operator errors and what can be done to minimize

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Operator Errors and What Can be Done to Minimize Global Congress on Process Safety March 31, 2014

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Operator errors : what can be done to minimize them

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Page 1: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Operator Errors and What Can be Done to Minimize

Global Congress on Process SafetyMarch 31, 2014

Page 2: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Presenter

Tom Nolan• Graduated from Ohio University with B.S.

in Chemical Engineering• 24 years experience in chemical process

industry in a variety of roles• MAIC and DFSS Six Sigma Black Belt

Page 3: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

The Cost of Errors

Average Dollar Loss per Major Incident by Cause

0 25 50 75 100

Mechanical Failure

Operational Error

Unknown

Process upset

Natural Hazard

Design error

Sabotage / arson

Millions of DollarsSource J & H Marsh & McLennan, Inc.

Page 4: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

The Cost of Operator Errors

• ASM estimates total loss due to operator error is $8B per year

• Chemical Safety Topical Committee - average of one chemical incident per day - cost of over $2 million per incident to comply with requirements

• Errors cause 42% of unscheduled shutdowns• 70% of process incidents occur during start-

up or shutdown

Page 5: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Reasons for Errors

• Lack of Skill• Lack of Knowledge• Carelessness• System Design

• Operator set up to make errors by inappropriate design – built in errors

• Errors that are predictable are preventable by better design

Page 6: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Focus of this Discussion

• System Design• Alarm Management• Operator Graphics

• Operator set up to make errors by inappropriate design – built in errors

• Errors that are predictable are preventable by better design

Page 7: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Alarm Floods

In a number of industrial incidents, alarm floods were identified as a significant contributing cause to the incident…

As found by EEMUA in 1999 and CSB

Alarm Flood defined by ISA 18.2 as -“10 or more annunciated alarms in

any 10 minute period per operator”

Page 8: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Why do Alarm Floods Occur?

One reason is not providing dynamic alarm management• Alarms need to indicate abnormal situations that

require operator action• Processes do not operate in one state• What is normal vs abnormal changes with state• Alarms are typically configured for run therefore

many alarms are triggered upon a Change of State: Run to Shutdown

• Many of the alarms are not applicable or actionable for the new state impleading the operators ability to act quickly on what is important

Page 9: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

What is Impacted by Alarm Floods?

• Product quality• Operability or profitability of the

process• Loss of equipment• Loss of containment –

environmental releases• Injury and loss of life in plant or

community

Page 10: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

What Makes Alarm Floods so Dangerous?

Can be a problem for three reasons:• A deluge of alarms can cause critical

alarms to be missed• Floods can be a significant distraction

when dealing with process upsets• Can be an indicator of larger systemic

safety issues

Page 11: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Impacting Alarm Management Design

• Alarm rationalization is not a process to eliminate alarms - its about quality

• Good rationalization will add alarms when appropriate

• Typical (Static) rationalization is only for run mode

• Dynamic rationalization considers all plant modes

Page 12: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Dynamic Alarm Management

• Dynamic rationalization does everything a static rationalization does plus asks “when” for each alarm

• Requires dynamic software to make changes based upon operating mode of the plant

• Eliminates redundant alarms and lowers operator loading during transitions

• Only alarms what is abnormal and actionable for the given state

Page 13: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Actual Performance Metrics vs ISA 18.2

TypeAvg

Alarm Rate/hr

Low/Hiof Avg Rate/hr

Peak Alarm

Rate/hr

Low/Hi of Peak

Rate/hr

% Time in

Flood

Standing Alarms >24 hrs

BeforeRationalization

30 Low=6.2Hi=61

638 Low=152Hi=2402

17.2% 9

ISA 18.2 Target Metrics

6 --- <60 --- <1% <5

After Dynamic Alarm Management

2 Low=0.09Hi=2.5

25 Low=13Hi=42

0.25% 4

Page 14: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Results After Dynamic Alarm Management

Page 15: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Operator Graphics – The Risk of Changing Focus

• Distraction of changing focus from process graphic to faceplate window

• Added workload from managing multiple open windows

• Increased probability of errors when changing values for un-intended tag with multiple faceplates open

• All of above become multiplied and more complex when process is transitioning from one state to another

Page 16: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Faceplate Operation

Page 17: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Potential for Errors

Faceplate Design -can introduce additional errors

• Mode drop down list covers SP, PV and OP values

• Operator may select wrong Mode if SP, PV and OP values are hidden from view

• Mode list offers more options than necessary

Page 18: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Direct Entry Operation

Page 19: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Direct Entry Fields

Values can be entered by:• Select point• Typing value via keypad• Pressing enter

Key Factors:• By maintaining focus of points

after value change, it improves safety for input errors, multiple clicking functions and is more time efficient

• Easily recognizable operator enterable fields

Page 20: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Evaluation of Methods

Comparison of Faceplate to Direct Entry• Keystroke Level Analysis• Operator Loading Analysis• Risk Analysis

Page 21: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Keystroke Level Model

Symbol Time (s) Description

K 0.28 Keystroke

P 1.1 Point to object

BB 0.2 Click on object

H 0.4 Home hands on keyboard or mouse

M 1.2+ Mental act or routine thinking

Page 22: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Estimate Execution Time Analysis

• Evaluates execution time by an operator comparing faceplates to direct entry for SP/OP and Mode Changes

• 50 % Reduction

Page 23: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Estimated Operator Loading Analysis

• Evaluates Mental and Physical Load on Operator• Tasks that require very

little thought are removed – such as (BB), (H)

• Mental and Physical tasks are weighted based on the amount of fatigue they cause – assigned a weight of M=2.0 to 5.0

Page 24: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Risk Analysis

• Identifies actions where operator entry errors can occur

Page 25: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Risk Analysis

Faceplate operationKLM for changing SP/OP Potential Error

Move to shape (P) Select wrong point

Click on shape (BB)

Move to faceplate (P) Point in faceplate is previous point

Click on SP/OP field (BB) Change wrong parameter

Move hands to keyboard (H)

Type in value and press enter (4K) Mistype value and press enter

Move hands to mouse (H)

Move to close faceplate (P)

Click to close faceplate (BB)

Potential error count 4

Page 26: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Risk Analysis

Direct Entry operationKLM for changing SP/OP

Potential Error

Move to SP/OP (P) Select wrong parameter or point

Click on SP/OP field (BB)

Move hands to keyboard (H)

Type in value and press enter (4K) Mistype value and press enter

Potential error count 2

Page 27: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Direct Entry Vs Faceplate

Summary of Benefits• Execution Time SP/OP Changes - 51.5% less• Execution Time for Mode Changes – 50% less• Operator Loading – 33 % to 47% less• Risk of Errors – 50% less

Page 28: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Conclusion

• Many industrial errors are a result of operators using control systems with flawed designs• Poor design and performance by alarm management

distracts operators and/or occludes critical alarms• Operator graphics with multiple open faceplates can

cause a change intended for one controller to be entered into the faceplate of another

• The two mechanisms listed above are predictable and therefore preventable through better design available today

Page 29: Operator errors and what can be done to minimize

Questions?

Comments?Contact Prosys

@prosys.com or 225-291-9591 x225