oral history interviews - bureau of reclamation · 2015. 7. 1. · suggested citation: vernon,...

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

KENNETH F. VERNON

APRIL 1995HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA

Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë

STATUS OF INTERVIEWS:OPEN FOR RESEARCH

Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë

Interviews Conducted by:Brit Allan StoreySenior HistorianBureau of Reclamation

Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë Ë

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMBUREAU OF RECLAMATION

Processed: 2002-2006Printed and Bound: 2006

SUGGESTED CITATION:

VERNON, KENNETH F. ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW. Transcript of tape-recorded Bureau of Reclamation Oral History Interviews conducted by Brit Allan Storey,Senior Historian, Bureau of Reclamation, during April 1995, in Fullerton, California.Transcription by Deborah Lattimore, TechniType Transcripts of Pacifica, California.Edited by Brit Allan Storey. Repository for the record copy of the interview transcriptis the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Record copies of this transcript are printed on 20 lb., 100% cotton, archival quality paper. Allother copies are printed on normal duplicating paper.

i

Kenneth F. Vernon

Table of Contents

Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Statement of Donation of Oral History Interviews: Kennethf.vernon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

Portrait: Kenneth F. Vernon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

Brief Chronology of Career and Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxii

Missouri Basin Coordination Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiv

Portrait: William E. Warne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv

Photograph: Wesley R. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxvii

Oral History Transcript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Born in Spokane, Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Family homesteaded in North Dakota in the 1880s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Related to Brigadier General John Fraine and jurist George Fraine both of North Dakota

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Family moves to Spokane in 1909 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1“I was born October 16, 1910, at home, the last of seven children.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Father retired in 1923 and moved the family to Elverta, California, outside Sacramento

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Attended Harkness Junior High School in Sacramento . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3“I knew that I wanted to be an engineer. . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Rode the interurban train to high school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Stayed out of college for one year and worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Father ran a poultry operation on his farm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Enrolled in Sacramento Junior College in September 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Sophomore year took the civil service exams for the state highway department . . . . 5Worked for the state highway department in the Santa Cruz Mountains for two years

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Saved money to go back to college . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Became aware of efforts to protect old growth redwoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Worked on location of highway from Richmond, California to the Carquinas Strait

Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Worked on locating highway Hayward to Livermore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ii

Bureau of Reclamation Oral History Program

Worked locating the highway from Livermore over Altamont Pass to Tracey . . . . . . 6Surveyed the relocation of Route 17 between Los Gatos and Santa Cruz . . . . . . . . . 6In 1932 enrolled in University of California - Berkeley and majored in irrigation

engineering, transportation, and buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Took courses outside engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Summer of 1933 worked on highway construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Later in the summer of 1933 worked on the approaches to the San Francisco-Oakland

Bay Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Attended college while working on the bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Looked at running the Southern Pacific across the bay on the bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8The two transportation systems in the East Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8“my wife used to take a streetcar. . . from Berkeley. . . down to . . . catch one of the Key

System boat trains, . . . then take a streetcar to her office . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . 9“I was correcting papers for two professors . . . as well as working 16 hours a week in

the Bay Bridge, as well as taking 22 hours of course work” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Christmas holiday worked for the survey crew full-time on the bridge . . . . . . . . . . . 9school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Bank in which he had saved his money from working in 1932-3 closed its doors . . 12“So I was without a nickel, without a penny, even a penny. . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Advanced money by Charles Scheidel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12I graduated in May of 1934 at the top of my class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13After graduation went to work for the highway department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13They were widening the streets in San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Moving emergency earthquake fire hydrants in San Francisco was an interesting

problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14During his last semester took a graduate course under Professor Bernard A. Etcheverry

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Etcheverry focused on structures and organization and his associate, Sidney T. Harding,

on farm irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16“So I had asked Professor Etcheverry, after graduation, could he give me a good word

with the Bureau of Reclamation . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Offered job with Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Problems with Arizona over Davis Dam result in change in assignment for first

Reclamation job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Marries Helen Garlinghouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Reported to the canals division under McBirney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Worked with Howard Curtis and Arthur “Bud” Reeves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18In Denver soon roomed with Brooks Morris in a boardinghouse hotel . . . . . . . . . . . 18Married on December 29, 1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Became involved with Hinman School of Music (later the Lamont School of Music) and

performed in operas at Cheesman Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Wally Schneider and Loyce Johnson of the Canals Division also participated . . . . . 20

iii

Kenneth F. Vernon

“In other words, I had other interests than besides just engineering. . . .” . . . . . . . . 20Worked on several interesting projects in the canals division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Oldest son born in 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Because of Etcheverry’s class, followed the development of the Central Valley Project

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Offered job on the Colorado-Big Thompson Project by Mills Bunger . . . . . . . . . . . 21“I was anxious to get back to California if I could. . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Went on vacation and approached Walker Young about a transfer to the Central Valley

Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Offered job on the Delta Division by Walker Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Reported to Oscar T. Boden in Antioch, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Worked on the Central Valley Project 1936-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Overview of canals of Central Valley Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Pumping plants on the Contra Costa Canal were located to increase irrigable acreage

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Contra Costa Canal designed to deliver water to Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Did cost estimating and preliminary structure design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Worked with Barney Bellport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Canals in the boggy areas were designed to float . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Excavation of the Contra Costa Canal in the initial boggy sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Canal trimming and lining after the first pumping plant on the Contra Costa Canal

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Curing compounds for concrete were just coming into use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29The problem with black asphaltic-hydrocarbon compounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29We experimented with a white compound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30The canal trimmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30“at that time, the Bureau had its own master mechanic and master electrician, and we did

not employ contractors to install the machinery in the [pump] building. . . .”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Problems in installing pumping plant equipment because of a nearby railroad . . . . 32“The Bureau wanted things done correctly. . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Assigned to review a new estimate for the Contra Costa Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Error in review of Boden’s estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34“And so, I learned you don't take anything for granted. . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35World War II affects the project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Accident at Port Chicago during World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Operated the partially completed Contra Costa Canal to provide water to war industries

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Deferred during World War II because involved in water supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36In 1943 began study of distribution systems to irrigated acreages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Small acreages presented special policy issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37The distribution system was to be concrete pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

iv


Work on the Delta-Mendota Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37George Imrie supervised construction on the Delta-Mendota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Did structure design on Delta-Mendota Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Studying the Delta Cross Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38The advantages of building a canal to deliver fresh Sacramento River water to the Delta-

Mendota Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Ed Heinnemann suggests Vernon move to the Washington, D.C., office . . . . . . . . . 40Salary in 1942-1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Brief overview of the organization of the Central Valley Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Relationship of Sacramento to Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41“I would come up with a preliminary design. We would send in detailed topography

[and] . . . our thoughts on the subject, give them a sketch design, and they coulddo with it as they pleased, and did. Then . . . we'd have to tailor it to fitconditions. . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

In the field we would tailor the structure to suit the field conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Worked on figuring what payments should be made on contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Worked on preliminary cost estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43How money is committed to construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Relationship of Denver and the regions to the construction process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Transferred to Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45In December of 1943 became Engineering Assistant in the Commissioner’s Office

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Worked for Louis Douglass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Worked on priorities at the War Production Board on the Tripartite Agreement . . . 45Worked on getting generation unit N8 at Hoover in operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46N8 was to provide power to the aircraft industry in southern California . . . . . . . . . 46Transferred a generating unit from Shasta to Grand Coulee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Coulee provided power to the Hanford Engineer Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Secretary Harold Ickes liked the idea of regional authorities like TVA . . . . . . . . . . 47There were many advocates for regional river basin authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48The Tripartite Agreement was designed to counteract the tendency to regional

authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Quadripartite Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49In the Quadripartite Agreement “We kept our backs covered because we'd never know

when you'd get a stab in the back from one of the other agencies.” . . . . . . . 49Harry Bashore became the Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Commissioner Bashore liked to use him for special tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49FIARBC established as a formal arrangement expanding the Quadripartite Agreement

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Missouri Basin Interagency Committee established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50These interagency committees were designed to counteract regional authorities . . . 51John Dixon is brought in to be Engineering Assistant to the Commissioner and to run the

v

Kenneth F. Vernon

activities of FIARBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51Involved in the hydrologic studies related to the treaty with Mexico of 1944 . . . . . 52Flood Control Act of 1944 and the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program . . . . . . . . . 53“. . . you're going to be delegated as Acting Commissioner." (laughter) And then he

said, "Your instruction is not to do a damn thing." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Secretary Harold Ickes loved the preposition that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Initial authorization of the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Development of regions at Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55The regions were created partially to forestall creation of regional development

authorities like the TVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Originally there were six regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Creation of a seventh region for Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57A Gunnison-Arkansas diversion was considered in Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Region VII headquartered in Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Personnel established in Region VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Transferred to Billings as second regional director in Region VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Issues related to Garrison Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Disagreement between Reclamation and Corps raised issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61President Harry S. Truman appeared to favor a Missouri River Authority . . . . . . . . 61The “old line” agencies created FIARBC to show the agencies could coordinate their

work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62The St. Louis Post Dispatch was pushing a Missouri Valley Authority . . . . . . . . . . 62Planning for the Missouri River Basin involved bringing American servicemen home to

jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Eleven initial projects were selected for the Missouri Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Served as secretary of the planning meeting for the Missouri Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Asked to set up Office of Progress Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Became Acting Progress Control Officer and began to design a staff and office . . . 63Arranges for Oliver Folsom to leave the Army and work in his office . . . . . . . . . . . 64Began to use a critical path method in tracking Reclamation work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Legal reviews were a bottleneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Time required for award of contracts was reduced from six months to thirty days

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66The legal division wasn’t used to working with deadlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66The office focused on identifying those things which were holding up projects . . . 67In 1946 Commissioner held a comprehensive planning meeting with the Secretary of the

Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Bill Warne assigned Vernon the job of organizing the Missouri River Basin Project

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Bill Warne never had a problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68“I used to say to my economic staff, "I could lay you guys end to end, you couldn't reach

from here to a conclusion." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

vi


“It all aimed at a comprehensive program which could be fed into a valley authority. Itwas all moving in that direction.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Asked the Bureau of Mines to do a study of coal resources in the Missouri River Basin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

“I was handed the job of coming up with an Interior program financed throughReclamation.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Approached National Park Service about doing recreation development . . . . . . . . . 70Worked on a study to see whether Central Arizona Project water could be diverted in the

Grand Canyon in order to avoid the pumping required if it was removed loweron the Colorado River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Approaches USGS about participating in the activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Approached USGS about improved mapping and hydrologic surveys . . . . . . . . . . . 72Problems working with the Fish and Wildlife Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Decided to use fish hatcheries to deal with some of the issues related to dams in the

Missouri River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Suggested replacement areas for upland game also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73“I came up with the idea of the Interior Missouri River Basin Committee” . . . . . . . 74Mills Bunger’s role in various Missouri Basin committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74Glenn Sloan moves into some of the Missouri River Basin committees . . . . . . . . . . 74Sent to Billings in January of 1947 by Commissioner Mike Straus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Wife’s reaction to the move to Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Interview with Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Sent Vernon as assistant regional director to overlap three months with the retiring

regional director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Took George Pratt to Billings with him . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Begins to plan how to organize the region in Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77The Commissioner’s charge to Vernon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Reorganization into regions was slowed by the new regional directors’ long backgrounds

in Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Wanted a strong Planning Division and a strong Operation and Maintenance Division

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Setting up the Federal Missouri River Basin Interagency Committee . . . . . . . . . . . 83Approached the Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Reclamation’s appropriation bill had a separate section for the PSMBP . . . . . . . . . 85Acting Chief Progress Control Officer while still in Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . . . 85No-year money in Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Mike Straus as Commissioner of Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Commissioner Straus knew Harold Ickes in the Chicago newspaper business . . . . . 86Commissioner Straus had to deal with Central Valley land owners who wished to ignore

the 160-acre limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87In Region VI the agricultural colleges had determined that an operating entity was about

480 acres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

vii

Kenneth F. Vernon

“I'd asked him to consider some relaxation of the 160-acre limitation, because we foundthat 160 acres, in general, was inadequate in the northern Plains States.” . . 88

Interacting with Commissioner Straus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Goodrich Lineweaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Existing projects when Vernon became regional director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Riverton Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Shoshone Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Heart Mountain Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Huntley Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Lower Yellowstone Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Buffalo Rapids Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Sun River Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Buford-Trenton Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Belle Fourche Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Heart Mountain Relocation Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Projects formerly reported to the Denver Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Harold Comstock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93William E. Rawlings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Splitting regional and project work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Missouri Basin Project Activity Staff established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Municipal Water Group established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Cody District Office established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Yellowstone District Office established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Upper Missouri District Office established in Great Falls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Milk River Project had international complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98North Dakota office established in Bismarck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98Sheyenne River problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98South Dakota office established at Huron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Fall of 1947 felt his organization was in good shape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Charles Anderson, Regional Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Tom Judah was the Planning Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101John Walker was Power Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Stan MacAsland was likely to take a job to study diversion of Columbia River and

northern California water into California’ Central Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102Senator Clair Engle supported MacAsland’s studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Charlie Heinz becomes District Engineer in Great Falls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104Charlie Heinz becomes District Manager in Cody, Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104Ollie Johnson was the acting O&M Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Ed Landerholm made Director of Operation and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Bill Rawlings made Assistant Regional Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Flood during the summer of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106General Lewis Pick, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, tasked with finding a solution to

viii


floods that occurred periodically on the Great Plains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Reclamation also received flood control money, and the Commissioner wanted fast

results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Montana Power and the Anaconda Copper Company controlled Montana at that time

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Reclamation was assigned the responsibility to distribute and market electricity from the

Fort Peck Powerplant, a Corps project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110Montana Power refused to enter into a “wheeling agreement” with Reclamation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112How Montana Power worked with the Bonneville Power Administration and caused

problems for Reclamation’s power management out of Billings . . . . . . . . 112Vernon’s plan for a power grid in Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Fort Peck-Glendive transmission line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113There was a lot of potential for electricity on farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Demand for electricity kept outpacing Reclamation’s ability to install capacity . . 115“Wheeling agreements” explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Nebraska was a public power state and insisted on “its share” of electricity generated at

Federal dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116How power was marketed and why Nebraska was upset at first . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Reclamation took over Corps power at the high side of the substation at the dams

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Coordination between the Corps and Reclamation wasn’t working well . . . . . . . . 118Implications of Missouri Valley Authority for Reclamation and the Corps . . . . . . 119Reclamation begins to build a transmission system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120W. Glenn Sloan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120There was a personality clash between Sloan and Pick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121W. Glenn Sloan moved to chair Interior’s Missouri Basin Committee and Interior

representative on the Federal Missouri Basin Interagency Committee . . . . 123W. Glenn Sloan had great vision and a silver tongue, but did not like detail work

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Vernon wanted detailed preconstruction planning done for projects . . . . . . . . . . . 124Howard Watt installed as Personnel Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Removed the husband of the Republican county chairwoman from the regional

personnel office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Began a heavy recruitment program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126In 1946 the regional program was $6,000,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127In 1950 the regional program was $50,000,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Had provided support to the USGS that proved very helpful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Boysen Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Canyon Ferry Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Heart Butte Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Angostura Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

ix

Kenneth F. Vernon

Expansion of the Riverton and Shoshone Projects and the transmission system . . 128Korean War slowed work and recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128Used state agricultural colleges to do studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Father got into chicken farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130How he used farm agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Planning for diversions from Oahe Dam on the Missiouri River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132Issues with the North Dakota diversion in the Sloan Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132There were problems with applying the reclamation program to Indian lands . . . . 132Land classification studies were underway in northwestern North Dakota . . . . . . 133Permafrost and drainage issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Sprinkler irrigation was just developing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Because of soil issues began to look at diverting water from Garrison Reservoir

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Consulting board set up to study the issues of irrigation in North Dakota and Montana

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Conservancy district established in North Dakota for the Garrison diversion . . . . 137Governor Aahndahl in North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137William J. Burke an attorney important in irrigation law in the high plains . . . . . . 138Wilbur A. Dexheimer becomes Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139Replaced by Frank Clinton and made special assistant to the regional director . . . 139Setting up development farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Belle Fourche Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Angostura Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Keyhole Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Pactola Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143Heart Mountain Division of the Shoshone Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Veteran settlement program drawing for the Heart Mountain Division . . . . . . . . . 144Riverton Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Review board established to study irrigable lands in South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . 147The Eisenhower Administration’s effects in the region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Group studies establishment of a Missouri River Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Reduction in force in the early months of the Eisenhower Administration . . . . . . . 149Commissioner Dexheimer announces there needs to be a change in the region . . . 149Downgraded to a GS-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150Studies problems at the Riverton Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150Studied recreation opportunities at Boysen Dam and Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151Studied recreation opportunities on Angostura Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152Yellowtail Dam was to be a key element of the power program in the region . . . . 153Yellowtail Dam and the Crow Indian Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Large agricultural interests on the Crow Reservation opposed the Yellowtail Dam

development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Montana Power Company was probably opposed to Yellowtail Dam hydropower

x


development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156Some Indians opposed the Yellowtail Dam development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156Naming of Yellowtail Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Meetings with the Tribal Council regarding Yellowtail Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Montana Power Company wanted to market all Reclamation electricity . . . . . . . . 162Electricity grid system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162Dexheimer is suggested for a job in Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Lester Bartsch appointed Assistant Regional Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164How he kept in touch with various activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164Devoted most attention to field operations and contacts outside Reclamation . . . . 165January of 1954 introduced Frank Clinton to the regional staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Was going to be assigned to the High Aswan Dam project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165George Pratt runs the Point Four Program for Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Foreign activities approved by Congress after World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Wesley Nelson moved to Development Board for the Iraqi government . . . . . . . . 167

Vernon is requested by Wesley Nelson for work in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168International Cooperation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168Vernon takes over First Technical Section in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168Director General, First Technical Section, Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168Moves to Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Didn’t go through foreign aid program indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Went to foreign aid program, International Cooperation, Administration, Department of

State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Point Four Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Travel from Billings to Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Railroad travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Airlines travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Railroad interest in Missouri River Basin development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172The problem of moving around in the region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173"Region VI Airlines” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Hired pilots and had three airplanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Willard Snyder was chief pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Delta Division of the Central Valley Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Oscar Boden in the Antioch office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176George Imrie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176In the Antioch, California, office did office engineering work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177Field and office engineers in Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178Functions of the chief clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178How field and office engineers related to designers in Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179Keeping records in the office safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181Field engineer supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

xi

Kenneth F. Vernon

Concrete mixing and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Concrete work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Why Vernon went into the field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188Normal work hours for the job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188Living arrangement while working in Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189Worked in the canal section in Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190Design issues on canals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Work on the All-American Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Sinclair O. Harper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Location of the Canals Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Technical Division, the “eggheads” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Raymond F. Walter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Grant Bloodgood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193Foundation inspection at Canyon Ferry Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193Walker R. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194Walker Young studies saltwater intrusion into the Delta area on Suisun Bay . . . . 195Power Division in the Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes moves toward regional authorities . . . . . . . 198Oscar Chapman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Julius Krug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Tours Missouri Basin area with Thomas E. Dewey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199Traveled with President Truman during a visit to Reclamation projects in the area

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199Again rode President Truman’s train in 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Oscar Chapman tries to introduce Vernon to President Truman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Escorted Dwight D. Eisenhower during his campaign in 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201Interior Missouri Basin Coordinating Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202Establishment of the assistant secretaries in Department of the Interior . . . . . . . . . 203William Warne and Mike Straus relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204Acting Engineering Assistant to the Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205Responding to questions from Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205Boysen Dam contract in the fall of 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206Relocation of the Burlington Northern Railroad at Boysen Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207Moving money to cover the Boysen Dam construction operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208Political complications in funding Boysen construction operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 208Dealings with Congressman D’Ewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210How he lost his position as regional director in Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211D’Ewart’s opposition to Vernon’s appointment to the High Aswan Dam in Egypt

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212Cost-benefit ratios at Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213Reclamation projects started without reimbursement contracts in place . . . . . . . . . 213Tiber Reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

xii


Oscar Boden and Harry Bashore as managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215Walker Young’s management style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216Grant Bloodgood as a manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216Barney Bellport worked on right-of-way acquisition for the Contra Costa Canal

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217Wes Nelson becomes regional director in Amarillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218Status of the region when Vernon arrived in Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Glenn Sloan, Assistant Regional Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Regional Counsel had been stationed in Billings before the region was created . . 221Scattered regional officing in Billings was very inefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Brought Fred Gilbert in as Supply Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224Disposition of Japanese relocation centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225Moving in housing for Reclamation staff in Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225Problems with assigning housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226Tensions in the Missouri Basin over navigation demands versus irrigation demands

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Office conditions in various offices where Vernon worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229In the “bull pen” in the Denver office you didn’t have visual privacy . . . . . . . . . . 230Office space in Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231Became an Associate Engineer in Antioch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Engineer grades in those days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232“. . .in the hierarchy of the Bureau at the time I entered it, dam construction was the

thing, and therefore they were assumed to be the fair-haired people. . . .”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Technical Division work in Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235Frank Banks was offered the job of regional director, but chose to stay at Grand Coulee

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236Frank Banks was asked to head the Bonneville Power Administration . . . . . . . . . 237Bob LeTourneau development of earthmoving equipment used on early job at California

Division of Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238Improvements in earthmoving equipment in the 1930s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Benefits of earth construction of dams as opposed to concrete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240Andrew Coyne discussed differences in dam design and construction between Europe

and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240“. . . we recognized that under the Walter and Savage era, the dams people got more

recognition. . . than the people out on the canals. . . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243World War II efforts to obtain necessary construction material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Dueling priorities in wartime production at plants caused problems for the War

Production Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Writing specs for high pressure gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246Pump design on the Contra Costa Canal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247Travel to and from Billings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

xiii

Kenneth F. Vernon

Glenn Sloan didn’t want Reclamation to devote energy to anything besides water andland development in the Missouri Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Some Reclamation managers were concerned the bureau didn’t pay enough attention toensuring farmer success on projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

“... it took three generations of settlers to make a success out of an irrigation project . ..” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Vernon was interested in ancillary activities Sloan didn’t support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254Sloan was concerned about whether the costs for ancillary activities would be

reimbursable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254Regrets not having become Commissioner of Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254Harry Polk become director of the National Reclamation Association . . . . . . . . . . 256Wanted Commissioner Straus to agree to increase acreage permitted on Reclamation

projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256The upper Missouri River Basin required more land than permitted under Reclamation

Law for an economic farm unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Vernon believed California’s contracted water on the Colorado River exceeded its share

of the river under the Colorado River Compact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258California supported 160 acre limitation to slow upper Colorado River Basin

development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259The High Aswan Dam assignment would have been on loan from Reclamation . . 260Nasser’s coup d’etat ended the possibility of the Aswan Dam assignment . . . . . . 261

Wesley Nelson solicited Vernon’s working for the Foreign Service in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 261Transferred into the Foreign Operations Administration, Department of State . . . 262Arrived in Baghdad for service on November 2, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Met in Baghdad by the people with whom he would work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Flew to Iraq in propeller planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Joined the Development Board which was different than the United States Operation

Mission (USOM) staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266Worked for the Iraqi Ministry of Development within some limitations because was still

employed by the State Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266Bernard Murphy, RIFed in Billings, was heading a design unit in Iraq . . . . . . . . . 267Family came to Baghdad in July of 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268In Rome airport met Calvin Davis, President of Harza Engineering, which was under

contract to the Development Board in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268Make-up of the Development Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269How the Development Board worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270Derbendi-Khan Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272Derbendi-Khan site had foundation problems that suggested an earth and rockfill dam

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273Iraqi budgeting structure and oil money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277The Iraqi members of the Development Board requested an expanded program . . 280

xiv


Imported Larry Whearty from Billings to help establish a programming and reportingsystem for the Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

The Iraqi system basically was designed to prevent expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284Obtaining Development Board approval of a system for the Technical Section to follow

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284Working with the Directorate of Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286Wadi Tharthar Flood Control Project on the Tigris River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287Flood of 1954 in Baghdad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288Ramadi Barrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292Explosion at the Ramadi Barrage caused by pore pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294Beas Dam, India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295Dokan Dam, Kurdistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295Hydroelectric power station on the Wadi Tharthar Flood Control Project . . . . . . . 301Developed a comprehensive basin-wide planning program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301Developing a field staff to read gauging stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302Drainage issues in the First Technical Section of the Development Board . . . . . . . 305Revolution of 1958 in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306Studies a reregulating dam between the Ramadi Barrage and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . 313By the spring of 1959 the situation had deteriorated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313Had difficulty obtaining an exit visa from Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314Insisted his wife leave with him . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314Upon leaving they were refused reentry visas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315Ultimately reassigned to work in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Mission in Baghdad had to pack up the Vernon house and ship the goods to Pakistan

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Evaluating contractors’ bids in Iraq was different than in the United States . . . . . 322The various sections in Iraq’s Development Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326Asked to find an engineer to head the Second Technical Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328The thrust was to spend oil revenues for development of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328After the revolution, the development program fell apart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329Prior to the revolution in 1958 government in Iraq was based on the English system

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329There was a shadow government in the country, the tribal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331Finding a house, living conditions, and lifestyle in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333Wesley Nelson’s contract was not renewed in 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Litani Project in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349Went to the Hotel Metropole upon arriving in Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350Assignment in Pakistan was water development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351Proposed a reorganization of the mission’s construction programs in Pakistan . . . 356Sent to Washington, D.C. to explain his proposed program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357How the Foreign Service worked then . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359Set up a program and scheduling group so he would always know the status of work

xv

Kenneth F. Vernon

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363In Pakistan worked in the American mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363Karachi Development Authority water supply plan for Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364Indus Basin Development Replacement Works, Water Power Development Authority

of West Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Look at improving harbor facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367Mangla Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367Karnafuli River dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368Problem of cyclones [hurricane or typhoon] in the Indian Ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368Proposed to build a large system of dikes and polders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371Dealing with salt and drainage in the Punjab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374Agency for International Development created . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376There were many people with Reclamation backgrounds in Pakistan, but they were all

on the Foreign Aid Program staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379Housing and living conditions in Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380Ambassador approached about construction of a new capital city – Islamabad . . 384Tensions among tribal units in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385United States Military Aid Program in Pakistan was heavy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386There was an American school in Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387Son had to be sent to private school in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387Staffing of the Vernon home in Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389Using the military commissary in Karachi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403The problem of using the commissary for black market purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404In 1962 moved to Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407Wife becomes ill in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408Touching base with colleagues in D.C. during home leave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412Began to brush up on nuclear power because Pakistan wanted a nuclear energy program

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413Sent to Saudi Arabia to see about reopening technical aid to the country . . . . . . . 418

Assigned to Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426Assigned to the engineering group, Technical Services Division of the Near East South

Asia Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427Assumed the functions of Chief of Public Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428Returned from Karachi and Jordan to find he had been appointed Chief Engineer of the

Near East South Asia Engineering Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428Beas Dam, Ravi River, India, had a monetary commitment from the United States, but

also required a finding of feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431Bureau of Reclamation agreed to do studies for Beas Dam, India . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436The Reclamation team completely redesigned the Beas Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439Report on Beas Dam submitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443Recommended Reclamation technicians assist in construction of the Beas Dam . . 443

xvi


Made Director of engineering, Agency for International Development (AID) . . . . . . . . . . 445Oversaw intermodal transportation study in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445Karachi airport expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449Jordan River and issues among Jordan, Israel, and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450Tensions within the United States government over the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . 453Suffered a heart attack in 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455

Appointment as Director of Engineering for the State Department in 1965-1966 . . . . . . . 457Sworn in as Director of Engineering in 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459Area of responsibility when Chief Engineer of the near East South Asia Bureau . 462Requested that as Director of Engineering he be non-political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463Refugee housing program in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464Construction of the city of Korangi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465Cement was being diverted from construction of refugee housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466Construction of university buildings in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467Problem of earthquakes at Lahore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468Construction issues at the University of Dhaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470Use of the Bureau of Reclamation by AID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473Approach to work of Director of Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474Functioned away from project operations, and provided overview and established

policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474Managed “standby contracts” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474As Director of Engineering had a staff of about six engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475Took Regional Chief Engineers to the executive dining room for lunch each Thursday

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478Director of Engineering did not have supervisory responsibilities for the Regional

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478Developed guidelines for review of project proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480AID review of contracts by foreign government and hiring of consulting engineers

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480Engineers wanted to assure the quality of the contractors as well as a good price

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481Attempted to set up norms for planning and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482Had to deal with environmental issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483Visits Vietnam to review AID programs there . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487Wanted to restore and improve Vietnam’s electric power system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488In 1970 began to move toward retiring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489Retired in 1971 with 37 years of Federal service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490Worked with Overseas Private Investment Corporation to try to protect contracts from

changes by governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490Moved back to California in 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493

xvii

Kenneth F. Vernon

Set up study of Pa Mong Dam on the Mekong River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493Reviewed RFPs for contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497Moved back to California after retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510

xviii


(Intentionally blank)

xix

Kenneth F. Vernon

Statement of Donation of Oral History Interviews: Kennethf.vernon

xx


xxi

Kenneth F. Vernon

Portrait: Kenneth F. VernonNew Regional Director in Billings, 1947

xxii


Brief Chronology of Career and LifeKenneth F. Vernon

1910, October 16 – Born in Spokane

1923 – Father retired and moved north of Sacramento, California

1928, January – Graduated from high school.

1928, September – Entered Sacramento Junior College.

1930 – Graduated Sacramento Junior College.

1930-1932 – Worked for California highway department.

1932 – Enrolled at University of California - Berkeley.

1933 – Works highway construction and approaches to San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge.

1933 – Continued to work on Bay Bridge and attend Berkeley – including night shift time.

1934, May – Graduated from Berkeley.

1934 -- Worked briefly for California highway department.

1934 – Went to the Bureau of Reclamation in Denver in canals.

1936 – Transferred to Reclamation's Antioch office on the Central Valley Project for more canalwork.

1943, December – To Washington, D.C., office as engineering assistant to the Commissionerto work on war time priorities of Reclamation.

1947 – To Billings as assistant regional director for a few months and then regional director.

1953, Fall – Told we was to no longer be regional director, but special assistant to the newregional director.

1954 – Left region and transferred to the International Cooperation Administration to work inBaghdad in the First Technical Section of the Iraqi government.

1959, July – transferred to Karachi, Pakistan, to work in the American Mission supporting water

xxiii

Kenneth F. Vernon

development.

1962, March – Transferred to Washington, D.C., as Chief Engineer of the Near East South AsiaBureau.

1965 – Becomes Director of Engineering for the Agency for International Development.

1971, May 31 – Retired with 37 years of Federal service.

2000, April 20 – Died in California where he retired.

xxiv


Department of the InteriorMissouri Basin Coordination Committee

Don Huff, assistant to W. Glenn Sloan; Harry Beckman, USGS; Bud Molahan, Bureau ofReclamation management; Avery Batson, regional director, Lower Missouri Region (RegionVII), Bureau of Reclamation; W. Glenn Sloan, chairman; Kenneth F. Vernon; Paul Zimmer,Bureau of Mines; Mos Mosbaugh, Fish and Wildlife Service; Russell McKown, National ParkService; Paul Fietinger, Bureau of Indian Affairs

xxv

Kenneth F. Vernon

Portrait: William E. WarneAssistant CommissionerBureau of Reclamation

About 1946

xxvi


P h o t o g r a p h :W e s l e y R .N e lsonAssistant CommissionerBureau of ReclamationAbout 1947

xxvii

Kenneth F. Vernon

Introduction

In 1988 Reclamation hired Brit Allan Storey as the bureau’s senior historian to createa history program and work in the cultural resources management program of the bureau. While headquartered in Denver, the history program was developed as a bureauwideprogram.

Over the years, the history program has developed, and one component ofReclamation’s history program is oral history. The primary objectives of Reclamation’s oralhistory activities are: preservation of historical data not normally available throughReclamation records (supplementing already available data on the whole range ofReclamation’s history); and, making the preserved data available to researchers inside andoutside Reclamation.

The senior historian of the Bureau of Reclamation developed and directs the oralhistory activity, and questions, comments, and suggestions may be addressed to the seniorhistorian:

Brit Allan Storey, Ph.D.Senior HistorianLand Resources Office (84-53000)Office of Program and Policy ServicesBureau of ReclamationP. O. Box 25007Denver, Colorado 80225-0007(303) 445-2918FAX: (720) 544-0639e-mail: [email protected]

For more information on Reclamation: www.usbr.govFor more information on Reclamation’s history program: www.usbr.gov/historyFor more information Reclamation’s projects: www.usbr.gov/dataweb

xxviii


(Intentionally blank)

1

Kenneth F. Vernon

Oral History TranscriptKenneth F. Vernon

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, senior historian at theBureau of Reclamation, interviewing Kenneth F.Vernon, a former regional director of the Bureauof Reclamation, on April 24, 1995, at his home inFullerton, California, in the afternoon. This istape one.

Mr. Vernon, could you tell me where youwere born and raised and educated and how youended up at the Bureau of Reclamation, please?

Vernon: Well, I was born in Spokane, Washington,October 16, 1910. I was the last; I was theseventh child to my parents, John Albert Vernonand Annie Catherine Fraine Vernon. All of mybrothers and sisters were born in the state ofNorth Dakota, where my family hadhomesteaded in the 1880s, and my father brokesod with a team of oxen, but later became a storeowner and then was a member of the statelegislature.

Born in Spokane,Washington

Family homesteaded inNorth Dakota in the1880s

My mother had two uncles in NorthDakota who became rather well known. Onewas a Colonel John Fraine, who commanded theNorth Dakota National Guard in World War I,and retired as a brigadier general and was activein veterans' affairs. And another was a notedjurist in North Dakota, my Uncle George Fraine. So when I in later years went to North Dakota, Iused their names as entrées to many of theleading people in North Dakota, but we'll get intothat later.

Related to BrigadierGeneral John Fraine andjurist George Fraineboth of North Dakota

As I said, my father went from NorthDakota to Seattle in 1909, thinking that he mightrelocate in Seattle, but on his way back to NorthDakota, he stopped at Spokane and liked theplace, so he wrote my mother and said, "Start

Family moves toSpokane in 1909

2


packing, because we're going to move toSpokane. I'll be home and help you move, andwe'll move the family to Spokane."

My mother was a very active woman. She said, "You stay where you are. I'll pack thefamily up and the kids, and meet you in Spokane. I'm tired of North Dakota winters." (Laughter) So they moved to Spokane in 1909 and located at1517 East Ninth Avenue in Spokane.

I was born October 16, 1910, at home, thelast of seven children. I had three brothers andthree sisters. Two of my sisters died while I wasrelatively young, so I don't have too muchrecollection of them, but my three brothers andmy third sister lived to much longer lives. Incidentally, I just visited my 94-year-old sisterin Sacramento [California]1 last month.

“I was born October 16,1910, at home, the lastof seven children.”

I went to school at the Grant School inSpokane, the grammar school, which was thefirst through eighth grade at that time. Then myfather retired in 1923 and took up some land inCalifornia just outside of Sacramento, and in1923 we moved temporarily to Elverta,California, just outside of Sacramento. Afterbeing there through the winter, in which we builta garage on the farm to stay in while we builtother buildings, we went back to Spokane inMarch of 1924 and I entered Lewis and ClarkHigh School and did a few months as a freshmanat Lewis and Clark High School. My familyclosed up its business affairs in Spokane in thesummer of 1924, and we moved permanently toElverta, California, just outside of Sacramento.

Father retired in 1923and moved the family toElverta, California,outside Sacramento

During the winter of 1923-24, when wewere temporarily in California, I enrolled andfinished up my grammar school education at theWashington Grammar School in Sacramento,living with my brother and his family just across

3

Kenneth F. Vernon

the street from the school, and going back to thefarm each weekend, helping my father buildbuildings.

After relocating in the summer of 1924,permanently, I enrolled in the Harkness JuniorHigh School in Sacramento. This was an oldwooden building that had been used many yearsand all of the stairs had deep grooves in thewooden steps. I imagine that school had beenthere, oh, from 1880s, 1890s. It was a fire trap, awooden fire trap.

Attended HarknessJunior High School inSacramento

At any rate, I knew that I wanted to be anengineer, so I enrolled in a pre-college courseemphasizing math, science, also starting withmechanical drawing and artwork, because I feltthat the ability to utilize visual aids would be animportant element in my later engineering life. An interesting facet to going to school inSacramento from the farm was that we lived twomiles away from a railroad station, where Iwould walk every day and take an interurbantrain into Sacramento, then a streetcar to the highschool.

“I knew that I wanted tobe an engineer. . .”

Rode the interurbantrain to high school

After the first semester at the HarknessJunior High, the authorities closed that schoolbecause a new high school had been built, a newmain high school had been built, and we movedover to the previous main high school, whichthen became the Sutter Junior High. So I did onesemester at the Sutter Junior High and movedover to the main high school in the winter of1924. I continued my pre-engineering educationin Sacramento High School and graduated inJanuary of 1928.

In my senior year, I also concentrated onpublic speaking and debating, as well ascontinuing studying elements of artwork, visualaids, while concentrating on science, math, and

4


other studies which would prepare me for anengineering career.

Jesus, where's this coming from? (Laughter)

Storey: It's just fine. Don't worry about it.

Vernon: After graduating from the high school in Januaryof 1928, I decided to stay out of school until falland then enter the Sacramento Junior College, soduring that spring and summer, I did a number ofodd jobs, working both for farmers, helping myfather on his farm, and working for a farmer whodid dryland farming during the summer in hiswheat operations.

Stayed out of college forone year and worked

Storey: His name?

Vernon: Incidentally, I neglected to say that in helping myfather build the buildings on the farm, he builtmany buildings to conduct a chicken operation,both eggs, poultry, and broilers. Also we had alot of irrigated farming, and that's where Ilearned how to handle a number-two round-pointshovel in the hot summer months, irrigating fororchard, alfalfa, and vineyard.

Father ran a poultryoperation on his farm

I enrolled in the junior high school,Sacramento Junior High [Sacramento JuniorCollege], in September of 1928, and took theusual pre-engineering course with major in civilengineering.

Enrolled in SacramentoJunior College inSeptember 1928

Storey: I thought you graduated in '28.

Vernon: No, I graduated from junior high [college] in1930. I graduated from high school in January of1928. I stayed out of school for eight months,working, and then enrolled in the junior college.

Storey: In '28?

5

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: In 1928.

Storey: And you graduated there in '30?

Vernon: In 1930.

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: I went two years to the junior college. I also gotinvolved in both the debating societies andhelped establish the Associated Engineers Cluband became its first president, as well as becamethe vice president of my sophomore class.

During the last half of the sophomoreyear, I began taking civil service examinationsfor the state highway. I passed one fifth [ranked]in the state and was offered a job for the statehighway before the semester ended, so I decidednot to take that and finish up the year at school. Shortly after finishing the sophomore year, Ireceived an offer from the state highway for a jobon a mountain construction highway contract outof San Francisco in the Santa Cruz Mountains. Iworked for the state highway for two years,because this being in the depths of theDepression, and my father was struggling withhis farming operations, I figured I would have towork for a couple of years, save every nickel Icould, and then go back to the university to finishmy education.

Sophomore year tookthe civil service examsfor the state highwaydepartment

Worked for the statehighway department inthe Santa CruzMountains for two years

Saved money to go backto college

Storey: So that would have been '30 to '32.

Vernon: '30 to '32. In the highway construction job, weworked on a mountain construction project thatwas located near the Big Basin, and this waswhere I first became aware of conservation oftimber resources, because we were in some old-growth redwood. One of the professors fromStanford University, a Professor Wing, was, Ibelieve, one of the early members of the Sierra

Became aware of efforts to protect oldgrowth redwoods

6


Society. At least he was very strong inprotecting the old-growth redwoods.

It was interesting that a lot of thisterritory had been logged off earlier and hadregrown over a lot of it, but there was still someold growth. I can remember one intersection thatwe had to design, which was in the middle of anold growth [area], and Professor Wing had us outthere measuring each tree to figure out how wecould get that intersection in that location andsave as many trees as possible, which was aninteresting thing. That was a interesting thing.

I worked on that job for about – well,from June of 1930 to October of 1931. Thenafter the close of that job, our party became whatwas known as a fly party, or a location party, andwe began making surveys for new projects, oneof which was to connect up from Richmond,California, to the Carquinas [Strait] Bridge, therelocation of the highway from Richmond,California, to the Carquinas Bridge, abandoningthe old location. Another project was therelocation of the highway through the DublinCanyon from Hayward to Livermore. Again weabandoned the old location and got a completelynew location, and also the Altamont Pass, whichwas from Livermore over to Tracey, againabandoning the old locations and adopting newlocations which gave the opportunity to expandto what has now become modern dual-carriage-way freeways. Incidentally, those locations stillhold. We got enough room so they could beexpanded. When we first went through there,they were four lanes, but they weren't divided,and then later they were able to divide andexpand and expand, and they're still there.

Worked on location ofhighway fromRichmond, California tothe Carquinas StraitBridge

Worked on locatinghighway Hayward toLivermore

Worked locating thehighway from Livermoreover Altamont Pass toTracey

Later we moved to Los Gatos, California,where we began the surveys for the relocation ofRoute 17 from Los Gatos to Santa Cruz. The old

Surveyed the relocationof Route 17 between LosGatos and Santa Cruz

7

Kenneth F. Vernon

location had been built in the Richardsonadministration in the 1920s, which had becomegrossly overloaded with weekend and holidaytravelers so that a whole new location wasrequired, which could later be expanded into amodern freeway. This was a very interestingexercise in modern highway location, upgradingto, what were then, very modern standards.

During that summer, the summer of 1932,I decided that I had saved up enough money byscrimping and saving, to re-enroll, or to enroll, inthe University of California, which I did inAugust of 1932. I adopted three majors:irrigation engineering, because of my experienceon an irrigated farm; transportation, because ofmy experience with the state highway; andstructures, because I was interested in the designof buildings and bridges.

In 1932 enrolled inUniversity of California -Berkeley and majored inirrigation engineering,transportation, andbuildings

Storey: These were three majors in engineering?

Vernon: In engineering.

Storey: In civil engineering? And this was at Berkeley?

Vernon: Berkeley.

Storey: University of California at Berkeley.

Vernon: University at Berkeley, yes. Incidentally, I stillwear it; my wife gave me that on my graduation,so I still wear it.

Storey: Your class ring.

Vernon: Yeah. As well as concentrating on engineeringstudies, I also went over into the College ofLetters and Science and loaded up with a numberof electives, subjects to broaden my overalleducation, and one of the most interesting that Ifound was historical geology, and [I] carried that

Took courses outsideengineering

8


as a sort of a hobby throughout my life, studyingthe history of geologic formations and what hashappened over time with various physicalfeatures in a landscape.

In the summer of 1933, I was able to get ajob on a highway construction contract which Istarted out as a guy on the fill, patrolling theunloading of trucks, and later becoming shiftforeman on the night shift, where I had charge ofa earth-moving shovel, a number of bulldozers,trucks, and labor crews.

Summer of 1933 workedon highwayconstruction

Later that summer, I was given theopportunity to rejoin the Division of Highways inSan Francisco, working in the approachesdivision to the San Francisco-Oakland BayBridge. There I prepared maps and drawings,locating where the approaches might go. Because this was still in the depths of theDepression and money was scarce, I made anarrangement with my supervisor to work twoafternoons a week and Saturdays and Sundays inthe bridge while I was still attending the classesat university.

Later in the summer of1933 worked on theapproaches to the SanFrancisco-Oakland BayBridge

Attended college whileworking on the bridge

One of the interesting problems I workedon was the study of whether the Southern Pacific“red trains” could be routed across the bridge,but we found that they were so big that it wasvery difficult to get them off of the bridge on theEast Bay side and feed into their existing system,so we concentrated then on utilizing the KeySystem,2 which became the system of choice totravel from San Francisco across the bridge anddistribute out through the East Bay side.

Looked at running theSouthern Pacific acrossthe bay on the bridge

Storey: The Key System?

Vernon: K-E-Y. Key System. There were twotransportation systems on the East Bay side. There was the SP, Southern Pacific “red trains,”

The two transportationsystems in the East Bay

9

Kenneth F. Vernon

and there was the Key system yellow cars. Therewas two ferry systems that went across the Bay,and the red trains went to the Southern Pacificmole on the East Bay side, and the Key Systemran on a long mole out into the Bay, and itsferries to the San Francisco side.

The lady who later became my wife usedto take a streetcar; she worked in San Francisco,she was the executive secretary in a publishingfirm, and she would take a streetcar fromBerkeley, where she lived, down to where shewould catch one of the Key System boat trains,then take a ferry to San Francisco, then take astreetcar to her office location in San Francisco,all of which she could do within an hour. That'sa record that the BART [Bay Area Rapid Transit]system has trouble matching today.

“my wife used to take astreetcar. . . fromBerkeley. . . down to . . .catch one of the KeySystem boat trains, . . .then take a streetcar toher office . . .”

Storey: Uh-hmm.

Vernon: Also during that year, I was correcting papers fortwo professors in structural mechanics, strengthof materials, etc., so I was reading papers fromabout 120 students, as well as working 16 hours aweek in the Bay Bridge, as well as taking 22hours of course work in the university. That'swhen I began wearing glasses. I traded my bedfor a lantern. (Laughter) Oh, God, what a year.

“I was correcting papersfor two professors . . .as well as working 16hours a week in the BayBridge, as well as taking22 hours of coursework”

That Christmas holidays, I was able to getfull-time work out on the survey crew workingon the Bay, on the East Bay side, makingsoundings in the Bay to determine where the EastBay approach roads should go. What we werelooking for was the bottom of the Bay wascovered with about eight feet of mud and slime,then underneath that were layers of nearly puresand, which could then provide a base to take theapproach roads after dredging off the mud andslime.

Christmas holidayworked for the surveycrew full-time on thebridge

10


There's a sidebar to this. We had a littlescow about, oh, eight feet by sixteen feet, thathad a well in the center, which we would drop asounding device [through] and pull up cores tofind out where the sand layer was and how deepit might be. One day we had decided we werethrough with taking soundings, so we brought thescow up to a wharf and tied up, and we weregoing to take the A-frame off the top of the scowbecause we would use the scow then just as atransport rather than as a working boat. We tiedup to the wharf, and it was at low tide. The deckof the wharf was about eight feet above the levelof the water. We tied up the boat, we thought, tothe dolphins on the wharf, and I stayed in theboat, whereas the rest of the crew got up on topand were lifting the A-frame off the boat, and Iwas guiding it away from the wharf down below,'til we got up to a point where I couldn't liftanymore and they couldn't pull anymore. So Isaid, "Wait a minute. I'll climb up the wharf andget up there with you and give you more pull." So as I was climbing up the facing on the wharf,I thought the chain around the dolphin wasfastened, but to my horror, when I grabbed holdof it and pulled on it, I found out it wasn't, and Iflopped over backwards into about six feet ofwater, mud, and slime up to my neck. (Laughter)

Storey: Oh, my! (Laughter)

Vernon: And part of that slime was the general sewerageoutfall from Oakland and Berkeley. (Laughter) Oh, God, what a mess! And bad news travelsfast. About two days later, the supervisor cameout and said, "Hey, Vernon, I understood youwent into the drink." And I said, "I probably willnever live that down." (Laughter) Oh, dear.

Am I going into too much detail?

Storey: No, this is great. This is absolutely great.

11

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: Because it just keeps coming back. I have tothink of where I am.

Storey: That's fine. Let's just keep going.

Vernon: After working out there all during Christmasvacation, I asked the supervisor – by this time,they had let the contract to begin dredging for thefills to make the approaches into the Bay spans. The plan was to dredge out the mud and slimedown to the sand and discharge it some distanceaway from where the approach road would go. Also we were to dredge the sand from what wasto become the turnaround for the Port ofOakland, which was adjacent, and the contractfor the dredger had been let and moved to thesite, had come down from Fort Peck, at that timewas one of the largest dredgers in the world, theFort Peck Dam up on the Missouri River, it hadhelped build the Fort Peck Dam up on theMissouri River. This was going to dredgetwenty-four hours a day.

So I'd asked the supervisor could hearrange for me to do the night shift inspection onthe dredger, figuring that I could get my studyingdone on the night shift, because there wouldn't betoo much going on, and I might even get a nap ortwo in the process. But by this time, I haddecided that by struggling and scrounging, Imight be able to squeak through, and borrowinghere and there, squeak through and get through inJune. If I worked that night shift, I'd have to takepossibly another year, and by that time I'd had it. I just felt that I just couldn't do it, so I went backand told my supervisor that I thanked him formaking the effort to get me that job, but I said, "Ijust feel I shouldn't do it, can't do it, and I want toget through."

Asked to work the nightshift full-time whilegoing to school but thendecided to push to finishschool

One of the elements I didn't mentionearlier, back in the winter of '32-'33, was after

Bank in which he hadsaved his money from

12


working for two years and saving up money togo back to the university, I had had an operationon my back over the Christmas holidays of 1932,and then I was still recuperating when in Januaryof 1933 the bank in Sacramento that had all thefunds for me and my family went closed. Itmissed the Bank Holiday by six weeks.

working in 1932-3closed its doors

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 1, APRIL 24, 1995.BEGINNING OF SIDE 2, TAPE 1, APRIL 24, 1995.

Vernon: In the Christmas of '32, I had an operation on myback, and then I was still recuperating when inmid-January of 1933, my brother called me andsaid, "Kid, we're in trouble. The family'scompletely out of funds. The bank that containsall of our funds, including yours, has closed itsdoors."

I thought grim disaster stared me in theface, because I had cashed a check for $10 theday before he called me, and I'd had a penny inmy pocket which I'd given to a little girl, a littlebaby, at the boarding house where I was living,and I said, "Oh, my God. I've got to keep this$10, because they're going to bounce that checkand I'll have to make it good." So I was withouta nickel, without a penny, even a penny. (Laughter)

“So I was without anickel, without a penny,even a penny. . . .”

I called my father. I said, "Listen. I usedto work for a man named Charles, we called him"Chas," Scheidel." S-C-H-E-I-D-E-L. He wasthe dry farmer who I used to work for in theharvest field. I said, "Chas used to think I was apretty good guy. Take my bank book over tohim and show him that I have the funds in thebank, and maybe he'll loan me a couple ofhundred bucks on the strength of my bank book,and we'll ultimately get some money out of it,"which my father did, and Chas came throughbecause he was in another bank, and he came

Advanced money byCharles Scheidel

13

Kenneth F. Vernon

through with $250. [I] also went to the universityand got some money from them, so with thatmoney I figured I would be able to get through'til the summer, where I could get some work.

Then picking up now in the spring of1934, after deciding to not take the nightinspection job, but concentrating on theuniversity work and getting through, I graduatedin May of 1934 at the top of my class. I receivedtwo accolades at that time; one was a juniormembership of the American Society of CivilEngineers, which was awarded to the outstandingengineering graduate at Berkeley. Incidentally, Ibecame friends later with Brooks Morris, whowas the same type of graduate from Stanford, andwe roomed together when we joined the Bureauof Reclamation in the summer of 1934 in Denver,just by accident.

I graduated in May of1934 at the top of myclass. . . .

The second award was a membership inthe Society of the Sigma Xi, S-I-G-M-A X-I,which, translated literally, means "thebrotherhood of the search." Only two membersof the Engineering College were awarded suchmemberships in the Sigma Xi; I was one of themand one of my colleagues was awarded the otherone.

Also during the year I had become amember of the engineering society Tau Beta Pi,T-A-U B-E-T-A P-I, which was fundamentallythe civil engineering fraternity at the university. It was a scholastic fraternity rather than a societyfraternity.

After graduation, I went back to work forthe Division of Highways out of San Francisco,at my old rank, working on the widening of thestreets and approaches to the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge.

After graduation went towork for the highwaydepartment

14


Storey: Had you quit working for them while youfinished school?

Vernon: Yes, I quit after – when I told Paul that I justwanted to get through school.

Storey: Paul?

Vernon: Paul Harding, who was my supervisor in theApproaches Division of the Bay Bridge. I said,"I'm going to take a 'leave of absence' or atemporary resignation. As soon as I get throughschool, I'll want to come back." He said, "Okay,you can come back when you get through."

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: So I rejoined. They took me back, and they hadthis program going, the widening of the streets inSan Francisco.

They were widening thestreets in San Francisco

One of the interesting elements of thatwas we ran into the emergency earthquake firesystem in San Francisco, which has its reservoirsup on Twin Peaks, and also the fire boats can tieinto it at the Bay. Now, this fire system was verycarefully guarded and highly restricted access,but we found that in widening the streets, wewould have to set the hydrants back to – oh, Idon't remember, ten or twelve feet, somethinglike that, to give additional lanes to the streets. But we ran into trouble because nobody in SanFrancisco had the authority to let us move andshut that system off. I don't know. It may haveeven taken a special dispensation from thegovernor, I don't know what it took, but it tookmany, many meetings by the people in theDivision of Highways to get authority to shutthat system off, because these hydrants werelocated in a big block of concrete, because theywere under such extreme pressure that the nozzleeffect of just turning that water loose would just

Moving emergencyearthquake fire hydrantsin San Francisco was aninteresting problem

15

Kenneth F. Vernon

blow them right out of the ground. So weultimately got that authority, and they shut thesystem off so we could remove the old hydrantsand install new hydrants. I've even got somepictures in my scrapbook of what we were doingthere in San Francisco.

Storey: What were you earning when you first started forthe highway department in the summer of '34?

Vernon: Oh, my. Oh, my. I started out in the summer of1930 as a rear chainman at $105 a month. Iworked a year, taking examinations every chanceI could get, and I passed. I neglected to mentionthat. During 1931, I took a structuralengineering exam and passed. I took a seniorengineering field aide exam and passed, ninth inthe state, because I had a good background insurveying and construction surveying,inspection. But not having a degree, I couldn'tqualify for an engineer rating, but I couldbecome a senior engineer field aide for $145 amonth. So when I went back to work for thehighway in San Francisco, I went back at my oldrank of senior engineering field aide, which, ofcourse, sort of rankled, because I felt now I hadanother string to my bow, and I thought I shouldbecome at least a junior engineer.

So the last semester at university, I hadtaken a graduate course under ProfessorEtcheverry,3 who was head of the Irrigation andEngineering Department, and had studied manyof the [Bureau of] Reclamation plans for theCentral Valley Project. Correction: it was thestate plans at that time, it wasn't Reclamation. Itwas the state plans, the state water plan.

During his last semestertook a graduate courseunder ProfessorBernard A. Etcheverry

Storey: Upon which ultimately Reclamation built.

Vernon: Yes, but also studied many Reclamation plans,which this was a seminar course in which there

16


were only three of us and we met two afternoonsa week with Professor Etcheverry, and it wasvery informal. I felt that I learned a great dealjust being associated with the man and learninghis background. Professor Etcheverry – E-T-C-H-E-V-E-R-R-Y.

Storey: Thank you.

Vernon: As a matter of fact, he had written three bookswhich he used in his courses, which were biblesfor anybody studying irrigation engineering, andalso his associate professor was Sidney T.Harding. Etcheverry was more of the structuresand organization man, and Harding was on farmirrigation, so I got an excellent background inboth irrigation hydraulics, irrigation structures,and irrigation distribution on the farm, preparingthe ground for irrigation practices.

Etcheverry focused onstructures andorganization and hisassociate, Sidney T.Harding, on farmirrigation

So I had asked Professor Etcheverry, aftergraduation, could he give me a good word withthe Bureau of Reclamation, so he wrote R.F.Walter, who was then the Chief Engineer, andalso Walker R. Young, who was thenSupervising Engineer of Hoover Dam, andtelling them that here was a young man who hadgraduated, made a good record at the university,and, having worked, I was some senior to mostgraduates, so he put in a very good word for me.

“So I had askedProfessor Etcheverry,after graduation, couldhe give me a good wordwith the Bureau ofReclamation . . .”

As a result of his efforts, I received aletter from Reclamation in Denver; I forgetwhether it was R.F. Walter or Sinclair O. Harper,the assistant chief engineer, offering me anappointment as a junior engineer at Davis Dam. So I began making arrangements to stop myassociation with the Division of Highways andprepare to join up with the Bureau ofReclamation. This was the summer of 1934.

Offered job withReclamation

In the middle of this, I got a letter from Problems with Arizona

17

Kenneth F. Vernon

Denver saying that my appointment had beenchanged, that I was no longer going to DavisDam, but I'd be assigned to Denver. It seems thatthere was an argument about the Colorado Riverwith Arizona, and they had called out their navyand stopped construction on Davis Dam. Now, Imay be a little haywire on this. I think it wasParker Dam,4 not Davis Dam, but Parker Dam,because that's where the Metropolitan WaterDistrict, I think, was taking off in its pipeline tothe Metropolitan Water District. So I'm probablywrong, not Davis Dam, it was probably ParkerDam.

over Davis Dam result inchange in assignmentfor first Reclamation job

Storey: But they did call out their state militia, I believe,at one point.

Vernon: Well, the state militia, and they got out somerowboats, and we always said they called outtheir navy. (Laughter) So things got into ahiatus there, but apparently Reclamation wasinterested in me, so they transferred me, mademy appointment to Denver. So I madearrangements to stop my association with theDivision of Highways and to appear in Denver, Ithink it was July 14, 1934.

In the meantime, my association withHelen Garlinghouse had become much moreexciting and interesting, and we agreed that weought to take life together after that. Excuse me. She's gone.

Marries HelenGarlinghouse

I proposed and she accepted, but I saidthat, "Look. I owe everybody in town. I've gotto work a while. I owe the university. I've got towork a while to pay off these debts. Then we'llthink about getting married, and let's aim forChristmastime of 1934." So I went to Denver. She agreed.

I went to Denver and was told that I was Reported to the canals

18


to report to the canals division under Mr. [HarryR.] McBirney, and after reporting to the canalsdivision, I worked for a few days with HowardCurtis, who then was working particularly on theAll-American Canal designs, but then was laterassigned over to Arthur "Bud" Reeves, who wasworking on a number of rehabilitation projects,who had charge of the work on a number ofrehabilitation projects.

division under McBirney

Worked with HowardCurtis and Arthur “Bud”Reeves

I first located at the YMCA when I got toDenver, and there I met a young man, BrooksMorris, whose father was – I can't think of hisfirst name, but Mr. Morris, who was the chiefengineer and general manager of the PasadenaWater Works. Brooks was also the award-winner at Stanford that I mentioned earlier, so wehad a good deal in common. I said to him,"Look. I want to get married at Christmastimeand I'm trying to save as much money as I can. Iwant to find a place to stay. Do you want toshack up with me and let's find a boardinghousethat we can room together just like we would atcollege, and I can save a bit of money and youcan save a bit of money?" Well, Brooks agreed,so we found a place close to downtown, whichwas then a boardinghouse hotel, and we roomedtogether then all during that fall and up untilChristmas.

In Denver soon roomedwith Brooks Morris in aboardinghouse hotel

By Christmastime, I figured I had enoughleave saved up and enough money saved up toget back to California, and I'd also bought a car,so I drove back to California, arriving just beforeChristmas. California had instituted a three-daylaw, and because of the holidays, we were kindof stuck with a problem of scheduling. (Laughter) My then-to-be wife said, "I don'twant to get married on Christmas, because ifsomething happens to us along the way, I thinktoo much of Christmas to have you spoil it forme." She was then declaring her independence.

Married on December29, 1934

19

Kenneth F. Vernon

(Laughter)

At any rate, we married December 29th ather parents' home in Berkeley. Then we took alow flight back to Denver, traveling morning tonight, late in the night, 60 miles an hour over badroads, managed to get back to Denver to anapartment that I had rented, where we could landand then get really located after we had gotsettled. So we stayed in a one-room apartmentfor a month. We then located to a nice flat outnear Cheesman Park in Denver. Incidentally, in1993, I tried to find that place, but it was now aparking lot. (Laughter) But it was close toCheesman Park. We used to walk over toCheesman Park all the time.

Incidentally, that fall at Denver, while Iwas living there at the boardinghouse, I also gotinvolved in the Hinman School of Music, whichhad an adult course there. The lady, FlorenceLamont Hinman, ran a school for buddingoperatic students, and then she had an adult classwhich would provide background [music; thechorus]. She would give her prime studentsoperatic roles and give the adults the spear-carrying roles, and so we put on several segmentsof operas during the spring and summer, in thesummer out at Cheesman Park. You know thatpergola that's out there? That was the stage, andthen people sat on the grass out there, and we puton the operatic segments out there.

Became involved withHinman School of Music(later the Lamont Schoolof Music) and performedin operas at CheesmanPark

Storey: Where was the Lamont School of Music locatedthen?

Vernon: It was down – I'm trying to recall. I used to walkdown. It was about 8th Street, 8th or 9th, downthere. You remember those big old houses thatbelonged to the mining moguls down there about8th or 9th, Grant, Sherman, and Washington,whatever those streets are? So it was down in

20


there somewhere. It was a big old mansion-typething.

Storey: A big red-stone mansion up there on GrantStreet, I think.

Vernon: Well, one of those. I don't recall just exactlywhere it was now, but I know I used to walkdown there in fifteen minutes, something likethat. Also there were a couple of my buddiesthat worked in the canals division that, also, theywere the ones that got me interested in this:Wally Schneider, who was a basso, and LoyceJohnson, who was a tenor, and he was trying tobecome one of her prime students, one of Mrs.Lamont Hinman's students.

Wally Schneider andLoyce Johnson of theCanals Division alsoparticipated

Incidentally, one of her prime students atthe time I was there was – Janet Dickinson? Herlast name was Dickinson. I don't recall whetherher first name was Janet or something like that,and she became a star on NBC Radio in NewYork. She was a coloratura, a beautiful voice. So it was very nice to be associated with thesepeople. In other words, I had other interests thanbesides just engineering.

“In other words, I hadother interests thanbesides justengineering. . . .”

I worked on several interesting projects inthe canals division there in the design. Sincethey knew that I had a good hydraulicsbackground, I got to perform several interestinghydraulic studies. One particularly was on theAll-American Canal. Another was on theMalheur siphon for the Owyhee Project, whichwas then quite remarkable for its size and length.

Worked on severalinteresting projects inthe canals division

Then also my oldest son was born inDenver on January 18, 1936, at St. Luke'sHospital.

Oldest son born in 1936

During all this time, I was following whatwas happening in California in connection with

Because of Etcheverry’sclass, followed thedevelopment of the

21

Kenneth F. Vernon

the Central Valley Project, because I, during mysenior year, in that graduate course had studied alot about the state plan for the Central ValleyProject. So I kept talking to Mr. McBirney, whowas the head of the canals division, if it washappening, and when it would happen, and if ithappened, would there be an opportunity totransfer out there. I'd had to pass up oneopportunity to transfer back to the field becauseMills Bunger, who was then the planningengineer for the Colorado Big Thompsontransmountain diversion, was getting ready forpreconstruction work, and he was setting up aheadquarters at Grand Lake. Since I had donesome work with him on the planning estimatesfor the Gila Project, he offered me the job ofoffice engineer at Grand Lake. I said, "Well, letme go and see. I think my wife is now pregnant,and I've got to see what the facilities are at GrandLake."

Central Valley Project

Offered job on theColorado-Big ThompsonProject by Mills Bunger

So one Sunday we drove over to GrandLake and found it sky-high in snow, and veryfew facilities, and some distance from a hospitalat that time, so I had to tell Mr. Bunger that I feltthat I had to refuse his kind offer. So I kept intouch with Mr. McBirney about happenings onthe Central Valley Project, because I was anxiousto get back to California if I could.

“I was anxious to getback to California if Icould. . . .”

He came back from one trip and said Mr.Young, who was a former Supervising Engineerof Hoover Dam, had now been set up asSupervising Engineer for the Central ValleyProject, and his headquarters were going to be inSacramento. One of the big problems of theCentral Valley Project would be the watertransfer facilities in the Delta, which wouldmainly be canals. Water was being sent downthe Sacramento River, then would transferthrough the Delta, up the San Joaquin River bymeans of conveyance canals, and then would

22


replace the water in the San Joaquin River,whereas water in the San Joaquin River behindFriant Dam would be sent south in the Friant-Kern canal; in other words, there would be awater exchange.

So I kept in touch with Mr. McBirney ondevelopments going on out in California, tellinghim that I was very interested in getting out thereif I possibly could. In late May, it sounded likethings were happening out in the Central ValleyProject, to get started, so I told Mr. McBirney I'dlike to take some leave and take a vacation. I hadenough leave to get out there, and would it beokay if I talked to Mr. Young about maybegetting transferred to the Central Valley Project. He said yes. He said, "I think they could use youout there."

So we went to my parents' farm outside ofSacramento, and then I went into Sacramento andtalked to Mr. Young, trying to persuade him thatthe Central Valley Project would not be a successunless it had my services.

Went on vacation andapproached WalkerYoung about a transferto the Central ValleyProject

He said, "What makes you think you're sohot, Vernon? I never saw you before until youwalked through that door." (Laughter)

I said, "Well, that's your problem, Mr.Young." (Laughter) Fortunately, he took itokay. At any rate, I said, "I cleared it in Denverthat if you request me, they'll release me to cometo the Central Valley Project. I dearly wouldlove to come. I've got my background here andall the rest of it."

So he agreed then, he would ask Denverfor my transfer. So both my wife's family andmy family were in California, so we werevisiting around, and time was going on, time togo back to Denver. We were back out to the

23

Kenneth F. Vernon

ranch, and we'd already overstayed a day. Wewere throwing stuff in the suitcase. I said,"We're probably going to have to drive all nightto get back to Denver in time for Mondaymorning," when some guy drove up yelling, "I'vegot a telegram for Kenneth Vernon! I've got atelegram for Kenneth Vernon!"

So we all rushed out of the house to seewhat this telegram for Kenneth Vernon was, andit was a telegram from Walker Young, sayingthat Denver had approved my transfer to theDelta Division of the Central Valley Project, thatI should report there A-S-A-P – as soon aspossible. So what a relief! (Laughter) What arelief.

Offered job on the DeltaDivision by WalkerYoung

So we then, instead of packing up to go toDenver, then we packed up and went down toAntioch, which was the headquarters of the DeltaDivision, where I reported in to a Mr. Oscar T.Boden, who was the division engineer of theDelta Division.

Reported to Oscar T.Boden in Antioch,California

How much do you want to go into theDelta division?

Storey: Please, keep going.

Vernon: We're still only in 1936. I don't know whetheryou're going to get out of here. You may have to– I'm leaving for Atlanta next week. (Laughter)

Storey: I may just have to buy more tapes, or come back.

Vernon: At any rate, God, where's this stuff coming from?

Storey: This is great. Don't worry about it. This isexactly what I want.

Vernon: I'm trying to weave in things that were going onat the same time around me.

24


Storey: This is beautiful. Don't worry about it.

Vernon: Incidentally, the other night, one of myneighbors, one of the consulting engineer firmsthat I did work with overseas, he said his sister'shusband also worked for that from TAMS inNew York, and she was going to be visiting, sohe said, "Would you come up and visit withher?" Because she also knew the men that werein Baghdad with me and also in Pakistan. So Iwent up there, and a lot of this stuff came up, butthis was basically in Baghdad and Pakistan whenI was in the Foreign Service. But, you know,you get started, and, God, it just rolls on.

Well, at any rate, here we are.

Storey: This is great.

Vernon: Now I'm reporting to the Delta division. Let'ssee. I've got notes on the Delta division. We gotthrough (a) Denver, 1934 to '36. Now we're inthe Central Valley Project, '36, and I included upto 1944.

Worked on the CentralValley Project 1936-1944

The three basic elements of the CentralValley Project were the Contra Costa Canal,which was a canal which would pick up in theDelta area and deliver fresh water along thesouthern coast of the San – not San Pablo. I can'tremember the name of the bay, the confluence ofthe Sacramento and the San Joaquin Rivers. Thesecond element was the Delta Mendota Canal,which would pick up water which would comefrom the Sacramento River and discharge it bypumps into a canal which would deliver it to theMendota pool, the upper/lower San JoaquinRiver. The state plan had presumed to build aseries of low dams up the river, but Mr. Boden,being an excellent canal man, concluded that thething to do was to pump the water in one step outof the Delta and into a canal which would keep

Overview of canals ofCentral Valley Project

25

Kenneth F. Vernon

the water, the Sacramento River water, the Deltawater . . .

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1, INTERVIEW OF APRIL 24, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2, INTERVIEW OF APRIL 24, 1995.

Storey: This is Tape two of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 24th, 1995.

Vernon: The Delta Cross Channel. We got to the Delta-Mendota Canal delivering water to the Mendotapool, which was a structure which deliveredwater to lands along the Lower San JoaquinRiver.

The third element was the Delta CrossChannel, which was to get the Sacramento Riverwater across through the delta to the pumps forthe Delta-Mendota Canal. I'll take these upseparately.

The Contra Costa Canal began at theRock Slough, a channel in one of the myriads ofchannels in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta,picked up water, and for four miles went throughboggy terrain to a series of pumping stationswhich would deliver the water, raise the water, asI recall, about 120 feet.

The state plan had included a series ofpumping of stations, but had spread them out[along] over the canal, so that a number of areasof irrigable land was lost in the process becauseit didn't gain enough elevation.

Mr. Boden's plan concentrated the fourpumping stations near the headwaters of thecanal, and then gained command of a good dealmore land, and also made a better operatingentity because the [pumping plant] operatorswere condensed into a relatively smallgeographic area.

Pumping plants on theContra Costa Canalwere located to increaseirrigable acreage

26


Also because of his scheme, there was atunnel of about a half-a-mile length to get awayfrom the basic delta area and then gain thiselevation so as to command additional lands, andpick up a reservoir for the city of Antioch watersupply where we could deliver fresh water to [thecity] them instead of [it] them having to pumpout of the bay [during high salinity periods].

Contra Costa Canaldesigned to deliverwater to Antioch

Storey: Now, had all this been decided by the time yougot there?

Vernon: We were in the process of surveying. I was justgoing to take up what was going on when I gotthere.

Storey: Okay, excuse me.

Vernon: When I arrived on the Delta Division, it had beenactive for about six months, and the main activityat that time was topographic surveys, and alsocanal route location surveys, and cost estimating.

My assignment was fundamentallyconstruction cost estimating, structure design,preliminary structure design. . . Well basically,at the beginning of it, canal quantity estimates,preliminary structure design, and cost estimatingwas my principal function because of myexperience both in highway work and in theDenver office on structure design and canalstructure design.

Did cost estimating andpreliminary structuredesign

Mr. [Bernard (Barney) P.] Bellport,5 whowas my associate at that time, was heading up theoffice work on the topographic surveys. He wasa graduate mining engineer, and later becameChief Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation,incidentally. And also, later days, he got verydeeply involved in the property land surveysbecause we were involved in old Spanish grants. We also had some of the regular U.S.G.S. [U. S.

Worked with BarneyBellport

27

Kenneth F. Vernon

Geological Survey] cadastral surveys, but wealso were involved in old Spanish grantproperties, which was a whole different ball ofwool.

We started construction of the canal in1936 with the excavation of the four-mile sectionleading away from the delta area through thebog. And this was a very interestingconstruction, because we had a number ofstructures to build, and we literally built them onfloating rafts. That is to say we over-excavatedinto the peat and muck, then laid down a heavylayer of gravel base many feet thick, upon whichwe erected the structures. So literally, thesestructures floated with the up and down[because] of the tide in the various waterchannels [caused the delta banks to go up anddown].

Canals in the boggyareas were designed tofloat

Another interesting element was themethod of excavation of this canal. Thecontractor used a Walking Monighan, M-O-N-I-G-H-A-N, Monighan, which was basically adrag-line, a power drag-line, sitting in a tubwhich had pontoons and a tub at a base. Thepontoons were on walkers, on cams, so that bymoving the cams, the pontoons would set down,then the cam would lift the tub off the groundand move it forward. Then the tub would sitdown and relift the pontoons. A sketch will –you'll need a sketch.

Excavation of the ContraCosta Canal in the initialboggy sections

Storey: I think I understand, though. They would besitting on the pontoons, then it would be sittingon the tub, then on the pontoons.

Vernon: Yeah.

Storey: And unfortunately, we can't put a sketch into thetape. (laughter)

28


Vernon: I didn't know whether you'd get that or whoever,but here's the cab, the drag-line's out here. Andthen there's this kind of a track here, like that,and there's a cam in here. And then over here,down under here was a tub, like this, but alsohere on this cam was this pontoon arrangementwhich sat out here looking at it this way. Herewas the tub down here, and here was thepontoons here, you see. They moved up anddown, so as the pontoon settled on the ground,then this cam would come around and lift [thetub] this up like that. Then this would moveforward or backwards. Backwards would movethe cab forward. The pontoons would sit downagain, I mean the tub would sit down again.

Storey: Yeah, and the pontoons would go up.

Vernon: The pontoons would lift up. So that's the way itworked. And it could work in that soft, muckyground because it had low enough groundpressure.

Storey: Which canal?

Vernon: This was the Contra Costa Canal.

Storey: This was the canal to get to the pumping plants?

Vernon: Yes. This was the length of canal, about fourmiles, from the slough into the first pumpingstation. Then we let successive contracts. Thenafter the first pumping station, the canal was tobe concrete-lined.

And one of the developments of thatconcrete lining was somebody invented a canaltrimmer, a mechanical canal trimmer, to thedesired section which ran along on rails,carefully controlled as to elevation, and thenlater, placed the concrete. There was a liningmachine which placed the concrete in the desired

Canal trimming andlining after the firstpumping plant on theContra Costa Canal

29

Kenneth F. Vernon

sections at the desired thickness.

And the contractors used mobile transittrucks, used a central mixing station for theirconcrete. Brought the concrete to the groundlocation in transit mixers, dumped the concreteinto hoppers which spread the concrete across thelining machine. And there was a vibrator in thelining machine which vibrated the concrete,consolidated it into the desired form andstrength.

Incidentally, one of the otherdevelopments of that lining was at that time,curing compounds for concrete were justbecoming available on the market. The Huntprocess at that time was a black asphalticcompound. This was spread on by pressuresprays which sealed in the water. Up to thatpoint, concrete [needed] needs to be cured in adamp environment to gain its strength.

Curing compounds forconcrete were justcoming into use

Normally, we consider the twenty-four-hour strength, the seven-day strength, the twenty-eight-day strength – concrete by testing to seehow it's developed its strength. But in order tothat, because concrete dehydrates or hydrates,whichever is the proper term, there's a chemicalreaction going on with the cement in the concretethat takes up the water. So if you don't keep itmoist, in a moist environment, it becomes too dryand then never gains its true strength becauseconcrete [can] will gain its strength in acompletely submerged environment.

So the magic of these curing compoundswas that being asphaltic or at least hydrocarbons,waxy, it sealed in the water that was in thecement mix, concrete mix. But the problem waswith the black curing compound out in the sun –and California sun gets very warm – thetemperature in the concrete could get up to 150

The problem with blackasphaltic-hydrocarboncompounds

30


degrees, which would destroy its strengthbecause of expansion. You had a conflict goingon in the concrete itself, expansion due to heat,contractions during hydration.

So somebody developed a whitepigmented compound. We did a lot of testingwith that white pigmented compound in '37 and'38, and as a result of that, it became widelyutilized. The main thing that it did was reducethe curing temperature in the concrete, in thelining spread out in the sun because of thereflective power of this white pigmented curingcompound. So this became widely used afterthat.

We experimented with awhite compound

Storey: Now the canal trimmer? Was that invented byReclamation?

Vernon: It wasn't invented by Reclamation, it wasinvented by somebody. It was utilized – I thinkwe were about the first canal to utilize it becausethen it was widely used on the Columbia BasinProject in a much larger form. I've forgotten whothe guy was that actually developed it, probably anumber of people. A form of it was brought –one of the contractors brought it to the canalcontract that he had, and then they worked on it, improved it, as they went along.

The canal trimmer

But it was a series of buckets. The canalhad a section like this, and a rail was set up hereon the sides of this little berm, and then this wasvery carefully controlled as to elevation. Thenboth the canal trimmer and the canal liningmachine ran on these rails, and you had a levelline, which there was a needle that ran along it sothat it had levelers on it in case there was anydifferential in the rail, you could control thethickness.

So this was a bucket, a continuous bucket

31

Kenneth F. Vernon

line, the canal trimmer. First the canal sectionwas like this, but then because of the trimmer,this was rounded off to an arc, and then thebuckets came down through here, chain buckets.

Storey: And just shaped the sides of the canals.

Vernon: Then this dropped into a hopper here and thenthere was another chute here and ran this out anddeposited this trimming, because you run throughwith drag-lines first and got this down to maybeabout six inches or so, a rough section. Then youcould put the trimmer in and take off that last sixinches, and came out with a smooth section. Youthen brought the lining machine in, and theyplaced a three-inch lining, concrete lining.

This was a continuous bucket line that ranlike this and dumped over here, and then ahopper which then carried this off and depositedit out on the side. They could run trucks under itor whatever, wherever they wanted to put thematerial.

Storey: Now, was the canal full of water when it wasbeing lined?

Vernon: No, no.

Storey: It was dry?

Vernon: It was dry. We hadn't built the pumping stationsyet. So we got into several contracts on buildingthe canal sections. Then by this time thepumping stations had been designed, andcontracts were let for the construction of thepumping stations.

We ran into a very interesting problemwith the number-one pumping station because itwas just at the edge of the solid ground and thepeat bog. We tried to locate it far enough back

32


into the solid ground so it would have a solidfoundation, not a floating foundation, althoughthe way we constructed it we also gave it thatfloating foundation on a very heavy level ofgravel.

But this station was located less than aquarter of a mile from the main line on the SantaFe Railroad. By this time it was wartime, andthere was a very heavy load of traffic on theSanta Fe Railroad going in and out of the SanFrancisco Bay Area, particularly because of theshipyard building, shipbuilding yards. Theywere located at Richmond. They were turningout a ship a day there.

And at that time, the Bureau had its ownmaster mechanic and master electrician, and wedid not employ contractors to install themachinery in the building. The contractor builtthe building, but then the machinery wasinstalled by Bureau employees, headed by amaster mechanic for the pumping machinery anda master electrician for the electrical machinery.

“at that time, the Bureauhad its own mastermechanic and masterelectrician, and we didnot employ contractorsto install the machineryin the [pump] building. .. .”

And I recall that in this first pumpingstation, it about drove the master mechanic crazybecause he would true-up the – these wereturbine pumps which the motor sat on a verticalstaff and the impeller sat down in a well somedistance below where it would lift the water upand out into an after bay at a higher elevationsection of the canal. But he would get all of hisequipment lined up, trued-up, and ready to cinchdown, and he'd come back in the morning andfind it was all out of true, particularly his verticalshafts. And this was driving him crazy becausehe was a – what's the term?

Problems in installingpumping plantequipment because of anearby railroad

Storey: A perfectionist?

Vernon: Perfectionist, he was a perfectionist. And that's “The Bureau wanted

33

Kenneth F. Vernon

why the Bureau employed these guys directly. They weren't under the pressure of being acontractor's employee and set it in once and thatwas it. The Bureau wanted things done correctly.

things done correctly. . ..”

So it about drove him crazy 'til he foundout what the problem was, was during the nightall these heavy loaded freight trains were goingpast this pumping station on their way into theshipyards in the Oakland area, and the vibrationwas knocking his equipment out of line.(laughter) So he finally decided that he had todevelop some kind of a little elasticity in thesetup, but there was nothing he could do aboutthat. It was just going to be that way.

Storey: Was this the Tracy pumping plant?

Vernon: No, no, this was the Contra Costa Canal. But,you see, we learned a lot. But the Contra CostaCanal, actually the Contra Costa Canal was thetesting ground for the later canals, even the city[??unclear] water plant canal.

I recall, after we got well into the locationof the canal throughout its length, about twenty-eight miles, Mr. Boden developed a newestimate, a revised estimate, for the canal. Ihelped develop a lot of the structure estimates. But Mr. Boden and the head office engineer, aMr. Stubblefield, prepared the report. Mr.Bellport and I were given the task of reviewingthe transcript, the typescript, of Mr. Boden'spenciled report. He was a great guy to take ashort pencil and write like mad for days at a timewriting up his report. Then he would turn it overto the typist, and then Barney Bellport and Iwould have to review it and make sure that it wastyped correctly.

Assigned to review anew estimate for theContra Costa Canal

We got through the whole estimate andMr. Boden – during our review, I shouldn't say

34


review – during our reading of the transcription, Inoticed in the estimate for the canal lining thatthe weight of concrete that he was using wasvery light. And at that time, there was talk oflightweight concrete being used on the deckingof the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Sowe were all involved in this so-called lightweightaggregate, aggregate being the stone.

So I said to Barney, "Hey, the boss isgoing to use lightweight concrete in there. That'sodd, really strange, but I guess he know's whathe's doing. Stubb checked him on this, so I guesshe knows what he's doing. We're only supposedto be reading this damn thing." (laughter)

Anyway, Mr. Boden took his estimate toSacramento, and a couple of days later he cameback. He was waiting for us in the office whenwe came in, and he was blowin' steam out ofboth ears. He said, "You so's-and-so's let medown?"

Error in review ofBoden’s estimate

And we said, "Well, how's that, Mr.Boden?"

And he said, "The first thing Sacramentocaught me on was that I was way short on myaggregate for the canal lining."

And I said, "Well we caught that. Barneyand I talked about it. We decided you were usinglightweight aggregate."

Now just to explain, a cubic yard ofconcrete weighs about 3,500 pounds. It hasabout 3,000 pounds of aggregate in it, and about400 pounds of cement and ever [just] so muchwater. And so what he had done was he hadconverted his cubic yard to a ton. And so he'dtaken his tonnage of aggregate and hadn'tconverted it to 1.75 or 1.5 or whatever it should

35

Kenneth F. Vernon

have been. He'd forgotten his multiplier. And hesaid, "Sacramento just gave me what-for for thestupidity of my estimate."

And we said, "Geez, we'd talked about it,but Stubb had checked it. We thought you knewwhat you were doing, and you didn't tell us tocheck your numbers." (laughter)

And so after, I learned you don't takeanything for granted. If you've got a question,ask it. (laughter) That's a little sidelight on theBureau of Reclamation. I'll come a little later tothe relationship of Oscar Boden and HarryBashore as Commissioner.

“And so, I learned youdon't take anything forgranted. . . .”

Oscar Boden was a goin' machine. Hewas a real tough taskmaster, but he was awonderful guy to work for, and he was a goodteacher. But one thing you learn, like I did, ifyou did it right, he'd go to bat for you. If you didit wrong, he'd really let you know.

Well at any rate, we finally got the canalabout two-thirds of the way down past a placecalled Port Chicago. By this time, the war wason, and our construction activities werebecoming very much slowed down. Since wehad our pumping stations in now, we couldoperate this first segment of the canal down topast Port Chicago. Many industries were locatedalong the south shore of the Suisun Bay. Iremember earlier I said I couldn't remember thename – Suisun Bay. There was the fiberboardplant in Antioch. There were a couple ofchemical plants in Pittsburgh, as well as a bigsteel, Columbia Steel Mill. There was a Shellchemical plant further on down. There was aJohn Mansfield plant which was makingasbestos, which was being utilized in the ships,insulation in ships, piping. Then there was PortChicago, which the Navy was using as a ship out

World War II affects theproject

36


point for munitions.

Incidentally, during the war, there was aterrific explosion at Port Chicago. You'll find itin the archives. It blew windows out as far awayas San Francisco. It cleaned out a wholebattalion of men who were loading the ships. Something happened. I don't recall the detailsnow.

Accident at PortChicago during WorldWar II

Also along the canal, at Pittsburgh, theArmy had built a staging depot, Camp Stoneman,and then again later they built a replacementdepot. I don't remember or recall the number oftroops that were there at any one time, but manythousands.

So it was arranged that we would providewater. We could operate the canal, and wewould provide water for all these war industries,as well as Antioch and Pittsburgh, the militarycamps, and then further down by Port Chicagowas a municipal water service called CaliforniaWater Service Company, which was supplyingwater to oil refineries in the Martinez area. Iforget – there was an Associated refinery,Associated Oil Company, and a Shell refinery atMartinez, which they were supplying processwater, not cooling water, process water. ThenPG&E [Pacific Gas and Electric] came in andbuilt a steam generation plant there which alsoused water.

Operated the partiallycompleted Contra CostaCanal to provide waterto war industries

So we were heavily involved in providingwater in the Contra Costa Canal for the warindustries. So for that reason, we all receiveddeferments because we were involved with warindustries, and did this during those early waryears.

Deferred during WorldWar II because involvedin water supply

[Also in 1943, I began design studies ofthe distribution system to the lands served by that

In 1943 began study ofdistribution systems to

37

Kenneth F. Vernon

portion of the canal between pumping structuresNo. 1 and No. 3. This became a very complexproblem because most of this land wassubdivided and carved into 5 and 10 acre tractswith a few 20 and 40 acre ownerships. Cropswere mainly orchard, grapes and small grain.

irrigated acreages

In projects serving unowned public landsthe Bureau’s policy was to deliver water to thehigh point of each 160 acre quarter section andlet the farmer work out his internal distributionsystem. This policy proved to be unworkablehere because of the numerous small ownerships.

Small acreagespresented special policyissues

Also because of the light sandy loamysoils, this distribution system was going to beconcrete pipes. Therefore, in agreement with theIrrigation District, the pipeline system wouldhave a delivery point on each ownership, but notnecessarily on the high point. It would be up tothe farmer or owners to provide his own internaldistribution system. Because of the slope of theground away from the canal toward the Bay andits uneven topography, some sections of thepipeline would be under considerable hydraulicpressure, so that special designs of outlets wouldbe required to prevent high pressure “spouting”of the outlets. Some of the pressure reliefstandpipes were going to be 20 to 30 feet tall.]

The distribution systemwas to be concrete pipe

Now I'll take up the Delta-MendotaCanal. Mr. Boden was also the [DivisionEngineer]. His division also included thesurveys [and] planning for the Delta-MendotaCanal, and George Imrie, I-M-R-I-E, GeorgeImrie was set up as the engineer in charge of thesurveys for the Delta-Mendota Canal.

Work on the Delta-Mendota Canal

George Imrie supervisedconstruction on theDelta-Mendota

I reviewed a lot of the structure designsfor the Delta-Mendota Canal and cost estimates,still staying in Antioch because that was ourheadquarters, but I was not directly involved in

Did structure design onDelta-Mendota Canal

38


the field operations of the Delta-Mendota Canal.

Also we were studying the Delta CrossChannel. Our preferred solution was to takewater out of the Sacramento River at a locationnear the town of Hood and conduct it through acompletely separate channel through the deltaarea or around the delta area, and deliver it to theheadwater of the Delta-Mendota Canal pumpingstation.6

Studying the DeltaCross Channel

There were a number of advantages inthis. For one, it did not mix Sacramento Riverwater with delta water. One of the studies that Iconducted while I was at Antioch was arecordation of the encroachment of the salinityprism in the delta. And we knew that during thefall years when irrigation deliveries were high,[during] the summer and fall years [seasons], andthe stream flows were low, the tidal prismcarrying salt water would encroach into the deltaarea. And at times it would get so salty in thedelta that the irrigators would have to stop theirirrigation pumping because [of the] it was high-value of crops which had a low tolerance forsalinity.

The advantages ofbuilding a canal todeliver freshSacramento River waterto the Delta-MendotaCanal

So our preferred solution was to conductthe water around the delta delivering water intovarious channels into the delta which could thenbe measured and maintained at a discrete flow sowe knew where water was going.

The state, however, preferred to dump theSacramento River water into the maze of thedelta channels and let it find its way to theheadwaters of the Delta-Mendota Canal. Ourestimate for the Delta Cross Channel back in thelate 1930s was $4 million.

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 2. APRIL 24, 1995.BEGINNING OF SIDE 2, TAPE 2. APRIL 24, 1995.

39

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: The Delta Cross Channel Canal.

Vernon: The Delta Cross Channel. The state plan was tojust dump the water from the Sacramento Riverinto the maze of delta channels, and let it find itsway to the headwaters of the Delta-MendotaCanal.

