operationalizing political analysis in the east asia pacific region

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Advice

Please select a topic

Agenda ExampleApproach Process

Value

ABSM

Operationalizing Political Operationalizing Political Analysis in the East Asia Analysis in the East Asia

Pacific RegionPacific Region

An Agent Based Stakeholder An Agent Based Stakeholder ModelModel

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agendaagenda

• Background on Operationalizing Political Analysis

• ABSM Approach & Process

• A (Thinly) Disguised Example & Demo

• Really Early Lessons

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Political Analysis ToolsPolitical Analysis Tools

Cocktail party chatsCocktail party chats Comparative case Comparative case studiesstudies

Scenario analysisScenario analysis Stakeholder analysis Stakeholder analysis (traditional)(traditional)

SenturionSenturion

What is it?What is it? Talking with political Talking with political actors and stakeholders actors and stakeholders on an informal basison an informal basis

Descriptive case studies Descriptive case studies of historical of historical development of and development of and current political current political economy; often placed economy; often placed in comparative in comparative perspective with other perspective with other countriescountries

Identify political Identify political economy trends economy trends and building out and building out alternative alternative scenarios scenarios

Snapshot of the major Snapshot of the major political actors/groups political actors/groups on specific issues – on specific issues – defined as broadly or defined as broadly or narrowly as necessarynarrowly as necessary

Picks up where stakeholder Picks up where stakeholder analysis picks up; agent-analysis picks up; agent-based model to understand based model to understand political dynamicspolitical dynamics

Why do we Why do we do it?do it?

Gives a sense of the Gives a sense of the political landscape; political landscape; often what Bank often what Bank country teams usecountry teams use

Rich context & deep Rich context & deep knowledge; try to not knowledge; try to not miss connections miss connections between Bank between Bank operations and broader operations and broader political system; political system; understand multiple understand multiple causationcausation

To develop a menu To develop a menu of possible of possible strategies and strategies and contingency contingency planning; planning; preparation for preparation for futurefuture

Understanding where Understanding where specific stakeholders specific stakeholders stand on particular stand on particular issuesissues

Systematic exploration to Systematic exploration to illuminate things we didn’t illuminate things we didn’t see from the raw data – see from the raw data – visual map of what we know; visual map of what we know; make more informed make more informed decisions; knowledge decisions; knowledge collaboration tool; tests collaboration tool; tests strategies explicitly; strategies explicitly; challenges assumptions challenges assumptions about whether we should about whether we should always focus on just our always focus on just our reform alliesreform allies

When to When to use it?use it?

Broad understanding of Broad understanding of coalitions around coalitions around reform issues that we reform issues that we care about; possible care about; possible leverage pointsleverage points

Background Background understanding of the understanding of the political environment in political environment in a country; where do a country; where do current coalitions come current coalitions come from, why do they exist from, why do they exist in the manner they do?in the manner they do?

Long term strategic Long term strategic planning – either if planning – either if things continue or things continue or for possible for possible exogenous shocksexogenous shocks

Identify the key Identify the key government and society government and society groups in order to groups in order to achieve a specific achieve a specific outcomesoutcomes

High information in terms of High information in terms of data; build consensus for data; build consensus for specific operations (possibly specific operations (possibly more useful for continuous more useful for continuous spectra than non-continuous spectra than non-continuous reform issues); sensitivity reform issues); sensitivity analysis to different Bank analysis to different Bank strategies and effective good strategies and effective good cop/bad cop strategies; cop/bad cop strategies; dynamic tool for analyzing dynamic tool for analyzing possible strategiespossible strategies

Where Where does it fit does it fit in Bank in Bank

products products and cycle?and cycle?

