optimizing disease outbreak detection methods using reinforcement learning masoumeh izadi clinical...

34
Optimizing Disease Outbreak Detection Methods Using Reinforcement Learning Masoumeh Izadi Clinical & Health Informatics Research Group Faculty of Medicine, McGill

Upload: elijah-gallagher

Post on 18-Dec-2015

219 views

Category:

Documents


2 download

TRANSCRIPT

Optimizing Disease Outbreak Detection Methods Using Reinforcement Learning

Masoumeh Izadi

Clinical & Health Informatics Research Group

Faculty of Medicine, McGill

Overview

• Motivation

• Problem formulation

• Basic definitions

• The suggested method

• Experimental results

• Concluding remarks

The Surveillance Cycle

Event Report

s

Individual Event Definitions

Population Pattern

Definitions

Event Detection Algorithm

Pattern Report

Population Under Surveillance

Intervention Decision

Intervention

GuidelinesPublic Health Action

Data Describing Population

Pattern Detection Algorithm

1. Identifying individual cases

2. Detecting population patterns

3. Conveying information for action

(Buckeridge DL & Cadieux G, 2007)

Surveillance Research

• Achieving the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) architecture

• Data fusion (linkage)• New data sources• Case definitions (automation/validation)• Geographic Information System (GIS)

indices• Forecasting• Evaluation and quality control

The Surveillance Cycle

Event Report

s

Individual Event Definitions

Population Pattern

Definitions

Event Detection Algorithm

Pattern Report

Population Under Surveillance

Intervention Decision

Intervention

GuidelinesPublic Health Action

Data Describing Population

Pattern Detection Algorithm

1. Identifying individual cases

2. Detecting population patterns

3. Conveying information for action

Decision Algorithm

Knowledge

2. Using RL to identify

optimal policies for responding to statistical

alarms.

1. Accounting for population

mobility in detecting spatial disease clusters.

3. Simulation modeling to

evaluate outbreak detection.

(Buckeridge DL & Cadieux G, 2007)

Outbreak Detection

Knowledge

Data

DetectionMethod

Environment

Warning???

Workschool

Primary CareClinic

Emergency Dept

Lab test

Pharmacy

Telehealth

Data Sources

Outbreak Problems

• Large scale bioaerosol (e.g., Anthrax)

• Communicable (e.g., SARS)

• Waterborne

• Building contamination

• Foodborne

• Continuous release

• Sexual/blood borne

Detection Methods

• Define a threshold .

• Signal an alarm when the # of ED visits per day exceeds the threshold.

Number of ED Visits per Day

0

10

20

30

40

50

1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100

Day Number

Nu

mb

er o

f E

D V

isit

s

Anthrax Cases in DC

Flu Flu Flu

Anthrax Attacks

Data courtesy of Medstar & Georgetown University

Existing Detection Methods

Temporal methods

e.g. Moving average

Spatio-temporal methods

e.g. Space-time scan

Features Shared by Most Detection

Methods

• Design a baseline.

• Define an important event when the p-value of a statistic is less than an expected value by the baseline.

Obtaining Baseline Data

Baseline

All HistoricalData

Today’s Environment

1. Learn Bayesian Network using Optimal Reinsertion [Moore and Wong 2003]

2. Generate baseline given today’s environment

Bayesian Biosurveillance of Disease Outbreaks [UAI04 Cooper et al]

Important Events

• determine which of these p-values are significant for a specific problem.

Idea: use association rules to define cases

Key Observations

There is a great amount of uncertainty about suspicious events. An action has to be taken in response to any suspicious change in the environmental patterns.

Surveillance systems faced by high-risk decision problems under uncertainty.