Our preferred plan was to carry the wateraround the delta in a channel which could thendeliver discrete quantities of water into thevarious channels of the delta, and we couldcontrol – we would have positive control overthe encroachment of the salinity prism.

Storey: Is another name for this the Peripheral Canal?

Vernon: Yeah, the Peripheral Canal. It's the greatestmistake that was made in the project.

Storey: Not doing that?

Vernon: Not to have built it. Not to have built it. Because it introduced so damn many problems,and then Fish and Wildlife got into it becausethey – well let's see, we'll take it up in the properorder. I want to be careful. I don't want toaccuse the state of things which aren't true,because I'm depending on my recollection.

At any rate, the state felt that our estimateof $4 million was too expensive, and that theirscheme could be done for much less cost andwould be practical and would ameliorate theencroachment of the salinity prism, but had noreal control over it. So the state plan was the onethat was accepted, and a control structure at theheadwaters delivering water out of theSacramento River into a short channel into thedelta maze.

I reviewed all the structure designs for

40


our estimate on the Delta Cross Channel, and feltfairly confident that what we were proposing wasan adequate solution.

In the summer of 1942, a young mancame to us from the Colorado River Dam inTexas, a chap by the name of Ed Heinnemann,H-E-I-N-N-E-M-A-N-N. Ed was a verypersonable chap, good engineer, and felt that hewas not being utilized to his full extent in ouroperations in Delta Division, particularly becauseof the war. Apparently he had connectionselsewhere, and he transferred into Washingtonduring either late '42 or '43 – early '43.

Ed and I got along very well. He was inmy group. In the fall of 1943, I got a personalletter from Ed saying that due to the newregionalization organization of the Bureau, hisboss, Mr. Wesley Nelson, Engineering Assistantto the Commissioner, was moving to Amarillo asdirector of Region V.7 Since Mr. Nelson wastaking most of his staff from Washington withhim, Ed's slot in Washington would be open, andwould I be interested.

Ed Heinnemannsuggests Vernon moveto the Washington, D.C.,office

My wife and I discussed the situation. We were happy in California, but we felt alsothat there were problems during the wartime inCalifornia, and things would be a slow time, andperhaps a move to Washington would be veryexhilarating.

So I wrote Ed back saying, well, “yeah,but I owed some allegiance to the people out herein California, and any such transfer would haveto be obviously cleared through the ChiefEngineer in Denver and Mr. Young and Mr.Boden.”

By this time I think I had arrived at theglorious rank of Associate Engineer P-3, and the

41

Kenneth F. Vernon

job in Washington would be a P-4 – Engineer P-4.

Storey: What kind of salary are we talking about? Doyou remember?

Vernon: Well, yeah. P-3 was $3,200. I'd gotten up to$3,200. P-4 was $3,800. A P-4 was ajourneyman engineer. He was capable of doingeverything. It's like a captain in the military,you're decorated as a field grade officer, a major. When you became a P-5, you now had a squad or[in Reclamation] a section. A P-6, you had asection, and a P-7, you had a division. So P-4was a qualified engineer.

Salary in 1942-1943

Storey: So it would have been section, then branch, thendivision, even in those days?

Vernon: No, no. Well let's see, back in those days – no,back in those days, the Bureau was strictlyDenver and Projects. The closest thing toregionalization was the way the Central ValleyProject had been set up. Perhaps I should havediscussed this in some detail, because it servedme greatly in my later life.

Storey: I'd like that.

Vernon: Mr. Young was the Supervising Engineer inSacramento, with a small staff. Then thedivisions were the Shasta Division with ShastaDam, the Delta Division with the transferfacilities, and the Friant Division with FriantDam and the Friant-Kern Canal. Oscar Bodenwas also a consultant to relocation of the Friant-Kern Canal because he was the canals guy.

Brief overview of theorganization of theCentral Valley Project

At any rate, Denver insisted on havingdirect access to the division offices. Sacramentowas our supervisors. They maintained programcontrol, which is the closest way to describe it.

Relationship ofSacramento to Denver

42


They had the budgets, they kept the records, theykept the financial records, they divvied out themoney between the divisions. And like theCabots and the Lodges, Walker Young couldspeak to God, Mr. Walters, the Chief Engineer.(laughter)

At any rate, that worked very well. Theonly problem was, at times Sacramento wouldget felt [feel] left out, as I did sometimes withDenver when I became Regional Director. I'dget handed a package that Denver had cooked up,and then I had to finance it out of a clear sky. (laughter). So Sacramento kind of felt the sameway. [Tape recorder turned off]

Storey: Denver and the regions and so on.

Vernon: We could deal directly with Denver. Wheneverwe would come up with a structure location, Iwould come up with a preliminary design. Wewould send in detailed topography at thestructure sites. We'd send in our thoughts on thesubject, give them a sketch design, and theycould do with it as they pleased, and did. Thenour problem was after we would get it back, we'dhave to tailor it to fit conditions as theydeveloped during the construction process. So Iworked both the preliminary and the finalizingof the contract drawings, as adjustments to thecontract or what we called the change ordersduring construction.

“I would come up with apreliminary design. Wewould send in detailedtopography [and] . . . ourthoughts on the subject,give them a sketchdesign, and they coulddo with it as theypleased, and did. Then .. . we'd have to tailor itto fit conditions. . .”

Storey: So it was all designed . . .

Vernon: In Denver. It was all designed in Denver.

Storey: Did they come out and look at the sites?

Vernon: No. No, we'd send them a detailed topography. Would you like a soft drink?

43

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: No. That's what this is. Thank you.

Vernon: I've got some in the refrigerator.

Storey: Would you like something to drink?

Vernon: No, no.

They would come up with their designs,and then always in the designs, particularly withrelation to foundations, they would always havenote "as directed in the field." In other words, asyou opened up the site, you might have to adjust,like on bridge foundations, you might have toredesign the depth of the wall that would godown to the footing. That sort of thing. Wenever really tampered with the structure designitself, but basically tailored the structure to fit thefoundation conditions as they showed up in thefield. That was our function in the field.

In the field we wouldtailor the structure tosuit the field conditions.

Then also we would come up with thecontract pay quantities, and then would send thecontract pay vouchers up to Sacramento to makethe payments, the contract payments. And alsowith Denver, we had such a thing as was calledan engineering work order, and before we woulddefine a contract, we would come up with thelimits of a canal section and what it included. Then we would work up a preliminary costestimate which we'd send to Denver to get anengineering work order number. Theneverything related to that contract would berelated to that engineering work order. It wasEngineering Work Order and Authority forWork. It's utilized in many forms in manyengineering and construction organizations, butit's basically the way management controlsthings, the parceling out of the money and thatsort of thing. You don't just get a pot full ofmoney, you've got to account for it.

Worked on figuring whatpayments should bemade on contracts

Worked on preliminarycost estimates

44


In the government system, you get anappropriation, then that's divvied out throughvarious authorizations. Then the finance [office]sets up, you set up your accounts, then when youfirst decide you're going to do something, youmake what's called an encumbrance. It meansyou're going to use this amount of money. Youdon't really tie it down, but you're kind of settingaside this amount of money to finance thatoperation. So you make an encumbrance. It'sstill fluid. Then when you [set up] let a contract– I can't recall the term. It escapes me for aminute, the encumbrance. Then you actuallymake an [allocation] assignment, you actually tiethose funds to that activity, they are now tied toit. You've got to go through the whole process ifyou want to untie it.

How money iscommitted toconstruction

Then when you let a contract, then it'sobligated. Obligation. When you set up acontract, then you obligate the funds for thatcontract. Then the last process is for them tomake payment vouchers. So you've got theencumbrance, [allocation,] obligation, paymentvoucher.

Denver would get involved in theEngineering Work Order and Authority forWork. Sacramento was involved in the handlingof the funds, the encumbrance, the obligation,funds on the payment, payment of obligations ascontracts payments came due. So Sacramentowas the management end of the field operations,but Denver insisted on having directrelationships with the field divisions. And iteliminated one step in a process, for Sacramentoreally didn't need to get involved in, except theyneeded to be kept involved in what the costswere going to be. Because as I found out when Iwas Regional Director when Denver handed mea couple of packages, I wished to hell I'd known[about them] it previously. (laughter)

Relationship of Denverand the regions to theconstruction process

45

Kenneth F. Vernon

So I got this letter talking about movingto Washington. The next thing I knew, out of aclear blue sky, comes a cable direct from theCommissioner's office, "Transfer KennethVernon to Washington first availabletransportation."

Transferred toWashington, D.C.

Boden comes out [of his office] awaywith this thing and says, "What the hell is this,Ken? What the hell have you done to me now?"

I says, "My God." So I told him, I said,"Listen, I had this letter from Ed. He said this iswhat was happening, and would I be interested. So I wrote back and said, well, yeah, sure I'minterested, but you've got to clear it through theroutines. And I fully expected you to be askedwould you release me." I said, "I didn't reallyhave anything to talk about because I didn't knowI was going to be asked." Well at any rate, heheld that against me for a long time.

So I was sent into Washington then, inDecember of 1943, and assigned to theEngineering Assistant to the Commissioner'soffice. Mr. Nelson had then departed, and EdHeinnemann and – oh, yes, we had another guynamed Giles had departed for Amarillo, and aman named Louis Douglass, D-O-U-G-L-A-S-S– I always remember his name ended in adouble-S, had come in from Denver to be thenew Engineering Assistant Commissioner, and Iwas assigned to him to work with him as hisassistant.

In December of 1943became EngineeringAssistant in theCommissioner’s Office

Worked for LouisDouglass

We had two primary assignments at thetime. One was the processing of applicationsfrom Denver down to the War Production Boardfor priorities, and the other was working withwhat was then called the Tripartite Agreement,which was an agreement between the Corps ofEngineers, the Civil Division of the Corps of

Worked on priorities atthe War ProductionBoard on the TripartiteAgreement

46


Engineers, the Department of Agriculture. No,not the Department of Agriculture, but theFederal Power Commission, and Bureau ofReclamation, because this is a whole differentstory, a whole different can of worms.

And so we kept busy processing theseapplications from Denver. We were doing several thingsat Reclamation at the time. We were directly tied inwith the war effort. There was Unit N8, Nevada Unit 8,at the Hoover Dam.

Worked on gettinggeneration unit N8 atHoover in operation

Storey: N8 would have been a generator?

Vernon: Yeah, the generator, N8, generator N8 at HooverDam. There was the movement of the Shastagenerator, which was scheduled to go to Shasta,[but was sent] up to Grand Coulee Dam, becausethe Shasta generator was available, was beingmanufactured, [and] but the Coulee generatorswouldn't be available for some time. And N8 atHoover was required for the aircraft industry inSouthern California, so it had very high priority.

N8 was to provide powerto the aircraft industry insouthern California

Storey: Why would you move a generator to GrandCoulee for Southern California airplanes?

Vernon: No, I was just going to come up with what wasinvolved in the transfer of Shasta unit to Coulee. There was the thing called the Hanford EngineerWorks [close to Grand Coulee Dam]. We neverknew what it was. All we knew was, if wewalked down to the War Production Board with apaper that was labeled Hanford Engineer Works,they'd give you the place, anything you needed. "Take two of them, take three, take a lot."

Transferred a generatingunit from Shasta toGrand Coulee

Coulee provided powerto the Hanford EngineerWorks

We later learned that it was the HanfordDiffusion Plant for the atomic energy, plutoniumplant, but all we knew was the Hanford EngineerWorks. [As] and so they needed the power forthe processing of the plutonium, and [as] so that

47

Kenneth F. Vernon

was the only way they could get power in ahurry, was to take the unit from Shasta and moveit to Grand Coulee instead. We had to revampGrand Coulee to do it, but I've forgotten what therating was then, but it gave them someimmediate power there, then later the GrandCoulee unit started coming on in later stages. But the initial stage was to get power into theHanford Engineer Works. [Tape recorder turnedoff]

Storey: About Hanford.

Vernon: Yes, we had talked about Hanford, and I said thatas an Engineering Assistant to theCommissioner, we had two jobs. One,processing applications and chasing themthrough the War Production Board, and the otherone was the association between the Corps ofEngineers, the Civil Works Division of the Corpsof Engineers, the Federal Power Commission,and the Bureau of Reclamation.

Now, this is a very complex subject, andsome of this is speculation on my part, but Mr.[Harold L.] Ickes was Secretary of the Interior,and he was also the Head of the TVA, theTennessee Valley Authority, although themanagement of the Tennessee Valley Authoritywas somewhere in Tennessee, but they worked orreported through Secretary Ickes.

Secretary Ickes favored the idea ofregional authorities because he was pleased withthe record that the TVA had made in developingthe resources of the Tennessee Valley Authority. So he had established some divisions in theDepartment which were looking forward to thedevelopment of other valley authorities.

Secretary Harold Ickesliked the idea of regionalauthorities like TVA

One of the elements of that would be theBureau of Reclamation, the designing capacity,

There were manyadvocates for regional

48


the engineering capacity of the Bureau ofReclamation. Also, the RooseveltAdministration, parts of it, was in favor of thedevelopment of regional authorities, so thebudget bureau was mixed up in it. And alsothere was the St. Louis Post Dispatch. It wasbeing very strong toward the Missouri ValleyAuthority, as well as other media people werepromoting a Columbia Valley Authority, aCentral Valley Authority, and Southwest PowerAuthority, and so on, and so on. So this wasquite a movement going on.

river basin authorities

Well now, it was my reaction that the oldline-agencies weren't all that much in favor. They were less than enthusiastic about valleyauthorities. So the Corps of Engineers, theBureau of Reclamation, and the Federal PowerCommission sort of banded together and decidedthat they needed to set up some sort of acountervailing program which would try toaccomplish nearly as much as, say, a valleyauthority would do.

The TripartiteAgreement wasdesigned to counteractthe tendency to regionalauthorities

Lou Douglass was the representative ofthe Commissioner of Reclamation at themeetings of the Tripartite Agreement, but hedecided early on after just a few months that theWashington maelstrom was not his cup of tea. He liked to know what he was going to do today,tomorrow, and next week. But that hecticactivity in Washington, you never knew whatyou were going to do in the next fifteen minutes. So he saw an opportunity to transfer as anAssistant Regional Director at Region III toBoulder City.

So it wasn't too long after I had arrived inWashington, had been formally transferred intoWashington – first I was there on detail, then Iwent back to California, then I moved my familyinto Washington. And then not too long after I

49

Kenneth F. Vernon

was formally transferred into Washington, Loutransferred to Boulder City and I became ActingEngineering Assistant to the Commissioner.

And during that time after that, theagencies decided they needed to bring in theDepartment of Agriculture and its variousagencies. So that developed the QuadripartiteAgreement, which contained the other three pluselements of the Department of Agriculture. Andthis met rather regularly, talking aboutcoordination of programs, trying to eliminateduplication of effort. But also in the meantime,you always kept your powder dry. We kept ourbacks covered because we'd never know whenyou'd get a stab in the back from one of the otheragencies. (laughter) In other words, there was abit of competition going on, and each guy wastrying to protect his turf.

Quadripartite Agreement

In the QuadripartiteAgreement “We kept ourbacks covered becausewe'd never know whenyou'd get a stab in theback from one of theother agencies.”

Harry Bashore was then theCommissioner. John Page had died and HarryBashore had become Commissioner, and he wasthe only man that Oscar Boden was afraid of. Harry Bashore had been the Project Engineer onthe North Platte Project, had gone through all thetrials and tribulations of the development of theNorth Platte Project, then he had been theConstruction Engineer of the Seminoe Dam inWyoming. And then he somehow became theCommissioner of Reclamation. He was a sterntaskmaster, and he had a way about him thatwould challenge you very severely on any ideayou proposed. Basically, he wanted to knowhow well you had thought it out, and he'dchallenge you very severely.

Harry Bashore becamethe Commissioner

I had worked under Oscar Boden, andthis was old home week to me because afterbeing chewed out about that damn estimate onthe Contra Costa Canal, I wasn't really afraid ofanybody after I had done my homework. So

Commissioner Bashoreliked to use him forspecial tasks

50


Harry took a liking to me, and he used to call mein for all kinds of things. I got involved in allkinds of things that he would want done that – itwas completely strange to me because I had beenin Denver, yes, I had been in the Delta Divisionof the Central Valley Project, but I forgot thatthere was this whole world of Reclamation goingon that I knew nothing about.

And people would come in to him withsome kind of complaint about some damn projectout in Podunk, and he'd call me up and say,"What's this all about, Vernon?"

"I don't know, Harry. I gotta find out."

So I'd beat the files to death trying to findout what was going on and what was theproblem. And there was some real tough nuts in what then became Region I in the Snake RiverValley, and there were some other ones I gotinvolved in.

Well, at any rate, I used to representHarry at this quadripartite meeting. Then theagencies decided what we needed was to do wasformalize the arrangement, and so with theBureau of the Budget's agreement, we set upwhat was called the FIARBC, Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee, [knowncolloquially and pronounced as “FIREBRICK”]FIARBC. That met regularly. But that discussedthe whole area. Then the FIARBC decided thatsince the Missouri Valley – I'm jumping ahead alittle bit because there was the Flood Control Actof '44 and appropriations for the Missouri Valley,but later the FIARBC decided what we neededwas a Missouri Basin Interagency Committeewhich would be composed of representatives ofthe four main departments plus five of the tengovernors, and then [for] to balance out webrought in the Department of Commerce. So

FIARBC established as aformal arrangementexpanding theQuadripartite Agreement

Missouri BasinInteragency Committeeestablished

51

Kenneth F. Vernon

there were representatives of five Federalagencies and representatives of five governors,which was then the Missouri River Basin Inter-Agency Committee.

Storey: And the acronym for FIARBC is?

Vernon: Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee. I've got it here – F-I-A-R-B-C and IMBIAC. Then there also became an IMBAC, InteriorMissouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee.(laughter) It's the whole damn structure here ofthe agencies, see, to counterbalance this move forthe valley authorities. And what the Bureau ofthe Budget was doing was fomenting contestsbetween the various agencies to create whatappeared to be conflicts of interest andinefficiencies of operations, etc., anything youwanted to call it, which would ultimately [help]result in the establishment of the valley authority,which would then coalesce all this stuff andmake it efficient, you see, just like the TVA.

These interagencycommittees weredesigned to counteractregional authorities

Well, all right, now getting back. Afterwe set up FIARBC, the war was over, and therehad been a gentleman down at the WarProduction Board named John Dixon, who wasan ex-Corps of Engineers engineer in the CivilWorks [Division], and apparently the Bureauthought a great deal [of] about him because theydealt with him on war projects. They broughthim over then as Engineering Assistant to theCommissioner, and I dropped back to myposition as his Assistant. So Dixon then tookover, then, the activities with FIARBC, then alsohe was given the charge of designing a planningdivision, Branch of Project Planning inWashington, moving the Branch of ProjectPlanning, which had been in Denver, intoWashington. So I assisted him in setting up theorganization for the Branch of Project Planningin Washington.

John Dixon is brought into be EngineeringAssistant to theCommissioner and torun the activities ofFIARBC

52


So as that was going on, then, Bill Warne,who was the Assistant Commissioner that Ireported to, called me in, said, "I've got a new jobfor you, Vernon."

And this was in '45. No, this was fall '44. It was during the consideration of Flood ControlAct of '44.

Storey: Which authorized Pick-Sloan Missouri BasinProgram.

Vernon: Yes, right, yes. And also, I mentioned there, Igot involved to a degree in the –


Storey: This is Brit Storey with Kenneth Vernon. This isTape three, on April 24, 1995. Go ahead.

Vernon: I'm kind of overlapping here. There's severalactivities that were intermixed, and it's a littledifficult to take them in continuity, but as well asthe FIARBC thing and the Flood Control Act of'44, I was also involved with, to some degree,with the hydrologic studies that were involvedwith the treaty with Mexico, the 1944 treaty withMexico. Particularly involved there was thequestion of whether the United States wouldagree to share water supply with Mexico.

Involved in thehydrologic studiesrelated to the treaty withMexico of 1944

Some of the studies were related to thequantity of water which might be delegated ordesigned to be received by Mexico, and whatwaters that might be under the Colorado RiverCompact in the United States, and the degree towhich some of them might be return flows fromsome of the projects which might have someserious salinity problems. So these were rathercomplex studies that I was involved in, butRandy Ryder was the chief on that and did most

53

Kenneth F. Vernon

of the analysis and thought process. I merelymostly crunched numbers.

So we get up near the fall of 1944, I wasstill Acting Assistant Engineering Assistant tothe Commissioner, and the Flood Control Act of1944 was being considered by the Congress forauthorization. Basically it was in the WarDepartment's authorization bill, because [MajorGeneral Lewis A.] Pick [Corps of Engineers] hadcome up with a scheme for mainstream dams onthe Missouri River and navigation and floodcontrol on the Lower Missouri River south ofOmaha.

Flood Control Act of1944 and the Pick-SloanMissouri Basin Program

Reclamation interests in the Upper Basinwere concerned because they were afraid thatdedication of this water for navigation channel inthe lower river might foreclose irrigationdevelopment in the Upper Basin. Reclamationhad put Glenn Sloan in planning irrigationactivities in the Upper Basin above Omaha,including the Republican, the Platte, all thetributaries up through the Dakotas, theYellowstone, and the Upper Missouri. He hadcome up with what became Senate Document#191, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, might havebeen 97th or 98th Congress, 2nd Session, whichwas introduced into the War Department's[authorization] appropriations bill as theO’Mahoney-Milliken8 Amendment whichauthorized the Reclamation plan for theconservation control and utilization of the waterresources and land resources of the MissouriBasin.

This was under floor debate in the Senateabout mid-November of 1944. I got a call fromthe Commissioner's office one day to come up,and Harry Bashore told me, he said, "Vernon,we've got all the brass around here are going togo out to Denver to a big meeting, and you're “. . . you're going to be

54


going to be the senior engineer in theCommissioner's office and you're going to bedelegated as Acting Commissioner." (laughter) And then he said, "Your instruction is not to do adamn thing." (laughter) Which deflated my egoto no end. Here I was a young engineer, ActingCommissioner of Reclamation. He said, "Icleared it with the Secretary and told theSecretary, the Secretary of the Interior, not to putany big load on you while this debate's going on,but to clear everything through Ken Cheadle, theChief Counsel of Reclamation."

delegated as ActingCommissioner." (laughter) And then hesaid, "Your instructionis not to do a damnthing."

I'll always remember during the heat ofthe debate, a request came down from the Hill fora report from Reclamation on some particularitem which Mr. Cheadle prepared and Itransmitted up through the Secretary to theSenate committee. The next thing I knew –correction. I sent [it] up to the Secretary to betransmitted to the Senate committee, but theSecretary had a grammarian on his staff whoreviewed everything for grammar which wentbefore Mr. Ickes, and Mr. Ickes had a love affairwith the preposition that. The more “thats” youcould work into something, the better he liked it. And so Mr. Cheadle's memorandum bouncedback from the Secretary's grammarian because itdidn't have a particular “that” in there. SoCheadle delivered himself a hot memorandumback to the Secretary which had five or seven“thats” strung in a line. It was a jewel ofcomposition. Let me see if I can put it together. "Because of that that ‘that’ that that man wanted,that almost lost the battle." (laughter)

Secretary Harold Ickesloved the prepositionthat

Storey: "Because of that ‘that,’that that that manwanted."

Vernon: "That that 'that' man –." (laughter) Cheadle wasa student of the Harvard [U.S. Supreme Court]Justice--what was his name? [Felix] Frankfurter,

55

Kenneth F. Vernon

he was a student of Frankfurter. Oh, he was asharp attorney. My God, he was a jewel to workwith.

Well, any rate, so we got that "that" inthere, and it went on up. And then theauthorization bill was passed which authorizedthe [initial] additional stages for Reclamation,authorized the initial stages of what became theMissouri River Basin Project for Reclamation –Interior.

Initial authorization ofthe Pick-Sloan MissouriBasin Program

Right after that, in Denver, when theappropriation bill was passed, then theCommissioner held a big meeting in Denver withall the people from Region VI and also RegionVII. I'll pick up how Region VII got developed,but by that time Region Seven had beendeveloped, which[.] I think I should digress rightnow and drop back and develop how Region VIIgot developed.

Storey: Tell me how the regions got developed, to start. You were in Washington, right?

Vernon: Well, the whole thing got started, this is as far asmy knowledge is concerned, again it goes backto the Roosevelt Administration and the desire toreproduce the equivalence of the TennesseeValley Authority. Whether it was the NationalPlanning Resources Board which the RooseveltAdministration had had before the war – I don'tknow whether you know about the NationalResources Planning board – but there wasRexford Tugwell in the Department ofAgriculture, the Dust Bowl, and God knows whatelse was going on just immediately before thewar, and the TVA had made a real splash.

Development of regionsat Reclamation

And so somewhere it was decided thatmaybe we should move toward some form ofintermediate step of government between

The regions werecreated partially toforestall creation ofregional development

56


Washington and states, and this would be thisregional development authority, giving it [an]authority concept which would give it [corporate]powers to do things which might not be in theold-line governments, maybe the states wouldn'thave it, but you could coalesce a lot of thingsinto this regional authority then, which gave it acorporate body and law which let it do things. Like one guy said, do everything but declare warand coin money. (laughter)

authorities like the TVA

At any rate, my knowledge [is sketchy]. Iwas still in the Central Valley Project [when]regionalization was developed, but we were onlysix regions, and it made not a great deal ofdifference to us out on the Central ValleyProject, because basically, the Central ValleyProject became Region II, with headquarters inSacramento. I don't remember whether WalkerYoung, he was the first Regional Director ofRegion II,9 or whether he had moved into Denverand become Chief Engineer and someone elsehad become – I think someone else had beenappointed Director of Region II, who was not aReclamationist, but had knowledge and skills inareas other than specifically Reclamation. I don'tknow whether he was a journalist or aneconomist. I just don't recall. I don't even recallhis name.

But it didn't make a great deal ofdifference to us in what became Region II,because fundamentally it was going to beoperated the same as we'd been operating as theCentral Valley Project.

Storey: I show Regional Director Charles Carey and thenRichard Boke.

Vernon: Carey. Boke followed Carey. Carey was thefirst one, Carey was the guy. He had differentskills, he came from a different field of endeavor,

57

Kenneth F. Vernon

but he apparently was a pretty good administratorbecause I didn't have any real [but I didn’t haveany real knowledge] – I left before he really gotinto it as I went to Washington.

The first step was, they set up six regions. Columbia Basin was Region I, with the SnakeRiver. Region II was California with the CentralValley as the head, and then Southern California.

Originally there were sixregions

Storey: Southern Oregon? Southern California?

Vernon: Did it include Southern Oregon? KlamathRiver?

Storey: Later it was Klamath. I don't know whether itwas originally.

Vernon: I don't know what it was initially, and some ofthose details escape me. Then there was RegionIII, which was the Lower Colorado, and RegionIV was the Upper Colorado. Region V wasbasically the Rio Grande, and Texas, NewMexico.

Storey: So that would have been Amarillo?

Vernon: Had headquarters in Amarillo, and that's whereWes Nelson went. Then Region VI included allof the tributaries of the Missouri River [includingthe Platte River] down to Omaha.

Storey: Out of Billings?

Vernon: Out of Billings. Then one day when I was stillacting as Assistant Engineering Assistant to theCommissioner, Harry Bashore called me in andsaid – this is one of those odd jobs that I wouldget out of a clear blue sky. He said, "We'regetting a lot of pressure from the politicians outthere in Nebraska and Colorado. They think theyought to have a region of their own. So I'm

Creation of a seventhregion for Reclamation

58


delegating you and another engineer named CecilJacobson to come up with what might be called aRegion VII based on Denver."

So we studied the situation, and decidedthat the southern boundary ought to be somethingto do with the Arkansas River. There was aproject being considered, the what was called theGun-Ark, which was the Gunnison, ArkansasTrans-Basin Diversion. Waters from theGunnison River would be trans-basin divertedthrough the Continental Divide and dumped intoheadwaters of the Arkansas River. So we feltthat that ought to be included in the Coloradoactivity, but that as you went down the ArkansasRiver, you changed from basically arid territoryto more rain-fed farming and drainage.

A Gunnison-Arkansasdiversion wasconsidered in Colorado

So we decided that we ought to divide thedivision between potential Region VII andRegion V somewhere along the mid-range of theArkansas River which would be below any [aridland] irrigation, but above the rice irrigation anddrainage projects, flood control on the LowerArkansas.

But we left the decision of specificallywhere that division should be to the powers-that-be, but we clearly decided that the NiobraraRiver, which ran along the boundary betweenWyoming, Nebraska, and South Dakota, whichwas more associated with the sand hills ofNebraska, ought to be included in a potentialRegion VII. So then our recommendation orsuggestion for Region VII was beginning withthe Niobrara River on the north, including all ofthe Platte with its tributaries, and the upperreaches of the Arkansas. That would include theRepublican River and also some of the tributariesdown in Kansas. I don't recall all those things. I'm not that familiar, but the tributaries down inKansas where there might be irrigation.

59

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: And that would include Colorado-BigThompson?

Vernon: Yes, that would include the Colorado-BigThompson, and the power distribution from theBig Thompson. It would divide all the thingseast of the Divide, which was adopted. Andthere was some debate whether they would makeMcCook, Nebraska, the headquarters or Denverthe headquarters, but they finally decided tomake Denver the headquarters, which introducedsome problems, because there was anintermixture between Region VII activities andDenver [Office] activities. People were not veryhappy about it, but still, it seemed to work allright.

Region VIIheadquartered in Denver

Mr. [Erdman B.] Debler, who had beenthe Chief Planning Engineer of the Bureau, wasthe first Regional Director of Region VII, but hewas ready for retirement or thinking ofretirement, let's say. And when we really gotgoing in the Missouri Basin, it was decided in thefall of '46 that both Mr. Debler and Mr. [HaroldD.] Comstock, who were Regional Directors ofDenver and Billings, respectively, would retire,and that Avery Batson, who had been Debler'sAssistant, would be Regional Director of RegionVII, and I'd be transferred out to Billings asRegional Director of Region VI, but that's awhole different story which we'll get into in somedetail.

Personnel established inRegion VII

Transferred to Billingsas second regionaldirector in Region VI

So now we're up to this meeting inDenver, going back to this meeting in Denverafter the [Flood Control] Authorization Act [of1944].

Storey: This is when you had been told that you wereActing Commissioner, but you weren't to doanything.

60


Vernon: Yeah, not to do anything. Then immediatelyafter that, after the Commissioner got back toWashington, he decided now that the legislationhad been passed, we now had authority toproceed with the conservation control andutilization of resources of the Missouri Basin.

He decided to have a big comprehensiveprogram meeting in Denver, calling in all thepeople of authority from Denver and Region VIand Region VII. That's how I had to get intoRegion VII, because at that time Region VII hadbeen established, you see.

Storey: Before we go on, this act was actually passed?

Vernon: In the fall of 1944.

Storey: So this was the compromise between the Corpsof Engineers' plan?

Vernon: It was known colloquially as the Pick-SloanPlan, because the Pick element was the Corps ofEngineers plan, the mainstream dams for floodcontrol and navigation, including a diversionfrom the Garrison Reservoir into Central NorthDakota, which is whole new ball of wax we'll getinto later.

And then the Sloan Plan was thedevelopment of irrigation and power in theUpper Basin, including a diversion to NorthDakota from either Fort Peck or immediatelybelow Fort Peck to irrigate lands along theMissouri River in Montana, and then introducingwater into the northwestern corner of NorthDakota.

So by design, now this is speculation onmy part, and it has to be taken as speculationbecause I was on the receiving end, I don't knowhow it all happened, but I was on the receiving

Issues related toGarrison Reservoir

61

Kenneth F. Vernon

end of it – but they developed this contest, andthe "problem" of conflict between the old-lineagencies of the question of diversion to NorthDakota from Garrison or the question ofdiversion to North Dakota from below Fort Peck,and then to complicate the issue was at whatlevel would the Garrison Reservoir be operated,whether it be 1,830 or 1,850, because at the1,830 level it wouldn't affect the Buford-TrentonProject and lands around Williston [, NorthDakota].

Storey: That's the elevation of the reservoir?

Vernon: Yes, the 1,830 elevation. But at 1,830 it wouldn'taffect the lands of the Buford-Trenton Project atlands around Williston, but it would affect theefficiency and lift of the pumping station fromthe Garrison Reservoir over into lands of CentralNorth Dakota.

So the Bureau was whip-sawed one way,maybe to the 1,830 level, and the Corps waspromoting the 1,850 level, and this gaveeverybody a chance to really argue that theseagencies can never get together, and this createda need for an authority to resolve all theseconflicts, you understand.

Disagreement betweenReclamation and Corpsraised issues

Storey: A valley authority?

Vernon: A valley authority.

Storey: A Missouri Valley Authority?

Vernon: And the Post Dispatch really got onto that. Bythis time Harry Truman had become Presidentbecause of the death of Franklin Roosevelt, andhe was more or less in favor of a valley authoritybecause he'd seen what had been happening inthe Tennessee Valley, and he was well impressedwith it. Ickes was the major-domo of the

President Harry S.Truman appeared tofavor a Missouri RiverAuthority

62


Tennessee Valley Authority, because itresponded to him, and he responded to thePresident.

So there was quite a conflict going onthere, and this was why the old-line agenciesdecided they had to come up with this FIARBC,to show that there could be coordination amongthe agencies. So, you see, this is all interwoven. The St. Louis Post Dispatch, which was aPulitzer paper, was pumping valley authority forall they [had] got, and they assigned DickBonhoff as a reporter to follow all theseactivities. I've got his book The DammedMissouri Valley, which he inscribed to me, [he]they called me a "dam powerful friend" because Iwas very involved in the power program. Butwe'll get into that later.

The “old line” agenciescreated FIARBC to showthe agencies couldcoordinate their work

The St. Louis PostDispatch was pushing aMissouri ValleyAuthority

Storey: Now, why – in 1944, that was still wartime.

Vernon: Yes. One of the elements or objectives of takingthis flood control program of 1944 up was post-war planning, and something to bring the boyshome to, because it was known that the war wason its final stages and that we were going to havea great immigration of men again from the armedservices. The President wanted to have plansready to provide employment for the veterans. So there was quite a lot of post-war planninggoing on, and one of the deals was what could bedone with these basin development plans, theColumbia Basin, the Missouri Basin, theColorado Basin, the Rio Grande Basin. So thesethings were all boiling at this time, you see, inthe post-war effort – the post-war planning effort,I should say.

Planning for theMissouri River Basininvolved bringingAmerican servicemenhome to jobs

So that was when I was called in, after themeeting in Denver, which I somehow got to bethe secretary of that meeting and had to prepareall the reports coming out of it, and the main

Eleven initial projectswere selected for theMissouri Basin

63

Kenneth F. Vernon

substance of that meeting was a naming of elevenprojects which would be called the initial phaseof the Missouri Basin Development Project. From that naming of those projects, then later weworked out an appropriation to go before theCongress so we could begin activities on that.

Served as secretary ofthe planning meeting forthe Missouri Basin

As I say, I was the secretary of thatmeeting in Denver. Then after I had submittedall the reports and records of that meeting, oneday, this was in the spring of 1945, I was calledinto Bill Warne's office. He says, "I've got a newjob for you, Ken."

"Yeah, what's that?"

He says, "Well, we're going to set up anOffice of Progress Control, and I want you to setit up."

And Harry Bashore said, "You mean tosay we're making so [damn] much progress we'vegot to control it?" (laughter)

Asked to set up Office ofProgress Control

Well at any rate, so I got to set up anOffice of Progress Control, and this was with thehelp of the Bureau of the Budget, they wereinvolved in this, and they wanted to use us as away of getting control of the Civil WorksProgram of the Corps of Engineers which wasnationwide, and they figured our effort would besmall enough that they could tamper with it, fine-tune it, develop it as we went.

So I got promoted to be Acting ProgressControl Officer. So the first thing we had to dowas decide how we were going to controlprogress. So I designed an office and a staff, gotit cleared through the Civil Service Commission,started recruiting, brought people in from theoutside, brought people from Interior, inReclamation, and fundamentally what we set up

Became ActingProgress Control Officerand began to design astaff and office

64


was a program section, a program and schedulingsection, and an analysis section which recordedprogress, a recording section. I utilized that allthrough the rest of my career because I found outhow important it was to keep managementinformed as to what in the hell was going on, andwhat we were doing with the authorities we weregiven, and what administrative problems wewere bumping up against that neededadministrative attention.

So I got that office set up, and along thatline, about June 1945, one of my old colleaguesfrom the Central Valley Project, Mr. OliverFolsom [showed up.] He had been, before thewar, in a construction battalion, a reserveconstruction battalion, and he'd gotten picked upreal early in [the] putting together [of] the armedservices for the war. He wound up in NorthAfrica, went up through the Italy campaign, andthen he wound up in London in the planning for[Operation] Overlord, the invasion of Normandy.

Arranges for OliverFolsom to leave theArmy and work in hisoffice

But he had been brought back since theinvasion had occurred, and so there was no need[for him]. They were disbanding that operationin London. He had been brought back intoWashington, and was camped out in somecubbyhole in the Pentagon, and he came over[as] I was in the process of setting up this Officeof Progress Control. So I said, "Ollie, can youget [an early] out[;] or do you want to get out ofthe military? Are they doing anything with youover there?"

And he said, "No, not really." He said,"I'm just marking time 'til my number comes up,then I'll be discharged."

So I said, "Want me to see if I can get youan early out? I think I can because we're deeplyinvolved in post-war planning here, and the

65

Kenneth F. Vernon

military would be very interested in that."

So I managed to get him out, and he cameover, and I put him into that program inscheduling. We designed this system which – wewanted something that would attract people'sattention. Fundamentally, we drew upon a fewthings which the military had developed duringthe war – the critical path method and the – Iforgot what the other one was.

At any rate, you program linearly, youstart out with an objective. Here's where youwant to be. Then you feed backwards with allthe things that you have to do and who's got to dothem. And then you tie together all the thingsthat interact as you go along. Then you work outa critical path. That's the critical path method. But this had never been done –

Began to use a criticalpath method in trackingReclamation work


Storey: You were saying that the critical path methodhad been used by the military, but not, evidently,in civilian applications.

Vernon: No, not in civilian activities because the militarywas, shall we say, sort of a cardboard image. Itwas one-dimensional, to create war, but they hadto feed backwards into the logistical, clear backinto the production of the munitions andmanpower, and so on, and so on. But it was allto a single objective of war, making war, whereasresource development involves not onlyconstruction and planning activities, constructionactivities, but involves legal aspects, workingwith local governments, state governments, legalentities, and becomes a very complex issue. Itbecomes very intertwined, and you have to workyour way through all of these things, and youfind that one particular action in one of these

66


lines over here may be holding up a whole seriesof actions somewhere else because you can'tmove until this has been approved.

What we found out was our legal eagleswere the smallest neck of the biggest bottlearound. One of the early improvements we cameup with was by focusing Denver's attention onthe award of construction contracts. We reducedthe time, or Denver reduced the time, of award ofa contract from about six months to less thanthirty days by utilization of the idea that themilitary had developed of the “Intent to Award”a contract.

Legal reviews were abottleneck

Time required for awardof contracts wasreduced from sixmonths to thirty days

After you had taken bids and [everything]seemed to be in order, you could issue a letter ofintent which said, literally, provided all of thethings in your bid come out okay, you can startorganizing, arranging your financing, and we willaward you the contract. So Denver then, over thestrong objection of our legal department, startedissuing letters of intent, and reducing the time toaward a contract, and we got things under way ina hurry.

The one division of the organization wehad the biggest trouble with, with getting them toprogram anything, was the legal division,because they weren't accustomed to workingagainst a deadline. They'd take something andstick it under the bottom of the pile, and when itfloated to the top, they'd stick it under the bottomof the pile again. The problems were not theconstruction contracts that were holding thingsup, [it was] as well as the construction contracts,were the entering into repayment contracts withirrigation districts because that was a long,intense, and difficult negotiation.

The legal division wasn’tused to working withdeadlines

So we found that as we startedprogramming this thing out, that many times the

The office focused onidentifying those thingswhich were holding up

67

Kenneth F. Vernon

achievement of a repayment contract with anirrigation district just held up the whole damnprogram. So by programming all these activitiesout and focusing on the actions which wereholding other subsequent actions up, andreporting to the Commissioner regularly whatwas holding up an action on a particular project,he could then focus his administrative power ongetting things [done] on law, and it worked outvery well.

projects

So I set up not only the office inWashington, but I got set up [a] Progress ControlOffice in Denver, then in all the regions. So thenin June 1946 or was it '45, '45, I held a – no itwas '46.

Storey: '45, the war would have been still on.

Vernon: It must have been '46, because I was into theprogram, the progress control thing. I held ameeting, I called all the regional officerstogether, all the control officers together, andDenver. We met in Salt Lake City for about tendays, and worked out this overall approach ofhow we were going to do this thing, and gotthese guys started in their regions. No it was '45,because in '46, then we held the firstcomprehensive Commissioner's program meetingwith the Secretary of the Interior.

In 1946 Commissionerheld a comprehensiveplanning meeting withthe Secretary of theInterior

So here I was in the midst of setting upthis Office of Progress Control, and Bill Warnecalled me into his office one day in the spring of'45, and said, "Ken, I've got another new job foryou." He said, "I'm handing you the MissouriRiver Basin Project. You've got to get this thingorganized, and the Department wants anorganized approach within the department. Andwhat we're going to do is, we're going to financetheir Missouri River Basin activities through theReclamation appropriation. You've got to go to

Bill Warne assignedVernon the job oforganizing the MissouriRiver Basin Project

68


all the departments, all the agencies in theDepartment, and get them to develop a programwhich will support a coordinated Missouri RiverBasin Project." And that's why he gave me thislittle squib at the bottom. [Showing anautographed picture of Bill Warne.]

Storey: On the bottom of the picture.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: "To Ken Vernon, who has been doing a series ofhard jobs well.” Dated April 16, 1946.

Vernon: And so what I did, I went to all these . . .

Storey: Now at that time he wasn't . .

Vernon: He was Assistant Commissioner . .

Storey: Of Reclamation.

Vernon: Of Reclamation. I reported directly to him. There was another Assistant Commissioner whohad construction and power. Bill had planningand operation and maintenance and basically anyeconomic studies, that sort of thing. He was anewspaperman, but he had a powerful mind, veryanalytical.

One thing I learned early on was never togo Mr. Warne and say, "Bill we've got aproblem," because he'd rear back and say, "Whatthe hell you mean 'we've' got a problem? You'vegot a problem. You come to me with suggestionsand solutions. I'll decide what we're going to do,but you've got the problem." (laughter) I sawhim rip one guy apart, just tore him into shreds,because he said to Mr. Warne, "Bill, we've got aproblem." He was an economist. Of course, as asidebar, I used to say to my economic staff, "Icould lay you guys end to end, you couldn't reach

Bill Warne never had aproblem

“I used to say to myeconomic staff, "I couldlay you guys end to end,you couldn't reach from

69

Kenneth F. Vernon

from here to a conclusion." (laughter) here to a conclusion."

At any rate, he said, "You've got to comeup with a coordinated program for theDepartment." It all aimed at a comprehensiveprogram which could be fed into a valleyauthority. It was all moving in that direction. Ofcourse, I was just on the periphery of it, youknow, but it's still important in its elements.

“It all aimed at acomprehensive programwhich could be fed intoa valley authority. It wasall moving in thatdirection.”

So I went to all the departments, andsome were really interested. For instance, theMissouri Basin includes a fantastic quantity ofbrown coal, and I had been involved in a seminarin which somehow or other I got assigned a studyof the coal reserves in the Missouri Basin. So Iwent to the Bureau of Mines and said, "Look. We're putting this program together. We'd likeyou to undertake a study of the coal resources inthe Missouri Basin. We know you're involved ina study of the [oil] coal shales."

Asked the Bureau ofMines to do a study ofcoal resources in theMissouri River Basin

Storey: Of the oil shales.

Vernon: Of the oil shales. "But here's another wholecomplete resource that you haven't really beendoing much with is the lignite resources in theMissouri Basin. There's trillions of tons outthere, and we need to know how they can bemade useful." Incidentally, the railroads use itnow, and they even talk about a slurry pipeline,and I don't know whether that was ever built ornot, because these things all came up.

At any rate, so we got the Bureau ofMines to set up a laboratory at the – I don'twhether it's the college or the agricultural collegeor the University of North Dakota at Fargo.10 Sowe financed through the Missouri Basin Projectin Reclamation, financing for the coal [oil shales]laboratory in Fargo, and we also financed asupplement to their oil shale laboratory in the

70


University of Wyoming.

Storey: Explain to me why Reclamation would beinterested in coal and oil shale reserves.

Vernon: Well, first off – and this is just speculation on mypart – first off, up here somewhere, somebody istrying to put something together and get theframework of something which ultimately couldbecome a comprehensive program in one entity.

Storey: Like the T-V-A?

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: Instead of having all these different agencies.

Vernon: Running around, knocking each other, fallingover each other.

Storey: Okay. You were postulating that that's what wasgoing on.

Vernon: Yes, I was postulating, but I didn't bother withthat. My assignment was come up with aprogram in Interior. I was handed the job ofcoming up with an Interior program financedthrough Reclamation. The reason it was financedthrough Reclamation is because we had themuscle to get the money, Q-E-D.

“I was handed the job ofcoming up with anInterior programfinanced throughReclamation.”

Storey: QED is?

Vernon: Quod erat demonstrandum [from EuclideanGeometry]. It means that which is demonstrated,we could demonstrate we had the muscle. (laughter).

So I went to the National Park Serviceand said, "Look. We're going to be building allthese reservoirs out there. Recreation has been abig thing in the TVA, but you guys got pushed

Approached NationalPark Service aboutdoing recreationdevelopment

71

Kenneth F. Vernon

out of it because TVA took over fishing andrecreational developments around reservoirs. What we'd like to do is have you come up with aprogram as we build these reservoirs, youcoming up with developments, recreationaldevelopments that could be around thereservoirs."

I made a study, after I got to be RegionalDirector, I made a study of what happened in theCentral Valley and introduced a lot of that intothe Missouri Basin.

But they said, "Oh, yeah, yeah, thatsounds pretty good." Because up to this point,the Park Service had been at odds withReclamation because they always felt we wantedto destroy the Grand Canyon with this diversionfrom the Central Valley Project [for the CentralArizona Project]. One of the studies I'd workedon when I was in Washington, I think it waswhen I was in Washington, was could we divertfrom the Grand Canyon somewhere to theCentral Arizona rather than taking out ofsomewhere down below and having to pump allthat water up as the Central Arizona Project doesnow. We found it was feasible, but the ParkService, geez, they really shuddered to think thatwe were going to tamper with the Grand Canyon. So they always felt that we were their enemy, buthere was a chance to introduce a whole newelement in their program of recreation.

Worked on a study tosee whether CentralArizona Project watercould be diverted in theGrand Canyon in orderto avoid the pumpingrequired if it wasremoved lower on theColorado River

The one I almost bent my pick on was theGeological Survey. The Geological Survey wasone of the older elements of the InteriorDepartment. Fundamentally their activities werehydrology and cadastral surveys, and they hadtheir program that they had been working on foryears. They were perfectly happy with it. Theyfelt that they'd been robbed of Reclamation,because initially Reclamation had been a part of

Approaches USGSabout participating inthe activity

72


the Geological Survey, and Major Powell, whobecame the first Commissioner, he was in part ofthe Geological Survey and made his trip downthrough the Grand Canyon.

Storey: He was the first Commissioner of the U.S.G.S.

Vernon: Oh, was he of G.S.? Oh, I didn't realize that. Ididn't know that.

Storey: I mean he was the first or the second one, I'veforgotten the – but not of Reclamation.

Vernon: Oh, he wasn't? That's how he got into it. At anyrate, they felt that somehow or other they'd beenrobbed of Reclamation because it had been a partof the G.S.

Storey: Yeah. That's very true.

Vernon: So I went up to them and I said, "Look. Youguys have got a program that's nationwide. Nowwe're going to start an intensive program here inthe Missouri Basin. First thing we need is animprovement of our hydrologic surveys, thedetail surveys, so we can get a better handle onthe water supplies that are available. In yourprogram, you'll never get around to that, but wecan finance an improved effort with that. Secondly, your mapping program. You'renationwide, and you'll get around to the nationultimately, but now we need a stepped-upprogram within the Basin to give us the mappingresources that we need to further our activities."

Approached USGSabout improvedmapping and hydrologicsurveys

Well they finally bought it, but theystruggled, but they finally bought it, and so theyultimately came up with emphasis on hydrologyin the Basin and cadastral mapping.

I went to the Fish and Wildlife Service. Now, I’d had some run-in before with Fish and

Problems working withthe Fish and Wildlife

73

Kenneth F. Vernon

Wildlife Service when I was acting asEngineering Assistant to the Commissioner, andit related to the Central Valley Project, and alsothe anadromous fishes [salmon] of the ColumbiaRiver Basin. They were concerned because theyfelt that our dams were blocking off theheadwaters of a lot of the streams which wereused as spawning areas for fish. The first guy Iwas assigned with to work in the Fish andWildlife Service was, he was a very strictgentleman of ichthyology, and he thoughtanything we thought of should be dead andburied immediately. I never could just getanywhere with him. Somehow we got the wordthrough that we needed someone else to workwith, and so they came up with another guy. Ican't remember his name, but he was a jewel towork with.

Service

What we did was analyze the problemson these river basins, and concluded that if damswere going to go forward, perhaps what weneeded to do was institute alternative methods ofhatching fish. In other words, fish hatcheries. And also, in order to be able to finance that, weneeded some new law which would give us thechance to ask for appropriations for Fish andWildlife activities in our appropriation. So heand I came up with what we called the 1944Treaty with Fish and Wildlife, and got someappropriation which gave them some authorityand gave us some authority to take care of someof these problems with fish, fish and wildlife.

Decided to use fishhatcheries to deal withsome of the issuesrelated to dams in theMissouri River Basin

So I went to them and I said also not onlythat fish hatchery, but around these reservoirs,there's upland game. And what you need wouldbe protection for – because we'll be destroyingthe lowlands for reservoirs, what we need isreplacement areas of brush and other growth thatwill provide cover for small game and wildlife. So they bought that. And so on down through

Suggested replacementareas for upland gamealso

74


the line.

So I came up with the idea of the InteriorMissouri River Basin Committee, and the firstchairman of that was Mills Bunger. I'd workedwith him earlier when I was in Denver, in theCanals Division, and he had come in with theplanning report, I think it was on the Gila RiverProject, and I had worked with him on preparinghis report for the Gila project. And also he wasthe guy that offered me the job of office engineeron the planning of the Colorado-Big Thom[psonProject in 1935].

“I came up with the ideaof the Interior MissouriRiver Basin Committee”

At any rate, he was the first chairman ofthe Interior Missouri Basin Committee, and alsowas the representative on the Missouri BasinInter-Agency Committee. So he represented allthe agencies. He theoretically represented theSecretary. We gave him authority, or he gotauthority from the Secretary for his activities. And then he would call meetings to review theactivities of the various agencies to make sure wewere all in lockstep together, and so on and so. So it came out to be quite a group here. You cansee the representatives of all the agencies there.[Showing a picture.]

Mills Bunger’s role invarious Missouri Basincommittees

Well, after about a year, it wasdetermined that Mills wasn't the man for that job,and he got interested in the River Jordan, andtransferred over into the Foreign Service or the, Iguess – I don't know whether he did that throughInterior or Reclamation or whether he transferredover to State, but he became a [U. S.]representative on the River Jordan and thedifficulties between Israel and Jordan and Syria,in dividing up the waters of the River Jordan.

So it was decided in the fall of 1946, thatMr. Debler, the Regional Director of Region VII,Mr. Comstock, Regional Director of Region VI,

Glenn Sloan moves intosome of the MissouriRiver Basin committees

75

Kenneth F. Vernon

should retire, and that Glenn Sloan, who hadbeen Assistant Regional Director of Region VI,would be moved into the slot of therepresentative of the Secretary for the InteriorMissouri Basin Committee and representative tothe Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee withthe other [five] four Federal agencies and the fivegovernors. Avery Batson was appointed asDirector of Region VII.

So I was sent to Billings in January of1947. Incidentally, it was very interesting, oneday Mike Straus, who was then Commissioner –he was a bear of a man, great guy to work with,you could wrestle with him and he never held itagainst you – he called me into his office oneday, and said, "Ken, we're going to make somechanges out in the Missouri Valley, and I'm notoffering it to you, but if I offered it to you, theRegional Directorship of Region VI, would youtake it? Would you be interested?"

Sent to Billings inJanuary of 1947 byCommissioner MikeStraus

"God, Mike, I don't know, that's quite apackage. I don't know that I'm ready for it. Afterall, these guys out there, they're all senior to me,I'd be jumped over a hell of a lot of numbershere, and I don't know whether I'd be accepted. I've got to think about that a little bit, do a littletalking around."

So that evening when I went home, mywife said, "What's bugging you?"

"Oh," I said, "I had a long conversationwith the Commissioner this afternoon."

She said, "When are we moving?"(laughter) Déjà vu all over again. Back in 1943was when we left the Central Valley Project. SoI told her what was up. She was always a goodsport. She says, "Well, I opted for better or forworse. I don't know if this will be for better or

Wife’s reaction to themove to Billings

76


for worse, after all, it's your career."

And we just got this place organized. We'd only been there three years. I said, "That'sthe problem. I just got this office organized, justgot it going good, and I’d like to try to see itthrough to completion because I think I could goon from there, but if the Commissioner offers methat Regional Director's job, I don't see how inthe hell I can refuse it.

She says, "I don't either, I don't see howyou can."

I said, "I may stumble and break my pick,I don't know, but if he says ‘yes,’ I'm going tohave to say ‘yes.’"

So I went back to him, and I told himwhat I'd thought through, and I said, "If you offerit, Mike, I'm your man. I don't know how longI'll live, but I'm your man."

So next thing I knew, I was sent down tohave an interview with the Secretary, who wasthen "Cap" Krug, Julius Krug, who had been theChief Electrical Engineer of the TennesseeValley Authority, then had moved into the WarProduction Board, and had been Head of theOffice of War Utilities, which had to do with allthe utilities involved in manufacturing during thewar.

Interview with Secretaryof the Interior JuliusKrug

I'd had some contact with him, I think heat least knew my name as we would chase thisstuff through the War Production Board fromReclamation because of the power aspects. So Isat down to have an interview with him. I had avery nice interview with him. He tried to get myideas or thoughts on the subject of resourcedevelopment. I have a very hazy recollection ofthat because I was so damn nervous. (laughter)

77

Kenneth F. Vernon

After all, you don't get to talk to the Secretary ofthe Interior very often. I mean, that's like talkingto God. And so anyway, apparently I passedmuster.

So the next thing I knew, Mike called mein and said, "Well, when can you go to Billings?"

This was right after Christmas 1946. So Ihad a number of things to wind up. They weregoing to send me out as Assistant RegionalDirector, Dick [Glenn] Sloan's place, andComstock would stay on for three months, andthen would retire. That would overlap gettingme familiar with the area, so I could get familiarwith what was going out there, get settled in.

Sent Vernon asassistant regionaldirector to overlap threemonths with the retiringregional director

So I [reported] moved out there inJanuary – 15th[, 1947]. I think I reported onJanuary 15, 1947. Now, I took with me GeorgePratt, who had been Chief Counsel of theNational Labor Relations Board, but he had beenalso involved with the group at Kansas City – it'son the tip of my tongue. Harry Truman had beenpart of that organization. It'll come to me; theold computer will keep charging up here.

Took George Pratt toBillings with him

So I wanted to take George, becauseGeorge had both the legal background, but healso had a good sense of organization. So Iwanted him to come out as Assistant to theRegional Director, be a part of me. We took thetrain to go out there, and on the train I said,"Now, this is how I want to organize it, George. I want to adopt the pattern that we had on theCentral Valley because I know it works. I wantto make the regional office the headquarters, theadministrative headquarters, but I want to moveeverybody I can as close to the scene of theirwork as justifies a person, and I want to do thatthrough district offices just like we had on theCentral Valley Project, divisional offices in the

Begins to plan how toorganize the region inBillings

78


Central Valley Project." But also we hadoutlying offices like the Delta-Mendota Canal,and the Delta Cross Channel, and so on. I said,"I want to adopt that kind of a pattern, and what Ineed to do, what I want you to do is definefunctions of a regional office and the functions ofa district or project office. I want execution inthe districts, but I want supervision in theregional office, and I've got a real problembecause there's 350 people in Billings right nowthat are falling over each other, worrying aboutwhere that drill rig goes next, or whether thatsurvey crew should be over somewhere else. Now, the regional office should be devoted toforward planning, and I want to get those peoplethat are doing [the detailed] that work out in thedistricts or projects. In a sense, it's just [as] theCorps of Engineers has with their division officesand their district offices and their projectoffices." I said, "There's a pattern that'sestablished."

And I had talked to Germaine Ellsworth,who was the organizational planner inWashington, and had scouted these ideas withhim, so he'd given me some ideas on the subject. So that's our charter that we arrived at inBillings. And I think that's a good place to stopfor today.

Storey: What you're saying to me is this had not beenworked out even, though the regions had been inplace two to three years. Is that right?

Vernon: I beg your pardon?

Storey: The regional organization was put in place in '44,early '45. So by the time you went there in '47, ithad been in place two to three years.

Vernon: Exactly.

79

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: And the functional responsibilities of the officeshadn't been worked out, or was it that the areaoffices hadn't been established, or what?

Vernon: [That’s right, it hadn’t been done.] No, I was theone that did that, because this was what theCommissioner told me. He said, "Listen, Ken,what I want you to do is get this project off theground. We've got the appropriation, thePresident wants work done, the Secretary wantswork done."

The Commissioner’scharge to Vernon

Yes, the regions had been established, butthe problem was that the current regionaldirectors had a long background in projecthistory of Reclamation.

Storey: Before the foundation of the regions.

Vernon: Before the foundation of the regions. Mr. Deblerhad been the Planning Engineer in Denver, andMr. Comstock had been the ProjectSuperintendent down on the Riverton Project inWyoming, and they didn't see the scope of theMissouri Basin activity. The Commissioner andthe Secretary wanted new blood put in there, butin a way that could draw upon the experience ofthese men and their past history so that therewould be an overlapping of new blood and theexperience of the elder statesmen. (Storey:Okay. Good.)

Reorganization intoregions was slowed bythe new regionaldirectors’ longbackgrounds inReclamation

So my first activity, along with GeorgePratt, was to redefine the functions of theregional office and what would be set up asdistrict offices and what would remain as projectoffices, because as I show here on page four ofmy summary statement, I show a listing of theprojects which were already in existence, whichwere one, two, three, four, five six, there wereabout a dozen older projects which were alreadyin existence which we had to service, as well as

80


this new Missouri Basin Project [Pick-SloanMissouri Basin Program].

So what we wanted to do was to establisha strong Planning Division plus a strongOperation and Maintenance Division whichwould deal with the existing projects, and take onnew projects as they would be constructed.

Wanted a strongPlanning Division and astrong Operation andMaintenance Division

Storey: Good. Well, it's been going on three hours now.

Vernon: I think that's a good time to stop, because thisgets into the creation of the district offices andwhat we did getting the Missouri Basin Projectunder way. That's a good place to stop.

Storey: In that case, I'd like to ask whether or not you'rewilling for the materials on these tapes and theresulting transcripts to be used by researchersinside and outside Reclamation.

Vernon: Certainly inside of Reclamation, I don't knowwhere it could go outside. I don't think I saidanything which – I tried to qualify– [would bedetrimental to anyone.]

END SIDE 2, TAPE 3 – APRIL 24, 1995.BEGINNING SIDE 1, TAPE 4. April 24, 1995.

Storey: This is tape four of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April 24, 1995. Goahead.

Vernon: As I said, I have no objections to using thismaterial inside the Bureau, because it deals withpeople that are well known within the Bureau. How far outside, I don't know what use it mightbe put. I've had to speculate, and I've tried toidentify my speculations as to why certain thingswere occurring as orders were fed down to meand activities were assigned to me to be carriedout, and I had to speculate the whys and the

81

Kenneth F. Vernon

wherefores as to what was going on at upperechelons of government, such as the Secretary ofthe Interior, the Bureau of the Budget, and theadministration. So that has to be acknowledgedand accepted as speculation on my part, andrationalizing why I was given certain tasks toperform.

Storey: Yes, and I think historians do that. That's whatwe're trying to do is to cross-reference everythingand that sort of thing.

Vernon: Because there was a lot going on at that timewhich we can – actually, during the NationalResources Planning Board during the thirties,Jack Dixon, whose name I mentioned as ourRegional Planning Engineer, had started with theCorps of Engineers, and then he had been anengineer with the National Resources PlanningBoard. Then when it was disbanded, he got intothe War Production Board. Then after the WarProduction Board disbanded, he was broughtover into Reclamation as Head PlanningEngineer in Washington. As he took over, then Iwas fed into these other operations, so that waskind of the pattern that was followed there.

So with those qualifications, yes, sure, it'sa record. Bill Warne's been after me for years towrite these things.

Storey: Good. Well, maybe we can prevent you havingto write it all.

Vernon: Right.

Storey: Thank you.

Vernon: That's the reason I didn't want to sit down and doit.

Storey: Well, thank you very much.

82


END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 4. APRIL 24, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. APRIL 25, 1995.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, Senior Historian of theBureau of Reclamation, interviewing Kenneth F.Vernon in his home in Fullerton, California, onthe afternoon of April the 25th, 1995. This istape one.

Mr. Vernon, I'd like to ask you a coupleof name spellings to start with. Fraine, yourrelatives in Sacramento area, I believe it was.

Vernon: No, my name Fraine, is my middle name. Thatwas my mother's family name. F-R-A-I-N-E.

Storey: And you had two uncles.

Vernon: And my two uncles, Colonel John Fraine ofNorth Dakota, and my uncle George Fraine, whowas a noted jurist in North Dakota.

Storey: And then Ken Cheadle?

Vernon: Cheadle was spelled--J. Kennard Cheadle, J. K-E-N-N-A-R-D C-H-E-A-D-L-E. Ken Cheadle.

Storey: Okay. And then before we going on and I startasking questions again, I'm wondering if there'sanything that you thought of after ourconversation yesterday that you'd like to add ortalk more about?

Vernon: Yeah, there were a couple things that require alittle clarification I kind of left hanging, andmight clarify why certain things happen. I toldyou about meeting up with Brooks Morris when Ireported into Denver, who was the son of Sam B.Morris, the Chief Engineer and General Managerof the Pasadena Water Works. I couldn't think ofSenior Morris' full name. His name was SamuelB. Morris, M-O-R-R-I-S. It was through Brooks'

83

Kenneth F. Vernon

father's association with the then Chief Engineerand Manager of the Denver Water WorksSystem, that we, both of us, received a, reallycook's tour, of the Denver Water Works System,compliments of the Chief Engineer and GeneralManager. I don't recall his name.

But I learned at that time the seriousnessof Denver's water supply problems during thedrought in the mid-thirties, and why Denver wasanxious to build the Cheesman Reservoir on oneof the tributaries of the [South] Platte [River],and also look forward to the ultimatetransmountain diversions of West Slope wateronto the East Slope of the state of Colorado. That clarifies that.

Then when I was talking about theestablishment of the Federal Interagency RiverBasin Committee, I said that George Beard of theCivil Works Division of the Corps of Engineersand Bob, Robert de Luccia, L-U-C-C-I-A, of theFederal Power Commission, and I weredelegated to come up with a charter for such acommittee, and then we were delegated to comeup with the charter for the Missouri River BasinInteragency Committee. We suggested that theDepartment of Commerce be made a member ofthe committee because of their census anddemographic studies and other economic datawhich would be essential in planning futuredevelopments of a broad area. And then we alsoconcluded that those five interagency membersshould be matched by five governors drawingupon the committee of ten governors of theMissouri River Basin states. And werecommended that the Missouri Basin GovernorsCommittee, I've forgotten its strict name, it mayhave been called the Missouri River BasinCommission or some such a name, select fivegovernors from the ten states, and that theywould match and collaborate with the five

Setting up the FederalMissouri River BasinInteragency Committee

84


interagency members.

I think the first selection of the GovernorsCommittee was the Governor[s] of Montana,North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and oneof the lower states, I can't remember if whetherit was Kansas or Missouri, but I believe it wasKansas. Because Missouri felt they were onlyinterested in navigation, primarily interested innavigation on the Mississippi River, so they feltthey were not as deeply involved with theMissouri River, as, perhaps was Kansas.

Also when I was discussing the formationof the Interior Missouri River Basin FieldCommittee, I gave you the reasons, I gave youthe basis of my discussions with the GeologicalSurvey, the National Park Service, the Fish andWildlife Service, and the Bureau of Mines, but Ididn't discuss what approach I made to theBureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of LandManagement. The Bureau of Land Managementwas responsible for the management of all thepublic lands, of which there were tremendousquantity in the Missouri Basin drainage area,primarily devoted to grazing rights on publiclands, and also on mineral development, oreresources. So that then is how I approached theagencies.

Then, also, I approached the Bureau ofIndian Affairs on the basis that there were a greatnumber of Indian reservations in the [MissouriRiver] Basin, and that Indian water rights wouldbe involved, and that the Bureau of IndianAffairs was interested in developing waterresources and land resources of the Indianreservations, and that we could tie in accelerateddevelopment of those resources through thecoordinated Interior Missouri Basin Program. Sothat was how I approached each of the agencies,and all of them ultimately swung into line.

Approached the Bureauof Indian Affairs

85

Kenneth F. Vernon

We instituted, then, a separate section ofour appropriation bill which would finance theseincreased activities relating to the Missouri RiverBasin – development through the Reclamationappropriation. I think that clarifies the things Iwanted to.

Reclamation’sappropriation bill had aseparate section for thePSMBP

Storey: Was that while you were still in Washington thatwe started—

Vernon: That was while I was still in Washington settingup the Missouri River Basin Program.

Storey: But did we start getting appropriations while youwere still in Washington?

Vernon: Yeah. I should explain that I had beendesignated as the Acting Chief Progress ControlOfficer, delegated to set up this office and startestablishing the various programs and budgetsfor the whole Reclamation program. One of myfirst reports to Mr. Bashore, the Commissioner,sometime during 1945, there was a supplementalappropriation bill being sent forward from theDepartment through the Congress to provide foran accelerated program to take care of thereturning veterans. My first report to theCommissioner was, I warned him that we alreadyhad a big backlog of appropriations, and that wewere nowhere near accomplishing that program,and I fully doubted, and he should be aware, thateven if a supplemental appropriation would begranted, we probably wouldn't even get to spendit for a couple of years. He thanked me verymuch for that information, but the Departmenthad decided that the supplemental appropriationwould be sought, and it was granted.

Acting Chief ProgressControl Officer whilestill in Washington, D.C.

Storey: So in those days we got to keep money?

Vernon: Yeah, though, see, though, there's anotherelement. See, Reclamation had no-year money.

No-year money inReclamation

86


Once it got it, it kept it. Now, when I was in theForeign Service, in the Agency of InternationalDevelopment, we had to go through a torturousexercise every June. If you'll remember, Idiscussed this business of obligation, and youtied up money, but in the Foreign Service, in theAgency of International Development, everyJune we had to go through an exercise in whatwas called DEOB-REOB. We had to deobligateany money that wasn't spent, and then we had toimmediately reobligate it for the new fiscal year–because our money only extended for each fiscalyear, but we could carry over, if the agency wasgranted the authority, we could carry over anyunexpended funds into the next year, but theyliterally were reappropriated. Therefore we hadto deobligate them, and then reobligate them forthe new fiscal year. So there was a difference inthe foreign program, as opposed to theReclamation program.

So that, I think, it covers some of thethings that I wanted to clarify, and those can be,as you transcribe these notes, can be inserted attheir proper places in the text.

Storey: Mike Straus selected you to be RegionalDirector, is that correct?

Vernon: That's correct.

Storey: What was Mike Straus like as a Commissioner?

Vernon: Mike was a very complex person. He was veryactive, very forthright, but he had a tremendousdrive. He had been an Assistant Secretary. We'llstart a little earlier. He had been associated withSecretary Ickes in Chicago, as a newspaperman,and had become familiar with Mr. Ickes, whenMr. Ickes was in Chicago. Incidentally, I readthe biography of Mr. Ickes, and it's a fascinatingbook, and the life of a fascinating gentleman.

Mike Straus asCommissioner ofReclamation

Commissioner Strausknew Harold Ickes in theChicago newspaperbusiness

87

Kenneth F. Vernon

Mike Straus had become familiar with Mr. Ickes,or vice versa, Ickes became familiar with MikeStraus, and so he brought Mike Straus in as anAssistant Secretary of Public Relations.

When Harry Bashore decided that hewanted to retire on the closing of the war, Mr.Straus was then appointed by the Secretary asCommissioner of Reclamation. I found him avery good man to work with. He was veryforthright. You could talk directly to him. Youdidn't have to pull any punches. He didn't pullany punches, but you could work with him, andhe would listen to you.

One thing that he was struggling with wasthe fight over the 160-acre limitation inCalifornia. [, because] The agricultural interestsin the Central Valley area, who owned the landoutright. Rather than the water being deliveredto public lands, [it would be] they were beingdelivered to private lands, [that] and they werealready in private ownership. The agriculturalinterests[, who held large ownerships,] wantedsomehow to bend the application of the 160-acrelimitation, which was a fundamental ofReclamation law, to be able to get the projectwater to more than 160 acres of each ownership.

Commissioner Straushad to deal with CentralValley land owners whowished to ignore the160-acre limitation

There was a good deal of politicalpressure in the Congress being exerted bymembers of the Congress on the Secretary andMr. Straus to somehow bend the law and permitthat to happen. This came up at a later time inmy experience when I was Regional Director inRegion VI, because there we found out throughcertain agricultural studies and economic studiesperformed by the state agricultural colleges,which I will deal with in plenty of more detaillater, that a land ownership, or the land, that anoperating entity, was about 480 acres. [It tookthat amount to] That would support the farm

In Region VI theagricultural colleges haddetermined that anoperating entity wasabout 480 acres

88


family and support the machinery that wasrequired to meet the operations and economics offarm development.

But Mr. Straus felt that he could not – andso I'd asked him [Mr. Straus] to consider somerelaxation of the 160-acre limitation, because wefound that in 160 acres, in general, [wasinadequate in the northern Plains States. we hadin the northern states, Northern Plains states, Wefound that there was from 100 to 120 acres ofClass Three and better irrigable lands in a 160-acre quarter section, which was inadequate thento support the farm family and pay watercharges. So I had asked him somehow toconsider going to the Congress and get somekind of a special dispensation of these economicfactors, but he felt because of the stress andstrain of the fight in California, that he could notgive that problem any consideration for theUpper Plains states, which gave us a real difficultproblem to solve.

“I'd asked him toconsider somerelaxation of the 160-acre limitation, becausewe found that 160 acres,in general, wasinadequate in thenorthern Plains States.”

It was ameliorated, let us say, byexamining what [were] was the operatingentities. [We] found that ownerships were beingdevolved to both parents, each parent, and anyheirs, which would then result in an ownershipmeeting the 160-acre limitation, but with anoperating entity of 500 acres or more.

Just as a sidebar to this, to describe whatkind of a gentleman Mr. Straus was, he wasmaking a field inspection trip of Region VI, andat the time I was anxious to develop some smallprojects in North Dakota, and the Governor ofNorth Dakota was with us on this tour. As wewere flying around showing the Commissionerthe potential projects, I was pressing him to relaxhis insistence that there be irrigation contracts,irrigation repayment contracts, signed, beforeany construction could begin. I tackled him

89

Kenneth F. Vernon

several times during the course of that inspectiontour, and the Governor, later the Governor ofNorth Dakota, said to me privately, “I never sawanybody tackle his superior the way you did andget away with it.”

And I said, “But I know Mr. Straus, and Iknow how he operates, and he wants you to comeat him full bore, because the harder you come,the better he feels that you believe in it.” But Iwas always very, very careful that when I wasmaybe a little bit out of line, I called him Mike –no, I called him Commissioner, Mr.Commissioner. But when I was really pressinghim hard, informally, I called him Mike. (laughter) He loved it. Did that answer yourquestion? Maybe you've got some particularquestions you'd like to know.

Interacting withCommissioner Straus

Storey: No, not particularly.

Vernon: I should say also, Mr. Straus was strongly infavor of the development of the power program,and he was very supportive of my efforts todevelop the power marketing program as I sawforthcoming from the mainstream dams, whichhad been delegated to Reclamation. So he was avery complex guy, and one of his principalassistants in Washington used to say, “God,we've got to protect Mike from his own anxieties,because if he sees a fight, he wants to get into it.” (laughter) So this particular assistant's job was torun around with an oil can and smooth thingsover.

Storey: There was another person in Washington, I thinkbefore you left, named Lineweaver.

Vernon: (laughter) That's the guy I was referring to.

Storey: Tell me about Goodrich Lineweaver, if youwould.

90


Vernon: Lineweaver was a very genteel Kentuckygentleman. I loved Goodrich Lineweaver, Ireally did. He was a very fine gentleman. Hewas a very serious sort of a guy, and he took hisresponsibilities very seriously. His job was tobuild up the – basically he'd been assigned thetask of building up O&M department, whichfundamentally had its feet buried in the dirt ofoperating canal systems, but he seriously wantedto broaden that approach into considering moreof the economic aspects of irrigationdevelopment and community development andirrigated lands. So he was given theresponsibility to bring in and strengthen thewhole economic effort.

Goodrich Lineweaver

Storey: Was he effective?

Vernon: Yeah, yeah. And I'll bring that up later as we getinto my efforts on the Missouri Basin. That'show we got Floyd Dominy. Lineweaver broughtFloyd Dominy in from the Department ofAgriculture. First, Floyd had been a countyagent out in Wyoming, as I recall, and then he'dbeen in the military, in the Navy, I believe, andthen after the war, he showed up as an Assistantto Mr. Lineweaver in the O&M department inWashington. And we learned that Floyd was areal powerhouse.

Storey: Last time you were traveling with your newassistant to go to Billings, and you were talkingabout wanting to set up district offices. I'd like topursue that a little more. Had the regions notestablished any offices under them, other thanconstruction offices?

Vernon: That's what I wanted to get discussed in detail inour conversations today.

Storey: Good. Well, let's get started on it, then.

91

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: I've got a whole program that I wanted to getinto. I wanted to pick up these other items, andthen we'll get into that. Before I do that, I got tomake a pit stop.

Storey: Okay. [Tape recorder turned off]

Vernon: Yesterday, our conversations were devoted, inthe later session, to emphasis on the developmentof the Missouri River Basin Program and mythoughts about how we might set up theorganization of the region, but I didn't discusswhat had been going on in the region before theMissouri Basin Program was authorized andfunded, because it was a fairly sizeable programat the time.

As a matter of fact, there were a numberof projects which were very old Bureau ofReclamation projects. For example, inWyoming, there was the Riverton, with theMidvale Irrigation District, and then theexpansion of Division Two, and thinking ofextending it on into the East Bench. There wasthe Shoshone out of Cody, which had theWillwood Division, which was a very well-rundivision, and then its problem-plagued FrannieDivision. Then there was the expansion of theShoshone Project, the Heart Mountain Division,and the Heart Mountain Power Plant.

Existing projects whenVernon became regionaldirector

Riverton Project

Shoshone Project

Heart Mountain Division

Then in Montana, there was the HuntleyProject just adjacent to Billings, which was, Ibelieve, an old Carey Act project whichantedated Reclamation, the Reclamation Act. Then there was the Lower Yellowstone Project,with headquarters at Sydney. There was theBuffalo Rapids Project, which was what wecalled a Wheeler-Case project, which was acombination of Reclamation and SoilConservation Service approach to irrigation. TheBureau of Reclamation built the canal systems,

Huntley Project

Lower YellowstoneProject

Buffalo Rapids Project

92


and then the Soil Conservation Service helpedthe farmers develop their on-farm water systems.

There was the Sun River Project in NorthCentral Montana. There was the Milk RiverProject in, again, in North Central andNortheastern Montana. Then in North Dakota,there was the Buford-Trenton Project, which wasanother Wheeler-Case project, that was close toWilliston. Then in South Dakota, there was theBelle Fourche Project on the Belle FourcheRiver, in extreme western North Dakota, justnorth of the Black Hills. So you could see therewas already a fairly sizable program going on inthe region.

Sun River Project

Buford-Trenton Project

Belle Fourche Project

Now, the problem as I saw it, as Iapproached how to organize the region, was tobring these older projects into, and get themassociated with, this new approach to the muchlarger and expanding Missouri River BasinProject. But I must say that the problem wascompounded because, being frank, I felt thatregional management, senior management at thetime, was more concerned about the conduct ofthe programs in these older projects and had notyet been fully [realized] apprized of the emphasisthat the Department wanted to place on theexpansion and effort into the Missouri RiverBasin.

Also on the Riverton and on theShoshone Project, the Heart Mountain division ofShoshone, since these were older projects andhad an ongoing program, new developmentsthere were approaching completion to where wecould institute a veteran settlement program oneach of these two projects. This also involvedthe demolition of the Heart Mountain RelocationCenter, Japanese relocation center, that had beenbuilt and populated during World War II, and wedistributed portions of the buildings to the

Heart MountainRelocation Center

93

Kenneth F. Vernon

settlers, new settlers, as well as distributing lotsof items which were present at the war relocationcenters, such as beds and office equipment, notoffice equipment, but farming implements and soforth.

So there was a good-size program alreadygoing on in the region. This then required thatsomehow I bring these older projects into thisnew form of organization, because here theywere, they had been accustomed to dealingdirectly with their center of their world, whichhad been the Denver office. They had suddenlybeen removed from the Denver office and had tonow report through a regional office, and herewas this guy coming out on the white horse, thatnow was going to remove them twice fromDenver and once from the region and forcingthem to go through a district office. So let us saythat they approached the new organization withsomewhat less than enthusiasm. (Chuckles)

Projects formerlyreported to the DenverOffice

However, the first thing I did after I got toBillings, I told Mr. Comstock what had been laiddown before me as my charge, and that I hopedthat he would see his way clear to make it easyfor me, which he did.

Storey: Now, Comstock was–?

Vernon: He was then Regional Director. HaroldComstock was then the Regional Director. Buthis feet were anchored in Riverton Project. He'dbeen the Project Manager, Riverton, for lo thesemany years, and his feet were anchored in theconstruction of canal systems and the delivery ofwater to farms and settlement of farms, and hedidn't really appreciate this broader effort ofregional development.

Harold Comstock

There also had been established inBillings, besides the regional office, there had

William E. Rawlings

94


been a group set up which was a sort of a tokentoward the Missouri Basin Project. This washeaded up by a man, William E. Rawlings, R-A-W-L-I-N-G-S, Bill Rawlings, who had beengiven a small economic staff and some landclassifiers, and they were beginning landclassification work on some of the new projectareas that Mr. Sloan had included in his broaddevelopment plan for the Upper Missouri Basin.

So my approach to the problem oforganization was to break down the number ofpeople in Billings as to those who were doingproject work and those who were doing regionalwork. But, unfortunately, what I found was thatmany of the people who should be doing regionalwork, such as advance planning and programplanning, they were involved in such mundanethings as where –

Splitting regional andproject work


Storey: You found that people were doing the detailedwork of the projects, then?

Vernon: That's right.

Storey: And trying to figure out where drill rigs shouldgo?

Vernon: Yeah, they were worried where the hell to drillthat damn next bore hole. And I said, “Wait aminute, this is not the way. What we've got to dohere now is we got to segregate [these things]this thing out.” And so we set up an entity wecalled MBPAS, Missouri Basin Project ActivityStaff. And I brought Bill Rawlings into the[regional office] – by this time, I had becomeRegional Director. Mr. Comstock had retired. I'd done this planning and sorting out <til – I thinkMr. Comstock retired on April 1, and that's April

Missouri Basin ProjectActivity Staffestablished

95

Kenneth F. Vernon

1, 1947. And then I took over as RegionalDirector, and then I was free to begin myinstitution of the changes that I wanted to make.

So Mr. Pratt – incidentally, I've tried torecall Mr. Pratt's background, and I couldn'trecall it completely, but I said he was fromKansas City, and he'd been involved in the clean-up of the Pendergast gang. That was the name Icouldn't remember yesterday, the Pendergastgang. If you read President Truman's history,you'll find that he was very involved with themachinations of the Pendergast gang in KansasCity, which is a political power, that's the sameas Mayor Daley in Chicago. But he had been apart of the effort to clean that gang up and getthem out of there. So he had a terrificbackground in organization as well as being asharp lawyer.

So I then brought Ralph Workinger outfrom Washington, whom I've become acquaintedwith while I was working in Washington, andwas a part of Germaine Ellsworth's staff, whowas the Organizational Assistant to theCommissioner, developing and promoting theregionalization of the Bureau. So I assigned Mr.Workinger the job of administering this MBPASstaff, Missouri Basin Project Activity Staff, andbetween the three of us, we sorted out those thatwere doing project work and those that should bedoing strictly regional work, and we put thepeople who were doing project work into theMBPAS group, and then from there we decidedwho should go to where in the various districtoffices we were going to set up, on the basicprinciple that we would move each individual asclose to the site of the work that he wasperforming as would justify a full-time person. That is to say, if there was a project that requireda full-time person, we'd move him to that project,such as Riverton or Shoshone or somewhere else.

96


But if it didn't require a full-time person, we'dmove that person into the district office, wherehe could then be available to a number of projectareas, but the district offices were to do projectwork, that was their job, was to execute projectwork, both project planning, the operation andmaintenance of the district projects, [and] theexecution of the electrical power program and soon.

I also set up a unit called the MunicipalWater Group, because I felt that municipal waterwould become an element of the development ofthe Missouri Basin as time went on. So we setup a separate section for that, but included in thisMBPAS group <til we decided just exactly whereit should be located.

Municipal Water Groupestablished

Then I called together all of the projectmanagers of existing projects and all of thegentlemen who I felt should become the newdistrict managers, and we held a terrific programsession to identify, or explain to them, this neworganizational concept, and what their roleswould be. I said to them, giving certaingentlemen area responsibilities on an ad-hocbasis, and I said, “Now, this is the objectives thatI'm laying down for you. Mr. Sloan has somegrandiose projects in his scheme, which willrequire a great deal of detailed project planningever before they're ready for undertakingconstruction. So we must have a broad-planningeffort to carry on, to ultimately develop thoselarger projects. But in the meantime, there mustbe a number of smaller entities that could beconsidered for intermediate development, let'ssay, which would give the effect of activityhappening on development of the Basin, andsatisfy the political elements, that are pushing theprogram, that activities and progress is actuallybeing made.

97

Kenneth F. Vernon

So that Mr. Pratt and I had divided theregion up into five major areas. First one was theCody District Office, which would include theRiverton Project, the Shoshone Project, the HeartMountain Project, the Boysen Dam, and anumber of small developments which wouldhappen on the Little Big Horn River – no, theBig Horn River, below Boysen Dam. I knew thiswas going to be a tough problem, because thisinvolved new activities as well as melding in theolder activities. And we tentatively decided thatMr Workinger, when we finally unraveled theMBPAS staff, we would put him in charge of theCody office, even though he was not an engineer,but he was a good organizational man, and wefelt that he would be successful in bringing thepeople together down there to work as a team.

Cody District Officeestablished

I established the Yellowstone DistrictOffice in Billings. I wasn't happy about doingthat, because it put both a district office and aregional office in the same locale, but the onlyother alternative would have been to put it inMiles City, which made it rather isolated, andbecause we felt that the Yellowtail Dam wasgoing to be one of the larger projects, and it waseasier to manage it from Billings than it would beto manage it from Miles City. Also powerplanning was going to take place in theYellowstone area, so that it seemed that Billingswas the logical place to establish that office.

Yellowstone DistrictOffice established

Then the Upper Missouri area was tocover the Upper Missouri River down to theupper waters of Fort Peck Reservoir, andextending into the headlands of the UpperMissouri area, including what was called theThree Forks area, where the three rivers that fedinto what became the Missouri River. Therewould be Canyon Ferry Dam and power planningof, how to distribute power out of Canyon FerryDam. There would be the Lower Marias Project

Upper Missouri DistrictOffice established inGreat Falls

98


on the Marias River, the Tiber Dam. Therewould be the Sun River Project, which wasalready an established project, and there wouldbe the [old] Milk River Project, which hadcomplications, because the waters arose in theGlacier Park, flowed northward into Canada,then swung around and reentered the UnitedStates, then in the irrigated areas, where belowHavre, Montana, on the Lower Milk River beforeit entered into the Missouri River below FortPeck. Complications there included an alreadyexisting compact between Canada and the UnitedStates on the Milk River under the jurisdiction ofthe International Joint Commission. Turn it off(whisper). [Tape recorder turned off]

Milk River Project hadinternationalcomplications

[Next I] established the North DakotaBismarck area, which would include the – sinceit would include what Mr. Sloan called theMissouri-Souris Project area, the diversion fromthe Missouri River below Fort Peck, we includedeverything below Fort Peck in Montana on theMissouri River, including then the diversion intoNorth Dakota, also the Jamestown River, up toand including the South Dakota line, and theMissouri-Souris River, which [began in] flowedthrough Peyota [phonetic], Canada, [entered theU.S.,] flowed through Minot[, North Dakota] andthen back into Canada, which was destined totake the return flows from the proposedMissouri-Souris Project area.

North Dakota officeestablished in Bismarck

And then there was also the SheyenneRiver, which flowed eastward and emptied intothe Red River of the north, which flowed out ofNorth Dakota into Canada, which created someproblems, international problems, with Canada. But there was a problem with the SheyenneRiver, because the Corps had proposed areservoir, a dam, on the Sheyenne at Bald Hill,which was farther down on the Sheyenne River,but Sloan had proposed a dam higher up on the

Sheyenne Riverproblems

99

Kenneth F. Vernon

river, which would presumably control water thatwould be diverted from the Upper Missouri, fromthe Missouri River below Fort Peck and into theMissouri-Souris area, which then could be fedinto the James River.

Storey: Excuse me. The Sheyenne River, the spelling?

Vernon: S-H-E-Y-E-N-N-E.

Storey: Yeah, I thought it was a little different.

Vernon: It's a little different. The Sheyenne River, yeah. Then we also established the Huron District, theSouth Dakota District, with headquarters atHuron, which would be involved with theplanning of the diversion from the OaheReservoir, being built by the Corps of Engineers,into the James River. We also assigned to it theAngostura Dam and project [in the area of HotSprings, South Dakota] at Rapid City, which wasone of the very early projects of the MissouriBasin activity. We also assigned responsibilityto the Belle Fourche Project, which was north ofthe Black Hills, but was in South Dakota. Andwe also assigned some of the planning operationsin the upper reaches of the Belle Fourche and theCheyenne River in South Dakota, upon which theAngostura Dam was being built in [westernSouth Dakota.] eastern Wyoming. In otherwords, we took the basins of the rivers whichflowed through South Dakota, even though theywere in Wyoming, we included those into theHuron district's charter, if you follow me.

South Dakota officeestablished at Huron

So that was our general approach to thedivision of the region into discrete district areas. I understand my opposite number, Mr. [AveryA.] Batson, who became Regional Director inRegion VII, was doing the equivalent thing in theRegion VII area. But I'm not too familiar howthat was developed, because I had my plate full

100


in Region VI.

One of the decisions we made early onwas that since we were both operating under thesame basic law, the Flood Control Act of 1944,we should have our staffs meet regularly in a sortof a retreat, where we would get away from thepressures of the day, and decide and coordinateour activities with the same basic set ofprinciples. So we then developed a basic set ofprinciples which would govern and guide ourdevelopment of our activities with thedevelopment of the basin. So that nowestablishes the first step in our organization ofour activities in the region.