Country team Country team operations; identifying operations; identifying reform alliesreform allies

Long-term, over several Long-term, over several CAS cycles; informing CAS cycles; informing country team’s overall country team’s overall knowledgeknowledge

CASCAS Identifying reform allies Identifying reform allies and/or veto players for and/or veto players for specific operationsspecific operations

Operational decisions, Operational decisions, building consensus, building consensus, conditionality; use framing & conditionality; use framing & issue discussions in CAS issue discussions in CAS

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EAP’S Political Analysis Quest: EAP’S Political Analysis Quest: A Search for Relevance and A Search for Relevance and RigorRigor• (Amazing) Emerging Consensus that Politics Matter (Amazing) Emerging Consensus that Politics Matter

to Developmental Outcomes to Developmental Outcomes • Growing Body of Analytic Work on Political Growing Body of Analytic Work on Political

Economy Issues Economy Issues • Soft Tools for Incorporating Stakeholder Views in Soft Tools for Incorporating Stakeholder Views in

Program DesignProgram Design– Interesting but Not Used Interesting but Not Used – Accessible but Not RigorousAccessible but Not Rigorous

• Challenge: How to develop operationally relevant Challenge: How to develop operationally relevant and methodologically robust analytic tools that will and methodologically robust analytic tools that will change decisions on the ground in real timechange decisions on the ground in real time

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From Early Pilot to New & From Early Pilot to New & Improved SenturionImproved Senturion• Early Pilot with Agent-Based Model in 2 EAP Early Pilot with Agent-Based Model in 2 EAP

CountriesCountries– Consultants Performed AnalysisConsultants Performed Analysis– Outside of Operational CycleOutside of Operational Cycle– Little Operational ImpactLittle Operational Impact

• New Modeling Tool (Senturion)New Modeling Tool (Senturion)– Desktop Software for In-House UseDesktop Software for In-House Use– Modeling Built-in to ProgramModeling Built-in to Program– Training for Bank StaffTraining for Bank Staff– Feeds into Operational Decision MakingFeeds into Operational Decision Making

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What is the ABSM Approach?What is the ABSM Approach?

• Agent Based Stakeholder Model (ABSM) draws upon leading-edge work to analyze the preferences & behaviors of relevant decision makers on politically driven issues.

Provides (much) more systematic, dynamic modeling of complex interactions than traditional stakeholder analysis

• Employs microeconomics & political (rational choice) theory algorithms to simulate bargaining dynamics & coalition formation over time on specific issues.

• Accurate analysis can be generated using subject matter experts (not primary sources)

• Gauges in advance whether proposed policies are politically feasible as designed.

• Allows reform packages to be tailored to domestic political conditions.

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• SENTURION defines problems as issues on which stakeholders compete to influence.

• With Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), SENTURION maps the current political landscape of stakeholders & coalitions on issues.

• Power or Potential to Influence• Position• Importance or Salience

• The SENTURION ABSM then:

• Tracks the complex interactions of all stakeholders using microeconomic & political theory.

• Anticipates bargaining dynamics & coalition formation over time.

• Identifies tactics to achieve desired outcomes.

• Allows comparison of alternative starting assumptions, hypotheses & scenarios.

How Does the ABSM Process How Does the ABSM Process Work?Work?

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Model AlgorithmsIssue n

Issue 2

Issue1

Framing• Definition of Problem• Structuring of Issues

Knowledge Outcome Matrix

Issue Outcomes

Out

put

Paths

Consensus

Action Plan

Stakeholders

•Influence•Position•Importance

Continuum

10

20

30

40

50

60

Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4

Equ

ity S

take

%

Partner 1, Partner 2 & ATeam

W VC, External Investors, CF1 & CF2

W CEO & CFO

W Chairman

Amicable Agreement at

25%

Dynamics

Dat

a C

olle

ctio

n

. . .. . .. . .. . .Legal Movements

Etc. from DelphicPanel

. . .. . .. . .. . .Regulatory Policy

(related to Legal)

What events orcombination ofevents are likely toproduce significantchange?

Opportunity & Costto achieve desiredoutcome:

• Influence

• Lobbying

• PR

• Negotiation

Is a new modellikely?

