycle for RC units, Major Gen-eral Tim Orr, the Adjutant General of Iowas NationalGuard, proposed adapting the ARFORGEN model toreect the realities of peacetime training for the RC.Since most RC units are not likely to deploy again in

the near future, Orr suggested maintaining ARFOR-GENs timelines but revising the goals and expecta-tions for what should be accomplished in each year ofthe cycle. This could also take into account the variedprobability that units would deploy, laying out morestringent readiness aiming points for those special-ized units more likely to be mobilized.

Orrs ideas for adapting ARFORGEN were practi-cal, realistic, and easy to implement. They go beyondthe scope of this monograph, but the authors recom-mend ARFORGEN program managers and RC lead-ers examine the ideas further.112

As with many other issues, the successful use ofARFORGEN as a planning tool will be determined inlarge part by funding available to resource the plan.


56/86

44

BUDGETS AND BARGAINS

In January 2013, Chief of Staff of the Amy (CSA)General Raymond Odierno conducted an awards cer-emony and had an informal dinner with leaders andspouses of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade atOsan Air Force Base, Republic of Korea. During thedinner, the CSA spoke frankly about the looming DoDreductions in budget and basically afrmed that withthe continuing resolution, the Army was short aboutsix billion dollars. He also lamented sequestrationand signaled that if sequestration were to occur, thenit would likely mean a 17 billion dollar shortfall, andif this happens, it will come out of readiness dollars.Regarding benets, he further added that there wouldnot likely be an impact to Soldier benets for at leastseveral years, but pointed out that since 2001, the

cost of an individual Soldier had doubled, with muchof that cost found in health care.113

One month later, testifying before Congress, Odi-erno spoke forcefully of the scal cuts the Army wasalready undertaking under the Budget Control Actof 2011: about $170 billion over the next 10 years. Hecited the Armys intent to:

[Reduce] active duty end strength from a wartimehigh of about 570,000 to 490,000; the Army NationalGuard from 358,000 to 350,000; the U.S. Army Reservefrom 206,000 to 205,000; and the civilian workforcefrom 272,000 to 255,000 by the end of scal year 2017.. . [By 2017] we will downsize our active componentforce structure from 45 Brigade Combat Teams to po-tentially as low as 32 . . . In 2014, however, we will

begin signicant force reductions. . . .114


57/86

45

Perhaps one of the most thought-provoking detailspresented by the CSA was the minimal reductions to

be allocated to the RC (just 13 percent of all Soldierreductions). What was the rationale behind makingbroad cuts to the AC and civilian work force ratherthan the RC? Why not make proportional cuts acrossthe board? In an environment characterized by drasticreductions in budgetary resources, why was the RCspared draconian cuts in end strength?

What Odierno did not say (out loud) was that theRC is more cost-effective. This scal reality has beenproven by numerous studies and is touted by RC lead-ers as one of the main reasons the RC should be main-tained at current (or even increased) strength levels.

Not surprisingly, one of those publicizing the scalwisdom of maintaining the RC is Lieutenant GeneralJeffrey Talley, the current Chief, Army Reserve (CAR).

In recent testimony to Congress, he stated that:

[a]s the Armys Federal OR force provider, the ArmyReserve provides a cost-effective way to mitigate riskto national security, comprising almost 20 percent ofthe Total Army for only 6 percent of the current bud-get, and adds that this is an excellent return on invest-ment.115Then Acting Director of the Army NationalGuard (DARNG), Major General Raymond Carpenter,cited statistics that reected the ARNGs 33 percent ofthe total Armys force while consuming only 10 per-cent of the total Army budget.116

The 2008 CNGR report gave signicant attention todiscussing the economic and budgetary environment.The CNGR concluded that the RC is a bargain: The

National Guard received about 12 percent of the totalArmy 2008 requested budget, while the Army Reservereceived only 6 percent, (compared to 66 percent pro-


58/86

46

vided to the AC, with the remainder going to research,development, testing, and evaluation programs).117

Despite its small portion of the Armys budget, theRC mobilized and deployed in huge percentages andgreater frequencies than originally planned.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) also con-cluded that the RC provided a bargain for nationaldefense:

[T]he most recent report of the Reserve Forces Policy

Board (RFPB) concluded that while Reserve compo-nent forces comprise 39% of the total force, they ac-count for 16% of the costs. It calculated that an Activecomponent service member costs taxpayers $384,000compared to $123,000 for his counterpart in the Re-serves, which would translate into about $2.6 billionin savings for every 10,000 positions shifted from full-time to part-time.118

Critics of these numbers point out that RC forma-tions require more training time to get ready for de-ployment than AC troops, and that this train-up pe-riod could cost more than a steady-state investment.They also say the numbers do not take into accountthe economic impact of RC Soldiers being out of thecivilian economy and therefore may be costing the na-

tion in ways not altogether measurable.There is also concern that increased usage of the

National Guard in a warghting role would dimin-ish the NGs ability to perform its homeland role ofDSCA. Indeed, a state may suffer if its NG Soldiersare deployed elsewhere while a natural disaster or ter-rorist incident occurs in the state. This concern is miti-

gated in two ways: 1) It is unlikely that a state wouldever have to deploy all of its forces at the same time;and, 2) Emergency Management Assistance Compacts


59/86

47

(EMACs) exist between states to provide domestic re-sponse capabilities for states in need.119

Perhaps the real issue is that the AC does not wantthe RC to assume an operational role. Although SeniorAC leaders have publicly echoed the lets have anOR mantra, they have also more privately expressedconcerns over the concept. Some have mentioned thatmobilization of the RC during a crisis and during ashooting war is one thing, but a regular, peacetimemobilization could have drastic effects.

One senior Army commander said in an interviewfor this project, . . . with the localization of the Re-serve component, large mobilizations could destroya community, take down an industrythat is wherethis is fuzzy.120This could, indeed, be an issue in cer-tain towns and industries (i.e., law enforcement has aheavy percentage of reserve component Soldiers), but

one must question whether it is a large enough con-cern to negate the benets of having an OR.

The budgeting and resourcing process highlightsthe reality that we have three Armies: the AC, theARNG, and the Army Reserve. When it comes to de-cisions regarding manning, equipping, training, andmissions, the three Armies vie for precious dollars toeach serve its own needs. While the Army Total ArmyForce Policy directs that the AC and RC be consid-ered as one,121it is idealistic to think that the parochialghts for resources will abate.

For example, RC general ofcers have recently be-come bolder in directly asking Congress for increasedfunding for specic RC endeavors. Are the RC leadersmaking an end run around the Department of the

Army, asking lawmakers to do what the Pentagonmay not want done?122As one critic noted, [The RCgenerals] want to stay part of the operational force in-


60/86

48

stead of the strategic reserve because it means theyllget much greater resources.123 He further surmised

that maintaining an operational RC would also in-crease pressure for deeper cuts in the active-dutyArmy.124Are these legitimate concerns, or is this justanother example of the three Armies posturing andvying for increasingly scarce resources?

At his Congressional testimony in January 2013,Odierno listed the steps the Army needed to take asa result of the expected budget shortfalls for FiscalYear (FY) 13 and FY14.125He rst mentioned furloughplanning and cuts to civilian personnel; cancellationof third and fourth quarter depot-level maintenance;cancellation of all but one of the Brigade maneuverCombat Training Center rotations for nondeployingunits; and large reductions of institutional train-ing across the Army (including reduction of aviation

training ying hours; courses on DSCA and militaryintelligence; NCO common core courses; the CaptainsCareer Course; and Intermediate Level Education[ILE]). Odierno also discussed cuts in base sustain-ment funds, severe reductions in RC pre-mobilizationmedical readiness accounts, and others.

Odierno ended the long list of budget reductionmeasures by saying:

Let me emphasize that these readiness issues are notlimited to the Active Component. They will hit theTotal Army. In fact, the reduction in overseas deploy-ments which has sustained our reserve readiness overthe past twelve years may result in us being unable tomaintain our OR.126

It remains to be seen whether Congress wil

operational reservations: considerations for a total army force

Documents