After we had identified all the people thatshould be called regional people, who weassigned the function of supervision, and all thepeople that we determined were project people,and assigned them the adjective "direction ofactivities,” we then started moving right down tothe people that was in the MBPAS staff, anddistributing them around the regions, around thedistrict offices. So this activity took up most ofthe year of 1947. It was not until fall that wereally felt that we had our organizationestablished.

Fall of 1947 felt hisorganization was ingood shape

I'd appointed Ralph Workinger as the[District Manager] Regional Manager, the AreaManager of the Cody office. I appointed HaroldAldrich, transferred him out of the MBPAS staffup to Great Falls, as the [District] Manager of theUpper Missouri area. I appointed Don Ketchum,who was basically a power engineer, to theBillings office, to the Billings area, theYellowstone area, because of the planning for theYellowtail Dam. I appointed Bruce Johnson,who had been the head of the planning operationin North Dakota and was thoroughly familiarwith the work on the Missouri-Souris Project

101

Kenneth F. Vernon

with the diversion from the Missouri River intoNorth Dakota, appointed him as district managerat Bismarck. And then I appointed Joe Grimes,who had been a Project Engineer down on someof the projects of the Lower Yellowstone, whichwhom I felt had a good deal of knowledge andsavvy about what our objectives were. Iappointed him district manager at Huron, SouthDakota. So that, then, put our organization inplace.

Now we have the field team in place,basically. I was reviewing the makeup of theregional staff. The Regional Engineer wasCharles Anderson. I knew him from my dayswhen I was working in the Denver office back inthe mid-thirties. He had just come in from theSeminoe Dam and was waiting for a newassignment, when he was then sent out to ShastaDam as to be the Office Engineer at Shasta Dam. , but He had been a part of Grant Bloodgood'sSeabee organization, and he spent the war yearsout in the South Pacific in the Seabees, but on hisreturn to the United States after the war, Denverhad sent him up to Billings to be the RegionalEngineer. So I had a great deal of confidence inCharlie Anderson, whom I knew as Andy, andwhom I used to often [walk to] work with when Iworked in Denver.

Charles Anderson,Regional Engineer

I was somewhat concerned about myPlanning Engineer. I tentatively assigned TomJudah, who I think was related somehow to theengineer Judah, J-U-D-A-H, who located theroute of the Central Pacific Railway fromSacramento to Ogden, back in the 1860s.

Tom Judah was thePlanning Engineer

John Walker was the Power Manager. Ifound him to be an excellent manager and fullycognizant of what was intended to be done in theMissouri Basin, and who had felt completelyfrustrated with previous management, because

John Walker was PowerManager

102


previous management had not looked upon thepower program as an important part ofReclamation. The manager of the O&MDepartment was one of Mr. Comstock'scolleagues from the Riverton Project, who wasintimately involved in project canal operationsand did not envisage project development as amuch larger effort in community and area-wideeconomic development base. So I acceptedCharlie Anderson and John Walker, but Ireserved judgment on Mr Judah and Mr.Johnson, who was the O&M head, 'til I becamemore familiar with them.

I interviewed several people for theplanning job, bringing them to Billings. Onewho I was particularly interested in was Mr. StanMacAsland, who I had become acquainted withwhen I was in Denver, working in Denver, and[who] had then been doing a number of broadplanning jobs around the West for Reclamation,but he was already being talked about as the headof the complex study that Reclamation wasundertaking of diversion of Columbia Riverwaters into California, which he felt was a muchmore interesting assignment.

Stan MacAsland waslikely to take a job tostudy diversion ofColumbia River andnorthern Californiawater into California’Central Valley

Storey: He was working on that for Reclamation?

Vernon: Yeah. He was [to be] set up with an office inSalt Lake City, attached to Region IV for rations,so to speak, in Army parlance, but he was not apart of Region IV. He was a separate entity, buthe was attached to Region IV for rations. Buttheir study was to examine the possibilities ofdiversion of various additional water suppliesinto the Central Valley of California, both fromthe streams arising on the West Coast ofNorthern California, the northwest coast ofNorthern California, as well as streams in Oregonand ultimately the Colorado River. Not theColorado River, the Columbia.

103

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: The Columbia. Why would they put him SaltLake instead of in Sacramento? [long pause]

Vernon: I can't answer that. I don't know [but perhapspolitics were involved].

Storey: Do you know if there were any other peopleworking with him?

Vernon: Oh, he had a group of people. Yeah, he had agroup of people working with him. Really, Idon't know why he was set up in Salt Lake City. Perhaps it was to avoid any implication ofpolitical pressures from either California orOregon or Washington, because there were a lotof vested interests involved. Even thoughSenator Engle was a prime mover in establishingthat study, he did not, as I understood – and thisis speculation on my part – he did not care to beknown that he was supporting this effort.

Senator Clair Englesupported MacAsland’sstudies

Storey: This was Clair Engle of California.

Vernon: Clair Engle of California. And one of the specialproblems that resulted from that study was therewas a hell of a lot of water rising from the riversin California that could be diverted to theSacramento River, and one of them became thedam up there on the [Trinity River.] Gila – Ithink it's the Gila River or the Truckee River, notTruckee – but . .

Storey: The Klamath, maybe.

Vernon: Clair Engle Dam [Lake behind Trinity Dam onthe Trinity River], which diverts water into theUpper Sacramento, above Shasta.

Storey: That's part of the Shasta Project [technically theShasta/Trinity Division of the Central ValleyProject].

104


Vernon: Became part of the Shasta Project, but there werea lot of broad politics involved in this thing, and Ithink that probably, speculation on my part, whyit was set up in Salt Lake, so as to avoid anyimplication, or avoidance of the application ofany political pressures.

Storey: I interrupted your discussion of trying to get aplanning engineer.

Vernon: So ultimately the other alternative would havebeen to select Charlie Heinz, H-E-I-N-Z, as thePlanning Engineer, who was an excellentengineer and had been one of Mr. Sloan'sfavorite subordinates. But in discussing with Mr.Heinz possible career moves, I found that he[was] would be interested in getting out of thestrictly planning operation and get over into theother areas of Reclamation, such as constructionand project management. Feeling that he was aman of some substance and potential, I thendecided to put him up as District Engineer underthe District Manager, but put him up as DistrictEngineer up at Great Falls. And then toultimately get a laying on of hands from theDenver office on Mr. Heinz, I moved him over asField Engineer, which ultimately was theAssistant Construction Engineer of Canyon FerryDam. And then ultimately, after I felt that RalphWorkinger had done his job in the Cody District,I moved Charlie Heinz down to Cody as theDistrict Manager. And just as he was becomingwell entrenched down there and performingbrilliantly, he had a heart attack and passedaway. So it was an early end of what I thought avery promising career. I thought a lot of CharlieHeinz. But he was a tremendously large man,and I think he enjoyed life to its fullest, if youknow what I mean, and as a consequence, hisheart got the better of him.

Charlie Heinz becomesDistrict Engineer inGreat Falls

Charlie Heinz becomesDistrict Manager inCody, Wyoming

So I then ultimately settled on Tom Judah

105

Kenneth F. Vernon

to be the Planning Engineer. I was still had myfingers crossed about the gentleman we calledOllie Johnson, [in O&M] because I felt that hewas a great Project Operator, but he did not fillthe bill for the effort that we wanted to place intothe division of operation, the project of operationand maintenance. So Mr. Johnson decided, earlyon, to take retirement. He was well able to takeretirement.

Ollie Johnson was theacting O&M Manager

Then I placed a man named [EdLanderholm]– his name escapes me for themoment. He had a background in agriculturaleconomics, and he had been part of the Bureau ofAgricultural Economics, and had worked withthe University of California, and had a workingknowledge of how to work with the stateagricultural colleges, which was an effort that Iwanted to strengthen, or introduce andstrengthen, and get them deeply involved in ourplans for area development. So I moved – it'salmost there – Ed [Landerholm], I moved Edover to be Director of Operation andMaintenance, and I had moved Bill Rawlings,who had been head of this small project activitystaff of the Missouri Basin, I moved him in to bemy Assistant Regional Director. So I felt that Iwas capable of handling the engineering side inits early stages, and that Bill Rawlings wouldlook after the economic side in planning andproject development. He had a background – hehad been a county agent, and had been in theWar Relocation Center's operation during thewar. He was a graduate of Purdue, so he was agood alter ego for me, fulfilled skills that I didn'thave. I felt that rather [than] take on anotherengineer as Assistant Regional Director, I feltthat he would be an excellent man to support meas being Regional Director.

Ed Landerholm madeDirector of Operationand Maintenance

Bill Rawlings madeAssistant RegionalDirector

So now we had our team in place. Duringthe spring and summer while this was going on,

106


in the spring and summer, it was in the summer,it wasn't the spring and summer, it was thesummer of 1947, there was one of thosehorrendous floods that occurs along the front ofthe Rocky Mountains in the high plains in theKansas River Basin. Same thing had happenedon the Republican River in 1935 when I wasworking in Denver, the same thing had happenedon the Powder River in 1923, the same thinghappened in the Great Falls area, and it happenedas far north as Alberta, Canada, in whichapproximately twenty-four inches of rain wouldoccur in a two- or three-day period. This waswhere the wisdom of bringing the CommerceDepartment into the Missouri Basin activityproved out, because at that time the WeatherBureau was a part of the Department ofCommerce, and so we drew upon the . . .

Flood during thesummer of 1947


Storey: This is tape two of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 25th, 1995.

Vernon: Do I need to backtrack?

Storey: Yes, you need to backtrack a little.

Vernon: I was telling you that these floods that wouldoccur along the high plains areas in which up totwenty-four inches of rain could occur in a two-to three-day period, and the wisdom of bringingthe Commerce Department and its WeatherBureau into the Missouri Basin activity, becausethat gave us a lot of detailed activity on wherestorms occurred and the intensity of them.

Lewis Pick, of the Pick-Sloan name, hadreturned to the United States from his work in thecampaign, the Burma campaign, and President

General Lewis Pick,Chief of the Corps ofEngineers, tasked withfinding a solution to

107

Kenneth F. Vernon

Truman had appointed him as the head of theCorps of Army Engineers in Washington, and, ofcourse, with his background in the prewarplanning of the Missouri Basin, the Presidentturned to General Pick to come up with some sortof a solution as to what to do about theserecurrent high-intensity floods in the plains area.

floods that occurredperiodically on the GreatPlains

So the Corps of Engineers was coming upwith an emergency flood control appropriation,and the Department of the Interior decided thatwe also should get involved with that, and so thesenators that were interested in the MissouriBasin development, particularly in the northernbasin, saw to it that Reclamation received someappropriations for this flood control emergency,flood control appropriation. So I can recall thatthe Commissioner had his first field meeting,program meeting, of all the regions in [Salt LakeCity] Boulder City, in, I believe it was eitherAugust or September of 1947, and it becamevery apparent in that meeting that there was adichotomy existing in Reclamation between whatone might call the new approach and the olderproject approach in all of its knowledge of howto build and operate projects.

Reclamation alsoreceived flood controlmoney, and theCommissioner wantedfast results

The Commissioner was adamant to meand to Mr. Batson that we immediately showresults with this new flood control appropriation,some of which was devoted to projects alreadyfor which we had appropriations, but the politicalpowers had included a number of projects,particularly dams, which might have some floodcontrol aspects, but which were considerabledistance in the future in detailed planning,preconstruction planning.

So in discussing with Mr. [Walker R.(Brig)] Young, the Chief Engineer, as to how Icould satisfy the Commissioner's desires, Isuggested that while we institute immediately

108


dam-site investigations, which would ultimatelylead to designs, that we build access roads andestablish construction camps at these variousdam sites. Mr. Young ultimately agreed that thatprobably was the most we could get away withwithout getting in too much trouble.

Storey: Who was Young?

Vernon: “Brig” Young was the Chief Engineer in Denver[– formerly of the Central Valley Project and ofHoover Dam].

Storey: Oh, okay. Brigham Young?

Vernon: “Brig” Young. No, he was Walker Young, buteverybody called him “Brig” Young. (laughter) Brigham Young. Brig Young.

Turn it off a minute. [Tape recorderturned off]

While we were trying to get our basicMissouri Basic Program organized, carrying outthe activities on the existing projects, wesuddenly had dumped on our lap a whole seriesof new projects for which we were ill-prepared toundertake any immediate activities. So the firstthing that we had to do was to find out wherethese dam sites were, to organize drill crews tostart drilling dam sites to find out what thefoundation conditions were, and [find out] howwe could get access to these dam sites. So westarted a program of building access roads andconstruction of camps, which, if and when theconstruction of the dam would proceed, we wereprepared to start immediately. We'd already hadthat preparatory work done.

Now, another element that I didn't discussearlier, which was an interesting aspect of theconflict of existing activities – I shouldn't say

109

Kenneth F. Vernon

conflict, but the need to coordinate existingactivities and the new Missouri Basin Programwas the Fort Peck Project. The Corps ofEngineers had constructed the Fort Peck Projectin the mid-thirties, and had managed to install acouple of generators in the power house prior tothe war, but it had to suspend operations duringthe war for any additional construction. But atransmission line had been built from Fort Peckto Great Falls, which was delivering power fromFort Peck to the Montana Power Company tofeed into its distribution system, because theMontana Power Company had a very complexand complete power system, including its tie-inwith the Anaconda Smelting and CopperRefining Company, ASCR. The commonknowledge was that the Montana PowerCompany and ASCR controlled Montana, andthat if you were one of their people, you wore thecopper collar.

Montana Power and theAnaconda CopperCompany controlledMontana at that time

Storey: The copper collar.

Vernon: I'll let that go by. (laughter) You wore a coppercollar.

Storey: What was that supposed to mean?

Vernon: Well, it meant that you were under the thumb ofthe Anaconda Copper and Montana PowerCompany.

Storey: Okay. That's all.

Vernon: Now, the Anaconda Copper had ties back tomoney in New York, and I've been told – I don'tknow that this is true, but I had been told that ittied straight back into European money. TheMontana Power Company was a part of theEBASCO . . .

Storey: E-B-A-S-C-O.

110


Vernon: Electric Bond and Share Company in New Yorkand its kingdom of power companies out throughthe [country] region. Anything that says Edisonin it, like Detroit Edison, Commonwealth Edison,anything that said Edison in it was part of theEBASCO realm.

There was another realm, the BillsbyOrganization in Chicago, which had failed duringthe Depression, because it had overextended itsfinancing, and it went bankrupt during theDepression, but it had been a competitor of theEBASCO operation.

Any rate, previous regional managementhad been content. . . Back up. Reclamation hadbeen assigned the responsibility to market,distribute and market the power from the FortPeck Power Plant, so that the power line hadbeen built to Great Falls, and turned, basically,the production of power from Fort Peck over tothe Montana Power Company to distributethrough its existing system. Previous regionalmanagement was not really interested indeveloping an active power program, butReclamation had been given the responsibilityunder the Fort Peck Act of 1930 something orother, <36, <37, something or other, [to] ofmarketing power for Fort Peck and anysubsequent power developments which might bedeveloped in the Basin.

Reclamation wasassigned theresponsibility todistribute and marketelectricity from the FortPeck Powerplant, aCorps project

Similar legislation had been written forthe Bonneville Power Dam in the ColumbiaRiver, and Dr. [Paul J.] Raver11 had created theBonneville Power Administration, and hadabsorbed all of the distribution of the power fromthe dams being built on the Columbia River. Iwas [questioned] reminded a number of times,both by the Commissioner and Mr. [William]Warne, as Assistant Commissioner, and thenlater as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for

111

Kenneth F. Vernon

Water and Power, how I proposed to create a“power administration” for the Missouri Basin,particularly when the mainstream dams wouldcome on line, because we had received theauthority to transmit that power and market itaround the region.

As I said, this was one of the elementswhich created unhappiness in the upper echelonsof departmental management, because theprevious regional management did not see thepower program as a really a Reclamationactivity, even though it was a cash cow forReclamation in repaying project costs. I,however, having grown up on a farm and livedabout a mile from the end of a power line of aprivate power company, and saw my father put tothe wheel and rack, and all of the things that hehad to do to get that line extended to include ourfarm, and then see a competing power companybuild a spite line of fifteen miles on a Sunday toprevent the line that served us from picking up afew more customers, I realized how importantpower development was – the access to electricpower on the farm was important to farmers andtheir operations, particularly in this new age ofmechanization.

So I was strongly supportive of a veryactive power program, personally andprofessionally. So my power manager, JohnWalker, felt that a new day had dawned, and heset up a magnificent program of power marketingand the design of a complex 220-volttransmission line system around the Basin, whichwould ultimately market the power for themainstream dams, including the third unit fromFort Peck when it was completed after the war.

Mr. Walker was a good negotiator, and heworked out agreements with eight of the existingpower companies in our area of the region of the

112


Missouri Basin, and we had excellentrelationships with them through wheeling, whatwe called “wheeling agreements.” In otherwords, they would allow us to transmit powerover their existing systems to reach ruralelectrification projects, which, underReclamation law, held priority in the distributionof and reception of Government power. However, we were never able to arrive at anyreasonable agreement with the Montana PowerCompany, because it felt that it was entitled tomarket all the power in Montana that might bedeveloped, and it saw to it with its financialresources that it managed to do so, although at alater stage, it did agree to tie in with theBonneville Power Administration. Because ofthe low cost, they couldn't equal the cost ofBonneville Power in eastern Montana. So theydid agree to join with the Bonneville Power,particularly at Hungry Horse Dam, to bringBonneville Power into eastern Montana, whichthen did place a real problem with us in having asuccessful power program in the Montana area.

Montana Power refusedto enter into a “wheelingagreement” withReclamation

How Montana Powerworked with theBonneville PowerAdministration andcaused problems forReclamation’s powermanagement out ofBillings

Storey: Now, are you meaning to say eastern Montana,or do you mean western Montana?

Vernon: Eastern Montana. Western Montana, HungryHorse Dam was western Montana. BonnevillePower included all of the Columbia Basin. Now,the Columbia Basin headquarters, The ColumbiaBasin arises in northwestern Montana. TheColumbia Basin tributaries go north into BritishColumbia, then come back around in the state ofWashington, and flows through the state ofWashington. So the Hungry Horse [Dam] is onone the various upper tributaries of the ColumbiaRiver. And so Bonneville, with Dr. Raver, whowas a tremendous administrator, and he had atremendous group of people with him, theycreated a broad power program in the ColumbiaBasin, marketing that very, very cheap power

113

Kenneth F. Vernon

from the Columbia Basin.

The Montana Power Company said,“Well, you've got this guy Vernon, this guyVernon giving us all this trouble down inBillings, let's tie in with Raver and get some ofthat cheap power, and we can block Vernon withhis plans for developing a power system ineastern Montana.” Q-E-D. I had hoped to createa grid, which would include the Yellowtail Damas the southern anchor, the Canyon Ferry as thewestern anchor, the Fort Peck as the easternanchor, and then a main transmission grid downthrough the Yellowstone River, picking up all theirrigation projects and farms along theYellowstone River.

Vernon’s plan for apower grid in Montana

Now we did, as one of our first elementsof our power program marketing Fort PeckPower, was to build the Fort Peck-Glendivetransmission line, which came down the MissouriRiver from Fort Peck, then south to Glendive,and then we were proposed to [build] add it upthe Yellowstone River to Miles City and beyond,but, until Yellowtail was built, we didn't haveenough power to extend beyond Glendive up theYellowstone River.

Fort Peck-Glendivetransmission line

But that was a problem that we had todeal with, because this power program wasanother part of Commissioner Straus's and theDepartment's program for the Missouri Basin. The Secretary had a division in his office calledthe Power Division, headed up by "Tex"Goldsmith, who was setting up poweradministrations all over the West – the SouthwestPower Administration, the tie-in down [a similarone] in Arizona, [and] the Bonneville PowerAdministration, and they saw the next logicalstep was ultimately to be the in the MissouriBasin. So Mike Straus was very interested inseeing an active power program, power

114


marketing program, set up for the basin, but hewas, shall we say, less than enthusiastic abouthaving the power program taken away from himand set up as a separate administration. So hefought for continuing appropriations for us tocontinue our power marketing operations throughReclamation. As a matter of fact, sometimes inlighter moments I would accuse him of takingand promoting as much irrigation as wasnecessary to promote his power program. (laughter) During one of our arguments, whenhe got very strict about insisting in gettingirrigation repayment contact signed before wecould start the construction of an irrigationproject, but he had all kinds of money for powerprojects.

But at any rate, Johnny Walker set up agood design section, designing a transmissionsystem, the layout of a transmission system, anda power marketing program in which he enlistedthe support of eight of the power companies thatwe were dealing with in the area, and all of theseREAs that were being established around theBasin. And in the immediate years right after thewar, the REAs were very active throughout thebasin. John Walker's marketing program, hewould establish the size of a substation to deliverto an REA. We placed the orders, but the orderswere very slow in being delivered because of thebacklog of orders after the war. Before we couldget the delivery of the particular equipment for aparticular substation, the marketers would comeup with a new analysis which showed that thatrequirement was at least double and maybequadruple. So we were placing new orders allthe time and hopscotching around with oldorders, placing them in new areas, and waitingfor deliveries in the first designed areas. So itwas a very intense program there in the very firstfew years.

115

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: So there was a lot more demand for electricpower than was anticipated?

Vernon: Indeed, indeed. See, having grown up on a farm,and I knew how you could use electric power,instead of all this damn gas-powered equipmentthat you had to use, how clean and efficient itwas, I knew these REAs would take off likewildfire, and particularly right after the war,there was this effort of mechanization, anyway,and as I tell later in this story, through our studiesin cooperation with the state colleges, there was agreat revolution in farm size occurring, and sothat this meant more investment in equipmentand farms and in buildings and so on, which Iused this to great advantage in my work inPakistan.

There was a lot ofpotential for electricityon farms

Storey: You're talking about moving around thesubstation equipment.

Vernon: We got to the point where we were havingdifficulty in keeping up with this very growingdemand, and so as rapidly as we could get theequipment we were installing, but probably notwhere we first intended, because the demand hadgrown larger where we first intended it, so weplaced it further out on the system. John Walkerhad worked out these wheeling agreements withthe local power companies, and it was working toeveryone’s advantage. The power companieswere happy, because they lacked generation, andthey were making money off of transmitting ourpower out to these REAs. So they were gettingtransport charges.

Demand for electricitykept outpacingReclamation’s ability toinstall capacity

Storey: Could you explain wheeling, please?

Vernon: Wheeling was a term that meant that we wererenting capacity on a local power company'stransmission system. They might have, say, thebuilt-in capacity much larger than their

“Wheeling agreements”explained

116


generation, their existing generation. So just ashighway traffic builds up, you build a highway totake care of a certain density of traffic, but in itsearly years, you have less traffic than thehighway can carry. So what we did, in effect,was rent that unused capacity in theirtransmission system, which was done throughwhat was called wheeling agreements. But whythey were called wheeling agreements, it wassaid that we wheeled the power over theirtransmission systems. And there were measuringdevices set up to measure the amount of powerthat we used, and we paid them a fee for thatpurpose. So these wheeling agreements werecooperative arrangements with the powercompanies to utilize the unused capacity of theirsystems. And it made them look good, too,because they were assisting the REAs in gettingpower out to them through REAs, the RuralElectrification Administration Projects, whichwere strictly local operations.

There was one special problem we had,was Nebraska, because Nebraska was a public-power state, and the Governor of Nebraska wasinsistent that it get its share – quote "its share"unquote – of the power that would be developed,marketed from the mainstream dams, being builtby the Corps of Engineers. Of course, in theearly years this created a problem, because,obviously, there would be a time when the damswere being constructed, and then there would bea time when the powerplants were beingconstructed. There would be a time when thereservoirs were being filled, and so there wouldbe a time that there were limited amounts ofpower being available from these mainstreamdams.

Nebraska was a publicpower state and insistedon “its share” ofelectricity generated atFederal dams

So the theory and strategy that was takenwas to create a transmission system withconcentric circles, an area of marketing of

How power wasmarketed and whyNebraska was upset atfirst

117

Kenneth F. Vernon

concentric circles, not the transmission system ofconcentric circles, but the marketing area inconcentric circles, which would equal the thengenerating capacity developed by the mainstreamdams as they were approaching completion. And, obviously, in the early days, well, maybenot so obviously, but at least what occurred wasthat the REAs were absorbing, in North andSouth Dakota, all the power that was beinggenerated in this interim phase, before it couldreach Nebraska, which made Governor ValPeterson very unhappy. (laughter) And henailed me to the cross one day at an interagencymeeting down at Omaha, as to why we weren'tdelivering power into the state of Nebraska,which was acknowledged to be a public-powerstate, which had priority for delivery of powerfrom Federal dams. And I had to say simply,“Governor, I'm sorry, but there just isn't enoughpower to go around, and there just isn't enoughpower yet to reach Nebraska.” He took it goodnaturedly, but he always kept reminding me thathe was waiting to get Federal power.

Well, obviously, after the mainstreamdams were completed, the power systemincluded Nebraska, and they were well served.

Storey: The mainstream dams were Corps [of Engineers]dams, right?

Vernon: Yeah. They were the mainstreams right on theMissouri River.

Storey: What were their purposes?

Vernon: Flood control and navigation, principally, withelectric power as a byproduct, which theyoperated the powerhouses, but turned the powerover to us at the high side of the substation at thedam, and we took it and built the transmissionsystem and marketed the power. This was a bone

118


of contention which got aired at one of theinteragency meetings, because, in theory, theCorps of Engineers was to coordinate withReclamation on the design and operation of thepower stations and the substations at the plant, atthe powerplant, and initially the Corps wouldsend us [design documents] documentation andrequire review and comment in an impossiblyshort period of time.

Reclamation took overCorps power at the highside of the substation atthe dams

So having my background in theestablishment of the Federal Interagency RiverBasin Committee and the Missouri River BasinInteragency Committee, I took General Pick totask in open meeting when he asked me howcoordination was going between Reclamationand the Corps, and I said, "General, it stinks." You could hear a pin drop. (laughter) Becauseeverything was supposed to be peaches andcream, you understand.

Coordination betweenthe Corps andReclamation wasn’tworking well

And he said, “Well, how's that Mr.Vernon?”

And I said, “Well, sir, your people inOmaha have sent us the designs for the GarrisonPower Station and the Fort Randall PowerStation.” See, Fort Randall was to be the firstdam, which was the lower dam, one of the lowerdams, and Garrison was one of early dams. Itwas in North Dakota. And they had sent us theirdesigns for the Fort Randall Dam and theGarrison Dam, and gave us a week or ten days toreview and comment on their proposed design,which did not meet the power marketingrequirements, which my people were developingin the power area, the power utilization area, ofthe Basin. So we had some grave doubts aboutthings, and we wanted some revisions made innot so much the actual design of the powergenerating equipment, but more that whichwould be associated with the ability to transmit

119

Kenneth F. Vernon

power and get it away from the dams and meetthe requirements of the power market, whichrequired some revisions. I don't recall thedetails, because I was not that . . .


Storey: You were saying that Mr. Walker had kept youup to date. You'd been supporting him.

Vernon: Yeah. As a sidebar to the conversation in openmeeting of the interagency committee, GeneralPick met me in the hallway. We were meeting atFort Peck, and he met me in the hallway, andtook me to task for raising such a question andissue in open meeting. So I told the general thatthis was not a military operation in which heissued orders and everybody said, “Yes, sir,” buthaving been associated with the establishment ofthe Federal Interagency Committee and theMissouri Basin Committee, I understood thedesire at upper echelons of receiving somecoordination as a response to a possible MissouriValley Authority, and that I felt that his actionsdid not meet those requirements, and I thoughtthat the Interagency Committee should know it,and I would continue to call that attentionwhenever I felt that he again tried to [overrun us]charge Hill 902, as a metaphor. I think thegeneral understood me, because we had nofurther problems in that regard, because he wasfearful of the loss to the Corps of Engineersshould a Missouri Valley Authority beestablished, and it was being talked about atsome length around the valley, particularly thelower valley, because it was more closelyassociated with what was occurring on TennesseeValley Authority, and they were enamored withthe idea of a Missouri Valley Authority. Socoordination did improve greatly after that.

Implications of MissouriValley Authority forReclamation and theCorps

120


So to continue with the development ofthe power program, we then started atransmission system going down the MissouriRiver [from Ft. Peck Dam] and continuing ontoward Garrison Dam, and, ultimately, Bismarck,where we would put in a major distributionsubstation, which would be a key point in theultimate transmission system of the MissouriBasin. And then we ran a transmission system,an extension, from the Fort Peck Glendive line,eastward to tie into the big substation we wereplanning at Bismarck. So this takes us into theearly stages of the powerplant system planning ofwhat became the basic power program with theMissouri Basin. I think now that we ought totake up some of the other activities that weregoing on simultaneously, which we might callmore prosaic Reclamation activities.

Reclamation begins tobuild a transmissionsystem

Storey: Okay. Before we do that, did you ever meet Mr.Sloan?

Vernon: Oh, yes. I knew him well. Oh, yes.

Storey: Tell me about him. He's just sort of a shadowyfigure out there.

Vernon: Well, Glenn Sloan [William G. (Glenn)] was aman who had a golden tongue, and he had a greatvision. I think he could sell iceboxes to Eskimos. He had been up there in the prewar days doingthis planning work in the Missouri Basin. But atthat time, see, you have to understand that duringthe Dust Bowl days, the upper prairie states werein horrendous economic condition. Water waslow, a dry farming area, wheat production haddropped to practically nil. Farmers weredestroying their herds, because they didn't havewater or feed. And so Reclamation, in its usualfashion, was trying to develop a program ofadditional Reclamation projects in the UpperMissouri Basin, which predated the start of

W. Glenn Sloan

121

Kenneth F. Vernon

World War II.

Pick was then Division Engineer atOmaha. He was developing a program of floodcontrol and navigation for the Missouri Riverunder the General Civil Works Program of theCorps of Engineers, which stemmed and relatedto what we called the 308 Reports, which was aseries of reports that the Corps of Engineersissued on the rivers of the country following thefloods of 1928. So their program was acontinuing activity under the general authority ofthe so-called 308 Reports.12

General Pick, let us say, was also a manof tremendous vision and ability to expresshimself well, and he could also not only sell theicebox, but he could he find the Eskimos to sellthem to. So we had a real clash of personalitiesthere, let us say egos, to be quite frank, let's sayegos, between Mr. Sloan and General Pick.

There was a personalityclash between Sloanand Pick

Storey: He was a general at that time?

Vernon: Well, he was colonel initially, [when] but hedeveloped his basic program for the MissouriRiver, but after he came back from the Burmacampaign, he then became a general.

Storey: So he was probably a District Engineer as acolonel?

Vernon: He was a Division Engineer as a colonel.

Storey: Division. Okay, I just wanted to check.

Vernon: See, in Omaha there was two things, there wasthe Missouri River Division in Omaha –

Storey: Right. That would have several districts.

Vernon: Yes. There was the Fort Peck District and the

122


Omaha District and the Kansas City District, andprobably the district at St. Louis was probablyassociated with the Mississippi River. But therewas the Kansas, the Omaha, and the Fort Peck,and then later, as they got into the construction ofthe dams, he established district offices at theGarrison District and the Oahe District, whichwas just a means of establishing administrativeentities on those large construction projects. Buthe was the Division Engineer at Omaha, andcame up with this scheme of dams, which FortPeck had been one under the 308 [reports], ofcourse, and these dams related – the Garrison,the Oahe, the Big Bend, Fort Randall, andGavins Point, all stem from the initialauthorizations of the 308 Reports.

Storey: So, anyway, we had this ego clash going on.

Vernon: And so Glenn Sloan felt a “paternalship,” shallwe say, a paternal relationship to his scheme thatwas [outlined] declaimed in Senate Document191, which is the authorizing document for theSloan element of the Pick-Sloan Plan, and heprotected it zealously.

Storey; Where was Glenn Sloan located when he wasdoing this planning?

Vernon: I don't know, but I think he was located inBillings, as I recall. I don't really know, but Ithink he was headquartered in Billings, but hehad teams out in Wyoming. He had teams out upin the Upper Missouri. He had teams out inNorth Dakota and South Dakota, but these werebasically planning groups. They were just verysmall groups, and they were what we would callfly parties. They were here a few weeks andthere a few weeks and somewhere else a fewweeks. There was no what we callpreconstruction planning. It was still broadplanning in trying to identify land resources and

123

Kenneth F. Vernon

water resources.

Storey: So they didn't know exactly? They thought thereought to be a major dam somewhere, but theydidn't have the detail background?

Vernon: Let us say that Document 191 was a wonderfulcatalog. And that's why the flood controlappropriation of 1947 was such a thunderbolt tome, because here we were given appropriationsto build dams that we didn't even know wherethey were, and I was supposed to go out thereand start construction. So I believe the upperechelons of administration, Reclamation, and theDepartment, felt that Mr. Sloan's talents could bebetter utilized, instead of being AssistantRegional Director. He had been made AssistantRegional Director in Billings, would be betterutilized to make him as the Chairman of theInterior Missouri Basin Committee, and then alsothe Interior representative on the FederalMissouri Basin Committee. So that meant Sloanwas then moved over and replaced Mills Bunger,who, I indicated earlier, had been the firstChairman of the Interior Committee. But MillsBunger became interested in overseasassignment, so Glenn Sloan was moved over asthe Chairman of the Interior Committee, and thenalso as the Interior representative on the MissouriBasin Interagency Committee. Both myself andAvery Batson then supported Glenn Sloan withstaff work in representing Reclamation in theInteragency Committee, which was composed ofthe Federal agencies and the five governors.

W. Glenn Sloan movedto chair Interior’sMissouri BasinCommittee and Interiorrepresentative on theFederal Missouri BasinInteragency Committee

But, Glenn Sloan was a very interestinggentleman. He had a great vision, and he had asilver tongue. He could go to a meeting and he'dhave everybody's vote before he left, there's noquestion about it. Unfortunately, Glenn did notlike detailed work. When it fell to me to bringdown some of his ideas to basic fact, it created

W. Glenn Sloan hadgreat vision and a silvertongue, but did not likedetail work

124


some stresses and strains, because he did notwant his baby, so to speak, tampered with. Thiscame to a head when I finally decided that wewere not going to utilize his diversion to NorthDakota from below Fort Peck, but that's acomplete other story, which I'll get into later. Did that answer your question about GlennSloan?

Storey: Yes.

Vernon: That's about as well as I can describe him. Hewas a remarkable guy, really, but at the sametime, he was a visionary. He didn't want to bebothered with facts, so to speak. (laughter) Andone of the problems we had with him was whenwe insisted that we had to do preconstructionplanning, detailed preconstruction planning, as Iwould get into later, when I instituted thepractice, which was similar to that of the Corpsof Engineers, of after having, shall we say, asummary report or an exposition of what aproject might be, then we had to get down to thenitty gritty and get it at what we called a definiteproject plan report, which I adopted from theCorps of Engineers' practice, because they wouldhave their authorizing report, which was prettymuch a description of what they thought could bedone, then they would get authorized to study itin detail and come up with a definite project planreport, which was everything but final designs. Then, ultimately, then they'd get the projectappropriated for, and then they would go intotheir final design work. So I said that makes a lotof sense to me. [Also this was parallel to myexperience on the Central Valley Project.] Withthis stuff that's floating around here in the upperether, to bring it down to brass tacks, that wewould have to adopt something similar to thatwith this first set of series of projects, and go intodetail project planning and come up with adefinite project report, where we would establish

Vernon wanted detailedpreconstructionplanning done forprojects

125

Kenneth F. Vernon

the elevations of the dimensions of what was tobe done. Then we would go into the formationof an irrigation district, and that was a wholeseparate activity, formation of an irrigationdistrict, because each state had different rulesand laws, but fundamentally it required a vote ofthe people that would be involved if there werealready people on the land in formation ofirrigation district.

Previously, Reclamation hadn't beenfaced with that problem, because it was designedto develop public lands and get them into privateownerships. Then irrigation districts came at alater date. But Mr. Straus insisted that sincemuch of these lands that had already passedownership that we were going to develop in thePick-Sloan Plan were already in privateownership, then private ownership rights wereinvolved, and we would have to give the people achance to vote on the formation of an irrigationdistrict under state laws as it applied to thatparticular area, which became a very difficultproposition, a time-consuming proposition.

So now we've got our regionalorganization in place. We've got our fieldorganization in place. We’ve got money tospend. So it was to have at it. And that becamea very interesting exercise.

Storey: Now, when was all of this in place?

Vernon: Well, by this time, it was beginning of about1948. I had my field organization, the structurein place. I had my leading people in place, andnow it was a matter of starting recruitment,which that brings me to the changes I made inmy personnel office. I maintained control,myself, of finance and personnel. And so Icalled one of my colleagues that I knew from myWashington days to come out to Billings and

126


assist George Pratt, my Assistant to the RegionalDirector, of examining our personnel officeoperations, because we were going to head into avery heavy recruitment program.

Well, they came up with the answer thatthe people that were there were just not capableof executing such an expanded program, and,therefore, we should either find them other placesof activity or transfer them out on something, andbring in a whole new team. I was given access toa man from the War Department, Howard Watt,to be the head Personnel Officer. I wasimmediately impressed with Mr. Watt – Watt orWatts? – Howard Watts – as a guy whounderstood how to create a really effectivepersonnel organization and how to institute arecruitment program, matching up people withslots – functions. So we made Howard Watts theChief Personnel Officer.

Howard Watt installedas Personnel Officer

One of the people that we decided wasineffective in his current position was the thenAssistant Personnel Officer, who also happenedto be the [husband] wife of the RepublicanCounty Chairwoman of Yellowstone County inMontana, which Billings is located.

Storey: The husband of the . . .

Vernon: He was the husband of the Republican [countychairwoman], [who] which became my nemesisat a later time, because I suggested that he find adifferent relationship and a new associationrather than Reclamation. In other words, I firedhim. (laughter) And she marked on hercalendar, "I'll get you, Vernon, someday in thefuture, along with some of your colleagues."

Removed the husbandof the Republicancounty chairwomanfrom the regionalpersonnel office

At any rate, we then instituted a heavyrecruitment program, because we had money. Just to show you how it worked, the program that

Began a heavyrecruitment program

127

Kenneth F. Vernon

was executed in the year 1946 was only $6million. There were a lot of reasons for that. Among others, there were shortage of material,there were shortage of manpower, but there wasalso this older approach to Reclamationdevelopment that had not really received themessage of the new Missouri Basin Program, andby 1950, in three years, we were executing $50million worth of projects and were ready to[expand further] proceed more when the KoreanWar started, and had to put things in the iceboxagain. But the point that I'm making is howeffective our operations were in bringing theprojects to the execution stage, bringingadditional projects, the detailed project reportstage, and then ready for execution, and then alsocarrying on what we called broad Basin-typeplanning operations, which were identifyingresources – both land and water.

In 1946 the regionalprogram was $6,000,000

In 1950 the regionalprogram was$50,000,000

This is where the Geological Surveycame in very handy, because as I told you, wefinanced and gave them emphasis on their[cadastral] mapping, creating mapping,additional mapping, in the Basin, and also theyinstituted a whole additional network ofhydrologic measuring stations. So we then had ahandle on water supplies that were available fordevelopment. We had land areas that could beconsidered for development. We hadidentification of other resources from the Bureauof Land Management, and the National ParkService for Recreation. All this began to meldtogether and become a cohesive approach to abasinwide development program. Theeffectiveness of it was that by 1950, we executed$50 million worth of activities, including theconstruction. We instituted the construction ofBoysen Dam on the [Bighorn] Wind River. Weinstituted the construction of Canyon Ferry Damon the Upper Missouri. We institutedconstruction of Heart Butte Dam on Heart River

Had provided support tothe USGS that provedvery helpful

Boysen Dam

Canyon Ferry Dam

Heart Butte Dam

Angostura Dam

Expansion of the

128


in North Dakota. We had instituted theconstruction of the Angostura Dam in SouthDakota, as well as expansion of the RivertonProject, expansion of the Shoshone Project, andexpansion of [the] this transmission system.

Riverton and Shoshone Projects and thetransmission system

So as I say, this was in full flower by1950 when the Korean War occurred, and thatrequired us to then put a damper on things, sothen we had to sort of retract, which obviouslystopped our recruitment program, and we had tostart retracting in areas of activity that mightconflict with the emphasis on the Korean War,and particularly because various supplies becamescarce as they were required for the war effort.

Korean War slowedwork and recruitment

But I got up to about a total employmentin the region of about 2,400 people. I toldHoward Watts, when we reached 2,400, I said,"Close the door, Howard, I think we'd betterstop." Well, to make a long story short, becauseof the pipeline, we ultimately got up to do about2,500 total employees in the region.

Storey: Because of the pipeline?

Vernon: Because of the pipeline. In other words, therewere certain commitments that already had beengiven, which you had to honor. But certainthings which were in the conversation stage, youcould cut off. So the pipeline produced a total ofabout 2,500 people.

Storey: The personnel pipeline.

Vernon: The personnel pipeline. Also at that same time,in our finance office, I had instituted a programoffice which was a carryover of my days as theChief Progress Control Officer effort inWashington. I insisted on a series of monthlyreports, which gave me an up-to-date status ofour appropriations, both as to total availability, to

129

Kenneth F. Vernon

the amounts which we placed encumbrancesupon as to future activities, those amounts whichwere sequestered as obligations for constructionand payment of contract obligations, and actualchanges into expenditures. So I carried on mydesk an up-to-date statement at all times of wherewe stood with our financing operations, as wellas program performance, and where problemswere developing, which required administrativeattention.

It was working very well. Theorganization was paying off. As one element inthe planning operation, not located in projectplanning, but located in the Operation andMaintenance Division, was the assignment ofestablishing coordination with the stateagricultural colleges. We entered intomemorandums of understanding with the fourstate colleges that we were dealing with: SouthDakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. We provided money to them to undertakedemographic and other economic studies as towhat was occurring in the agriculturaldevelopment of the Basin.

Storey: Before we go on, you said there were five, butyou only listed four.

Vernon: Did I say five?

Storey: North and South Dakota, Montana, andWyoming.

Vernon: I'm sorry, I should have said four. BecauseAvery Batson had Colorado. So I mistookmyself; it was four. I was thinking districts,rather than the states. We had five districts in thefour states.

We would transfer money to the statecolleges to undertake demographic and other

Used state agriculturalcolleges to do studies

130


economic studies of what was happening in thefarming, particularly irrigated farming, in thevarious states, and we found some very seriousthings were occurring, particularly in North andSouth Dakota. As a point in my talks in thosestates, one of their most highly valued exportswas young people, that young people could notfind employment within the states, because dueto the advent of mechanized farming, farm sizeswere suddenly increasing, and therefore, lessopportunity for farm population. We found thatlarge operators, which later were labeledagribusiness, were entering into the basin, andtaking up large tracts of land through operatingrelationships, and so that therefore there wasexodus of people from the farms both to thecities and out of the Basin, which I felt was anextremely important element, which would affectultimately the development of the Basin.

I placed that in the economics group. Their training had been in the farm agent work inthe Department of Agriculture. I wasaccustomed to what farm agents did, because inmy youth, on my father's farm, my father wasconsidered as a progressive farmer, and thecurrent local farm agent used to use my father'sfarm for demonstration activities among the otherfarmers. He came over from the University ofCalifornia in Davis, and he would periodicallyhold demonstrations on my father's farm, whohad gone into chicken farming, chicken raising,not so much – we [also] had the agriculture, butthat was not his primary or income development. He ultimately in later years got into chickenfarming, and we had, at that time, a sizeableflock of about four thousand chickens. He wouldbuy day-old chicks. At that time, they haddeveloped how to sex the day-old chicks, and sohe would buy a certain number of what we calledpullets, the females, the hens, and also thecockerels. He would separate those, and he

Father got into chickenfarming

131

Kenneth F. Vernon

would raise the pullets to replace the laying hens. You'd figure they were good for about threeyears, and then by that time, you'd sell them tothe Chinese market to make bok choy orwhatever kind of soup they make out of littlechickens.

But he would then force feed – theyconfine and force-feed the cockerels, and so hecould turn them off to [the] a broiler market inabout ten weeks. This has later become a very,very large activity in Arkansas and other placesin California, in Holly Farms and Foster Farms inCalifornia, and the Tyson Farms in Arkansas,and so on. But he was one of the early guys toget into that complex of the chicken farming ofboth the broiler market and the egg market.

I became familiar with the farm agentprocess and what they were trying to do as astimulator of activities to improve the farmoperations through demonstrations on particularfarmers' farms to demonstrate particular things,so I supported the activity that these people weredoing, because I understood what they weredoing and how necessary it would be, ultimately,to development of these land resources in theBasin.

How he used farmagents

About this time, we were beginning to –


Storey: This is tape three of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 25th, 1995.

Vernon: Do I need to backtrack?

Storey: Yes, just a little bit.

Vernon: Well, as I was telling you about these farm

132


agents and their activities, we had begun to getinto detailed planning and investigations,detailed investigations and planning, in Sloan'splan for diversion to North Dakota and diversionfrom the Oahe, the future Oahe Dam, to [James]Jim's River Valley in South Dakota.

Planning for diversionsfrom Oahe Dam on theMissiouri River

We were running into several problemswith Sloan's scheme on the North Dakotadiversion. His scheme was to build a diversiondam below the mouth of the Milk River as itentered the Missouri below Fort Peck [and] havea canal travel along the northern bank of theMissouri River, delivering water to lands whichwere then, and I presume now, in Indianreservation ownership, ultimately go through anold channel of the Missouri River and debouchinto the northwest corner of North Dakota.

Issues with the NorthDakota diversion in theSloan Plan

Two problems were becoming veryevident. One was the problem of ownership ofIndian lands. Now, as I told you, when settingup the coordinated Interior program and gettingappropriations for the other Interior agencies, oneof the problems was the development of Indianownership lands in the Reclamation program. Sohere we were face to face with this problem ofIndian ownerships of various kinds along thisnorthern boundary, northern bank of the MissouriRiver. I don't recall which tribes were involved,but it was a very complex ownership situation. Some of it was in tribal ownership. Some of itpassed to heirships. I recall one particularportion of the land, the lowest commondenominator of the heirships was over 300,000. That was the lowest common denominator. Theupper denominator was something more thanone. But the point was that it was such acomplex heirship-ownership, that no one couldconceive of how in the world we could determineand get the owners of that land to ever establishan irrigation district, because under Montana

There were problemswith applying thereclamation program toIndian lands

133

Kenneth F. Vernon

law, they would have to establish an irrigationdistrict.

Then we ran into problems as we hadproceeded with our land classification studies innorthwestern North Dakota. Mr. Sloan, in hisstudies, planning studies, had not gotten into thatvery deeply. He had simply laid out a projectplan, but had not been able to get into the detailof which lands would be served. We ran intotwo major problems. One was, this land was ahighly dense compacted glacial till, a cold soilthat nearly approached permafrost. It frozedeeply in the wintertime, and it was late summerbefore all the frost was out of the ground. Thiswould create, not only because it was densecompaction as glacial till, but the permafrostcreated drainage problems in the soils. So weconcluded that these soils would present aproblem of getting water into the soils and thencreating a more difficult problem of getting waterout of the soils through a drainage system.

Land classificationstudies were underwayin northwestern NorthDakota

Permafrost and drainageissues

Another problem was micro-relief, micro-topographic relief, in this territory. Since thiswas the remnants of glacial till, in other words,it'd been deposited underneath the Great NorthAmerican Glacier, and it was why the MissouriRiver departed from the channel that GlennSloan had thought to use going into northwesternNorth Dakota, it caused the Missouri River tobend south at about the Montana line andproceed down south through North Dakota andSouth Dakota and so on. So this topography hada serious problem of micro-relief, but it wasmicro-relief in the sense of not a few feet, but itmight be up to twenty feet, and it would be verydifficult to create a distribution system thatwould deliver water over such a system. Theonly system we thought might be useable wassprinkler irrigation, which was just becomingdeveloped during that period, and it wasn't well

Sprinkler irrigation wasjust developing

134


known or well developed, and we were a littleleery about really putting our future into it.

So Mr. Johnson, who was the DistrictManager in Bismarck, had been looking at otherlands in [North] South Dakota, and he came upwith the idea that farther south and east of thelands which Glenn Sloan had thought to irrigate,were lands which were covered with residualglacial deposits, but they weren't highlycompacted glacial tills, but were more loamysoils and were what we called warmer soils,which did not frost so heavily and freeze sodeeply and became warmer earlier in the spring,and therefore had been utilized as spring plantingrather than the winter planting which thenorthwestern farmers used. They did a lot ofwinter planting, fall planting, and then allowedthe crops to come up right after the fall. But thelands further south and to the east seemed morelikely to be receptive to irrigation agriculture.

So along about 1950, as I recall, thisstudy was coming to a head, and I authorized Mr.Johnson to make a comprehensive study of thealternatives of abandoning the Sloan plan ofdiverting just below Fort Peck and adopting theCorps of Engineers' plan of pumping from theGarrison Reservoir. As I indicated earlier, thiscreated a strong dissension with Mr. Sloan andthe supporters of Mr. Sloan's plan in NorthDakota. But as Mr. Johnson carried on hisdetailed investigations, it became more and moreclear that the diversion from Garrison, both landresources-wise and hydrologically, was moreimportant to the Basin, and had a higherprobability of development than the Sloan plan.

Because of soil issuesbegan to look atdiverting water fromGarrison Reservoir

Just to make a point, the Sloan Planwould have debouched whatever drainage itdeveloped into the Souris River, which came outof Canada, curved around Minot, and then went

135

Kenneth F. Vernon

back into Canada. So whatever drainage wasplaced into the Souris River became lost to theBasin. The second thing was, because of otherwater-saving elements, we figured that therewould be an overall savings of water to the Basinof about 200,000 acre-feet per year, which was aresource which could be used somewhere else inthe Basin, particularly, say, the Jim River, theJames River, or eastern and southern NorthDakota. It could be diverted from the GarrisonReservoir and placed in North Dakota. So thatstudy was going on.

But, under the rules of operation inkeeping states informed as to the developmentsof our investigations, I held a meeting with theGovernor of North Dakota and his watercommission to explain to him what we wereincluding, and the reasons why were including itand so on, and that it looked like we ultimatelywould be recommending abandonment of GlennSloan's [diversion] plan to northern North Dakotaand adopting a plan to divert into central NorthDakota. This, of course, created some problemsfor the Governor, because he had a politicalclimate to live in, also. And the people innorthwestern North Dakota had been very strongsupporters of the Pick-Sloan Plan.

Storey: The folks who were living on the permafrost.

Vernon: Yeah, right. It really wasn't permafrost, but itwas close to it, because it took late spring beforeit ever thawed down to through the root zone,and so you'd get water out of it and drain it.

Well, at any rate, he made a reasonablerequest to me. He said would I engage in athorough vetting of these alternatives and set upa consulting board, [in] which the state of NorthDakota could participate and examine thesealternatives, which I readily agreed to. I said,

136


“Yes, indeed, we will.”

So I set up the consulting boardcomposed of my old professor at University ofCalifornia, Mr. Sydney T. Harding, who I toldyou earlier, his elements of teaching related toon-farm developments, drainage, crops, and thatsort of thing; a gentleman who was nominated bythe Bureau of Indian Affairs because of theIndian land problem, and a gentleman from theDepartment of Agriculture. Now, I don't recallthose names, because I was not intimatelyfamiliar with them, but they were carefullychosen, and they accepted the charge, and theyexamined the results of our investigations both inthe field and in the office and so on, and talkedwith the people in North Dakota and Montana.

Consulting board set upto study the issues ofirrigation in NorthDakota and Montana

They concluded that our results of ourinvestigations were correct, and that the SloanPlan should be dropped, and that the diversionfrom Garrison should be adopted as a step to thebetter for the development of the Basin, not theleast of which was that Indian lands problem inMontana.

About that same time, as we began toformulate a discrete plan for the ultimatedevelopment of North Dakota, it becameessential that we consider how this developmentwas going to be conducted in the state of NorthDakota and meet the requirements ofReclamation law. Now, I had a very brilliantregional counsel, who I've not mentioned earlier,but he had been very important in thedevelopment of the legislation of the MissouriRiver Basin scheme, and he was a very brilliantlawyer that had been involved for many, manyyears in the development of Reclamation in theupper plains states, and he was accredited topractice before the Supreme Court of UnitedStates, because he had been intimately involved

137

Kenneth F. Vernon

in the solution of the Platte River problemsbetween Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska.

So I suggested to Mr. Burke, what aboutthe establishment of what we might call aconservancy district in North Dakota, whichwould have much broader ramifications than justthe usual irrigation district where just the landsthat were being served. We would thenencompass a much broader base. I said, "Youknow, in a practical matter, the Corps ofEngineers, with its non-reimbursable investmentsin flood control and river transportation, hasmade a conservancy district out of the totalUnited States. Call it by any other name,basically the United States is a gross conservancydistrict, and all the people in the United Statescontribute to their project[s]. So can you can upwith some kind of a scheme that would meetrequirements of our law and North Dakota's lawsthat we could establish a conservancy district forthe Garrison diversion project?"

He said, “That's a very interestingchallenge.” But he did work out a scheme inconsultation with the people of the governmentof North Dakota for a conservancy district for theGarrison diversion to North Dakota, and itpassed. They held an election, and it did pass. Now, that was somewhere along in the early1950s. I'm not just exactly sure of when thisoccurred, but it was in the early 1950s, because itwas before the advent of the EisenhowerAdministration, because the then Governor ofNorth Dakota was Fred Aandahl. He had beenvery active in Missouri Basin Project affairs andthrough the interagency committee.

Conservancy districtestablished in NorthDakota for the Garrisondiversion

Storey: And Aandahl, I believe, is A-H-N-D-A-H-L.

Vernon: I don't remember. It's a Norwegian name. A-A-H-N-D-A-H-L or A-H-N-D-A-H-L, but it's a

Governor Aahndahl inNorth Dakota

138


Norwegian name.13 But Governor Aandahl was astaunch supporter of the Missouri BasinProgram, and he saw the rationale [of what] thatwe were proposing, and so he put his people towork, and he strongly supported theestablishment of this conservancy district.

When the Eisenhower Administrationcame in, he was appointed Assistant Secretaryfor Water and Power in the EisenhowerAdministration, Interior. So I know it occurredwhile he was still Governor.

Storey: The attorney's name again?

Vernon: William J. Burke. B-U-R-K-E. As I said, Mr.Burke was a powerful intellect. He wasrecognized as being one of the fathers ofirrigation law in the high plains states. He hadhis office in Montana, in Billings, Montana. I[inherited] encompassed him, and he was anotherone of the elements that I had encompassed intothe regional structure. Mr Burke was somewhatchagrined because of his close association withthe development of legislation for the MissouriBasin, [that] but I did not appoint him as anAssistant Regional Director, but Mr. Burke hadsome other problems which made him sometimesunavailable. I did not want to feel that he[should] could then become a part of the regionaladministration, but that his function was bestserved as regional counsel with a group ofassistant counsels under him to solve ournumerous problems of legal character. At times,Mr. Burke became unavailable and we neverknew just exactly where he was, and sometimeshe would lock himself in his office. Sometimeshe would disappear for days. We never quiteknew exactly where he was, neither did hisfamily. He maintained it was his ability tocleanse his mind of all the confusing thoughtsthat he had, and become refreshed and tackle the

William J. Burke anattorney important inirrigation law in the highplains

139

Kenneth F. Vernon

problems anew. [Tape recorder turned off]

Storey: You say ultimately Mr. Burke went toWashington?

Vernon: Mr. Burke, our regional counsel, who was veryinvolved in the original legislation for theMissouri Basin Project, was tapped to be anAssociate Solicitor in the Department, in theEisenhower Administration, after the EisenhowerAdministration came in, and I don't recallwhether his transfer was effected before I leftBillings or after I left Billings, in the fall of 1954,but my recollection is that he was transferred intoWashington before I left, and one of the menfrom the Chief Counsel's office in Washingtonwas sent out to replace him as Regional Counsel. I can't recall his name for the moment, but itoccurred probably in the later days of my tenurein Billings, because I was not intimatelyassociated with him, although I had known himvery well while I was stationed in Washington. Herb de Vries, that was his name. Herbert deVries. D-E V-R-I-E-S, I think it was.

Storey: With a capital V?

Vernon: Yeah. Capital D, capital V. Because in my –well, we'll get into this later. After theEisenhower Administration had gotten itselforganized and [Wilbur A.] Dexheimer becameCommissioner, it was decided to replace me asRegional Director with a Mr. Frank Clinton fromRegion I, and I was established as a SpecialAssistant to the [regional director]Commissioner, and was given the opportunity toconduct some studies that I'd wanted to do,which I'd never been able to do while I wasRegional Director. Frank took overadministration of the region. I think it wasduring that time that Herb de Vries came out andtook over as Regional Counsel, and I didn't have

Wilbur A. Dexheimerbecomes Commissioner

Replaced by FrankClinton and madespecial assistant to theregional director

140


any direct association with him, any occasion fordirect association with him, but I continued tohave association with some the associatecounsels in the regional counsel's office becauseof some the special studies I was conducting.

At any rate, we did get the conservancydistrict established in North Dakota, and we wereconducting our investigations of the potentialdiversion from the diversion reservoir, theGarrison Reservoir, rather than utilizing theSloan plan below Fort Peck.

One of the elements that we werefollowing up on in our project developmentphase was the establishment of what we calledexperimental farms, particularly for the lands inNorth and South Dakota. This group that I hadearlier indicated in the O&M Department hadestablished a development farm in this glacial tillarea, and they were coming up with all kinds ofdifficult problems relating to this glacial till soil.

Storey: This was the compacted soils?

Vernon: Compacted glacial till soils. And the drainageproblems, and the short growing season, shortergrowing season, and they began looking intothese lands further the south and east, that wecalled the warmer soils, and we started adevelopment farm over there and were gettingmuch better results from that, and so this wasanother element that fit into the conclusion thatthe lands further south and east diverting fromGarrison was [a better] another solution.

Storey: Now, when you say we started a developmentfarm, what do you mean exactly?

Setting up developmentfarms

Vernon: We actually either made an agreement with alocal farmer or bought some land, and actuallyset into farming. Irrigated farming.

141

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: So we weren't, for instance, paying theAgriculture Department?

Vernon: No. We called upon the state college to adviseus on this, the agricultural college to advise us onthis, this was done in cooperation with them, butit was our operation, and these men that I hadplaced in our Operation and MaintenanceDepartment of project development conductedthese operations on these development farms.

We also set up a similar developmentfarm in the James River Valley down close toHuron, and we came up with some astoundingresults, what irrigation would produce in theJames River Valley in South Dakota. Forexample, rain-fed corn, which was producing upto a hundred bushels an acre in Iowa, was onlyproducing under rain-fed conditions in the JamesRiver Valley of ten to fifteen bushels an acre,whereas under irrigation, we found thatimmediately, without going into any furtherdetails, with simply the application of water,ample quantities at the right time, weimmediately produced eighty bushels to the acre,and by introducing applications of various kindsof fertilizer and other farming techniques, wecould see 120 bushels to the acre as a completepossibility. One of the problems we had,however, was that in order to make those resultspossible, we would probably have to develop anew breed of corn, which the agriculturalcolleges started to undertake, because under dryland conditions, the corn that was being used hada maturity date of about ninety days, which thenmeant that corn could be harvested before thefreeze-up in the fall. However, under irrigatedconditions, and the more intense growing, thecorn was still in what was called the milk stage. In other words, it hadn't matured completely. And so that the time the frost occurred, the cornhad not matured, and therefore did not become

142


really a merchantable quality.

So we undertook the program with thestate colleges to see what they could do towarddeveloping a new breed of corn. I also called inDr. Harlan Barrows of the University of Chicago,[head of] the Geography Department of theUniversity of Chicago, as a consultant who hadbeen active in previous stages of the MissouriBasin, who had done some investigations inRussia, of Russian developments on the tundra,of crops which could grow under conditions of ashort growing season, mature under a shortergrowing season, and he was assisting theagricultural college in coming up with that. Wellthis was going on while we were carrying onthese other investigations.

One of the things that I also wanted to do,particularly as we found out what could occur inthe James River Valley, was we were active intrying to develop irrigation in what we called theWest River Area, which was west of theMissouri Basin, west of the Missouri River. Glenn Sloan had proposed a number of irrigationdevelopments in what was called necklacedevelopments along the river bottoms, along theGrand River, the Morro River, the CheyenneRiver, and other rivers in the west country, butfundamentally that area was cattle-growing area. It was grass country. What irrigationdevelopment could occur would support range-fed cattle with additional sources of hay, but thereal thing would be, if this corn proposition inthe James River Valley could be really madesuccessful, I foresaw a new cattle industrypredicated upon the range lands of west of theMissouri River, bringing them over to the JamesRiver Valley for finishing operations with thecorn that would be developed in the James RiverValley, in the irrigated lands of the James RiverValley. To a certain extent, this was being done

143

Kenneth F. Vernon

in Nebraska, and, as a matter of fact, there weregreat feeding operations going on in the Omahaarea, and in the Sioux City, and other cities. Let's see. There was Sioux City and Sioux Fallsin the South Dakota and Iowa area of cattle-feeding operations, predicated on bringing cattlefrom the high plains area down to the Omaha –


Storey: You were talking about the potentials for raisingcorn in the James River Valley and then bringingin cattle for finishing there, and that kind ofthing.

Vernon: Right. Now, I think that that pretty well coversthe activities that we were engaged in, in theMissouri Basin area.

Our South Dakota District Office wasalso involved in expansion project[s], the BelleFourche Project, certain activities of the BelleFourche Project. Then in the western part ofSouth Dakota, there was the Angostura dam. And then we also were looking at a dam site onthe upper reaches of the Belle Fourche Rivercalled Keyhole, and then there was also PactolaDam, which was closer to Rapid City, whichwould ultimately service municipal water toRapid City and the big air base that had beenbuilt just adjacent to Rapid City, where the bigB-52 bombers, part of the SAC.

Belle Fourche Project

Angostura Dam

Keyhole Dam

Pactola Dam

Storey: I've forgotten the name of it.

Vernon: Ellsworth. I think it was Ellsworth. I won'tguarantee that, but I think it was Ellsworth AirForce Base. They stationed first B-47s – no, firstB-36s, which was fantastic to see, then that was apusher airplane, a propeller pusher airplane, thenthere was the B-47s and then, ultimately, the B-

144


52s. So we worked out a deal whereby we wouldbuild the Pactola Dam and provide municipalwater to Rapid City and water to the Air Forcebase.

So I want to take up now what was goingon in Wyoming, because this was a differentaspect of the Basin development. Fundamentally, it was predicated on the olderReclamation development, but I was bringing itinto the Missouri Basin Program. The first one,which was quite successful, was the HeartMountain Division of the Shoshone Project,adjacent to Cody. These lands were of highquality and didn't require a large amount of canalconstruction to bring water from the Buffalo BillDam to these lands on this Heart MountainBench, which, incidentally, had been the site of aJapanese Relocation Center during World War II.

Heart Mountain Divisionof the Shoshone Project

So very early on, in 1947, we held ourfirst drawing of [settlers in the] VeteranSettlement Program for the Heart MountainDivision. And then in succeeding years, we heldadditional drawings and settlement of selectionsof veterans to award them homesteads in theproject area. These lands were very good, andthese settlers became successful very early on.

Veteran settlementprogram drawing for theHeart Mountain Division

However, it was a different story on theRiverton [Project]. In the expansion of theDivision Two of the Midvale Irrigation District,we ran into some soil problems of salinity. Iimmediately enlisted the help of the Soil SalinityLaboratory of the Department of Agriculture tocome and give us assistance in determining whatthe salinity problems were and what might bedone about it. Basically it's called anexchangeable sodium ion, which tends to, in thepresence of water, cause the soil to lose itsstructure loamy structure, and become, first,almost impermeable to water, and then, second,

Riverton Project

145

Kenneth F. Vernon

once water is into it, become almost undrainable.

It took some time to find out what wasgoing on, and we had already held a couple ofdrawings for veteran settlement on the expansionof the Midvale Irrigation District. At the sametime we were constructing the drainage system,but the expansion of the irrigation was occurringfaster than the drainage system was being built,and then because of the problems of the soilbecoming impermeable, we suddenly discoveredthat the settlers on these lands were faced withdisaster.

The Farmers Home Administration of theDepartment of Agriculture had moved in, andhad provided financing to these farmers to getthem established on their farms, and, therefore,these farmers were not only saddled with theexpense of getting their farms into production,but they also were faced with mortgages on theirfarms from the Farmers Home Administration forfinancing of equipment and so on. And here,suddenly, they discovered that their land wasbecoming unproductive, and this began to showup in about 1950.

At the same time, we were planning toexpand the canal system of the Riverton Projectinto what was called the Third Division or theCottonwood Bench area. These were soils ofmuch lighter character, and it was a muchwindier area. So to begin with, early on, weestablished a development farm on theCottonwood Bench area, and there we found thatwhile these soils responded well to theapplication of water, they were of such lightcharacter that the prevailing winds would causethe sandy soil to move and literally saw the cropsoff, the growing crops off, at the ground [level].

So before we wanted to undertake, really,

146


expansion of the canal system into theCottonwood Bench area, we began anotherprogram of trying to figure out how to makethese soils less volatile and still retain theirproductivity. That work was still going on whenI left the region in the fall of 1954, and I don'tknow for sure whether that canal system had everbeen extended into the Cottonwood Bench area.

But going back now to the MidvaleDistrict, one of the experiments that we weretrying with these salinized soils was electrolysis,to see if we could get an eye on displacement inthe soils by introducing electric current, and getthe sodium out of the soils into the drainagesystem. Well, that worked to some extent, butnot very well, and it was expensive. So in about1952, I believe, <53, a rescue program wasauthorized by which these farmers who [had]now received lands, who now were trying tofarm lands which had become heavily salinized,would be [relocated] replaced to some otherproject, given a new opportunity in some otherproject, and that was going on when I leftBillings. I don't know how successful or howlong that was carried on. But the experience ofthis sodium in soils served me very well in mylater work both in Iraq, Mesopotamia, and inPakistan, in the Punjab in Pakistan, because Iwas now aware that an exchangeable sodium ionhad a very bad effect on irrigated soils.

So let's see, what else have we got now? Sloan's Plan, adoption of the diversion for theGarrison Dam Conservancy District, diversionfrom Oahe at James River, the problems there.

Oh, yes, before I left Billings, we hadbegun to find out that there were a lot ofproblems in the diversion of the Oahe Damwaters to the James River Valley, and we beganconsidering, since we were moving the North

147

Kenneth F. Vernon

Dakota irrigation to further south and east, thatperhaps we could create a diversion to the upperwaters of the James River, which arose in NorthDakota, and bring that water into the James RiverValley, rather than going to the expense ofcreating a diversion canal across the ridge fromthe Oahe Dam to the James River Valley, andeliminate pumping costs, those pumping costs, inconsolidating with the Garrison pumping.

In order to solve this problem and get areal review of it, I again instituted, with the helpof the South Dakota Governor, a review board toreview our findings to date, and review our landfindings in the James River Valley, and makerecommendations as to which plan should befollowed out in greater detail. Their report wassubmitted just about the time I left Billings, but Iwas not directly involved in handling theirreport, because by that time I was SpecialAssistant to the Regional Director and it wasbeing handled by the Regional Director and theregular staff. So I'm aware of that report, but I'mnot aware of all the things that happened as aresult of it.

Review boardestablished to studyirrigable lands in SouthDakota

Now, then, we get to the occurrences ofthe Eisenhower Administration [while I was stillregional director]. We received instructions fromWashington [that] and it was desired to retract anumber of activities that we were following inthe Basin. Particularly emphasis was onretracting our economic studies, our demographicstudies, and perhaps revert more to what wecalled prosaic Reclamation activities. At thesame time, there was a group set up, I don't recallfrom where its authority stemmed, but it was toreview the strength of the movement of theestablishment of a Missouri Valley Authority andto review the work that Reclamation and Interiorhad been doing, which could be the basis of abroad Valley Authority program.

The EisenhowerAdministration’s effectsin the region

148


This group came to Billings. Weprepared much documentation of our activities,and I demonstrated to them, in my view, at least,that what we were doing was for the good of theBasin, whether it be carried out by Interior andthe Corps of Engineers and the establishedagencies, or by a Valley Authority [When] andpressed as to my opinion as to the efficiency ofthe current standard agency's approach asopposed to a Valley Authority, which wouldpromise a higher degree of efficiency, I stated tothem that in my view, a Valley Authority wouldbe much more efficient, probably [more]effective, but that also in my view, it would beless democratic, as demonstrated in the TVA;that we just recently fought a war to destroydictatorship, which was closely akin to a ValleyAuthority administration, and that therefore, inmy view, I thought that the current program inthe Missouri Valley held great promise, it shouldbe continued. I don't know to whom theysubmitted their report, or what their report was.

Group studiesestablishment of aMissouri River Authority

Later in the Eisenhower Administration,there was set up a group of wise men, basicallyof Reclamation stalwarts. I've forgotten exactlywho was on it, but I know that Ernie Moritz ofRegion III was there. I don't recall whetherRobert Newell, from Region I, who'd beenpreviously Director of Region I, was on it, butthere were four or five gentlemen who weredeeply embedded, shall we say, in the pro formaReclamation programs, and not at all acquaintedwith the broad ramifications of the then MissouriBasin, the type of program we were carrying outin the Missouri River Basin.

They first attacked my structure of thearea district offices. I pointed out to them thateach one of my district offices had a largerprogram and more finance than several of thethen current regions, and that I felt it was

149

Kenneth F. Vernon

essential that this structure was [effective in]essential to carrying off the broad program,which was authorized and funded, and that it wascopied, literally, from the structure which hadbeen previously created in the Central ValleyProject. I don't know how well my presentationwas accepted by these gentlemen, because I don'tthink it quite squared with the answers they wereseeking.

Shortly after that, in the fall of 1953, afterwe had gone through a terrific reduction in forceunder instructions from Washington, whichaimed heavily at our economic activities, andbroad ramifications of Basin-wide development,I was in the Washington office and I was about toreturn to Billings when I received a call from theCommissioner's office that Mr. Dexheimer, whowas then Commissioner, wanted to see me atabout five o'clock. So I appeared in theCommissioner's office at five o'clock, and "Dex"seemed cordial, but he announced that it hadbeen determined that a change was to be made inthe administration of Region VI.

Reduction in force in theearly months of theEisenhowerAdministration

CommissionerDexheimer announcesthere needs to be achange in the region

“Well”, I said, “You're entitled to haveyour own man there. I've done my best. Whatdo you want me to do?”

Well, he said, “We're bringing in FrankClinton to become the new Regional Directorfrom Region I, and obviously there should be aperiod of overlap while Frank becomes familiarwith the operations in the region. When he getsready to place his imprimatur on the operations,then you decide. But until that time, we'll createa new post of Special Assistant to the RegionalDirector, and then you can be a sort of an advisorand consultant to Frank Clinton if and when hefeels he needs you. And, incidentally, of course,you must accept a downgrade from Grade 15 tothis new position of Grade 14.”

150


Well, I said, “That's quite a blow,Commissioner, because I've got one kid incollege and another kid about ready to go tocollege, and I'm at the top of the rank now, andI've been graded by the Civil ServiceCommission for Grade 16, except there's no slotsfor Grade 16 in Reclamation," at that time, butmy job had been graded as Grade 16. "I've beenlooking forward to a normal progression, but I’vegot to stay on somebody's payroll. So you'reentitled to do as you wish, because myCommissioner, as I refered to him, Mike Straus,he did as he wished and put me in charge ofRegion VI. So you're entitled to put your man incharge of Region VI, as I see it.”

Downgraded to a GS-14

They did the same thing in Region VII. So they moved Avery Batson over and foldedhim into the Denver office somewhere. I don'trecall what position he held there, but obviouslyit was some form of a sinecure, and he took theopportunity to be employed by the FordFoundation in a team that they were assemblingfor Pakistan to work on the Indus River Basinreplacements works.

However, I took the change in Billingsand received an office which I could touch thefour walls in either direction by spreading myarms out. But I did have some ideas that Iwanted to develop, and I talked to Mr. Clintonabout it, and he said, “Go ahead. That makessense. Go ahead.” One of which was I wantedto review the ancient history of the RivertonProject to find out if there had been anyindication of these problem soils so that had webeen aware of the record of the Riverton Project,we might have avoided the problems as theyoccurred.

Now, after I undertook that investigationreviewing, I called from the tomb, so to speak, all

Studies problems at theRiverton Project

151

Kenneth F. Vernon

the ancient annual reports that Mr. Comstock hadprepared as he was Superintendent of thedevelopment of the Riverton Project. By thistime, unfortunately, Mr. Comstock had passed onto his reward, and so I couldn't consult with himdirectly. But in reviewing his reports, I foundthat whether he knew it or not, the rate ofdevelopment of the Riverton Project had been, toa certain sense, its salvation. In other words,during the Depression years, he found it verydifficult to recruit settlers, so that the rate ofexpansion in the Midvale Irrigation District wasvery slow, and as a consequence, then, thedrainage program had been able to keep up withthe development of the irrigation, so that thissalinization problem had not become apparentbecause of saturation of the soils and the lack ofdrainage which occurred in the after-warprogram, the highly intense after-war program.

Likewise, I got the feeling, although itwas never identified, that he had developed someuneasiness about some of the soils that they weregetting into on the Riverton Project, although itwas never specifically identified, but it waspretty obvious that he was avoiding certain areaswhich we then developed under our post warprogram after the war. So there was a certainamount of institutional intelligence there whichhad gotten lost in the process and by the loss ofone gentleman's not recording his history, suchas you're doing now with me.

Another thing I wanted to do, as I toldyou, I had talked to the Park Service about theexpansion and the exploitation of recreationalactivities around reservoirs and in the projectareas. So with Mr. Clinton's approval, Iundertook a comprehensive study of the[Boysen] Washington Reservoir, the BoysenDam having been completed and in operation. Now, we had an interesting problem there,

Studied recreationopportunities at BoysenDam and Reservoir

152


because we had both private lands, public lands,and Indian lands involved in the periphery of theBoysen Reservoir. So I enlisted the support ofthe Indian Bureau and the Bureau of LandManagement, the National Park Service, and theFish and Wildlife Service in a comprehensivestudy of what we might do to exploit recreationalactivities at the Boysen Reservoir.

At the same time, Angostura Reservoirwas now completed, and it had alreadydeveloped quite a recreational activity orvisitation, shall we say, from people fromNebraska, which were bringing boats andwhatnot up to the Reservoir for water recreation,and there had been nothing done towardproviding any facilities. So on that reservoir, Ienlisted the support of the Park Service, and theFish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau ofLand Management again, so a comprehensivereview of developing some form of acomprehensive plan for development around thereservoirs.

Studied recreationopportunities onAngostura Reservoir

I had previously, while I was RegionalDirector, being aware of these potentials forrecreational development, on one vacationperiod, I had visited a number of projects both inRegion I and in Region II, which I was awarerecreational facilities had been provided, and Iwanted to get an idea of how it had beendeveloped and what had been developed and thatsort of thing. Particularly I was impressed withwhat happened at Friant Dam, Friant Reservoir,Millerton Lake, as it was called, and at Shasta[Reservoir].

This was the genesis of my idea of aspecial study that I might conduct, create, in ourreservoirs up in Region VI, and I had alreadyappointed a guy in our O&M Division, I forgetwhat we called him, but he had a background in

153

Kenneth F. Vernon

Fish and Wildlife and in Recreation, and so Iutilized him as my staff, immediate staff. I gotapproval that he was my immediate staff, toassist me in making this study. And he wastickled to death, because he now had an objectivethat he could really tie into. He was reallythrilled with the opportunity.

So we came up with quite acomprehensive report of what to do withAngostura Reservoir and with the Boysen, butwe did run into a problem with the Indians,because they wanted to have a hand in thedevelopment of any recreational resources, andalso get the benefit of any fees that might becharged, which, of course, was an anathema tothe National Park Service. They wanted to makeit free for everybody. So this was a very specialproblem that wasn't resolved, but was identifiedin the report. It would have to be resolved beforereally a comprehensive program could beconducted, that additional negotiations wouldhave to be carried on with the Indian Bureau [andIndian tribes].

Now, I didn't mention earlier in thediscussion the problem that developed with theIndian lands on Yellowtail.

It's now six o'clock. Listen, what I wantto find out –


Storey: This is tape four of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 25th, 1995.

Vernon: As I said, this other material, I wanted to get intosome detail on the special problems we ran intowith the planning for Yellowtail Dam. Now,this, as I've indicated, was to be a key element of

Yellowtail Dam was tobe a key element of thepower program in theregion

154


our power program, anchoring our transmissionsystems between northern Montana, Fort Peck,into Wyoming, and further east. It was aconcrete dam with short penstocks, and thereforewould be a highly productive dam with a highhead, and it would create a high degree of firmpower, highly marketable power, whereas themainstream dams, being subject to widevariations of flow, and particularly widevariations of spring flood, would create largequantities of what might be called fuelreplacement power, which we could only createan energy charge, whereas firm power couldcreate a power availability charge, demand apower availability charge, as well as an energycharge, whereas this other was seasonal power,which would be marketable as fuel replacementpower [of] to the fuel-fired power plants.

And, as I'd indicated earlier, I wasinterested in the development of the coalresources in North and South Dakota, and Ithought that ultimately there would be largepower stations, fuel-powered, fuel-fired powerstations, in the Dakotas, utilizing the lignitecoals. So that this fuel replacement power wouldbe [a] very valuable [supplement] to them, yousee. The power stations would only operateduring the periods of nonavailability of thisintermittent power, and then there would be athird element, which is called interruptiblepower, which was just over and above everythingelse, [but] was only occasionally available. Andthere was also a market for that, too, as fuelreplacement, but you never could tell one year tothe next if you're going to have it [because itdepended upon the size of the spring floodrunoff].

So Yellowtail was going to be our anchorin our southern Montana power transmissionsystem. Sloan's plan included irrigation of lands

Yellowtail Dam and theCrow Indian Reservation

155

Kenneth F. Vernon

below Yellowtail dam on the Crow IndianReservation. Now, you have to understand thatthe Crow Indian Reservation was being farmedby three major entities. There were probablyothers, but there were three major entities. Theywere dry-land farming, basically wheat farming. And they were renting this land from the Indiantribes and [also] the Indians the, land that hadpassed ownership, and they were farming. TomCampbell, [one of the operators] I can recall oneyear, reading an article in the paper, that he hadharvested a million-bushel crop off of the landsof the Crow Indian reservation. I don't recall theexact number of acres he was farming, but itapparently was some kind of a bumper crop,which, at that time, wheat was bringing aboutthree dollars or three dollars and a half a bushel,so there was literally a million-dollar crop thatyear that spread between Campbell and hisinterests and the Indian tribes, and their interest.

There was also the Antler Corporation,which was headquartered in Omaha. Now, I'vebeen told, I don't know this for a fact, but I hadbeen told that the Vatican was involved infinancing the Antler Corporation. They werefarming a good deal of land on the Crow IndianReservation. Then there was Matt Tsurgzis. Idon't recall how to spell his name, because Ithink he was a Pole or a Czech, and he had someT-Ss and some Zs in there, but it was somethinglike T-S-U-R-G-Z-I-S, something on that order,so I don't recall how to spell his name correctly. But he was operating more as an individual on asomewhat smaller scale than the AntlerCorporation and the Campbell interest, but hestill was a large entity operating a good bit of theCrow Indian reservation.

Large agriculturalinterests on the CrowReservation opposedthe Yellowtail Damdevelopment

These entities and interests were notparticularly interested in irrigation developmenton Crow Indian lands, because it might cut into

156


their operations, because some of the betterlands, obviously, were the lands we might selectfor irrigated agriculture. So that was oneopposition element to Yellowtail Dam.

Another element that was more behindthe scenes was the Montana Power Company. Ifirmly believe that had we agreed, at the outset,to pump Yellowtail Power into the MontanaPower Company system, a lot of oppositionwhich developed on the Indian Reservationwould have disappeared, and that element ofopposition to the construction of YellowtailDam, during my tenure, would have beeneliminated.

Montana PowerCompany was probablyopposed to YellowtailDam hydropowerdevelopment

As a counterbalance to our promoting ofYellowtail Dam, the Montana Power Companydeveloped a gas-fired power station in Billings totake care of the growing market in Billings, sothey could then declare, with some realism, thatthere was really no need for the power fromYellowtail Dam.

The third element that was in oppositionwas the tribe and the Indians themselves, theCrow Indian tribe itself. There was acomplication in the lands that would be involvedin the creation of the Yellowtail Reservoir. Therewas some still all-public lands. One bank wasstill public lands. In the upper reaches, therewere lands that had passed to private ownership.And there was still lands held both in privateIndian ownership and tribal ownership, so it wasa very complex land ownership problem thatwould have to be solved before we could create aYellowtail Reservoir. One abutment of theYellowtail Dam was in public lands, as I recall,and one abutment of the dam was on some formof either tribal or Indian ownership. I don't recallwhich, but I think it was tribal, under control ofthe Tribal Council.

Some Indians opposedthe Yellowtail Damdevelopment

157

Kenneth F. Vernon

Now, the reason for the name Yellowtail,Glenn Sloan, in order to enlist the aid and favorof the Indians on the development of YellowtailDam, decided to name the dam Yellowtail afterChief Robert Yellowtail, who was a well-educated Indian. There was also another chief inthe Tribal Council, I forget his first name, but hislast name was Whiteman. It was [Harry] CharlesWhiteman or Robert Whiteman or something onthat order, but his family name was Whiteman,but [and] he was also a chief of the TribalCouncil. Now, he was in favor of construction ofthe Yellowtail Dam, although he hated the name,but Robert Yellowtail, for some reason or other,was not persuaded yet that all signs were ready,were pointing toward the construction of theYellowtail Dam, for reasons that were neverreally clear.

Naming of YellowtailDam

We were faced with all these problems,competing issues, as to how to get the agreementon the construction of Yellowtail Dam. Well, wedid get the agreement of the Tribal Council thatwe could encroach on Indian lands and conductdam-site investigations such as drilling and soon, and, of course, we got ready permission fromthe Bureau of Land Management to enter into thepublic lands, and we made a withdrawal,immediate withdrawal, of the lands for the publiclands to withdraw them from entry.

In our investigations of the dam site, wefound that the formations which were theMadison limestones, which were a form ofindurated sandstones and harder limestones,contained many caverns. Bob Herdmann, whowas our engineer over there, brought me a wholebig crystal formation which they found in onethese caves that they entered into as we wereexamining the abutments of the dam. We knewthat we had a problem there, that there would beleakage from that reservoir into those caves, or

158


through those caves into this formation, whichwould not be a loss to the Basin, but would be aloss to the effectiveness of the reservoir, becausethe Big Horn River was a part of the catchmentarea which served the formations which underlaythe high plain states. , and Before a lot ofpumping [had been] was created in, say, SouthDakota, west of the Missouri River, there wereartesian wells all over the place. But asdevelopments occurred along the river and so on,in [western South] eastern North Dakota, thehydraulic pressure in the aquifer was reduced sothese artesian wells were disappearing.

But this water that would be lost throughthe Yellowtail Reservoir would go into thisformation and would ultimately find its wayfarther east, but that would seriously affect theefficiency of the operation of the YellowtailReservoir. So this created quite a problem in thedesign of the dam and its flanks, to somehowprevent loss of water from the reservoir. [In otherwords, a lot of grouting of the flanks would berequired.]

I held a number of meetings before theTribal Council, and it was, one interesting aspectof this, to discuss our findings of the YellowtailDam site, and it was very interesting. All thesegentlemen were educated in English, but theymade me speak through an interpreter, and thenthey would quarrel with the interpreter whetherhe translated my English correctly in their CrowIndian language. (laughter)

Meetings with the TribalCouncil regardingYellowtail Dam

At any rate, somebody advised – somehow [Robert] Howard Yellowtail had heardabout some tribe in Oklahoma who had taken acase to court and had gotten a big award to theIndian tribe for the “strategic value” of theirlands for either the reservoir and/or the dam site. So he began propounding before the Tribal

159

Kenneth F. Vernon

Council that the tribe should never agree to theconstruction of Yellowtail Dam, unless and untilReclamation agreed to evaluate the strategicvalue and award the tribe many, many, manymillions of dollars and at least some share of thepower revenues, which, of course, made it verydifficult for me, because we were counting on theuse of the power revenues, integration with ourpower system to help [repay] defray some of thecosts of the Missouri Basin Program.

I called upon the Indian Bureau to helpme evaluate these Indian lands, and they came upwith some really difficult problems because ofthe mixed-up ownership [in which] of the lands,which were not only held, some were held by thetribe and some had passed to private Indianownership. Then we had also these public landsand then we had other lands which had passed onto other private ownerships.

Storey: Non-Indian.

Vernon: So that my argument to the Tribal Council wasthat so far as I could see, and I sent my counsel,Burke, down to examine the record of this case inOklahoma, [that] and there they were awardedtheir strategic value, because the tribe wascapable of financing the construction of the damitself. In other words, through their oil revenuesincurring to the tribes, they had the funds, theycould actually finance the development that wasproposed by somebody else, but they werewilling to, for a price, participate and not expendtheir funds, but take a payoff for this “strategicvalue” of their lands for the dam site.

My argument for that was, after Mr.Burke examined that case in Oklahoma, thatthere was really no strategic value of the “triballands,” because they did not have sufficientcontrol [of the] land to either the dam site or the

160


reservoir site, nor could they, on their own,develop it themselves, so therefore under theprinciples laid down in this Oklahoma case, therewas no strategic value accruing to the Indians.

Finally, I think in about 1952, I haddecided that we were never going to be able tocome to an agreement with the Indian tribe that Ifelt I could live with and recommend to mysuperiors under the law, [so] that I told the tribethat I was not coming back, we were disbandingour efforts on Yellowtail Dam, and that I was notcoming back unless I was invited back.

So after the Eisenhower Administrationcame in, in 1953, Governor Aandahl, who wasthen Assistant Secretary for Water and Power inInterior, passed down an instruction to me to goback to the tribe and again discuss thepossibilities of making an agreement for theconstruction of Yellowtail Dam, because thegovernor had been very deeply involved in thedevelopment of the Missouri Basin, and he wasstill very interested in promoting thedevelopment of the Basin, so he wanted to makean additional effort to see if that problem couldbe solved.

But in that meeting, again we gotnowhere. The tribe would not listen to anyagreement that I felt that I could recommendunder Reclamation law to my superiors. So Ithen reported back upstairs that we agreed todisagree, and that I felt that the meeting was afailure to come to any kind of agreement, that'swhere I left it.

Now, I understand later that BruceJohnson, after Frank Clinton's tenure, he wasable to work out some agreement, eitherpolitically or otherwise, with the Indian tribe thatthe Yellowtail Dam was built. I don't know for

161

Kenneth F. Vernon

sure, but I think Bruce told me that Senator[James Edward] Murray14 from Montana gotinvolved in it, and he was able to push throughsome legislation which, outside of Reclamation'sresponsibilities, granted the Indians some kind ofa settlement that permitted the dam to beconstructed. Now, I'm not quite sure on thatdetail, but you might, in your other conversationswith other people like Harold Aldrich orsomebody, get a line on that. I think Haroldfollowed Bruce Johnson. Let's see, there wasFrank Clinton, and then I think it was BruceJohnson. Bruce Johnson was then in FloydDominy's regime [as Commissioner and] wassent down to Omaha, and he became the Interiorrepresentative in Omaha, but he was not happywith that assignment.

And, by this time, I was back inWashington as Director of Engineering for theforeign aid program, and I'd been in contact withBruce. I knew that he was interested in somenew association, so I brought him into theforeign aid program as Chief Engineer of ourNear East/South[east] Asia Bureau, and then hemoved on into various other activities, but hisfirst approach was as Chief Engineer of – I saidNear East/South[east] Asia, I meant ourSoutheast Asia Bureau, which included Thailand,Vietnam, Burma, so on.