Which model?

Timeline?

Who will support oroppose?

Congress

Regulators

Wellpoint

Competitors

Consumer

Media

etc

Alternative Modelsof HealthcareStructure

Early WarningTriggers

Strategic InitiativesBasecase OutcomeStakeholder DataIssue

Analysis

Results

Low

High

Low

High

Decision Making

Landscape

Num

ber o

f Am

eric

an V

oter

sRightLeft Center

R2

D2

Median Voter

Median

Deal makers

Terrorists Freedom Fighters

ExtremeExtreme

Risk

Winning Politically

Win

nin

g Pers

onally

Get less of what you want for reaching a deal

Less likely to reach a deal given more of what you want

C

B

A

Decisions

StakeholderA Decision?

ChallengeStakeholder

B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists

3rd PartyIntervention

BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins

Perceptions

- Compromise

Negotiate Compromise

To Rival B

+ Conflict

A Advantage

+ Compromise


To A Advantage

+ Compel

B gives in to A

+Stalemate

- Stalemate

- Give In

Yield to Rival B

- ConflictRival B Advantage

A v B?

A v B?

A v B?

+ A- A

+ B

- B

- Compromise


To Rival B

+ Conflict

A Advantage

+ Compromise


To A Advantage

+ Compel

B gives in to A

+Stalemate

- Stalemate

- Give In

Yield to Rival B


A v B?

A v B?

A v B?

+ A- A

+ B

- B

- Compromise


To Rival B

+ Conflict

A Advantage

+ Compromise


To A Advantage

+ Compel

B gives in to A

+Stalemate

- Stalemate

- Give In

Yield to Rival B


A v B?

A v B?

A v B?

+ A- A

+ B

- B

Proposals

ABSM ProcessABSM Process

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Eff

ec

tiv

e P

ow

er

(Inf

luen

ce*I

mpo

rtan

ce)

Low

High• Issue continuum

• List of stakeholders

• Position they adopt

• Potential to influence

• Salience of the issue

Where are stable

coalitions?

Where is compromise

possible?

Where are politically powerful groups?

Issue Continuum

Creating a snapshot of the current political landscape with experts, not to predict outcomes but to render the context.

Initial DataInitial Data

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Data Collection and Framing Data Collection and Framing ProcessProcess

• Interview of ExpertsInterview of Experts• Pair-wise Comparisons to Check ValidityPair-wise Comparisons to Check Validity• Data Refined in Framing Process (Issue Data Refined in Framing Process (Issue

continuum, Relative Positions, Power, continuum, Relative Positions, Power, Salience for Individual Actors and Groups Salience for Individual Actors and Groups -- with relative weights) are Checked, -- with relative weights) are Checked, Re-checked, and Revised as Needed. Re-checked, and Revised as Needed.

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Conceptual Underpinnings of Conceptual Underpinnings of ABSMABSM

• Median Voter TheoryMedian Voter Theory

• Game TheoryGame Theory

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Num

ber

of

Am

eri

can V

ote

rs

RightLeft Center

Political Orientation

R2

Republican Winner

D2

Democratic Winner

R1 R3D1

D3

The Median position for each party wins the most votes

MedianMedian

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Num

ber

of

Am

eri

can V

ote

rs

RightLeft Center

Political Orientation

R2

D2

General Election “The Race to the Center”`

The Median Position is the winning position in a pairwise comparison of all alternatives (Duncan Black 1958).

MedianMedian

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Deal makers

Terrorists Freedom Fighters

ExtremeExtreme

• Risk Acceptant stakeholders are further from median or preferred outcome

• Risk Averse stakeholders are close to median or preferred outcome.

Risk & the MedianRisk & the Median

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• Risk Acceptant: Overvalue benefits of what stakeholder wants, undervalue costs of action.

• Risk Averse: Overvalue costs of action, undervalue benefits of what stakeholder wants.

• Risk Neutral: Similar evaluation of costs & benefits.