Surveillance algorithms are inaccurate in practice

• How precisely can we detect if an outbreak is happening? (sensitivity)

• How early can we detect it? (timeliness)

Research to address this problem– Novel or ‘improved’ data streams– Better forecasts or detection methods– Improve decision making after alarms

Our Approach

Instead of trying to improve the detection method, we ‘post-process’ the signals:

Use a standard surveillance method to provide alarm signals

Feed this signal to the model of outbreak detection as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP)

Partially Observable MDP

• POMDPs are characterized by:– States: sS

– Actions: aA

– Observations: oO

– Transition probabilities: T(s,a,s’)=Pr(s’|s,a)

– Observation probabilities: T(o,a,s’)=Pr(o|s,a)

– Rewards: R(s,a)

Solving POMDPs

• To solve a POMDP is to find, for any action/observation history, the action that maximizes the expected discounted reward.

V(b)= max a [Σs R(s,a)b(s)+

Σs’ [T(s,a,s’)O(s’,a,z)α(s’)]]

OUTCOME: an optimal policy over belief space

Suitability

The ‘true’ state of the outbreak cannot be observed

Statistical algorithms provide imperfect measurements of the true state

That the probability of success of (i.e., effectiveness) of actions can be determined

The that costs of actions and of outcomes can be determined

Limitations for inhalational anthrax

• Limited data from actual anthrax attacks available:– Postal attacks 2001 (Only 11 people affected,

not representative of a large scale attack)– Sverdlovsk 1979

• But literature contains studies on the characteristics of inhalational anthrax

Background knowledge for inhalational anthrax

Can coherently incorporate different types of

simulation data :

• Progression of symptoms

• Incubation period

• Spatial dispersion pattern

The POMDP Model

S - True epidemic state {No Outbreak, D1, ….}

O - Output from detection algorithm {0,1}

A - Possible public health actions

T(s,a,s’) - Impact of actions given the state

R(s,a) - Costs of actions and of epidemic states

Do nothing

Review records

Investigate cases

Declare outbreak

Actio

n

Transitio

n

No OutbreakOutbreakdetectedD1 D2 D3 D4

(Izadi M & Buckeridge DL, 2007)

The transition functions reflect the probability of moving to another state if an action is performed in each state of the model.

Clear

Day 1

Day 2

Day 3

Day 4

Detected

Clear D1 D2 D3 D4 Det

s

s’

T: Review records0.99 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.10.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.01.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

T: Investigate 0.99 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.30.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.01.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Transition Functions

Observation Functions

Observations are noisy output of the detection

algorithm

• Alarm

-sensitivity at outbreak states and 1 - specificity in the no outbreak state.

• No Alarm

-specificity at normal states and 1 - sensitivity in each outbreak state.

Sensitivity in Days of Outbreak

Reis et al. (2003) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 100, 1961-1965

Costs and Reward

• Costs Investigation (false and true positive) Intervention (false and true positive) Outbreak by day (false negative) calculated as (# deaths* future

earnings) + (# hospitalized * cost of hospitalization) + (# outpatient visits * cost of visit)

• Rewards Preventable costs each day - investigation / intervention costs

Sources Investigation costs are estimated from wages Intervention and outbreak costs from (Kaufman, 1997)

Experimental SetupThere is a constant probability of an outbreak.Epidemic curve taken from historical outbreak.After 4 days, the outbreak is detected clinically.Population size is 50,000 exposed and the outbreak

results in a mean increase in surveillance data of 8% or 15%

• POMDP solution– Point-based approximation – Ran simulation for ten years.

Things to Notice

• Any alerts before actual anthrax release are considered a false positive

• Detection time calculated as first selection of C/P action after anthrax release.

• Maximum detection time is 4 days.

Preliminary Results

Method Performance

Sensitivity SpecificityPOMDP 100 -

Moving Average 65 0.97

Linear 71 0.97

Exponential 61 0.97

Initial Evaluation Results8% Increase in ED visits 15% Increase in ED visits

Day of Outbreak Day of Outbreak

Compared POMDP operating on detection method, to detection method alone

Method was SARIMA + MA on residuals Specificity of 0.97 for the detection method used

Se

ns

itiv

ity

Se

ns

itiv

ity

Final Words

Conclusion: POMDP improves the timeliness and

the sensitivity of detection processes

Future work: Sensitivity analysis over parameter values. Apply to other diseases and in other settings!

Thank You