So I was never able to really accomplishone of the things I really wanted to do, was tohave the Yellowtail Dam constructed and to thencreate a complete network of transmission linesfrom Fort Peck to Great Falls to Helena toCanyon Ferry, down to Billings, down theYellowstone River, over into Bismarck,connecting up with the mainstream in thenetwork for the mainstream dams. We had set upa power dispatching entity unit in Billings, but inthe later stages as more power became available

162


from the mainstream dams, we set up a maindispatching center, control center, I think it wasover in Watertown, South Dakota, as I recall, andthat was just being established when I left.

Storey: Of course, Eisenhower didn't like public power,is my understanding.

Vernon: They weren't very favorable about it, no. That'sfor sure. That's for sure. It was very interesting,the approaches to it. The Montana PowerCompany was a well-financed organization, andit was very capable. Jack Corett, vice presidentof their system planning, and I don't know whatall his responsibilities were, he was a verycapable guy, and I had a number of discussionswith him trying to find some way we could cometo some form of agreement. The only agreementthat he was willing to settle for was that we couldgenerate the power all right, he wouldn't object tothat, if we would turn it over at the high side ofthe substation and feed it through the Montanapower system, which then destroyed our abilityto integrate this whole systemwide thing and getthe maximum degree of firm power.

Montana PowerCompany wanted tomarket all Reclamationelectricity

And, incidentally, there was a connectionbuilt between the Montana Power Companysystem and the Columbia Basin system built overto Hungry Horse, which then through ourconnection to Fort Peck, to our connection toBismarck, to our connection east that tied intothe Northern States Power Company inMinnesota, which connected up to the WisconsinPower Company, which connected up to theCommonwealth Edison, or whatever it was inChicago, that one year when the Columbia Basinwas short of water, they had to reduce theirfrequency, rate of frequency and alternatingcurrent, [so] because all the clocks ran slow allthe way to Chicago because the one way ofreducing the drain of power is to reduce the

Electricity grid system

163

Kenneth F. Vernon

frequency, [as] but speed of a motor is directlyrelated to its frequency, the alternatingfrequency. So if you drop it to fifty-five, [fromsixty per second,] you immediately loseapproximately 10 percent of your speed ofrotation in a motor. So just to make the point, allthe clocks ran slow as far east as Chicago, butwhat we had found out through ourinterconnections and due to the time zones, wewere able to shift excess power that we had fromthe Columbia Basin [east], because it hadn’treached peak power with demand, shift east intoour area. We would shift our [power] area intothe Northern States Power, [which in turn] wouldshift to the central states around Chicago. Then[later as load demands shifted west the powerwould also be shifted back to the west.] insucceeding hours, the power would shiftbackwards, the flow. So we had this integratedpower system where the power flowed back andforth with whomever, at particular times of dayand particular times of the week, because powervaries, the power demand varies during the day,and it also varies depending on the day of theweek, so that power was being shifted back andforth through this interconnected system. Andthat was why I was so interested in creating thisintegrated power system for the Missouri Basin,which I accomplished to a great degree. I sawthe construction of about two thousand miles ofhigh-tension power lines.

Oh, and I didn't tell you, about 1950,when things were getting going good and strong,Brig Young – no, it was Les McClellan at thattime, he'd taken Brig Young's place, Brig hadretired, I phoned McClellan and said, “Les,things are going so strong here now, I've got todivest off of my desk the power program and theconstruction program. And so if you've gotsomebody you'd like to suggest for considerationas Assistant Director for those programs[,.please

164


suggest him.]”

Well, he first sent up Dexheimer. I hadmy whole top staff talk with Dexheimer, andDexheimer talked to them and my immediatestaff, George Pratt, Personnel Director and so on,talked with Dexheimer, and we never felt thatDexheimer was really interested in coming toBillings, whether it was just isolation, whether itwas program content, or whether he hadsomething else in mind, ultimately there wouldbe a change of administration and he mightbecome something else, I don't know. So Italked to McClellan about it, and I said, “I didn'tget the feeling that Dexheimer really wanted tocome to Region VI, so [do you have] if you'vegot another suggestion.”

Dexheimer is suggestedfor a job in Billings

So then he suggested a fellow namedLester Bartsch, B-A-R-T-S-C-H, who was ayounger man, and he was a guy on the move. Hewas a gung-ho type, fitted right in with mymethod of operation. So I immediately selectedhim and had him appointed as Assistant RegionalDirector for the power and constructionprograms. Andy with his construction program,and working with John Walker, promoting thepower transmission and marketing program. Itworked out very well.

Lester Bartschappointed AssistantRegional Director

So every morning that I was in the office,I would hold maybe a half-hour meeting withBill Rawlings and Les Bartsch, and we called inwhomever else I might want to brief me on whatwas on their plate for the day, because that's howI kept in touch with those activities. Then I keptin touch through personnel and finance on wherewe stood that way.

How he kept in touchwith various activities

Another thought came to me there that Ihadn't explained to you. So then I let them[Rawlings and Bartsch] operate pretty much on

165

Kenneth F. Vernon

their own. Oh, yes, what I wanted to say was,but then [that] I was devoting my attention tofield operations, visiting the area offices andbeing acquainted in detail of what was going onin the field offices, as well as working with thestate governments, state commissions, Chambersof Commerce, advising people throughout theregion as to what our program plans were, whatour funding requirements would be, and enlistingsupport before the Congress to support ourappropriation requests, which was fairlysuccessful. That's about it, unless you’ve gotsome questions.

Devoted most attentionto field operations andcontacts outsideReclamation

Storey: Well, we left me with you as the SpecialAssistant to the Regional Director. Whathappened?

Vernon: Well, they brought Frank Clinton in January of1954. I called a big meeting of the regional staffand formally presented Frank to the staff, andsaid he was now taking over, that I was steppingdown, and that from here on I fully expectedthey'd give him the same kind of support thatthey had given me, and that I was going to be insome special studies, but would not be involvedin the day-to-day operations of the region. Sothat was in January of 1954.

January of 1954introduced FrankClinton to the regionalstaff

The Commissioner's office began lookingfor places that I might be placed out of RegionVI. During spring, I got a call from the foreignactivities office that perhaps there would be needfor me to go to the High Aswan Dam, which wasto be constructed in Egypt on the Nile River. Isaid, “Yeah, sure, I'd be interested in that."

Was going to beassigned to the HighAswan Dam project


Storey: You had talked over going to the High AswanDam with your wife.

166


Vernon: Yes. And she said, “Well, we've taken about allwe can here, so why not.” So the appointmentwas proceeding, and we put our house on themarket, and I actually had a buyer. When wordcame through from Washington that “Hold thephone,” Mr. Dulles had become disenamoredwith Mr. Nassar in Egypt, and that Mr. Dulles,the Secretary of State, was not sure that wewould finance the High Aswan Dam, and,therefore, there might not be any need for me inEgypt.

So I immediately had to eat a lot of crowand go to my prospective buyer and say, “I'mvery sorry, but I got to take my house off themarket, because I've still got to live here.” Thiswas, let's say, in May.

Then in about July, Frank Clinton cameto me and said, “I've just had a long meeting withthe Commissioner when he was visiting NorthDakota, and we've decided, Ken, that you'veabout outlived your usefulness here in RegionVI, and that they're seriously going to try to placeyou somewhere else.”

Well, I said, “Okay, that's the way theball bounces. I got to stay on somebody'spayroll, and so let me know what happens.”

Well, during this time, George Pratt, whohad been called into Washington in 1950 to theCommissioner's staff to take on this foreignactivity staff, creation of a foreign activity staff,because Mike Straus was very interested increating a presence of the Bureau of Reclamationaround the world, and he wanted George Pratt totake on that activity[.] , and I [had] arguedbitterly with him not to take him away from me,but I said, “After all, you're the boss, you can doas you damn please.” So George went in toWashington and then created this foreign activity

167

Kenneth F. Vernon

staff and was being very successful in gettingReclamation people around the worldparticipating in under the foreign aid program,the Point Four Program. I don't whether youknow the Point Four Program.

George Pratt runs thePoint Four Program forReclamation

Storey: No.

Vernon: In Truman's acceptance speech, in his inauguralin 1948, among other things, he came up with aforeign aid program which had four points. Onewas the Marshall Plan, and point four was thetechnical assistance program to underdevelopedcountries, and we would provide technologicalassistance to these underdeveloped countries tohelp them develop their resources. Mike Strauswanted to be a strong part of that program, andso he set George Pratt up as this foreign activitiesoffice, drawing upon people in Reclamation thatwere willing to accept assignments overseas.

Foreign activitiesapproved by Congressafter World War II

Well, when the EisenhowerAdministration come in, George Pratt, beingclosely associated with Mike Straus, it was feltthat his services were no longer needed in theWashington office, so he was advised to seekanother association. He then went to work for aconsulting organization in Philadelphia, theKuljian Corporation, who was also involved inoverseas operations.

Storey: Can you spell that for me?

Vernon: K-U-L-J-I-A-N. He was an Armenian. TheKuljian Corporation. Now, in this interim, Mr.Wesley Nelson, who had been AssistantCommissioner, apparently felt that his presencecould be better used elsewhere under theEisenhower Administration, so he received anappointment as a member of the DevelopmentBoard under contract to the government of Iraq,financed through – no, it was financed by the

Wesley Nelson moved toDevelopment Board forthe Iraqi government

168


Iraq government, but he still retained hisAmerican – how do I want to say this? He wasstill a U.S. Government employee, but the Iraqigovernment reimbursed our government for all ofhis salary and expenses. That's the way itworked. And he became a member of theirnewly established Development Board and alsothe Head of what was called their First TechnicalSection, which was related to irrigation, floodcontrol, and drainage. So he was wearing twohats, and he'd been there since 1952, early 1953. That program was getting rolling.

So George Pratt had made a visit toBaghdad in the summer of 1954, and he wastelling Wes [Nelson] about my situation – that Imight be available. So Mr. Nelson then put arequest in to the Director of the Foreign Aidprogram, at that time it was called ICA,International Cooperation Administration, whichis [was headed by] Governor [Harold] Stassen,formerly of Minnesota. And while there weresome demurements announced, [in] politicalquarters, about my getting a “fat job” in theforeign aid program, Mr. Nelson was able toconvince Mr. Stassen that I had thequalifications for his support in Iraq to take overthe job of the First Technical Section, and thathe would then concentrate on being a full-timemember of the Development Board. Because bythis time the activities in Iraq had begun to roll, just as they had for me in Billings when I wasgetting the Missouri Basin established. He thenhad a full-time job as being a member of theDevelopment Board, and he had to shed himselfof the responsibilities of the First TechnicalSection. He recommended to the DevelopmentBoard that they make a request to our foreign aidprogram to send me to Iraq.

Vernon is requested byWesley Nelson for workin Iraq

InternationalCooperationAdministration

Vernon takes over FirstTechnical Section in Iraq

So I ultimately wound up in Iraq as theHead of the First Technical Section, which, in

Director General, FirstTechnical Section, Iraq

169

Kenneth F. Vernon

their parlance, was the Director General, theD.G., for the section – [which was the equivalentof a bureau in our structure]. But they didn'tthink that foreigners should hold the title ofD.G.; they called them “Head.” The Rais ofAlfamya – let's see, the Rais was the head;Alhaya, technical. Rais is head; Alfamya is first;Aluola is section. That was my title in Arabic. Rais [Alhaya Alfamya Aluola. The literaltranslation is head, section, technical, first.]

So I was then brought into Washingtonin September [October.] , and I went back to myoriginal purchasers of my house and said, “Hey,my house is back on the market. Are you stillinterested?”

And they said, “Yes.” So we worked outa deal. It wasn't quite as favorable as the onewe'd worked out in spring, because they knew Iwas under some pressure, and they'd been put upto some travail, also, but at any rate, we worked[it] out, so I sold my house to them.

Then I went into Washington, and I leftWashington on my birthday, October sixteenth. I left to Washington on my birthday, Octobersixteenth [thirty-first], and I went to Baghdad.

Moves to Baghdad

Storey: 1954.

Vernon: This was <54. I went to Baghdad on Novemberfirst. I left Washington October thirty-first.

Now, one of the problems that I had, [in]a lot of people's mind[s], was I was neverproperly indoctrinated in the foreign aidprogram. In my view, and some others' view, Iwas a guy of some substance. I had created myown reputation. I knew how to get things done,and it wasn't felt that I needed to go throughtheir indoctrination program of how to push

Didn’t go throughforeign aid programindoctrination

170


papers and how to exist in a foreign environmentand so on, and so I never got the benefit of amonth's indoctrination program in Washington. I was employed, processed, and sent to Baghdadin two weeks, where it usually takes about sixmonths. (laughter)

Storey: So you were transferred from the Bureau ofReclamation to . . .

Vernon: The foreign aid program.

Storey: Which is part of the State Department?

Vernon: Actually, it was the International CooperationAdministration, which was a part of the StateDepartment, of the Economic AidAdministration in the State Department. Yousee, in this program of foreign aid that Trumanset up, which the main effort was the MarshallPlan in Europe, and that was the transfer of a lotof resources, financial resources to the thenexisting governments in Europe, which couldabsorb financial resources and get somethingdone with it.

Went to foreign aidprogram, InternationalCooperation,Administration,Department of State

Point Four was the transfer of technicalassistance through this Technical CooperationAdministration, International Cooperation, ICA,International Cooperation Administration. Itwas a separate administration, but it was underthe purview of the Department of State, and sothe administrator of the ICA, he held the rank ofa Deputy Secretary.

Point Four Program

So I was sent to Baghdad and reportedinto Baghdad on November 1 second. Andtomorrow we'll get into some of the interestingexperiences I had in Baghdad.

Storey: Yes. Now, when you moved to Billings, whatwas that?

171

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: It was January of <47.

Storey: Okay, in <47. You told me about taking thetrain. How did you travel from Billings toWashington, and then Washington to Baghdad?

Vernon: Well, by that time. during my tenure, duringBillings, there was [only] a train system. Billings was on the Northern Pacific Railroad,which went into Chicago, and then we wouldtake the Northern Pacific Railroad into Chicago,and then we would take either the B&O or thePennsy into Washington. We always tried totake the B&O if we possibly could get aboard,because it was a much nicer railroad. ThePennsy went through all the Rust Belt ofMichigan and Pennsylvania, and we like felt itwas kind of a cattle car.

Travel from Billings toWashington

Railroad travel

But then about 1950, Northwest Airlineshad begun to develop a through airlines fromChicago through to Seattle, through Milwaukee,Michigan, Minneapolis, Fargo, Bismarck, MilesCity, Billings, Great Falls, and then on West, I'm not sure just where all it went. But then itwas possible to take an airplane from Billings,which went through there sometime in the[Sunday] evening, and we would get toWashington [on Monday morning]. We wouldleave on a Saturday night, and we would get toWashington sometime Sunday night, so wewould be in Washington for business Mondaymorning.

Airlines travel

When we took the train at that time, wewould leave Friday evening, and we would getinto Chicago Sunday morning, but we had to atthat time stay in Chicago for a day. In otherwords, there were no trains [leaving for the] outEast leaving [in the daytime], so you'd spend aday in Chicago. Somebody said a pig could gothrough Chicago, but a person couldn't.

172


(laughter)

Storey: Because they were on the freight cars.

Vernon: Yeah, they were on freight cars. So freight wasmore valuable than people. So we would haveto spend a day in Chicago. But then that wouldarrive us in Washington about nine o'clock, andso we were a little late for the opening ofbusiness, because the Interior Departmentopened at quarter of eight, and we weresomewhat bushed. But oftentimes when wewere going in for appropriation hearings, wewould take the train, nevertheless, because Iwould then take a drawing room with myfinance officer, and we would work on ourappropriation material on the train while wewere in [on the way to] Chicago and then on thetrain to Washington.

Storey: Do you remember the names of the trains?

Vernon: Well, the Northern Pacific train was the NorthCoast Limited. That was a beautiful train. Really enjoyed that train. It was like gettinghome, and their pièce de resistance was primerib of beef with an Idaho [baked] potato.

Now, this was another element I didn'ttouch upon, but the railroads were veryinterested in this Missouri Basin development,because they had been very interested in projectdevelopment, because it created freight for themfrom the irrigation developments, and so theyhad agricultural agents out through the Basinand keeping in touch with us as to what we weredoing. And so there was the three main trains. There was the Northern Pacific, the Chicago-Milwaukee-St. Paul, and the Great Northern,which [were] in the Upper Basin and farthersouth was, of course, the Union Pacific, theBurlington, and the Chicago Northwestern went

Railroad interest inMissouri River Basindevelopment

173

Kenneth F. Vernon

west from Chicago, and it wound up somewherein Wyoming. I don't recall just where it woundup at its terminus, but it was never a real factorin the Basin development.

One of the problems we faced in gettingaround the basin was there was East and Westtransport, but there was no cross-Basin[transportation] development. Some—

The problem of movingaround in the region

Storey: No north-south.

Vernon: No north-south transport. There was theBurlington Railroad, which came up fromOmaha, up through Wyoming, easternWyoming, and then to Billings, then it turnedaround and went down through the Big HornRiver Valley, to the Shoshone Project and theRiverton Project, and wound up ultimately inDenver. So until airplane traffic got developed,which was slow in developing, I developed the"Region VI Airlines.” We got hold of a numberof war surplus airlines.

"Region VI Airlines”

Storey: Airplanes?

Vernon: Airplanes. I hired my own pilots, and we hadthree airplanes in Billings and another airplaneand pilot located in Huron, South Dakota,because they had to get over into easternWyoming all the time. Bruce Johnson, inBismarck, Bismarck being a major center, hewas able to contract, to hire airplanes there fortransport around if he needed it. But we had atwo-engine Beechcraft, five-passenger, two-engine Beechcraft. My pilot that I hired hadbeen an engineer in Region II, a graduateengineer from Caltech, but he had been a Navypilot and had flown RD-4s, that was the oldDouglas, DC-2, DC-3, from Hawaii out throughthe western Pacific to Australia. I had a numberof plane jockeys also on the staff there, but I

Hired pilots and hadthree airplanes

Willard Snyder was chiefpilot

174


wanted someone who was not a hot-shot pilot. Iwanted someone who was accustomed totransport flying and also had the ability to doflight scheduling, so I took on Willard Snyder asmy chief pilot.

Then we set up a maintenance center inBillings, and hired an A&E mechanic, an aircraftand engine mechanic. So we ran a three-airplane fleet out of Billings for cross-Basintransport, because there was no way we couldget to Huron, for example, from Billings direct. We had to go to Denver and then back upthrough Rapid City and then over to Huron, orgo to Minneapolis and then back around toHuron, but it was only about three and a halfhours in the twin-engine aircraft from Billingsdirect to Huron. I insisted that we would notschedule our plane to Denver unless there wereat least three passengers. In other words, it wasnot cost-effective to fly our twin-engine aircraftto Denver, back and forth to Denver, unless atleast three passengers. So I had a standing orderthat people that had business in Denver had topost their requirements with our airplaneheadquarters so that they could plan if enoughpeople needed to go that they could plan a trip toDenver, which worked out very well. As Irecall, we got our cost down to about ten-cents-a-seat mile or something like that in that twin-engine aircraft at that time, something like $50an hour flying time.

Storey: What was the train you'd take out of Chicago toWashington?

Vernon: Well, it was either the B&O Columbia –Columbia? Columbus? Something like that,however. And also on the Pennsy,Pennsylvania, I forget what the name of that onewas, but that wound through all that Rust Beltand down through Indiana and Ohio and into

175

Kenneth F. Vernon

Pennsylvania, went through Pittsburgh, anddown to Harrisburg, into Baltimore, andultimately finally got into Washington.

On the B&O, Baltimore and Ohio, thatwas a more direct route, and somehow I'veforgotten the towns we went through on that,because it was at night, but they weren't so large,but we went through western Maryland andcame down the Potomac River and directly intoWashington.

Storey: Maybe through Harper's Ferry there?

Vernon: Yeah, Harper's Ferry. We didn't have to gothrough that Baltimore stop. We went directlyinto Washington, so it was a little easier trip. And it was a nicer trip, because that train [had]was better [accommodations] accommodated –and one thing I always remember about it, thedining car, they served a tremendous salad bowlabout like this, that the waiters would carryaround that you could dig into.

Storey: Two feet across.

Vernon: Two feet across. And, oh, it was lovely. And ithad a lot of bleu cheese in it and a lot of othergoodies, so we used to really load into that.

Storey: That was the B&O train.

Vernon: That was the B&O. Their train was better keptup than the Pennsy.

Storey: Well, I appreciate your spending all this timewith me, and I'd like ask again whether or notyou're willing for researchers inside and outsideReclamation to use the tapes and the transcriptsfrom this interview.

Vernon: Well, [unclear]. I signed it yesterday. I want

176


this to become a permanent record and available,so, yes, of course I agree.

Storey: Good. Thank you.

END OF SIDE 2, TAPE 4. APRIL 25, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1, APRIL 26, 1995.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, Senior Historian of theBureau of Reclamation, interviewing Kenneth F.Vernon, at his home in Fullerton, California, onApril the 26th, 1995, in the afternoon. This istape one.

Could you tell me a little more, Mr.Vernon, about the Delta Division? Was theremore than one office in the Delta Division, forinstance, that you remember?

Vernon: Yes. Initially there was only the one officelocated in Antioch under the control, ordirection, of Mr. Oscar Boden, but about a yearor two later, the project began considering themovement of water from the Delta down [south]or up the San Joaquin Valley, whichever youwant to call it. The effort became large enoughthat a satellite office was established at Tracy. That was under the direction of a Mr. GeorgeImrie, I-M-R-I-E, who had come from a projectin Utah and other areas of the Bureau effort. Wehad a full field staff [in Antioch] and a smalloffice staff located in Tracy.

Delta Division of theCentral Valley Project

Oscar Boden in theAntioch office

George Imrie

The Antioch office continued directingthe work on the Contra Costa Canal, and weworked the studies of the Delta Cross Channel,or the movement of water through the Delta, outof the Antioch office because it was closer.

Storey: And the Antioch office is where you were?

Vernon: The Antioch office. So I did as well as the In the Antioch,

177

Kenneth F. Vernon

office engineering such as all of the contractcontrol estimates, all of the revisions of Denveroffice designs to meet field conditions, that sortof thing. I also did office engineering work,such as similar work related to the planningwork of the Delta-Mendota and the Delta CrossChannel. And I had a small staff associated withme.

California, office didoffice engineering work

Storey: You weren’t a supervisor at that time, were you?

Vernon: No, there was another gentleman named Mr.Stubblefield, who was a very elderly gentleman,who was the nominal [titular] Office Engineer.

Storey: Why do you say nominal?

Vernon: Well, Stubb had a good career, but he was in theclosing years of his service and at times heneeded a great deal of support. As I’veevidenced at the time, you remember when Ispoke about when Mr. Boden had taken therevised estimate for the Contra Costa Canal toSacramento and it [had] come back and gave Mr.Bellport and me what for?

Storey: Yes.

Vernon: Because we had missed something or had notcalled his attention to an obvious error in hisestimate. But Mr. Stubblefield had beenresponsible for the review of Mr. Boden’sreport, and so this was evidence of Mr.Stubblefield sort of losing his grasp with what Imight call reality at times. So I literally becamethe effective Office Engineer, although I did nothold the title.

Storey: I notice that you say "Office Engineer," and Ibelieve a few moments ago you said "FieldEngineer."

178


Vernon: Oh, yes.

Storey: What are we talking about here?

Vernon: You need to understand the structure of a fieldoffice. In Reclamation’s field structure, there’sthe Project Engineer or the ConstructionEngineer who heads up the effort. He issupported primarily by a Field Engineer, who isreally the deputy Construction or ProjectEngineer, and he controls and directs all the fieldoperations. If it’s construction, he has thesupporting inspection crews, the survey crews,the laboratory crews that have to do with theconstruction or all field operations.

Field and officeengineers inReclamation

The office engineer directs andsupervises all of the office operations,engineering operations, and as those engineeringoperations are related to making computationsand record keeping, design estimates,[revisions,] and so on, supporting the fieldoperations. The project structure also includes,back in those days, what was the called the ChiefClerk. We would now call him theAdministrative Officer. He supervised anddirected all of the administrative functions, suchas personnel, purchasing, and basically financialrecords and so on. So that basically was the oldstructure.

Functions of the chiefclerk

Now, after the war, the structure changedsomewhat and we got such things as PurchasingAgents and Financial Officers, and the ChiefClerk became the Chief Administrative Officer.

Storey: Okay. Now I’d like to explore a little bit howthe office engineers related with the fieldengineers. For instance, yesterday or the daybefore, we were talking about how things weredesigned, how you would send the informationto Denver, they would design it, it would come

179

Kenneth F. Vernon

back with that little note that would say, “Asinstructed in the field” on it. So who was doingwhat in all of this process?

Vernon: This related particularly to any structure to bedesigned, such as in canal work there wouldobviously be highway bridges, for example. There would be road crossing structures of adifferent nature, such as you might call them alarge culvert, or another hydraulic structurecalled a siphon, which would cross a depression. It’s really an inverted siphon, but they werecalled a siphon, but basically they were apressure pipe, which would start at one side of adepression and go down through the lowlands ofthe depression and come up on the other side.

How field and officeengineers related todesigners in Denver

Now, besides our general topographicmaps, which we used for layout purposes of thecanal system and its distribution systems, wewould, at major construction sites, prepare adetailed map of a much larger scale, such asperhaps our general topographic maps would beof a scale of one inch equals a hundred feet, orone inch equals two hundred feet on the ground,but at major structure sites we might make adetail map as small – or as large, I should say, asone inch equals twenty feet or one inch equalsforty feet and so on.

At major structure sites, we would thenprepare a detailed map of that structure site, atopographic map of that structure site. Wewould include such data as the dimensions of thecanal at that particular site, we would includeany foundation information that we might havemade, such as borings to determine criticalfoundation elements. This would all beprepared, packaged up. I would prepare awritten report accompanying that map that theConstruction Engineer, Mr. Boden, the ProjectEngineer, or at that time the District Engineer,

180


he would then submit that to Washington[Denver] with copies to Sacramento for recordpurposes.

When I was in Denver, we would receivesuch information from the field, then thedesigners would sit down and design thestructure that seemed to be required, whether itbe a bridge or a siphon or a culvert or whatever,and then prepare what would later become thecontract drawings to be included in the latercontract specifications for construction.

Storey: Okay. Now, before we go on, you were sayingwe would prepare the map and then you wouldwrite –

Vernon: A report accompanying that map.

Storey: Who is "we"?

Vernon: Well, when I said "we," I meant our office staff. I actually wrote it with the support of –

Storey: You wrote the text?

Vernon: The text. My staff prepared the detailed maps. Isupervised the preparation of those maps.

Storey: So they went out in the field to get the data to beable –

Vernon: No. The field staff, under our instructions,would do the detail. We told them what werequired to prepare this report. They woulddevelop the field data, submit it back to us. I setup a system, probably the equivalent of manyother places, but first you had your line surveys. I set up a system with the heading of T, T1, T2,T3, which meant transit [survey] book, so thosewere the transit surveys. Then immediatelyfollowing the transit books, the [level] transit

181

Kenneth F. Vernon

surveys, was the leveling information whichestablished elevations along the line, controlledelevations. Those were recorded in a series witha heading of L – level.

Then after we determined – "we" beingthe gross effort, the field staff and the office staff– had concluded that the location of the canalwas in the proper place, then a third surveywould start, which was what we called cross-sections, which established detailedmeasurements at right angles to the canal linefrom which we could plot and computeexcavation and fill quantities. That series ofbooks was headed with an X, meaning cross-sections.

Now, these books, [were kept in] we hada very large safe in the office – "we" meaningour whole effort, staff. There was a large safewhich we accounted for everything every nightbefore we closed up the office, locked it in thesafe, because these were our basic and finalrecords, so they had to be protected. But everynight the safe was locked, and then everymorning the Field Engineer would come in andlook over what of the field books that he wouldneed for his particular efforts that day. Hewould have to sign out that he had taken thosebooks, and then in the evening those bookswould have to be returned and signed in again. So there was very careful control. And this fellto me to keep that record, or as my office staffdid, to keep that record of who had what booksand where they were, because this was the final,so to speak, legal effort of the results of all thefield work.

Keeping records in theoffice safe

Storey: So now, if I’m understanding – not being anengineer, you know, I have trouble with some ofthis – the first two books would give you theroute of the canal, say, and the various

182


elevations along the canal.

Vernon: Those were the first two books, right.

Storey: And then the third book, the cross –

Vernon: The cross-section book.

Storey: The cross-section book gave it width?

Vernon: Width, width. And then from that you couldcompute the quantities of excavation and/or fill.

Storey: Okay. So out in the field, then, under the FieldEngineer, would be survey crews?

Vernon: Survey crews, construction supervisors,construction inspection, construction laboratory,and any other field operations.

Field engineersupervision

Storey: What kind of a lab are we talking about?

Vernon: Well, you see, when you get into construction,you need to have careful control overparticularly the strength of the concrete thatyou’re producing for construction, because thedesigners have specified that the concrete mixmust develop a certain strength per square inchto meet the criteria of their design.

So it was necessary, then, to run acontinuous record of the daily concrete mixesand samples were taken regularly as to theproper mix of cement, aggregate, and water. Then those samples were put into curing rooms,except sometimes we would put them in a waterbath. We had a small testing machine in whichthese samples could be tested, and this testingmachine tested them for whether they weredeveloping the proper strength, indicatingwhether the mixing of the concrete had beenproperly performed and the additives that were

183

Kenneth F. Vernon

required had been properly added.

Storey: You mentioned, yesterday I think it was, thatyou talked about, I think it was twenty-four hourstrength, seven-day strength, fourteen-daystrength. When did you test it?

Vernon: Well, as I said, in the laboratory what happenedwas, let us say there’s a bridge being built. Allright. And the first thing, of course, the footingsare excavated, the area for the footings isexcavated, and the base prepared. Then theforms are set up so that the proper shape of thefooting would be prepared. Then the steel workwas installed. All right. Now we’re ready topour the concrete, so then the necessaryaggregate are assembled, including the cement. Now, it’s very necessary, very important, inmixing [concrete] cement that you observe notonly the mix of various sizes of the aggregate,such as stone and sand, but also the properamount of cement that goes into the mix, pluscareful control of the amount of water that goesinto the mix.

Concrete mixing andtesting

Concrete work

Now, we have found – "we" meaningengineers – have found over time what we callthe water-cement ratio is very, very important. As a broad general description, a [generic] mixcalled the 1-2-4 mix, which is one part cement,two parts sand, four parts gravel is the standardwhich will produce usually better than 2,800pounds per square inch of concrete. All right. But we have found that you get better strength[and workability] if you temper this just a littlebit and add a little more sand and a little less ofthe gravel. Depending after you’ve taken testsin the laboratory to define the elements in thesand and the various sizes of the aggregatewhether you’re going to limit yourself to one-and-a-half-inch aggregate or two-inch aggregateor four-inch aggregate, whatever, depending on

184


the size of the form that you’re going to bepouring this concrete into, you may tamper thatto – let us say 1 to 2.2 to 3.8, but you’re stillaround the 1-2-4 mix, which is one part cementto six parts aggregate.

Storey: And you’re saying tamper, like to tamper withsomething.

Vernon: Well, you adjust. You adjust. See, what you do– sand is a mixture itself of various sizes ofgrains, and it has a certain workability,depending on the size of those grains. It also hasa certain amount of voids in it. You don’t thinkof sand of being voids, but sand has a certainamount of voids to it, open spaces in theinterstices between the grains of sand. And thegravel also – you obviously understand the ideaof the interstices between the gravel because youcan see them.

Now, what you want to do is you want toadjust your ratio of sand to gravel, which, aswell as you can, fill the interstices in theelements of the gravel with the sand. Now, then,the other notion is to complete your function ofgetting workability with your cement, with yourconcrete, is to adjust your cement quantities, sothey, in turn, fill the interstices of the sand whichis left after filled interstices of the gravel.

Then you’ve got a question ofworkability. In other words, depending on theshape of your form, [whether] which it’s a massconcrete or whether you’re working in acomplex structure like the beam of a bridge orthe foundation of a bridge, or whatever, youadjust, through laboratory studies, the best mixof the elements that go into your concrete whichgive you the necessary workability. Then youhave to be very careful as to the amount of thewater that you add to the mix. We found that the

185

Kenneth F. Vernon

less water you add, the stronger your concretewill come out. But you have to add water to getworkability. So this is called the water-cementratio.

In dam work, there they go through allthese exercises that I’m talking about, but again,in order to reduce this water-cement ratio, orshall we say reduce the water to the cementratio, they add additives to the concrete whichalmost gives it a jellylike substance, and youwalk on the concrete after it’s been poured into alarge block in a dam, for several days it actuallyfeels like it’s a Jell-o sort of thing, because itslows down what’s called the heat of hydration,which is the chemical action of the cement andthe water.

In dam work, you also then addrefrigeration pipes to this mass concrete, because that concrete in its chemical reaction ofthe cement and the water and so on, in a bigmass of concrete it can get up to, say, 150degrees. So you set up a refrigeration plant andcirculate cooling water through this mass ofconcrete to reduce that and remove the heat ofhydration of the chemical reaction of the cement.

Now, what you want to do – you askedwhat about this relative strength. You want tofind out as early as you can in a structure howquickly can you remove the forms. And thatrelates to the, as I said, the one- or two-daystrength and the seven-day strength. Concretewill, within about three days, if it’s not subject toany stress like in a footing or in a wall, say, youcan remove those forms in about three days, andthe wall will support itself if it’s not under otherstress. But now on a beam, you may have tomaintain your form work as high as seven days,because now that concrete has had to develop

186


enough strength to withstand whatever stressesthat beam will be put under, including just itsown weight. Does that answer your question?

Storey: Well, I think we’re getting there, yes. (laughter) If I knew how to ask the question so that youwould understand it, it would help. So, now, ifI’m understanding correctly, the lab for the DeltaDivision would first of all determine what themix should be for the various structures, andthey would do that on the basis of the concreteavailable to the contractor and the aggregates ofvarious kinds. Then the concrete is placed in thestructure, and during that placement,Reclamation’s inspectors would be out there andthey would take samples of the concrete.

Vernon: Correct.

Storey: And if I understood what you were saying, theywould take them back, they would cure them,and then they would test them in machines.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: How long did they wait in order to test them? For instance, did they do a test after twenty-fourhours and after seven days? Or did they just doit once? How’s that work?

Vernon: Well, depending on where the concrete wasbeing placed. Any particular sample or anyparticular list of set of samples would besubjected to a different scheduling of tests. It ifwas like in canal lining, for example, which wasresting on dirt, it was not really subjected to anystress, so to speak of, other than temperature,probably the testing and strength testingprogram was not so severe because its strengthwas not really an issue.

But in a structure, you usually went

187

Kenneth F. Vernon

through, say, a three- or four-day test to see thatthe thing was properly starting to contain itsstrength, and whether you could start removingforms. You get the seven-day test and then youtake the twenty-eight-day test. This was atwenty-eight-day test, because you wanted toknow. That was the test that determined that itwas meeting the design specification.

Now, normally speaking, this mix – I justmentioned the basic 1-2-4 mix adjusted to meetthe field aggregate conditions, would develop atleast 2,800 pounds per square inch, normally itwould develop about a strength, a compressivestrength, that is, of about 3,500 pounds persquare inch. About the only reason why itwouldn’t make that strength is if too much waterwas used and therefore a slurry developed and alot of the cement washed out or it hadn’t beenmixed properly and you get what’s calledhoneycombing, and it wasn’t an adequate mix,there was sand filling the voids of the aggregate,if you look at a wall and you can see coarseaggregate, you don’t see a smooth surface.

The standard that we were using at thattime for Class A concrete was by the AmericanConcrete Association and adopted by the civilengineering societies, was 2,800 pounds persquare inch. In later days, because of thisadvance in technology of concrete, it was gettingup to 3,500 pounds per square inch and even ashigh as 5,000 pounds per square inch in certainvery critical mixes.

Storey: Good.

Vernon: That’s it.

Storey: That’s very interesting, thank you. Now, asOffice Engineer, as this design process wasdeveloping, did you ever go out in the field?

188


Vernon: Oh, yes.

Storey: Why?

Vernon: Well, to observe what was going on. In otherwords, to keep abreast of field conditions as theywere developing in the field. Not regularly. Asa matter of fact, a lot of the times [that] I went inthe field was on my own time, just to keep trackof what was going on in the field. Also at times,at critical structures, I’d want to go out there andjust see how things were developing on site,such as a bridge or a siphon, one of theseinverted siphon structures, and to see how thecontractors were developing the form work toconstruct some of the hydraulic structures,because one of the things we want to avoid inhydraulic structures were sharp corners, becausethat creates turbulent flow and some of the formwork is very difficult. Sometimes it took a littlebit of figuring out how the contractor was goingto create this form work. So I’d like to followout how contractors were developing this formwork so we could then translate that back intofuture design work, in other words, to avoidcreating an idea that a contractor couldn’t makeinto forms.

Why Vernon went intothe field

Storey: What kind of hours did you work in the office,normally?

Vernon: Fundamentally; it was eight-to-five. At first weworked six days a week. Then we got the PWApay, when they were trying to make work, wegot Saturday afternoons off. Sometimes weworked alternate Saturdays. In other words,worked one eight-hour Saturday and take thenext Saturday off. Then somewhere along theline, I don’t recall just when it was, the forty-hour-week developed. So not too many. But wewere on call. If something was required, wewere there. If some particular occurrence

Normal work hours forthe job

189

Kenneth F. Vernon

occurred that had to have something right now,you immediately got the call and went back towork.

Storey: Were you living in a construction camp?

Vernon: No. Our office was at the town of Antioch. Now, when I first went there in 1936, Antiochwas a bedroom community to this other villagecalled Pittsburgh, which was largely this steelmill. It served as the steel mill plant, Imentioned, and some of these chemical plants. So Antioch was considered a better place to live,and it was usually fully occupied by people who– these towns were only about five miles apart –by the better-paid people working in thePittsburgh Steel and other plants.

Living arrangementwhile working in Antioch

So we began our service in Antioch in anapartment in Pittsburgh, and I had to drive backand forth, five miles every day. Unfortunately,the water in Pittsburgh was so filled withminerals, I would carry water from Antioch eachday, about four gallons at a time, for ourdrinking purposes and ablutions, but we onlyused the local water to do the laundry work, andit used to form such a terrific curd in the waterthat you could hardly get it out in the rinsing andthe washing machines.

We kept eyeing things available inAntioch, and after about a year, we saw a littlehouse become available which we rented, wereable to rent, so we moved over the Antioch.[Tape recorder turned off]

We lived [in Antioch] there until I wastransferred into Washington in 1943, winter of‘44.

Then some time later, the Contra CostaCanal work was coming to a close, so the main

190


effort, the main office was moved to the DeltaDivision office, the Delta-Mendota Canal officein Tracy, and the . . .


Storey: So later on, the office in Antioch just became . . .

Vernon: A satellite office of Tracy.

Storey: For O&M on the Contra Costa Canal.

Vernon: Yeah, right. And then the main effort to – bythat time, the Delta-Mendota Canal was beingconstructed, so that was the very heavy effortdown there.

Storey: Let me go backwards just a little bit to theDenver office. You mentioned hydraulic studieswhile you were in the Denver office. Were youworking in the lab there?

Vernon: No. I was in the canal section. In the design ofa canal, you have to design the section andhydraulics of the canal so that you can establishvarious elevations. It’s the water surface, theelevation of the water surface, which is yourcontrol, not the bottom, but it’s the elevation ofthe water surface, because that is equivalent ofthe hydraulic gradient of your canal system. Each structure that the water passes through, itloses a little bit of elevation due to turbulence,so you have to make a whole series of hydraulicstudies depending on the type of canal sectionyou have, whether it be earth or whether it beconcrete or pipe or whatever. So as the designsproceeded, you had to take the kind of designthat was being developed into consideration, andeach type of structure, we had learned byexperience, that you used an empirical formulato calculate what we called the head loss, or the

Worked in the canalsection in Denver

191

Kenneth F. Vernon

loss of elevation for the water surface.

For example, if you’re going through aninverted siphon, the water [enters at the upperend.] comes here. Now, your water isapproaching it at a very slow velocity. You runit through a transition section which goes outinto this pipe, and in through the pipe, you thenspeed it up to somewhere around from, let’s say,a velocity of maybe two or three feet per secondup to a velocity of ten or twelve feet per second. That requires a loss of head to do that.

Design issues on canals

Now then, going through this pipe youhave a certain amount of head loss forcing thiswater through that pipe, that has to becalculated. Now, at the outlet you’re going toreduce the speed of that water from its ten ortwelve feet per second down to canal velocityagain, so you get some recovery of thathydraulic [head]. So you have an overall loss ofhead, we call it, which is hydraulic elevation, toforce this water to speed up and then recover,and so then you establish a new water surfaceelevation at the outlet of your structure. So youhave to continue to adjust that depending uponthe designs that are created as your design workproceeds.

I remember one of the major studies thatI made was on the All-American Canal, I’veforgotten now all the details of it, but there wassome questions that came up about something inthe All American Canal, and they figured I knewmore about that than anybody, so I made thatstudy on the All-American Canal and establisheda whole bunch of elevations for various pointsalong the All-American Canal. That took waterfrom the Colorado River along the Mexicanborder and then into the Imperial Valley.

Work on the All-American Canal

Storey: And avoided the canal going into Mexico.

192


Vernon: Yeah, yeah.

Storey: While you were in Denver, did you meet RayWalter?

Vernon: Who?

Storey: Raymond F. Walter.

Vernon: No, I never did. I reported in to Sinclair O.Harper, who was the Assistant Chief Engineer. Mr. Walter made a lot of visits to the field, butsince all my correspondence was signed by Mr.Harper, I reported to him. The Denver office, atthat time, the main office was in the CustomHouse, over by the post office. It was called theNew Custom House. The Canals Division waslocated in a bank building a few blocks away. There were several elements in that bankbuilding. I remember, I think we were on theeighth floor, as I recall. On our particular floorthere was the Canals Division, there was theBridge Division, and over here was [also] theTracing Division servicing I don’t know howmany elements, but I know that it serviced theCanals Division and the Bridge Division, but Idon’t know what other divisions. Then onanother floor were the "eggheads," which wascalled the Technical Division, and they wereperforming all kinds of "gee whiz" studies, ofwhat I don’t know. laughter) But it was calledthe Technical Services Division. I was neverquite sure what they were doing.

Sinclair O. Harper

Location of the CanalsDivision

Technical Division, the“eggheads”

Did I meet Mr. Walter? Not many of usdid. I remember one time there was a chap, aMr. Wilhelm, who was one of the boys down inthe trenches, and he was known as a sort of awag. He was alleged to have said one morning,“Gee, fellows, I had a long conversation withMr. Walter this morning."

Raymond F. Walter

193

Kenneth F. Vernon

"You mean the Mr. Walter? “ said we.

“Oh, yes, the real Mr. Walter."

"Well, what did he say?”

"I said, 'Good morning, Mr. Walter,' andhe said, 'Uh.'" (laughter)

Storey: Was that a general experience? (laughter)

Vernon: Yeah. (laughter) There’s another story aboutMr. Walter, but I won’t tell it on the machine. [Tape recorder turned off]

Storey: We’re talking about Grant Bloodgood now.

Vernon: I didn’t know Grant Bloodgood’s earlier history,but I’d heard of him through my association withCharlie Anderson, who I mentioned earlier, whowas Office Engineer at Shasta Dam. But GrantBloodgood was the Field Engineer in charge offield operations at Shasta Dam, so I’d heard ofGrant Bloodgood.

Grant Bloodgood

Then later, after I became RegionalDirector at Billings and Grant had moved intoDenver as the Assistant Chief Engineer, I gotbetter acquainted with him because CharlieAnderson had moved to Billings and was myRegional Engineer of design and construction,and Grant would visit us, and Andy wouldsquire him around.

We were ready to have the foundationinspection of Canyon Ferry Dam. I assembled agroup, first in Billings, which was composed ofthe consulting board, I don’t remember who wasinvolved in that, but Mr. McClellan was theChief Engineer and he was accompanied byGrant Bloodgood and Ken Markwell, theAssistant Commissioner. So my wife agreed

Foundation inspectionat Canyon Ferry Dam

194


that she would entertain all these gentlemen fordinner that evening. Well, apparently she andGrant hit it off tremendously, and Grant reallyenjoyed the evening, if you understand what Imean. [Now] Then it came time that I was goingto take Mr. McClellan and Ken Markwell in theplane and fly them up to Canyon Ferry the nextday. We, of course, didn’t take everybody. Weassigned the consulting board and CharlieAnderson and Grant Bloodgood to ride the train. It left Billings about midnight and would get intoHelena the next morning, which was adjacent tothe Canyon Ferry Dam site. We had a verydifficult time getting Grant to the train. He’denjoyed himself so much that evening, everytime we’d get everybody outside, we’d say,"Where’s Grant?" Well, he was back in thehouse enjoying himself again. And it took usquite a while to pour him into the train. (laughter)

Storey: Let’s see. Another person, you mentionedWalker Young was in Denver at that time. IfI’m recalling, he was Construction Engineer atHoover.

Vernon: Yes, he was the Supervising ConstructionEngineer at Hoover Dam. Then he wastransferred over and became SupervisingEngineer of the Central Valley Project. Thenafter the death of R.F. Walter [and Sinclair O.Harper as Chief Engineer], he was moved in tobe Chief Engineer in the Denver office. Since Ihad been on the Central Valley Project, I wasknown as one of Brig Young’s boys.

Walker R. Young

So what else would you like to know?

Storey: I’d like to know about Walker Young. Whatwas he like and all that?

Vernon: Well, he was a very nice gentleman, thoughtful,

195

Kenneth F. Vernon

courteous, apparently a very capableadministrator, because he had managed theCentral Valley and the Hoover Dam. When Ihad some problems I needed to discuss withsomebody, particularly project problems orconstruction problems, or whatever, I could talkto Walker Young and he’d give seriousconsideration to it.

Storey: Now, wait. Walker Young is what you’recalling “Brig Young,” is that right?

Vernon: Yeah. Everybody knew him as Brig Young. Inthe parlance, he was Brig Young. He wasWalker Young, Walker R. Young, but hiscolloquialism was “Brig.”

Storey: Oh, okay. Why was that?

Vernon: Well, I don’t know. That was before my time. He had been on the Yakima Project. He hadalso made a study in the early 1920s, a study ofhow to prevent the salt intrusion into the Deltaarea on the Suisun Bay and San Joaquin and SanJoaquin Rivers. He was the head engineer onthat study for Reclamation. So he had a longhistory of Reclamation activities.

Walker Young studiessaltwater intrusion intothe Delta area on SuisunBay

Storey: You mention Sinclair O. Harper, also, anotherfigure that keeps popping up all overReclamation’s early history.

Vernon: At that time, I was a lowly junior engineer, so itwas sort of like the Cabots speaking to Lodgesand only the Lodges speaking to God, you know. Sinclair Harper was someone I only knowprincipally by name, because I think I reportedto him, and he immediately told me to gosomewhere else. (laughter) But apparently hewas a very capable engineer. Then he ultimatelybecame Chief Engineer [after Raymond F.Walter. One thing I remember about S. O.

196


Harper was one time when he was visiting theWashington Office, and we were sitting aroundshooting the bull, he said, “yeah, I know, youhave had the most meteoric rise in the Bureau.]

Storey: Yeah, he was actually Chief Engineer beforeWalker Young was.

Vernon: Oh, that’s right. That’s right. I was just goingto say. Because I suddenly caught myself. Iremember when we were in the midst of ourheavy program in the Delta Division, he madean inspection trip to the project, to the DeltaDivision. We picked him up at one end of theproject and deposited on a low flight in a car atthe other end of the project. I think his visitlasted all of two hours.

Storey: What about Chief Design Engineer Jack Savage? Did you meet him?

Vernon: No, because, you see, I was in the CanalsDivision, and Savage made his mark on damsdesign. So I never was involved in the groupthat was involved with dams design. I onlyknew him by reputation as a very forward-looking dam designer.

Storey: After you left Denver, you went to Washington?

Vernon: No, no. After I left Denver I went to . . .

Storey: You went to the Central Valley, then you wentto Washington?

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: Did you meet Harold Ickes and Julius A. Krug15

while you were there?

Vernon: Yes, yes.

197

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: And the assistant secretaries, could you tell meabout all these folks?

Vernon: Well, now it’s a little difficult for me to –starting with Harold Ickes, it’s a little difficultfor me to decide what I actually know bypersonal contact and what I know because I reada biography on him which was very interesting. It’s about that thick [indicating several inches]. He’s a very complex personality.

Storey: Yeah, quite a thick book.

Vernon: And I learned about his history in Chicago andso on and how he happened to become Secretaryof the Interior. But he apparently was a veryable administrator, and he not only ran theInterior Department, but he also ran the PWAprogram and the Works ProgressAdministration. And he was supported, at thattime, by Abe Fortas as Under Secretary.

Storey: Mr. Fortas is actually the person who signed theBureau of Reclamation’s reorganizationdocument in early 1944 when the regions werecreated.

Vernon: Was he the one who signed that document? Well, I found that there were certain anomaliesgoing on within the Department, which, afterreading his biography, I better understood andanswered some of the questions I’d had, becausethere were certain people within the Department,the Department structure, that I alwayswondered what their role was. I found out later,for example, Mr. Ickes wanted the ForestService. He wanted to get control of the forestryresources of the United States and he foughtregularly with the Secretary of Agriculture,because he felt that the Secretary of Agriculturewas being dominated by lumbering interests,whereas Mr. Ickes wanted to develop the

198


conservation of the nation’s timbering resources.

So he had a special assistant whoseprincipal role – well, he was a forester. Whatwas his name? Lee Wood. Lee Wood. I don’tknow why, but I had some relationships withWood. I don’t recall what they were for, but Igot to know him, and I always kind of wonderedwhat his role was in the Department, why wasthere a forester in the Department. He wasobviously in the upper echelons of theDepartment. Then I find out by reading thebiography that Mr. Ickes was desperately tryingto get hold of the Department of Forestry, to getit in the Interior department.

He also had a group which was called thePower Division, which was headed up by agentlemen known as "Tex" Goldsmith, and hehad another bunch of guys. They were the onesthat ran herd on the Tennessee Valley Authority,provided staff assistance to the Tennessee ValleyAuthority, and then established the BonnevillePower Authority and the Southwest PowerAuthority. I don’t recall what other powerauthorities were established, but under thegeneral purview of the Department. Andapparently this was a part of Mr. Ickes’ andothers' effort which might lead to theestablishment of other Valley Authorities. Theirfirst move was the establishment of these powermarketing authorities.

Power Division in theDepartment of theInterior

Secretary of the InteriorHarold Ickes movestoward regionalauthorities

The Under Secretary and the Secretarythat I became most familiar with was OscarChapman,16 because, as Regional Director, as Itold you earlier, before I became RegionalDirector, I had an interview with Julius Krug,known as "Cap" Krug, Truman had appointed[him] as Secretary of the Interior after he firedHarold Ickes. So I did not have too much

Oscar Chapman

Julius Krug

199

Kenneth F. Vernon

association with Krug, although he did make acouple of visits to the region, meeting primarilywith local big-wigs in the region which wewould try to set up for him. Reclamation wasonly one of the interests that he was reviewingwhile he’d be out there. So we had very littleassociation with him.

But Oscar, as Under Secretary and asSecretary of the Interior, I got quite familiar,well, I became quite familiar with Oscar for tworeasons. One was he was interested inReclamation because he was a Coloradan, andthe other was that because I was one of theleading government officials out in the MissouriBasin, it fell to me to squire – what was[Thomas E.] Dewey’s first name, thepresidential candidate of 1948, [around myarea]?

Tours Missouri Basinarea with Thomas E.Dewey

Storey: Well, embarrassed though I am, I don’tremember for sure.

Vernon: Well, at any rate, I got notified that Mr. Deweywas making a campaign trip out through theregion and that I was delegated to become hisaide de campe, so to speak, and arranging forhim to visit many of the Reclamation – becomefamiliar with the Reclamation and the MissouriBasin effort and squire him around a bit.

Following that, I was deputed to ride Mr.Truman’s train. He was making a non-politicaltrip out through the West, and his train would berouted through the Missouri Valley. I was toldthe trip would not be labeled for politicalpurposes; he was inspecting ReclamationProjects as he traveled through. So I wasdeputed to ride his train and be on call in case heneeded any particular information aboutReclamation, which, unfortunately, he didn’tseem to need. (laughter)

Traveled with PresidentTruman during a visit toReclamation projects inthe area

200


Then in 1950 –

Storey: So you escorted the two opposing candidates.

Vernon: Then in 1950, I was again deputed to ride thePresident’s train, Mr. Truman, and this time hedid take a little more interest in what was goingon in Reclamation because by this time we hadthings going on. The mainstream dams werebeing built and he was interested in the MissouriBasin development because he’d grown up inthe Lower Basin and he understood [it]. Hestrongly supported the Corps' program for floodcontrol in the valley. So he was more interested.

Again rode PresidentTruman’s train in 1950

I recall we stopped in a little city – we’dbeen through Great Falls and we stopped in alittle village, out in the hinterlands, on our wayto Havre, Montana, which was the departingpoint to go visit the Tiber Dam site, which wewere inaugurating the construction of the TiberDam. Well, this was a lovely afternoon in thefall, or evening of the fall, early fall. I sawOscar Chapman at one of the whistle stops and Isaid, “Oscar, can I meet the boss? Do yousuppose you could work me in so I could meetthe boss?”

Oscar Chapman tries tointroduce Vernon toPresident Truman

So he says, “Sure, why not, we’ll see.”

So after we left Great Falls, he said,“Come on, let’s go back to the President’s carand we’ll see if we can find a spare moment thatmaybe I can work you in to meet the President.”

So we went to the President’s car, whichwas at the end of the train and in the little sittingroom, which was at the end of this Magellan car–

Storey: Magellan car?

201

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: Magellan was the name of this private car whichhad been built to protect Presidents. It wasliterally a battleship on wheels. And in this littlesitting room, which was about as big as thisalcove here, was Mrs. Truman and the daughter .

Storey: Margaret.

Vernon: Margaret. So Mr. Chapman introduced me toMrs. Truman and Margaret. The President wasout on this little platform out on the back of thecar, from which he made all his speeches, and hewas out there with one of his aides, and so Mr.Chapman said to Mrs. Truman, “This is Mr.Vernon, the Regional Director of the Bureau ofReclamation who’s in charge of all theReclamation activities in this area, and he wouldlike to meet the President. Do you suppose wecould interrupt the President so I could introduceMr. Vernon?”

“Oh,” she said, “sure, he’s just looking atthe scenery out there. Go on out there.”

And so just about as we went and got upto go out there, some guy come rushing throughthe train with a lock bag on his wrist and said toMr. President, “I have some dispatches for you.”

So the President said, “Sorry people, I’mbusy.” So that was the closest I got to meetPresident Truman. (laughter)

Then later, at the inauguration of theconstruction of Garrison Dam, this was at thetime that Eisenhower was campaigning and Iwas [in] one of the parties, because I wasinvolved in the Missouri Basin development, Iwas one of the parties that got introduced to thecandidate Eisenhower. So while I was notinvolved in the political arena, you got awfully

Escorted Dwight D.Eisenhower during hiscampaign in 1952

202


close to it at times, but never into the sense ofdetermining politics, but just associated with it.

Storey: Tell me more about Oscar Chapman. What washe like as an individual?

Vernon: Well, he was a very thoughtful guy. He was aquiet sort of type. Good administrator. I believehis background was a lawyer, as I recall. Buthe’d been involved in resources development inColorado and whatnot. So he was a differentpersonality from either Ickes or "Cap" Krug.

Storey: Now, at this time he was actually Secretary ofthe Interior?

Vernon: After he’d become Secretary of the Interior,that’s when I got to know him the best. I hadsome association with him, but not [so] much[when] as he was Under Secretary, as he took onSecretary after "Cap" Krug left. I forgot howlong he was Secretary.

Reclamation was only one of the variousefforts that the Secretary of the Interior isinvolved with. So you did not have, let us say, adaily association with the Secretary. MikeStraus used to say, if some question would comeup, I heard him say many times, he’d call downto the Secretary’s office to speak to SecretaryIckes’ secretary and say, “This is Mike. Can Ispeak to my employer?” (laughter) Apparentlyhe had a good relationship with Mr. Ickes.

Oscar was, I think, an effectiveSecretary, as I think Secretary Udall was aneffective Secretary, because they wereWesterners, they understood the problems, themulti interests, as was indicated in this InteriorMissouri Basin Coordinating Committee, the sixor seven departments that were involved thereand how we were able to integrate that. But it

Interior Missouri BasinCoordinating Committee

203

Kenneth F. Vernon

was just an indication of the broad spectrum ofInterior’s efforts. So each Secretary might havea particular interest in certain sections of theInterior activity. Ickes, while he was very strongwith the public works program and resourcesdevelopment, he also was a conservationist atheart. The Park Service and the Bureau of LandManagement and Fish and Wildlife Service,those, I think, were the things he really liked,personally.

"Cap" Krug was more interested inpower development and things that were moreinvolved with TVA and with the War ProductionBoard and the War Utilities Office.

Oscar was more interested in broadresources development that he met up with in hisexperience in the West, Bureau of LandManagement on Taylor Grazing [Act of June 28,1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269] and that sort ofthing, as well as the Fish and Wildlife and thePark Service. I think he had a broader spectrumof interests than the others that I’ve beenassociated with, in terms of resourcesdevelopment.

Storey: At that time did they have assistant secretaries?

Vernon: Well, yeah, they had – it was during, I don’trecall whose administration it was when theyestablished the Assistant Secretary for Water andPower and there was a restructuring of the levelof assistant secretaries, and I think that wasabout 1950. So that might have been duringOscar Chapman’s tenure, because Bill Warnemoved up from being Assistant Commissionerand moved up to become Assistant Secretary forWater and Power. Then there was an assistantsecretary which covered the Park Service, theFish and Wildlife Service, and there was anotherassistant secretary that included the Bureau of

Establishment of theassistant secretaries inDepartment of theInterior

204


Mines and the Geological Survey and so on. Sothey partitioned out among the assistantsecretary level [the] to various agencies17 in theDepartment. At times we wondered if the headof our [bureau] department was not a strongperson if the assistant secretary [wouldn’t]didn’t become really the effective administratorwho was calling the shots.

Now, Mike Straus and Bill Warneworked very closely together because Bill hadworked under him as Assistant Commissioner,so they got along very well and there was nodoubt who was boss, Mike Straus was boss. Inlater days I was never sure, particularly in whatlittle I saw of the Dexheimer Administration inReclamation, as to who was boss, but I thoughtit was the Assistant Secretary or the UnderSecretary. I forget – Tudor, I forget whether hewas Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary.

William Warne and MikeStraus relationship

Storey: Tudor?

Vernon: Tudor.

Storey: Yeah, Under Secretary [James Douglas] McKay.

Vernon: Yeah, Under Secretary McKay, yeah.

Storey: Now, there was another secretary who got FloydDominy appointed. That would have beenSecretary–

Vernon: McKay. He was in the EisenhowerAdministration.

Storey: Yeah, but he had been replaced, I believe.

Vernon: Oh, that I don’t know.

Storey: I’ve forgotten the name right now. [Secretaryof the Interior Fred A. Seaton].

205

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: By that time I was overseas, so I don’t know.

Storey: Tell me about politicians. When you were inWashington and when you were RegionalDirector, did you have any contact withcongressmen and senators?

Vernon: Yes, yes. As Acting Engineering Assistant tothe Commissioner, I helped prepare a lot of thedocumentation that was presented to the Bureauof the Budget and to the committees ofCongress. At times I accompanied theCommissioner or his other assistants andprovided them with staff support as they weremaking testimony to the various committee –

Acting EngineeringAssistant to theCommissioner

END SIDE 2, TAPE 1. APRIL 26, 1995.BEGINNING SIDE 1, TAPE 2. APRIL 26, 1995.


Members of Congress would refer –

Vernon: Would refer questions down to us that they’dreceived from their constituents, and whenever itrelated to an engineering problem, I wouldreview the problem and draft a response for theCommissioner’s signature to go back to theparticular member of Congress, or I might evengo up and explain some of the details of it beforewe submitted our formal response. Then asRegional Director, I would prepare my budgetfor the region, I would defend that before theCommissioner and his assistants. Then I woulddefend whatever they included in theCommissioner’s appropriation request in theDepartment and at the Bureau of the Budget, andthen would accompany the Commissioner andhis staff to the committees of Congress andwould supply detailed information if I wascalled upon to do.

Responding toquestions fromCongress

206


For example, one of the congressmen orthe senators might have a particular questionfrom a constituent, he wanted to know a littlemore details than the Washington staff would beaware of, and this was particularly true as theMissouri Basin development developed. So attimes I testified directly before the appropriateappropriations committees. Then I becameacquainted with all the members of Congress inmy area, the four states in my area, and regularlyas they visited their districts, regularly talkeddirectly with them to keep them apprised of whatwas going on, because it was very important tothem to be informed as to what was going on sothey could talk intelligently with theirconstituents.

Just as a sidebar, one of the things wehad stressed in setting up the budgeting processin the Missouri Basin, we wanted to preventwhat Mike Straus used to label [call] his “thirty-one pocketbooks.” He wanted to keep thatappropriation as one single appropriation to theMissouri Basin, and then he would parcel out orwe would maintain a sort of fluidity withingeneral guidelines, applying that money to thevarious activities.

Well, it so happened that after the – Ithink this was in the fall of 1947, we decidedthat we would advertise the contract for BoysenDam in Wyoming in the fall of the year, but thatbefore we could get the contract awarded, itwould be wintertime, and therefore the actualconstruction would not begin before spring andthere would be adequate funding to finance thecontractors' activities until a new appropriationbecame available.

Boysen Dam contract inthe fall of 1947

Well, in my activities as Chief ProgressControl Officer, we’d worked on the Denveroffice to improve its ability to award contracts at

207

Kenneth F. Vernon

an earlier date, not requiring quite as muchreview. So to my surprise, the contract wasawarded in early November, and it turned outthat in this new system, they had issued a letterof intent, so the contractor, which was acombination of Morrison-Knudson and PeterKewitt, two very large Western contractors, hadbegun assembling equipment. One of the majorelements, and the first things we had to dobefore we really began dam construction, seriousdam construction, was to relocate the BurlingtonRailroad, which ran through the bed of thecanyon, around the dam site and reservoir.

Now, as it turned out, in that relocationof the railroad, the construction of that, therewas a great deal of excavation that wasn’trequired for filling, for the road bed, but wouldbe simply deposited [off] out at the site and[with] no particular engineering requirements tocover, so it was just a matter of excavating anddisposing of it. And it turned out that particularwinter was an open winter, so the ground didn’tfreeze. We were down, then, working wellbelow the frost level, so this contractor just wenthell-bent for election on excavating that railroadrelocation.

Relocation of theBurlington NorthernRailroad at Boysen Dam

So here I was. That was about February,and I was staring disaster in the face, facing theAnti-Deficiency Act, so to speak, which is aFederal crime. (laughter)

Storey: If you overspend.

Vernon: Creating a deficiency. So I went to theCommissioner’s office and said, "Hey, look. You guys are aware of what’s turned out here,and I need, oh, several millions of dollars tofinance this operation for the rest of the year. What can you scrounge up in the rest of theMissouri Basin and feed it into me to finance the

208


Boysen operations?"

Well, they said, "Region VII has gotten alittle slow on getting its program going, so we’llassign some of Region VII’s money to you."

Moving money to coverthe Boysen Damconstruction operations

Well, the next thing I know, SenatorWherry18 had called from Nebraska, had called aspecial meeting of the Senate subcommittee onour appropriations, and I was called on thecarpet as to what in the world I was doingstealing the money that he'd fought, bled, anddied for to get for the projects in Nebraska. (laughter) Well, he was just cutting me up insmall pieces, when, fortunately, SenatorO’Mahoney19 from Wyoming, got wind of whatwas going on.

Political complicationsin funding Boysenconstruction operations

Storey: Senator who?

Vernon: O’Mahoney. He was the O’Mahoney-MillikenAmendment. He was the senator of theO’Mahoney-Milliken Amendment [of the 1944Flood Control Act], which created our part ofthe Missouri Basin development. He heard whatwas going on, so he came in, and he undertookto create record from me that rescued me. Hesaved my bacon. With Wherry, I couldn’t getinto the record what had happened. [Wherry’sposition was that] "This was strictly a dirty plotof you bureaucrats to rob our good people ofNebraska of the projects that they were entitledto." But O’Mahoney was able to let me get intothe record of the series of actions which hadoccurred, and it was a strictly logical event ofmoving money to meet requirements whichwasn’t otherwise being used. But of course thiscreated a problem for the politicians, becauseafter they had made their record during theappropriation hearings and so on, and with theirconstituents and so, then suddenly they’d haveto do it all over again, because we'd take the

209

Kenneth F. Vernon

money, rob Peter to pay Paul, and this kind ofmade them a little unhappy.

I got into a similar situation to that, thereverberation of that Boysen situation in NorthDakota, because I robbed a North Dakota projectof some money to feed into Boysen. GovernorAandahl at that time, he took me to task aboutthat, and [also] the people who supported theappropriation for the Heart Butte Dam. I wasn’ttheir favorite person for quite a long while.

Storey: Can you spell O’Mahoney?

Vernon: O, I think, comma.

Storey: Apostrophe.

Vernon: Apostrophe, yeah,

Storey: O’M . . .

Vernon: Apostrophe. I said comma. Apostrophe. M-A-H-O-N-E-Y. It’s an Irish name.

Storey: Yeah, which I would say MahÇney. Okay.

Vernon: Normally you would do O’MahÇney, yeah,O’MahÇney. Yeah, anybody else would call itO’MahÇney, but he called it O’Mah ahn‘.

Storey: Oh, okay. Did you ever see politicians come inand try and get you or somebody else inReclamation to do something? You know, toimplement a project or –

Vernon: Yes, yes. And this is how I became less thanCongressman D’Ewart’s20 favorite. He was thecongressman from the Second District inMontana.

Storey: And you spell that name how?

210


Vernon: Dewart, D-E-W-A-R-T. Up to this point he’dbeen one of our stalwarts. He was on the [a]member of the House AppropriationsCommittee, Interior Appropriations Committee. I’d squired him around the projects many times,flew him around in our airplane and all, and hewas impressed with what we were doing.

Dealings withCongressman D’Ewart

We were starting the construction of theFort Peck-Glendive transmission line, which Ihad mentioned earlier. This transmission linewould be located adjacent to the town ofSydney, Montana. Well, the town of Sydneydecided that they needed an airport. So since wehad not started any construction or anythingdown there, they said, "Well, could you relocatea portion of the line around the favored locationof the airport?"

I said, "Yeah, we can handle that okay."

Well, it wasn’t too much longer beforethey came back with another request forrelocation. But by this time we’d started topurchase right-of-way for the easements for thetransmission line. I said, "Now this is going tobe a little difficult, but I’ll see what I can do." So we made a second relocation.

Storey: This was at D’Ewart’s request?

Vernon: Not yet. Then came a third request. This time Isaid, "No, fellas, we can’t do it. We’recommitted to this location."

So the next thing I knew, Mr. D’Ewartvisited me in Billings on one of his various tripsto his district, and he said, "You know, we’vegot a real problem down at Sydney. They wantto get that new airport in there and thattransmission line that you’re building downthere is having a very serious effect on their

211

Kenneth F. Vernon

plans for their airport."

I said, "Yeah, I know, Wes, but under ourlaws, I just can’t move it again because it addsan unneeded expense, and under Reclamationlaw our expenses are reimbursable to thegovernment. So it seems to me that if thattransmission line is going to be moved again,there’s going to have to be a bit of legislationinvolved that would somehow excuse theexpenses that we’ve already made and take onany additional expenses – that provide for anyadditional expenses in making this thirdrelocation."

Well, he evidenced some displeasure atthat response, because he, at that time, was on aneconomy kick, and he did not want to go beforehis committee and start talking about an addedexpenditure. So it seems that after that, I wasnot one of Mr. D’Ewart’s favorites, and after hewas defeated as a congressman from the SecondCongressional District of Montana, he becameAssistant Secretary for Water and Power, Ithink, in the Department of Interior, about thetime I got sent to the suburbs.

Storey: Oh, really. Along that same line you mentionedthat you had a problem with the Chairperson ofthe Billings Area Republicans.

Vernon: Yeah, yeah.

Storey: Do you know if she played any role in –

Vernon: Yes, indeed. Mr. D’Ewart, and I’ve forgottenwhat her name was, they were both deeplyinvolved, because I have a letter from – I don’tknow whether I still have it, but I had a letter inmy files from Len Hall, who was the NationalRepublican Chairman, which indicated that inthe early days of the Eisenhower Administration

How he lost his positionas regional director inBillings

212


there was a requirement that the Republican big-wigs in your residential area had to give youtheir blessing. This they refused to do. Now,this was the sorry part of this situation. I onlyresided in Billings. I only got home to Billingsonce in a while for a clean shirt and see myfamily. My activities were spread out overeastern Montana, all over North Dakota, all ofSouth Dakota, and the northwestern part ofWyoming. I had no relationship, basically, withthe people in Billings.

I was supported by Francis Case21, thesenior senator from South Dakota, to LeonardWood. I was supported by the senior senatorfrom North Dakota, he was Chairman of theSenate Agricultural Committee. I was supportedby Mr. Lemke,22 who was one of the seniorrepresentatives in the House from North Dakota,and Senator O’Mahoney, from Wyoming, wassupporting me. But none of that carried theweight of the County Chairwoman in Billingsand Mr. D’Ewart in the Second CongressionalDistrict. Our activities were very small withinthat district, except that was where theheadquarters were located.

As I understand it, when I first wasnominated to go to Egypt to go to the HighAswan Dam, Mr. D’Ewart objected to that. Now, I have no record of that, but that was whatI was told, that that was one of the things whichcaused some shaking of the tree in getting myappointment approved to that.

D’Ewart’s opposition toVernon’s appointment tothe High Aswan Dam inEgypt

Storey: Did you ever run across anybody changingfigures in order to make cost-benefit ratiosappropriate for projects? You know, one of thebig arguments and challenges that critics ofReclamation often come up with is thatReclamation cooked the cost-benefit ratios inorder to get good cost-benefit ratios.

213

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: No, I never saw a deliberate conversion offigures. We often studied many ways ofcalculating cost-benefit ratios, because it’s avery elastic subject, if you understand, andthere’s a great deal of difference, there was atthat time, a great deal of difference between the“broad economic benefits,” which weren’trecognized by Reclamation law, and thereimbursable elements, which were required byReclamation law, and sometimes the two didn’tmeet. There might be broad economicdevelopments which we couldn’t take intoaccount, but the reimbursement elements didn’tquite add up. So it caused our economists agreat deal of problems, particularly in the highplain states, because economics up there werepretty tough.

Cost-benefit ratios atReclamation

That was why I was so deeply involvedwith the state colleges and their agriculturaleconomists and programs to somehow crank in,to the extent that we possibly could, more thanjust simply the reimbursement elements. But,no, I never saw any deliberate cooking of thebooks.

Storey: You mentioned yesterday that you wanted toproceed on construction of some project orprojects without [repayment] contracts signed inadvance.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: And you mentioned a little while ago that TiberDam was started under you. Now, I believe thatone was started without reimbursement contractsin place.

Vernon: That’s right. And that was a long and difficultstruggle. My approach to it was that we hadbeen working with the people in the MariasRiver area and had set up various boundaries of

Reclamation projectsstarted withoutreimbursementcontracts in place

214


possible irrigation districts. So there was noquestion about it, in my mind, that ultimately wewould arrive at a satisfactory irrigation districtcontract, but also I approached it from thestandpoint that the Tiber Dam was basically apart of the flood control program for theMissouri Basin, so that I argued with theCommissioner that he should accept theproposition that we would continue to work onthe definition of the irrigation district andapproval of the irrigation district, but to proceedwith the construction of the Tiber Dam as anelement of the flood control program of theMissouri Basin, which I was ultimately able toprevail, and that’s how we were able to get itstarted.

Tiber Reservoir

Unfortunately, just about the time we gotthe darn thing started, the Korean War began,and so we had a number of difficulties reallymaking any progress with the construction of theTiber Dam.

Storey: So it was primarily flood control, from yourpoint of view?

Vernon: Well, part of its capacity was dedicated to floodcontrol on the Marias River. It had the irrigationelement, yes, but it also had a flood controlelement. So my argument was that the irrigationelement would take longer to work out, but thedam – again this goes back to your cost-benefitratios. We were able to show that its floodcontrol benefits would justify its construction asa part of the flood control program of theMissouri Basin.

Storey: Oh, I see, okay.

Vernon: So that is not cooking the books, but it’s usingsome, shall we say, enlightened approach to thecalculation of benefits. (laughter)

215

Kenneth F. Vernon

Storey: Okay. (laughter) What was the style ofReclamation managers back when you were inDenver and the Central Valley Project and inWashington? You know, people talk aboutdemocratic styles and autocratic styles and allthat kind of thing.

Vernon: Well, I mentioned Oscar Boden, that I workeddirectly under. I mentioned also Harry Bashoreas Commissioner. And I also said way back inour earlier discussions that Harry Bashore was, Ifelt, the only man that Oscar Boden reallyfeared. And this goes way back to the NorthPlatte Project days when – this is an anecdote.

Oscar Boden and HarryBashore as managers

Storey: That’s fine.

Vernon: When Harry Bashore was the Project Engineeron the North Platte Project and Oscar Boden wasa young engineer at that time in the constructionof the North Platte Project. As this story goes,Mr. Boden was down in a construction holedoing some kind of inspection work orsomething or other, and Harry Bashore climbeddown in this hole and didn’t like what he sawand did a royal chewing-out of Mr. Boden’s rearpockets. And so apparently Mr. Boden alwaysgave Mr. Bashore considerable respectthereafter.

Now, I saw that happened in Washingtonin my three-year tenure in Washington. Afterworking under Mr. Boden, I found workingunder Harry Bashore just old home week. Theywere two of a kind. They demanded immediateresponse. They also demanded accurateresponses. I told you about the time we missedthe point on the estimate that he took toSacramento.

Harry had the habit of challenging youbefore you really got through the door to his

216


office, and he’d start yelling at you before yougot there. What really was a method of testingyou, as to how well you'd thought through whatit was you were talking about, how well youwere able to defend what you were proposing, ifyou were proposing something. And so thebetter you were able to defend and discuss whatyou wanted and thought should be done, thebetter he liked it and he'd ultimately comearound to this point of view, but he’d give you astrong discussion in the process.

I saw him jump poor old Bill Kubach, K-U-B-A-C-H, who was at that time HarryBashore’s Chief Clerk, the equivalent of hisProject Chief Clerk, [although] he was at thattime called the Director of Finance, orsomething like that. But to Harry Bashore, hewas his Chief Clerk. Every time poor old BillKubach got a call from the Commissioner’soffice to come up front and center, Bill wouldstart to shake, and he’d literally collapse on hisway in to the boss’ presence. (laughter)

Now, Harry was not a cruel man, but itwas just his style of administration. WalkerYoung had a different style of administration. He was thoughtful, kind, considerate, knew whathe was about, knew what he wanted. Hedemanded results. He got his staff to do theirstaff work. So he was a different administrator.

Walker Young’smanagement style

Storey: How about Grant Bloodgood?

Vernon: Grant, I don’t think was an administrator, really.[For] my Regional Engineer, Charlie Anderson,if Grant Bloodgood told Charlie that the moonwas made out of green cheese, Charlie wouldbelieve it. He was a guy who elicited strongsupport from his subordinates, but at the sametime he really wasn’t an administrator, if you getthe distinction of the word. He’d become

Grant Bloodgood as amanager

217

Kenneth F. Vernon

personally involved in things. He didn’t take thebroader view, it seemed to me. Now, that wasmy reaction to his way of administering things.

Storey: And after him came Barney Bellport. Whatabout him?

Vernon: I never knew Barney as a senior administrator. Barney and I worked adjacent to each other inthe Delta Division. To a certain extent, we werecompetitors. He had preceded me on the DeltaDivision by about six months. So therefore hehad established certain relationships, particularlywith old Stubblefield, that I’ve mentioned. Andthen I was the Johnny-come-lately from Denver,who really didn’t understand project activities,you understand, although I’d spent four yearswith the state highway – surveys of the statehighway. So I felt that I was fairly capable inmy own right and understood some of Denver’srequirements, and I was [ready and did] open toannounce what I thought Denver’s requirementswere and tried to put them into effect. So therewas some contest there.

So as time wore on, Barney got deeplyinvolved with the surveys for – the Contra CostaCanal was being built in lands that were alreadyinto ownership. There were some verycomplicated ownerships, the Spanish land grantsthat went way back to Mexico and even Spain. So Barney got very deeply involved with theright-of-way acquisition elements, and so hepretty much devoted all of his time to that, andhe spent a lot of time at the county courthouses,developing deed information and so on. Hewould take the elements of the canal of whichmy group was developing and lay out therequired right-of-way boundaries and thenwould do all the preparation of all the land platsfor the right-of-way acquisitions. So he wasdeeply involved in that sort of thing, and so

Barney Bellport workedon right-of-wayacquisition for theContra Costa Canal

218


while we were there working together andassociated, we weren’t in any form ofcompetition.

I don’t know how Barney would havebeen as an administrator, really I don’t. Imentioned to him that he was a cruel man to hissubordinates. He had an unhappy way ofneedling people and embarrassing them and alsoto undercut them, which he tried to do to meseveral times. I knew he did with old Stubb.

Storey: Yes, you could see that first-hand, huh?. Whenyou went to Billings as the Regional Director, in‘47, right?

Vernon: Yeah.

Storey: In ‘47, I think the regional reorganization hadactually started in ‘43, but it was signed by AbeFortas only in early ‘44, when it became official.

Vernon: Yes, yes, that’s, yeah. Wait a minute, wait aminute. Well, I don’t know about his signature,but Wes Nelson left the Washington office in thewinter, January of 1944, because that’s when Iwas moved into Washington. He went to beRegional Director of Amarillo in January of1944. So the regions were established by thattime. I don’t know about when it was signed.

Wes Nelson becomesregional director inAmarillo

Storey: Yeh. Okay. So ‘43-’44, the regions werecreated and you arrived about two to three yearslater to become Regional Director. Do you haveany sense of how the regional office was puttogether before you arrived, where it had comefrom and –

Vernon: Yes, indeed, I do.

Storey: Tell me about it, could you? And how thepeople were selected and brought in, all those

219

Kenneth F. Vernon

kinds of things.

Vernon: That I can’t answer, as to how they wereselected, because many of them were selectedbefore I got there. When I arrived, there was agroup of about 350 people spread out in tendifferent locations in the town of Billings,because there was no adequate provision ofoffice space which could house that manypeople. Because Billings was sort of an out-of-the-way cow town.

Did you give me some sort of a signal?

Storey: No, go ahead. I remembered something I needto ask you later.

Vernon: Oh, okay. Also, as I told you earlier, I found theregional office heavily involved in what I callproject activities, very little what I expected tobe assigned to regional activities, regionalplanning and thinking ahead and that sort ofthing. This group had been assembled from allover, many of them were from Reclamation,many of them were from various other agenciesof government, such as there was this groupdoing Missouri Basin Project work . . .


Storey: You were talking about the situation that youfound in the region and where the region hadcome from and all of that.

Vernon: As I had indicated earlier, I found about 350people spread all over Billings in ten differentlocations, [some in] garages. The Regional[Director’s] office itself was in a downtownoffice building, the Regional Director’s office. Ibelieve that the design and construction groupalso had space in that, as well as the power

Status of the regionwhen Vernon arrived inBillings

220


group, but planning was some distance away. Operation and maintenance was somewhere elsein the town. This group that had been doingwhat work was being done on the MissouriBasin Project was over in a converted garagebuilding. The Regional Counsel had himself anoffice which he had had for many, many years inone of the nicer buildings in town and he wasn’tabout to be moved out of there.

So the first thing I said was, "I’ve got tobreak down this bunch of people and get themclassified as to what they’re doing and definewhat they’re doing, as to regional work orproject work." These people had come frommany other agencies, [but] so there was a core ofReclamation people, but most of this 350 peopledid not have Reclamation history or Reclamationassociation, so there was need to develop, shallwe say, a closer affinity among the variousnewcomers to the organization and have themlearn that Reclamation basically was guided by arelatively strict law, but at the same time it wasflexible enough that you could accomplish agreat deal, properly applied. So that wasbasically the problem I first addressed when Igot there, was to break that effort down.

Storey: You say these people had been brought in fromoutside Reclamation.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: So there had been a recruiting effort?

Vernon: Oh, yes, to a certain degree, but there hadn’tbeen a real effort devoted to the field yet. Therewas this 350 people concentrated in Billings. This is why there hadn’t been any real [field]activity. As I indicated earlier, previousmanagement of the region, [previous to] myadvent, was project oriented. Their feet were

221

Kenneth F. Vernon

anchored in the projects. Therefore, most oftheir attention was devoted to servicing theexisting projects. They had not become reallyconcerned with this new vehicle, the MissouriRiver Basin Project, and really they didn’t knowhow to approach it.

Mr. Sloan, as the Assistant RegionalDirector, had been the Planning Engineer, andhe had this broad vision of what might beaccomplished, but he was not an administratorand he didn’t know how to accomplish it. Hedidn’t want to be bothered with developingpeople and getting them organized and all thevarious activities that were required to carry outa total program. So my field experience taughtme that if we were ever going to get anythingdone, we had to get people moved out into thefield, actively working close to the project areas,that we would have to carry on a dual program,not only servicing the older projects, but also thenew vehicle of the Missouri River Basin.

Glenn Sloan, AssistantRegional Director

Storey: Was there another office in Billings before theregional office?

Vernon: No, only the Regional Counsel. The RegionalCounsel had been established in Billings forquite some time, I don’t know exactly how long. But this was a special problem. With thepersonality of the Regional Counsel, was he feltthat he was being shunted aside in theimportance of his role in the Basin because theregion was assuming many functions which, defacto, but not de jure, he’d been exercising as asort of a regional functionary among the variousexisting projects.

Regional Counsel hadbeen stationed inBillings before theregion was created

Storey: Did you get everybody under one roof?

Vernon: Ultimately, not one, but two. The first thing Idid was I had Mr. Pratt scour the town to see

222


where there might be any space that we could setup the regional headquarters, including thepersonnel and finance operation, because that’swhat I wanted close to me. So he found abuilding, which, incidentally, happened to be thesame building that the Regional Counsel waslocated in. [It] had been a lodge hall or somesuch a matter. It had been some form ofassembly hall. So we had that remodeled andmy regional suite, regional office suite wasestablished in there, in which I had myself, myAssistant Regional Director, Bill Rawlings, nextto me. I had George Pratt in the same suite. Ihad the Regional Finance Officer and theRegional Personnel Office and their supportingstaffs in that same suite, and I was next door,across the hall from the Regional Counsel,which I conferred with regularly over variousproblems. That was our first move ofconsolidation.

Then I actually had the temerity at one ofmy appearances before the AppropriationsCommittee of the House to request anappropriation to build a building in Billingswhich could become our regional office. Idescribed how utterly inefficient it was the waywe were. I’d come to the office in the morningwith requests to maybe I’d like to see three orfour people, but it took all day to locate thevarious people that I might want to talk to. Imight say, "I want to talk to the PlanningEngineer," but he was over in construction. OrI’d want to talk to the Power Manager and hewas over somewhere else, and it would take allday to get those three or four guys over to me sowe could sit and discuss whatever it was that Iwanted to talk about. It was a grossly inefficientoperation. The heads of these various operationswere constantly fluctuating among themselves,talking and trying to coordinate amongthemselves. So I asked the Appropriations

Scattered regionalofficing in Billings wasvery inefficient

223

Kenneth F. Vernon

Committee for an appropriation to build abuilding so I could get these people under oneroof. I described this grossly inefficientoperation we had.

Well, the head of our subcommittee wasRepresentative Ben Jensen, from Iowa. Ben wasa serious conservative and he said, "Well, can’tyou arrange to get somebody to build you abuilding and rent it?"

I said, "Yeah, we hadn’t gone that routebecause there’s certain difficulties about long-term leases with the government. So mypreferred solution would be to have them build abuilding which could be the Reclamationheadquarters."

He said, "Well, before we go any furtherI’d like you to explore the other opportunity."

So I got George Pratt visiting witheverybody in town, and he found a number ofpeople, some of the town leaders, that might gotogether and build us a complex, which if wecould give them a long-term lease, they couldarrange construction financing. They said theydidn’t want to build one building, but there wassome property on which they would build twobuildings, in which case if Reclamation wentthrough one of its usual reorganizations orwhatever and contractions, they would wind upwith maybe a unit they could rent to somebodyelse. In other words they wouldn’t have half abuilding left vacant, which made sense to me.

So I talked to the Regional Counsel tosee what we might be able to do about making along-term lease, and he came up with a possiblesolution. I’ve forgotten just how he solved it. But we were able to come up with a proposedlease which these people were able to take to a

224


group of finance people and get constructionfinancing.

So about 1950 we moved out of thecenter of town. I said, "There’s no point of usbeing in the center of town, because we don’t doany business with the townspeople, really. Ourbusiness is the people who come to Billings tovisit, and we’re talking to people from all aroundthe states. So there’s no need for us to bedowntown taking up expensive spacedowntown." So we got these two buildingsbuilt.

I remember the first morning after we[moved] walked in, I told my secretary I’d liketo see Charlie Anderson, I’d like to see TomJudah about something, I’d like to see JohnnieWalker about something. So then I went to mydesk and started busy, the next thing I knew, by10:30 I’d seen these guys, and I was all throughwith my day’s agenda. (laughter) Because oneguy was upstairs, one guy was down the hall.

Storey: And it was easy to locate them now.

Vernon: Yes. And by the time we got through with thisseparation that I talked about earlier, of all thevarious functionaries, we got what we called theregional office down to something more than100 but less than 150. In other words, wemoved nearly 200 to 300 people, about 200people, out of Billings into the field offices. Ofcourse, it created a lot of stress for them family-wise. On the other hand, they had been havingsome struggle with housing in Billings, becauseBillings had been a bywater during the war.

One of the little gimmicks that we did, Ibrought Fred Gilbert, from the Washington staff,out, who I’d gotten acquainted with. He was asupply officer in the Washington office. I

Brought Fred Gilbert inas Supply Officer

225

Kenneth F. Vernon

brought him out to Billings as my RegionalSupply Officer. He was the guy who managedthe disposition of these relocation centers that Italked about, these Japanese relocation centers. But he also got wind of a whole camp that hadbeen built at a mine. , that had been involved, Ithink it was a chromium mine, because thechromium supply of the United States was verylimited. So this very expensive mine had beendeveloped to mine chromium. It had closedwhen the war closed down. It was closed. Sothis camp became available.

Disposition of Japaneserelocation centers

So Fred came to me and said, "Hey, Ithink that camp’s going to be declared surplus. It’s got a bunch of nice housing in it. I think wecan move that down here to Billings if we canfind the property to put it on, and we can helpthis housing problem in Billings"

Moving in housing forReclamation staff inBillings

So it turned out that we got somethinglike fifty or sixty wartime houses. Some of themwere prefab. Some of them were log cabins. Some were various forms of emergency housing. And we labeled that Termite Terrace. (laughter)

But at any rate, the next thing thatoccurred –

Storey: And you got them relocated?

Vernon: We got them relocated and assembled inBillings, and then we were ready to put peopleinto them. Then I called Fred over, I said, "Nowwhat are we going to do, Fred? How are yougoing to parcel this stuff out? What have youthought about parceling this stuff out?"

