optimal conversion and put policies

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Optimal Conversion and Put Policies The first theorem establishes the existence of a boundary of critical host bond prices . The second theorem describes the boundary in terms of critical firm value. The third theorem characterizes the shape and relation of the boundaries for the different types of bonds.

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Optimal Conversion and Put Policies . The first theorem establishes the existence of a boundary of critical host bond prices . The second theorem describes the boundary in terms of critical firm value. The third theorem characterizes the shape and relation of - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

• The first theorem establishes the existence of a boundary of critical host bond prices .

• The second theorem describes the boundary in terms of critical firm value. • The third theorem characterizes the shape and relation of the boundaries for the different types of bonds.

Page 2: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Remark The continuation region for conversion, put, and puttable- convertible option is the open set

Note that for all , .

If the subscript Y is CB, ;

if the subscript Y is P, ; if the subscript Y is PCB,

Page 3: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 1

Page 4: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem (given the firm value) Let and If there is any bond price such that it is optimal to exercise the embedded option at time , then there exists a critical bond price such that it is optimal to exercise the option if and only if .

Intrinsic Value

(𝜆 (𝑉 𝑡 , 𝑡 )−𝑃 𝑡 )+¿¿

𝑷 𝒕

b(,t) -(,t) -

in the money

Page 5: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof • Let and are two states of and Step 1

Suppose it is optimal to continue at and . We show that it is then optimal to continue at .

According to the call delta inequality

Page 6: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

it is optimal to continue at , thus we have

+ +

Besides, for all . Thus, .It is then optimal to continue at .

in U

Page 7: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Step 2 Let be the infimum of that . The point can not lie in because is open.

Thus , for all and

Then, .

This theorem implies that the increase of interest rate can not only trigger bond put but also trigger conversion.

not in U

Page 8: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 2.A

Page 9: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem (given the host bond price) Let and 1. For the pure convertible bond, there exists a critical firm value such that it is optimal to default if and only if

𝑽 𝒕

(,t) - -

Intrinsic Value

(𝑧𝑉 𝑡−𝑃 𝑡❑)+¿¿

in the money

Page 10: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof Let and are two states of and .

Step1 Suppose it is optimal to continue at and. We show that it is then optimal to continue at .

Using put delta inequality

Above result is implied by

Review

Page 11: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

it is optimal to continue at , thus we have

+ +

Besides, for all . Thus, .It is then optimal to continue at .

in U

Page 12: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Step 2 Let be the supremum of that . The point can not lie in because is open.

Thus , for all and

Then, , not in U

Page 13: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 2.B

Page 14: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

• Theorem 1. 2. 3. (put delta inequality)

Bond Valuation

Back_p20

Page 15: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 2.B-1

Page 16: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

2-1 For the (default-free) puttable-convertible bond, there exists a critical firm value , satisfying (implied by z)

, and such that it is optimal to convert if and only if .

(𝑧𝑉 𝑡∨𝑘𝑡

𝑃− 𝑃 𝑡❑ )+¿ ¿

Intrinsic Value 𝑽 𝒕

--

(,t) -(,t)

Page 17: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 2-1 (the case : ) Suppose it is optimal “NOT” to convert (continue) at .

Using put delta inequality , implied by

Page 18: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

𝑽 𝒕

thus we have

+ +

Besides, for all . Thus, . It is then optimal not to convert at z.

in U

-

---

(,t)

Page 19: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Therefore, there exists a critical value such that it is optimal to convert ,

Note (1) . Otherwise (2) (implies ). Otherwise, there exists a firm value that makes less than at which is optimal to convert, which is impossible. (put rather than convert)

Page 20: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 2.B-2

Page 21: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

𝑽 𝒕

2-2 If there exists any firm value , at which it is optimal to put at time t, then there exists a critical firm value and such that it is optimal to put if and only if

-

(,t) -

- -

(,t)

(,t)

Intrinsic Value

(𝑧𝑉 𝑡∨𝑘𝑡𝑃− 𝑃 𝑡

❑ )+¿ ¿

the case of optimal to convertthe case of optimal to put

Page 22: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 2-2 (the case : )

Suppose it is optimal “NOT” to put at . We want to show it is also optimal “NOT” to put at . ( i.e. ) It follows

in U

By Thm of PCB, part 2 Review

Page 23: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Note that it must be optimal to put at .

Thus, based on the discussion above, there exists a critical value , such that it is optimal to put ,

as , it is optimal to put.

𝑽 𝒕

-

(,t) - ---

Page 24: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 3.A

Page 25: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem 3.A For each , 1. 2.

Page 26: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem 3.A For each , 1. 2.

Page 27: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.1

If . Then as well.

According to put delta inequality, + Thus, , because 0

𝑷 𝒕

b(,t) -(,t) -

in U

in U

Page 28: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

𝑉 𝑡(1)<𝑉 𝑡

(2)⟹𝑏𝐶𝐵 (𝑉 𝑡(1 ) , 𝑡)≤𝑏𝐶𝐵 (𝑉 𝑡

(2 ) ,𝑡 )The higher the firm value, the higher the bondvalue must be to trigger conversion.(the easier to trigger conversion)

Page 29: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.2 If . Then as well . According to call delta inequality, +

Thus , because

in U

𝑽 𝒕

(,t) -

-

in U

in U

Page 30: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

The discussion above suggests

𝑃 𝑡(1 )>𝑃 𝑡

(2)⟹𝑣𝐶𝐵 (𝑃 𝑡(1 ) ,𝑡 )≥𝑣𝐶𝐵(𝑃 𝑡

(2 ) ,𝑡)In high interest rate environments, it takes lowerfirm values to make bond holders convert theirbond.

Page 31: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 3.B

Page 32: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem 3.B For each , 3. (conversion case)

( and ) 4. (put case) ( but still ) – to confirm default-free

Page 33: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.3

If . Then as well.

According to put delta inequality, + Thus, , because 0

in U

in U

in U

Page 34: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.4

If . Then as well.

in U

in U

Page 35: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

- exercise means conversion.- the higher the firm value, the higher the bond value must be to trigger conversion.

- exercise means put.- at lower firm values, it takes higher bond value to trigger a bond put.

Page 36: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Part 3.C

Page 37: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Theorem 3.C For each , 5. (conversion case)

6. (put case)

Page 38: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.5

If , then .

Thus

in U

in U

Page 39: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

Proof 3.5

If , then .

Thus

in U

in U

Page 40: Optimal Conversion and Put Policies

- when both options are present, the value, the value of preserving one option can make it optimal for issuer to continue servicing the debt in states in which it would otherwise exercise the other option.