Winning Politically

Win

nin

g P

ers

onally

Get less of what you want for reaching a deal

Less likely to reach a deal given more of what you want

C

B

A

Every stakeholder wants to achieve their specific goal, subject to risk tradeoffs

Risk & MaximizationRisk & Maximization

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B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B winsMaps all potential interactions and decision calculations among all stakeholders based on

how risk colors perceptions

Game theoryGame theory

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• The exact same process is repeated for all pairs of stakeholders

• This creates a social network of political relationships



B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins



B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins



B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins

A v. B = + value for action B v. A = + value for action

A B?

Game theoretic interactionsGame theoretic interactions

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+ A- AStakeholderA Decision?


B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins

A v. B = + value for action



B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins



B

Do NotChallenge

StatusQuo

InStatusQuo

Positive

Negative

B givesin

B resists


BilateralA v B

A wins

B wins

C doesnot

intervene

C entersdispute

Cassists

A

Cassists

B

A & Cwin

A & Close

B & Cwin

B & Close

A wins

B wins

B v. A = + value for action

+ B

- B

+ Conflict

A Advantage

- ConflictB Advantage

• Combining both A’s perceptions & B’s perceptions about each other, we can derive their anticipated interaction

• Here A & B’s anticipated interaction is conflictual

Perceptual mappingPerceptual mapping

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- Bargain


To B

+ Conflict

A Advantage

+ Bargain


To A Advantage

+ Impose

B gives in to A

+Status Quo

- Status Quo

- Impose

Yield to B

- ConflictB Advantage

A v B

A v B

A v B

+ A- A

+ B

- B

• Any potential combination of vectors is possible for any pairing

• The angle of the vector determines the relationship

• The length of the vector determines the intensity

Perceptual mappingPerceptual mapping

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A B

C D

A’s offer to B

B’s offer to C

A’s offer to D

A’s

offe

r to

C

Network of proposalsNetwork of proposals

• What are anticipated interactions?

Offers

Pressure

Moves

Leverage

B’s offer to A

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Eff

ecti

ve

Po

wer

(Inf

luen

ce*I

mpo

rtan

ce)

Low

High

1. Initial Stakeholder Data

3. Intermediate Dynamics

2. Agent Based Rules & Modeling Elements1. What is winning coalition or Median position?

2. Given the winning coalition position, which groups are risk taking?

3. How does each stakeholder view every other stakeholder on assisting or opposing the issue?

4. Which stakeholders will make what proposals to other stakeholders, strengthening or weakening coalitions?

5. Which stakeholders will revise their position on the issue allowing us to anticipate the political dynamics?

Eff

ec

tiv

e P

ow

er

(Inf

luen

ce*I

mpo

rtan

ce)

Low

High

4. Modeling Iterations

1. How did Median position change?

2. How did risk profiles change given the change in the median position?

3. How do stakeholder perceptions change?

4. Which stakeholders will make what proposals to other stakeholders given these changes?

5. Which stakeholders will revise their position on the reform issue showing how the political dynamics might be modified?

1. Iterations stop when stakeholders see no further gains in discussions. 2. Where key stakeholders end up on the issue determines the anticipated

issue outcome.

3. If a majority of stakeholders coalesce around a position, there is a large degree of consensus. If not, conflict will occur.

6. Interpreting Outcomes5. Anticipated Outcome

Eff

ecti

ve P

ow

er

(Inf

luen

ce*I

mpo

rtan

ce)

Low

High

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Early Experience in EAP Early Experience in EAP Country XCountry X

• Very Problematic Governance ContextVery Problematic Governance Context• High Risk Adjustment Operation High Risk Adjustment Operation

(PRSO) Over a One-Year Period(PRSO) Over a One-Year Period• Which Reforms (nature, level, and Which Reforms (nature, level, and

extent) Should be Included as Prior extent) Should be Included as Prior Actions?Actions?