He said, "We’ve got a problem."

I said, "Oh?"

226


He said, "Yeah, I’ve got rumbles already. You know Andy Anderson, he’s been very closeto top management in the projects and obviouslythe head of the project and his various assistantshave got first call on the housing."

I said, "Fred, set up a committeeimmediately. We can’t have that happen here. If anybody can buck the town on its housingcost, it’s the prize people around here. They arenot automatically eligible for this emergency-type housing. This is for the poor people in thelower grades that can’t afford the housing whichbecomes available within the city. So you createa committee with personnel and finance andothers around the office which then will set upsome form of a grading and ranking system. Obviously there has to be an inverse proportionof ranking to salary, and that’s how you’re goingto solve it." And that’s how we solved it.

Problems with assigninghousing

Andy wound up in one of the houses outthere, but he didn’t get the best house in town. Itused to be common knowledge, when you go onthe project [if] you didn’t know where theproject manager [lived] was, you’d look for thebest house in the camp and that would be theproject manager[‘s house], obviously. (laughter) So that’s how we solved that little problem.

Storey: Were these all in one location?

Vernon: Yeah. Those fifty houses, we found a plot ofground. I forgot whether we rented or just whatwe did now. But we had to put in sewers,streets, and that sort of thing on an empty plot ofground on the periphery of the town, and set upthese fifty-odd houses, I think that’s how manythere were, on little plots of ground, put insewerage, streets, other utilities, and then rankedthe various people needing housing, particularlygiving preference to the lower-grade people that

227

Kenneth F. Vernon

couldn’t afford the basic cost of housing in thetown.

Storey: Did we sell them or rent them?

Vernon: No, we rented them. They had to pay for them. We rented to them because they didn’t knowhow long they would be in any one particularlocation. So we rented them to them. It was anominal rent. But that’s why I insisted on aninverse proportion of ranking to salary.

Storey: I remember, when you were first talking aboutthe Pick-Sloan Plan, you pointed out that therewas some tension between the Upper MissouriBasin and the Lower Missouri Basin because theCorps was proposing basically a flood controland navigation project, and the Upper Basin wasafraid the navigation water would takeprecedence over the irrigation water for theUpper Basin. How did that work out? How didnavigation affect water rights on the river? Or"water use" maybe is a better term.

Vernon: Let me think this one through. That was one ofthe very complex questions. You really handedme a hot potato there. That was one of the realdifferences that existed between the Upper Basinand the Lower Basin.

Storey: Well, I know it’s still there because in theserecent floods . . .

Vernon: It was sort of a standoff. The Corps had to yieldsomewhat on its navigation project, the demandfor water and the length of the navigationseason. Reclamation, because of the length oftime that it would complete its completion of theReclamation and the consumptive use of water,did some yielding on its adamancy of demandinga cessation of flow for the navigation. And thenalso we found that the power releases from the

Tensions in the MissouriBasin over navigationdemands versusirrigation demands

228


main dam, would, to a certain extent, amelioratethe water requirements for the navigation, andcertain improvements that the Corps introducedinto the channel of the river assisted inameliorating some of the navigation waterrequirements. It was a problem that theMissouri Basin Interagency Committee wrestledwith all the time I was there trying to find [theultimate] an answer.

One of the things which, if you’ll recall, Ichallenged General Pick at one of the meetingson the amount of coordination. Well, after hehad left to become Chief of Engineers and hissuccessor of interest, General Sturgis,23 who wasa much easier man to work with, and he didn’thave any pride of proprietorship, shall we say, ofproject, he was an easier man to work with. Weestablished a coordination group, a hydrologiccoordination group. I patterned it after what wasgoing on on the Colorado River, between thevarious competing interests on the ColoradoRiver, and my suggestion was patterned afterthat coordination group. So that we establisheda coordinating hydrologic study group. Mygroup was using the data that the GeologicalSurvey was developing on improved watersupply records and the Corps with its continuingstudies on how the mainstreamed dams [were] tobe operated and the water requirements for thenavigation system.

This group met rather regularly to figureout how water could be allocated among thevarious functions. So we did solve a seriousproblem of lack of coordination and waterdemand on that score, but it was always acontinuing problem that would probably neverbe solved completely, because it varied year toyear. If it was a generous water year, then therewas no problem. If it was a scarce water year,then it became a real problem, and there had to

229

Kenneth F. Vernon

be an adjustment of requirements.

Storey: So there was still a tension over navigation?

Vernon: Oh, yes, there was all the time.

Storey: It wasn’t an issue that was solved.

Vernon: Yes, there was all the time. I don’t knowwhether it still is or not, but I know that after weset up that hydrologic study group, it solved anumber of the issues and put them in a formatthat some intelligent solutions could be arrivedat, or at least compromises.

Storey: One of the things I’m sort of interested in is theway working space has evolved for Reclamationemployees over time. If you could start back inthe Denver office and tell me what you officespace was like and then go to – let’s see, youwent from Denver to Antioch to Washington toBillings. Go through each one and tell me howthe office space evolved. I’m talking about theoffice space for the workers out in the office,you know.

Vernon: Well, when I was working in the Denver office,which we developed the name Bullpen; it was anopen space. Each person had a drafting table inthe engineering office, had a drafting table. Hehad to have room enough because on thisdrafting table was called a drafting machine,which was an apparatus which the draftsmanused in making his drawings, which you couldmove, but it was a series of parallelograms, sothat you could move this thing anywhere aroundyour paper. Your control ruler would stayperpendicular to your drawing. Or you couldchange it. It had an adjustable head so that youcould change it to any angle.

Office conditions invarious offices whereVernon worked

But incidentally, I was struck by what I

230


saw last Sunday, "Jefferson in Paris," the movie"Jefferson in Paris." It’s a new movie that’s justout. And in that thing, here’s Jefferson writingletters, and he’s got a damn parallelogramwriting machine, and as he’s writing his original,his machine is making a copy. So this thinggoes way back, which, of course, the draftingmachine has been much improved in its laterconnections.

But you had to have space enough that asyou moved this thing around, this parallelogramdidn’t poke the guy sitting in front of you in theback and we wouldn’t have to duck all the time,or if you were busy down here and he’d bumpinto it. So your fundamental space really hasn’tchange much from what we consider now, as Irecall. I was talking to my son about this theother day, because this is one of the things he’sinvolved in, moving people around atMcDonnell-Douglas [Aircraft Company]. Thebasic modular space is somewhere around 100 to120 feet per person. Of course, being in abullpen and not being in a cubicle, in otherwords, you didn’t have visual privacy, whichwhen you sit in modular spaces you set up visualprivacy. You may not have oral privacy, butyou may have visual privacy.

In the “bull pen” in theDenver office you didn’thave visual privacy

I would judge we had about 120 squarefeet per person, but that didn’t include thehallways and that sort of thing, alley ways,aisleways and that sort of thing. It was an openspace on this floor of the bank building, and herewere the various groups of engineers and overthere was the various groups of the draftsmenmaking the tracings and over there was a groupof somebody else. But basically it was a wideopen space. I don’t know how it was over in theCustoms building, because there there were a lotof different efforts requiring different spacerequirements, and I presume that the engineering

231

Kenneth F. Vernon

offices were much the same, because it probablydid the same thing in the bank building that theywere doing over in the Custom House, I don’tknow.

When we moved to Antioch, there wewere able to rent an idle what had beenpreviously a joint union high school. A newhigh school was built and so this one hadbecome standing idle. So we were able to rentspaces of that. We used as much of that as wasneeded. As activities grew, we kept increasingmoving out into different rooms. Thelaboratory, as we discussed earlier, was in thebasement. We had one room which we woulduse if we were doing some kind of work [on] inthe office, doing some remodeling or whatever. We’d send some guys, one of the boys of theoffice down there to do some painting orstaining or whatever.

Office space in Antioch

The field office, at first, as you come inthere was one room which probably had been theprincipal’s office, that was the ProjectEngineer’s office. On the other side of theentrance was not quite as large an office space,but they both had plumbing facilities. Thatprobably had been the assistant principal’soffice; that the was the Office Engineer’s office. Going down the hallway on this side was thefinance office, the Chief Clerk. Then there wasa large room here at the end which included thePurchasing Agent, the personnel office andwhatever assistants were involved in that work.

Across the hall from the entrance wasthis large [room] which had been the assemblyhall. That was the bullpen for the officeengineering staff. Barney and I and my group ofassistants worked in there. We had variousequipments that we [used] worked. Forinstance, as the field staff would bring in the

232


field sheets from the plane table work on thetopographic mapping, one of my draftsmen wastracing those field sheets onto what we calledout hard copy rolls, and do that [on] through alight table. Then we would align the map of thecanal so as to get the best advantage of a longroll of paper. So north was always beingadjusted, segment to segment, so we’d get themost efficient use of paper.

At one time we had one, two, three, four,five, six, seven, eight, about ten people, theimmediate office engineering staff there.

Storey: In the bullpen?

Vernon: In the bullpen.

Storey: And they all just had drafting tables?

Vernon: Yeah, except later we brought in some morepeople as things were going on. I got promotedto a flattop desk because I was basically doingadministrative work, reports and supervisorywork. I wasn’t doing actual drafting anymore ormapping or whatever.

Storey: Did you move to a different grade?

Vernon: Yes, by this time I was up to P-3, the wondrousgrade of P-3. I was Associate Engineer by thattime.

Became an AssociateEngineer in Antioch

Storey: And P-2 was higher or lower?

Vernon: It began with P-1, which was junior engineergrade. Then there was a second level. That wasthe magnificent salary of $2,000 a year. Thenthere was an upgrade in that, which was to$2,300; that was the first assistant engineergrade. But that was still P-1. Then P-2 was$2,600. It was like the Navy, you had your

Engineer grades inthose days

233

Kenneth F. Vernon

junior lieutenant and your senior lieutenant. P-2,you were senior assistant engineer. P-3 was$2,900 a year. Now wait a minute. P-3 was firstgrade of associate engineer, that was $2,900 ayear. Also at P-3 there was a senior grade ofassociate engineer, that was $3,200 a year. Bythis time you were given some supervisoryresponsibilities. Then [at] P-4 was you werenow considered to be a journeyman engineer. You were capable of doing anything in theengineering line. So you were given maybe theresponsibility of a section, a group of people tosupervise. I should say a squad, not a sectionbut a squad. Because P-5 was $4,800 a year. That was now – what the hell did they call a P-5? It was $4,800 a year, but now you were headof a section of maybe ten or fifteen people or ofa particular activity. P-6, you now had adivision, which was $6,500 a year. Now youwere with it now. You almost could talk to theLodges. You could almost talk to the Cabots atP-6. P-7, you were now the head of an effort, adivision. P-8, you were head of everything.

Storey: So P-8 would be . . .

Vernon: It was now considered a supervisory engineer, P-8, and that was $7,000 a year.

Storey: Your Supervisor on the Contra Costa Canal wasMr. . . .

Vernon: Mr. Stubblefield.

Storey: Above him?

Vernon: Was Mr. Boden, who was the Project [orDivision] Engineer.

Storey: What level would he have been?

Vernon: I’m guessing now that Stubb[lefield] . . .

234


Storey: No, Boden.

Vernon: Oh, Boden. He was probably a P-7. I’mguessing now. I never did ask him, but I’mguessing. Because Walker Young was at thetop, he was obviously a P-8. He was aSupervisory Engineer.


Storey: This is tape three of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 26th, 1995.

It might have been a six or a seven.

Vernon: Six or seven. I would say this, probably, thatbecause of the hierarchy in the Bureau at thattime, the Project Engineers at Shasta and atFriant were most likely P-7s. The CanalsDivision, which were sort of poor relations, so tospeak, in the hierarchy of the Bureau structure,Mr. Boden probably was a P-6. In other words,I don’t think he had arrived at grade P-7 yet.

Storey: Tell me about these relationships. Tell me aboutrelationships among different types of engineersin Reclamation, among canals versus dams,versus hydro versus –

Vernon: Well, in the hierarchy of the Bureau at the time Ientered it, dam construction was the thing, andtherefore they were assumed to be the fair-hairedpeople. Walker Young and Harry Bashore andpeople of that group had had project experiencewhich included maybe not the direct supervisionof a dam construction, but they had had thesupervision of project development. So if askedto define them, I would say they were people ofbroader consideration than the people that were involved in dam construction, because itinvolved not only – but perhaps could include

“. . .in the hierarchy ofthe Bureau at the time Ientered it, damconstruction was thething, and therefore theywere assumed to be thefair-haired people. . . .”

235

Kenneth F. Vernon

supervising or being the supervising engineer ofa dam, such as Boulder or Grand Coulee, but italso would include dams like, for instance, onthe Snake River, would include dams on theSnake River, but also the development of theproject lands or on the Platte River where damsand diversion dams and so on was involved, aswell as the development of the project lands.

So the men that had the basic projectexperience were, I would say, of much broadercaliber and of higher administrative capabilitythen the men who came up through the strictlydam construction route. The dams people weremore technical. They answered to Jack Savage. You mentioned Jack Savage. They answeredprimarily to Jack Savage, who was the ChiefDesigning Engineer. As I recall, under JackSavage, he controlled all the laboratory workwhich was related to dam designs andconstruction.

Then I mentioned earlier a bunch ofeggheads up on the tenth floor in our building,they responded to Mr. Savage. I recall one thingthey were working on, I don’t know what you’dcall it, but it was just coming into vogue. Theywould take pieces of plastic and formulate thatinto various forms of structures, and then theywould put that piece of plastic under stress,under polarized light, and it would show thestress patterns in that structure by the variationsof the wavelength [light] bands in the plastic.

Technical Division workin Denver

So as structure design was advancing,many types of structures became impossible toanalyze directly. You reverted to this imagery toget stress patterns, and then you figured out howyou would either change the form, because ifcertain concentrations of stress would show up,or design your reinforcing to meet thoserequirements. So this all was under Mr. Savage.

236


Then my head was a Mr. McBirney inthe Canals Division. I don’t know hisbackground, because I never had a lot of directcontact with him, because he was theSupervising Engineer of the whole CanalsDivision. But Art Reeves, who was my group’sleader, had been on the Platte River project, sohe had a good deal of field experience. I used tospend a good deal of time, when I could, talkingwith him about project experience, because Iwanted to absorb as much of that as I possiblycould.

So then Walker Young had a very broadpattern of experience on projects prior to hisbeing designated as a Supervising Engineer ofHoover Dam, and then that fit in with hisprevious experience, so then he was designatedas Supervising Engineer of the Central Valley,he had supervisory responsibilities over damconstruction, the transportation systems, and allthe rest of it. So that’s the extent of myknowledge.

Now, Mr. Frank Banks, who was theSupervising Engineer of Construction of GrandCoulee, he’d also had a broad experience inearly project development, but I think he foundhis heaven, so to speak, as the ConstructionEngineer, Supervising Engineer of Grand CouleeDam, because he was offered, as I understood,the regional directorship of Region I. It’s myrecollection that he turned it down. He said hewould rather be at Grand Coulee Dam.

Frank Banks wasoffered the job ofregional director, butchose to stay at GrandCoulee

Robert Newell at Boise was designatedas Regional Director of Region I, or it may havebeen in the early days of regionalization, FrankBanks was Regional Director, but Bob Newellwas Assistant Regional Director down [in Boise,Idaho, and was running the regional affairs, andFrank Banks really had nothing to do with it.

237

Kenneth F. Vernon

As a sidebar to that, when I was talkingabout the departmental effort to set up theseregional power authorities and Bonneville PowerDam Authority, Bonneville PowerAdministration was being set up, it was myunderstanding that Mr. Banks had been offeredthat responsibility, but he turned that down. Hesaid, no, he wanted to close his career out atGrand Coulee Dam. So that’s my experience.

Frank Banks was askedto head the BonnevillePower Administration

Harold Comstock, who was mypredecessor at Region VI, he’d had projectexperience. He’d been down for many yearsdeveloping the Riverton Project. The men werechanged around and over the years had aconsiderable variety of experiences.

Storey: You mentioned a moment ago, if I understoodyou correctly, that the canals people were sort ofpoor cousins to the dams people.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: Was there sort of a pecking order amongconcrete dams and earthen dams and the otherspecializations?

Vernon: Well, I can’t say that I can answer that directly,but my general reaction to your question is“yes,” and that it was only in the later stages ofmy association with the Bureau of Reclamationthat forms of construction, other than concretedams, was becoming recognized as a realalternative. , because Concrete dams requiredcertain specific requirements in order to supportthe construction of a concrete dam with its highstresses[. Later] and that the development ofearth-moving equipment through the RobertLeTourneau24 effort – incidentally, I shouldmention that as a sidebar. But the manner ofconstructing earth-filled dams with theimprovement of earth-moving equipment made

238


earthfill dams a respected alternative.

Now, I want to mention that when I wasworking for the California Division of Highwayson the construction job in the Santa CruzMountains, the contractor on that job [knew BobLeTourneau who] was a born-again Christian. He also was a metal worker and an inventor ofsorts. He had a workshop over in Stockton,California. Over time he’d been, shall we say,messing around with trying to develop someform of mechanized earthmoving equipmentwhich was an improvement, an enlargement,over the old horse-drawn scrapers.

Bob LeTourneaudevelopment ofearthmoving equipmentused on early job atCalifornia Division ofHighways

Storey: The Fresno Scrapers.

Vernon: The Fresno Scrapers. The contractor on thishighway construction job worked out a deal withthe Reverend Bob to bring some of his earlyefforts of his earth-moving equipment over onthe highway job. So we helped him develop andimprove some of his early efforts on this earth-moving equipment, such as the bulldozer andsuch as the carryall scraper, mechanized carryallscraper which was powered by a tractor.

In later years he was bought out – Ishould say that his efforts were primarily – howwill I explain this so you will understand it? Hislifting mechanisms were basically winch andcable. For instance, the blade of a bulldozercould be raised, but it depended upon its weightto cause it to dig into the ground. But hispowered scrapers, his tractor-drawn earth-movers, it was the weight of the equipment thatcaused the blade to excavate the earth[.] , buthe, by a minute inflation of winches and cables,He could move the various parts up by a minuteinflation of winches and cables, but it dependedupon their weight to move them down. In itslater reincarnation, he became associated with

239

Kenneth F. Vernon

the Caterpillar Tractor outfit, and they institutedhydraulic controls. So by the time I was – myearly experience was in 1930, and by the timethat we were starting construction on the ContraCosta Canal, say in 1938, he had joined forceswith Caterpillar Tractor and there were severalnew forms of this earth-moving equipmentwhich had hydraulic controls so that you notonly had positive up pressure, but you also hadpositive down pressure. And over time, theCaterpillar Tractor outfit won that market withits advanced equipment.

Improvements inearthmoving equipmentin the 1930s

Storey: Do you remember how to spell LeTourneau’sname?

Vernon: It’s a French name, I’m going to have to guess. Now, this is my guess. L-A-T-U-R-N-E-A-U. Laturneau. It was a French name, it had aFrench spelling. But I believe that was the wayit was spelled. Robert LeTourneau. He wasknown among the trade as Reverend Bob,because he was a sort of born-again Christianand part-time preacher.

Storey: What was the significance of this equipment?

Vernon: Well, it was the advent of mechanizing – he hadthree pieces of equipment that he worked on. There was the bulldozer, which could shoveearth around. There was the carryall scraper,which could pick earth up and move it and carryit and dump it somewhere else. And there wasthe sheep’s foot roller, which was used incompaction of fill material so it could achievethe proper density. It was the development ofthis equipment that made earth-filled damconstruction an alternative to concreteconstruction, because before that time, and beinglimited to concrete construction, all sorts ofvarious designs of dams had been developed, allsorts of buttress dams, slab and buttress dams,

240


buttress and arch dams, which would saveconcrete, but again it would increase thefoundation stresses. So each one of themincreasingly required more favorable foundationconditions, because as they transmitted theconcentrated loads to the foundation, thefoundation had to be more secure.

This is one of the benefits of earthconstruction. In the first place, although themass might be larger, its unit mass is muchsmaller, therefore the unit pressure on thefoundation is much lower and is spread over amuch wider [area] distance, and so you wereable to accept a less strong foundation. Also,[in] to my later experience I saw this [was a bigadvantage in] to a great extent that in an areawhich was earthquake prone. An earth-filleddam will adjust to the shake but it won’t fail,whereas a concrete dam [might fail] has failed. I've got some pictures of the failure of a famousdam in France. One of the famous dam designengineers who developed the complex arch dam,concrete arch dam, to its finest end did not havea success with some of them because he hadfailed to evaluate the conditions of thefoundation. It was the foundation, not the damthat failed, it was the foundation that failed.

Benefits of earthconstruction of dams asopposed to concrete

Incidentally, when I was RegionalDirector out there, the Bureau had him visit. Hevisited the United States and he came up andvisited Region VI. I discussed with him what hethought about what was going on in the Bureauof Reclamation. He said, "Well, it’s veryinteresting, the economics of dam design. InEurope, labor is the inexpensive element ofconstruction. Materials is the expensiveelement, so therefore our design is directed moretoward reducing the requirements of materialsbut [that] would require more manpower information and placement and that sort of thing.

Andrew Coynediscussed differences indam design andconstruction betweenEurope and the UnitedStates

241

Kenneth F. Vernon

Whereas I noticed that you people consider thematerials as the cheapest part of the equation andyour labor is the most expensive part of the costequation, and therefore you use materialsprofligately to save labor."

I said, "Yes, that’s correct. That’sexactly the way we approach it."

And later in my experience in Iraq, hewas on one of the consulting boards for one ofour dams out there.

Storey: Do you remember his name?

Vernon: It’ll come to me. [Tape recorder turned off]

Storey: You were saying that this French designer’sname, you think was Andrew Coyne.

Vernon: Andrew Coyne. I forgot how he spells it, butperhaps it was C-O-Y-N-E.25

Storey: And the dam that you were talking about thatfailed was Mal . . .

Vernon: Malpassat, however you pronounce it in French. M-A-L-P-A-S-S-E-T.

Storey: E-N-T, I think.

Vernon: It’s on a river in southern France. The point Iwas making was that thin arch dams, obviouslymade out of concrete, but very high stressesrequire a very competent foundation. It was thefailure of the foundation stresses, rather than theactual failure of the dam, which caused thistragedy. Of course, after the foundation failureoccurred, the dam was destroyed because theyfound chunks of the dam, lower elements of thedam, [some distance] distances downstream withpieces or parts of the foundation material still

242


attached, so the failure was below the base of thedam.

In my later experiences, I was workingfor the Iraq Development Board, I had theopportunity to recommend to the DevelopmentBoard to change their proposed design of a damfrom a concrete dam, because I felt that thefoundations were not adequate, to a rock-fill andearth-core dam which could be superior on theparticular foundations that existed there.

Storey: Backtracking a little again, I asked aboutwhether there was sort of a pecking order inthese different specializations.

Vernon: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I can’t answer specifically inthe dam elements, but, yes, there was definitelythat – those in the dam efforts didn’t considerthe people in the canal efforts, shall we say, theirpeers. But having been raised on an [irrigated] irrigation farm, my argument always wasnobody knew whether the dam was five feet toohigh or five feet too low, but the poor old farmercertainly knew whether his turnout was sixinches too high in a low water stage. So in termsof the irrigator, he didn’t know anything aboutthe dam, but he certainly knew the operation ofthe canal.

Storey: Was there a pecking order in the differentspecializations within engineering, inReclamation, I mean?

Vernon: No, I don’t believe so, because Reclamation hada broad spectrum of requirements. Of course,fundamentally, I would say they were civilengineers. But then there were electricalengineers who worked in the electricalgeneration areas and the transmission systems. There were mechanical engineers who dealt withthe requirements of the mechanical apparatuses

243

Kenneth F. Vernon

that were required. Then there were people whowere involved in the laboratories. In terms ofhierarchy, I don’t know whether there was aconsideration of a pecking order, so to speak, butamong the people in the trenches, certainly werecognized that under the Walter and Savage era,the dams people got more recognition, shall wesay, than the people out on the canals.

“. . . we recognized thatunder the Walter andSavage era, the damspeople got morerecognition. . . than thepeople out on thecanals. . . .”

Storey: Okay. Let’s see, after we had stopped yesterday,you mentioned a war materials meeting, or somesuch thing, about Harvey-Tynes Company inBirmingham, Alabama. Could I get you to putthat on tape for me?

Vernon: Yeah. That was an interesting exercise. Itdemonstrates the difficulties that were beingfaced by servicing the war effort [with] in thelimitations of the facilities that were available toservice it. As I’d indicated earlier, one of myfunctions when I was acting as EngineeringAssistant to the Commissioner was to processapplications from Denver to and through theWar Production Board to get priorities forproduction priorities.

It developed that the Tennessee ValleyAuthority was constructing the Fontana Dam,and it had placed an order for some high-pressure gates with the Hardy-Tynes FoundryCompany in Birmingham, Alabama. We didn’tknow what the Fontana Dam would be servicing,but it later developed it was for the Oak Ridgeatomic effort.

World War II efforts toobtain necessaryconstruction material

At the same time, Reclamation wasinstalling the eighth unit on the Nevada side ofthe Hoover Dam. The power from the HooverDam was being required to service theburgeoning aircraft industry in SouthernCalifornia, so that all the power that could besent into Southern California was urgently

Dueling priorities inwartime production atplants caused problemsfor the War ProductionBoard

244


required as an important war effort. Now, theproblem with that was that the requirements ofthe contracts for each of these high-pressuredgates was supposed to require the foundry toerect these gates in such a way, at the site, atthe foundry, to subject them to the fullhydraulic pressure head that they’d be subjectedto when they were installed. This was to makesure that there wasn’t any warping, there was noleakage, etc., and that they’d function, etc., etc.,under the complete hydraulic head that they’d besubjected to. This would be very disruptive tothe other operations that were going on at theHardy-Tynes Foundry because of the spacerequirements. At the same time, then, this gaveHardy-Tynes a problem, because at the sametime they had a very high-priority order – well,actually they had two very high-priority ordersfrom the Navy Department, one of which was ahigh priority for pumps going into submarines. Another was an order from the Navy, or perhapsit was from the Army, I'm not sure which, Iguess maybe it was the Army, for somerequirements for pumps and things andequipment that were required for landing craftthat were being built down somewhere along theGulf Coast. These all were taking up space andactivities in the Hardy-Tynes Foundry, and, ofcourse, the Navy insisted [that] to stop theirproduction would put them at great disadvantagewith the submarine warfare and the Armyinsisted that it was absolutely critical not todelay the construction of these landing craftwhich would ultimately be used in the Overlordinvasion from Britain to France and [GeneralDouglas] MacArthur in his leap froggingoperations out in the West Pacific.

So it was easy to see this was a verycritical question for Hardy-Tynes as to who wasto get the nod. This question was placed beforethe War Production Board, and I attended a large

245

Kenneth F. Vernon

meeting which representatives from the Denveroffice attended, representatives from the TVAwere there. There was a flight of eagles, Agalaxy of stars and a flight of eagles from theNavy and Army were there to plead their cases].

It was interesting to note that the firsthalf-day of this meeting was spent on arrangingexit transport from Washington back to thevarious participants' headquarters, because theWar Production Board also controlled thetransportation [priorities] limitations. (laughter) So the first half of the meeting was spent oneverybody getting priorities of transport back totheir headquarters. However, everybodypresented their case and then the War ProductionBoard representative said they would take thematter under advisement. I don’t recall exactlyhow that was settled, because I was notintimately involved in the settlement, but Ipresume there was some way of eitherameliorating the contractual requirements ofboth the Tennessee Valley and the Hoover Damrequirements, Reclamation requirements, orthere was some other way suggested to subjectthese gate apparati to stresses in some otherfashion then full hydrostatic head. That Icannot recall. My memory fails me on that onhow that was solved. But ultimately, of course,the requirements of the war effort were served. But that demonstrates the problems which werefaced by the various people involved at the WarProduction Board.

Storey: Can you spell the name of the company for me?

Vernon: H-A-R-D-Y (dash) T-Y-N-E-S. Hardy-TynesFoundry in Birmingham, Alabama.

Storey: This raises an interesting issue. WhenReclamation does specs, I understand forconstruction we do it in quantities, so that if we

246


use an extra thousand cubic yards of cement, thecontract covers it, we just pay by cubic yard ofconcrete.

Vernon: Cubic cost, yeah.

Storey: How did we write specs for things like high-pressure gates?

Writing specs for highpressure gates

Vernon: Well, that’s a completely different kind of thing. To begin with, your specifications includedvarious requirements of the metallurgy. It wasmore of the performance-type specification afterspecifying to various metallurgy that wasinvolved in the various parts of it, such aswhether it would be stainless steel . . .


Storey: You were saying that first of all, you specifiedmaterial.

Vernon: The quality of the materials.

Storey: Which might be stainless or cast iron.

Vernon: Cast iron or a cast steel or a various – themetallurgy, the gender of the metallurgy. Thenyou would set up certain stress requirements,capabilities of resisting stress, which then mightbe required, as I was describing earlier, in theexercise involving Hardy-Tynes. It might be arequirement of a demonstration, in other words,a performance test, before it was shipped fromthe factory. Usually the payment was made perpound of equipment, which would be anincentive to the contractor or the manufacturer toreduce the weight of the equipment and toperhaps use higher-stress materials. But you hadto watch out in higher-stress materials, you hadto watch for deformations within that equipment.

247

Kenneth F. Vernon

So there had to be a payoff there.

Usually the specifications were clear asto what was wanted, and then usually thepayments might be made per pound or couldeven be per unit. It all depended largely on whatit was. For instance, gates, other than high-performance pressure gates, might be by thepound. Gates which were operated bymachinery, such as valves, that might be byperformance – by per unit.

We’d gotten into some of thosedifficulties when we were building the pumpingstations on the Contra Costa Canal, because wehad both the electrical equipment and the pumpswere mechanical equipment. The ultimaterequirement, as I recollect, for the pumps, wasper unit, but they had to [meet] be certainspecified performance requirements before thatpayment would be made, but there might be aschedule of progress payments made as the thingwas being manufactured. In other words, thecontractor did not have to completely finance thewhole operation before he got any payments, buthe might draw certain progress payments whencertain things were accomplished, so there mightbe certain units set up for purposes of paymentas they were completed.

Storey: For instance, on pumps you say performancestandard. What does that mean?

Vernon: Well, I was just going to get into that.

Storey: Oh, okay.

Vernon: The pumps that were designed for this ContraCosta Canal were a relatively new form ofpump. It was called a mixed flow turbine pump,and, as I recall, the normal efficiency on theelectrical side, in other words the motors that

Pump design on theContra Costa Canal

248


drive the pumps/impellers, had to met a 95percent efficiency. In other words, the amountof electricity that was put into the output of thatmotor had to be at least 95 percent, exceed 95percent of the input energy. The energy outputof the motor had to exceed at least 95 percent ofthe input energy, electrical energy. Now, thatthen had to be combined with the energy or theefficiency of the pump. This became a realproblem, because pumps are notably inefficientdue to a number of problems inherent in thedesign of impellers and other moving parts ofthe pumps. But it’s related also to the design ofturbines that generate electricity so that theprinciples are basically the same, but since in theone you’re generating power, whereas in thematter of the pump you’re utilizing input power,so as I recall – and this is used as an examplerather than as a finite truism – that the overallefficiency of the combination electrical inputand motor and the pump output had to exceed 85percent of gross power input. And [on] this weran into trouble.

The company that designed and providedthe pumping equipment had to replace, in thefirst pumping station, had to redesign the pumpsbecause they couldn’t meet the efficiencyrequirement after they were installed. So theyhad to redesign that pump and remanufacture attheir cost, because they didn’t meet the overallefficiency requirements.

Storey: So it had to pump a certain amount of water incomparison . . .

Vernon: For instance, let us say that the initial quantity ofthe canal at the first lift, pumping station, was,let’s say, 400 cubic feet per second. I don’tremember the exact quantity. But let’s say its400 cubic feet per second. There were, say, fourpumping units in there. Each pumping unit had

249

Kenneth F. Vernon

to lift 100 cubic feet of water per second, 25feet, at an overall efficiency of 85 percent.

Storey: And there are standardized ways of figuring thatefficiency?

Vernon: Yes. You meter all of this, so you know how itis. You meter the inputs of the electrical side. You meter the output on the hydraulic side. Youknow the amount of water that’s being lifted. You know the lift, so that’s a certain energyrequirement. And when you measure what’slifted in a certain particular period of timeagainst the electrical power input, you cancalculate the efficiency –the overall efficiency ofthe unit.

As I recall, the first designs came out atsomewhere around, let’s say 80 percent, whichwas a considerable deficiency, which meant thenthat had they been accepted, the irrigationdistrict would have been faced with a higherenergy charge than they really should have beenbecause they would be losing 5 percentefficiency each time the pumps were operated. So there is a combination of materialspecifications and again a final test overalloperational efficiency requirements. This istrue, also, in the design and output of electricalturbines.

Storey: And there would’ve been cities also doingrepayment on this project, right?

Vernon: Yeah. Right. It’s all involved in repayment, yousee, so this is why it becomes important to you.

Storey: So now, for instance, on a high-pressure gate, Ipresumed that we had already designed basicallythe holes on which these were going to beinstalled.

250


Vernon: Yes. The structure had been designed.

Storey: So we gave them constraints within which theyhad to operate.

Vernon: Yeah. The powerhouse had been constructed atHoover Dam, and on the Nevada power side,there’d already been seven units installed, butthis was the eighth unit. So that all of theelements of the design were well known. So itwas simply the meeting of a performancerequirement, that this new unit would meet theperformance requirements which caused theproblem of space to make the test.

Storey: Yesterday we talked about your traveling toWashington from Billings.

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: We didn’t bring you back from Washington toBillings.

Vernon: Oh, well, that was simple. In the early days,because of the lack of an airlines development,we would travel by train, both in and out ofWashington. It seemed like every time I livedsomewhere, my transportation left in the middlenight and arrived in the middle of the night. Itso happened that the North Coast Limited on theNorthern Pacific went through town on it’s wayto [Chicago] Washington somewhere about twoo’clock in the morning, so we’d leave either lateFriday night or early Saturday morning . . .

Travel to and fromBillings

Storey: Depending on your perspective.

Vernon: Get into Chicago early Sunday morning. Haveto stay in Chicago all day Sunday and then takea train out somewhere around five o’clock in theevening, either on the Baltimore and Ohio or thePennsylvania Railroad, and get into Washington

251

Kenneth F. Vernon

somewhere around eight or nine o’clockMonday morning. Then again the transportationout of Washington was arranged literally thesame way, because people would leave aroundfive or six o’clock in the evening, having donetheir business in Washington. So as we wouldleave, say Friday night, from Washington we’dcatch a train. again either somewhere aroundfive o’clock in the evening. We'd get intoChicago the next morning, on Saturday morning. We’d have to spend all day in Chicago. Thenwe’d leave Chicago around five o’clock in theevening and then we’d get to Billings. Thattrain went through Billings at five o’clock in themorning.

Storey: On Monday morning?

Vernon: On Monday morning, yeah. Then sometimes itmight work out that I would take the Chicago-Milwaukee-St. Paul road from Chicago toBillings or Billings, but the Milwaukee roadwent up the Musselshell River. So the closeststation on the Musselshell was over at Roundup. So I’d have somebody drive me over toRoundup, where I could pick up that train. Ithad a little better schedule, but it did involve afifty-mile auto trip. So it was a little faster train,but scheduling for some reason or another mightfit a little bitter, but it involved an hour’s driveboth going and return going to Roundup.

Then when the Northwest Airlines begana better degree of service through Billings, wethen could leave late Sunday afternoon. Itliterally became a red-eye flight. We couldleave late Sunday afternoon and we would makea change connection on the Northwest Airlines,would go to Chicago, and there we would makea connection to a flight from Chicago toWashington, and we would arrive, say, inWashington somewhere around seven or eight

252


o’clock in the morning, although you [were]kind of [the] worse for wear, having made a red-eye flight. Then literally we’d reverse thatprocess. You’d leave Washington on a flight toChicago somewhere around five or six o’clockin the evening, get to Chicago, and then you’dcatch a flight around midnight out of Chicagoand get to Billings early the next morning.

Storey: So when you had to take the trains, it wasbasically a full week and the two full weekendson either end?

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: And a rather tiring trip?

Vernon: Yes.

Storey: When you were able to take Northwest Airlines,you could take half a weekend on one end, half aweekend on the other end, and the full week inbetween, and it was still a very tiring trip.

Vernon: Well, yeah, but literally we would get the fullweekend at home because you wouldn’t leave 'tilSunday afternoon some time.

Storey: Oh, okay,.

Vernon: And you would leave Washington on Fridaynight and you’d be home relatively earlySaturday morning. So it literally just involvedthe working time. But it involved red-eyeflights. That’s the way we did it in order to gethome. But I don’t know. I presume it could’vebeen daytime flights. As traffic built up on theNorthwest Airlines, there might have beendaytime flights, but I don’t recollect [if therewere] while I lived there, there were.

Storey: You mentioned to me when we didn’t have the

253

Kenneth F. Vernon

tape running that Mr. Sloan was opposed to theancillary activities, the recreation and so on. Could I get you talk about that a little bit?

Vernon: Well, it became a bone of contention. Sloandidn’t feel, really, that all this other stuff wasimportant to his plan for the development of thewater and land resources of the Missouri Basin. In other words, he was of the school thatbelieved Reclamation’s interest was simply theconstruction of facilities to deliver water to land,and other interests would take up the farmers'problems, so to speak. He didn’t want to botherthe Reclamation effort or felt that Reclamationinterest [didn’t go] went that far, shall we say.

Glenn Sloan didn’t wantReclamation to devoteenergy to anythingbesides water and landdevelopment in theMissouri Basin

I had learned, listening to both OscarBoden and Harry Bashore, that they both wereseriously concerned, from their projectexperience, they were seriously concerned aboutReclamation’s lack of interest of what happenedduring the stages of project development to thefarmers making a success, and it was widelyquoted that it took three generations of settlers tomake a success out of an irrigation project. Inother words, the first settler, he got a shack builtand got his irrigation system, an on-farmirrigation system constructed, but by that timehe’d lost interest in it, he’d lost heart. So thenhe would manage to sell his interest, whatever itwas, to somebody else who would pick it upfrom there and proceed with the on-farmdevelopment with whatever resources he had. Then he would run out of steam, and then thethird guy would come in and he would probablylive to make the farm a success.

Some Reclamationmanagers wereconcerned the bureaudidn’t pay enoughattention to ensuringfarmer success onprojects

“... it took threegenerations of settlersto make a success outof an irrigation project . ..”

So I heard this thrown at Glenn Sloanmany times, and Glenn refused to acknowledge,because he had never had any real on-farmexperience, he refused to accept that and said,"Well, that’s other people’s problems. That’s

254


not our problem."

So that was why my own personalexperience and the problems of on-farmdevelopment and making a success of the firstfarmer was why I was interested in supportingthese ancillary facilities. And Glenn was afraidthat the cost of these ancillary facilities mightget somehow lodged against his plan ofirrigation, and he knew that because of the kindof agriculture we had in the high plain states thatthe repayment of irrigation costs was going to bea difficult thing for the farmer, the directirrigation costs were going to be a difficult thing. That’s why, in fairness to him, his view, hewanted to make those costs somebody else’s, soto speak.

Vernon was interestedin ancillary activitiesSloan didn’t support

Sloan was concernedabout whether the costsfor ancillary activitieswould be reimbursable

Storey: Okay. Was there anything else that you thinkwe ought to talk about with Reclamation beforewe go on?

Vernon: I’d kind of make a sort of a swan song here, inregards to all this conversation. It’s brought tomind a lot of things that I’ve thought about andI’ve dealt with in my later professional life. Idon’t know whether it’s been apparent in thisthing, but one of my regrets after I leftReclamation was I had never becomeCommissioner. I felt that my training, seriouslyfelt that my training and experience in thevarious elements of Reclamation, would havequalified me to become an excellentCommissioner. I say this seriously and withhumbleness.

Regrets not havingbecome Commissionerof Reclamation

I had learned how, in my variousincarnations, particularly in Washington and inBillings, to enlist the aid – well, first inWashington how to coordinate with otheragencies, enlist their support in the overallobjectives of Reclamation. And then I also

255

Kenneth F. Vernon

learned in setting up the Missouri Basin programof how to work inside of Reclamation law toaccomplish some of those things, whereas priorto that time, Reclamationists sort of felt thattheir only concern was to simply build theworks, get the water to the land, and thensomebody else had the worry of that. So theReclamation interests stopped at the farmers'turnout. But my own personal experience was itwas something more than that was involved toreally make a successful project.

I had learned in my experience how toenlist the aid of other agencies and to enlist theircooperation with coordinating efforts that theywere interested in with our effort to make a totaldevelopment. Then I got involved in thebusiness of developing the Missouri RiverBasin, that became very apparent, and there,because I spent a great deal of time workingwith elements of state government and trying toadjust the requirements of Reclamation law tothe requirements of the various state’srequirements such as irrigation districts andwater rights and so on and so on. I also learnedhow to work with the electric utilities to get themost out of the investment and power facilitiesto the Federal Government and to help therepayment of the Reclamation investment.

So I sort of regretted that my tour withReclamation was ended where it did, because Ifelt the next logical extension of that careerwould have been to move back the Washingtonoffice and run through the various chairs thereand hopefully at some point in time become theCommissioner of Reclamation. But it was not tobe, and as it worked out, my career as anengineer blossomed in other areas, and I becamedirector of engineering of a much larger effortwhen I became Director of Engineering for thetotal foreign aid exercise. QED. Finish.

256


Terminus.

Storey: That’s it?

Vernon: That’s it.

Storey: Okay. Why don’t we take a little break.

Vernon: Okay. [Tape recorder turned off]

An example of the coordination of thevarious interests that were involved in thedevelopment of the Missouri Basin. Forinstance, Harry Polk, P-O-L-K, was theeditor/publisher of the Williston North DakotaJournal, a small-town newspaper which covereda relatively wide area of northwestern NorthDakota. He was also a staunch supporter of theMissouri Basin Development Plan andReclamation, in particular, because he felt thatthis was important to the Upper Basin. Hebecame president of the National ReclamationAssociation, which was, let’s say, the lobbyingorganization for Reclamation and which wassupported heavily by the railroads, because therailroads wanted Reclamation developmentthrough their traffic areas because it generatedtraffic for them. They’d been heavily involvedin the settlement of the West. So they had set upagricultural agents that kept track of what wasgoing on, and we had a lot of associations withthem.

Harry Polk becomedirector of the NationalReclamationAssociation

But at any rate, going back to Mr. Polk,at the time he was President [of the NationalReclamation Association], there was this fightgoing on. Commissioner Straus had this fightgoing on in California where the California[agribusiness] agricultural interests were tryingto break down the 160-acre limitation so that theagribusiness interests could get Reclamationwater to larger units. At the same time, I was

Wanted CommissionerStraus to agree toincrease acreagepermitted onReclamation projects

257

Kenneth F. Vernon

trying to convince the Commissioner that weshould be permitted to somehow adjust [upward] the 160-acre limitation, because we were findinga difficulty of developing a viable farm unit in[160 acres.] the lands, In fact, [in the] ofagriculture we had in the Upper Basin, and theamount of irrigable land that would usuallyresult [from] in a 160-acre tract which usually, ata maximum, would be about 120 acres, becausethere’d be space taken up by buildings, perhapssome sink holes or whatever, it was not desirableland or a knoll or something that was not underthe command of the canal.

So our average of Class Three, ClassTwo, and Class One lands which were desirablefor irrigation was what we called the equivalentof about 100 to 120 acres of Class Oneequivalent. This just wasn’t enough in theUpper Basin to support all the investments thatwere required in a modern farm and support thefarm family and pay the water charges. But theCommissioner was very adamant. Mr. Strauswas very adamant, because of this fight that wasgoing on in California, not to hear ourarguments, consider our arguments aboutenlargement.

The upper MissouriRiver Basin requiredmore land thanpermitted underReclamation Law for aneconomic farm unit

But Mr. Polk came back from a meetingof the National Reclamation Association downin, I believe it was held somewhere in Arizona,in other words it was in the southwestern portionof the Reclamation area, and I had heard that hehad made an agreement with the Californiainterests [who supported the 160 acrelimitation], as President of the NationalReclamation Association, to support their views;in other words, somehow [against] enlarging andjust literally destroying the 160-acre limitation.

I visited with Mr. Polk and said, "Harry,do you really know the trouble you’ve created

258


by making that agreement to us in the UpperBasin that you’re so interested in developing?"

He said, "I was put to the rack on thisthing. The California delegation came to meand said, 'Mr. Polk, we want to enlist the supportof the National Reclamation Association and ifwe can have that support, we’re prepared tomake a sizable donation, financial donation, tothe cover the expenses of the NationalReclamation Association.'" And he said, "Whatdo I do? He said we needed the money. TheAssociation needed the money to support itslobbying activities, considering the whole areaof the West, so,” he said, “I had to agree. I feltthat I had to agree to support the Californiainterests."

I said, "You know, there’s two problemsthat are going on here. One is the agriculturalinterests [up here] that want to break down the160-acre limitation, but there’s also anothercompeting interest in there, which in Californiaand Arizona, a twenty-acre or a forty-acre plotof ground can meet the test of a farm family andmeet the water charges. So you’ve got twocompeting interests there and we’re caught inthe middle up here, because we’re limited to the160-acre limitation. I can’t get anyconsideration of it up here. But you supportingthe California interests is just putting us in a realbind, and it’s going to slow our rate ofdevelopment up here."

And another issue in that thing was thatCalifornia had entered into a number of watercontracts on the Colorado River which [Ray]Lyman Wilbur [of California], as [a previous]Secretary of the Interior, had agreed to, whichgrossly exceeded California’s share of theColorado River water. In effect, California,particularly the Imperial Irrigation District and

Vernon believedCalifornia’s contractedwater on the ColoradoRiver exceeded its shareof the river under theColorado River Compact

259

Kenneth F. Vernon

the Metropolitan Water District, was borrowingArizona’s [and the Upper Colorado RiverBasin’s] water, which was really going to beused in the Central Arizona Project. So you hadanother element in this argument of not wantingArizona to develop its project. So supportingCalifornia threw Arizona into a tailspin, too. [Ihad been told that California’s strategy, bysupporting the 160 acre limitation, would delaydevelopment of the Upper Colorado Basin, andthus that unused water would continue on downto California.]

California supported 160acre limitation to slowupper Colorado RiverBasin development

So I said, "You've really put a lot ofdevelopment of the West into a tailspin whenyou decided to accept the money from theCalifornia interests."

"Well," he said, "I felt I had to do it – Idid it." And it did. (laughter) End of story.

Storey: Well, let’s see, it took until ‘82, I think it was, torevise the acreage limitations.

Vernon: My counsel, ex-counsel, Bill Burke, after I don’tknow just exactly how long in the Solicitor’soffice, when I was on home leave in thefall/winter of 1959, my son was living inSacramento at the time, I visited the Sacramentoregional office, and lo and behold, there was BillBurke, as Regional Counsel. And apparentlyhe’d come up with one of his brainstorms andhad found out a way to come up with some legalscheme, legal theory, by which it – and this, ofcourse, was much earlier than ‘82, but somehowor another, he came up with some kind of a legalscheme which satisfied to some extent [theagribusiness interests in breaking the 160 acrelimitation.] California’s interest in getting the –the agribusiness interests.

I think that when the Central Valley

260


Project, or the state project, I don’t rememberwhere the water came from, I think it was fromReclamation, went into that Westlands IrrigationDistrict, I think somehow he came up with thescheme for that that made that WestlandsIrrigation District somewhat looser [on] than the160-acre limitation. So Bill came up with one ofhis brainstorms there. This was it. He had anuncanny ability but it created a toll on himmentally-wise. Turn it off. [Tape recorderturned off]

Storey: Well, I think we’re about ready to start talkingabout your assignment in Iraq.

Vernon: Okay. As I told you, when it became apparentthat my tour in Billings was to end, my firstpossible assignment was to go to the HighAswan Dam in Egypt. There . . .



For the High Aswan Dam, you would’vebeen on loan from Reclamation?

Vernon: I believe I was to be on loan, or to be a teamfrom Reclamation to the Foreign OperationsAdministration, which would then be supportingthrough the technical activities program of PointFour and be stationed at the High Aswan Dam. My reasoning for that is that by continuing to bea member of Reclamation, I could call upon theDenver office, say, for some support activities ifI felt that I needed them. Then we could issuewhat was called a P-I-O-T, ProjectImplementation Order Technicians, and perhapsborrow some people from Reclamation to

The High Aswan Damassignment would havebeen on loan fromReclamation

261

Kenneth F. Vernon

perform certain specific activities in support.

But as it turned out, Mr. Nassar, who hadbeen the support to the then President of Egypt,decided to hold a bloodless coup, coup d’état,and he became the President of Egypt, and theprevious president was retired. Well, Mr. Nassarwas a great operator and he was also toying andtrying to play the Russians off against the UnitedStates. So Mr. [John Foster] Dulles, who wasthen the Secretary of State, got provoked withMr. Nassar and said that we were no longerinterested in supporting the construction, theU.S. was no longer interested in supporting theconstruction of the High Aswan Dam.

Nasser’s coup d’etatended the possibility ofthe Aswan Damassignment

So therefore, even though I had begunarranging to sell my house and close out myinterests in Billings, I had to suddenly call a haltto those operations because I was told nothingwould be forthcoming for the immediate future. So the Egyptian thing passed on.

Later, through one of my friends, GeorgePratt, who I mentioned earlier, who was workingfor a consulting firm and was visiting Baghdad,and Mr. Wesley Nelson, who had been anAssistant Commissioner with whom I hadworked closely, had joined the Foreign Serviceand had been assigned and loaned to thegovernment of Iraq to be an Executive Memberof [the] a Development Board which was goingto utilize oil revenues to finance a developmentprogram within the confines of Iraq. Mr. Nelsonwas holding two positions, both as an ExecutiveMember of the Development Board and as theHead of the First Technical Section, which wasthe equivalent of the Bureau of Reclamation forthe Government of Iraq, for covering irrigation,drainage, and flood control, and hydroelectricpower generation.

Wesley Nelson solicitedVernon’s working for theForeign Service in Iraq

262


So Mr. Pratt told Mr. Nelson about myavailability, shall we say, and Mr. Nelson, hisprogram had developed to the point where hewas becoming completely involved inDevelopment Board activities, as a member ofthe Board, because by that time other elementsof the board activities had begun moving ahead. So he felt that he needed to remove himself fromthe First Technical Section’s activities, and hefelt that I was capable of handling that. So hewent to Mr. [Harold] Stassen, the then head ofthe Foreign Operations Administration, and toldhim of my availability and suggested that he goto Reclamation and request my transfer over tothe Foreign Operations Administration and be apart of Mr. Nelson’s team at the DevelopmentBoard.

At the same time there was anothergroup of Reclamation people who were still onReclamation payroll that were in the IrrigationDirectorate, which was in the Ministry ofAgriculture in Iraq. These people were still onloan from Reclamation. But it was decided thatI should transfer, terminate my connection withReclamation, and actually transfer over into theForeign Service, in the Foreign Service part ofthe Foreign Operations Administration. So thenI assumed a Foreign Service reserve officer'srank.

Transferred into theForeign OperationsAdministration,Department of State

So, I reported into Washington October16th, 1954, went through a pro forma[indoctrination] enlistment program, but I didnot engage in what was the normalindoctrination program because I was needed inIraq. So I was sent immediately out. I leftWashington the night of October 31st andarrived in Baghdad the morning of November2nd, 1954.

Arrived in Baghdad forservice on November 2,1954

As an item of interest, I left Washington

263

Kenneth F. Vernon

in the midst of a snowstorm and I arrived inBaghdad and it was 98 degrees the 2nd ofNovember. I asked my colleagues there, "Whendo we go swimming? Where’s the swimmingpool at 98 degrees?" They said, "Oh, no, we’vestopped swimming for the season because [of]the [lack of] humidity, it’s so arid, that the bodyevaporation is so rapid, that the body can’treplace the coolant effect of the rapidevaporation of the water off their body. Sowhen the temperature gets down to 100 degrees,we stop swimming." It’s a fact.

Storey: I’m not following it, I’m afraid.

Vernon: Well, if you’re wet, you see, for instance, when Igo to Atlanta – you might want to take this offthe tape.

Storey: No, go ahead.

Vernon: Well, when I go to Atlanta, for instance, theyhave periods, they get air from the Gulf, or whenyou go to Florida, that air is very humid. Forinstance, in the spring in Pakistan it was aircoming off the desert. Beginning about June 1,the monsoon winds began and air came off theArabian Gulf, and it was 95 percent humiditywith 95 percent temperature, in other words,nearly 100 percent humidity, so the body did notlose any heat through evaporation. Your bodywould perspire, but you would drip, because itcouldn’t evaporate and therefore have a coolingeffect. But in the spring of the year, they wouldget air off the desert, which was the same asBaghdad, and the [temperature] aridity might beat 110 or 115 degrees with 5 to 10 percentrelative humidity. So you would have a veryrapid evaporation which had its . .

Storey: So that would cool you off.

264


Vernon: . . . cooling effect, but if you tried to swim at 100degrees, you’d be very wet and you’d have thisrapid evaporation which would chill the body,you’d actually get a chill in the body. So thegeneral rule was that around 100 degrees, youstopped swimming.

Storey: At 100 and above?

Vernon: At 100 and below. When the temperature gotdown to 100 – you see, in the middle of thesummer in Baghdad, it ran from 110 to 115degrees in the middle of the day and with 5percent relative humidity, very arid, and wecould use the swamp type of coolers there. Sothen when we would say that we were having acold wave if the maximum daytime temperaturegot down to 108, say, or 105. So as thetemperature in the fall of the year decreased to,say, maybe a maximum of 100 degrees, youwere still on the low end of the scale, but youstill had arid conditions, so you still had at 100degrees rapid evaporation from the body, whichwould create the removal of heat.

There’s not such a thing as coldness,that’s not an element, it’s heat that is theelement, and coldness is simply the absence ofheat. So that when you have this removal of theheat from your body, but through evaporation,because evaporation, as I recall, takes eightycalories per gram to change one cubic centimeterof water from liquid to vapor. So for every gramof water, a cubic centimeter of water you haveon your body, you’re removing eighty caloriesof heat in its transfer of liquid to vapor, plus onecalorie per gram of every degree between zerocentigrade and the ambient temperature.

Storey: But what I don’t understand is, why wouldn’tyou chill more at higher temperatures?

265

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: No, because then you’ve got a counterbalancingeffect because it was so damn hot, that it wouldcounterbalance and replace the heat in yourbody.

Storey: I see.

Vernon: There was a counterbalancing effect. But thebreaking point was about 100 degrees. I wasconfused on that, too, until I experienced it and Iaccepted the rule. (laughter)

Storey: Well, that’s interesting.

Vernon: Yeah, it’s just one of those things.

Storey: So you got over there and then what did you endup doing?

Vernon: It was our practice at the station that the peopleyou would be associated with met you at theairplane, were the welcoming committee, so tospeak. So I was welcomed there, and a numberof people that I was to work with met me out atthe airport. And, of course, I was completelybushed because I’d been traveling directlythrough from Washington to Baghdad. That wasback in the days of propellers, so it took quite awhile to get from Washington D.C., to Baghdad,Iraq. And I think, and as I say, I left Washingtonthe night of October 31st and arrived in Baghdadthe morning of November of 2nd, but with arather a long layover in Rome, which is anexperience I want to tell you about and discusslater.

Met in Baghdad by thepeople with whom hewould work

Flew to Iraq in propellerplanes

So I arrived the morning of November2nd. I went immediately and reported in to Mr.Nelson at the Development Board. His officewas in the Development Board downtown.

I should explain that there was what was Joined the Development

266


called a “usom” a U-S-O-M, United StatesOperations Mission [of the InternationalCooperation Administration], associated withthe U.S. Embassy. This was the group of peoplethat were still U.S. employees and wereperforming U.S. activities patterned out throughthe various ministries of supporting the technicalactivities of the various ministries.

Board which wasdifferent than the UnitedStates OperationMission (USOM) staff

The Development Board [group] was aseparate operation. Although we were tied tothe Mission in Army terms, for rations, we werea separate entity and we worked directly withinthe Ministry of Development. The Ministry ofDevelopment reimbursed the U.S. Governmentfor our salaries and expenses. But we werebasically considered Iraqi employees, Iraqigovernment employees [because we occupiedIraqi positions]. Of course, we were under theconstraints of general U.S. policy and receiveddirection to that extent from the MissionDirector and from the Ambassador. But ourfundamental operations were as individualsworking within the Iraq government, and I wasactually assigned [as] to the head of the FirstTechnical Section, which in their terms was asthe Director General of the First TechnicalSection, which was the equivalent to the Bureauof Reclamation in the Reclamation portion of theDevelopment Board’s activities.

Worked for the IraqiMinistry of Developmentwithin some limitationsbecause was stillemployed by the StateDepartment

Storey: So Mr. Nelson would’ve sort of been theequivalent of the Secretary of Interior.

Vernon: No, if it had been a commission that wasgoverning, for instance, you would be more likea member of the governing commission of theTVA. The TVA was covered by – well, it had aChairman. It also had a Commission which setthe policies and direction and that sort of thing. So he [was] then became a member. His basicassignment was as Executive Member of the

267

Kenneth F. Vernon

Development Board, and the DevelopmentBoard [and the Ministry of Development] had toact upon [requests for] and grant funds to carryout the operations of the Development Board. Now, the Development Board [and ministry] hadfive separate sections: there was water andirrigation drainage development; there was whatthey called communications which includedhighways, railways, (pause) I believe,telephones; there was the third section ofindustry. Industry, they were developingindustrial plants, cement plants, sugar mills,other industrial developments. They were alsoclosely associated with the oil administration. Because the oil ministry, the oil development inIraq was making great strides. The fourthsection was agricultural development. The fifthsection was social development, which includedhousing for refugees, schools, that sort of thing.

So all of these activities now, by the timeMr. Nelson asked for me, all these otheractivities had begun to become very active. Sohe was having to devote a good deal of attentionto consideration of [those] their programactivities and he wanted to take off his hat thathe wore when he [was] first Head of the FirstTechnical Section, as being responsible forwater development and that’s why he asked forme to come in and take his place in thatdepartment. So then I began. First I said, "I’vegot to go home and get some sleep."

Well, Bernard Murphy, who’d been partof my group in Billings and had been caught upin a reduction in force when the EisenhowerAdministration came in and told us to peel off alot of people, Bernard Murphy had gotten aconnection with Wes Nelson in the DevelopmentBoard, [and] was heading up a design unit in myFirst Technical Section. So he was training abunch of Iraqi engineers to design irrigation

Bernard Murphy, RIFedin Billings, was headinga design unit in Iraq

268


systems. So Barney says to me, "Come on [tomy] home, Ken. I’ve got a big house, we’ve gotroom, so I’ll put you up till you get located."

So I went and took up quarters withBarney Murphy and his family while I gotmyself located. At a later time I decided it wastime for me to move out of Mr. Murphy’s house,and I moved into a hotel because my family didnot come until after the school year was out inthe States, and they came over in July of 1955. So I did not see my family from the middle ofOctober of 1954 to the middle of July of 1955. So that gets me started in the DevelopmentBoard.

Family came to Baghdadin July of 1955

I mentioned that I had an experience ingoing through the airport in Rome. It was abouta four or five or six-hour layover, I’ve forgottenjust what, from the plane from the States topicking up the connection to get into Baghdad,Iraq. We were assigned to places in the transitlounge so we didn’t have to go throughimmigration, through Italy. We stayed in thetransit lounge, and I noticed this gentlemansitting over there across the room from me, andit was apparent he also was an American. So wekept eyeing each other and finally I decided,well, why not go over and introduce myself. SoI did. I went over. We started up aconversation, and it turned out that he wasCalvin Davis, who was President of HarzaEngineering in Chicago, who had beenemployed by the Development Board of Iraq todesign a dam at the Derbendi-Khan site up in themountains of Iraq on the Diyala River.

In Rome airport metCalvin Davis, Presidentof Harza Engineering,which was undercontract to theDevelopment Board inIraq

I said, "Well, that’s very, veryinteresting, because I’m going over to Iraq totake on the job of head of the First TechnicalSection in the Ministry of Development."

269

Kenneth F. Vernon

He said, "I’m going to be reporting toyou instead of Mr. Nelson."

I said, "Yeah, I guess that’s right."

So he said, "You know, I’ve got aproblem that I’d like to discuss with you."

I said, "How's that?"

Well, he said, "The Development Board,in assigning me the job of designing this dam,the then Prime Minister – " I should explain, theDevelopment Board was composed of tenmembers. There were three political members:the Prime Minister, the Minister ofDevelopment, and the Minister of Economics,they were the political members. Then there[were what] was called the Executive Members. The Vice Chairman was a military man. Hewent by the title [of Pasha], he was a brigadiergeneral who had been trained in the TurkishArmy, before the British days. So he was anelderly gentleman, a senior gentleman. He wentby the title of Pasha, which was a Turkish title,which [allowed him to] he could wear thefeathers on his lance. I’ve forgotten how manyfeathers he could wear on his lance as he rodehis horse and all that sort of jazz. But at anyrate, he was the Vice Chairman, and then heheaded up what was called the ExecutiveMembers [which formed the SteeringCommittee].

Make-up of theDevelopment Board

There were (pause) four other executivemembers. These members were under contractto the government and they were appointed forfive-year terms, and they were all importantIraqi people. One, Dr. Jaleeli was a graduate ofCambridge, I believe, in economics. SaidChalibi was a member of a prominent bankingfamily in Iraq. The Chalibi family owned the

270


Rafadain Bank, which was literally thegovernment depository of all revenues. Therewas Jalal Baban, who was a Kurd, who spokevery little English. Mr. Jaleeli spoke excellentEnglish because he had been educated [inEngland] either in France or Europe somewhere,I’ve forgotten what. Then Jalal Baban was aKurd who did not speak English, but he wasbringing Kurdish interest into the activities ofthe Development Board. Then there was AbdulMajred Allawi, who was an ex-ambassador, adiplomat. So you had a typical board to dealwith.

Then you had two foreign members, Mr.Nelson was one, an American, and Mr. Ionides,who was a Britisher, who had formerly been amember, had experience with the Directorate ofIrrigation, had many years of experience withirrigation in Iraq and in Jordan. So he was anexperienced irrigation engineer.

So you had quite a complexion ofinterests and skills in this board. The way theboard operated was the executive membersoperated as a Steering Committee. The workweek began on Saturday, [and you worked]work through to Thursday. Friday is the MuslimSabbath. So that Friday was the holiday, so youtook off, you didn’t work. The DevelopmentBoard began what they called a new agenda withtheir Steering Committee meetings on Saturday,and each of the sections would send up throughthe Minister items to be considered by theDevelopment Board. The heads of the varioussections would appear before the DevelopmentBoard, explain and discuss what the proposalwas, and then the Steering Committee wouldeither require more information, or put the itemover to a later meeting, or send it forward to afull plenary session of the Development Boardheaded by the Prime Minister, and that would

How the DevelopmentBoard worked

271

Kenneth F. Vernon

meet on Thursday evenings.

Then the Development Board, the formalplenary session of the Development Board,would take a decision as to either approving orsending back for further consideration whateveritem you might have that the SteeringCommittee had set up for consideration. Iintroduced a practice there, which I found usefulin my experience in working with thecommissions in the States. I would send up myreports through the Minister and [ended] linedup the discussion with a set of recommendationswhich would formulate, basically, the languageof the decision I wanted from the DevelopmentBoard. So I would request the Minister to placethis before the Development Board for itsconsideration, and then I would send up myreport addressed to him covered by amemorandum from him to the DevelopmentBoard transmitting my report and request forconsideration. My [Iraqi] colleagues had[previously] all gone [, without anyrecommendations,] before the Minister, whodidn’t know what the hell was going on, becausehe was a political member. [And so earlierBoard’s decisions left a lot to be desired.]

Storey: He was the brigadier?

Vernon: No, no. The Minister, you see, was a member ofthe Parliament. He was a member of the PrimeMinister’s Cabinet. He didn’t know a goddamnthing about what was going on, but he was apolitical member, you see. In the British system,it’s very interesting, the Minister is simply atitular head. The Ministry is run by the FirstSecretary. I got into this with a vengeance inPakistan, but in Iraq it has sort of been changedsomewhat.

But anyway, the Minister then, found it

272


very simple. He didn’t know what the hell I wasproposing, so he’d automatically sign it and tellhis secretary to send it down to the secretary ofthe board to put on the agenda, and then I hadalready set up what I wanted as a decision. So Igot decisions that were workable. But up to thattime, these things kind of got to theDevelopment Board. The Development Boarddidn’t know quite what was going on and theydidn’t know quite how to formulate a decision,and so some of the earlier decisions were veryvague and nobody knew quite what the hell whatthey covered and what was authorized.

So I would set it up in such a way that I[could] would formulate [the discussion] thisthing after [which] I would make my discussionthat my recommendations would begin, and I'drecommend that the Development Boardconsider taking the decision along the followinglines. The Development Board, in its “blankmeeting,” in its “blank session,” took thefollowing decision, points one, two, three, four,five or however many things I wanted done, andparticularly I made them authorize me to doeverything I did. In other words I did very littleon my own [authority], but I was always coveredby their instructions. Because I felt, after all, theworst thing that could happen would be aforeigner to get skewered by somebody with anax to grind. But I always was covered by adetailed Board’s decision.

Well, the board found this very handyand so they kind of put it into practice in theother sections there. But at any rate, now you’vegot the structure that I was working in.

I got a call from Mr. Nelson, he said,"Ken, we’re going to take up in the next SteeringCommittee meeting Calvin Davis and hisproposed Derbendi-Khan Dam, so you be

Derbendi-Khan Dam

273

Kenneth F. Vernon

prepared to discuss that with the ExecutiveMembers in the Steering Committee meeting."

So, we went to the Steering Committeemeeting. It began on a Saturday morning. Theyturned to me and said, "Well, what’s on youragenda, Mr. Vernon?"

I said, "Mr. Davis is here from Chicagoand he’s got his plans for the proposedDerbendi-Khan Dam. I happened to meet him inRome, and we’ve been discussing this. Heindicates that he’s got a problem that he’d like todiscuss with you."

So with that entree, then, Calvin said, "Ihave completed my charge of designing a damthat I feel is sound and safe for the Derbendi-Khan site, but there are problems with that sitewhich I do not feel are the kind of problemswhich should be solved with a concrete dam[. So], that I believe you should authorize me todesign an earth and rockfill dam." The problemwas in the foundation. These foundationformations were tilted at an angle so that youwound up, [with foundation formations thatcould easily fracture from the pressure of thewater.] here was the face of the pressure of thewater, and then you wound up with theseformations shaped like this. You had thetendency for this foundation formation to shear,and they weren’t all that strong, just as I pointedout in that Andy Coyne example [of theMalpassat Dam].

Derbendi-Khan site hadfoundation problemsthat suggested an earthand rockfill dam

Storey: So they were slanted, so they came up facingdownstream?

Vernon: Yeah, facing downstream.

Storey: So that if you put the dam on it, the dam . . .

274


Vernon: Would have a tendency to break those cornersoff.

Storey: To just break it off and go on downstream.

Vernon: Yeah, right. And it was an indurated sandstone. It was kind of a poor-quality limestone. Itwasn’t a foundation that was best served by aconcrete dam. So Mr. Davis explained all this tothe Board and he said, "I’ve competed mycharge as I was told to, and I have the plans withme. But I would recommend that you seriouslyconsider a design for a rock filled dam, because Ibelieve that is the type of structure that shouldbe built there." Incidentally, Mr. Davis had beenthe Chief Design Engineer of the TVA, so hewas a highly qualified engineer.

And so the Board turns to me and says,"Well, Mr. Vernon, you’re our expert. Whatshould we do?" My second day there. (laughter)

So I said, "Well, gentlemen, I’ve onlyhad general discussions with Mr. Davis, but myexperience in Reclamation, building dams andhaving been associated with dams in the UnitedStates, I seriously recommend that you considerhis suggestions. But I would suggest that youauthorize me to hold detailed discussions withMr. Davis, and we could come back with aproposal which you might authorize him todesign such a dam if that seems to be reallyindicated."

So they said, "That sounds pretty good."

So I got the [problem] putty off theirback. They said, "You go ahead and do that andreport back to us."

So Cal and I went back and so we reallywent into it in depth. I was convinced from

275

Kenneth F. Vernon

some of my experiences in the States,particularly with – not rock-filled dams, [butwith earth-filled dams to. . .]--


Vernon: ... listen seriously to Mr. Davis, that some formof at least a compacted earth-fill dam or perhapsthe rock-fill dam, of which I’d had littleexperience was warranted, a better selection. And it might even work out to be cheaper. So Iprepared a report. The way we would deal withthese things, then as Head of the First TechnicalSection, I would prepare a report through theMinister to the Development Board, a writtenreport, a formal report, discussing all theseelements, putting it forth, and this would then besubmitted bilingually. On a page there’d be theEnglish and the accompanying Arabic, so thatthe members who weren’t conversant in Englishcould read the Arabic.

It was very difficult sometimes for myboys to translate engineering terms into theArabic, because the Arabic is not [as rich alanguage as] the rich language, the romancelanguages, as in particularly English with itscombination of Germanic and the romancelanguages. So when you get into some of yourconditional phrases, it’s very difficult. Iremember [Said] Chalibi one time wasdiscussing this with me and he was commentingabout how difficult it was some times to convertthe English into the Arabic, because the Arabicwas basically two tenses, to do or completed, thepresent or completed. And it didn’t have thesubjunctive phrases or the conditionals in there.

So at any rate, I prepared my report. Myrecommendation was that the board authorizeMr. Davis and his organization to come up with

276


a design for a rock-filled dam, but to alsoprepare parallel specifications [and] tenderdocuments, for a rock-filled dam. and Thenwhen those were completed we would go out fortenders for both the concrete dam and the earth-filled dam to see how the prices worked out, andthen the Development Board could make anintelligent decision based on economics.

Well, they thought that sounded prettygood, so they authorized that. So I took Calback to my office and I said, "All right, now,Cal, I got you to your point that you wanted,now you’ve got to give the Development Boardsomething. I think you should do this job atexpenses only, no fee, no profit. You’ve got togive the Development Board that much."

Well, he squirmed and wiggled a little bitand he said, "Well, I guess you’re all right."

So normally our formula was, which webegan negotiations with consulting engineers,was two and a quarter times direct [drawingboard] board expense, direct activity expense,which covered overhead and fee. I got himdown to something like no fee and a reduction ofhis overhead. So I got him down to somethinglike 1.6 times his direct expense. He squirmedwith that, but he finally accepted. He said,"Well, I guess you’re right."

So he went back and then in a fewmonths he came back with the design for therock-fill dam and then we went out for tender. When the rock-fill dam came in several milliondollars cheaper, less expensive than the concretedam, so the Development Board then authorizedthe construction and appropriated the money forthe construction of the rock-fill dam. That wasgoing on midway when the revolution occurredin 1958, so I never did get to see the completion

277

Kenneth F. Vernon

of it.

What I was trying to work in there wasmy introduction to the Development Board, howthe Development Board operated, how theMinistry operated with the Development Board,getting back, authorizing decisions, includingappropriations of funds to the activity, becausethe Development Board controlled the money,although the basic allocations of oil revenueswas by the Parliament.

Now, that creates another element of myactivities with the board which I’d like to go intonow, rather than getting into project details. Thegovernment of Iraq began to get into the worldmarket of its petroleum resources after theMossedegh revolution.26 [Tape recorder turnedoff for telephone call]

Storey: We were talking about . . .

Vernon: I said that now I’d like to give you a little betterexplanation of the government budgetingstructure which the Development Boardoperated under. The Iraq Petroleum Companywas just entering the world market in the earlyyears of the 1950s. What had happened was thatthere were problems in Iran, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been sort of closeddown, and so the British then stimulatedactivities in Iraq to put the Iraq petroleum oilresources on the world market through the IraqPetroleum [Company], which was closelyassociated with, but not openly, with the Anglo-American Oil Company, later became BritishPetroleum [BP].

Iraqi budgeting structureand oil money

But at any rate, this began thendeveloping oil revenues, and the government ofIraq decided that it was going to take and devote70 percent of those surplus oil revenues to

278


development of various functions within thecountry. It would also [devote] develop 30percent of those revenues to supporting activitiesof the then existing government.

Now, in the British system, in order toget around its strictures of avoiding theexpenditures of money, which are indigenous tothe British system of government, they woulduse the corporate entity to give the power toexpend money. So they set up both in Iraq theIraq Development Board as a separate entity, asPakistan did with their Water and PowerDevelopment Authorities, and literally gavethem the power to do everything but declare warand to coin money, but they could sure spend it.

So then the Parliament had generaloversight of this operation, particularly throughthe Prime Minister and the Minister ofDevelopment. At first there was simply theDevelopment Board, but the Development Boardthen began to get such strength that thegovernment felt they needed a little morepolitical control, or policy control would be abetter term, policy control over the activities ofthe Development Board, so they then set up aMinistry of Development, which theDevelopment Board was attached to. The makeup the Development Board I previouslydescribed [was retained], but the DevelopmentBoard then became an attachment to or anadjunct to the Ministry of Development. Andthe Minister of Development was theoreticallythe executive officer of the Development Board.

Storey: And this is the Minister who signed the paper?

Vernon: Yeah. The Development Board would issue itsdecision, which would be passed down to theMinister of Development, who would then passit down to me, and if I felt that there were any

279

Kenneth F. Vernon

policy issues involved, I would go back to theMinister, but I’d never refer any technicalquestion to the Minister, because he was notqualified to make that decision, but I had thatbasic authority as Head of the Section. Had Ibeen a local Iraqi in a position like that, I wouldhave been called a Director General, and in theother ministries like Agriculture and PublicWorks and so on, their various elements werecalled Directorates. So it’s strictly patternedafter the British system, which was headed by aDirector General.

So the Development Board then woulddevelop its various programs and then theywould go up to Parliament to be considered forapproval. Well, in the mid-1950s, Iraqpetroleum was really making money and theywere generating excess revenues, and while Iarrived in the fall of 1954, by 1956 I’d decidedhow I was going to operate, and I had puttogether a program of activities. So I went backto the Development Board and got a greatexpansion of the current program. So it wasfully funded by financial resources from theDevelopment Board, but they were lodged in theBank of England, the funds were lodged in theforeign exchange, the resources were lodged inthe Bank of England.

So then in the middle of 1957, I got a callfrom the Vice Chairman’s office, and herequested that I come over and visit with himand his colleagues. I said, "Yes, sir, I’ll be overthere immediately." So I put my tie and jacketon and went over to meet with the ViceChairman. As I walked in, he was there in ameeting with his Iraqi colleagues, but the[foreign] board members were not there. So Ithought, "Well, this is going to be an interestingsession." And it turned out it was basically apolitical problem.

280


He said, "Mr. Vernon, you’ve given us abit of a problem."

I said, "Oh, how's that, sir?"

He said, "As you know, the governmenthas issued a directive that the DevelopmentBoard, because oil revenues are building up, thatit wants [an expansion of program] a programexpansion of activities that it could consider forapproval by the Development Board, and all theother elements of the Development Board havecome forward with expanded programs, [but]which you did not. Now, this gives us a problemwith the Parliament, because as you well know,your program, the program of waterdevelopment, is the most important one and themost widespread one within the country. If wego to the Parliament with a program that doesnot include an expanded program in waterdevelopment, drainage, irrigation, flood controland drainage, we’re going to have a problem. So how can you help us solve that problem?" [Tape recorder turned off]

The Iraqi members ofthe Development Boardrequested an expandedprogram

So he said, "Can you help me with ourproblem?"

I started to laugh, and he said, looking athis colleagues, he said, "What’s so funny?" Hewas very serious about it. He was a little bitmiffed.

I said, "Pasha, that’s the first time in myprofessional career, in working through theelements of the U.S. government, that I’ve everbeen told I didn’t ask for enough money. It wasusually fighting for enough money. But in truth,you people did approve my requested expandedprogram last year, if you’ll recall, and I had putin everything in that expanded program that Ifelt we could reasonably accomplish within the

281

Kenneth F. Vernon

next few years. And as a practical matter of fact,we’re only up to a performance rate of about 50percent of that expanded program, so I didn’tfeel that it was appropriate for me to request anadditional expanded program, because wewouldn’t ever be able to get to it for a number ofyears."

He said, "Could you come in with anexpanded program?"

I said, "If you’ll agree that you won’tpress me about accomplishments on some of[the] things I might put into that program, I thinkwe could come up with a few items." In otherwords, we could come up with a wish list, likeGlenn Sloan did in the Missouri Basin.

So I went back to my group and called inmy people and said, "I’ve just been directed bythe Vice Chairman to come up with an expandedprogram even beyond the expanded program wealready have. So you guys go back and cleanout everything you’ve got in the drawers backthere that anybody ever thought of, and we’ll goback, then, with an expanded program forconsideration by the Development Board andthen up to the Parliament." (laughter)

So these guys went back and theydragged out things that anything that had everbeen mentioned as a possibility, and we came upwith about a 50 percent expansion.

I had become rather friendly with Dr.Jaleeli, who had a good sense of humor and hewas very facile with the shadings of the Englishlanguage. So you could talk pretty directly tohim and he understood an English-language jokeor a sarcasm and whatnot. So I went back tohim in an informal session one time, after that allhappened and said, "You know, that really was a

282


poser, because I was concerned that you peoplewere concerned that I wasn’t accomplishingenough on the currently approved program andhere you were telling me I didn’t have a bigenough program." And this really was a poser,and I was really confused. But I said, "We didwhat you asked, but we had a lot of work to dobefore we’d ever get to a lot of it."

I had instituted, as I had in the MissouriBasin, I had instituted a program section,program planning section, which I got LarryWhearty from Billings, who was one of ourprogram planners, schedulers in Billings, I’dgotten him through the mission, the U-S-O-Mmission, to bring over to Baghdad and be a partof my group down at the Development Board. So I put him to work developing a programmingsystem and a reporting system for why we wouldreport regularly to the Development Board ouruse of funds and accomplishments each monthby month. This was the first time they’d everhad that reporting function in Baghdad wherethey could actually see what was beingaccomplished.

Imported Larry Wheartyfrom Billings to helpestablish aprogramming andreporting system for theSection

So they then authorized me to make Mr.Whearty available to the other sections of theministry to see what could be done aboutinstituting such a system. The English memberof the Development Board gave me strongsupport in that, because he felt that was anessential part of the operation, was not onlygetting the authorization to act, but the reportingback to the administrators what was beingaccomplished with what funds were beingprovided.

As a matter of fact, after we got thatexpanded program approved, I had a fullyfunded $500 million program, of which we wereexpending at that time only roughly 50 to 60

283

Kenneth F. Vernon

million dollars a year. But by the time therevolution occurred in 1958, we had about one-hundred million dollars of contracts ready toissue for tender.

In one of the initial stages of theappearance before the Development Board, theysaid, "Now, Mr. Vernon, how do you want toorganize your First Technical Section?"

I said, "Well, I’m not familiar with yourgovernment structure, so give me a little time tostudy the government structure, particularly yourfinancial operations, your personnel operations,and how elastic they are, and what seems to bethe availability of Iraqis to assume positions andtheir capabilities in the First Technical Section."

Well, it didn’t take very long for me todetermine there were very few, at this point intime, very few Iraqis who could take onpositions within the First Technical Section andexecute engineering and design studies andconstruction components. Also I concluded thatthe personnel operation and the Director Generalof the Diwan, which was administration, wassuch that even if they were available, it wouldtake forever to employ them, because theywould have to go through some form of apolitical clearance operation or they’d have to beat least promoted, by some particular – get thelaying-on of hands by some particular big-wig,because it was a paternalistic organization.

Then also their financial operations weresuch that – the Director General of Accountswas such, it was all predicated on the Britishsystem of the avoidance of the expenditure ofmonies. So in a construction operation, youneed money and you need it fast. At a latertime, I had quite an argument before theMinister with the Director General of Accounts, The Iraqi system

284


but I really don’t want to get into that detail. But it was a system which basically wasdesigned to prevent the expenditures of money,and avoidance of expenditures of money.

basically was designedto prevent expenditures

So I went back to the DevelopmentBoard and I said, "Gentlemen, my conclusion isthis. I would like to employ as many Iraqis as Ican. You’ve already employed a group of Dutchdrainage engineers under contract with theDutch Government, which are advancing thedrainage section of the program, and I wouldlike to employ as many Americans as I canlocate either directly through the U.S. mission orunder direct contract or through consultingengineers. So this will be the central groupwhich will do the administration. This wouldparallel our regional organization in ourstructure in Reclamation. Then to performproject activities, we will employ consultingengineering firms who can then recruit andemploy competent people who can perform thedesigns or whatever is required." I said, "You'reaccustomed to that situation because you noware employing engineering contractors as well asconstruction contractors in the construction ofprojects, and it seems to me that under your localconditions, that a continuation and expansion ofthat system makes sense if you want a rapidlyexpanding program. If you want a trainingprogram of Iraqi engineers, we never will getmuch accomplished for quite a long while. So inorder to respond to your desire foraccomplishments, my recommendation is thelatter program."

Obtaining DevelopmentBoard approval of asystem for the TechnicalSection to follow

So they said, "Well, go ahead."

So we developed a stable of consultingengineers worldwide. Fundamentally they wereAmerican, British, German, French, Dutch. Idon’t believe we had any Italians. A Greek firm,

285

Kenneth F. Vernon

Doxiades Associates. When we got reallygoing, I figured we had, through theseengineering firms, had about 500 employeesworking on my section on the DevelopmentBoard’s program. So by 1958 then, as I said, wehad developed definite project plans, designdrawings and all, and tender documents forapproximately a hundred million dollars.

Storey: A hundred million, I think.

Vernon: Five hundred million was my bank account, butwe developed contract documents for $100million of projects, and we had a pipelineaddressing itself to that 500 million, because wehad this fine group of engineers working onspecific projects.

Now, what I had done, also, was whilewe were working on specific project plans, I saidto the Development Board, "There’s a number ofthings that we need to do."

Before I get into that, I had spoken aboutthe desire of the Development Board or of thegovernment of putting part of their oil revenuesinto the existing departments. Also theDevelopment Board had a section of itsbudgetary process, called Chapter Two. ChapterOne was direct Development Board activities. Chapter Two was money that the DevelopmentBoard handed over to existing agencies ofgovernment to perform supporting activities,such as my colleagues and counterpart was theDirectorate of Irrigation in the AgricultureDepartment.

The Director General of Irrigation was agraduate of Michigan, and his Assistant DirectorGeneral, the Deputy DG, was a graduate of theUniversity of California-Berkeley. So here Iwas dealing with well-trained individuals and

286


conversant in English, so it was easy to discussthings.

I had suggested then to the DevelopmentBoard that they authorize me to set up what theycall in their language a Tanse’eq committee, T-A-N-S-E-E-Q, with an apostrophe between thetwo Es. T-A-N-S-E-’-E-Q – it’s a glottal stop intheir language, which is literally a coordinationcommittee similar to what we had in Interior onthe Missouri Basin. So that we held regularmeetings with [our] the counterparts [in] and theDirectorate of Irrigation, because they wouldhave to come to me with their proposals forDevelopment Board support. I would have toreview them and then pass them forward to theDevelopment Board with my comments andrecommendations, and then they would considerit and then we’d pass that approval back to theDirectorate of Irrigation, and then they wouldexecute it.

Working with theDirectorate of Irrigation

But through this coordination operationwe could settle out any technical differences inthe proposals. Any policy decisions whichmight be relative to agricultural operations,because the Director General was receivinginstructions from his Minister of Agriculture,and it at times gave him problems. I obviouslycouldn’t solve those problems, so I would passthose up unresolved to the Development Board. I could solve all of the technical problems, but Iwould have to pass those kind of problems up tothe Development Board, through the Minister, tobe solved at governmental levels, and it workedout very well, at that rate.

So we would hold our regular meetingsand also I would consult with Anwaral Hasani,who was the Director General of Irrigation orMahmoud Hassan-Al Juma, who was the DeputyDG, with some of the things that we were doing

287

Kenneth F. Vernon

and kept them apprised of what we were doingin the Development Board, because it was theintention of the Development Board to turn overthe operation of the completed projects to theDirectorate of Irrigation. We had severalprojects that were nearing completion and weneeded to bolster the personnel and build up theabilities of the Irrigation Directorate to take onthe operations of those projects. So we wouldsometimes ask the Directorate of Irrigation toassign some of their personnel to these projectswhich were approaching completion so theycould become familiar with it. So they thencould get involved in the later stages of theoperation of the project.

So there was a close coordination therebetween the activities of the DevelopmentBoard, and this went through all of the agenciesof government, particularly the section washeavily involved with the Ministry of PublicWorks, for example. I don’t know exactly whothe Third Technical Section on industrialprojects was involved with it, but I imagine oneof them was the – I don’t know whether it wasthe Ministry of Oil or the Directorate of OilAffairs, whether the Director of Oil Affairs wasin the Ministry of Economics or the Ministry ofFinance, I don’t believe it was a separateministry.

But the Development Board wanted thiscooperation between the Development Board’sactivities and the old ministries, so that theministries then could take on the operation of thecompleted projects. At the time that I got there,the Development Board, during Mr. Nelson’stenure as Head of the section and as member ofthe Development Board, had commencedconstruction of the Wadi Tharthar Flood ControlProject on the Tigris River and the RamadiBarrage, which was a part of the flood control

Wadi Tharthar FloodControl Project on theTigris River

288


project on the Euphrates River [also the DokanDam on the Lesser Zab River. When I got there,these were in the midst of their constructionprogram.

The Wadi Tharthar Project was acomplex project of literally a dam across theTigris River and then a control structure whichwould divert water from the [flood] flow of theTigris River into a channel which wasconstructed out into the desert, an escapechannel out into the desert, and pour this excessflood water out into this very large depression,the Wadi Tharthar, which would then take theexcess surplus waters off the flood flow of theTigris River because the channel capacity [of theriver through Baghdad was limited to 7000 M3/s,and flood flows could approach 12,000-14,000M3/s.]


Storey: This is tape five of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 26th, 1995.

Vernon: I was describing to you the elements of the WadiTharthar flood control project on the TigrisRiver located about sixty kilometers upstreamfrom the city of Baghdad. The need for thisflood control project was because the channelcapacity through the city of Baghdad waslimited to a flow of seven thousand cubic metersper second. And during the flood of 1954, flowsof up to twelve to fourteen thousand cubicmeters per second was experienced, and solevees were breached above the city of Baghdad,and flood flows were diverted around theperiphery of the city of Baghdad which isolatedthe city of Baghdad for a considerable period oftime.

Flood of 1954 inBaghdad

289

Kenneth F. Vernon

So this Wadi Tharthar project had beeninstituted, which consisted of basically a damstructure across the river, a low level damconstruction across the river bed, and then adiversion control structure which deliveredwater, surplus waters to a surplus flow channelwhich went about fifty kilometers out into thedesert between the Tigris River and theEuphrates River [to a large depression in thedesert], the bottom of which was atapproximately zero or sea level elevation, but itsperiphery was at an elevation of some sixty toseventy meters above sea level. So that the totalquantity of water which could be held in thisdepression totaled a quantity of [about twenty-five] cubic kilometers of water, I’ve forgottenthe exact number, but it was a tremendousdepression. This was already under constructionwhen I got there, when I arrived in Baghdad.

So when I entered into the exercise, Iimmediately made an inspection tour up to theproject. There were two major contractors busythere, one constructing the actual diversionarystructure in the bed of the Tigris River, andanother contractor who was building the controllevees for the diversionary channel. I wassomewhat amazed at the design of the structure,because the consulting engineer who was incontrol of the design and engineering of theconstruction had great experience in buildingthings both in Iraq, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Sothat organization had developed certainconstruction techniques and design techniqueswhich were strange to me as an American. Notto say whether they were effective or not, and asI examined them, I found that they were veryeffective in terms of the capabilities of theIraqis. The contractor was a German outfit andit was a very capable outfit from Germany – hadbuilt many structures in Germany.

290


One of the techniques which was strangeto me was this diversionary structure consistedof a number of gates mounted on buttressesacross the bed of the river. These gates werebeing manufactured in Britain. Mr. Nelson, inhis review of the initial project, as head of thesection, he had support of other Americans thathe had brought to Iraq, reviewed the basicBritish design and had proposed to theDevelopment Board a completely revampeddesign of the initial British engineer'sconstruction design, and, among other things,had suggested that instead of six-meter gates,which would require a tremendous loss ofchannel capacity because of the abutments thatwould be required to service the gates, herecommended that the design be changed totwelve-meter gates which would reduce thenumber of abutments which would be required,although it did introduce problems of stability ofthe size of the buttresses and the machinery thatwould be involved in the raising and lowering ofthe gates.

It was apparent to me, after studying theBritish design, that I could understand theprinciples of their overall design because theywere accustomed to the lack of machinery tohandle large pieces of equipment and had todepend largely upon something that manpowercould handle. So their design for the abutments,instead of using form work, as we would do,they had the contractor construct a series of one-cubic-meter blocks of high-density concrete. These one-meter concrete blocks then would beliterally the form work and an integral part of thebuttress formation with a hollow center, whichthen could be filled with a low quality ofconcrete which was simply not required forstrength, but simply for weight and stability ofthe buttress or pier. Then this high-densityconcrete could resist the erosional effect of

291

Kenneth F. Vernon

water passing around it, but the utilization of thelower-grade concrete in the center of the pierwould be economic and save its costs. Theseone-meter cubes were of a size that could behandled through various devices that could behandled by manpower. But, of course, theGerman contractor was accustomed to utilizingequipment, machinery and so on, so he washandling this all by very modern Germanhammerhead cranes.

Then also the contractor had developed abridging form work to support the deck betweenthe piers so that transport could travel back andforth across the completed structure and it wouldbe an operational deck and so on. Themachinery, which would raise and lower thegates, could be stationed on this decking. Butbecause of the increase of the span of the gatesfrom six meters to twelve meters, this introducednew problems of design of the bridge deckingand the loading that it would have to sustain,which the British engineer had not considered inhis original design of six-meter bridge spans.

The German contractor then created aform work which literally was on wheels and letus say we had eight [or ten] gate openings tospan, he built three or four of these dollies, jigs,if you want to call them that, and then he couldput those in place, and by the time he got placingthe concrete in the third or fourth span, how evermany he had, the concrete had achieved enoughstrength in the bridging that he could remove theform work [from the earlier spans] and move itahead, so he could leapfrog his form work. Itwas a very effective method, but was strictlymodern construction type, which was strange tothe Iraqis.

There were a number of other elementsin the design which were different to me which I

292


reserved judgment on until I became moreexperienced and familiar with it, and found thatthey were effective, although literally it was notwhat I was accustomed to.

I reported back to the DevelopmentBoard the results of my first examination, and Ipointed out there were a number of things whichI felt we should discuss with the consultingengineer and the contractor, particularly hismethodology of handling mixing of the concrete,control of the concrete, and the control of his so-called relationship of the water-cement ratio thatI discussed earlier. Because he was utilizing avery sloppy mix. In other words, for ease oftransport and handling, he was using a verysloppy mix with surplus water, which there wasa good deal of wastage going on, of cementwhich was scarce. Because all the cement at thattime was being imported. So I told the Boardthat I would follow up with the contractors andsee if we couldn’t get some control over there,and I mentioned a number of other items which Ithought we could improve upon. Butfundamentally I said that the project seemed tobe going along on schedule.

There was also a similar project going onover on the Euphrates River, which was calledthe Ramadi Barrage, barrage meaning a lowdiversion weir. There were certain elements thathad been previously built of that particularproject. There had been a diversion channelbuilt from the Euphrates River and into the WadiAbu Dibbis, which was similar to but smallerthan the Wadi Tharthar, which I had mentionedearlier. So that also was in the middle ofconstruction.

Ramadi Barrage

About 1957, we were approachingcompletion of both the Ramadi Barrage and theWadi Tharthar flood control project. During

293

Kenneth F. Vernon

1956, it became time to close off the TigrisRiver, in other words, complete the closing bankand divert the river out of its existing channeland into the diversion control structure, whichwas being built that I described earlier. TheConsulting Engineer from Britain came down,and he had requested a meeting with theDevelopment Board to discuss this issue on howto conduct the closing operation of the river. This was one of the ticklish operations when youdecide to divert a river from its existing channelto its diversionary structure.

That year, after having an extreme floodyear in 1954, here we were in 1956, literally adrought year, and the consulting engineer wasconcerned because he felt that the contractorreally didn’t have the capacities around tosupport the effort that would be required to closeoff the Tigris River. The [Development] Boardrequested my reactions. I said, "My reaction isthat we must close it this year because wehappen to be in a very low flow year, and wewould have no guarantee if we put it off anotheryear that we’d have the equivalent low flow,"and this was a very favorable year for closingthe river, and I thought that the DevelopmentBoard ought to authorize the ConsultingEngineer to issue a change order on the contractto provide the contractor with additionalfinancing so he could assemble additionalequipment that would be required, to assembleon an assembly line bit back-up resources ofrock and materials to make the closing bank, sothat once we commenced it would be around-the-clock operation and that the critical time ofwhen you finally close off the flow, everythingwas in order, and ready and available, we[wouldn’t] didn’t have to wait for anyproduction, but it was already there and thecontractor could have the material and theequipment all organized and a continuous

294


operation could be conducted to ultimately closeoff the river.

The Board agreed with me andauthorized the Consulting Engineer [by] to adecision to make a change order on the basiccontract with the contractor, negotiate thechange order to let him do the things that I hadsuggested. It worked out very well.

I had an interesting experience. I wasvisiting the project during the time [of] thisactivity of closing the river off, and I was at theResident Engineer’s house, enjoying lunch withhe and his wife. His dining room was such thatyou could look out over the scene of the work,because he was up on a bluff above the riverwhere he could sit on his veranda and watchwhat was going on. They had completed theclosure of the river and were rapidly building upthe body of the [closing] embankment, and at thesame time the contractor was constructing awave deflector structure along the crest of theembankment, the facing of the embankmentupon which the water would rest.

All of a sudden, I saw a tremendouscloud of dust arise off the work site. I thought,my God, there’s been an explosion. So I said tothe Resident Engineer, "We’d better get downthere and see what’s happened."

Well, what happened is that theconstruction operation had been going on sorapidly that air had been entrapped within theembankment and was being closed off by thiswave deflector structure, and that finally thepressure built up to the point where there was anactual explosion and this entrapped air sought itsrelease. The minute I saw what had happened, Isaid, "Yes, this happens. We call it porepressure in the building of an earth-fill dam.

Explosion at the RamadiBarrage caused by porepressure

295

Kenneth F. Vernon

You have to be very careful on your rate ofcompaction, the rate of water, the amount ofwater that you introduce to the embankment andthe rate of embankment, because there is a build-up of what we call pore pressure or entrapped airin the interstices of the material going into thedam."

[That] What happened at Fort Peck,when Fort Peck was being built, Fort Peck wasbuilt by hydraulic dredgers, the embankment atFort Peck. They actually had a great sloughingout of the downstream face of the dam through abuild-up of pore pressures in the embankmentmaterial that was being dumped by these verylarge dredgers. So it actually generates a largeoverpressure within the structure. I justhappened to watch the release of that pressure.

So when I was involved with theconstruction of the Beas Dam in India and wasinvolved in the redesign of that, I was veryconcerned about the rate of construction and theability of construction to close off the BeasRiver. And again it was an earth and rock filleddam.

Beas Dam, India

[We were also constructing the DokanDam on the Lesser Zab River up in themountains of Kurdistan. Dokan Dam was acurved arch gravity section dam about 500 feethigh, very similar to Bureau of Reclamationdesigns. The dam was located in a dolomiticlimestone formation which had numerouscaverns, so reservoir leakage was anticipated. The construction contractor was a French firmsupported by a number of Frenchsubcontractors.]

Dokan Dam, Kurdistan

[Extensive curtain grouting was extendedout on each abutment from the dam site. Asconstruction was winding down and the grouting

296


sub-contractor was preparing to remove hisequipment, I went to the Development Boardand asked for authority to enter into anagreement with the sub-contractor to leave someof his equipment on-site because I anticipatedthat we might not have located all the caverns.]

[I was later told by the ConsultingEngineer that after the reservoir was filled alarge leak, about 10cumecs, 350 second feet,developed and my foresight in having theequipment left at the site proved to be veryuseful. By that time I was working in Pakistan.]

I think that’s a pretty good place for us tostop for today.

Storey: Okay. Good. Let me ask you whether or notresearchers can use the tapes and resultingtranscripts from this.

Vernon: I’m glad to make this available to anybody thatfinds it interesting.


END SIDE I, TAPE 5. APRIL 26, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. APRIL 27, 1995.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, Senior Historian of theBureau of Reclamation, interviewing Kenneth F.Vernon at his home in Fullerton, California, onApril the 27th, 1995, at about 8:30 in themorning. This is tape one.

Vernon: Yesterday I was describing to you theconstruction of the Wadi Tharthar Flood ControlProject. This was a rather major project, a majorconstruction. It consisted of an earth-filled damacross the main bed of the Tigris River, thenlooking downstream, the closing bank on theriver was to the left, then there was a weir-like

297

Kenneth F. Vernon

gated control structure of some twelve tofourteen bays controlled by gates. Then therewas about 200 feet of section between the weirstructure, and then a new side discharge weirstructure of some 18 bays. Of course, the cell onthe weir structure passed the main flow of theriver was somewhat lower in elevation than theside-channel weir discharge, because that was totake the surplus flood flows that we did not wantto pass on down through the river.

As I told you the main channel throughBaghdad was limited to 7,000 cubic meters persecond, and anything above that, we woulddischarge through the flood channels to WadiTharthar. The Tharthar is spelt T-H-A-R-T-H-A-R, one word. [Tape recorder turned off]

Now I should describe the flood controlchannel which led from this control structure tothe Wadi Tharthar, which consisted mainly of adike on the lower side in the channel. On theupper side was up against about a twenty-meterescarpment. So that the channel consistedmainly of the normal ground level plus a dikealong the lower side. In order to improve thealignment of the dike at some places, it wasnecessary to excavate peninsulas, say, of thehigher ground, so that in some places there wasexcavation in the channel bed, which got into amore permeable formation than was in the topsurface of the ground. Also certain places alongthe construction of the dike, excavations hadbeen made on the lower side, on the downstreamside of the dike, so that again there were areaswhere the excavation borrow pits had gotten intothis more permeable foundation.

So in the flood season of 1956, while theproject was not completed, the construction wasnot completed, it was operational. So theDirector General of irrigation, Mr. Anwar-al

298


Hasani, A-N-W-A-R, dash; small A-L, dash; H-A-S-A-N-I, Anwar-al Hasani, came to me andsaid, “You know, I think we ought to test theoperation of the project, including the floodchannel, while the contractors still have all oftheir equipment available, so in case anythingshould show up, they could take care of it.” Because he was concerned that his departmentwould be charged with the overall operation andmaintenance of the project after it wascompleted.

I thought this was a pretty good idea, butI also said, “Well, we'd better not test thechannel full bore, but close the gates on thecontrol channel just enough to raise the forebayto give us a reasonable discharge out through theflood channel.” Is that clear?

Storey: Uh-huh.

Vernon: So that was the plan we adopted in the floodseason on the Tigris River, T-I-G-R-I-S, whicharose in the mountains of Turkey and thenflowed eastward through Iraq and then into thePersian Gulf.

We closed the gates sufficiently to giveus a reasonable discharge. Actually, thefundamental, or the maximum carrying capacityof this flood channel was more than what wewould allow through Baghdad, because it had totake the surplus of the flood waters, whateverthat might be.

Well, it was a good thing we tried thisout, because it soon developed that in these areaswhere there had been the excavation, which gotinto this lower permeable foundation, what wecall boils appeared on the downstream slope andbeyond the downstream side of the dike. Thecontractor, then, having his equipment there,

299

Kenneth F. Vernon

could immediately build up walls, circular walls,around these boils, similar as what happens inthe Mississippi River Valley when dikes start toleak and leakage from the high-side water eitherin on the slope of the dike or beyond. The wayyou control that is to build up retaining walls ofearth or sandbags or whatever to equalize thehydraulic pressure, and then you can undertakecontrol and repair before the dike is washed out.

So we felt that was a successfuloperation, because it showed up in a number ofplaces, and we hadn't realized the extent of thismore permeable layer of material.

Storey: And if I'm understanding, I think a boil is wherewater starts bubbling up, and it looks like a littleboiling area.

Vernon: Yeah. [drawing an illustration.] Like that. Thisdike was constructed – well, here, like this. Whenever they'd take out one of these things,they would borrow it back here and get this –see, maybe there was a nose of earth, a point ofland, or something like that. We didn't want toput great bends in this channel. It wouldimprove the alignment, you see, then you'd haveto excavate here. Now, down under here aboutsome five or six feet or more, there was thismore permeable earth.

In a structure like this, the water level islike that. Say that the hydraulic gradient issomething like this, and what we try to do ismake this slope extend out far enough that thehydraulic gradient never reaches this point,because then you start getting leakage here, andit starts washing out your bank. Or if it gets outbeyond that, the area around here, then it startsboiling up out here, what you do is immediatelyerect a berm or a wall or whatever to equalize[the hydraulic pressure], so that this hydraulic

300


gradient becomes stabilized, and so youcounterbalance the hydraulic pressure. Thisprevents any washout, and you can get in andrepair and do whatever you have to do to repairthat leakage. So that worked out very well onseveral areas that needed correction which wasmade.

Storey: Wadi Tharthar was the location where the waterwas going to go?

Vernon: Yeah. The Wadi Tharthar . . .

Storey: Were they storing water there?

Vernon: No, they hadn't been. No, this was out in themiddle of the desert.

Storey: But were they intending to?

Vernon: Oh, yes. Yes. And, a matter of fact, it shows upon aerial photos in today. I left – I wanted to getinto this a little later, one of the things I wantedto mention.

Storey: Sorry.

Vernon: This same kind of project had been developed onthe Euphrates River, but to a much smallerdegree, and there the water went out into adepression called the Abu Dibbas, capitol A-B-U new capitol D-I-B-B-A-S. The word Abu inArabic means father, Ibn means son, I-B-N, soIbn Saud the King of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud,was the son of Saud. My principal Iraqiassistant, his name was Hassen-al Rufai, R-U-F-A-I. He was also known as Abu Majud or AbuMorad or something like that, meaning he wasthe father of his son Majud. So Abu Dibbasmeant it was the father of something of Dibbas,whatever Dibbas meant, I don't know.

301

Kenneth F. Vernon

But that was such a location that nobodyhad ever figured out how to use the water thatmight be diverted into that during a flood timeand get it back into the Euphrates River. So theWadi Tharthar Flood Control Project wascompleted by the spring of 1957 and wasdedicated. The thing left to be completed was apower station, a hydroelectric power station, butthat was to come along later.

Hydroelectric powerstation on the WadiTharthar Flood ControlProject

So now going back to the generaloperations at the Development Board. One ofthe things I instituted early on in my tenure wasto proceed with comprehensive, what we wouldcall in the United States, Basin-wide planning. While the Development Board had employed theAmerican firm of Tibbetts, Abbot, McCarthy, &Stratton of New York to make a comprehensivesurvey, which it was more or less like a catalogof things people had talked about, with someanalysis, but it was sort of about the same levelas Glenn Sloan's plan for the Missouri Basin. There was an awful of lot work that would berequired to produce basic plans which might bedeveloped.

Developed acomprehensive basin-wide planning program

So I instituted two things. One was acomprehensive hydrologic survey, what wecalled the hydrologic survey of Iraq, and there Iemployed a joint venture of Harza Engineeringof Chicago, H-A-R-Z-A, and Binnie DeaconGourley, a partnership of London, because bothwere active and already active and had forces inIraq. In fact, Binnie's firm was the consultingengineers who designed and was controlling theconstruction of Dokan Dam, D-O-K-A-N, on theLesser Zab River, Z-A-B.

Storey: Could you spell Binnie Deacon?

Vernon: B-I-N-N-I-E; Deacon, D-E-A-C-O-N; Gourley,G-O-U-R-L-E-Y, which later, in its later

302


incarnation just became Binnie & Partners,because some of Binnie's more senior partnerswere either retiring or had died, and so they hadto reformulate their structure under English law,because they could not contain the name of adeceased partner, so it became Binnie &Partners.

When we were setting up this hydrologicstudy, obviously we needed stations out inremote areas which could make a continuousrecord, a hydrologic record. In one of ourcoordinating meetings together with theirrigation directorate, we were concerned with,number one, what kind of equipment could weput out there which could take continuousmeasurements and wouldn't get stolen the firstday and show up in the Souks, “themarketplace.”

The second things was, well, what kindof observers could we employ? Who could weget that would go out to these hinterlands? Because everybody at that time wanted to cometo Baghdad or some center where they felt theycould get the amenities of modern life, becauseout in the hinterlands it was pretty grim.

So one of the English engineers who hadserved a long time in the irrigation directorate inIraq came up with a couple of ideas which weadopted. He said, “Well, we need to havesomebody who knows how to read and write andcan follow an instruction. So, therefore, let's seewhat schoolteachers might be available in thesehinterlands that we could send in the records ofthe gauging stations, and where we can't findschoolteachers, you know, in the school systemin the cities and villages, as the students progressalong the educational path, they become failures,and as they have progressed further in the schoolsystem, they have at least learned to read and

Developing a field staffto read gauging stations

303

Kenneth F. Vernon

write and can understand an instruction, butthey're failures, so they never can find a place insociety that they'll be happy with. But at leastthey'll have the qualifications that we need, andmaybe we can pay them enough to interest themto take on and become an important personage inthe locale as to be an observer of the gaugingstation." And that's the method we adopted.

Some of our more technical brethrenfrom the United States and England wanted togo into radio, continuous radio recording andsending into a central location, but we all fearedthat that equipment would disappear by the firstevening that it was left alone. So we set that up.

Then as a second operation, I had theDevelopment Board employ Tibbetts, Abbot,McCarthy, & Stratton again. That's T-I-B-B-E-T-T-S; Abbot, A-B-B-O-T; McCarthy, M-C-C-A-R-T-H-Y; Stratton, S-T-R-A-T-T-O-N – ofNew York, who was already busy, had forces inIraq, in a comprehensive study of the LowerTigris and Euphrates. There were a number ofvery difficult problems there that needed to be fittogether in some kind of a comprehensiveprogram, not the least of which was about 100kilometers below Baghdad, there was a controlstructure which diverted water out into thehinterlands between the Tigris and EuphratesRivers. But below that, there had developed abig break in the levees along the Tigris River,which poured additional waters out into what'sknown as the marsh area, which had becomeknown to everybody during the [Persian] GulfWar, because that's a group of people live downthere in the marshes.

Also I wanted Tibbetts, Abbot,McCarthy, & Stratton, which was their acronymwas TAMS, T-A-M-S, to study the possibility ofreestablishing navigation on the Tigris River

304


between Basra, which was the port that servicedIraq, and Baghdad, could we reestablish anavigation project. TAMS had access to manyCorps of Engineers people in the United Stateswith navigation experience, so they made astudy on that.

A third element that I introduced, andthis, again, I used Harza Engineering, H-A-R-Z-A, was an economic evaluation of a number ofcompeting projects which were located on theTigris River above the Wadi Tharthar and itsvarious tributaries to the Tigris River, because inthe general ideas of Iraq, a dam had beenproposed on the Greater Zab River.

Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab River wasalready under construction, D-O-K-A-N, but theDevelopment Board had not really consideredgoing into construction on the Greater Zab, butalso there was talk of a dam near Mosul, M-U-S-O-L, the city of Mosul on the Upper Tigris.27

At the same time as we were discussingand describing the Wadi Tharthar Project, theBritish had long thought that as the flood waterswould be impounded in the Wadi Tharthar, in itsgeographic and elevation position, it couldbecome a source of irrigation water to the lower-lying lands between the Tigris and EuphratesRivers south of there, south and east of there. Sothere were also competing demands forirrigation areas along the Tigris and EuphratesRivers, which would require irrigation water. Inother words, how much water would we haveavailable, which was the best way to conservethat water, whether it be in upstream dams orcomplete the Wadi Tharthar diversion systemout of the Wadi Tharthar? And then which ofthe lands below Baghdad and along the Tigrisand Euphrates that ought to be developed.

305

Kenneth F. Vernon

So I instituted a comprehensive study,which Harza undertook, and this was my firstintroduction to the modern age of computers,and that study was not completed by the time Iwas reassigned from Baghdad, but I saw aninitial draft.

While I had Harza doing that study, I hadassigned a study to a Dutch firm, went by theacronym NEDECO, N-E-D-E-C-O, which meantNetherlands Engineering DevelopmentCompany, which was a sort of a Netherlandsgovernment-sponsored organization of acombination of Dutch consulting engineers. Iassigned them the task of what would berequired to make it possible to divert the WadiTharthar water to the lands lying below the WadiTharthar and between the Tigris and EuphratesRiver. So we had this comprehensive studygoing on to evaluate what should be the nextphases of the development of Iraq, beyond thosethat were already started and under way.

That work was proceeding and coming tofruition by 1959 when I was reassigned fromIraq. So I don't really know what the results ofthat study showed, because it was notcompleted, although as I recall, the NEDECOgroup had arrived at some numbers whichlooked like it might be promising and really be acompetitive source of water as opposed to theupstream dams.

I haven't discussed the drainage side ofthe Development Board activities, but throughthis organization NEDECO, the Netherlandsgroup, the Development Board had employed anumber of individual Dutch drainage engineerswhich were set up as a drainage section in theFirst Technical Section, and it was a verycompetent group of drainage engineers. Therehad been one in charge who had gotten a good

Drainage issues in theFirst Technical Sectionof the DevelopmentBoard

306


program started before I arrived, and then histour was over just about the time I arrived, and anew Dutch drainage engineer, a Mr. Peter vander Sluis; small V-A-N; small D-E-R; Sluis,capital S-L-U-I-S. Sluis, in English, it meant asluice, a channel. Peter used to say, “Vernon,you never did know how to pronounce myname.” (laughter) Since he had a verycompetent group that he had working with, Igave him pretty free rein to develop and executethe drainage program. I had charged him withkeeping in very close contact with the IrrigationDirectorate and to utilize the IrrigationDirectorate over there in the Department ofAgriculture, to the greatest extent possible. Sowe had all these activities going in.

Then we come to the revolution of 1958. By this time, the oil revenues were building upvery rapidly, and the Development Board wasmoving ahead full blast on its five basicprograms. I believe it was the morning of eitherJuly 14th or 15th of 1958,28 as I was showeringand shaving, getting ready to go to work, I couldhear a lot of what sounded like gunfire. TheAmerican enclave and embassy was not too faraway from a rather major garrison, stationed forthe protection of Baghdad. So my immediatereaction was, “Gee, the guys are out firing earlythis morning, must be out having an exercise,”when my phone rang, and it turned out to be myDeputy Chief Engineer Hassen al Fufai, F-U-F-A-I, he was my counterpart, said, “Mr. Vernon,don't go downtown today, there's trouble.” andhung up.

Revolution of 1958 inIraq

So I immediately called the embassy andgot hold of the Marine guard. I should add,parenthetically, he did not want to say too much,because obviously my telephone was alwaystapped by the intelligence agencies, because Iwas a foreigner in Iraq, and they wanted to keep

307

Kenneth F. Vernon

track of what the hell I was up to. Because wefound out later they’re all paranoid, you know. So I called the Marine guard and I said, “Pleaseadvise the Ambassador immediately that I'vebeen reliably informed that there was arevolution going on.”

They said, “Well, we understood whatthe hell was happening because there were a lotof trucks and tanks moving down the boulevardin front of the embassy into town.”

So I went over to the embassy later in theday to see what they knew what was going on. [Tape recorder turned off]

So I went over to the embassy to seewhat was going on, and so I decided to take my– there was these truckloads of peons from thefield coming into the center of Baghdad, theywere yelling and screaming and having a greattime, and we found out later that therevolutionaries had gone out into the farms andvillages and gave everybody a quarter dinar,which is about seventy cents, to come on in andhave fun in the center of town, raise hell.

So I immediately called the people I wasresponsible for that were working for me at theDevelopment Board. A couple of them were inisolated far-out locations. And since my wifehad returned to the United States earlier in thespring to attend my oldest son's graduation fromthe University of Colorado, and my youngestson had indicated that he was having troublewith the authorities at the University ofColorado, and had been invited to leave, he wasgoing to join the military on the bounce, whichcaused my wife no calmness, and so she wantedto go home and attend my son's graduation fromthe university and see if she couldn't straightenthe younger son out. So I said, “Go ahead. It's

308


going to be a long hot summer.” It was May. “Go ahead, go on home. Don't come back untilOctober, or later when the weather gets better.” I said, “You know, these summers here arepretty brutal, so enjoy yourself in the States.”

So I had an empty house there, and so Iimmediately told one family to come in, move inwith me immediately, because they were so farout, that if something really happened, therewould be no way of getting to them.

Another man I had there, who I had gotthe Development Board to employ directly undercontract, who had been an ex-New York Timescorrespondent in the Middle East, he was toadvise the Development Board on a publicrelations program, how to inform the populacewhat was happening in the Development Boardand . .


Storey: A New York Times correspondent . . .

Vernon: Because he was to develop a public relations – Ishould say a public information, not relation, apublic information program, which could figurea real pattern of informing the public as to whatwas occurring and happening and developing inthe Development Board activities. He was asingle man, and I forget just exactly where hewas living, but, again, it was in an isolated area,so I had him come and stay, move into myhouse.

That evening, I received a call from ourmission director. Even though I worked in theMinistry and Development Board every day andwas assigned to the mission, our operation'smissions were rationed, so to speak, I was still

309

Kenneth F. Vernon

under the general policy guidance as anAmerican employee. I received a call from themission director, who said, “Ken, don't go towork."

I said, “Oh, why not?”

He says, “It's a matter of recognition.”

I said, “Oh, that's all right, Ben,everybody knows me down there. They'llrecognize me.”

He was very cryptic, he said, “I said,don't go to work.”

So as I hung up the phone, I walked inand I was talking to this correspondence guy,this New York Times guy. I said, “That was avery strange telephone call. I was advised thatnone of us should go to work, because it wasmatter of recognition. What the hell was hetalking about?”

And so he said, “Oh, that's plain. It's amatter of our government isn't recognizing therevolutionary government yet, and, we, asfundamentally Americans, and under the generalpolicy guidance of the American group, we can'tgo to work. We're told to stay home.” Well thatwas, I felt, a grave, and as it developed, it was agrave tactical error. However, we had to followthat up.

So after about a week or so, the embassyhad arranged with the government to allow someplanes to come in and take out all of theAmerican dependents, and send them and putthem up in a Rome, station them all in Rome. Of course, my wife was already in the UnitedStates. But the wife of one of my people, whowas rather garrulous, used to call me up, call up

310


on the phone, and she start to voice her opinionsrather loudly, and I used to have to say, “Chris,for God's sake, shut up.”

She'd say, “Why?”

I'd said, “There's very good reasons. You're saying too much” I'd try to get her toshut up. Then I'd get her alone, and I'd say,“Chris, damn it, you know my phone's tapped. Everything that happens on my phone is listenedto, and you get spouting off on what you thinkabout what's happening here and your lowopinion of these people. We, as Americans here,are diplomatically in a tough spot, so keep yourgoddamned mouth shut.” (laughter)

Well, we had known them, because I hadbrought him over from Billings, Montana, out ofBillings, Montana. He was the man I had doingthis program and scheduling and reporting work. So I finally got her to shut up.

Then, as I say, the embassy had arrangedwith the government to bring in planes to takeall the dependents out, and they sent them toRome. Then they decided that our previousambassador would never be able to work withthe new group of revolutionaries, so he wasreassigned somewhere else, and a newambassador, who had no ties to the oldgovernment, came in, and, hopefully, he couldlearn to work with the revolutionaries.

Shortly after he came in, it was decidedthat our mission director and I would go down tothe new Minister of Development and see ifthere was some way we could get our groupback to work within the Ministry ofDevelopment and reestablish the relationshipsthat we'd had. Well, the first challenge was,“Why did you stay away? Nobody's told you to

311

Kenneth F. Vernon

stay away. All the other people came to work. Why did you people stay away? And if youstayed away, why do you want to come backnow?” So it was a kind of a real standoff therefor a while.

But, anyway, the new governmentgracefully decided that, “Okay, come on back towork. We didn't tell you to go stay away. Comeon back to work.” And so we reported backdowntown.

In the meantime, now, a whole newgroup of people, there was a new minister and anew set of directors general in the Ministry and anew Development Board had been established,because the old members, some of them hadbeen put in jail, some of them were under housearrest, and so on and so on. So the newDevelopment Board decided that no foreignershould hold a position of administrative chargeof any of its sections, of which there wereseveral, and therefore, by appropriate decision,and I have a record of it in my file, theDevelopment Board took a decision that it wasdecided that Mr. Vernon should no longer behead of the First Technical Section, but thatshould be assigned as a consultant to theDirector General of the First Technical Section. Déjà vu all over again, as Yogi Berra said –Billings. (laughter)

But it so happened that I knew the newDirector General. He being Iraqi, was declaredto be Director General. His name wasMohammad Hassan al Jumma, M-O-H-A-M-M-A-D, Mohammad; Hassan, H-A-S-S-A-N; al, A-L, small A-L; Jumma, J-U-M-M-A. I was toldthat he really didn't have a family name, but hehad taken on a family name. Jumma, I was told,meant Friday, and he says he'd been born on aFriday, which was their Sabbath, they accepted

312


that as his family name, but we always knewhim as Mohammad Hassen, and you wouldaddress him as Said Mohammad Hassen. But hewas a graduate of the University of California,and I'd worked with him over in the Directorateof Irrigation and so on, so I knew him well. Wegot along fine.

So then I was set aside as a consultantand gradually our mission, what we called theU.S. Operations Mission, which was basicallyTechnical Assistance Group, was transferred outof Iraq, because it became very difficult for thepeople to work. So it wasn't too long before Ibecame the most senior citizen of the Americancommunity, and as such, a number of thingsdevolved upon me. I had become the President,the first President of the Iraqi-American Society,which had been set up to foster relationshipsbetween the American community and theIraqis. And the embassy was requiring me, ordesired me, let's say, I don't know whether itever was issued an order, but indicated theirdesire for me to keep them apprized as to whatmight be going on within the government that Icould know, which I did regularly. I usuallyreported to the DCM, the Deputy Chief ofMission, which was literally the DeputyAmbassador.

Well, again, I had a number of items thatI thought were worth study, so as this consultantand set aside the daily chores, I made someadditional studies, particularly I'd developed theidea that – I knew that a dam was being built inSyria, and I knew that the Turks wereconsidering a dam on the Euphrates in Turkey. Since these dams would be largely, for a longlong time, devoted to the development of power,their releases would be completely out of phasewith the irrigation requirements in Iraq, becauseIraq had a very highly developed irrigation

313

Kenneth F. Vernon

system along the Euphrates River.

So I went to Mohammad Hassan, andsaid, “Look, I have already instituted somestudies, sent some field crews out to see if therewas a possible location for a dam above theRamadi Barrage and between that and the Syrianborder to act principally as a reregulatingreservoir from these power releases from theupstream dams, and then you can release thatwater on a schedule which fit the irrigationschedule in Iraq."

Studies a reregulatingdam between theRamadi Barrage andSyria

So he said, “Okay, go ahead, that makessense. Go ahead and do it.”

So just before I was ordered to leave andtransferred over to Pakistan, I had completed arough draft of that report, which made it lookvery favorable that such a dam should be built. Ialso said, “I think we ought to have theNEDECO group study, since we've located adam site, if water could be diverted into theWadi Tharthar from the Euphrates as well asfrom the Tigris to see how that would work out." So that study was undertaken, also.

So all of these things were going on, andduring that fall of 1958 and the winter of 1959and spring of 1959, things were very difficult. There is this new group of revolutionaries, theysuspected everybody, and my yard was full ofpolice all the time. As a matter of fact, watchinga documentary one time on what happened inIran after the embassy was attacked in Iran, andthe people had escaped from the embassy andgot protected, got asylum, in the consulate of theCanadian Embassy, and the experiences thatthey went through. I said, “Déjà vu, I wentexactly through that," and I said, “My God, isn'tit a fact, same thing happens.”

By the spring of 1959the situation haddeteriorated

314


So as that spring wore on, it was moreand more difficult to work, and then it hadgotten to the point where the wives were comingback, and Helen was able to come back to thepost in late April of 1959, so I hadn't seen herfrom May of 1958 to April of 1959. So she wasvery busy getting the house reorganized andsaid, “This is a pigsty. Why did you let the boyslet this place run down so?”

I said, “Well, hell, all I was doing wassleeping here, that's all, sleeping and eating here. I wasn't paying any attention to it. I had otherproblems on my mind.” Anyway, she wasgetting the house organized.

In early June, an order came throughfrom Washington for the mission to send Mr.Vernon over to Karachi, Pakistan, to our missionin Karachi, Pakistan, on TDY [temporary duty]. So I went to Mohammad Hassan and told himthat I had received this order, and that I wouldbe going on leave under orders from ourgovernment. Well, he said, “Okay, go ahead.” So then the question was, could I get exit visas. So I had the people I was working with startworking and get me exit visas from thegovernment of Iraq. Well, there seemed to besome problems.

Had difficulty obtainingan exit visa from Iraq

So anyway, the day came that we weresupposed to leave, and I told Helen, I said,“Listen, you're coming with me. I'm not goingto leave you here.”

She said, “Well, I want to stay here. I'vejust gotten here. God, I've been gone a year. Iwant to stay here. You're only going to be gonea couple of weeks. I want to stay here and getthis placed organized.” She liked Baghdad.

Insisted his wife leavewith him

I said, “No way am I going to leave you

315

Kenneth F. Vernon

under this situation here. It's too dangerous. You never know what's going to happen. I don'treally fear, but I'm concerned. I've been livingin it, but to you it will be a real shocker, becauseit's not the same place.”

So at any rate, we appeared at the airport,and I went to the Immigration Control to get mypassport and visas, exit visa, so they handed memine, and I looked at it, and I said, “Where's mywife's?”

“Oh, well, where is your wife?”

“Well, she's right here.”

“She's going with you?”

“Oh, yes, of course she's going with me. I couldn't leave my wife here. Obviously I musttake her with me," etc., etc., etc.

“Oh, well. I see.” So they had to goback and contemplate their navels a while, madesome telephone calls and so on, and ultimatelythey came with her passport with an exit visa. And then I looked at them again, and said, “Butwhere are our reentry visas? We're only goingover there on temporary duty, and so we'll becoming back.”

“Well, why do you want to come back?”

“Well, because my house is there. Allmy goods are there. My car is here. I owe a lotof bills around town that I haven't paid, currentbills, etc., etc.,” gave them a long song anddance, you know.

“Oh, is that so? Well, you know, I'll tellwhat you do. When you get over to Karachi,you go to our embassy over there, and they'll

Upon leaving they wererefused reentry visas

316


give you reentry visas.”

I had been told by my Dutch ChiefEngineer that when he left, he had found out thatthere was a black mark against my name in thebook that said, “La moojude [phonetic],”meaning “No travel.” La, meaning no; moojude,meaning in its translation, travel. La moojude. He said he had a struggle getting out, and intheir contracts with the government, what wascalled a provident fund. In other words, theyput, I think, 10 percent of their salary, or 15percent of their salary into a provident fund,which the government held and matched it withanother 15 percent, so that they couldn't leavebroke. That was an excellent employmentcontract. It had been worked out by the British. It had been widely used, and it was an excellentcontract, personal services contract.

Anyway, he told me, he said, “Look out,Ken, you're going have trouble when it comestime for you to leave, because it took me quite awhile." And he said, “Boy, it looked for a whilelike I wasn't going to be able to get my providentfund,” equivalent to several thousands of dollarsin it.

Finally, I said to the person that seemedto have control of it, I said, “What's it going totake for me to clear my provident fund?”

He said, “It cost me 100 dinars.” Dinarbeing worth $2.80. It cost him three hundredbucks, literally, to clear us on his provident fund,so he managed to get his provident fund out. Since he was an employee under contract to thegovernment, he was able to get his exit visa. Hewasn't interested in a reentry visa, so he left. Heleft a couple of months prior to my leaving.

So in June of 1959, I went over to

317

Kenneth F. Vernon

Karachi, Pakistan, leaving all my worldly goodsin Baghdad. Closing out my Baghdadexperience, I was never able to get a reentry visato reenter to Baghdad, and as my workdeveloped in Pakistan, I ultimately wasreassigned there. I said to my wife, “You know,I'll bet you the day after I'm formally transferredto Pakistan, the offer of a reentry visa will bemade.” Sure enough, after my formal transferhad been made, somehow or other, the grapevineknew that I'd been transferred to Pakistan. Maybe our mission in Pakistan and Baghdad hadinformed the Ministry, I don't know exactly, orthe government, that I'd been transferred. I said,“I'll bet you that the offer of a reentry visa willbe made.” There was never a denial, never anoutright denial, you know, it was always a putoff, a put off, a put off, and then when theycould offer and know I wouldn't accept it, theycould make the offer, see? (laughter)

Ultimately reassigned towork in Pakistan

God, working with the Arabs was reallyan experience. It was a lot of fun working withthe Arabs, because they had a sense of humorvery similar to ours, and you could make a jokeand they'd just laugh like mad. They told mesome of their Arabic jokes which were prettyrich. (laughter)

At any rate, I closed out my house. Aftermy transfer had been made to Karachi, Irequested our mission in Baghdad to pack up allour goods and send them over to Pakistan, whichultimately they did arrive. In the meantime, mywife and I had lived six months out of just twosuitcases, all the clothes we had taken when wewent over there on TDY.

Mission in Baghdad hadto pack up the Vernonhouse and ship thegoods to Pakistan

But I always look back on my Iraqexperience as a very fruitful one. It became verydifficult after the revolution, because theserevolutionaries had to reestablish a whole

318


governmental structure. It was a bunch ofdiscontents and whatnot. They didn't know howto run a government, and they suspectedeverybody of being malcontents and plotters andso on.

So the Communists started moving in. There were Communist cells all through thecountry, and the Communists started moving in,because they had a program. So they startedtaking control of the government, literally, andso it became very, very difficult, because youwere living then under a government which wasgoing under Communist control and all thedisagreeable things we've heard aboutCommunist control were occurring,

My God, the city was under curfew. Igot caught one night, had been over the nineo'clock curfew, and I'd been over playing cardswith a group of people over at one of theirhouse, and was some distance from my house. Ilooked at my watch and said, “Oh, my God, it'sfive minutes to nine, and I'll never make it homebefore the curfew.” So I had a choice ofwhether I would go down the main drives pastthe German Embassy, and around to my house,or whether I'd tried to sneak up a back road andcome into my house from the back. But I forgotabout the Baghdad Pact Headquarters, whichwas a very suspect operation by this new group,particularly the Communists, because that wasjust something that the British and Americanshad set up parallel to NATO. It extended allthrough the Middle East, and Dulles had set upthe SEATO, S-E-T-O [sic.], Southeast AsiaTreaty Organization, so you had this what hecalled the bulwark against Communistexpansion, NATO, Baghdad Pact, SEATO,Southeast Asia. That was a bulwark of nations,a treaty organization that we created to try tostem the expansion of the Communists.

319

Kenneth F. Vernon

Well, at any rate, it was a very difficulttime, and the Communists were moving in, so Ihad told the mission, after I got transferred I toldthem to send my goods over to Pakistan, and thatclosed out my tour, which lasted from November2nd of 1954 to mid-June of 1959. But from July14-15, 1958, through my leaving in June of1959, I was as a consultant to the First TechnicalSection, and living under the very difficultconditions of the revolutionary government.

I happened to see one of my oldcolleagues one day on the street, Doctor Jaleeli,who I mentioned earlier, J-A-L-E-E-L-I, Jaleeli,who was a member of the Development Board,and I said, “Oh, Doctor Jaleeli, how are youkeeping?” That's the way you would ask peoplehow they were. “How are you keeping?”

Well, he says, “I'll tell ya, I'm keepingout of jail.” (laughter) “I'm keeping a lowprofile.”

Another little sidebar on this, there hadbeen a previous Prime Minister, Salah Alswaud[phonetic] – no. At any rate, I can't rememberhis full name. At any rate, his son had been toschool in the United States and then had marriedan American woman and had several children. He came back to Baghdad, and he kept in closetouch with the American community. We'dbecome good friends, and he used to visit meperiodically. One day in the spring of 1959, heshowed up at my house, oh, maybe two or threeo'clock in the mid-afternoon, because in thesummertime you worked from seven to one, andthen you took a siesta and then you beganmoving around again around about five o'clockafter the heat of the day was over.

He showed up, and I thought, “Oh, that'snice, Saud, Saud, come on in, come on Saud,

320


come on in. What will you have? What willyou have?” Well, so we decided to drinkbourbon – not bourbon, but brandy on ice. I hada bunch of Courvoisier, and so we enjoyedourselves with a little brandy over ice, youknow? He, being a Muslim, didn't touch liquor,you understand. (laughter)

Storey: I understand.

Vernon: So we chewed the rag there for most of theafternoon, but he kept watching his watch. Andalong about five or 5:30 he said, “Oh, I've got togo. I must go.”

I go, “Oh, Saud, can't you stay a littlelonger?” You go through this formula, youknow, of protesting anyone leaving, all this andthat. “Oh, must you go now? It's been so nicebeing here,” etc., etc.

“No,” he says, “I must go.”

“Okay.” Well, after he left, I said,“Now, what the hell was that guy up to?” Because I knew he was involved in acounterparty to the revolution because of hisfamily ties. Has a son of an ex-Prime Ministerof the old government, and he being anAmerican and all, he wasn't at all in favor of thisrevolution. So I said, “What the hell is that guyup to?”

Well, it developed that there was acounterrevolution occurring, a counter couprevolution, up in the village of Kirkuk, K-I-R-K-U-K, Kirkuk, and there was some hangingsgoing on up there. I said, “Aha! I know whatSaud was doing, he was creating an alibi. Anybody asked him what he was up to thatafternoon, why, he was visiting with Mr.Vernon, the ex-head of the First Technical

321

Kenneth F. Vernon

Section of the Development Board. Everybodyknows Mr. Vernon. Obviously, I was not upanything at all.” (laughter) He was creating analibi.

Want to break for a minute?

Storey: Sure. [Tape recorder turned off]

Vernon: I wanted to tell you about . . .

Storey: You remembered the name of the Prime Ministerand his son, I believe.

Vernon: Oh, yeah, sure. His name was Solly Jabber, S-A-L-L-Y, or S-O-L-L-Y, or however it mighthave been spelled in Arabic. Jabber, the familyname was Jabber, J-A-B-B-E-R, and the son'sname was Saud, S-A-U-D, Jabber.

The reason Saud Jabber, the son, washaving a problem in making a living, was hisfather was very wealthy, but his mother haddied, the son's mother had died, and the old manhad remarried and, of course, marriage is ofconvenience in the Arab world. There was amatter of financial arrangements, there's amarriage contract, which we call a prenuptialagreement in our terminology, but they verydefinitely have marriage agreements, which Iread before the assembled multitude, before themarriage ceremony. The wife, the new wife,made it very clear that not only did she maintainher family's financial resources, but she claimeda great deal of the father's financial resources,and poor old Saud found himself kind of out inthe cold, whereas he had been raised as arelatively rich man's son and was havingdifficulty keeping his family going.

Another item I want to get into the recordbefore we leave Iraq was in evaluating

Evaluating contractors’bids in Iraq was different

322


contractors' bids, which is completely differentfrom our practice. In the United States, becauseour financial institutions make financing readilyavailable, the method of financing a contract isnot considered in evaluating a contractor's bid. A contractor gets a line of credit from a bank,and the cost of that is cranked into his bid, but itisn't apparent, and also there is usually like . . .

than in the United States

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 2. APRIL 27, 1995.BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE 1. APRIL 27, 1995.


Vernon: In a bid for dam construction, there's a practicein contracting of what we called front-endloading on his bid, in order to get initial cashflow, for example. So that, for instance, costswhich might more properly be allocated to thecost of concrete production, for example, someof those costs would be loaded onto, say,foundation excavation, or some other early itemof construction which had a high likelihood ofoverrunning the stated quantity, which gave thecontractor, then, some initial financing tooperate. It was a practice, but that wasn'tevaluated by the government in terms of the costof money which it would have to borrow to paythose contracts.

However, I found that in foreign affairs,the cost of money was considered in evaluatingcontractors' bids. He had a number of new itemsthat were considered. For example, since thiswas in the world market and many items wouldcome offshore, so to speak, the requirements forforeign exchange in the contractors' bid was animportant item. The question of whetherCustoms would be involved. Now, with theDevelopment Board of Iraq, Customs reallywasn't considered a vital item, because it was

323

Kenneth F. Vernon

another way that the government could transferthe funds from the Development Board, oilrevenues, into other elements of the governmentcosts and expenses, because customs in timespast, eons past, customs was an honored way of,taxation. was an honored way of financinggovernment, levying custom charges on goodstransport.

So in your bidding then, in your biddingdocuments, you'd always set up what kind offunding the contractor thought he would need asto both foreign exchange, the kinds of foreignexchange. For instance, was it British poundsterling? Was it French francs? Was it Germanmarks, or some other currency, or U.S. dollars? And what schedule those costs, those monieswould be required, and also the local currencythat might be required to pay local expenses. Soyou took those into effect, you took those intoconsideration, as well as the total cost of the bid.

Just to show the difference, now, in thispractice, I can recall when I was on the CentralValley Project and Shasta Dam, the contractorsbid Shasta Dam, I pointed out, after my ownanalysis of those bids, that the ostensible low bidwas more costly to the government than theostensible high bid, because the contractor whowas awarded the contract to construct ShastaDam, had front-end loaded his bid, and therewas a high likelihood that those early-on items,particularly dam site foundation excavation, waslikely to overrun. So there would be an “earlyover-payment of costs” to achieve earlyfinancing to the contractor, but the cost of thegovernment would be that those costs whichmight later be more properly charged in whenconcrete was being placed.

Let's just say, for example, a dollar percubic yard of the concrete cost was moved over

324


into the early excavation charges and payments,just to show how it worked. And this mightmean two or three years of borrowing costs bythe government, if borrowing costs were takeninto account. Now, if it had been privatefinancing where bond issues were being issued –this is what gave me the idea of this analysis,was because if it happened to be a private outfitthat had to issue bonds and so on, then the costof that money would be an important item. Butthe government apparently did not figure that thecost of borrowing could or should be taken intoaccount. So I always kept that in mind, evenwhen I was Regional Director in Region VI.

But this was absolutely apparent after Igot into Iraq. Not that it had a shortage offoreign exchange or whatever, but it took intoaccount the way the money was being drawn,because their surplus money was drawinginterest in the Bank of England, so if they had topay it out early, they would lose interest on thatmoney that was being paid out. Another thingwas, at what schedule. For instance, when itwas, say, for example, an equipment item, someform of mechanical equipment such as turbines,generators, high-pressure gauge, or whatever,that obviously had to be manufactured,purchased in Europe, and then transported byship. There had to be a schedule again offoreign exchange requirements. But instead ofgoing to a bank to borrow the money, thecontractor would establish a series of foreignexchange requirements of payments, such as,let's say, a 20 percent down payment of thecontract cost on the signing of the contract incertain foreign exchanges. That permitted himto start operations of buying materials, and, etc.,etc.

Then when the equipment was preparedfor travel, he got another, say, another 20 or 25

325

Kenneth F. Vernon

percent. Then there was another element calledCIF, which meant cargo in freighter, or maybewhich meant it was aboard ship and ready toship, or in the presentation of shippingdocuments, you'd get another progress payment. Or it might be CIP, cargo in port, and it was onport and ready to offload and come ashore. Andthen you made another progress payment whenit was installed, but there was always awithholding, a final withholding, of, say, 10 or15 percent to ensure that the equipment met itsstated specifications, etc., operatingspecifications, and so on.

But this issue of financing, in foreignwork, is very important, which was notimportant in practice in America, becausefinancing was always readily available. Theseelements of foreign exchange were not involvedbecause everything was in dollars and there wasplenty of dollars to go around.

Storey: We've manufactured most of our stuff in theU.S., anyway, didn't we?

Vernon: That's right. And a matter of fact, for a longtime, there was "Buy America," and it becamevery difficult. Because I can recall when I wasin the Commissioner's office, General Electricand Westinghouse had moved into Japaneseindustries immediately after the war, at thebehest of the American government. So then, Ibelieve this came to the forefront with thebidding on generating equipment for, I believe itwas Grand Coulee, and while it was nominallyAmerican bidders, GE or Westinghouse, it wasfundamentally Japanese equipment, and thiscaused the great deal of stress and strain as towhether the bids could be accepted because ofthe “Buy America” Policy. I don't know if itwas policy or actually legality, I'm not quitesure, but any rate, I don't remember how that

326


was resolved, but at least this became an issue.

But with the Iraq Development Board,with its great resources of foreign exchange, itwas no problem, but they wanted to know andtook into account the pattern of flow of moneyin the evaluation of the total contract.

You said you had a question.

Storey: I have a couple, actually. First of all, the IraqDevelopment Board, what was the objective ofthis program? Did they have one?

Vernon: Yes. It was to develop the resources of thecountry. As I said, they had these surplus oilrevenues, but the government had determined tospend seventy percent of the oil revenues inwhat they called a development program. Mysection was devoted to the expansion ofirrigation projects and drainage projects andflood control. In the Second Technical Sectionwas communications. There was highways,telecommunications, railroads, ports. In otherwords, and then there was the Third Section, wasindustry. There was a spinning and weavingmill being built. There was a sugar mill toprocess beet sugar, was being built, and therewere other projects, which, since I wasn'tworking with the Third Section, I didn't know allthat was going on, but I happen to rememberthose particular items. And that was beingheaded up by a French industrial engineer underpersonal contract to the Board.

The various sections inIraq’s DevelopmentBoard

One of my men on my group I broughtover from the Central Valley Project inCalifornia, was working in the IndustrialSection, Third Section, fuel-fired plantsgenerating electricity. I handled the hydro endof it, and the Third Section was handling thefuel-fired as an industrial project, and so they

327

Kenneth F. Vernon

were using oil-fired plants, and there was onebuilt in Baghdad and there were a number beingbuilt around the country. Oliver was working onan integrated transmission system to integratethese plants together, just as we did in theMissouri Basin, and he had been power managerin Region II, so he was well qualified to do thiswork. I ultimately brought him over to Pakistan,too.

At any rate, the Fourth Technical Sectionwas agricultural development. I don't recallwhether the Fourth Technical – that was cropimprovements, crop practices, everything relatedto the improvement of crops. A number of theIraqi, young Iraqis, had been to the States andwere acquainted with our County AgentDevelopment Program, and so they wereinstituting the same kind of a thing. There was acouple of agricultural colleges and so on. As amatter of fact, they started a beef project there,which prior to this, about the main source ofmeat, protein and meat, was goats or sheep andwater buffalo. The thing about eating waterbuffalo, it's great when it's steaming hot, but theminute it got a little bit cool, your mouth got justabout a quarter-inch layer of tallow fat that youjust could not get off the roof of your mouth. (laughter) So these boys out at the AggieColleges had been to school in Texas, and sothey were instituting a beef-feeding program,and before I left Baghdad and before therevolution, actually you could buy a T-bonesteak in the market, a good T-bone steak in themarket.

So then the Fifth Technical Section wassocial development, refugee housing. A lot ofpeople had come off the villages and the farmsto move into the cities. So they felt that thechildren had a better chance of getting aneducation, even though they lived in great

328


squalor and so on. They felt that their childrenhad a better opportunity for education and othersocial programs.

For instance, at one of my home leaves, Ihad been deputed by the Development Board tofind a new Chief Engineer for the SecondTechnical Section. I had utilized one of theconsultants, his headquarters were in Newark,New Jersey, to advertise and review applicationsand to weed out. Then I visited him on my wayback to Baghdad. I visited him and interviewedthe candidates which he felt were most likelythat the Development Board could use. Iremember I ultimately recommended agentleman who had a great deal of experience inhighway construction for the state of – I think itwas the state of New York.

Asked to find anengineer to head theSecond TechnicalSection

At any rate, it turned out that his wifewas, shall we say, a power, I'm not exactly whather level was, but it was in the Ladies GarmentUnion in New York. So when she came toBaghdad, there was an American ex-PrimeMinister's wife, who was interested in theimprovement of ladies' welfare and particularlyinstituting a garment industry. So this lady, thewife of this man I brought over from New York,she immediately tied in with this ex-PrimeMinister's wife and became very strong indeveloping improvement of ladies' welfarethrough the institute of a garment productionprogram. That was the part of their socialdevelopment.

Then there was, as I said, refugeehousing, there was a school program and anumber of other activities which I wouldn’t befamiliar with – but the point was that the thrustwas to not just spend those excess revenues. You said what was the objective. It was not tojust spend those revenues for “armaments” or in

The thrust was to spendoil revenues fordevelopment of Iraq

After the revolution, the

329

Kenneth F. Vernon

the gambling houses in Beirut, such as theSaudis did, but to intelligently pour thoserevenues into development and better theeconomic conditions in the country, and it wentto hell in six months after the revolution.

development programfell apart

Storey: What kind of an administration was it before therevolution?

Vernon: Well, it was primarily based on the Englishsystem. There was a young king whose fatherhad been the original king, but he had been“killed” in an untimely automobile accident.

Prior to the revolution in1958 government in Iraqwas based on theEnglish system

Storey: The son or the father?

Vernon: The father, who was a brother or a cousin of theKing of Jordan. They were members of thesame family. So then this child, when his fatherwas killed, became, well, I guess the princeregent, or whatever you might call it, prince-in-waiting and king-in-waiting, or whatever. Andhis uncle, a brother of the former king, wasdeclared the regent.

So when I got there in 1954, I think theyoung king had reached his majority, and I thinkthey had gone through his coronation. The unclestill was active in government and so on, but hewas no longer the power, but a senior advisor tothis young king. Then the rest of thegovernment was strictly patterned after theBritish system. There was a Prime Minister anda Council of Ministers, which were membersdrawn from the Prime Minister's party headingup the ministers. Then in the operation of theministries there were several directoratesgeneral, such as we would call bureaus. Therewas a directorate general always ofadministration, which in the British systemwould be the First Secretary. And in the Britishsystem that First Secretary really holds the

330


power, administrative power, in the ministry.

Storey: That's the civil service person?

Vernon: He's the senior civil servant, and he actuallyholds the power of life and death, almost. Hegoes to the Minister and says, “Sir, it's myunderstanding your policy is thus and so,”always giving the Minister the opportunity fordiplomatic denial, “Oh, yes, that's correct, that'sthe governments policy,” or, “No, unfortunately,you misunderstood the government's policy, it'sthus and so.” And then the Chief Secretary orthe DG of the Diwan would then enunciate suchorders that were necessary to carry out theMinister's policy. Then the Director Generalswere the equivalent of our Commissioners andso on, to head up various departments, such asthere was the Director General of Irrigation inthe Ministry of Agriculture. There was theDirector General of this and that and so on. There was a Director General over the Ministryof Public Works of this and that, who I had todeal with regularly.

Then there was the Lord Mayor of thecity of Baghdad, and he headed up a cityadministration. But these guys were all part ofthe Prime Minister's political group. Nuri-asSaid, Nuri, N-U-R-I; small A-S; capital S-A-I-D,Nuri as Said was known as the Fox of theDesert, and he was the principal Prime Ministerof the Iraq government. Periodically he'd decidethat he needed a rest, so then he would have theKing appoint a new Prime Minister and usuallythen there would be a general game of musicalchairs among the ministers, the Council ofMinisters, and a new Minister of Developmentmight show up. The old minister might comeback or it might be a new minister.

Then there was the Parliament, and the

331

Kenneth F. Vernon

Parliament operated just as the House ofParliament. There was not a House of Lords,but I believe they called it a Senate. I think theycalled them senators, as I recall. Then there wasthe Lower House, which was composed ofvarious representatives.

Now, the form of government facingbeyond the central government, there were theMutasarriffs, M-U-T-A-S-A-R-R-I-F-F. Thiswas a Turkish term and it was carried over fromthe old Turkish administration days. Thecountry was divided into liwas, L-I-W-A-S. This was equivalent to our States. So then youhad a Mutasarriff, who was the Governor of theliwa, and he had also a full complement ofsupporting government to support him, patternedafter the central government.

Then in the liwas, I forget what theycalled this lower units now, but it would beequivalent of our counties, but he was headed bya Kaimerkahn, and I believe that was spelled K-A-I-M-E-R-K-A-H-N , but he would be theequivalent of the Executive Officer of thecounty, under the Mutasarriff. That was thestructure of the formal government.

Unfortunately, there was another shadowgovernment within the country, which was thetribal sheikhs, S-H-E-I-K-H. These were theheads of the tribes, and they had the power oflife and death over the tribes. So there wasalways a dichotomy going on within the countrythat central government was trying toaccomplish certain things, and some of the moreenlightened sheikhs were cooperating, and manyof them were members of the Senate. But therewere also some that were not so enlightened,shall we say, and they were resisting efforts ofthe government, because they felt that thegovernment's, the central government's effort

There was a shadowgovernment in thecountry, the tribalsystem

332


was encroaching upon their prerogatives asheads of their tribes.

Now, the good sheikhs were the goodfather of their tribes. They had their--I'veforgotten the Arabic term, but literally they weretheir foreman, and they told the fellahin, F-E-L-L-L-A-H-I-N, fellahin, which is equivalent ofthe peon in Mexico, what to do, who wouldfarms what plot of ground, when it was time toplow, when and what was to be planted, whenand what was to be irrigated, when and what wasto be harvested.

Then the harvest was divided betweenthe sheikh and the fellahin, individuals,according to their rules of division, the theorybeing that the sheikh had two responsibilities. One, of course, was to provide for himself, andthe other was to provide what we called one timeduring the Depression the ever-full granary. Inother words, he was to store his part of his sharefor seed for the next year, and to provide a storeof food in case there were shortages during thenext year.

This system worked to a certain degree,quite well. If it was an enlightened sheikh andhe was serious about his responsibilities, andmany of them were, the tribes were very wellmanaged that way. Others were not so wellmanaged. My sons told me one time, that ayoung Arab took them for a weekend stay out toa village, and they were amazed at the obviouscruelty that was visited upon the fellahin by thesheikh and his family, and that it was obviousthat there was no respect for life or limb by thisupper echelon. They said they were reallyamazed and shocked. That was not the rule, butthat did happen.

Storey: You mentioned when you moved to Baghdad,

333

Kenneth F. Vernon

moving into a hotel for a period of time, then thenext thing I know you're in a house. Tell meabout living accommodations, and how youfound it and where it was, and how it was set upand all of that.

Vernon: Well, it was very interesting.

Storey: And what the lifestyle was.

Vernon: As I said, I stayed with this American family forabout two months. I felt it was a good idea. Itgave me a chance to get accustomed to this newculture. I was in a sort of a familiarenvironment, home environment. It gave me anopportunity. I didn't have the responsibility ofmanaging a household. It gave me anopportunity to spend a lot time studying, becausehere I was, I was dumped into a strange place,all strange names, and all the rest of it, so I hadto spend a good deal of time finding out whatwas going on.

Finding a house, livingconditions, and lifestylein Iraq

So after about two months, I thought,"Well, now, look. It's about time for me to strikeout on my own." Of course, my family was stillin the States, because this time it was about –just after Christmas or something like that. So Itold Mr. Murphy, I thanked him very much forputting me up. I'd been paying him rent and soon, even though he was – well, I'll get into that alittle later. But I thanked him very much, and Icertainly appreciated – enjoyed living with himand his family and so on.

So I moved into a hotel downtown. Well, now, it wasn't the Hilton. There werethree main hotels downtown at that time whichforeigners used. There was the Sindabad, whichI moved into. There was the Semiramis, S-E-M-I-R – I can spell it this way, Semi-ramis, S-E-M-I-R-A-M-I-S, it's pronounced "Semeris," which

334


is very similar to the Sindabad. Then there wasalso another hotel called the Hotel Zia, Z-I-A. Alot of people liked the Zia hotel, because it wasrun by a Michael Zia, who was a Christian. Matter of fact, I think all the hotels were run byChristians. I think they were run by AssyrianChristians.

But, Michael Zia was a great raconteur,and a lot of people liked him, and he liked theAmericans, so he treated them pretty well. I canrecall, after my wife had come there, one nightwe were invited to dinner and Michael was thehost, and he was telling one of his famous storiesthat he had a bartender whose name was Jesus. A British lord was visiting, and Michael washosting a dinner for this British lord, and soMichael in his loud raucous voice roared out,“Jesus, bring the lord a drink!” (laughter) Butpoor ole Mike drank himself to death. He justcouldn't leave a bottle alone.

At any rate, I moved into the SindabadHotel, and I enjoyed that stay there because itgave me an opportunity now to rub elbows withreally a cosmopolitan group of people, becausethis commercial interest was growing veryrapidly now, foreign commercial interest wasgrowing very, very rapidly in Baghdad, and theSindabad happened to be a sort of a headquartersfor a lot of the commercial, foreign commercialinterests that come to town.

So in the late afternoon and evening,we'd sit around out in the garden and chitchatand so on. I became familiar with a lot ofdifferent people of different backgrounds, whichI found was very valuable. At the same time, Ifound that there was quite a social activity goingon, evening social activity, which usually washeaded by a cocktail party and then you went onsomewhere else to dinner. Now, one thing I

335

Kenneth F. Vernon

learned early was that a cocktail party in thatenvironment was not as we know a cocktailparty where people drink to get drunk. Youwould walk around all evening with a glass inyour hand and maybe have, over a period of acouple of hours, not more than two drinks, butyou were working, you were on the alert all thetime, because you were being pumped and youwere pumping others as to what some things youmight want to know, and you had to very carefulthat you didn't say what shouldn't be said,because they pumping to find out. Then youwould go on to dinner.

One night before the revolution, I had tomake an appearance at three cocktail . . .

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2. APRIL 27, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. APRIL 27, 1995.

Vernon: You were invited and you had to make anappearance. Now, one of Parkinson's law is, youcan tell the hierarchy of the visitors invited to aparty – you understand Parkinson's law?

Storey: No, I don't.

Vernon: Well, he was a British wag. and one of his lawswas that expenditures always rise to meetbudget, rise to exceed budget, that the staffalways rises to equal or exceed workload, or youcan tell the hierarchy of the invitees to a functionas to who arrives last and leaves first. (laughter) He even gets with an ambassador who meets thehost, makes a small circle around the room, andimmediately exits, and so he arrives last andleaves first. So you have this extracurricularactivity going on all the time.

So I found myself – Jesus, and one thethings that was also difficult was when you wereinvited to dinner, usually you sat around. The

336


Iraqi fashion was very similar to the Spanishpractice. You'd sit around all evening 'til theywere sure everybody had arrived, and you mighteat dinner about eleven o'clock, then you atedinner, and then you went home. And here youwere at about midnight loaded up food anddrink, and had to get up early the next morningand go to work. It was a really a terrificenvironment.

Well, then we get to the housing. Now,the housing had not become modern by anymeans. Fundamentally, the houses were of aTurkish pattern, where they were a Muslimpattern, where there were basically two livingrooms, because in an Iraqi society, the mengathered in one living room and the women weresegregated, what women attended, sat separatedin another living room.

Then in the back of the house there werea number of bedrooms, you might have anupstairs, but basically the houses were one story,and they had flat roofs. Because in the old daysbefore the advent of adequate electric power andair-conditioning, it was the custom to sleep outof doors on the roofs, in the open. So there werethese flat roofs, and with parapet walls aroundthem, and that so that you can hang your laundryout there and also in the summertime you couldsleep on the roof. Unfortunately, those damnroofs were not waterproof, and so you had aproblem with the construction. These houseswere probably kiln-dried, K-I-L-N, kiln-dried,clay brick, but not hard burned, or they mighteven be just sun-dried adobe brick covered withplaster. So if there had not been a good waterseal developed at the base of a wall, because ofthe texture of the soil and the high groundwatertable in the Baghdad area, you would getcapillary rise within the wall, and the first thingyou know, the wall, for the first four or five feet,

337

Kenneth F. Vernon

might disintegrate.

Now, these rooms had ceilings usuallyabout twelve feet. They did very well. Theycooled well in the summertime and they cooledwell in the wintertime, if you understand whatI'm saying. Because, God, you just couldn't heatthe damn things. And in the old days, all theyhad was fireplaces. They also had this problemwith this leaky roof, so that the type of roofstructure was – for instance, these beams thatyou see up there would be maybe two feet apart,but they would be made of steel I-beams, andthen there would be a small brick arch laid inthere, which would support the roof, and thenthat would be plastered over, so that you hadthen a series of small looping arches across theceiling of the room. But there would be then aninsulation layer of maybe a foot of earth abovethat little arch, over which then was placed sometile, and the seal material between the pieces oftile would leak in the heavy rainstorms in thewintertime, and this earth material, insulationlayer, would become saturated. Then, againthrough capillary attraction, the water wouldleak through these brick and so then your ceilingwould start to disintegrate, and it would comedown the side walls.

So in the older houses, you had thisdisintegration of the walls coming up from thebottom and you had disintegration of the wallscoming from the top, which required that everyso often, they had to get in to repair the bloodythings.

Then, you get into the kitchens. Now,the kitchens were something that the women justabsolutely – our American women absolutelywere horrified. Many of them might have asink, and they would have a water tap. Baghdadhad a good water supply. The British had built a

338


good water supply for Baghdad, but they mightonly have a water tap in some of the Iraqis'homes, and those that were made for theforeigners probably had some form of a sink.

The cooks would prepare their food onthe floor. If they didn't have a workboard, they'dprepare it on the floor of the sink, on the floor ofthe kitchen.

Before my family came over, one of mymen was ready for home leave, and so he said tome, “Why don't you come out and babysit,housesit my house while I'm on leave and you'regetting ready for your family to come over, andit will give you a chance to see what living in ahouse is like, and you'll have the time to lookaround. Maybe you can find something that youcan consider for your family.”

So I said, “Sure, that makes a lot ofsense.” So I moved into his house, oh, maybe inMay or June of 1955. My family was due tocome after school ceased in the States, and theywould arrive sometime in mid-July. So I waslooking around at houses, and it turned out thatthere was a house not too far away from that,and it was not too far away from the AmericanEmbassy, which was a good location. It sohappened that this house had been built by aguy, an Iraqi, who had been to America, and sohe had hired an architect to work in somenotions of American amenities, so it was rather anice house.

Now, it sat well back from the street. Our front, what they called garden, would be ourfront lawn, our front garden was some 80 to 100feet back from the street, all enclosed in a wall. We had a party for 150 people there and weren'tcrowded. It had the two living rooms. It had anice dinning room with a nice built-in cupboard

339

Kenneth F. Vernon

in the dining room. There were some nice built-in cupboards elsewhere in the house that hadthree bedrooms downstairs. There was anupstairs that had a bedroom and bath, largeroom, bath, upstairs, and then there was thisbroad expanse of roof. The kitchen was aseparate kitchen much like our colonial houses. There was a breezeway between the kitchen andthe rest of the house. So I had that enclosed witha screen and made a runway across there, so thatfood being carried from the kitchen to the housewasn't exposed to flies and that sort of thing.

The kitchen was much like this modernkitchen you see here. There were cupboards,there was a proper sink, there was what we'vecalled a godown, which we would call a pantry,but it was an enclosed room which had shelvingin it, because you'd send off an order to theStates or Europe or wherever for supplies, andyou'd get six months' or three months' supplies ata time, you see, because it wouldn't be availableon the local market.

Also in that house there was onebathroom downstairs, one main bathroomdownstairs, that served the bedrooms. Therewas one little powder room off the entryhallway. Upstairs there was this big bath upthere, which we used as a laundry room, and I’dhad some clotheslines erected up on the roof,because we didn't need to sleep on the roof, so Ihad some clotheslines erected up there. So I hadthe house crew, when they did laundry, hang theclothing out there on the roof.

Again, on the roof, there was a watertank, because while there was an adequatesupply of water, of good-quality water inBaghdad, in order to get pressure in the house,your water would be delivered to a cistern in theground, and then you had a pumping system

340


which would pump the water up to this cisternup on top of the house, water tank on top of thehouse, which provided the water in the house. But also during the summertime, this water tankwould be heated by the sun, so that also gaveyou your hot water, much of your hot water forbathing.

So I found this house, it was not too far,so I thought, "I think this will suit Helen, besthouse I've seen around," and so when theyarrived, I was still living in Harold Miller'shouse. I showed her some of the other houses,you understand, and then I showed her thehouse. I said, “Now, I think that this housemaybe will do. What do you think?”

Well, she said, “I can see it's the besthouse you've shown me.”

When we moved to Billings, she lookedat, she said, sixty houses before she found onethat she would accept. She said, “I looked ateverything that was vacant in the city." Wefinally took one that was being constructed sowe could work some ideas into it, because Helenwas a very particular housekeeper. That wasone of her joys, was keeping an immaculatehouse. She wasn't a club woman, so to speak.

At any rate, then, we moved into whatwas known as the Pierce House, because GeorgePierce, who had preceded me in Baghdad, hehad been working over in the Third TechnicalSection, an American, he had vacated the house,his house was vacant, and he was back in theStates, and so we took on the Pierce House.

The way housing was handled, wereceived a housing allowance, and my rank gaveme $2,000 dinar housing allowance, which, at$2.8 dollars to the dinar, was roughly $5,500.

341

Kenneth F. Vernon

Now, it was up to you to negotiate your owncontract with the householder. Some of the lessastute members of the American communitywere paying through the nose. In other words,their housing allowance was gone before theywalked through the door, because the AmericanEmbassy did have an Iraqi Housing Advisor,shall we say. His function was to know whichhouses were available. I'm also sure he let hiscolleagues, Iraqi colleagues, know as to what aperson's housing allowance was, but you had todo your own negotiating.

So this Iraqi that owned the PierceHouse, Vadget, V-A-D-G-E-T, Vadget Ayer, A-Y-E-R, he was a Christian, and he'd been toAmerica, and he had this nice house, so he and Inegotiated. Well, I managed to negotiate him ayear lease on the house for less than my housingallowance, because I'd been working enoughwith the Iraqis, I knew the game and the gambit,you know, and you go through a negotiation, andif you don't negotiate, their feeling is, if youcan't hold your own, you don't deserve it. (laughter) At any rate, I got my house for lessthan my housing allowance. So then theembassy would pay the – I didn't get that money,it was just an allowance which was credited tomy account.

We also got a hardship allowance, whichwe had our base foreign-service salary. I thinkBaghdad at that time was classified as a 15percent post, so we got a 15 percent hardshipallowance in dollars, which would take care ofall the extra costs that were involved in livingoverseas and so on, as opposed to your statesidesalary, which was the normal Foreign Serviceschedule, and this varied between posts. Forinstance, it might be a very nice post, but,hellishly expensive like Paris, or it might besome God-forsaken out-of-the-way place that

342


they couldn't get anybody to go to, unless it wasat least a 25 percent post, and so on. So somepeople would opt for the real hardship postbecause it gave them money in the bank,because they couldn't have anyplace to spend it. Others would enjoy going to a post which hadno hardship, really a low hardship allowance,because it was a much more cosmopolitan place.

So we moved into this house, and we'regoing along very nicely. Come time one yearthings were going great guns in Iraq, and it wastime to renegotiate my yearly lease. So Vadgetcalled me and said, “Mr. Vernon, I'd like tocome over and visit with you.”

And I said, “Fine. Please do. Come overto the house about four o'clock in the afternoon. I'll be pleased to see you." You were alwaysvery polite and so on, very effusive in that.

So he came. Helen offered him – youalways began a visit offering them something,coffee, tea, a soft drink, but never liquor, unlessyou knew them very well, but you alwaysoffered them something. So she offered him asoft drink, he took it, so then we couldcommence our conversations after we had gonethrough the formula, the formula, youunderstand. He said, “Well, Mr. Vernon, yourlease is up, and I need to talk to you about nextyear.”

And I said, “Yes, I figured that'sprobably time, Vadget, yes, indeed. What's onyour mind?”

Well, he said, “I think I'm going to haveto have some more money.”

“Oh,” I said, “Vadget, I'm so disturbed

343

Kenneth F. Vernon

that you said that.” I said, “God, I'm in a terriblesituation. I've got two sons in the university,which is just killing me. My wife wants to goback to the States, and that's going to have to beat my expense,” and I just dredged up a hell of alot of things that just really put me into the rack.

He sat there with kind of a sly grin, youknow, and finally he said, “Well, Mr. Vernon,I'm in a spot. All my friends are gettingincreases in their leases. Don't you think youcould do something for me?”

“Oh,” I said, “Vadget, oh, oh, mygoodness, I didn't realize that. Well, listen,maybe we could work out something there.” And so I think we agreed on giving him a 10percent raise. I think we raised it to 2,200 dinarsor something like that, or whatever, a 10 percentincrease.

He was happy. “Oh,” he says, “now Ican tell my friends I got an increase. I don'thave to tell them how much, but I can also tellthem I also got an increase, too, out of that sonof a bitch Vernon.” (laughter) He was happy. Iwas happy. I thought he'd get over my housingallowance, and I'd have to paying through thenose. (laughter) So does that explain thehousing to you?

Storey: Yeah. Tell me about the house crew.

Vernon: Well, in Iraq the Arabs were pretty good. Youhad difficulty sometimes. But basically westarted out with a cook and what was called abearer. The cook did the cooking, and if youtrusted him, he could do the shopping. But thebearer was sort of a butler, he was the houseboy. In Pakistan, we called him a bearer, but inBaghdad, he was called a houseboy, and he tookcare of the house and served the meals and that

344


sort of thing.

We also had a laundry person come in,who did the laundry. We had Amali,[phonetic], who was the gardener, took care ofthe garden. And at later times, we had what wascalled a cook bearer, because Helen managed toget a pretty good one, and he was fairlyintelligent, so we just had the one. He did thecooking and the work around the house.

So some people were very lucky. Iknow there was one family who got a real sharphouseman, and we used to hire him to manageour parties, so he started a business doing that. He was really sharp. The thing that you had towatch was their sanitary conditions and habitswere not always very good, and you sort of hadto watch and make sure that things were beingkept clean in the kitchen.

I didn't describe one of the things, whichin this housing there was always provided in theback of the plot, quarters for the house crew ifthey wanted it. Some of them were married out,and so they would go home after dinner, go totheir home and be there before breakfast in themorning. Others might live in the providedhouse quarters.

The toilet facilities for the Arabs was ofthe Turkish style, which is basically what wealways called a bomb site in the floor. I don'tknow whether you're familiar with the Turkishtoot [phonetic]?

Storey: No.

Vernon: Well, it's fundamentally a toilet bowl sunk in thefloor, and it's got the trap in it, so it traps thegases and so on. But the methodology employedby the Iraqis and others in the Middle East is

345

Kenneth F. Vernon

that they don't sit on a toilet. They squat overthis bomb site on the floor. And they feel thatthat's much more sanitary. And then they don'tuse toilet paper, they employ water in the lefthand, so that it's a custom in the Middle East thatyou don't touch a person's left hand, you shakehands with your right hand, nor does he touch,theoretically, any cooking thing or anything likethat with his left hand, because that's reservedfor wiping himself and washing off his privateparts. You provided a towel and a jug of waterin their facilities so they can wash themselvesafter a bowel movement or whatever.

So you had to be very careful about that,make sure that your house crew observed thesanity rules, like you see in today's restroomswhere there's a high rate of Mexicanemployment, “All employees must their washtheir hands after using the restroom,” you had tomake sure that they observed those sanitaryrules.

I can remember one time, I was inAnkara, and I was in a hotel in Ankara, and therewas a very ornate Turkish toot. It was about ayard square, tiled, porcelain tiled area with a rimaround it, and in the middle, of course, was thetrap. But there were a couple of foot pads outthere, so you stood or squatted on those footpads raised above the elevation of this tiled area,because when you flushed, the water wouldwash out the whole area, you see, so yousquatted on these foot pads, so you're up abovethe level of the water, and after you've had a fewbeers, or whatever, you weren't quite surewhether you could manage that. (laughter) Okay.

Storey: Let's see, one last thing. Were there any Bureauof Reclamation staff working in Iraq that werestill Bureau of Reclamation staff?

346


Vernon: Yes. There was a whole team over in theMinistry of Agriculture. I'd forgotten, I thinkthere were six or eight people over there, whichthey stayed essentially as American employees,were not under loan to the Iraqi government. They were “advisors” to the Directors ofIrrigation as . . .

Storey: That was the Fourth Directorate or the FirstDirectorate?

Vernon: No, no, this was over in the Ministry ofAgriculture. The Directorate of Irrigation wasover in the Ministry of Agriculture. They werecompletely separate from me, and they had ahead of their division in our mission, and theymaintained their offices in the mission. So theywere not like me, attached to the mission forrations, so to speak; they were a part of ourmission, and they felt that they were a part of theU-S-O-M mission. They would sometimes beworking in the Ministry of Agriculture in theDirectorate of Irrigation, or they might go outinto the field, or do the work directly in someoffice.

I would keep in close touch with them,because I knew most of them. Fred Locher, whowas the head of that group when I first arrivedthere, L-O-C-H-E-R, Fred Locher, had been theFirst District Engineer that I assigned up toGreat Falls District Office. He had been part ofthe group at Billings, and then I assigned him asFirst District Engineer up in Great Falls, and hehad come over there to Baghdad, along with Mr.Nelson in 1952.

They were having difficulties working asadvisors, because you could give your advice,you never knew whether it was going to beaccepted, and they had no way of enforcing theacceptance of it. It was a matter of persuasion

347

Kenneth F. Vernon

and demonstration, etc, etc. So at times theywould get rather discouraged, and more than oneof them came to me and said, “Jesus, we wishwe had the same kind of a relationship with thegovernment that you guys have, because youguys can get things done, and we can't evensometimes get transportation out of town. If theDirectorate doesn't want to give ustransportation, we can't leave town.” So itwasn't a completely happy relationship.

And then as a sidebar to this, FredLocher, before he left, came over one day to theoffice, said, “Ken, I want to talk to you a littlebit. I want to talk to you quite frankly.”

I said, “How's that, Fred?'

He said, “Watch your back.” He says,“It's a game of king of the hill.” He says,“Doesn't matter who's in charge, everybody'sagainst him, so you've got to watch thatsomebody isn't trying to stab you in the back, ifyou want to exist here.”

And I said, “Well, I kind of learned that,Fred.” (laughter) You "CYAed" [cover yourass] all the time. But I said, "I get along prettywell with those guys over there."

He says, “You know Anwar, and youknow Mohammad Hassan, both educated in theUnited States, but each is jealous of the other, soMohammad Hassan wants to be Directorate ofIrrigation. As a matter of fact, MohammadHassan wants your job as director," and heultimately got it after the revolution. So he says,“Just be careful how you operate, and alwaysmake sure that you're well covered.”

So then he left and went on. He went toBrazil and he went to Ceylon and several other –

348


he stayed in the Foreign Service, and then healso went down to Dar es Salaam in East Africa. But I think all that time he stayed as a Bureau ofReclamation employee. I don't think he evertransferred into the Foreign Service, as I recall,and he retired to Florida.

When Mr. Nelson got word that hiscontract was not going to be renewed, this wasin the fall of 1956, apparently there had beenpressure by the British Ambassador not to renewMr. Nelson's contract, whatever the reasons Idon't know, because Mr. Nelson had done anoutstanding job on the Development Board, butfor some reason or other, the British felt that hewas making the American presence too muchfelt. The Americans did not want to be knownas a competitor to the British, because in thescope of things, or affairs, Iraq was reallyconsidered a part the British sphere of influence. So I think it was that they were feeling that hisinfluence was bringing in too many Americans,etc, etc.

Wesley Nelson’scontract was notrenewed in 1956

At any rate, before he left, we held aparty for him and Etta Lou, Mrs. Nelson, with allthese American colleagues from the Bureau ofReclamation and my group that were down therein the Ministry of Development. So altogether, Ithink there was probably working in our area,Bureau of Reclamation and the group I had,basically from the Bureau of Reclamation,probably about twelve or fourteen of usaltogether, maybe at the maximum at one time. Fred Locher's place was taken by another guythat I had known in the Bureau of Reclamation,and he had become head of the . . .


Storey: This is tape three of an interview by Brit Storey

349

Kenneth F. Vernon

with Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 27th, 1995.

This person had . . .

Vernon: When the Bureau took on the Litaniinvestigation in the Lebanon, one of the my guyswho became surplus to our needs was sent overto Beirut, assembled a team, and headed up theinvestigation of the Litani Project, L-I-T-A-N-I,in Beirut, in the Lebanon. Then he finished histour there, and I happened to be home on leavein Washington, and I happened to meet thisother gentleman who I'd also known in theBureau of Reclamation, I can't think of his nameat the moment, in the elevator, and I said, “Oh,what are you doing here?”

Litani Project inLebanon

“Well,” he says, “I'm going to Beirut,Lebanon, to take on the Litani Project.”

“Oh,” I said, “Great, that's great.”

So then he fulfilled that tour, and thenafter Fred Locher left, he was sent to the Bureauof Reclamation team in Baghdad in irrigation tohead up that team that was working with theIrrigation Directorate.

Storey: But in the meantime, you had gone to Pakistan?

Vernon: No. No, this was all occurred before Pakistan.

Storey: But then you moved from Iraq to Pakistan.

Vernon: Yes. Then in June of 1959, I was sent over toPakistan, I didn't know just exactly what for, butthis was on TDY.

Storey: Temporary duty.

Vernon: "Send Vernon over to Karachi, Pakistan. He'llfind out what his assignment is when he gets

350


there."

So we went over to Pakistan. I took mywife with me. The plane had been delayed, sowe arrived in the middle of the night and therewas nobody to meet us. Here it was June and itwas hotter than hinges of Hades, humid as southFlorida, and there was nobody there from themission to meet us.

So Helen said, “Well, what do we donow, go back to Baghdad?”

I said, “No. Some of my British friendshave told me about Karachi, and I understandthere's a hotel called the Hotel Metropole. Ihave no idea what it is or where it is, but we'llget a taxi and go into the Hotel Metropole, see ifwe can get a room.”

Went to the HotelMetropole upon arrivingin Karachi

So we got into the hotel there about twoo'clock in the morning, something like that, andso went up to the desk, and said we had justarrived at Karachi, and could we get a room,particularly an air-conditioned room. “Oh,” theysaid, “we're so sorry, Mr. Vernon, all of our air-conditioned rooms are taken, but we do have aroom we can put you, very nice room, youunderstand, but unfortunately, it doesn't haveany air-conditioning.” And we found that thebasic structure of hotels and buildings in India,or the Indian subcontinent, were single-loadedcorridors which were an open veranda, variousfloors, and you had first a veranda, which wasopen on one side, then the room took off fromthat veranda, and then they would have windowsin the room and then you had ceiling fans. Soyou would open your door and open thiswindows and turn your ceiling fan on, and ifthere was any breeze, this was your cooling.

Well, that night we got very little sleep, I

351

Kenneth F. Vernon

can assure you, because we were not accustomedto this sort of climate, because we'd come froman arid desert climate, which might be 110degrees, but here it was 95 degrees and 95percent relative humidity, and you walkedaround with your hands like this so theperspiration would drip off your fingers.

Storey: Just holding them out.

Vernon: Because if you touched yourself, you weresoaked. (laughter)

So at any rate, the next the morning I gota cab and went up to the mission, found outwhere the mission was, and reported in. Theysaid, “Well, where in the hell, where were you,where were you yesterday? You were supposedarrive yesterday.”

And I said, “Well, we did, but the planewas delayed, had engine trouble, or somethingor other, we were delayed en route, and wedidn't get in until about two o'clock in themorning. So here I am. What am I supposed todo?”

Well, James Killen, K-I-L-L-E-N, wasthe Mission Director, and he was an ex-laborleader, a very forthright gentleman, the kind ofguy I was accustomed to working with, likeMike Straus, who said what he thought anddidn't mince any words. This was old homeweek again. “Well,” he said, “Kenneth, we'vegot a problem here in the mission. I understandour government is going to pour a lot of dollarsinto Pakistan. We've already got a big programgoing of what's called PL-480 money." It wasimport of foodstuffs, grains and that sort thing,which the government paid for in local currency. Then the mission would turn that back to thegovernment for what was called budget support.

Assignment in Pakistanwas water development

352


I'll get into that a little later. But basically theyhad that program.

Then through the Development LoanFund, which had been set up in the later days ofICA, in, I should say, the EisenhowerAdministration, rather, was called theDevelopment Loan Fund, which was a separateentity, but was in the Department of State. Because the World Bank – in 1954 – correction, Going back to 1947, there was the partition ofthe Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, in that division, which waspredicated primarily on a religious basis, theMuslims in Pakistan and the Hindus in India, thedividing line between India and Pakistan carvedright across the Indus River system, andseparated the source of the water in the IndusRiver system from the tremendous land resourceof the Punjab, P-U-N-J-A-B, where all the waterutilization was occurring, so Pakistan, which had5 million acres of irrigable land in the Punjab,didn't have a form of water supply, and Indiasaid, "Well, we now have to develop a separateland base, irrigated land base, to replace whatwe lost in the partition. So we're going to takeall the water from the headwaters and divert itinto lands in India." So this became the IndusBasin controversy, and it was a very importantpolitical issue, a world issue.

The World Bank got into it and set up acommission to study and possibly come up witha solution which might ameliorate thedifficulties which would occur. So in 1954, anagreement, an Indus Basin Agreement, had beenarrived at, and the World Bank was going tohead up an effort to get financing to supportthese activities which would be required, and soparticularly in Pakistan, what was called theReplacement Works, for the existing previousirrigation system, the water supply system when

353

Kenneth F. Vernon

it was undivided India. India, of course, wasgoing to have to build structures which theycould call their water and then divert it to theirlands.

So, fundamentally, Pakistan's waterwould have to come from two of the northerntributaries. "Punjab" means five waters. “Punj”is five, water is “ab,” A-B. So the five waters. The northern river was the Indus. Then the –well, I'll have to think how that comes out. Butat any rate, there were the five tributaries whichultimately formed the main Indus River systemand debouched to the Arabian Gulf.

So when I arrived in Pakistan, Mr. Killensaid, “I've been told that our government isgoing to pump a great many dollars into thedevelopment of Pakistan through theDevelopment Loan Fund. I was advised to haveyou come over to tell me how to organize to helpthe government of Pakistan spend those monieswisely.”

So I said, “ Well, that's very interesting. That's old home week. That's what I did in theMissouri Basin, and that's what I did in Pakistan. You have to make a distinction right now.” Here I had been in charge of organizations,which were larger than they were under JimKillen's command in Pakistan. So I made itknown that I wanted policy direction, but I didn'tneed technical direction, and I would come backto him after I had examined everything andmade conclusions that he could accept it orrefuse it, but it would be my work, if you get thedistinction there I was insisting upon. I wantedfreedom of action, in other words.

Because most of the people that werecoming overseas – I'd been challenged when Iwas discussing the situation with one of my

354


colleagues at the Development Board in Iraq. He says, “Vernon, we feel that sometimes theUnited States sends us their riff-raff, It's not yourbest people. Now fortunately, you're one of yourbetter people, but a lot of people you send overhere are not your better people.”