• How Likely are Key Stakeholders to How Likely are Key Stakeholders to Support Reforms (Both Initial Support Reforms (Both Initial Agreement and Implementation)Agreement and Implementation)

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Country-Specific ProblemsCountry-Specific Problems

• Highly Sensitive Environment –Premium on Highly Sensitive Environment –Premium on Confidentiality Confidentiality

• Limited Interviews – “Super-friendlies” and Limited Interviews – “Super-friendlies” and Bank StaffBank Staff

• Shifting Political Environment – Adjustment Shifting Political Environment – Adjustment in Data Inputsin Data Inputs

• Changing Bank-Country Relationship More Changing Bank-Country Relationship More Broadly – Possible Need to Consider New Broadly – Possible Need to Consider New Issue (HR?)Issue (HR?)

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Data Sourcing Data Sourcing

• Process begins with Bank sources to minimize footprint

• IDs gaps in information and then go out to next sphere where necessary

Bank

Donors

NGOs Civil Society

Stakeholders

Stakeholder Influence Position Importance

a 100 0 20

b 20 10 50

c ? ? ?

d ? ? ?

e 20 90 10

f ? ? ?

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Suggested PRSO Reform Suggested PRSO Reform AreasAreas

PFM

Treasury

Customs

Civil Service Pay

NRM

State Land Mapping Disclosure

Centralized v. Localized

Forestry

PSD

Single Window

Risk Management Strategy

PRSO-1 Risks

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Public Finance ManagementPublic Finance Management

Treasury Cash

0% cash – 100% checks and transfers

0 100

Check payments 0%

0 100

Check payments100%

100% cash – 0 % checks s and transfers

Customs:

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Public Finance ManagementPublic Finance Management

Civil Service Pay

10-15% increase across the board

0 100

No more increase across the board-All increase thru MBPI

Donor Plan

100 % Donor project-based separate salary supplements

0 100

100 % Donor supplements pooled to support wage bill

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PFM: Treasury: Treasury Cash – Basecase – Initial Positions

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PFM: Treasury Cash – Mitigation Strategy – Good cop/ Bad cop

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PFM: Treasury: Treasury Cash – Basecase – Endgame

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PRSPRSO Y1 O Y1 AreaArea

IssueIssue BaseBase Mitigation Option Mitigation Option 11

Mitigation Option Mitigation Option 22



RecommendationRecommendation

CharacterizationCharacterization Push Hard & FastPush Hard & Fast Easy does itEasy does it Good Cop/Bad Good Cop/Bad CopCop

Use LeverageUse Leverage

WB players high WB players high levelslevels

WB players low WB players low levelslevels

PFMPFM TreasuryTreasury Convergence Convergence around WB position around WB position (2/3 checks), but (2/3 checks), but key MEF key MEF counterparts counterparts isolated supporting isolated supporting lower reform (40 lower reform (40 percent)percent)

No convergence No convergence around a higher level around a higher level of reformof reform

No convergence No convergence around a lower level around a lower level of reformof reform

WB hard 70, WB WB hard 70, WB soft 50:soft 50: Vast Vast majority, including majority, including all key government all key government counterparts, counterparts, converge around converge around 50 percent; WB in 50 percent; WB in driver seatdriver seat

No consistent No consistent leverage to use leverage to use across roundsacross rounds

CustomsCustoms No consensus; a No consensus; a bimodal outcome. bimodal outcome. Critical domestic Critical domestic players (incl. players (incl. Customs mgmt) Customs mgmt) supporting low supporting low levels of reformlevels of reform


WB hard, WB soft, WB hard, WB soft, and the IMF all and the IMF all start at a position start at a position of 25of 25 (which is the (which is the Customs Director's Customs Director's position): A high position): A high degree of consensus degree of consensus builds for about 30 builds for about 30 percent checkspercent checks