And I said, “Well, Dr. Jaleeli, I have toadmit I was a little guilty of that myself, thatsometimes when a call would go out forsomebody to make up a technical assistanceteam, I'd call the personnel officer in and say,<Who do we want to get rid of?' (laughter) So alot of the people that they had in the mission – itwas a large mission, too – a lot of them werepretty good, yet they had not had theresponsibilities like I had faced, so they weren'taccustomed to working on their own anddemanding freedom of action.”

“Well,” he said, “yeah, I understand that. Go ahead do what you do and you come backand we'll talk about it.”

There were already a couple of Bureau ofReclamation types that were, at that time,working in the mission's Agricultural Division. So I immediately enlisted their help and toldthem what Killen had told me was my charge,and I said, “As I see it, this is going to be a largecapital development investment program, andwe've got to set up something which will havefreedom of action across a broad spectrum ofthings, and water is going to be a very importantone because of the Indus Basin Settlement. Sofirst off, I want to get you guys into some otherentity.”

Jack Robeson, R-O-B-E-S-O-N, hadworked in India and had worked in Nepal andwas now working in Karachi, said, “You know,Ken, the structure of government here, the best

355

Kenneth F. Vernon

thing to do would be set up an equivalent patterncalled a Public Works Division, and then youcould collect into that division various elementsof the mission's program to provide theengineering support.” So I examined that, and Italked to the – there was these guys fromReclamation.

Incidentally, Jim Darnell, D-A-R-N-E-L-L, had been with me in Baghdad. He had beenat Shasta Dam. He'd been with Wes Nelsondown in Amarillo. But he was fundamentally ageologist had gotten in over into the engineeringside, but after he'd left Baghdad just before therevolution, he had then been assigned over toKarachi. So here was a guy I was accustomed toworking with and was accustomed to workingwith me.

So then we talked to the people in theIndustry Division who was working on ports,working on the improvement of the railroadsystem, and then were involved in a lot of otherindustry activities. I talked to the EducationalDivision and found they had a large program ofschool construction. I found out that educationaltypes that came over overseas, the first thingthey wanted to do, instead of getting intoimprovement of the educational process, theywanted immediately to go into a large capitaldevelopment program of school buildings, thelike of which no school board would everapprove in the United States. They wanted tobuild their monuments.

Then I also talked to the Public HealthDivision. I found out they were deeply involvedin municipal water supplies, among other things. So I formulated a plan which I set up. Therewas the Irrigation Division, Water, Irrigation,and Flood Control and Drainage Division, anElectric Power Division, a Transportation and

356


Communication Division, and, I think a – I wastrying to remember the other day what I calledthat, a kind of a General Engineering Division,which I found out later that there was this school– I was going to assign them the school buildingprogram and a number of other programs that Ifound existing in the mission. Also then we setup a group of local engineers and draftspeople,that could service us.

So then I went back to the missiondirector and outlined my program and method ofapproaching this thing, and I also created a gradestructure, and I said, “Now, if I understand theamount of money that's going to be poured intohere,” I said, “I understand you don't know howmuch, but it's going to be lots, we're going tohave to have some very good people. So it'sgoing to have to be a high level, and I'm going tosay that the top job should be a Foreign Serviceofficer, Rank 1, which is a grade A team. Andthe heads of these separate divisions should beGrade 2, which would be about equivalent of aGrade 16 or 16 and a half, something like that. Then others in the division would be graded 3and 4, but they all were senior people. And Iindicated where I thought the resources mightcome from.”

Proposed areorganization of themission’s constructionprograms in Pakistan

“Well,” he said, “makes a lot of sense tome. So when are you going back to Baghdad?”

I said, “I've been over to the IraqiEmbassy a couple of times, and I haven't beenable to get a reentry visa back to Baghdad, and Idon't think I'm gonna get one. I think that thedoor has been closed.”

“Well,” he said, “okay, let's go to work.” He says, “We'll just stay out here on TDY.”

Well, shortly after I got settled in there,

357

Kenneth F. Vernon

Jim Darnell said – he and his wife met Helenand me down at the Metropole Hotel, and said,“Hey, look, we've got an extra bedroom out atthe house. Why don't you come out and move inwith us since you're on TDY. It's got air-conditioning, and so stay with us.” So that madea lot of sense, so we moved out with Jim Darnellto their apartment and took residence in theirspare bedroom.

Well, then Killen said, “I think you putthis package together, write it up in formalreport. I'll transmit it to Washington via youhand-carry it and work it through the echelons inWashington.”

So I was sent to Washington to go andexplain this new program in Washington. Firstoff, each of the divisions, you see,Transportation said, “Hey, wait a minute, we'regoing to lose something here, going into thisPublic Works Division."

Sent to Washington,D.C. to explain hisproposed program

Industry said, "Hey, wait a minute, we'regoing to lose something here. I'm going to losethe engineering aspect of our industry program,etc., etc., around the various divisions.” But Ipointed out that this was patterned after thestructure of government, which most of this bigeffort headed up in the Department of PublicWorks, under the Minister of Public Works, andnot the least of which was the Karachi WaterSupply Project, which was in grave troubles. Itwas being headed up, if it was being headed upin the Mission, by this Public Health Divisionwho were a bunch of doctors.

Washington had hired the Ralph M.Parsons Company as a consultant to providebodies to the mission. The head of thisconsulting group, contract employee, if you will,was operating as a mission employee, and he

358


was even attending the mission director’s staffmeetings. He was an ex-Army post engineerand had brown on his nose clear to his eyebrows,because he would go play chess with theMission Director regularly. It was a realincestuous thing, and the project was in realtrouble both financial and physically. So thatwas one of the first things I said that had tocome over to us, so we could get an engineeringhandle on what was going on.

So I set up a charge as a series ofobjectives for this Public Works Division. Thefirst one was to review the project proposals ofthe Pakistani government, or rather, to reviewthe plans of development that were beingdeveloped by the Pakistani government, and todetermine those which might be recommendedto our mission management for financing.

The second one was to provide technicalassistance to our colleagues in the Pakistanigovernment in the execution of any projectswhich had been approved for U.S. financing.

The third one was to provide engineeringexpertise and assistance to the various divisionsof the mission in the execution of their capitalworks programs, such as school buildings, etc.,etc. I think there were a couple of other items,but basically it was this idea of advising missionmanagement as where investments might bemade, advising mission management for thoseprojects which were approved to give thePakistanis technical assistance and guidance inexecuting those projects, and to get theengineering aspects of all other elements of themission under some kind of engineering control,instead of doctors and educators and God knowswhat, running around and trying to overseebuilding projects.

359

Kenneth F. Vernon

Well, I managed to persuade Washingtonthat it was a workable plan, and it was approved,but they did not approve my grade structure. They wanted to haggle a bit, so I was in closecontact with the Mission Director. I said, “I’verun into a problem,” and I said, “Jim, the amountof money that's being talked about, we've got to[have] absolutely topnotch people if you're goingto make a success out of it. You just cannotafford to have second-rate people sent out tomanage this program for you, and so you'regoing to have to go to bat with the administratorof [the Agency]" At that time it was I-C-A,International Cooperation Administration, one ofthe later incarnations of the Foreign AidProgram. "You're going to have to got to batwith the Administrator to unlock some of thisbureaucratic delays," which he did.

So finally they did approve the gradestructure, so then I went back to Pakistan andstarted to recruit people and get this thingorganized. Well, this was about November, andI was due for home leave. This is December,late November or December of 1959. Althoughmy appointment had not come through, sofinally when writing my end-of-tour report – see,in the Foreign Service, you usually aredesignated for a two-year tour. Then you cancome on home leave and get refreshed, and thenyou went somewhere assigned for another two-year term.

How the Foreign Serviceworked then

Actually, in the Foreign Service it's anon-uniform[ed] service. There's an AssignmentBoard set up in personnel, and these requestscome in from the field for particular [type of]personnel, and then the Assignment Board startspulling out the personnel jackets to see who's onhome leave, or who's ready for assignment, andthen they'll recommend a particular person willbe assigned to a particular post for a particular

360


function.

Well, there was some delay in thisbureaucratic delay going on in Washingtonabout approval of all this as I had proposed, andthe bureaucrats in Washington were wanting togo on the cheapie, so as I was writing my end-of-tour report, I said in the final paragraph,“Either Washington is unable or unwilling toapprove my appointment at the appropriategrade to this position, and therefore I wish to bereturned to the United States possibly forseparation from the Foreign Service.”

Now, I did this with an ace in the hole. Ihad already done some work with the Chairmanof the Water and Power Development Authorityin West Pakistan. I had accompanied him intoWashington in a meeting for the DevelopmentLoan Fund Board and gotten acquainted withhim, and the Water and Power DevelopmentAuthority in West Pakistan had also employedHarza Engineering of Chicago as their overallmanaging consultant. So shortly after I hadarrived in Karachi and had gotten acquaintedand done some work with the Chairman of theWAPDA, W-A-P-D-A, the WAPDA – theyloved acronyms. The Paks loved acronyms. He[the head of the Harza team] said, “Ken, theChairman of the WAPDA would like us to hireyou. They'll pay for it, but to assign you on ourpayroll to him as his technical advisor, personaltechnical advisor.”

So I thought – well, this was cooking inthe background. So I thought, “Hell, if I can'tget what I want through the government, I canget a pretty good job with the WAPDA throughHarza," and I always wanted to get over to theconsulting field anyway.

So I made this recommendation of being

361

Kenneth F. Vernon

returned for separation with an ace in the hole. Well, anyway, I got back into Washington onhome leave, and I went in to the then RegionalDirector, and having an interview with him, I'veforgotten his name, he said, “What do you wantto do, Vernon?”

I said, “Well, basically I want you to fireme.”

“Oh,” he says, “what the hell. Why doyou want us to fire you?”

“Well,” I said, “you won't approve me inthat job in Pakistan at a grade level that I'llaccept. At any rate, I've been living for a yearunder a government that went Communist, andI've been living out of a suitcase for six monthsin Pakistan, and I've just about had it up to mychin with your bureaucratic approaches here. So, also, as a matter of fact, I'm at such a stagethat if you fire me, I can withdraw my retirementfunds. I'd like to get into consultingengineering, and I can use those retirement fundsto help support myself for a while 'til I getestablished.”

“Well,” he said, “we can't fire you.” Hesays, “There's three countries asking for you. And now that you're available, they're asking foryou.” He says, “We can't fire you. Andanyway, we want you to go back to Pakistan.”

And I said, “But look, somebody's got togive here.” (laughter)

Well, to make a long story short,lightning struck somebody. The word got down. Lightning struck somebody, and he signed off onmy appointment as a Grade 1 in the gradestructure for the Public Works Division inPakistan, so then I went back to Pakistan.

362


We had a very exciting experience inPakistan. I set up the Water Division. I gotJohnny Walker, who'd been my power manger inBillings, to be picked up by the Foreign AidProgram and put him in as the power manager inmy group. He worked with developing thepower distribution system in [both East andWest] Pakistan, in East Pakistan. At that time,East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, was apart of Pakistan, and they had a WAPDA of EastPakistan. We were building a dam over in EastPakistan, and some other activities over there,irrigation development and so on.

I got Jim Campbell, who was an ex-Corps of Engineers dredger man, because in EastPakistan, he . . .


Storey: You were talking about working with EastPakistan.

Vernon: Yeah. I got Jim Campbell, who had been sentout in a team from – he had been a dredger manin the Corps of Engineers on, I believe, theColumbia River Development. I'm not quitesure just all where he'd been, but he had been apart of that team, and they'd reported on some ofthe problems in East Pakistan. So I got him tohead up my Transportation Division.

Then one of the gentlemen, which Imentioned earlier that I had reviewed for apossible employment by the Iraqi DevelopmentBoard as to the Chief Engineer of the SecondTechnical Section, who had a good backgroundin highway work, he showed up. I got him tohead up the Social Development Division of myGeneral Engineering Division.

363

Kenneth F. Vernon

I got a man that had worked in Europeunder the Marshall Plan with the Corps ofEngineers in the reconstruction of theinfrastructure, particularly in France, and thenhad worked for a consulting engineering groupout through the Western Pacific, workingthrough the Corps of Engineers on depotfacilities. So he had a good background ingeneral engineering, so I managed to bring himin.

Then I appointed Jack Robeson, who hadbeen formerly working in the Department ofAgriculture [Agricultural Division]. I appointedhim as my deputy. Then I got another youngman, who was a younger engineer, Americanengineer, who had a pretty good background, Igot him in as my program and schedulingengineer. I always developed my program andscheduling group wherever I went, because Ialways wanted to know what was going on,where we were, and what was coming up next. Iwas one of the few members of the mission instaff meeting who always could report exactlywhere we stood in program execution. So thenwe were set up to go.

Set up a program andscheduling group so hewould always know thestatus of work

It was my time to go on home leave inlate November, and so we took off for thestateside, and were gone for about three monthsat stateside. Then this question of myappointment in Pakistan had been settled whilewe were gone, and so then I reported back toKarachi as the head of the Public WorksDivision. Then I kept recruiting and bringingthese people in, and we got going at greatlengths there.

Storey: This was in the American mission?

Vernon: Yes. There I was working in the Americanmission. I was another head of another division

In Pakistan worked inthe American mission

364


in the American mission. My offices were in theAmerican mission. We worked with andthrough the various elements of the Pakistanigovernment, particularly the Ministry of PublicWorks; the Ministry of Health; the WAPDAs,the Water and Power Development Authorities;the railroads; the port authority.

One of the projects that I got involved inearly on in my stay in Karachi was in measuringwhat the mission was involved in. I gotinvolved in a review of the KarachiDevelopment Authority's water supply plan forKarachi, Municipal Water Supply Plan forKarachi, which was a diversion of water fromthe Indus River through a system of canals to afiltration plant in Karachi, and this project wasin dire straits. Somebody had decided that theprojects should have a tunnel. Rather than goingaround a particular promontory, the projectshould have a tunnel. Well, they were just in themidst of the damnedest problems out there, andthis group from the Ralph M. Parsons Companyjust didn't seemed to be able to hack it.

Karachi DevelopmentAuthority water supplyplan for Karachi

Now, I'd had a good deal of experiencein tunneling, both on the Central Valley Project,on the Dokan Dam Project, and then theMissouri Basin. So over the Fourth of July inthe summer of 1959, I analyzed all the problemsthat were going on, and I presented the MissionDirector with an analysis of the things that werehappening, and, quite frankly, it was myrecommendation that unless a lot of trees wereshaken, that thing would never be completed. Just to show you the kind of things that weregoing on, this tunnel was not through a deepmountain, for example. It was going to beconcrete-lined after construction making thebore of the tunnel, then it was to be concrete-lined, and what they decided to do was toperiodically drill bore holes, and they would

365

Kenneth F. Vernon

dump the concrete down these bore holes and fillthe forms with the concrete, which would linethe tunnel.

My God, one day the man from theParsons Company said he started walking fromthe lower end of the tunnel, and he noticed thatthe water was warm. So as he got up to wherethey were pouring the concrete, he found outthat the forms had broken, and they were justmerrily plugging that tunnel solid with concrete. This was the wonders of the Ralph M. Parsons'inspection crew.

I found out a number of a bunch of otherthings that I didn't like about the Parsons'inspection crew, so one of the things I insistedearly on with the mission Director was thatmanagement of that crew be assigned to me, andthat we'd get a real handle on it. In the firstplace, he [Harza team leader] was horriblyexpensive, and we could get much better serviceout of some direct hires, then we'd have somecontrol over them. So I advised the MissionDirector that we really needed to go to thegovernment and talk about it, and show them myanalysis that this project would never becompleted unless they completely revampedtheir approach to the construction of the project,and a good deal more money was going to haveto be assigned to the project, because there was aserious overrun in the cost.

This created a rather a intense situationbetween the Mission Director and the Ministerof Public Works. During one session, theMission Director sort of lost his cool. TheMinister, who was a very capable man in hisown right, closed the meeting forthwith. As wewere riding back to our mission headquarters,the Mission Director said to me, he said, “Did Iblow it?”

366


The head of the Parsons group said, “Oh,Mr. Killen, you did exactly what they needed. You gave them a dressing-down that you exactlyneeded.” [Just] No – brown-nosing.

He said, “What do you think, Vernon?”

I said, “You blew it! What the hell,didn't you notice he closed the meetingforthwith? We're going to have to take anothermonth to ever get back to where we were. Youdeeply insulted that gentleman.”

He said, “Well, that's kind of the way Ifelt, but, unfortunately, I've got a hot temper, andwhen I get provoked, I speak out of turn.” Hesays, “I kind of felt the same way, and I justwondered what your reaction was.”

I said, “Well, I worked with these kind ofpeople long enough to know you don't do thatsort of thing. You may be seething inside, butyou never evidence it.” So that really put usback.

So my relationship with Killen was verygood, because I understood him and heunderstood me, and I could talk very franklywith him, and at times we swore at each other,but he took it in good faith. A couple of times Ihad to apologize to him, I said, “I spoke out ofturn.”

He says, “That's all right, I understandthat kind of language.” (laughter)

Basically, our operations in Pakistan, myoperations in Pakistan, were supporting theAmerican effort in the Indus Basin DevelopmentReplacement Works – that primarily wasthrough the Water Power DevelopmentAuthority of East [West] Pakistan. We were

Indus BasinDevelopmentReplacement Works,Water PowerDevelopment Authorityof West Pakistan

367

Kenneth F. Vernon

supporting – the Port Authority wanted toenlarge the port capacity.

I found that ships were having demurragecharges of thirty days or more, sitting idle in theports [waiting to be] unloaded, because therewas not port capacity enough to unload them. So I assigned to Mr. Campbell, who I mentionedearlier, to study what could be done aboutenlarging the port capacity, perhaps was thereroom enough to put in some additionalunloading facilities, additional berthing, etc., andadditional equipment, or was it going to requirethe construction of a satellite port, or justwhatever might be the solution.

Look at improvingharbor facilities

I urged the Industry Section of theIndustry Division that was working with the portmanagement to see what they could do aboutintroducing mechanized unloading, because oneof the big imports was bulk cargo and wheat, forexample, from our PL 480 program, Public Law480 program, the bulk wheat, grains, and so on,and these were all being unloaded by hand. Isaid, “Why don't you see if you can't get them tointroduce some equipment, mechanicalequipment, in speeding up this unloading, aswell as we'll undertake the idea of going intoenlarged port facilities." I said, “This is onlygoing to get worse, because the Indus BasinProgram is getting going now, the Mangla Damis under construction, other elements of theIndus Basin Program are going intoconstruction. So that this port is chuck-a-blocknow, and it's just going to be absolutely chokedsolid. I'll tackle the railroads and see what wecan do about improving their physical structure,and you tackle them on the basis of theirmanagement and improved equipment.” So weundertook that program.

Mangla Dam

Then John Walker was there by that

368


time, and he started working on what kind of atransmission line system might be required tomarket the power, distribute the power, that theWAPDA would be developing at these dams thatwere being developed under the Indus BasinProgram, and so on down the line. So we had abig program going in West Pakistan.

Then in East Pakistan, we wereconstructing a dam on the Karnafuli River, K-A-R-N-U-F-U-L-I,29 Karnafuli River, which wasbeing financed by Development Loan Funds, sotherefore we had a definite interest in it. Wewere keeping track of that construction with theWater and Power Development Authority ofEast Pakistan. They also wanted to improvetheir irrigation facilities over there, so they had anumber of irrigation proposals, but they also hadtwo special problems relating to storm surges inthe Gulf of Bengal. These are equivalent ofhurricanes or typhoons, but they called themcyclones, which would develop in the IndianOcean and and would gradually travel up theBay of Bengal, and then come to land, ashurricanes do in the Gulf of Mexico. Theymight land, go to land in India or at theheadwaters of the Bay of Bengal, or on the eastside of the Bay of Bengal, which was a part ofEast Pakistan, or on Burma, which was south ofthe part of Pakistan that was on the eastern sideof the Bay of Bengal.

Karnafuli River dam

Problem of cyclones[hurricane or typhoon]in the Indian Ocean

So I brought over a gentleman from ourhurricane center in Miami to study that situationand to come up with some measure of thesestorm surges as they occur, because this landwas around the periphery of the Bay of Bengal,was only about, say, elevation three or five feetabove high tide. So a storm surge of ten orfifteen feet created havoc, and there was recordof hundreds of thousands of people beingdrowned because this was some of the most

369

Kenneth F. Vernon

densely populated rural areas in the world.

So he studied that situation, and he gaveus a handle on what we were facing in terms ofthese storm surges. Also we found that thesemonsoon storms would come in, and it was likethese storms I mentioned earlier on when I wasdiscussing these intense storms in the MissouriBasin, where you would get twenty-two totwenty-four inches of rain in two to three days. The only problem in East Pakistan was, you'dget twenty-two to twenty-four inches maybe ineighteen hours. As a matter of fact, in the AssamProvince in India, which was just behind theprovince of East Pakistan, was the rainiest placeon earth. They didn't measure their rainfall ininches, they measured it in feet. Because thismonsoon flow off of the warm waters of theIndian Ocean would get batted up against theHimalaya Mountains, and just dump water like itwas going out of style.

As a matter of fact, we – very serious –almost lost the Karnafuli Dam before it wascompleted because of one of those storms. Wehad something like twenty-three inches of rain insomething like eighteen hours up there.

So they had this problem of these low-lying lands, and what the government wanted todo, was could we create a system of polders, justlike the Dutch did, around and reclaiming landfrom the sea. So I went to Holland and I studiedtheir system as they were reclaiming the seas, asto how they operated their polders, and so wecreated a series of basins, so to speak, just like inthe Sacramento Delta.

The Sacramento Delta, the low-lyingislands there only had – really, the problem therewas flood water, high flows of flood water. Butin East Pakistan you had a dual problem. Not

370


only would you have these intense rains, but youhad also the floods coming down from theBrahmaputra and the Ganges Rivers, from thehigh Himalayas, and so you had to keep thatflood out, but you also had to be able to get therainwater out of the polders before it drownedthe crops. I think that they concluded that theyadvised that you had a period of something –these crops would stand a submergence ofsomething like five to seven days, somethinglike that, and these intense storms would comeon a schedule of something like maybe everytwo to three weeks. So you had to be able tokeep the flood water out, but then you had to beable to evacuate the rain floods in a five- toseven-day period, so the crop could then growbefore the next flood came. So this was the dualproblem.

So then the next question we addressedwas how to prevent these storm surges fromflooding everybody out over this low-lying land. I've forgotten now whether our rule of onlyemploying Americans, or whether at that timewe could also employ foreigners, but I know thatDoxiades Associates [from Athens, Greece]were employed, because they were already inPakistan working on social problems, and I'veforgotten now whether we financed them or thegovernment of Pakistan financed them. But atany rate, we held a close association with theDoxiades Associates to study what might bedone about protecting the low-lying lands [from]of the storm surges.

I don't know whether you understand, butin a concentrated storm like a hurricane, forexample, in the rapidly swirling winds, in theNorthern Hemisphere, the circulation iscounterclockwise, and so as these intense windscirculate, they pile up a storm surge of manyfeet, which then comes ashore. I went through

371

Kenneth F. Vernon

the destruction of Hurricane Camille down inMississippi, where ships had been washedashore miles inland, boats that were milesinland, and actually some apartment buildingswere absolutely destroyed because they had beencompletely washed out.

The local people had instituted a programof where, in farming these low-lying lands, theywould try to build little mounds of earth onwhich they could locate their houses and otherinstitutional buildings like schools and so on. But Doxiades came up with a solution that weshould build a series of dikes which would havea sufficient height that would contain, hopefully,the highest surges on record, and make theseaward side a very flat slope, and that would beplanted to trees and other growth which wouldhelp break down the force of the tidal surge. AsI recall, that forward slope was to be on a ratingof about – a rise in elevation of one foot andevery ten feet horizontal, and these things thenwould be rather large structures.

Proposed to build alarge system of dikesand polders

Then in the polders, the dikes therearound the polders would be of more normaldimension. But I also said, because of myexperience with that flood control channel of theWadi Tharthar and its leakage, and the dikesaround the Mississippi River in the States, I saidthere could be no excavation for the building ofthe dikes on the inside of the polder. All theexcavation had to come on the exterior, becauseI did not want to have this undermining of waterleaking through the dikes, such as I was tellingyou about on the leakage through that dike alongthe Wadi Tharthar channel.

So at any rate, this was all adopted, andwe got started at it. Now, the method ofconstruction was such that you couldn't getequipment into this low-lying land. The only

372


kind of equipment that you could use would belike that walking Monighan that I described toyou that was used on the Contra Costa Canal inthe Delta area, but you didn't have that kind ofequipment in East Pakistan, but you had thisgreat tremendous [amount of] manpower. WhenI was in Iraq, I saw some of the old residualcanals that had been developed centuries ago,which had been built by manpower. There wasone canal which had been built somewherearound either 200 B.C., in the period from 200B.C. to 200 A.D., which was about three to fourhundred feet wide and about ten feet deep. Itwas a tremendous canal that ran for two hundredkilometers, and that was all done by manpower.

So I said to the chairman of the WAPDA,“What we need to do now is, you go to the Armyand see if you can borrow a lot of the Army,particularly the squad leaders, the sergeants,who can take an instruction and execute it, andthen you have your system of local contractorswho go into the villages and employ crews [of]for the villagers. So these employmentcontractors will provide the manpower, thesergeants will provide the leadership, and thiswill all be done by head-basket work."

They had a formula for doing that sort ofwork there. Some people dug the material. Some people put it into baskets, head baskets. Other people picked up these head baskets andput them on their head and carried them up anddumped them on the dike, or whatever, toremove the material from the excavation. Othershad little donkeys with paniers on them, andthey'd load those up, so now we get this materialup to the dikes.

Another question was, well, are we justgoing to dump it? How are we going to getcompaction of this? So I suggested – now, there

373

Kenneth F. Vernon

were a lot of mechanical equipment, compactorswhich were very good with this kind of thing,but they didn't have the foreign exchange tobegin with, but they had this gross manpower. So I said, “There are a lot of big trees downthere in the Sunderbyans, this area of low-lyingland. Cut out some trunks of those big trees to asize, say, that two or four men could lift, andthen put handles on this chunk of wood so thattwo or four men, depending on its size, or evenmore, could lift and use that as a tamper." Inwork crews in that world, they usually have aleader of a crew who sings the chant, just like onthe old sailing ships where they had the seachanties. So these guys, then, all worked inunison to the chanter who's singing the song. SoI said, “We can get compaction of these fillswhile they lift. These tree trunks will haveenough weight, and you got the manpower to liftthem, and so they can lift them up six inches anddrop six inches, lift up, drop six inches, lift upsix inches, drop, and get compaction, becausethese head baskets will not deposit enoughmaterial at any one point [so] that you will havea thick layer and then not get thoroughcompaction. That's why in sheepsfoot rollersyou have these feet that stick out maybe six toeight inches, these projections that stick out sixto eight inches, of conical shape, and so thematerial is laid down in layers of maybe eightinches to a foot, then you put this sheepsfootover it, and as these feet go in, you get not onlythe direct compaction, but you get the lateralcompaction because of the conical shape of thefoot of the projection. So we had to do it bymanpower, and it worked. It worked. And,heck, at one time I think they had 100,000people working out there. Can you imagine?

Storey: That's quite a process, isn't it?

Vernon: Now, have you got any more questions about

374


Pakistan that you can think of? It's almost –Amy [, my housekeeper,] will be here anymoment now. Sometimes she doesn't get here'til 12:30 depending on where she's worked inthe morning. Sometimes she gets here at twelveo'clock.

Storey: Were the polders and the dikes what you did inPakistan? That was it?

Vernon: Yeah. Well, that was it. I think that process isstill going on, because they had a tremendousarea to do. Now, then, on the West Pakistan,these replacement works have been largelycompleted.

But, oh, I didn't get into the other bigeffort we had in West Pakistan, had this five-million-acre Punjab area, plain, a perfect plainfor irrigation, and it was under irrigation, butthey were suffering from SEM and their salinityand water logging, because there was an over-application of water in irrigation and they didn'thave any drainage system. So they would alsoget tremendous monsoon rains there, so thecombination of irrigation water, and themonsoon rains, and no drainage system, theywere suffering from a good deal ofwaterlogging. Then also the water that wasbeing applied for irrigation not being drainedout, they had raised the water table to such aheight that the capillary rise from the water tablewas evaporating, was bringing the water to thesurface, and then it was evaporating and this wassalting up the soil column.

Dealing with salt anddrainage in the Punjab

So the irrigation engineers in Pakistanhad done quite a lot of experimental work interms of trying to define this problem. Theproblem was, what was the solution. So the firstthing I said to the Chairman of the WAPDAwas, "I think what we ought to establish is

375

Kenneth F. Vernon

something we might call the Water and SoilsInvestigation Division, and we'll call it theWASID," another acronym they love. "But whatwe need to do is get an actual handle on wherethis is really occurring and where the mostdifficult areas are which must be treated first, ifat all possible, and whether the groundwater isof such a quality that we might tap it as anadditional water supply, and, in a sense, developa drainage system [through pumping]." So thiswas adopted.

Then I went to him and said, now – theyhad been experimenting, shall we say, with . . .



Vernon: I was telling you about the problem of soilsalinity and waterlogging in the Punjab. So Ihad gone to the chairman of the WAPDA andsaid, “Now we got this group defining the areaof the problem. Now let's start a real program ofsalinity control and Reclamation program, theSCARP Program. It's worldwide known[worldwide] now, the SCARP Program. Andlet's set up a series of areas, which SCARP One,SCARP Two, SCARP Three, and so on, that youcould approach the problems in their mostlogical order, and what I suggest is that as theIndus Basin water becomes available, we'llleapfrog this water down the Punjab. In otherwords, it will discharge water from the canal, itwill go into the ground, we'll establish a batteryof wells, which will take the surplus water out ofthe ground, mix it with fresh Indus water tocorrect any salinity unbalance that you mighthave, through another element, then anotherbattery of wells, and so on, march down this

376


tremendous area, and we'll call those the SCARPOne, SCARP Two, and so on, and set them up asseparate project areas.”

Well, by this time it had gotten – theKennedy Administration had come in, and wehad now become the Agency for InternationalDevelopment. The government of Pakistan hadcome to President [John F.] Kennedy, thePresident of Pakistan had come to PresidentKennedy and said, “We've got this very difficultproblem in the Punjab.” [Tape recorder turnedoff]

Agency for InternationalDevelopment created

The President of Pakistan had gone toPresident Kennedy and said, “We've got thisproblem in the Punjab, and could you give ussome [aid] – send us some real experts over hereto help us solve this problem?”

So the President turned to JeromeWeisner, who was his Science Advisor and laterbecame President of MIT, assembled a team of“experts,” none of whom knew a blessed thingabout irrigation or drainage. Oh, there was oneguy that did, and he was from the – he'd been atReclamation, and then he was working in the U-S-G-S. But there was an ichthyologist. Therewas Roger Revelle, who was a demographer. He was head of the La Jolla Research Institutedown near San Diego.30 There was a guy fromsome asphalt institute or some blessed thing. I'mnot really – a group of disparate people, which –jiminy Christmas. Any rate, under the head ofRoger Revelle. They came to Pakistan, and myjob was to squire them around, arrange all theirmeetings and so. Well, I was completelydisgusted with this operation. I said, “Jesus,what a waste of money and talent.”

So as we were flying around one day,one of the gentlemen had his wife with him, and

377

Kenneth F. Vernon

she came down and sat beside me in theairplane. And so she started to talk to me, and Ithought to myself, “She's on a mission.” Shewas asking me questions, trying to get myopinion about what was going on and this andthat and the other thing.

I thought, “I'm gonna give her an earful.” So I said, “Quite frankly, I think it's a goddamnwaste of time, and all we're doing is aneducational program for these people. Theyhaven't got the foggiest notion of the problem, orhow to solve it. They'll leave here after having anice tour around the country, and then they'll gocontemplate their navels for a month or two andcome up with some kind of an innocuous report,etc. and etc. and etc. and etc.”

So shortly after we landed that night atLahore and we'd gotten bedded in when I got acall from Mr. Weisner's office that he'd like totalk to me. He happened to be along on thatparticular trip. He apparently had been primedas to what I told this lady, and he was trying toexplain to me the wisdom of this choice of thisgroup. He said, “You know, these guys are theguys that put man on the moon, and if we cansolve that kind of problem, we ought to be ableto solve this kind of problem, and we wanted afresh approach,” blah, blah, blah.

I said, “Well, that's very fine, Mr.Weisner, but these poor people [in Pakistan]have got a problem they need solving now, andthey don't want to go into an educationalprogram with this group that you’ve assembled. So that, quite frankly, I think it's a bloody wasteof American money, myself.” Any rate, weparted friends.

Well, to make a long story short, after Igot transferred into Washington, Roger Revelle,

378


who then had become the Science Advisor to StuUdall, Secretary of the Interior, he had a roompiled with documentation, but he was unable [to]write a report. And I then would go over to thegentlemen in Mr. Weisner's office, who wouldbe sort of riding herd on this effort, and I used totell him, “For God's sakes, light a fire underRoger Revelle, because these people need ananswer. Whatever it is, they need an answer, andthey keep coming to me and saying, ‘When arewe going to get Mr. Revelle's report?’”

Well, we finally got Mr. Revelle's report,and as I said, it was about as useful as“mammary glands on a boar hog.”

As a matter of fact, then, to close thisside of the issue, the SCARP Program became avery favorable program, and all the financingagencies of Europe and whatnot wanted to getinto the act. They wanted pieces of it, and it'sbeen a very positive program. So that was oneof the most successful efforts that were there.

Storey: Good.

Vernon: I think that's a good place to break, on that.

Storey: Okay. [Tape recorder turned off]

I was wondering, now, if you could tellme about the living accommodations and Bureauof Reclamation folks who were in Pakistan withyou.

Vernon: Well, there were, as I said, two previousmembers of the Bureau of Reclamation inKarachi, who became part of my new staff in thePublic Works Division. We had a–the Missionhad an area office, shall we say, up in the townof Lahore, up in the area of the Punjab, whichhad a lot of people up there, and there, a Mr.

379

Kenneth F. Vernon

Fred Locher [Ed Landerholm], an agriculturist,who I mentioned earlier as having been inBaghdad and had been with me in Billings, wasstationed. But again, he was a member – butthen he was a member of the Foreign Service, asI was, as well as the two men in Karachi. [Alsothere was Roy Goss from the Gila Project]. There was also a former member of the Bureauof Reclamation who was the resident engineer ofReclamation, resident engineer of the ForeignService, [the] Foreign Aid Program, stationed atKarnafuli Dam in East Pakistan. We all nowhad transferred over to the Foreign Aid Programof the Foreign Service. We were no longerassociated with the Bureau of Reclamation.

There were many peoplewith Reclamationbackgrounds inPakistan, but they wereall on the Foreign AidProgram staff

Storey: Oh, okay.

Vernon: We all had Bureau of Reclamation history. Walter Bierce, B-I-E-R-C-E,31 before beingstationed over at Karnafuli Dam, had also been apart of the Bureau of Reclamation team on theLitani Project in Beirut, as I previouslymentioned that team. But there was no “Bureauof Reclamation team” in Pakistan, as such.

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: And any member that I brought in – I brought inseveral members from the Bureau ofReclamation into my Public Works Division, butthey transferred over to the Foreign Service, andso they had terminated their association with theBureau of Reclamation, as a Bureau ofReclamation employee.

Housing was quite a bit better, shall wesay, more modern, both up in Lahore and inKarachi. It was still fairly primitive for thepeople over in Dhaka East Pakistan, which wasthe headquarters of the Mission Area Office overin Dhaka East Pakistan. Of course, Walter

380


Bierce, up at the dam, a rather modernconstruction camp had been created there,constructed there, because there were a lot ofAmericans and foreign employees andcontractors there, so that was fairly modern. ButDhaka was still fairly primitive, about the sameorder as it was in the early stages of Baghdad.

Fundamentally in Karachi, thegovernment had created what were calledhousing societies, cooperative housing societies,and many of the Americans had found quartersin what was called the P-E-C-H-S, which wasthe Pakistani Employees Cooperative HousingSociety. The type of housing that had beenconstructed was multiple-unit buildings, eitherduplexes or quadraplexes, but rather apartmentstyle, shall we say, which were quitecommodious, in fact, and quite modern in theirconstruction.

Housing and livingconditions in Karachi

My wife did not like to live in multiplehousing, and my rank justified individualhousing. So we wound up in a relatively modernhouse in a much smaller housing society. It wasquite commodious. It was owned by a man fromKashmir, not that that really made anydifference, but just as a distinction. He was nottruly a Pakistani. He was a Muslim, but he wasnot truly a Pakistani. He had come to Pakistan.

Our housing society was called theUnion Trading Cooperative Society. My housewas Number One Union Trading Society. Idon't even know the name of my street, exceptthat I was at the corner of a side street and a bigboulevard called the Shaid-A-Milat, S-H-A-I-D,dash A dash, Milat, M-I-L-A-T. This was abroad dual carriage way, boulevard, with arather large parkway between the two, a largepark area between the two carriage ways, as theBritish call them.

381

Kenneth F. Vernon

It was a single compound. We had a nicegarden area. The house had three bedrooms. Ithad a large living area, which in one of ourhouses would be called a living room,combination living room/dining room area, andthat was what it was originally intended for.

But all the houses in Pakistan wouldhave nice verandas, so adjacent to one end ofthis large living room area, we enclosed thatveranda with glass and made that into a diningroom area, and then we used this big living roomarea as a living room, combination living room. And since I was a kind of a music bug, I usedone end of it sort of as a music room area, hadmy stereo equipment,[ piano,] and so on in theother end of this. This room was aboutseventeen by thirty-five, actually.

Storey: That's a nice-sized room.

Vernon: There was a central hallway, and off this centralhallway was a pantry leading into a kitchen area. Also, doors off this central hallway led into tworather larger bedrooms. And then off of thislarger living room area I mentioned, there wasanother, third bedroom, which I used as anoffice. Now, one of the differences in Pakistanwas, each of the bedrooms had dressing roomsand bathroom facilities, tubs and the usual toiletand lavatory facilities, so these were quite moremodern than the ones that were in Baghdad.

There was another building on the backof the compound over the garage which hadhousing for the staff, so some of the staff livedin the compound, and some of the staff hadfamily and they'd go home at night to theirfamilies.

Also in this outer building, there was aquarters there for the chokidar,

382


C-H-O-K-I-D-A-R, who was the nighttimeguard. His post was at the compound gate, butwhen it rained he could retire to this littlecubicle area to be out of the rain. A lot of thepeople complained about their problem, becausethey would say these guards would go in thereand go to sleep. But I was usually very fortunateto get a good guard who seriously took hisguarding responsibilities. I've got a little sideitem that I'll mention later.

So here we were. Oh, yes, these housesalso had, as we had in Baghdad, flat roofs, sothat you could, if you wanted to, you could sleepout of doors in the summertime. There was alsoa laundry room up there, another bathroomupstairs which we converted to a laundry room.

In Pakistan, instead of using the swamp-type coolers, the evaporator-type coolers, weused refrigerant air-conditioning units, windowunits. Unfortunately, the humidity during thesummertime and the dust and grime in the airwould cause the humidity and grime to congealon the coiling of the condensers, and they'dactually become blocks of ice, because thecoolers, in the cooling of the air, this wouldcause the moisture to condense that was in thehumid air, and the cooling units would actuallyrun a stream of water.

The houses, as I say, were quitecommodious. There was lots of closet space. Itwas superior housing to what was in Baghdad. Now, up in Lahore, it was much the same there,except there were, I think, more singlecompounds with larger gardens, more like wehad in Baghdad, because Karachi was more of a– it was the commercial hub of the country, but alot of the Muslims from India moved intoKarachi at partition back in 1947, so it had amuch more secular affect, shall we say.

383

Kenneth F. Vernon

Lahore had long been a more moderncity and a more larger [with more] cosmopolitaninhabitants, so the housing was quite nice but[with] larger gardens and more modern housing. So our people up in Lahore, we've always felt itwas a much better station if you could possiblyget assigned there. The climate was muchbetter, too. Those who were in the outlyingareas were subjected to primitive conditions. Inthe villages, if you happened to be unluckyenough to get assigned to a village, you neverknew quite what kind of living accommodationsyou might get into, because it was very difficult.

Karachi was an interesting city, becauseit was a port city and it was a commercial city. So there were some modern facilities downtown,but there was a great deal, also, of strictlySoutheast Asia market stalls. Each littlemerchant would have a little cubicle, and hemight sell one thing. For instance, you would goto one place and buy a bolt, another place you'dbuy a nut, another place you might buy awasher, etc., etc.

My wife dearly loved to go to thoseplaces and sit down with the merchants andbargain with them for various items. And if shestopped to [go] get into a shop that had morethan one item, she would bargain with them foreach particular item, and then after she'dselected a number of items, she'd say, “All right,now let's talk about all of it. How much for allof it?”

And these guys just loved to see hercoming, because they always knew it was goingto be a good mental exercise, because they lovedto bargain. And they'd say, “Please sit downMemsahib, please sit down. Let me order sometea, or would you like a cold drink?” (laughter) And then the crowd would gather, and they'd

384


participate in this bargaining. (laughter)

She used to say, “Let's go downtown. Iwant to look around.”

I'd say, “Oh, my God. Okay, all right,let's go.”

And she'd go down, and she'd takeseveral hours down there, and that's why wehave so much stuff in the house that she'd got inthe local marketplace, because she'd gobrowsing around and find stuff, and she'd diginto these places. They might have stuff in atrunk or a case or somewhere that they didn'thave on display. Well, she said, “Let me seeyour good things. Let me see your – now comeup with a good thing.”

But living in Lahore was much nicer. Ithink that Lahore was quite comparable to livingin New Delhi, New Delhi, India, because NewDelhi, India, was quite a cosmopolitan place.

Storey: Did you live in Lahore?

Vernon: No. I was stationed in . .

Storey: In Karachi.

Vernon: In Karachi. The embassy was in Karachi. TheMission headquarters were in Karachi. Now,before I left, the government had come to theAmbassador and told him that the President ofPakistan wanted to create a new capital city,Islamabad, in northern Pakistan, up nearRawalpindi, R-A-W-A-L-P-I-N-D-I, which wasbasically the military – Rawalpindi wasbasically the military headquarters of thePakistani army. And so he, [the President,]beinga Pathan, P-A-T-H-A-N, the warrior class, hefelt uneasy down in Karachi being surrounded

Ambassadorapproached aboutconstruction of a newcapital city – Islamabad

385

Kenneth F. Vernon

by the group called the Sindhis, S-I-N-D-H-I,the Sindhis, because the lower region of theIndus River Basin was called the Sind.

Now, I don't know the translation of theSind, but Madam Bhutto, who is now the currentPakistan Prime Minister or President, I'veforgotten which, her family were Sindhis, S-I-N-D-H-I, and there was always a conflict betweenthe Punjabis and the Pathans and the Sindhis. The northern tribes looked down upon the Sinds. And so the President had this uneasiness beinglocated in this, shall we say, less favorableenvironment, so he wanted to establish a newcapital up what he felt was a more salubriousenvironment.

Tensions among tribalunits in Pakistan

He'd come to the American ambassadorand wanted to know if the Americans wouldsupport the construction of this new IslamicIslamabad. The ambassador said, “No, Mr.President, we can't really do that. That's notreally our mission here. But what we can do,perhaps, is provide some of the local currencythat was being generated through the PL-480Program,32 the Agricultural Import Program, as abudget support item through your government,which then might free up resources of your owngovernment which would otherwise be allocatedto those activities, and then you could use thoseto construct your capital up at Islamabad.” Butthe U.S. would, de jure, not be associated withthe construction of the new capital.

So that had started before I left, but it hadnot been completed. But by the time that thisgroup, led by Mr. Weisner, back in 1961, thePresident had moved his headquarters up toRawalpindi, and the construction of the newIslamabad capital was under way. I understandthat the government has moved up there nowand is operating out of Islamabad, because I've

386


talked to a number of people and they said thatthe government is conducting its operations outof Islamabad.

Now, an interesting sidelight, I told youearlier on that the U.S. government was startingto pour a lot of money into Pakistan. We had avery heavy military group there, Military AidProgram there, as well as a large embassy staff,as well as a large Foreign Aid Program. Theambassador was getting ready to go toWashington for a conference about what mightbe done about the total U.S. effort, and there wasalso indications that others now, other financingentities such as countries like Britain, Germany,France, and so on, were getting interested –including Russia – were getting interested inparticipating in the Development Program ofPakistan.

United States MilitaryAid Program in Pakistanwas heavy

So he called me over one day and said,“I'd like to talk to you about what your thoughtsare on what we might decide we would give upto other interests.”

Well, I said, “Mr. Ambassador, myrecommendation to you would be that, for God'ssakes, hang on to the development of the Punjab. This is something that will really be veryimportant in the development of Pakistan, theagricultural development of Pakistan. And if theRussians really want something, let them takethe Sind, which would be the lower area of theIndus. That's a real problem area, and I think itwould be a real good trick, dirty trick, to play onthe Russians. Let them worry about the Sind,and we should steer clear of it if we possiblycan.“ Although there was a good deal of activitygoing on down there, but it did have a lot ofproblems associated with its development.

So he thought that was pretty good

387

Kenneth F. Vernon

advice, but he did, and our side did agree, thatsince others wanted into the development of thePunjab, other financing entities began taking onsome of these SCARP Programs that I'dmentioned, such as the SCARP One. I think wekept through SCARP Three, but I think SCARPsFour, Five, and beyond were allocated to Britishinterests, Dutch interests, because I understoodthat [at] later dates that those people were activein that area.

Now, I had talked about living conditionsand so on. One of the things that was differentin Pakistan was that there was a large enoughAmerican presence, particularly in Karachi, bothembassywise and missionwise, that it waspossible to set up an American school, becausemany of the families had small children, andeven [students] of high school age.

There was an Americanschool in Karachi

But We had found that in the ForeignService that one of the difficulties of family lifewas, that as long as the children were small, let'ssay of grammar school age, it was easier to takecare of them than it was after they approachedhigh school age, because of the variety of studiesthat might have to be presented. So while wewere in Baghdad, the school effort there was avery rudimentary one, and most of the studentswere getting their curricula through universityextension courses, which were supervised bysome of the ladies that were married to peoplethat were in our Educational Division in theMission. I don't [know] whether they ever gotpaid or whether they were strictly voluntary,because I know my son, who was of high schoolage, we finally decided we would have to sendhim back to the States to a private school,because he just was not learning . . .

Son had to be sent toprivate school in theUnited States

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 4, APRIL 27, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 4, APRIL 27, 1995.

388


Vernon: We had decided that we would send my sonback to the States to a private school, because hewas not really studying or getting enoughsupervision to really gain an education throughthe extension course. So one day in Baghdad,when he'd been talking about wanting to go backto the States, I said, “Now look, boy, you haven'tbeen measuring up here, and you've gottenyourself into some troubles around here, as ateenager does. You'd better buckle in and getsome work done on your extension courses or,by God, you will end up going [if you want togo] back to the States to go to school to a privateschool.”

He had already been in a private schoolin Denver the year when I first went to Baghdad,because he had some problems. He had beenseriously burned in a motorcycle accident, andso he'd had some personality problems. Thephysical part of it was over. He'd had the skingrafting and all the rest of it, but it left himscarred emotionally, and so I had to periodicallychallenge him to get something done if he reallywanted it.

So he buckled in and brought his workup to date. We had sent him back to the Statesand entered him in this, again, this privateschool in Denver.

In Pakistan, although we didn't have anyreal association with the American school, Iunderstood that it was rather successful. Thewife of the head of our Educational Division inthe mission was also an educator, and so she was– I think she was a paid employee of the Missionto head up this school. And a relatively goodcurriculum was being presented, because manyof the children of foreign embassy families wereasking to be included. Now, I don't know howmany of those were included, but I understood

389

Kenneth F. Vernon

that as many as could be accommodated werebeing provided for, such as the French Embassy,the Dutch Embassy, the British Embassy, and soon, because they also had that same problem ofeducation.

And then in Lahore, they had a similaroperation going, but it was more of thesupervised university extension courses. Theydidn't have a big enough community up there, asI understood, to create a formal school programlike was established in Karachi.

Did I cover the housing problemsufficiently for your purpose?

Storey: I think so. How about house staff when youwere in Pakistan? How did that work?

Vernon: Now, that was something completely different. One time I counted up eight or nine peopleserving the two of us in our house, singlecompound, in Karachi. Unfortunately, not adamn one of them was doing a complete job.

Staffing of the Vernonhome in Karachi

But, let's see, there was what was calledthe bearer. He was theoretically the butler. Hewas the major domo of the household. Therewas a cook, and there was an hamal, H-A-M-A-L, who was sort of a utility person around thehouse, swept and mopped the floors and didother chores as assigned by the bearer. Therewas a derzey, who came in once a week or twicea week, whatever was required, to do thelaundry.

There was a seamster, a man – we wouldnormally called the feminine a seamstress. Idon't know what the masculine form of theseamstress is. But he had his little hand-operated sewing machine, and he'd come in andhe'd do whatever sewing my wife wanted,

390


helped her put up the curtains and draperies inthe house, and whatever other chores andmending that she might need. There was themahli, M-A-H-L-I, who was the gardener.

There was the chokidar, who was theguard, and at one time we had some dacoits,robbers, D-A-C-O-I-T, break into the compoundover the back wall, and it just so happened atthat time that the chokidar came around thehouse and caught these guys coming over thewall, or this man coming over the wall. Theguard was armed with a long sort of a bambooswitch. They called it a lathy. It was a little bitlimber, but it was strong, about four feet long,something on that order, and he started whippingthe heck out of this guy and grabbed hold ofhim. A police station was only a short twoblocks away, so he whipped this guy all the wayto the police station, [where] which they threwhim in jail, and they worked him over there, I'msure.

But that morning I awoke and my yardwas full of police, and I went outside and I said,“Well, good morning gentlemen, what's theproblem?”

Well, the officer in charge of the grouptold me that my chokidar had collared this guyand brought him over to them. They were overto look and see the situation, to see how it wasand what might be done about it. Well, whathad happened was, a house was being built nextdoor, and a lot of materials had been piled upagainst the compound wall on their side, and thisguy had crawled up on there and was able toclimb over the wall and drop down into the backof our compound, where our chokidar hadcaught him. So for a while we had twochokidars, one in front and one in back.

391

Kenneth F. Vernon

Now, the chokidars kept each otheraround the community [informed] that they wereokay and things were okay by a system ofwhistles, police whistles. One would whistle,and the others listen, and then whistle back. And they all knew [who was stationed where] whoever – now, these were employees. Theywere not my employees. They were employedby the Embassy. They were provided by theembassy group, or our mission group, I don'tquite remember just which. But anyway, I didn'temploy them. They appeared at sundown eachnight and were picked up each morning atsunrise. And so you heard these whistles goingon all night long, and theoretically, if one didn'treturn the whistle, the others were supposed togo over there and see what was going on, makesure he was all right, so it was sort of a mutualsupport activity.

So here I found this group in the yard,and I went out to see. They were telling mewhat had happened. My chokidar was a veryhonest and sincere guard, took hisresponsibilities seriously, and particularly if Ihad to go to the field on a trip. He would walkaround the house and make noises, eithertapping on the window or rattling his caneagainst the wall or any ironwork that might bearound, and my wife first complained. She said,“Can't you tell that guy to not make all thosenoises going around? I get so nervous, I can'tsleep.”

I said, “No, you're misunderstanding. He's letting you know that he's on guard, he's onthe job. So you get worried if you don't hearthose noises.”

And our cook was a pretty serious guy,and if I was gone, he would sleep over at thehouse, and he'd lay his bedroll down beside my

392


wife's bedroom door. And so he would stay allnight, and he'd sleep in the house at her bedroomdoor. So I said, “You're well protected. So, gee,you just worry if you don't hear those noises.”

Then the bearer, the butler, had decidedhe wanted to get another job, so he left ouremploy. And the cook had been doing a goodjob, so I thought a lot of Ali, A-L-I, and I said,“Ali, you've done a good job of being the cook. Do you think you could be a cook/bearer,”because he had a very large family that he wassupporting. I think he had something like,family, I don't know how many kids, sisters andbrother-in-laws, and God knows what all, but Ithink it was some nine or eleven people thatwere riding on his wages.

Now, the cook earned, for Paks, a prettygood salary. I think they paid him 160[rupees]dinars a month as a cook, which at fiveto one would be, what, $40.00 a month or such,approximately. So I thought, “Well, Ali's done apretty good job, and he's pretty serious. Maybegive him a promotion. Let him be cook/bearer,if he wants to do that.” And he said, yes, he'dlike that.

So I said to my wife, “Well, if he takeson that job, I think we should give him a raise,because he's going to take on two jobs, and he'sgot this big family to support.”

“Oh,” she said, “No, that's a gravemistake. Don't you do it. That's a gravemistake.” She was a pretty good judge ofcharacter. “If you do it, you do it [will ruinhim].”

I said, “But seriously, if [I took] he takeson another job, I would certainly would wantmore money. In all fairness, I ought to give him

393

Kenneth F. Vernon

more money. So I'm gonna do it. So I'm gonnaraise him to 200 rupees a month.”

“Well,” she said, “It's your problem.”

Well, she was right. Unfortunately, itruined him. He now was making so muchmoney, we'd find him sitting around. We'd begone, we'd find him sitting out on the front porchenjoying the view. So it wasn't too long afterthat that I said, “I'm sorry, Ali, this is just notworking out, and I think you'd better find a newassociation.”

About that time, a real sharp youngfellow had come down from Lahore, who'd beenworking for a private contractor up in Lahore. Inever knew quite knew why he had left up there,his employ up there, but his chits all looked inorder. They all have their chits, you know. Each employer gives you a chit of“recommendation,” and you had to learn thelanguage. If it said that he had becomeredundant to the household needs, it meant hewasn't worth a damn, and other such terms,British terms that told you, ”Look out.“

But he had some good chits, and he'dworked for this American contractor up there. But as I found out later, he had been operatingwhat we would sort of call a bootleg operationup there. This American contractor wasn't verysmart in the ways of things Asian, and he hadapparently had a very large expense account. And so he was importing stuff all the time, buthis family wasn't watching what was going outthrough the back door. This young fellow wassmart enough that he had quite an operationgoing on out through the back door. Then he'dtell the sahib that they needed this, that, and theother thing, and the Sahib would provide it, andhalf of that would go out through the back door.

394


And that's why he finally had to leave Lahore,because I think they finally caught up with him.

But as I say, at the time he was a nicepersonable-looking young man, and his chitslooked in order, so we took him on as acook/bearer. Well, I had been gone over to EastPakistan for several days. I came back, and mywife was showing me some of the things thatshe'd been working [on] with the gardener out inthe garden, and they were doing very nicely, soshe was quite proud of it. She was showing methese things, and as we were standing out therein the yard, this young man and a most beautifulPakistani young woman appeared with himcoming around from the back of the house uptoward the front gate. And I said to Helen,“Who's that?”

She said, “Well, that's Joseph's wife.”

I said, “His what?”

She said, “That's Joseph's wife. He saidthat she was having a little trouble where shewas living and could she come and live in hisquarters.” And she said she thought that wouldbe all right, so she said, “Sure.”

I said, “My God, Helen, don't you knowthat he's got a wife and family down in aparticular area in the city? He's running anoperation with that young lady for theunattached Pakistani males out over the backfence. Get her out of here.” This had beenknown among the Pakistani help, because thesecompounds are large and they might have backdoor access. And most of these guys that weredoing this housework had families out in thevillages, and so they were unattached males andthey needed certain services periodically, andsome enterprising Pakistani would set up an

395

Kenneth F. Vernon

operation to satisfy their needs, you understand,without calling it what it was. So I told Josephthat the young lady had to leave.

Well, then it developed that Joseph hadsome other problems. And one day Helen wasentertaining a bunch of her lady friends with acard party, and it was the rest period for thehousehold help. Joseph came running in, allbloodied, and said, “Memsahib, Memsahib, Ineed help, I need help, I need money. Myenemies are outside the gate trying to kill me.”

“Well,” she said, “you've got to wait tillSahib comes home. I don't know anything aboutthat. You go to your quarters, and talk to Sahibwhen he gets home.”

It turned out that he'd been gambling andapparently owed a lot of people, and they wereoutside waiting for him, trying to collect, and sohe was going to collect from Memsahib whileSahib was off to work. He'd try to get on hersympathies, get her to give him some money sohe could satisfy his creditors waiting for himoutside the gate.

So I said, “Joseph, you'd just better findyourself a new association. This just isn'tworking out.”

The ones that were really good, werepretty sharp. But if you were lucky enough tofind someone who wasn't quite so sharp, but hewould give you good service, why, then youwere fortunate. But the problem was, in theparlance of the Southeast Asia, not one of themwould break the other man's rice bowl, whichwas a simile to mean, a metaphor, to mean that ifsomebody could set up a particular area of grind,nobody else would crowd in on him or try totake it away from him, so they would coexist

396


together. That's why we had up to seven or ninepeople, not any one of them doing a full job.

I remember I was yelling at the mainbearer one day. I said, “Why in the hell don'tyou do that?”

He said, “Not my work, Sahib, not mywork. That's the Jamal’s work.“

“Well, get Jamal and get him to do it.”

“I can't make him do it.”

”Well,” I said, “that's your job.”

So to that extent it was – periodicallyHelen would drive them all out the house, lockthe doors, take a broom and a dustpan, and starton the house. Then they'd get all excited andpound on doors and yell, “Memsahib,Memsahib, you must let us in. What Sahib saywhen he comes home?”

She said, “He'll tell you off when he getshome.”

But she'd get so disgusted with them. She did not like Pakistan. She was really – andthat's where her health really started to fail, waswhen we lived in Pakistan, because theinadequacy, not the insufficiency, but theinadequacy of the help just drove her crazy ontrying to run a household. And many of theother women had the same problem.

Storey: How were cars arranged?

Vernon: Well, as members of the Foreign Service, wewere entitled to import one car for our personaluse. So I had just bought a new 1953Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight when I was in Billings,

397

Kenneth F. Vernon

before I left Billings, so I arranged to have thatimported over to Baghdad, and then afterBaghdad, I had it arranged to be imported overto Pakistan. So we had that '53 Ninety-EightOldsmobile over there.

The problem was that it required moderngasoline, and, of course, the basic cars that theyhad, or the community had, were getting aboutsixty-octane gasoline. So what we would do,there was also available aviation gas, so forevery, literally on the proportion of every four orfive gallons of this low-grade gasoline, we'd putin a gallon or two of the aviation gas, which,while it was an unbalanced fuel, our Americanengines could operate on it. But I found outlater that I burned all my valves in that process.

So then when I was transferred back intoWashington, again it was one of those damnthings where we had to leave everything inKarachi and have it sent to us. Had I stayed inKarachi, I would have been able to – usuallyfellows, when they were transferred out, theycould manage to sell their American car on thecar market there and make a nice profit. Butsince I wasn't there, I just said, “Well, bundle itup and send it to the Stateside along with all ofour household goods, and I'll use it as a trade ona car when I get back here.” But fundamentally,we were allowed to bring in one car, and thenyou could usually make an arrangement to sell itwhen you were transferred out.

Storey: And the U.S. would pay for the transportationand so on?

Vernon: Yeah, because, depending on your rank, youwere entitled to a certain amount of householdgoods. When we were in Baghdad, during thatspring of 1955, I had set my family up, hadmoved them from Billings and set them up in

398


Denver. My son, oldest son, was going to theUniversity of Colorado in Boulder, and myyoungest son was in this private school inDenver. So I kept advising my wife as to whatshe should prepare to bring when orders wereissued for the family to come over.

Well, first I got a statement from theMission that they didn't have any funding, sotherefore she would not be able to bring verymuch. Then I get word, “Well, we discoveredsome funding, so you can bring more of yourhousehold things,” back and forth, back andforth, back and forth.

So then just before she was scheduled toleave Denver, she came down with pneumoniaand wound up in the hospital. And [she’d] I'djust gotten back to home when it was time topack up, so that she really couldn't supervise thepacking, because some of it was to go to storagein the States and some of it was to be preparedfor overseas shipment.

So, let us say, at that particular time inmission funding, I was authorized to bring, say,2,500 pounds. First off, it was cookware andother accouterments which made life a littlemore easy, but no really heavy furniture. But inthe process, about 4,400 pounds – we hadsomething like 7,000 or 8,000 pounds altogetherof household goods, because we'd had a largehouse in Billings, and then I'd rented a largeapartment in Denver. So about half of it gotwrapped up for shipment overseas, so we woundup with about 4,400 pounds overseas, which wasabout twice what would have been normallyauthorized.

Well, I was finally managed to get paidfor shipping that overseas, but I had to pay forthe storage for the rest of it in the United States

399

Kenneth F. Vernon

all the time we were overseas. So we werewinding up with a good deal more Americanhousehold equipment than most people had, andthen also having a single compound and so onand so on, that we were fairly well fixed forAmericans. Of course, we supplemented withother things.

One of the things that I had sent overseaswas an Americanized kerosene stove. They usedkerosene stoves in Baghdad. And before we leftBaghdad, they were beginning to talk aboutLPG, liquid petroleum gas, but before we left,they hadn't gotten around to creating a gasnetwork. So then when our stuff finally arrivedin Karachi, we had this American kerosenestove, which was much better than the localstuff, which otherwise would have beenprovided, but still, it left a hell of a lot to bedesired.

By the time we were there about a yearand a half, the Mission had instituted a programof bottled LPG and were providing gas stoves,LPG stoves for kitchens. So we removed ourkerosene stove and stuck it out in one of thoseback buildings, and so then life got very mucheasier by having a really gas stove. My wifeliked to cook, and so periodically she'd shoo thecook out of there and she'd do some cookingherself.

Also in Karachi, the water left thefiltration plant in excellent condition, butbecause of the status of the water distributionsystem and the inadequacy of the supply, theywould have to segment the water supply systemin Karachi. So that while they serviced one areaof town with water, the rest of the town wouldbe out of water. Now, this sets up a negativepressure within the non-supply area, and leakagefrom the groundwater then starts leaking into the

400


system, so all of the water becomescontaminated, because this thing moves around,and so ultimately everybody was being deliveredcontaminated water.

So we were provided an electric boiler,in the kitchen, to boil all of our drinking water,and we found at times that the guys were just toogoddamned lazy to turn that damn boiler on. Wewould keep gin bottles of water in therefrigerator so it would be cool, and we'd findthem filling the damn water bottles out of thetap. For someone who was careful about herhousehold, it would just drive her crazy.

Since we had a single compound, I hadthe problem of a water supply for the yard, thegarden, and the amount of water that was beingdelivered to the compound through themunicipal water supply was inadequate for thatpurpose. We could use it for bathing and thatsort that thing, and boiling it and so on, but itwas inadequate to garden.

The Mission had instituted a program ofdelivering water through tank trucks, tankertrucks, from the filtration plant to the variouscompounds, and these were large tanker trucks. I used to let the boys order it and keep the recordand so on, and then I would get a bill for thatwater. Well, I got counting it up one day, beinga water engineer, and I got counting it up oneday, and I said, “Jiminy Christmas, we're usingtwo and three, four tanks of water a week. Howcome we're using that much water?”

So I started snooping around. And sothen I insisted that the Mission not deliver anywater to the compound unless I was there. So Iwould watch the operation to see what wasgoing on, and what was going on was that theywould come up with a full tank of water and

401

Kenneth F. Vernon

deliver half of it, and then they'd take the otherhalf and peddle it on the street.

Also, when we had the kerosene stove,we could order kerosene from the Mission, andthey would bring out a number of four imperialgallon [tins, this] would be [a] five gallon, U.S.gallon tin. And I got to looking at the record ofthe kerosene one day, because I had worked withthese people in my work and learned the thingsyou had to watch. I said, “Yee, Gods, if theyburned that thing twenty-five hours a day, wecouldn't be using that much kerosene.”

So I got snooping around some of theoutbuildings, and I found eleven tins full ofkerosene stashed away, which was going outover the back fence. They had an operationgoing on over the back fence. People wereshowing up with their little tin cans to get a fillof kerosene, and the boys were conducting abusiness, at my expense, over the back fence.

Well, maybe I was too strict. Maybe Ishould have said, “Oh, what the hell, I can affordit. Maybe they can't.” So maybe I should haveclosed my eyes. But having worked with thepeople more closely than most of the people inthe Mission, and I knew what their own peopledid to themselves, I said, “Well, I've got to dothe same thing.” So I put a stop to that.

Then as another matter, I knew . . .


Storey: This is tape five of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth F. Vernon on April the 27th, 1995.

Vernon: As I was telling you, Brit, about the

402


relationships with household staff and theproblems that were associated with that. I wastelling you a little bit about the water supply andthe kerosene supply.

Storey: When they were paid in the government.

Vernon: Yeah. There's another item that I wanted tomention that escapes me for the moment. Itslipped my mind. It's what I want to tell you,but it related to the problems of your householdstaff. Now, you have to understand that thesepeople were desperately poor. The salaries wepaid were good salaries in their terms, but still itwasn't very much money. For example, when Ipaid the cook 160 rupees a month, he was awell-paid cook, and he had eleven people livingoff of him.

As I was telling you, that I started to tellyou, that, as I would pay them their salary eachmonth, the local practice was, that as theemployee was paid – in the government this is –he would either have to sign the payment bookor he'd have to put his thumb print. So I had aset up an accounts book for each householdemployee, and at the first of the month, as Iwould go around with their payments, I wouldenter into the book, in their presence, their nameand what was being paid. If they could write,they either had to sign the book or they had toput their thumb print on it to show that they hadbeen paid in that amount. So I tried to operate asclosely as I could to the local custom.

Of course, you had to provide, if youwanted your help to wear uniforms, you tookthem to a local tailor and had white duckuniforms prepared for them, made for them, andthen you provided them with enough uniformsso they could stay clean, but they did have to dotheir own laundry.

403

Kenneth F. Vernon

Now, one main difference between theAmerican system and the British system, say, inthe use of household help, was our economy waspredicated on cash payment. Our economy is acash economy. You get paid, and that's [the endof] your responsibility from there on out. Youdon't normally accompany your cash paymentwith a whole bunch of perks.

But the British system was, give them apittance, so to speak, but then provide them witha lot of perks, like uniforms or householdsupplies or whatever, and they liked to keep thehelp on compound. Usually the compounds thatthe British lived in would be large enough tohave staff quarters, and so they might have twoor three families living on the compound, whichthey would provide rent free. So there was amore of a paternalistic approach to the staff inthe British system than in the American system,which said here's your money, now go forth.

Storey: Um-hmm. Did the embassy pay for any of thesestaff people?

Vernon: Oh, no. This was all on you, no. Now, theembassy did – the Mission paid our rent. Theygave us a quarter's allowance. And also inPakistan, I've forgotten what it was, there wasalso a hardship allowance, but I don't believe, asI recall, it was as much as Baghdad, becauseKarachi was considered to be a better post thanBaghdad. So let us say that Baghdad was a 15percent hardship allowance post, which was a 15percent override on our basic salary, whereasKarachi was, I say, a 10 percent post.

But one thing we did have in Karachithat we didn't have in Baghdad was, there was alarge enough military contingent there, the MAGgroup, Military Assistance Group, and there wasalso a two-star general heading that group. The

Using the militarycommissary in Karachi

404


military had a commissary there, which wecould participate in as members of the Americancommunity, the official American community. Not contractors who worked for private outfitscould, but as American employees, we couldalso participate in the military commissary,which made supplies, household supplies andfood, a much simpler problem than it was inIraq, where we would have to import the stuffourselves.

The Mission had set up, or the Embassy,I don't know which, had set up a sort of a reviewcommittee, which would review your purchasesat the commissary to try to forestall any blackmarketing of commissary imports. Andregularly at that time, since my wife and I wereboth heavy smokers, we would buy as many asthree cartons of cigarettes a week, three cartonsof cigarettes, that's thirty packs, for each of us,and I was smoking at least three packs a day atthat time. So periodically I got called on thecarpet, “Mr. Vernon, we've been reviewing yourpurchases of cigarettes. Would you pleaseexplain why you're using so many cigarettes?”

The problem of usingthe commissary forblack market purposes

I'd say, “Well look, I'm a heavy smoker. My wife's a heavy smoker. Look at my fingers. They're all brown. And then look at a month. Ifit's a five-weekend month, we always do ourshopping on Saturday, if it's a five-weekendmonth, I buy the supply for the month. If it's afour-weekend month, I buy a four-week supply. So that's why there's a variation in the quantityof cigarettes we purchase.”

And likewise, other supplies, andparticularly liquor. They'd check on your liquor. And then somebody got the bright idea that sinceliquor was very cheap, because we got it dutyfree, a quart of best whiskey was only $2.00,$2.50. Cigarettes were something like a $1.50 a

405

Kenneth F. Vernon

ten-pack carton, something like that, $1.10,something or other, because it was tax free, andother things the same way. They were trying tocontrol this back door economy.

As a matter of fact, one of the guys that Ihad brought over in the later stages that I was inPakistan, and then after I had – he had been inKorea, and after I had been transferred into theU.S., I learned that they collared him forcarrying on, he, an American, was carrying on ablack market operation of commissary supplies. And then he came to me when I was inWashington and said, “Can you help me? I'm upfor a discharge.”

And I said, “No, I'm sorry. You knowthe rules of the game. I don't know what theydid in Korea, but it certainly wasn't condoned inKarachi, and you knew the rules of the game, soyou did it deliberately. You deserve everythingyou get. So, no, I'm sorry, I just can't help you.”

Well, they kind of kept that under closecontrol, because we were rather heavy users on,particularly, cigarettes. We weren't abusers ofliquor. But after all, I did have to do quite a lotof entertaining because of my position, so wedid use more than the average family because weserved cocktails and that sort of thing. Wemight have twenty or thirty people in for anevening or something like that, which Americanliquor flows rather freely, in a Muslimcommunity, that is. And so I was periodicallydragged up. And I said, “Listen, you jokers, I'mone of the ranking members of the mission. Criminy, if I was trying to cheat on anything,would I be dealing with a carton or two ofcigarettes, for God's sakes, or an extra bottle ofwhiskey? Get real.”

So one time they came in with a whole

406


big shipment of T-bone steaks. So I said, “Oh,boy. Helen, let's give the gang a treat. Youinvite all the group, my group.” I had about adozen Americans by that time, eight or ten atleast, and they had families. So I said, “You calland invite everyone to dinner, and I'll go downand buy enough T-bone steaks for everybody.”

Boy, did I have to explain that. And Isaid, “My God, what's the matter with youpeople? It all went to Americans. I could affordit and they couldn't. So I gave them a treat of agod-darn good T-bone steak." I said, “You guyshave got to get real. You're accustomed towatching somebody who's got to watch hispennies." But I had equivalent salary andallowances that I could do something extra formy people at times, and I was willing to do it,because I was accustomed to enlisting thesupport and to create a family feeling among mystaff. I always had done that.

Professionally, the work in Pakistan waspretty good, not the same quality as Baghdad. But the living was not the same at all. It wasmuch less satisfying, both familywise and alsoprofession-wise.

I had one Pakistani official at my houseone night for dinner. We had a group in. And Idon't know whether he had a drink too many, buthe started to deliver himself of an oration howthe Americans were giving the Pakistanis a baddeal, and we're kind of giving them, shovingthem off to the side and telling them what theycould have and what they couldn't have, etc.,etc., etc.

So I finally got kind of tired of it, and Isaid – whatever his name was – I said, “Youknow, I'm an American. I'm kind of proud ofwhat were doing here for you Pakistani people.

407

Kenneth F. Vernon

I pay my taxes at home. My taxes are helpingsupport you. It's very disagreeable for me tolisten to you talk that way and show the lack ofappreciation you're showing for the effort thatwe Americans and the American public aredoing for you people. So if that's the way youfeel, I'd feel much better about it if you'd leave.”

But he shut up, because he was theMinistry of Economics, Ministry of Finance, Ithink, or something, and under that system overthere, they thought they were somebody. So ithad it's disagreeable aspects.

So do you have any more questionsabout Pakistan?

Storey: How long were you there?

Vernon: I was there three years. I was there from July of<59 to March of <62. I finished my Baghdad touron this TDY in Karachi. So that was up inNovember of <59. Then my next tour was up inMarch of <62. And a whole new experiencecame about when I was moved into Washington,which we can take up. If you want to make abreak now and stretch your legs, we can take upmy Washington experience, unless you havemore questions about Pakistan.

In 1962 moved toWashington, D.C.

Storey: No, not that I know of. No. Right now, whydon't we walk around a little. [Tape recorderturned off]

I think we were at the point of yourgetting ready to come back to the States.

Vernon: Yeah. This occurred – my tour was winding upin March of 1962. Mr. Killen, the MissionDirector, had been transferred to Korea, and weunderstood that the Mission Director in Korea,after his home leave, was going to report as

408


Mission Director of Karachi. Also, some newpeople would be coming in on the new MissionDirector's staff, but this would occur after I leftfor home leave.

One man came in of this new staff. Hewas to be the Assistant Director forAdministration. And he called me just beforewe left and indicated that he hoped that I wouldcome back to Pakistan. Well, I wasn't all thatthrilled about my work in Pakistan, not to theextent that I was in Baghdad, so I indicated that,well, I probably was coming back to Pakistan. Ihad to stay on somebody's payroll, because I hadkids in school, and all the rest of it. Any rate, Iwas kind neutral on the subject.

So as we took our tour home, we stoppedat a number of places in Europe, and then finallywound up in the United States. The life inPakistan had started to take a toll on my wife'shealth, and she had been sent once up to,evacuated [once] to Germany, medically, to – atthe time, we thought she would need some formof surgery, but it turned out that it was justmainly stress of living in there. And so I hadbeat my way across Europe on MATS, MilitaryAir-Transport System, up to Frankfort, andwhile I was on beating my way up there, theyhad determined that she simply needed some restand recreation. So I got there, and she didn'tneed any surgery and so on, and they wereprepared to discharge her. So we took a fewdays' vacation, traveling through Europe,stopped in Vienna and Athens and so on, finallygot back to Karachi. This was sometime during1961.

Wife becomes ill inPakistan

Then as we were working our way homeon home leave, we stopped in Tehran and anumber of other places. We stopped in Romeand had a nice visit in Rome. And then we were

409

Kenneth F. Vernon

going to spend a couple of days in Barcelonaand a couple of days in Madrid and a coupledays in Lisbon, and finally get to Washington.

While we were in Madrid, we were in ahotel downtown, and I went to the Embassy andtold them I was here, and I said, “I understandthat you’ve got a large air base contingent here.”

“Yeah.”

I said, “Don't they have billeting officehere?”

And they said, “Yes.”

Now, I had learned that at my ranking inthe Foreign Service that I drew the ranking oftwo stars in the military for quarters. And so Isaid, “Do you have any objections if I go talk tothem? We are going to be here in Madrid for afew days. Do you have any objections if I goover and talk to them?”

“Well, we really don't think you should. We don't like to impose on them, and they don'tlike them to impose on us – bureaucraticbusiness."

I said, “Well, am I forbidden to go talk tothem?”

“Well, no, you're not forbidden.”

So we drove out to the headquarters, thein-town headquarters there, where the billetingofficer was. And he was a Sergeant, a nice guy,and I told him who we were and what we weredoing and so on. And I said, “Do you have anyavailable quarters that we might be assigned?”because it would be a good deal less than thehotel.

410


"Well," he said, “I can't do it today, butcome back tomorrow. I might be able to worksomething out for you tomorrow.”

So we went to the museums and whatnotaround Madrid, did the usual Cook's tour, wentback tomorrow, and I said, ”Well, Sarge, haveyou got something for me?”

“Oh, yeah,” he says, “sure. The general'squarters are available." It was a two-room suite,a bedroom and a sitting room, suite. "I'll moveyou into that.”

Well, who am I to look a gift horse in themouth? So we moved in. I didn't bother to goback and tell the Embassy where we were,because I said it would make them awfullyunhappy, although I wanted to go over and jerktheir chain a little bit. And so we moved out totheir air force hotel.

Unfortunately, the night we were there,she suffered again one of these damn attacks thathad sent her to Germany. We were eatingdinner, and all of a sudden she just kind of froze. Well, I managed to get her up out of the diningroom and got her upstairs, and her abdomen wasjust absolutely drum tight. And I said, “MyGod, what's going on here?” So I drew a bath ofwarm water, and I said, “You get into that andsee if you can relax, and I'll go see if we can getsome help.”

So I went down to the billeting officerand said what had happened. I said, “My wifeneeds some medical attention. Do you have adoctor on call?”

Well, he said, “We use the local doctors,and we have one that we refer to.”

411

Kenneth F. Vernon

I said, “Well, could you get him over sohe could look at my wife?”

So about an hour later he came andexamined my wife. He said, “Well, I'm not quitesure what's going on here, but I think I bettertake her over to the British-American Hospitalso we can run some tests and see what's thetrouble."

So I rode through Madrid in anambulance, sirening in Spanish all the way to thehospital, which was a very nice hospital,incidentally. This Spanish doctor seemed to be avery knowledgeable guy. So they put her upthere, and they started running a bunch of tests.

In the meantime, I was staying there atthe hotel, the air force hotel. We had planned toleave Madrid and go to Lisbon and stay severaldays. Well, my wife was concerned about that.

She said, “You always wanted to go toLisbon.”

And I said, “Oh, forget it. It's moreimportant that we get you able to travel, andwe'll try to get you home. So we'll forgetLisbon.”

So they kept her there for several days,and then finally they didn't really know whatwas the problem. But I asked the doctor, I said,“Well, is my wife in a condition to travel? Whatwe would like to do, if possible, [is] to get herback to the States, and then they can determinewhat in the world is going on.”

So they said, “Yeah, we'll give her somemedication and whatnot to make the traveleasy.”

412


So then we left Madrid and flew directlyto Washington, by way of New York, andarrived in Washington March 21st, a very cold,stormy night. Any rate, so we reported into theMedical Department of the State Department,because every time when you came in theyexamined you to try to identify anything youmight have picked up while you were gone andwhether you were then in a condition to take onanother assignment.

Well, they examined her and came upwith the fact that several vertebrae in her backhad deteriorated to the point that it was affectingher sciatic nerve and everything else. It was justthrowing her whole nervous system out ofwhack. And so they recommended that – theysaid, “Where are you going for your leave?”

And I said, “Well, we're going first toDenver.”

They said, “Okay, we'll issue orders foryou take your wife to Fitzsimmons Hospital inDenver.” At that time Fitzsimmons was amilitary installation. I don't whether – is it stillthere?

Storey: Still is.

Vernon: And so they said, “You take your wife there, andthey'll take over and see what they candetermine.”

So we stayed in Washington about twoweeks, as I recall. In the meantime, I wastouching base to all my colleagues inWashington, and I'd become acquainted – at thattime, the Washington office had set up a thingcalled the Office of Technical Services in theNear East South Asia Bureau, and so I wasworking particularly through James Bloom, who

Touching base withcolleagues in D.C.during home leave

413

Kenneth F. Vernon

was the head of the Office of TechnicalServices.

Now, in that office there was the ChiefEngineer and his group, and also the othertechnical groups, like Agriculture, Education,Industry, and so on, which is basically theTechnical Assistance Group. His deputy hadbeen in the old ICA [International CooperationAdministration] Office of Industry, and so I hadbecome acquainted with him and he had becomeacquainted with me, because I'd been workingwith his industry people overseas as we workedout this business of the division between capitaldevelopment and the managerial side ofindustrial technology.

So Jim asked me what my plans were,and I told him about this medical problem thathad developed, and I said, “Well, I've got to stayon somebody's payroll, so I presume I'll have togo back to Baghdad [Karachi]. But I don't knowwhether the medics are going to clear my wife togo, so it's kind of a problem.”

Storey: You'd have to go back to Karachi, right?

Vernon: Yeah.

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: So we went on our leave, and I had a couple ofthings that I wanted to do while I was on leave. One particularly was that Pakistan had beentalking about developing a nuclear energyprogram, and with the EisenhowerAdministration, they'd been pumping [up] theexport of nuclear-energy technology, if notactually the nuclear devices. I wanted to get upto date on what was going on with power plantsfired by, or powered by, nuclear energy. So Igot approval to visit Oak Ridge Laboratory, the

Began to brush up onnuclear power becausePakistan wanted anuclear energy program

414


Dresden Power Station outside of Chicago, andthe General Electric manufacturing plant of fuelrods in San Jose, plus a number of other placeswhich I don't recall at the moment, but thosewere the three main ones, which I wanted to findout exactly what was involved in this nuclearenergy.

Quite frankly, what little I knew of it, Iwas really concerned about the import, or shall Isay export, of nuclear energy into these ThirdWorld countries, and I wanted to find out whatlevel of technology was required. What I knewin my experience when I was in the MissouriBasin, I knew that it was very expensive power. It was literally cheap power repackaged in theform of nuclear energy, because it took a hell ofa lot of electric power to process the uraniuminto plutonium into whatever and ultimatelybecame the fuel rods to power the fuel cells.

Now, you want to remember thatfundamentally, in a nuclear-powered station, thenuclear power does not have anything really todo with the electric power generation, exceptthat it's a completely separate entity in a closedsystem which provides the heat, which convertsthe water or whatever medium that boils thewater, or the medium, that runs the turbines, butit's a closed system. So that really the nuclearenergy never gets into the "electricity," so tospeak, but it's the means that provide – the sameas if it were coal or oil or whatever, gas,whatever. It's just an alternate system ofproviding the steam, so to speak.

So I wanted to find out what wasinvolved in that. So I did, I visited all theseplaces, and the more I learned, the moreconcerned I became. And I recall going throughthat Dresden Power Station [out of Chicago.] ,which [We were staying at the house of] my

415

Kenneth F. Vernon

oldest son, you met last night, was, at that time,had been brought back into the military, and hewas stationed at the Corps of Engineers Depot inGranite City, Illinois, across the river from St.Louis. , because The unit that had beenstationed there had been sent over to the BerlinWall crisis and [his unit was] they were sent inas a replacement unit to continue to prepareequipment to be sent overseas, because no oneknew just exactly what this [Berlin Crisis] wasgoing to involve, this Berlin crisis thing wasgoing to involve.

So I went up to Chicago, and then I wasmet at the door the next morning at the hotel bynone less than a limousine. I was driven out tothe Dresden Power Plant, which is about an houraway, by the limousine, and was given theCook's tour, the velvet glove treatment, and thentaken back to Chicago in the limousine.

But as I was going through this plant, Inoticed in each room we went into there was acareful division, a controlled entry, and we weregiven different patches to wear which wouldindicate any degree of nuclear fusion, radiation,that we were exposed to. And we were alsogiven protective clothing. And also on each wallthere were a whole list of instructions as to thedo's and the don'ts.

So I had an all-day tour. It was a veryinteresting tour. And then along about threeo'clock in the afternoon, we held a round-tableconference, and they said, “Do you have anyquestions you'd like to ask now about this tour?”

And I said, “Yes, indeed I do. And oneof the first things I want to ask you is, to whatlevel of education, what minimum level ofeducation do you think the people in your powerstation, your power station operators and other

416


mechanics and such types, have to have in orderto be considered, that could understand these (Imentioned these various instructions I'd seen andthe do's and the don'ts and this and that). Whatminimum level of education before you couldconsider a candidate?”

“Oh,” they said, “we don't really haveany problem with that. We can get collegegraduates. We never go below a high schoolgraduate. Even a mechanic is at least a highschool graduate.”


Vernon: We're talking about the quality of education,what education level people had to have to workin this nuclear power station.

“What would you say, if the people youhad might have a maximum of a fourth gradeeducation, and it would be somewhatquestionable whether it would be really thatlevel of understanding English, and could thesecomplicated instructions be reduced to a locallanguage? Would it be possible to reduce thoseinstructions to some form of visual aid ratherthan language?”

Well, this was a completely newapproach to them. They said, “We wouldn'tknow how to approach that, because we neverhad to face it, and we can see your concern.”

And then I said, “I'm also concernedabout the overall level of efficiency of the plant. Number one, fuel input versus electricity output;secondly, your efficiency of operation in thesense of downtime, how much time in the grossoperating time is spent in downtime because ofone thing and another."

417

Kenneth F. Vernon

"Well,” they said, “we do have problemsin those areas, and at the current time thisparticular plant, which is a pretty good one, isprobably at a level of about 60 percent.”

Storey: Efficiency.

Vernon: A lot of plants were much lower than that. A lotof time is spent more damn downtime than theywere on line.

And so I said, “Well, I certainlyappreciate you guys' frankness and showing meall these things, because I'm very fearful that ourgovernment is going to try to export, pressuredby the fusion industry, to export fusion products,particularly for electric generating plants, and Iwant to know exactly what we're faced with. Sowith the knowledge I've gained in this trip, I'mgoing to resist that as much as I can, because,my God, in the first place, it's a highly expensiveform of electric energy; in the second place, it'sa very dangerous form of electric energy; andthe third place is, nobody has come up with ascheme yet how to reprocess or de-process,whatever way you want to call it, of the spentfuel rods."

And Mr. Sisler of the Detroit EdisonCompany, who is one the large proponents,recently visited us promoting this activity, said,"Well, this method of reprocessing the fuel rods,we'll bring them back to the United States, andwe'll reprocess them there." And in response tothe question, do you have a process, "Well, wedon't have it right now. We'll store themsomewhere till we've worked out a reprocessing[system] item." We're still trying to figure thatout. We still don't know what to do with thespent fuel rods.

So at any rate, my overall report to

418


headquarters was that, for God's sakes, resist theeffort to avoid the export of this nuclear fusionenergy program, because, in the first place, thepeople don't have the technology to do it, and Iwould fear that there would be some form of –which later we saw happen in Chernoble inRussia – we'd have some form of a nuclearexplosion.

And so I was able to avoid that, but thepeople in India, they grabbed onto it, and theDevelopment Loan Fund, before it was passedout of existence, had agreed to finance such aplant in India, and one of my men in my groupin the Engineering Division in Washington, afterI became appointed in Washington, he was kindof herding that from our side. He was a well-experienced Power Engineer, but I have alwayshad my fingers crossed as to whether it would besuccessful, and it was terribly expensive.

So anyway, we went on this leave, andduring the middle of the leave I got a call fromMr. Bloom and [he] said, “Hey, Ken, the King ofSaudi Arabia has just been visiting withPresident Kennedy, and the President is going toset up an investigation commission to go out andreview certain things in Saudi Arabia.”

[The U.S.] We had been in Saudi Arabiapolitically [previously], but in 1954, for onereason or another, our efforts to give themassistance had been requested to leave thecountry, so we had had no support program. Wehad an embassy, all right, but we had no foreignoperations support aid program in Saudi Arabia. So Kennedy was interested, if we could, to getback in there.

The King and his advisors apparently hadconsidered that commercial interests in Europewere proposing things that were not always to

Sent to Saudi Arabia tosee about reopeningtechnical aid to thecountry

419

Kenneth F. Vernon

their advantage, and thought, perhaps, peoplefrom the U.S. government would not be trying tosell them something, so to speak.

So a group [of three] was set up, three ofus. While we were on leave, I got a telephonecall from Jim Bloom, who told me about thiscommission being set up, and he said, “Wouldyou be interested? We think that waterresources would be an important element in theinvestigation, and would you be interested ingoing?”

And I said, “Well, yeah, Jim, I think Iwould, sure. So count me in.”

After the telephone conversation wasover, my wife said, “What was that all about?”

I told her.

And she said, “When would you beleaving?”

And I understand I'd be leaving prettysoon. By this time, it was late June.

And she says, “You agreed to go toSaudi Arabia in the middle of the summertime?”

Storey: In June.

Vernon: [She said,] “Are you crazy? Didn't [you] we getenough of that in Baghdad and Karachi?"