WB hard 50, WB WB hard 50, WB soft 40: soft 40: Good Good consensus builds consensus builds around around approximately 25 approximately 25 percent, but WB percent, but WB hard and MEF SG hard and MEF SG are isolatedare isolated


Civil ServiceCivil Service Coalition of key Coalition of key govt players govt players around 3 MBPI, but around 3 MBPI, but donor community donor community divided and divided and COM+CAR mgmt COM+CAR mgmt driving position of driving position of other govt playersother govt players


WB CMU/PREM WB CMU/PREM and WB Sector and WB Sector both adopt a both adopt a starting position starting position of 50:of 50: Outcome is Outcome is bimodal for 3 or 4 bimodal for 3 or 4 MBPIs, and MBPIs, and consensus is built consensus is built around the PRSO around the PRSO prior actionprior action


NRMNRM Land Land DisclosureDisclosure

No ConsensusNo ConsensusGovt remains Govt remains entrenched entrenched Some high level Some high level supportsupport

Makes no difference Makes no difference to achieving to achieving consensusconsensus

No difference No difference because other because other donors & domestic donors & domestic reformers continue reformers continue to pressto press

No differenceNo difference Focus on COM, Focus on COM, Forest Admin, Min Forest Admin, Min Agr, Agr, concessionaries to concessionaries to support reforms support reforms upto ESIAupto ESIA

Annual Annual CoupesCoupes

PSDPSD Risk Risk MitigationMitigation

Single Single WindowWindow

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Operational Steps in ABSM Operational Steps in ABSM Application Application

• Train Staff in ABSM Techniques

• Through Training and Pre-Mission Discussion, Begin Framing Issues

• Assure Comfort Level of CMU (Agree Protocol for mitigating potential security risks while

collecting high quality data)

• Data Collection & Interview Strategies

• PRSO Areas Defined

• Mission Work and Analysis

• Refinement of Prior Actions

• Brainstorming Discussion of Findings – Working Through Tactics and Strategy

• Decision on PRSO

• Evaluation

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Early LessonsEarly Lessons

• Training is Intensive – Profile of Training is Intensive – Profile of Required Staff Skills?Required Staff Skills?

• Training Continues in Field – Training Continues in Field – Consultant Hand-Holding NeededConsultant Hand-Holding Needed

• Agree on Rules of Game w/ CMU Agree on Rules of Game w/ CMU (Client)(Client)

• Framing and Diligence Actually Framing and Diligence Actually Changes Bank View/Understanding of Changes Bank View/Understanding of Reform Definition and RequirementsReform Definition and Requirements

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Early Lessons (2)Early Lessons (2)

• Relevance to Operational Needs EssentialRelevance to Operational Needs Essential• Availability to CMU for Ongoing Analysis Availability to CMU for Ongoing Analysis

(1 year license)(1 year license)• To Mainstream, Business Model Has to To Mainstream, Business Model Has to

WorkWork– Cost to CMUCost to CMU– # and Location of Trained Staff and Software # and Location of Trained Staff and Software

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How to Evaluate Utility of How to Evaluate Utility of ABSM?ABSM?

User Views – (Mini-Survey)User Views – (Mini-Survey)

Degree of UseDegree of Use

Change in Understanding of IssueChange in Understanding of Issue

Change in ApproachChange in Approach

Results on the Ground Results on the Ground

Disaster AvertedDisaster Averted

Support for Reform MaximizedSupport for Reform Maximized

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End Game?End Game?

• ABSM Mainstreamed (as one of ABSM Mainstreamed (as one of Various Political Analysis Tools) in Various Political Analysis Tools) in Bank for Routine and Special TasksBank for Routine and Special Tasks– CAS UpstreamCAS Upstream– Lending OperationsLending Operations– Blue SkyBlue Sky– Crisis KnowledgeCrisis Knowledge

operationalizing political analysis in the east asia pacific region

Documents

microeconomic political

domestic political conditions

stakeholder model absm

absm process work

specific issues

driven issues

agentbased model

stakeholder modeladviceplease