And I said, “Well, I think it would be aninteresting exercise, something that I'd like todo. You won't have to go. You can stay in theStates. And I think I'd like to.”

Well she said, “How long are you goingto be gone?”

420


I said, “I don't know. Maybe up to amonth, I don't know.”

So the next thing I knew, I got orders toreport into Washington, and they had assembleda professor from Harvard, who was very activein oil affairs. He was a professor of economicsof oil affairs in the Persian Gulf area, and he wasknown to many of the governments out there. As a matter of fact, we found that Yamani, whowas the Oil Minister in Saudi Arabia, had beenone of his students. So he had an in to all of thatsort of thing.

I was the waters resources expert. Andthen Arthur Syran, S-Y-R-A-N, who had beenhead of previously ICA's, he had been the headof the Transportation Office, had beendesignated to be the commission member toexamine ports, railroads, highways, that sort ofthing. I think we had some other ancillarysupport, but they weren't really members of thecommission. We were the three main membersof the commission.

So we reported to – well, we met in, Ithink it was Athens, and had a sort of a get-together meeting to decide how we were goingapproach this thing, and then we reported intoJidda, in Saudi Arabia. And we visited with allthe various ministries around there. I wasgathering information on my part. Art Syranwas investigating the adequacy of port facilitiesand so on. And the head of our mission wasdealing directly with the Oil Ministry and theEconomics Ministry and other industries whichdealt with economic development.

Storey: Do you remember his name, the Harvardprofessor? That's the same person, right?

Vernon: I don't at that moment. Maybe it's one of those

421

Kenneth F. Vernon

things that will pop out all of a sudden, but rightat the moment, I don't recall.

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: So then after we did our work in Jidda, then wewent to Riyadh, which was the new capital, orthey were trying to make it the new capital,which was out in the middle of the desert.

So we all went through our exercisethere, and one of the things that I found was thatthe government was seriously consideringdevelopment of groundwater resources. Now,ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Company,which is a combination of Arab interests, Saudiinterests, plus CALTEX, Standard Oil ofCalifornia and Texaco, under the banner ofARAMCO, in their oil investigations, drillinginvestigations, they discovered there were largebodies of trapped water, groundwater. Somewas pretty good quality.

So the first reaction of the governmentwas, well, we can tap that water. So I got holdof a lot of ARAMCO records, since ARAMCOfelt, while they were their records, they alsobelonged to the government, the governmentwanted them. So I was charting where all thesebodies of water existed, the depths and so on.

We went over to Dhahran, which was theheadquarters of ARAMCO, and again Art waslooking at port facilities and so on and I waslooking at water developments that were goingon around over there around the Persian Gulf. Then we went back to Jidda, and then it wasarranged that there was a mountain resort, Taif,T-A-I-F, which was on the high mesa ground, anelevation of about 5,000 feet, where the Kinghad his summer palace. So we repaired up toTaif to have a round-up meeting with the King

422


and his immediate advisors.

Now, it turned out that the FordFoundation had had a team in Jidda advising thegovernment on various prospects fordevelopment, and the head of that team wasHarold [Folk] somebody. His name escapes meat the moment, but He later came over to AIDand headed up our effort in [the] capitaldevelopment [division]. He was basically afinancial [and economics] type, and he headedup our office of capital help, CapitalDevelopment Finance, which had taken theplace of the Development Loan Fund.

Any rate, we all reported to the Kingsummaries of our investigations, and of coursemy investigations, I had said that I wassomewhat concerned about the emphasis thatwas being placed on the development of thesegroundwater resources, because they were finite. This was geologic water, and it had a definitelife, depending on the rate of extraction, andhere you were tending to build this large city ofRiyadh, and I was reminded of the efforts – Itold him of my experience at the IraqDevelopment Board and the experience of oneof the caliphs.

It was always very good to let the Arabsknow you understood some of their history, andso I said, “One of the caliphs in Baghdad,somewhere along about 900 A.D., somethinglike about 300 Anno Hegira, which was theircalendar, had decided he didn't like Baghdad,and so he wanted to move his capital about sixtymiles upstream to this place called Samarra,where we had built the Wadi Tharthar DiversionProject, the flood control project.

"And up there, buried in the desert, thatyou could see flying over in an airplane, you

423

Kenneth F. Vernon

could see the residuals of that city buried, and itwas a very extensive city. It was buried in thedust of the desert. But the reason why they hadto abandon that city after about fifty years wasbecause they had no real way of extracting,efficient way of extracting water at thatelevation from the Tigris River. A lot of waterwas going by, but they had no efficient way ofextracting that water from the river. And sofinally that city had to be abandoned, and theyretreated back to Baghdad.

"The same thing happened in India. Oneof the Mogul emperors got tired of Agra anddecided to move out into the desert, and there's avery famous remnant of a very famous city[,Fatipur Sikri,] that he built somewhere around1500, 1600, which existed about fifty years. They had expended the available water supplies,and so they had to abandon the city and moveback to Agra, which was on the river.

“And so I'm concerned, Majesty, that thissame kind of a future might occur for yourdevelopment of the city of Riyadh unless someother form of water development would beconsidered for development.”

He said, “Well, what are you talkingabout?”

And I said, “Well, this is in its infancy,but our Department of the Interior has an officecalled the Office of Saline Water, which istrying to develop means and methodology toextract the saline elements in brackish watersand make it drinkable, potable. Unfortunately,at the present time that has not developed to thestage where it's really economically feasible. Itis possible, but it's very expensive. So there's agood deal of research work going on in theUnited States as to how this thing might be

424


improved. But this might be an alternativesometime in the future.” Well, I rested myreport there.

I understand that Reclamation gotinvolved in that and did some work with thegovernment of Saudi Arabia and developedsome desalinizing plants on the gulf coast andpiped it into Riyadh, which is 400 miles out inthe desert. Actually, after I became Director ofEngineering, I had on my staff, I got a guy fromthe Office of Saline Water in Interior and hadhim on my staff, working and finding out andgetting us up to date on things that were goingon in the desalinizing industry.

But any way, to pick up the yarn in SaudiArabia, so we made our report. Then we went tothe King. and then we went down to – Syran andI went down to Yemen. We spent a few days inYemen, because I had a couple of projects that Iwanted to inspect in Yemen, and he was lookingat the Port of Mocha to see what it might need.

And then from there we went over toAsmara in Eritrea, stayed a few days there. Wegot in connection with the – we had an unnamed,unidentified base in Asmara, whichfundamentally was an intelligence-gatheringstation, and what later I learned was calledELENT, electronic intelligence, listening to allthe various conversations going around theworld in the airwaves.

And then from there we managed to goback to – we had parted ways at Riyadh [with]This this professor at Harvard [who] went off tosome of his consultancies in the oil industryalong the Arabian Gulf, some of the sultanates,and I think one of them particularly was AbuDhabi. Then we agreed to meet in Athens again,where we would write our final report.

425

Kenneth F. Vernon

We wrote our technical aspect of thereport. Then we wrote a confidential sort ofeyes-only report, which was a politicalevaluation of the situation, as we saw it, in SaudiArabia. And we felt that there was a good dealof opportunity and a good deal of need forforeign aid support, but we should be verycareful in approaching it, because [GamalAbdel-]Nasser at that time was thumping theairwaves and was raising a good deal of trouble[for] to the existing monarchies, and particularlysuch a conservative monarchy as was existed inSaudi Arabia. And so we weren't sure [that] atsome point in time there might be an uprisingthere, which would overturn the monarchy, andthen there would be whole new ball game, andso we ought to be careful in getting overlycommitted, shall we say, with a large operationin Saudi Arabia until this situation becameclearer. So we reported that in.

Then I went back to the States andfinished my leave, and then I went back intoWashington. Helen was to accompany me. Andby this time – and while we had been in Denveron our leave, I'd taken her out to theFitzsimmons Hospital, and she spent about aweek out there, in which they'd evaluated hersituation, and they concluded that a large part ofher problem was mental stress from the strain ofliving in Karachi and [in] that theyrecommended, their report they recommendedthat she not be cleared for further overseas dutyfor some period of time, until her whole mentalattitude was considerably improved.

So I reported back into Washington. Iasked when they were discussing this, I said,“Well, if I have to go back to Karachi, could shego to some station in Europe, for example? Say,she loves Vienna or Rome. Would you permither to, clear her to go there to stay, and then I

426


could visit her periodically while she livedthere?”

“Oh,” they said, “yeah, that would be allright, because that's an environment which she'saccustomed to. And, yeah, she could go. Butwe don't recommend that she go into the kind ofthings you have been in up to this point. It's toostressful for her. It's affecting her health.”

So anyway, I got back into Washington,and I reported in to Jim Bloom, and by this timemy leave was about up. I'd been talking to Jimabout what other opportunities might exist, ifthere were any, and I said, “Well, you know, ifpush comes to shove, I'll have to go back toPakistan, because I got certain obligations that I[have] got to meet, and I [have] got to stay onsomebody's payroll, and I'll have to go backalone. I'm not looking forward to it, but I'll haveto go back alone.”

He said, “Ken, I've been working on yourproblem, and I think I would like you to stay in,overstay your leave. I can get you cleared andassigned to me on TDY, and to continue to workon your problem.”

Assigned toWashington, D.C.

So I said, “Fine. What do you want meto do?”

"Well, he said, “stick around.”

I said, “Well, give me a broom. I'llsweep the place out. I don't care, anything. I'mhappy to stay here.”

Well, I didn't know it at the time, butwhat was developing was that the then ChiefEngineer of the Near East South Asia Bureauwas a lush. By ten o'clock [or] , by eleveno'clock in the morning, he'd fall off the stool

427

Kenneth F. Vernon

over in the speakeasy that he went to by 10:30. So he'd report in, and the next thing he did afterhe kind of cleared his desk, he'd rush over thereand start tipping a few. And they had decidedthey had to get rid of him, because it just was animpossible situation. But they had to, underCivil Service regulations and so on, they had tocreate a case. So they had to be able todocument what the problems were.

So this was why Jim couldn't sayanything to me, but he had gone to personnel inNear East South Asia Bureau and said, “Who dowe have that might take this joker's place?”

Well, they said, “You've been looking athim, Ken Vernon. He's in right here, sittinghere. He's the best damn engineer in theagency.”

And so that was why Jim Bloom saidstick around. They had told him, <We can helparrange a slot for him in the manning table andget him assigned to it as TDY. We'll borrow itfrom somebody else.”

Storey: What's a manning table?

Vernon: Well, that's a military term. Each unit's got amanning table. It's your organizational chart,with its position chart and its funded slots and soon. And so, "We'll borrow a slot fromsomebody else that isn't filled and assign it toyou, and so you can assign Vernon to that onTDY."

I didn't know all this. They graduallykept working me more and more into theactivities of the engineering group, and it finallygot to the point where I was told that I was onmore or less permanent TDY to Washington. Iwas not going to have to go back to Pakistan.

Assigned to theengineering group,Technical ServicesDivision of the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau

428


Then I was actually transferred into Washingtonto the engineering – they had developed theorganization charts to the point where theyactually had a place for me, and so then theycould transfer me into Washington. So then Ibecame a part of the engineering group in theTechnical Services Division of the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau.

More and more, I was assuming thefunctions of the Chief of Public Works. Theykept assigning me new assignments, and so Iwas gradually gathering some of these guys thatwere in the Engineering Division andestablishing a unit in Public Works, such asschool buildings, the hospitals, airports,highways, railroads, etc., etc. Then later, at alater step, they had a minor reorganization, inwhich actually a Public Works Section wasestablished with me as its chief.

Assumed the functionsof Chief of Public Works

All the time they were gathering thisinformation, they needed to settle this otherproblem. So I went out to Pakistan on a fieldvisit, and on the way back I stopped at Jordan,addressed some problems in Jordan, and by thetime I got back to Washington, I was told that Iwas the new Chief Engineer of the Near EastSouth Asia Engineering Division, that theformer Chief Engineer had decided to resign. Apparently, they faced him down and said,“Look, this is what we know about you. We'llgive you the chance to resign, if you want to,gracefully, or we'll nail your body to the cross. Take your pick.”

Returned from Karachiand Jordan to find hehad been appointedChief Engineer of theNear East South AsiaEngineering Division

Apparently, they'd picked up some thingsin his history that were not very savory. I don'tknow what they all were. He'd been ingovernment for a long time and been involved inthe War Plant Production Board, war plantindustry or what not, and he had been also in the

429

Kenneth F. Vernon

Development Loan Fund engineering activityand so on. Intrinsically, he didn't fit in to thekind of operation that AID was operating, but healso had some things in his background, and alsohe had this weakness for the bottle. And so theyfaced him up with the information they'dgathered. He decided to gracefully retire. Andthen when I got back, I was announced as thenew Chief Engineer of the Near East South AsiaBureau.

Storey: Before we go on, Mr. Vernon, who was the Kingof Saudi Arabia that you . . .

Vernon: King Farouk. He was the brother of King IbnSaud. He was a brother of King Ibn Saud,[whose] but his health had deteriorated to thepoint where either he had been deposed or wassidelined in a health facility, or even may havedied by that time, I'm not sure which. [Taperecorder turned off]

You asked me about the King of SaudiArabia. Well, he was the brother of Ibn Saud,whose health had failed to the point he hadbecome incapacitated, and may even by the timewe were there have died. But any rate, KingFarouk had taken over as King, and I was greatlystruck by the man. He was a tall, slender manwith a hawk visage. He reminded my of myfather-in-law, who was a very tall man with astern visage.

Now, King Farouk had his feet amongthe Bedouin tents. He was not a city man, hewas a Bedouin, and believed in the desert tents,and that was his strength. Whereas Ibn Saud, hisbrother, was a sort of a dilettante and didn't caremuch about anything except having a good time. And it was rumored that it took three ladies anight to satisfy him.

430


Storey: Ibn Saud?

Vernon: Yeah, Ibn Saud, because he had a harem of Godknows how many wives. But at any rate, KingFarouk was [of] a much sterner metal, shall wesay. And it was a pleasure to talk to him,although you had to talk to him through aninterpreter, but he was very sharp. He knewwhat he was about.

As I told you previously, there was thishead of the Ford Foundation team that was inthere who accompanied us in our meeting withthe King, and periodically someone would raisea question or raise a point in his report to theKing, and the King would turn to the head of theFord Foundation and say, literally say, “Whydidn't you tell me about this? Why is thishappening?”

Of course, the head of the FordFoundation was kind of helpless, because hecouldn't very well respond to the King [with]some realistic answer. He had to apologize, andsincerely he would promise to look into it, etc.,etc. But he was being pilloried before theassembled multitude, and the King wasgracefully getting the thing off of his back andblame it on this Ford Foundation guy if it washappening or wasn't happening or whatever.


Storey: This is tape six of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth Vernon on April the 27th, 1995.

Vernon: We've been discussing my appointment as ChiefEngineer of the Near East South Asia Bureau. Well, prior to that appointment, I had beenassigned to a very special project which dealtwith a dam in India, related to this Indus Basin

431

Kenneth F. Vernon

replacement works project that I'd discussedearlier in my relationship with Pakistan.

During the closing days of theEisenhower Administration, the World Bank andthe Development Loan Fund had promised toprovide India with the required foreign exchangeto build the necessary works in India, so thatthey could then divert the waters from the riversarising in India to lands to be irrigated in Indiato give them the agricultural base that they lostby the division of Pakistan [and] India intoPakistan and the Punjab.

With the new legislation for the Agencyfor International Development, the DevelopmentLoan Fund had been – well, it ceased to exist,and its function had been wrapped into theAgency for International Development and[in]to an office of Capital Develop andFinancing. But there was this problem relatingto the Beas Dam in India,

Storey: B-I-A-S?

Vernon: B-E-A-S Dam in India on the Ravi River, on theheadwaters of the Ravi River, R-A-V-I, whichwas one of the tributary rivers to the Indus Basinand which was one of the major tributariesproviding irrigation water into Pakistan.

Beas Dam, Ravi River,India, had a monetarycommitment from theUnited States, but alsorequired a finding offeasibility

One of the first efforts of the Indiangovernment to replace the lost agriculturaldevelopment was to build a dam on the RaviRiver at the Beas site. But one of the elementsof the new Agency for InternationalDevelopment [law] organization was verysimilar to that of Section Nine of the 1939Project Reclamation Act,33 which required thefinding of feasibility.

In a few introductory meetings with the

432


World Bank, we soon found out that the WorldBank had decided that they were not going to getinvolved with the economics of the project. Ithad agreed, politically, to provide a $23 milliondollar loan to the government of India forforeign exchange purposes to the government ofIndia, QED. They'd buy their way out. They'dprovide it, and they wouldn't look again.

However, we were faced with theproblem of a finding of feasibility. Where werethe lands to be irrigated? Would they beirrigable? Would it be economic to irrigatethem? We were to provide $33 million to thegovernment of India for foreign exchangepurposes.

Storey: The United States? The State Department? Who's "we"?

Vernon: Well, the we is the U.S. government. Throughthe Development Fund, it promised to provide aloan of $33 million for these foreign exchangeexpenditures, which now was wrapped into theAgency for International Development, Butnow we were faced with the legislation whichrequired a finding of feasibility.

Storey: Uh-huh.

Vernon: So the Assistant Administrator for the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau – each geographic bureau inthe Agency for International Development washeaded up by an Assistant Administrator,responsible to the Administrator of Agency forInternational Development. And so theAssistant Administrator for the Near East SouthAsia Bureau was exploring this situation whenhe found out that the – it had been reported tohim that the World Bank was not going to lookinto it, and we couldn't depend upon the WorldBank to examine this and [make a] find a finding

433

Kenneth F. Vernon

of feasibility, that if the AID agency, the A-I-DAgency was going to provide the money,somehow a finding a feasibility had to becreated.

Well, everybody turned to me, becausethey knew of my experience in Reclamation. They knew of my experience in Iraq with theDevelopment Board. They knew of myexperience in Pakistan with the Water andPower Development authorities. The AssistantAdminister turned to me and said, “Is thereanything you can do about this, Vernon?”

I said, “Well, I don't know. But I knowone thing right off the bat. I would first want tovet the plans of the Indians for the Beas Dam,because I know what happened in Pakistan withthe dams which had been proposed, by then thegovernment of India, on the rivers, and notnecessarily the government of India, but theirrigation interest in Pakistan, who had all beenIndian engineers, so pro tanto,34 it was thegovernment of Indian principals that governedthe design of the dams on the tributaries inPakistan. And so the first thing that the foreignengineers had to do when they started reviewingthese plans was to completely redesign thembecause of the woeful inadequacy of thehydrologic data and the flood studies and theactual designs of the dams.

"So before we even talk about irrigation,I think the first thing we need to do is assemble agroup which might review the plans that theIndian government has for this Beas dam.”

Well, he says, “Who do you think mightdo that?”

Well, I said, “There are two groups thatcome to mind immediately in the United States

434


that we might draw on. There are others, but thetwo that I would nominate, first, would be theCorps of Engineers, their Civil Works Divisionat the Corps of Engineers, because it has a wideexperience in the kind of dams that the Indiansare proposing; or secondly, the Bureau ofReclamation, which has a little less experiencein this kind of a project.

Well, he says, “You're authorized tomake contact and find out what's possible.”

So I immediately contacted some of myfriends who were heading up the Civil WorksDivision in the Corps of Engineers inWashington, who I'd known from the MissouriValley days, and had them come over anddiscuss with me. I had worked out what Ithought would be an appropriate scope of work,which could be the basis of an interagencyagreement. I worked that out, and I put thatbefore them, and said, “This is what we think weneed. Would your agency be interested inundertaking such a study?"

Well, they looked at it and said, “Well,yeah, we think we can do it, but we'll have toclear it with our management to see whether theCorps of Engineers would like to undertake it.”

Well, the report came back from theCorps of Engineers for one reason or anotherthat the Defense Department did not want tobecome involved in India. Because it had verystrong relationships in Pakistan, they didn't wantto jeopardize [those] by coming into arelationship with the government of India. Itwas a political decision, because of the politicsin the Indian subcontinent.

Storey: Yeah, because of the tension between Pakistanand India.

435

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: Over partition. And so defense-wise, theDefense Department felt that Pakistan was moreimportant to us than some short-term associationwith the government of India, because theydidn't want to jeopardize their association withthe government of Pakistan, because as I toldyou earlier, we had a very large MilitaryAssistance Group in Pakistan.

So the report came back that,unfortunately, the Civil Works Division of theCorps of Engineers couldn't undertake theassignment. So that meant, then, that I wouldhave to go to the Bureau of Reclamation.

Barney Bellport was the Chief Engineerat that time, and he happened to be inWashington. So I went over to the InteriorDepartment and asked for an interview withBarney and told him my problem and what wewanted to do, and would he make available aBureau of Reclamation team that couldundertake this study?

Storey: He was Chief Engineer at that time?

Vernon: Yeah, he was Chief Engineer at that time. Well,he said, “What kind of people are you talkingabout?”

Well, I said, “I'd like to have the groupheaded up by Oscar Rice.” I think Oscar Ricewas the Chief Design Engineer at that time. Isaid, “I think I'd like to have whomever youwould provide, to be headed up by Oscar Rice,and then maybe one of your better constructionengineers on earth-fill and rock-fill damconstruction and some of your bettereconomists, and so on." So we talked about ateam of five or six people, headed up by OscarRice.

436


Well, he said, “Let me go back to Denverand talk it over with the guys and see what theirreaction is."

So word came back through the ForeignActivities Office of Reclamation in Washingtonthat, yeah, Barney agreed and that Oscar Ricewould be interested in heading up – oh, yes, andI wanted particularly Herb Reisbol,R-E-I-S-B-O-L, who was the Chief Hydrologistat that time in the Bureau in Denver, because Iwanted to get a handle on these hydrologicstudies, because they had felt they were veryimportant for flood studies. So I named a bunchof his stars to [make] head up this team.

Bureau of Reclamationagreed to do studies forBeas Dam, India

Well, Barney agreed, and so weassembled the team. I forgot. There was OscarRice, Herb Reisbol –

Storey: Carl Hoffman, maybe?

Vernon: No. A man from Glen Canyon Dam, who'd beena part of the construction crew, the fieldengineer at construction of Glen Canyon Dam. Ican't think of his name for the moment. Anotherconstruction engineer who'd been associatedwith a dam down in Texas. Then an agriculturaleconomist, but I forget whether he was locatedin Denver or Washington. So I think that wasour team.

So then I took them to India, and we hada number of meetings with the Ministry ofIrrigation in Delhi, and then we went up to theBeas Dam site. We reviewed the – they alreadyhad a large crew up there and a niceestablishment already going up there, headed bya very intelligent Indian engineer who had been– he had trained under Harvey [Slocum, anAmerican,], begins with a B, at the, I think itwas the Bhakra Dam or something like that, who

437

Kenneth F. Vernon

had been under contract to the government, buthad been associated with either Morrison-Knudsen or Peter Kiewitt or one of our big dambuilding outfits, and had taught them how tobuild a dam. And so this doctor, he was a Sikh,S-I-K-H, wore the turban and the beard, he wasthe head of the project, and he was supported bya couple of assistants, and then, of course, theusual crew.

Well, Oscar and his gang set to work. Isaid, “Well, while you're doing your work here,I'm not intimately involved in this. I've gotsome other projects that I want to look intowhile I'm here in India. So I'll got back to Delhi,and then I'll go visit these other projects, andthen I'll come back up to the dam here and wecan finish up the conversations here."

Oscar told me what they had kind ofgotten into and gave me kind of a quickie look-see. Then the head of the project said, “Youknow, this total project includes, upstream, adiversion from this river over into the SutlejRiver," above this concrete dam I'd been talkingabout that this Sikh had been the assistantconstruction engineer, and this was to be a realpiece of transmountain diversion in a very heavyearthquake area.

So I said to Oscar, “Well, you take yourgroup and people from the project staff and goup and investigate what that looks like, becauseobviously we'll want to know your reactions tothat proposal. And I'm going to ask the ProjectEngineer to have a private meeting with me,because I've got some questions that I want toaddress to him privately that I don't care todiscuss in front of the assembled multitude,particularly personnel problems and governmentof India intentions."

438


So they all took off and went off. Oneafternoon I had a long private session with theProject Manager, and I propounded to him thisquestion. I said, “I really am impressed withyou as a person and your obvious knowledgeand training, but I'm a little concerned as to theequivalent knowledge and training of a couple ofyour assistants, who might be your successors ininterest should the government of India decide tocall you back to Delhi."

Oh, he says, “No, no, they won't do that. I'm going to be staying here.”

Well, I said, “No, you know over timethese things happen, and my superiors will wantto have my reaction as to what will be theproject management over a period of time. Sowill you arrange for me to meet the FirstSecretary of the Ministry of Irrigation?”

So he did. So we all traipsed back downto Delhi, he and I, and had a long session withthe then First Secretary of the Ministry ofIrrigation. And I propounded this same questionto him about my concerns, and what was theintent of the government of India of leaving thegood doctor up there on the dam? Oh, heassured me that it was their full intention toleave him up there. I could rest assured that he'dbe there through the full project period.

Then I said I had a second concern,which dealt with problems at your level. I said,“I've operated enough in this government, yourtype of government, to know the dead hand ofthe Ministry of Finance, and even though wemight provide the money to you, they wouldgrab control of it and they would dole it out toyou in accordance with their whims and not inaccordance with your needs, of the projectneeds. There will be a critical time in the

439

Kenneth F. Vernon

construction of this project when it comes timeto close off the river. There must have been, andbe on hand, adequate equipment to do— in oneseason, there's going to have to be a millionyards of fill material placed in a very shortperiod of time, so there has to be adequateequipment on hand, with a backlog and stockpileof materials, both as to the materials itself andthe equipment to place it, and spare parts to keepthem working.

Well, he said, “You know, thegovernment has a way of solving theseproblems.”

“Yes,” I said, “I know. But it'sburdensome and tiresome and time consuming,and I'm concerned if some kind of a mechanismcould be set up, and I would like to say that youagree to set up such a mechanism that thesefunds, foreign exchange funds, would be madeavailable to you rather than to the Ministry ofFinance so that you can control their expenditureand dole them out in accordance with projectneeds."

“Well,” he said, that will take a bit ofstudy.” He agreed that would take a bit of study. As I told you [in] that form of government, theMinistry of Finance was designed to avoid theexpenditure of money, and particularly foreignexchange.

Well any rate, shortly after I went backto Washington and started working on my report– no, wait a minute, that's getting ahead of thestory. So I went back to Washington, and OscarRice finally went back to Denver with his group,and I started working on my report to theAssistant Administrator of this review, andwaiting for Oscar's report, which finally came in,and it was exactly as I anticipated. They

The Reclamation teamcompletely redesignedthe Beas Dam

440


completely redesigned the dam, because theyfelt that it was inadequate.

They completely – Reisbol came up witha completely different flood study, very similarto what Harza had come up with on the ChenabRiver in Pakistan and what TAMS was comingup with on the Indus River for the dam on theIndus, because the Corps of Engineers andhydrologists in the United States had developedwhat they called the – oh, what the hell did theycall it, the unit flood or something like that,which they could assign various values to, thehundred year, the 500 year. It doesn't mean it'sgoing to take 500 years to produce it, but it's theprobability of it occurring.

And they learned how to move thestorms around over the basin to develop thehighest flood intensity. This had been developedin the Corps of Engineers and in the Bureau ofReclamation, and Reisbol was very familiar withthis situation. Harza had come up with thisstudy for the Mangla Dam and TAMS wascoming up with a similar study, and the firstthing they did was about quadruple the spillwaycapacity of the dam.

Also, Oscar came up with the fact that,because of the size and shape of the rock in theriver bed which was to be used in this rock-fillfacing, was about the size and shape of about afoot in diameter just like [ball] roller bearings,so that all this rock facing which they proposedto put on the face of the dam, particularly thedownstream face of the dam, as ballast, so tospeak, and we were in earthquake country. Well, all that bloody rock would justimmediately shift downstream and the damwould lose it's stability, and you were in trouble. Also, he agreed that the year that the river was tobe closed off was going to be a very critical year

441

Kenneth F. Vernon

in the closing operations and that the supply ofequipment, materials, manpower, and etc.,would be very critical.

So, anyway, it was a good report. So Iattached his report to my report, and his report, Iparaphrased or condensed into my report, andcommented on his particular points as to mypoint of view, whether I agreed or whether I hadsome questions about it, would require furtherexamination, etc., etc.. But anyway,substantively I adopted his report, which wouldmake a great difference in the amount of,particularly local currency, rather than foreignexchange, and it would increase – it aboutdoubled the cost of the dam in terms of theparticular local currency.

Then I came to the issue of, I got all thatphysical part of the dam out of the way, and thenI had to come to the economic section as towhere this water was going to be used. Now,they were going to divert this water through aseries of canals to the Rajasthan Desert, R-A-J-A-S-T-H-A-N , Rajasthan Desert. And this wasglossed over, which had not really beenexamined as to the quality of the land resources,but on the presumption that the Indians had beenirrigating this type of land for some time, theyprobably knew how to handle it. But there wasthe question of farm size, which hadn't beenstudied, and then there was the question ofmanpower.

Well, in my economic analysis, I said I'dbeen experienced with the ability of greatquantities of manpower to accomplish greatthings, and I had visited a number of projects inIndia while I was on this visit, and I had seen theeffect of what gross manpower could do, ratherthan machinery. , but what gross manpowercould do. And so I said, instead of capital as

442


their resource, they've got manpower. Manpower is their resource. So that for a merepittance of local expenditure, they could providea great resource in manpower to do a lot of thecanal and irrigation work, so that was a plus. Inother words, the government was going to haveto expend the money of upkeep of these familiesand manpower in any event, one way or another. It would be simply a matter of the governmentreassigning that expense and relocating thesepeople to the project to carry out the projectfunction, but it was at no difference in cost to thegovernment, if you follow me.

Then there was the question of, at whatrate would the lands be developed on the project. And I pointed out that our experience on theColumbia Basin Project, that it takes a longperiod of time to develop a large tract. of area,that developing In the United States, thedevelopment at the rate of, say, 40,000 to 50,000acres a year, was a pretty high rate ofdevelopment. But here we were talking aboutmaybe a couple of million acres, and thequestion would be simply, how much land theywanted spread that water over, which was thenanother problem that would have to beaddressed.

So I had a guy on my staff, an industrialengineer, who had come in from Iran, Tehran,John McReynolds, and I said, “John I want youto undertake an economic study, just as youwould as an industrial project, and taking intoaccount the length of time over the years thatthis project would be developed, take to develop,and the rate of expenditure that would berequired to develop it. See if you can work outsome charts and graphs and whatnot that mightshow that economic results might be parallel tothe rate of expenditure of funds to develop, sothat we might at least maintain a one-to-one

443

Kenneth F. Vernon

ratio, benefit-cost ratio, reminding everyonethat, in terms of labor, it was really no cost to thegovernment, because they were going to providefor these people one or another, anyway." [Taperecorder turned off]

So I came up finally with a quite acomprehensive report and submitted it throughchannels, and it got the agency off the hook. Itnow had a finding which met the test of thefinding of feasibility, so we could now releasethe $33 million that had been promised to thegovernment of India in a development loan. And so the World Bank, then, made it's $23million available. We made our $33 millionavailable. So that provided the Indians with afund of $56 million worth of foreign exchange,which unfortunately went into the Ministry ofFinance. They never were able to get theMinistry of Finance to let go of its dead hand.

Report on Beas Damsubmitted

And then right on top of all that, the[First Secretary of the Ministry] Minister ofIrrigation had been appointed the governor ofGoa, which it was a little Portuguese enclave onthe west coast of India which had been takenover by India, and so now they needed agovernor. They took the First Secretary of theIrrigation Ministry and made him the Governorof Goa, and they brought my damned projectengineer down and made him the First Secretaryof the Ministry of Irrigation. So the very thingthat I was afraid of did happen.

Also in my report, and supplementary tothe Bureau of Reclamation’s report, I said, “Ithink we should enter into an interagencyagreement with the Bureau of Reclamation toprovide a number of skilled technicians to assistthe government of India during the constructionperiod of the dam," because there were certainperiods of critical construction that our people

RecommendedReclamation techniciansassist in construction ofthe Beas Dam

444


would understand and be able to guide theIndians in its processing, particularly this matterof pore pressure, which I discussed with youyesterday, I believe, because during the time ofthe actual closure of the dam, the great quantitiesof material that would have to be placed in sucha short time, there was a high probability thatpore pressures would be developed and that theBureau men could assist the Indian engineers insomehow avoiding that.

And if worst came to worst, we mighthave to actually put in the base of the dam, andthen adequately protect it against the flood, andpass the flood over an open section of this earth-filled dam, because we couldn't possibly get ithigh enough to withstand the flood, given thecapacity of the incoming flood and the outflowcapacity of the diversion tunnels.

So the government of India agreed tothat, because they were happy to have theBureau of Reclamation tied into it. And theBureau of Reclamation agreed to provide thosepeople, through us, to the government of India. And so there was a Bureau of Reclamation teamon that project during its heavy constructionperiod, headed up by the son of who had beenmy Chief Engineer [in Baghdad].

END OF SIDE 1, TAPE 6. APRIL 27, 1995, APRIL 27, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 6. APRIL 27, 1995.

Vernon: As I said, it turned out that the Bureau had sent ateam over there, and headed up by the son of myChief Irrigation Engineer when I was with theDevelopment Board in Iraq. But I didn't knowhis son at the time, either, then. I didn't knowhim or know that he was there. I didn't knowwho the Bureau of Reclamation provided. Because then the government of India alsoprovided a liaison engineer who was assigned to

445

Kenneth F. Vernon

Denver, and he kept track of the activities ofDenver regarding the design of the Beas Dam,and every time he'd pass through Washington,he'd stop and bring me up to date.

So that was a very heavy exercise that Icarried on both before I became the ChiefEngineer of the Near East South Asia Bureau,then immediately thereafter.

Of course, there were other activities Iwas gotten involved in. The A-I-D had a bigprogram going on in Turkey, and I hadmentioned, when I was discussing problems onthe Tigris and Euphrates River, that I hadlearned that Turkey was considering the buildingof dams in the upper reaches of the EuphratesRiver at least, and they had employed a lot ofpeople both to design such a dam, and to studythe lands that might be irrigated.

There were also some other dams beingbuilt in Turkey, one of which had developedsome serious foundation problems in oneabutment, which I went out to visit. And thenthe Turks brought in a consulting engineer,which we financed, from the United States toexamine the foundation problem and torecommend certain corrective activities.

By the time the big dam on the Euphratesgot really active, I had been moved up to beDirector of Engineering for the agency, and Iwas responsible to the Administrator for thestandards and practices and adequacy ofengineering activities in all the AIDorganizations. , throughout the AIDorganizations.

Made Director ofengineering, Agency forInternationalDevelopment (AID)

Getting over into the other activities wehad when I was still in the Near East South AsiaBureau, while I was in Pakistan I had gotten the

Oversaw intermodaltransportation study inPakistan

446


Pak government to agree to an intermodaltransportation study, trying to get a measure ofhow investments should be made in highway,railroad, ports, what the priorities should be,even airlines. They agreed to have that done, soour Washington office asked the Corps ofEngineers to assemble such a group and head upsuch an effort. I was basically opposed to that,but I was outvoted, because I didn't think weneeded to call an overriding agency, such as theCops of Engineers, to do it. We were perfectlycapable of doing it ourselves – I mean, notourselves, but managing it ourselves with thestaff that I had.

It turned out, in my mind, that while thereport was pretty good, they assembled a prettygood team, the Corps of Engineers, in itswisdom, managed the team and simply bought areport literally by the pound. In other words, itreally didn't exercise any supervisory actionsregarding the team, turned them loose, and said,“Give us a report.” That seemed to be their wayof doing business.

And, I had a great deal of difficultyselling that scheme to the Ministry of PublicWorks. With their assistance, we had workedout a pretty comprehensive scope of work,which we felt ought to be the basis of the study. But the Corps of Engineers simply threw thatdown the tube and told this group to go to work.

They assembled some pretty goodpeople. There was an ex-president of thePennsylvania Railroad, there was the ex-ownerof one or more airlines, there was a gentlemanwho was well experienced in port work. Theyhad a couple of good highway engineers in thegroup. So I must say that the group that theyassembled was pretty good, and they studiedboth West Pakistan and East Pakistan, and the

447

Kenneth F. Vernon

problems were different in both places.

But I felt, and the government felt, thatthe way the study was handled by the Corps ofEngineers, all they could do was sit and waituntil they got handed five pounds of report. Iwas never sure what we were getting for themoney being expended, because the Corps ofEngineers completely blocked us out of thestudy. So to that extent, I don't know howvaluable [it became], because then I left beforeany effect of that report was being put intoeffect. So I don't know how effective the reporttended to be, although some good effort was putinto it.

One of the problems we had in the insidethe government [of Pakistan] in Iraq was, therewas a feeling of contest or competition betweenthe railroad administration – the railroad isministered by the government – and the highwayadministration. The railroad didn't wanthighways to really be developed, because that[might] would take away traffic from them. Thehighways realized that [more] much moderntransport was moving traffic more rapidly overhighways, so a good highway network would bea large improvement over the availability of therailroad, because the railroad, its equipment wasnot all that great. I think their freight cars, forexample, would haul about ten metric tons,whereas our freight cars, the lighter freight cars,would hold twenty metric tons. And it wouldhave all the delays involved in moving trafficover a railroad, through the yards, etc., etc.. Butif we could establish an adequate highwaynetwork, see, the fluidity of truck traffic wouldbe as good there as it is in our country.

Also, what we had felt was that anadequate evaluation ought to be made of the –what's it called – piggyback operations, the

448


container ship being off-loaded through the port,not being tampered with in the port area, loadedonto a train or a trailer, loaded onto a train,hauled up country, off-loaded onto the ground,and then could be picked up by motor transportand moved around rapidly, just as is done in thiscountry. This was in its early stages, and soPakistan wasn't quite aware of what was goingon in our country in the development of thispiggyback operation. But if you'll note that amajor part of traffic now, freight is being movedby piggyback operations, and the trains now areloaded, the freight trains are loaded primarilywith piggyback trailers, piggyback cars carryingtrailers, rather than closed box cars. So this wassomething that we had thought had to beaddressed.

Also, in Pakistan before I left, the mainroad highway out of Karachi, leading up theIndus Valley, was too close to the river and wassubject to closure during floods, flood stage. SoI talked to the Mission Director, and I said,“What I would like to do, and with yourpermission, I'd like to ask the District Engineerof the Corps of Engineers stationed here tocooperate with us, to make a reconnaissancesurvey of a possible route out of Karachi and upto Hyderabad, at least, which would get awayfrom the river, and then it wouldn't be subjectedto flooding."

So he said, “Yeah, go ahead.”

So we spent several days, Jim Campbelland I and Colonel Northrup, the Corps' DistrictEngineer, and a couple of his guys, we scouted aroute up through the back lands at a much higherelevation so it wouldn't be subject to the riverfloods, and found a feasible route. So then Iasked the Mission Director for authority to hiresome local Pak engineers to do some surveying

449

Kenneth F. Vernon

for us, so I employed some surveyors and somedraftsmen. So we set about actually makingdetailed location surveys and detailed quantitymaps, etc., etc.

This was approaching completion beforeI left, and it was presented to the government forits consideration. I had hoped that our sidewould get to finance that, because I felt it wouldbe a feather in our cap as a very viable project. But unfortunately, the World Bank got wind ofit. They also thought it was a viable project andthey grabbed it, and so they agreed to finance it.

As it turned out over time, all the peoplethat were wanting to finance projects werewatching my group, what we were developingwith the government of Pakistan, and they weregrabbing all the good projects and we werebeing left with those of second, third, or fourthchoice. In other words, we were being left withthe dogs and the ones that were most difficult tocomplete.

So that was some of the efforts that weexpended in Pakistan, and then I got involved insome stuff while I was in the Near East SouthAsia Bureau, some airports. It was decided thatthe Karachi Airport needed to be expanded. Well, the Corps of Engineers was pretty good atmanaging construction, so it was decided to turnsupervision of construction of the KarachiAirport expansion over to the Corps ofEngineers. So they assembled some contractorsand got that job done.

Karachi airportexpansion

There was also a similar study beingmade in East Pakistan for a modern airport atDhaka. While I was in Washington as head ofthis Public Works Group, I received that reportand was reviewing it, and I ran into a number ofproblems with it, such as ownership of the lands,

450


which would have to be sorted out before theland could be purchased. Also, since it was verylow-lying land, the matter of bearing capacity ofthe soils, because at this time the 707 was justgoing into service and Dhaka was one of itsstops, so the design would have to encompassservice to the 707.

I've forgotten what the 707-320 weightwas, but the wheel loading was very heavy atthat time. So the question was, what kind ofbearing pressures the soil would withstand totake care of that wheel load, because I hadunderstood, for example, when the B-36 wasbuilt in the United States, and which was muchlarger than anything that existed at that time, itpulled into a particular military airport, whichhad given good service, and it was on a what wecalled the hard stands for overnight, and duringthe night it had sunk up “to its knees,” throughthe pavement on the hard stand, and it sunk intothe foundation. Up to that point, the design ofthe hard stands were inadequate. The criteriawere not ready for those very heavy aircraft, andthe 707 was much heavier than even the B-36.

This gave me some concern, and so I hada tendency to report that negatively. I thoughtthat the U.S. ought not to try to finance that inEast Pakistan, that perhaps someone else should.

Also, I got involved in some projects inJordan.

Storey: In where?

Vernon: The Jordan River had long been a very difficultproblem between Jordan and Israel and Syria. While I was in Pakistan, I'd received an order toreport to Washington ASAP, first availabletransportation. The jets had just come intoexistence. I left Pakistan at five o'clock in the

Jordan River and issuesamong Jordan, Israel,and Syria

451

Kenneth F. Vernon

morning. It was daylight. I flew continuouslyfor twenty-seven hours and arrived inWashington at eight o'clock that night, still indaylight, completely dead between the ears, acomplete block of wood between the ears. Imanaged to grab a taxi and get to a hotel anddied for a couple of days.

But at any rate, what the purpose was,was the Israelis had come up with a scheme toimport water from the upper Jordan River, andthey had submitted a report to the DevelopmentLoan Fund for financing. Some of the people inthe Near East South Asia Bureau were familiarenough with the problem that this raised certainflags in their minds, and so they wanted a vettingof the Israeli report.

Storey: Now, this was after . . .

Vernon: This was [when] while I was [first] still inPakistan this occurred [during the summer of1959].

Storey: Back before 1962.

Vernon: Yeah, before I went to Washington.

Storey: Okay.

Vernon: But I got into it later when I was in Washington. But any rate, so I had to give you thisbackground.

Storey: Okay. [Break in interview]

Vernon: So a noted water engineer, Wayne Criddle,C-R-I-D-D-L-E, with his headquarters in Utah,and I were assigned a room, and the door locked,and we were handed the Israeli report andrequested to come up with our analysis of it.

452


Now, Mr. Criddle had been over timeinvolved in various studies of the Jordan Riverwater problem, so he was quite familiar with it. But I, personally, was not. However, weenjoyed a good working relationship, and as wegot into this report, we found that the Israeliswere proposing to build into this diversionsystem, which would come from the Sea ofGalilee, or also known as the Sea of Tiberias, farmore capacity than ever would be available fromthe Jordan River. So that raised the question,why were they proposing to build in this excesscapacity? And I think some of our peoplesensed that, and that's why they wanted thisindependent review.

Well, there were two likely sources ofwater. One was the Yarmouk River, whichcame [to] from the Jordan River from the eastand was a boundary between Jordan and Syria,and there was also the Litani River in southernLebanon. And I was told by someone, who hadbeen associated with the Johnston Mission [of]the Eisenhower Administration way back in1954, that it became apparent to the JohnstonMission that the Israelis were ultimately, theirstrategic move was to get the resources of theYarmouk River and the Litini River in southernLebanon. That's why they were proposing tobuild this diversion system from Lake Tiberiaswith the capacity to take those waters.

This was a very touchy subject. And sowe were struggling with what to say about this,because the Israelis were only asking for moneyto -- they were theoretically proposing to buildthis project by stages, and stage one was, if itwas some kind of a permanent [structure] thing,like a siphon or a pipeline or something like that,or a conduit, it would have a much largercapacity than they were proposing in theirpumping stations, which would be limited to the

453

Kenneth F. Vernon

obvious quantity of water, which they couldlogically claim as their share of the JordanRiver.

So we drew several charts which showedthe disposition of all these waters and matchedthose up to the capacity they were proposing tobuild into this, what they called, their nationalwater carrier. And our report was placed underlock and key, and it was sort of an eyes-only sortof thing, because you have to understand thatthere were contesting forces in our owngovernment as between the various politicalentities in the Middle East, and it had beenexisting for a long time. Those [on] at our sidethat were interested in maintaining relationshipswith the Arabs because of the oil are on one sideof that argument, and those that were interestedin maintaining President Truman's promise tothe Israelis of supporting the creation of Israel. This was the dichotomy which was not likely tobe solved at any early date.

Tensions within theUnited Statesgovernment over theMiddle East

So that this report, I don't know, I don'tremember exactly what its result was. I thinkthe Israelis built their national water scheme inaccordance, more or less in accordance withtheir plan, but I don't think we financed it. Idon't think the Development Loan Fund decidedthat they wanted to get involved because of theseother implications, and I don't think they decidedthat they [didn’t] wanted to get involved, and Idon't think our government financed thatnational water carrier.

What they were proposing was to servethe cities along the Mediterranean front withmunicipal water, and then provide irrigationwater down into the Negev Desert, because theydesperately needed an enlarged agricultural basebecause they didn't have enough water supplythere to provide for an irrigated agriculture,

454


expanded irrigation agriculture.

Then as a corollary to that, when I wasstill in the Near East South Asia Bureau, and[during] the Johnson Administration was onboard, a gentleman from the InteriorDepartment, who is now heading up the Officeof Saline Water in Interior, came over to visit meone day to find out what our attitudes weretoward putting in a desalinizing plant, a largenuclear power plant to provide the energy todesalinize seawater for the Israelis.

Well, I said, “If you're asking me for myreaction, my reaction is negative for severalreasons. Number one, it’s highly uneconomicfrom my studies of desalinization and from mystudies of nuclear energy, it's highly expensiveand economically infeasible, and I'd be scared todeath of placing a nuclear fission station outthere, even as intelligent as the Ashkenazi Jewis, who is the European Jew, rather than theSabra Jew, who is the Near East and NorthAfrican Jew. I said I'd be fearful of the U.S.getting involved in that kind of an installation. So my reaction is negative.”

Well, he says, “I'm here to tell you we'regoing to do it.”

But our side never did decide to go intosuch thing, although a number of studies weremade in Interior of what kind of a station thatmight be, and in Johnson's Water for PeaceProgram, which I've got a certificate up there [onthe wall] which I was said [I was] to have madean important contribution, which probably wasto turn down aside any arguments for such adesalinizing plant, and such a plant never did getbuilt, because the technology for such a largeplant wasn't yet developed.

455

Kenneth F. Vernon

But I did, when I became Director ofEngineering, I did support an appropriation toInterior’s, the Office of Saline Water, to go intosome test bed studies of enlarged methods of the[multistage] flash distillation of seawater orother methodology to desalinize water.

So I think that about covers – the onlything left would be my experience as theDirector of Engineering after I was – I'd like totell you about that, but do you want to take abreak now? And then, if we can conclude thistonight, because I think my experience asDirector of Engineering will not take up a greatdeal of time, because, as I used to characterizemyself, I was the vice president of brokenpencils and bent paper clips. In other words, Iwas dealing with people. I wasn't dealing withthings.

Storey: Why don't we take a little break and talk aboutit, and we can decide what to do then.

Vernon: Okay. [Tape recorder turned off]

I think that pretty well covers my generalactivities in the Near East South Asia Bureau. One day in the summer of 1964, I suffered aheart attack when I was visiting one of mypeople's place over in Annapolis, so I was horsde combat over in Annapolis for a couple ofweeks. Fortunately, it was not a serious heatattack, but it meant that I was going to be on theshelf for a couple of months.

Suffered a heart attackin 1964

And by this time the man who had beenthe Assistant Administrator for the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau, he had been moved upstairsto become Deputy Administrator for theAgency, and also the D-C-M, the Deputy Chiefof Mission, or the deputy ambassador inPakistan, who I had worked with on several

456


projects, knew me, and he had been appointedAssistant Administrator for Administration inthe A-I-D administration.

So he came over to my office one day inDecember and said, “Ken, Bill Gaud, the[Deputy] Administrator (G-A-U-D), wants youto take on the job of Director of Engineering forthe Agency."

He said, "We've got a lot of problems. We've got five bureaus going in differentdirections. An outfit that's working in onebureau has been told to do it one way. They goover to a job in another bureau, and they weretold if they do it that way, they will get fired. They've got to do it a completely different way. And so the Administrator is catching a lot offlack from the Hill and from the constructionindustry and from financing industry and fromthe consulting engineers industry and so on.

"The gentleman that is now the Directorof Engineering is more of a political appointee,and the Deputy Administrator feels that it is timefor him to move on. So the [Deputy]Administrator would like you to take on the jobof the Director of Engineering for the Agency.”

I said, “Oh, my God, I don't want thatjob. That's a dead-end job. I'm having fun downhere in the trenches in Near East South Asia,because I'm dealing with things. I go out toprojects. I can get things done, the things I'vebeen doing all my life. To go and move into thatjob, I'll probably never see the light of day, andI'll be catching flack from everywhere for thingsthat I'm not particularly interested in. No, I don'twant that bloody job.”

Well, he said, “I don't know how Bill'sgoing to take it, but I'll tell him what your

457

Kenneth F. Vernon

reaction is.”

So they limped along. They got rid ofthe then Director of Engineering, and his deputykind of took over as Acting Director. Andperiodically the Assistant Administrator forAdministration would contact me and say,“Well, what's your attitude now, Ken? What'syour attitude now?”

And I said, “No, it's still the same, Bill.”

Well, finally he came over one day andsaid, “Listen, it's time to fish or cut bait, or tobreak wind or get off the pot.”


Storey: This is tape seven of an interview by Brit Storeywith Kenneth Vernon on April the 27th, 1995.

Vernon: We were discussing the Deputy Administrator ofthe Agency wanting me to take over the job.

Storey: And you had said he came to you, I believe, inNovember or December of which year?

Vernon: Yeah, of 1964. 1964. And I had told hisemissary that I really wasn't interested in the job. He would keep contacting me during the year of1965, wanting to know my attitude, and finallyhe came to me in the fall of 1965 and said,“Listen, boy, it's time for you to really fish or cutbait. Bill Gaud wants you in that job.”

Well, I said, “Bill, I can understandmarching orders, but I've got some caveats that Iwant answered to, too. Our regional bureauseach have competent engineering staffs, and Iwant to be able to contact each of those ChiefEngineers and discuss with them [if they] would

Appointment as Directorof Engineering for theState Department in1965-1966

458


they support me as Director of Engineering forthe agency and would they work with me intrying to solve some of the problems that theAgency has?”

Well, he said, “That makes a lot ofsense.”

And I said, “I have another caveat, that ifit's decided that I do take the job – oh, the reasonI insisted on this, I explained to him the reason Iinsisted on this, is the reason that the current, orthe one that has been the Director of Engineeringis such – what's a good adjective? (laughter) Iwant to say the rear end of a horse going south.

Storey: Okay. You just said it.

Vernon: That no one will follow anything that he wantsto do, because he's a political appointee. He'sthere more interested in what's going on up therein the Hill than solving some of the problemsthat we have. Because he had been appointed[after] because the man whom we all respected,who was the first Director of Engineering, andwhen AID, A-I-D, was formed, had suddenlydied of a heart attack, and we were all willing tofollow that man's guidance. But this bird, hewas a complete nonentity, and he was moreinterested – he actually had a private line in hisoffice up to the Hill, and one of the things whenI ultimately got the job, my secretary said,“What do you want to do about that telephone?”

And I said, “Tear it out. I don't wantanything like that around. Anything I do is onthe record, and you get that straight.”

She said, “Thank you.”

Well at any rate, so I said, "Also, if Idecide to take the job, then I want the

459

Kenneth F. Vernon

Administrator to have a laying on of hands sothat the Agency knows that I'm his man, that I'mnot some guy that's been plucked out of the skyand dropped into this job, but that I've beenappointed with his desire and approval. It willbe very important in my inter-bureaurelationships.”

Well, he said, “That makes sense, too.”

So I talked to all the Chief Engineers,and they said, “Oh, for God's sakes, take thatjob. We'd be so happy to have you take that job. If one of us takes that job, we can get somethingdone. We're glad to work with you.” So thatwas number one requirement.

And then I got word back that if I wantedto take the job, yes, the Administrator wouldarrange a formal induction ceremony, swearing-in ceremony. And also, he'd do better than that. He would award me the Distinguished HonorAward for services well beyond the call of duty,so to speak.

So I said, “Well, okay, I'll do it.”

So it was arranged that I would be swornin, in February of 1966. But in January of 1966,he also held a formal session in his conferenceroom, and I could invite all the friends that Iwanted, to award me the Distinguished HonorAward, which was the highest award the agencyhad to award, which is the picture up there onthe wall. So my requirements were met. Andthen in February, I was sworn in as Director ofEngineering of the Agency, and I invited mygood friend, Ellis Armstrong, [thenCommissioner of Reclamation,] among othersfrom the Corps of Engineers Civil WorksDivision and others around Washington whomI've been working with, to attend my swearing-in

Sworn in as Director ofEngineering in 1966

460


ceremony.

Storey: That was February of <66?

Vernon: Sixty-six. And then after my swearing-inceremony, I said to Ellis, “Stay over. I'd like totake you to lunch after my swearing-in, so stickaround."

So after we'd gone through the swearingceremony, I took Ellis and my deputy and Helen– no, I don't think Helen was at the swearing-inceremony. She was there at my awardceremony, but I don't think she was there at theswearing-in ceremony. I don't recall. But anyrate, if she was there, she was a member of theparty.

By this time now, I was such a rarefiedperson that I could go the Secretary's diningroom up on the eighth floor, the executive diningroom up on the eighth floor, and run an accountup there. So I took Ellis up there, among others. We had a delightful lunch up there.

Storey: And Ellis at that time was the Commissioner.

Vernon: Was Commissioner of Reclamation. So I usedto keep in touch with Ellis all the time, because Iknew him from way back. So that got me to beDirector of Engineering.

Storey: And this is a good stopping point for today.

Vernon: Okay, let's do it.

Storey: Let me ask you again whether or not you'rewilling for the tapes and transcripts from thisinterview to use by researchers.

Vernon: Well, maybe I want to make a caveat on thisone, providing you will excise some of my more

461

Kenneth F. Vernon

pungent remarks. (laughter)

Storey: That's a yes, with that caveat, right?

Vernon: Yeah. That's a yes.

Storey: And of course, you're going to see this before itever becomes published.

Vernon: That's a joke, son. That's a joke. No, of course,I'm happy to make this, because I'm getting it outof my system, for God's sakes, and it becomes apart of the government's record that a lot ofpeople don't know. Really, I was amazed at allthe things I did during the course of my career,and the people that I was able to work with. Somebody asked me one time, one of mynephews asked me one time – you're notrecording this, are you?

Storey: Yeah, it is being recorded. Do you want it not tobe?

Vernon: Well, let's go.

Storey: Go ahead.

Vernon: He said, “Uncle Ken, what qualities do youattribute to your success?” He said, “You've hada remarkable career in government, a highlysuccessful one, and one that not many peoplehave really had the exposure that you've had.” He's involved in the educational business. He'san assistant superintendent in a school district upin the valley.

Storey: Here in California?

Vernon: Yeah, here in California. And he said, “Whatqualities do you think you have that contributedto your success?”

462


Well, I said, “Mark, I'll tell you. In thefirst place, I grew up on a farm, so I learned torespect hard work. The second thing is, I had towork my way through school, and so therefore Iknew why I was in the university, and I got outof there with a flying record, top of my class. Igot into the Bureau of Reclamation, and I wasexposed to many activities in the Bureau ofReclamation, and I learned in that process that Iknew how to work with people and how to bringpeople together and get them to work with me. And I think that my fundamental technicalexpertise, which made me equal to my peers,plus my ability to get things organized and getpeople to work with me, I attribute that as thebasis, and get people that were superior to me torecognize that I was a dependable person andcould get things done for them. I think that'swhat factors I attribute [to] whatever success Imade in the process of my career.


END TAPE 1, SIDE 1. APRIL 27, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 1. APRIL 28, 1995.

Storey: This is Brit Allan Storey, Senior Historian of theBureau of Reclamation, interviewing Kenneth F.Vernon at his home in Fullerton, California, onApril the 28th, 1995, at about 9:30 in themorning. This is tape one.

I was wondering if you could tell me thearea that was covered by your bureau when youwere the head [Chief Engineer] of the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau.

Area of responsibilitywhen Chief Engineer ofthe near East South AsiaBureau

Vernon: The Near East South Asia Bureau covered thecountries of Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria,Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,both East and West Pakistan, India and Ceylon,and also all the Sultanates that were along the

463

Kenneth F. Vernon

Persian Gulf, also including the Yemen.

Some of those countries, particularly theSultanates, we didn't have any real aid programsgoing on there. The Greece program was fadingout. We were financing the construction of acouple of dams in Greece. But the heavieractivity with Greece was more in the economicaid area, such as was carried out through theMarshall Plan, rather than our more technicaland capital development program, which wascarried out by AID and its predecessor agencies.

Storey: Let’s see, we had gotten last time to your beingsworn in as the Director of Engineering for AID,right?

Vernon: Yeah.

Storey: Would you like to tell me about your job as theDirector there?

Vernon: Yeah. But before we get into that, I got a coupleof items that I’d like to fill in the previous recordthat I’ve happened to think about since we endedour conversation yesterday, which I think is animportant part of the record.

As I'd indicated, that I was somewhatreluctant to take on the job of Director ofEngineering, and I indicated certain caveatsbefore accepting my appointment, thatappointment.

I had a third caveat that I indicated andthat was, since the Director of Engineering waswhat was nominally called a Schedule C job inthe hierarchy of the government service, whichrequired a Presidential appointment and,therefore, could be considered to be in thepolitical area, and because of my experience asRegional Director when the Eisenhower

Requested that asDirector of Engineeringhe be non-political

464


Administration came in, I indicated that, since Iwas a Foreign Service officer, I would like myappointment to the position of Director ofEngineering, to be considered as just a nominal,rotational appointment of a Foreign Serviceofficer to another position, which was a standardoperation [in the Foreign Service]. Then Iwould not be considered as a political appointee. Since there was no increase in compensation,because I was already at the top level at theForeign Service structure, I felt that it wasimportant to me to maintain my base as aForeign Service officer.

The then-Administrator of AID indicatedhe felt that would be no problem, and he woulddiscuss it with the Secretary and over at theWhite House and get clearance for that kind ofan appointment, which was done. [Taperecorder turned off]

Another couple of items that I thought of,before we leave the Near East South AsiaBureau operation was, reviewing my memoriesof their activities in Pakistan. We were involvedin a couple of activities in the Public WorksDivision which I think is important to make apart of the record.

One morning I came to my desk, andthere was a large stack of documentation whichapparently had come from the MissionDirector’s office. It was something that I hadn’theard anything about previously in my review ofactivities. So I asked for an appointment withthe Mission Director to find out what in theworld this was all about.

Refugee housingprogram in Pakistan

Well, it turned out this was somethingthat he had been personally handling withgovernment officials. It was a refugee housingprogram being financed through our large

465

Kenneth F. Vernon

amounts of local currency generated by the PL-480 program. But he felt that since I now had anoperation that was effective, he could turn thisactivity over to me for further execution.

To begin with, a large number ofrefugees, both from the hinterlands of Pakistanbut also primarily displaced Muslims from Indiawhich left India and settled in Pakistan at thetime of the separation and establishment ofPakistan as a separate country from consolidatedIndia, and they were living in horrible conditionsof squalor and deprivation. So the governmenthad started a sizeable program of refugeesettlement, and a satellite city called Korangi,K-O-R-A-N-G-I, was being established south ofKarachi, and up to more than 5,000 refugeefamilies were to be relocated there.

Construction of the cityof Korangi

And the firm of Doxiades Associates,35

D-O-X-I-A-D-E-S, from Athens, Greece, whowas a city planner, was the consulting engineerto the government of Pakistan, was theconsultant establishing this new city. He wasalso arranging in his planning that industriescould move into this new city area, which wouldfind a ready access to labor force.

So I assigned our supervisory activitiesto my general engineering section. As theybegan, they said, “Well what is our function?”

I said, “You go out there and make surethat planning and execution of the constructionareas, including the water supplies, sanitation,and the actual building of the structures, wascarried out to a reasonable engineeringstandard.”

Their first report came back was thatthese houses were small, but they were beingconstructed of concrete blocks, and that their

466


first examination of the construction processindicated that somewhere along the productionprocess there seemed to be a diversion of thecement content placed in the construction ofthese concrete blocks and including a sort of a –[Tape recorder turned off] – deemed to be anadulteration in some of the materials that weregoing into the manufacture of these concreteblocks which appeared to look like dirt.

Cement was beingdiverted fromconstruction of refugeehousing

So I said, “Set up a testing process andfind out what the strength of these concreteblocks are.”

The first test indicated it was doubtfulthat these blocks might go [last] through one or,at most, two winters. So I said, “Okay, lowerthe boom and tell the local authorities that wewould withdraw our financing unless and untilthey institute a proper control over themanufacture of these concrete blocks.” So itwasn’t very long before the concrete blockswere meeting a reasonable standard of strengthand would then, therefore, have a reasonableexpectation of existing for some time into thefuture.

Storey: Let me ask you, based on your experience, whatwas going on? Was somebody skimming offmoney by adulterating the cement, or what doyou think was going on?

Vernon: Well, I never did locate just where it was going,but it was pretty obvious that the cement hadbeen allocated and the proper ingredients hadbeen allocated to the project, but there wereapparently what we might call a number offaucets or taps along the production line thatwere opened and finding their way, the products'way, into the local market place rather than tothe project products. This was sort ofindigenous to the economy in Pakistan.

467

Kenneth F. Vernon

So the Korangi Project became highlysuccessful, although it did suffer a problem,because many of the people that were moved toKarachi were employed in the Karachi cityproper area, so that a transportation system thenhad to be set up to take several thousandemployees to the local employment areas,particularly the port area, until industries couldmove out into the Korangi area and establishlocal employment areas.

Later in my tenure in Pakistan, a similardevelopment was proposed and gotten underway in North Karachi area, which was to be asatellite city of approximately the same size, anda similar project was instituted in East Pakistan,so that this became a rather sizeable effort insocial development of the U.S. mission and incooperation with the Pakistani government.

Storey: Let me ask a question before you go on. Sort ofall of the background that I have in India andPakistan, imperfect though it may be, tells methat the masses of people live in very squalidconditions. Are you saying that these refugeeswere living in even worse conditions?

Vernon: Well, the same conditions. There was worse andworse, not any [real] level of difference.

Storey: Okay. That’s all I was wondering about.

Vernon: I wanted to describe another activity that wewere involved in in Pakistan, just to indicate thescope of our operations there, and that was, mygroup was deeply involved in the support of ourEducational Division, who was supporting thecreation of a University of Karachi, a Universityof the Punjab up at Lahore, and the University ofDhaka over in East Pakistan. The constructionof the buildings that were planned for theseinstitutions went far beyond the expertise of the

Construction ofuniversity buildings inPakistan

468


learned professors in the Educational Division. However, they were interested in achievingbuildings the like of which no educational boardin the United States would ever approve.

Storey: Very nice ones, huh?

Vernon: Well, they approached monumental proportions,let us say. So my group, then, undertook thetask of supporting the appropriate agencies ofgovernment, particularly the Public WorksDivision, which was assigned the job ofconstruction of these buildings, to assure thatthese buildings, however they were to be built,were built properly to appropriate engineeringstandards.

We got into one interesting problem atLahore. I knew that Lahore was subjectedperiodically to severe earthquake damage, andthe initial design of the auditorium building, Ifelt, was rather inadequate, had inadequatestructural provisions to avoid perhaps thedropping of the roof of the large auditorium ontoan assembled audience if such an earthquakeoccurrence should happen.

Problem of earthquakesat Lahore

We ran into considerable resistance withthe Public Works Division, because they justsaid, well, they didn’t think any earthquakesoccurred in Lahore. Well, I showed them therecord, going back into the British records, thatthat whole area was rather closely associatedwith the Himalaya Mountains and that theBritish had records of rather serious earthquakemovement [occurrences].

Storey: And this was a Pakistani agency?

Vernon: Yeah. When I say the British, before partitionwere very strong in the administration of thesubcontinent of India. The British had a number

469

Kenneth F. Vernon

of competent people, which was the colonialgovernment of India, and they had established agood series of records there.

Storey: But the agency that was saying there aren’t any[earthquakes]?

Vernon: Well, the Public Works engineers of theDepartment of Public Works in Pakistan didn’tconsider that perhaps – a serious earthquakehadn’t occurred in, say, their lifetime, just as inthe United States. But there were records ofsome pretty serious shakings occurring, even inthe Lahore area, which was not immediatelyadjacent to the mountains. But as things happenhere out in the plains area, a shaking in themountains creates serious damage in the moredistant areas.

So I called in Mr. Doxiades, who was,again, the engineering consultant and designer ofthese buildings, and I said to him, “Tinos, you’reGreek, and certainly Greece is one of the moreactive seismic areas in the world, and you’vehad to face this problem in your building designin Greece.”

He said, “Yeah, that’s for sure.”

And I said, “Well are you providing anyreal seismic protection in the buildings?”

"No," he said, “The Public WorksDepartment has not asked us to do that.”

Well, I said, “I’m particularly concernedabout that auditorium building, because you’regoing to have a large roof structure beingsupported by bearing walls, and it seems to methat we ought to provide seismic protection, soin the case of a serious earthquake, that roofwould not fall down and the walls collapse.

470


Give me a roundhouse estimate right now as tohow much it might cost to provide that sort ofprotection over what you have now.”

Well, he said, “Certainly not less [more]than 10 percent, and possibly only 5 percent,because it would only include a minor increaseof reinforcement.”

Storey: You mean not more than 10 percent? You saidnot less than 10 percent.

Vernon: Did I say? I’m sorry. Not more than 10 percentand possibly as little as 5 percent. So I said,“Okay, I’m going back to the government andtell them that I want your designs increased toinclude such protection."

So I went back to the government. As Iindicated, I ran into some resistance. I hadalready discussed this situation with our MissionDirector and the indication that some additionalfinancing might be required, and he told me toget tough. So I told the Paks that we wouldwithdraw our financing for this structure unlessand until that protection was included in theplans. They saw the wisdom of such anapproach, and Mr. Doxiades went ahead andprovided the appropriate protection, particularlyin this auditorium structure.

I just simply wanted to add these itemsbecause it – oh, then, also, I wanted to say thatwhen my boys went over to East Pakistan andgot into the construction of the University ofDhaka, they returned with a horrendous report ofthe standards of construction being employed inthe various buildings of the University of Dhaka. So again my instruction to them was, “get backover there and get tough, because we’ve got thewhip of support financing, and if they don’tmeasure up, tell them we’ll withdraw our

Construction issues atthe University of Dhaka

471

Kenneth F. Vernon

financing, because I know I have the MissionDirector’s support.”

I wanted to add these as the elements tothe program of Pakistan just to indicate thebroad scope of our activities, not only the IndusBasin, but how my division was givingengineering support to other activities of themission.

Storey: How large was your division?

Vernon: I had about ten to twelve American engineers. Ihad, oh, I forget how many local engineers weemployed, but we had a sizeable group,particularly supporting this general engineeringgroup which was involved in these supportactivities to our Educational Division, our PublicHealth Division, and so on. Our whole total mission, as I recall, totaled around 300 people,so it was a very sizeable mission. I had dollarfinancing approximately $150 million a year in .. .

Storey: This is when you were in Pakistan?

Vernon: In Pakistan. I had a capital works financing ofapproximately $150 million a year, plus anyGod’s number [amount] of local currency up toperhaps a billion rupees which we were pumpinginto government, which previously had not beencarefully followed as to how it was beingexpended. But I had discussed this with theMission Director early on when I discoveredwhat was going on and indicated I thought weshould – this was ultimately U.S. taxpayermoney, even though it was currently localcurrency. We ought to take a hand in makingsure that U.S. money was providing reasonablygood results, which he was glad to havesomebody take that interest.

472


I accused some of my colleagues in thefinancial area that previously these localcurrencies. and what they euphemistically calledbudget support, literally they asked thegovernment to bring trucks and back them up tothe door, and they’d shovel out the localcurrency and say goodbye and forget it.

Storey: Now, when you were the head [Chief Engineer]of the Near East South Asia Bureau, how manystaff were involved there?

Vernon: Well, my group there – let's see. Again, therewas a group of eight to ten engineers. Previousto my being the Chief Engineer of the Near EastSouth Asia Bureau, and I was Chief of thePublic Works Group, I had approximately sixengineers in that group, but it would changefrom time to time. Sometimes engineers wouldcome into the field and were entitled to arotation program. In the Foreign Service,normally your field assignment was of twoyears, and after two tours of two years, you triedto rotate to Washington to sort of get a refresher. So the number would change from time to time,and the specific personnel would change fromtime to time.

Storey: What was the difference in the responsibilities ofa mission, say, in Pakistan or Iraq and the NearEast South Asia Bureau?

Vernon: Well, again the, as I indicated earlier, in themissions you tried to provide engineersparticularly that would be involved in projects. The regional bureau office[s] were associatedwith program control, program content, theadequacy of engineering operations and policieswhich were being followed out in the variousmissions, as well as providing additionalexpertise to the missions on particular projects.

473

Kenneth F. Vernon

It was sort of the same type of operationwhich I had established in the regional office inBillings that some were involved in specificproject areas, but not mainly. There [was]mainly was overview and seeing to it thatengineering operations were carried out to asatisfactory standard in the field and givingsupport to those activities in special areas, asrequired. If a mission indicated that it neededsome additional support, my group would thengo out into the commercial world, such as aconsulting firm or something on that order, andenter into an agreement, or negotiate withanother government agency, such as the Bureauof Reclamation or whatever, to get support, enterinto an agreement with that agency to providesupport to the mission.

Storey: You mentioned going to Mr. Rice, for instance,yesterday on one of the projects. Did you dothat often with the Bureau of Reclamation?

Vernon: Yes. We called upon, and particularly in thewater development area, we called upon theBureau of Reclamation quite extensively, andthe Bureau of Reclamation was interestedthrough its Foreign Operations Division. Mr.Strauss, during his tenure as Commissioner ofReclamation, wanted to establish the Bureau ofReclamation as a premier agency in reclamationdevelopments around the world, and so he hadestablished this Office of Foreign Operations. Then it provided a great deal of support to thefield operations through the TechnicalAssistance Program of the various foreign aidagencies. So AID and its predecessor agencieshad around the world a great many Bureau ofReclamation employees.

Use of the Bureau ofReclamation by AID

Storey: For instance, when you were Director ofEngineering, did you have any contact with theBureau of Reclamation for specific projects?

474


Vernon: No, because – I think I can get into that better asI describe my functions as the Director ofEngineering, because again, our relationshipswith the Bureau of Reclamation were primarilyproject oriented. A specific person or a specifickind of expertise was required somewhere in thefield, and so the regional bureaus wouldundertake that direct negotiation.

I think now we are ready to take up myapproach to the directorship of Engineering,which was a completely different type ofoperation. I was now removed from, in themain, direct project activities, and my mainfunction now was one of overview andestablishing policies, standards, basicprocedures, and coordinated approach toproblems among the several regional bureaus,which was one of the problems which theAdministrator had laid on me as being necessaryof achievement, as I’ll get into.

Approach to work ofDirector of Engineering

Functioned away fromproject operations, andprovided overview andestablished policies

We did also manage a number of whatwe called standby contracts with consultingengineering firms or other resources of expertisewhich we negotiated and had what we calledopen-ended contracts. Periodically, we wouldgo out for what we would call RFPs, Requestsfor Proposals, and we would indicate the variousareas we needed this expertise, or thought wemight need this expertise, and then we wouldnegotiate a series of what we called open-endedcontracts, whereby particular firms or entitieswould agree to provide, on-call, at stated prices,what might be needed.

Managed “standbycontracts”

These were negotiated, and as, say, aregional bureau might indicate that it needed, ithad a request from one of their project areas,some particular expertise, we could then issue awork order to one of these standby contractors,and he could have somebody on a plane within a

475

Kenneth F. Vernon

couple of days, because they would have staffswhich had all their visas, all their passports andtheir inoculations and everything in order, andunder the agreement they had agreed to, onreceiving a work order, literally put them on anairplane and have them on the way the next day.

So I had, again, organized a small staff,which I had possibly, at times, a maximum ofeight engineers.

END SIDE 1, TAPE 1. APRIL 28, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 1. APRIL 28, 1995

Vernon: So I had a staff of about, usually a base staff ofabout six engineers, highly qualified engineers. Then at times we would be, as again,[augmented] by engineers who were tied into arotation program, we’d feed them into theprogram. But our primary function was to giveoverview to the Agency’s engineering program. I was directly responsible to the Administrator,and I attended the Administrator’s executivestaff meetings.

As Director ofEngineering had a staffof about six engineers

First, I want to describe the staff that Ihad. I had a Deputy Engineer, who had hadexperience in water developments, but notparticularly reclamation developments. Hislatest experience had been as a Design andConstruction Engineer on the St. LawrenceSeaway. I had a Transportation Engineer, whowas an Army Colonel, a retired Army Colonel,but had had great experience in logistics ofhighways and other areas of construction in theCorps of Engineers. I had a highly experiencedElectrical Engineer, who had done a lot of workin the Department of Agriculture with ruralelectrification and other electrical developments,electric power developments, around the states.

I had a Water Engineer, Water Resources

476


Engineer, who I had known previously manyyears ago in the Bureau of Reclamation, whohad left the government service and had beeninvolved with the United Nations with waterresources developments involved in the FAO[Food and Agriculture Organization] in theUnited Nations in New York. Then he wantedto come back to the government service, and hehad – correction. When I entered the ForeignService back in 1954, he, then, was the WaterResources Engineer in the Near East South AsiaBureau. Then he left to go to his associationwith the United Nations. Then he wanted tocome back, and so I employed him then, becauseI needed a Water Resources Engineer in my staffbecause our bureaus were heavily involved inwater resources.

Storey: You said he went to the FAO?

Vernon: It was the United Nations, and I believe it wasthe FAO.

Storey: What’s the FAO?

Vernon: [Food and] Foreign Agricultural Organization. Its headquarters were in Rome, but I believe hewas stationed in New York.

I had a general engineer, a young generalengineer, who was a sort of a guy who, shall wesay, he was the utility player. He could do a lotof things. We would send him to the field if aproject required some general expertise ongeneral construction. He had been employed byconsulting engineers and had some experience inroad construction and port construction andbuilding construction. And, incidentally, heultimately became Director of Engineering insome later generation after I retired.

I also had an Industrial Engineer, who

477

Kenneth F. Vernon

had had a large experience in the Foreign AidOrganization and in industrial projects. But hehad a lot of experience with fertilizer plants thatAID was financing and other industrial plants,including one very interesting project which Isent him out to in Indonesia.

There had been discovered a great lodeof high [grade] degree of copper ore, but it was avery isolated area. And the Government ofIndonesia was wanting to develop that and wasemploying various organizations around theworld to plan and get into the development, sothey were coming to us for financing. I sent himout there to give an evaluation of what wasgoing on and what might be done and how itmight be carried out and so on. But this was thesort of thing my office might get into, wasproviding special expertise to a particular fieldproject.

I also had a former Mission Director infrom Central America, who had been involved inthe large effort in Central America of villagewater supplies. So he was basically what wemight call a Sanitary Engineer in municipalwater supplies of the less intense but highlyimportant village water supplies.

So that was my general makeup, and thenit would change from time to time, depending onwho might be available. I did employ at onetime a very special guy, who was a retired VicePresident of the American Telegraph andTelephone Company, because AID wassupporting the effort in Vietnam during the late1960s of creating a highly developedtelecommunications system, not only to improvethe telecommunications systems within thecountry, but also to provide connection to theUnited States to be used both by the military andby the lower-ranking military personnel to have

478


better access to their families within the UnitedStates. So this was the level of expertise whichwas located in my office.

As I'd indicated earlier, theAdministrator had given me the charge ofbringing coordination among the variousbureaus, so I established a practice of taking theRegional [Chief] Engineers up to the executivedining room on the eighth floor to lunch everyThursday, which then we would have aroundtable discussion of various activities withinthe regions, which would prime me to be awareof any problems which might come up at theAdministrator’s Friday executive luncheon.

Took Regional ChiefEngineers to theexecutive dining roomfor lunch each Thursday

This then gave the Chief Engineers of theregional bureaus an opportunity to interplayamong themselves and become – [develop] afeeling of a more cohesive unit, although theywere administratively responsible to theirRegional Administrator, their Regional AssistantAdministrator, but technically there was never areally defined extent to which I had eventechnical direction of them because of the waytheir positions were set up, which was one of theproblems which had been created earlier when aprevious Director of Engineering was unable toestablish a real rapport with and among theRegional Engineers, although it never became toopen revolt. So this was one of the problemswhich I wanted to quickly get a handle on, and itworked out very well.

Director of Engineeringdid not have supervisoryresponsibilities for theRegional Engineers

Just as a side indication, I took them tolunch. I hosted the luncheon, except that theyhad to pay for their lunches. I would make mysecretary, when we’d get the bill from theexecutive dining room, she’d have to collect themoney. She said, “Now, what a job. Is that inmy job sheet?” (laughter) But any rate, itworked out very well. These guys were really

479

Kenneth F. Vernon

happy, because it gave them a feeling that theywere part of a family and that they could discussmutual problems.

Also, while I didn’t have any directauthority over their appointments, the RegionalAdministrators would come to me and requestsuggestions as to who might be new candidatesfor the Regional Engineer positions. It wassomewhat akin to the same kind of a fuzzyrelationship that the General Counsel had of theagency, the General Counsel of the Agency hadwith the counsels assigned to the regionalbureaus, although his line of control was perhapsa little stronger because of the nature of attorneyappointments. The Regional Administratorswould come to me, and I could makerecommendations to them for selection of thecandidates for the positions of RegionalEngineers.

Another major charge that theAdministrator laid on me was to bringcoordination in among the bureaus as theapproach of [regarding] preparation of feasibilityreports, which was required by a particularsection of our legislation, and the approach tothe administration of contracts that was spreadaround between contracting officers, legalofficers and assorted others, includingdetermination by engineers. So I instituted astudy program composed of representatives ofthe regional engineering offices, the RegionalCapital Development Finance Officers, whowere literally the loan officers, and the LegalDepartment and any others who felt they mighthave an interest in this, to establish some groundrules as to how the bureaus, the various bureaus,would approach meeting the requirements of ourlegislation regarding feasibility reports.

This had been one of the major bones of

480


contention, and there were no real ground ruleson it. The Administrator at that time was alawyer, and he liked to have the security ofregulations which had the force of law. But myconcern was that the rigidity of publishedregulations in the Federal Register would thensubject us possibly to lawsuits and whateverbecause one of the bureaus did not followregulation .9.7.2 or whatever as the basis of alawsuit.

I suggested, and finally got his approval,that we would develop what we might call aseries of guidelines, a publication of guidelines,which basically said, "Look if you do it this way,it will make it much easier to consider projectproposals. But we are flexible enough toconsider other reasonable approaches. We’renot frozen in our approach, but we tell you, ifyou'll do it this way, it’s going be easier for allof us." Then we established a whole series ofvarious chapters as how to approach variousthings and what might be required and so on andso on. So this became a series of five, as Irecall, five documents which were then issued. We published them, but we maintained them asguidelines rather than regulations.

Developed guidelinesfor review of projectproposals

Also, it became necessary to arrive atsome standardization of contracting withconstruction organizations. The AIDorganization, because of legislation, wasrequired to approve the employment ofconsulting engineers and other contractingorganizations that the governments mightemploy, the foreign governments might employin the execution of a project which we werefinancing. The Agency had to approve thecontract requirements, the eligibility ofcontractors to submit proposals to make sure thatthey had adequate personnel, that they hadexperience in the field of endeavor, etc. and etc..

AID review of contractsby foreign governmentand hiring of consultingengineers

481

Kenneth F. Vernon

This had been an area which ourcontracting officers in the Agency, many ofwhom were experienced with the ASPERs, theA-S-P-E-R’s. That was the colloquial name forthe Armed Services Procurement Regulations,which were literally frozen in stone and gavegreat rise to many arguments as to theapplication of those multifarious, multitudinousdetailed regulations and which produced $500toilet seats in the aircraft [and 150 dollarscrewdrivers, etc.]. So this was of aconsiderable concern to the Administrator.

So I, again, instituted another groupwhich would consider arriving at some kind of acoordinated approach and clarification of ourcontracting procedures, although being Directorof Engineering, I really wasn’t in control of thatoperation. The Senior Contracting Officer was,the Senior Procurement Officer was, although[and] he agreed with me that we did need toarrive at some conclusions, general coordinatedconclusions.

One of the very difficult areas was thatthe administrative types felt very secure inaccepting the lowest price bid, whereas we in theengineering fraternity wanted to make sure thatthe contracts would be awarded to reallyqualified contractors who had the expertise, thepersonnel, and the knowledge of workingoverseas before that engineering contract wouldbe awarded to them. So a long and difficultseries of discussions were held between theContracting Officer on the one hand and theengineering fraternity on the other hand as towhether we would advertise proposedengineering contracts on a price basis.

Engineers wanted toassure the quality of thecontractors as well as agood price

The engineering fraternity outside of theagency was very concerned about this, also, andthis was one of the areas which the agency had

482


been receiving a good deal of criticism fromamong the engineering fraternity, such as theAmerican Society of Civil Engineers, theAssociated General Contractors, the ConsultingEngineers Council, and other associatedorganizations.

Unfortunately, that problem was neverreally satisfactorily settled during my tenure,because we held out staunchly that we first hadto know whether an engineering organizationhad that competence to perform and that pricewas secondary, although we also recognized thatprice was a consideration, but we also felt thatthere was a matter of value to be received for theprice paid.

At times, that discussion became ratherstrenuous, but the Contacting Officers, becauseof their backgrounds, disliked to lose thesecurity in their parlance on a low price bid. Weoften pointed out that we wondered how theastronauts felt enclosed in their little capsule onthe way to the moon that, my God, we wonderedjust how secure they were having being subjectto the whims of the lowest-price contractor inbuilding their capsule. Any rate, it was one ofserious concern. But at any rate, we finallyfound a method of operation by which price didnot become the primary basis of consideration,although it was a matter of consideration duringthe ultimate decisions.

Another area of concern was the matterof level of detail in cost estimating for projectsbeing proposed and to the degree ofinvestigation which would be required to comeup with the amount of information upon whichcost estimating of projects could be based. Sothere again I set up a group, and we employedone or more of our standby contractors anddrawing upon their expertise, and produced a

Attempted to set upnorms for planning anddevelopment

483

Kenneth F. Vernon

manual of approximately three volumes, whichattempted to codify the various elementsinvolved in project development and thenestablish norms and standards for the amount ofinformation which would be required inproducing cost estimates at various levels interms of consideration of project financing anddevelopment.

This was in process. The initial draft ofthat particular project was being circulated whenI retired. So I don’t know the degree to whichthat manual became widely used, although it wasagreed that it was accepted [needed], becauseamong the various bureaus, there was a widevariety of validity of contract estimates. , andthen There was also then later concerns as towhy cost estimates upon which project financingwas based were proving to be inadequate in thelater stages of the project's development.

At the time when I was Director ofEngineering, it became apparent thatenvironmental protection was becoming aconsiderable area of interest, and that the U.S.government was going into it seriously. So Icharged my Deputy Director to become veryclosely associated with the EnvironmentalProtection Agency, or whatever agency it wasthat ultimately became the EnvironmentalProtection Agency.

Had to deal withenvironmental issues

Again, there was a wide variety ofapproaches to this problem. In one of my lastefforts, I came to the office one day and Iannounced that I was going to prepare adirective for the Administrator’s signature whichwould declare that the agency would have tobecome intimately involved in environmentalconsiderations of projects, even though many ofthe areas where we were working wereunderdeveloped and environmental protection

484


was the least of their concerns. But still, theywere important in terms of the U.S. approach tothose projects and would be important in thelater stages of the development of the country.

I wanted to prepare just a simplestatement which might not encompass more thanone or two pages, which would simply have theAdministrator declare that environmentalconsiderations were henceforth a matter ofgeneral importance and that the ultimateinstructions on how these were to be approachedwould be issued at a later date. So with the helpof my immediate staff, we put together, let ussay, approximately a two-page document.

Incidentally, I ought to say that when Iwas in Interior, at the Commissioner’s staff inInterior, any document which we prepared forSecretary Ickes' signature had to be covered witha document not more than a half a page whichsummarized the content of whatever documentwas being prepared for his signature. So thiswas the approach that I took to thisenvironmental statement that I wanted toprepare, that it would be a simple statement ofpolicy, a declaration by the Administrator thatthis now had become a concern and had to betaken into account, the details of which would beleft to a later date.

So this was then circulated to theagencies. It was [throughout the agency before]going to the Administrator for signature. Then itwas submitted to the various elements of theagency. When I left, it was approachingsomething like forty or fifty pages by the variousadditions by the various elements of the agency. They all wanted to get their cracks into [at] it [–an exercise of micro-management].

So we kind of just kept that on the back

485

Kenneth F. Vernon

burner and would stimulate discussion of itperiodically. But I did, through my DeputyDirector, keep in close touch with thedevelopments of considerations and [with] theEnvironmental Protection Agency, and then wewould work through our contacts with theregional bureaus to get these considerationsworked in, even though we did not have [a] dejure announcement by the Administrator that itwas of considerable importance. (laughter) Oh,what a rat race.

This was a problem of bureaucraticapproach to things, because everybody hadsomething to say about it, and this is why thingsgot lost within the wheels, the interminablewheels, of bureaucracy. It was very difficult toget a simple statement of policy issued, unlessthe particular policy official just issued it on hisown.

I then was also instructed to, or given thecharge, of creating a better relationship, anexternal relationship of the various commercialinterests that the Agency was involved with,such as the agencies which we might draw upon,[such as] the governmental agencies which wemight draw upon for expertise; the engineeringorganizations upon which we might draw forexpertise; the Associated General Contractors sothey would better understand. [The AGC} Theyhad developed a Foreign Activities Divisionamong the general contractors, so there had beendeveloped a group of construction contractorswho were active in construction of foreignprojects, and keep them apprised of therequirements of our legislation and [also] of theso-called Consulting Engineers Council.

There was another group that I can’trecall, but it became a sort of a forum whichbrought all these entities together to discuss

486


these common problems. Among that was thisInstitute of International Engineering, the firstmeeting of which, and several others, were heldunder the auspices of the University ofColorado. Then it sort of branched out andbecame more broadly supported . . .

END OF SIDE 2, TAPE 1. APRIL 28, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 1, TAPE 2. April 28, 1995.


Vernon: This Institute of International Engineering wasoriginally supported by the University ofColorado, but later it became more broad thanthat, and I don’t know [who all was involved,but] it was supported more broadly. Meetingswere held in different places. The last meeting Iattended, just before my retirement, was held atHershey, Pennsylvania, which was the site of theHershey Chocolate Factory.

At that time, there was grave concernamong the various parties as to the future of theForeign Aid Program. I tried to explain to themsome of the strictures which were being placedupon the Agency through various legislation andother elements, that it looked like the ForeignAid Program was perhaps going to be lessproject oriented and possibly [oriented] more[toward] economic and financial support, suchas import programs and that sort of thing,because there was considerable talk in theagency of what was called sector approaches toforeign aid, which was largely support of importprograms. An explanation in modern-dayparlance, it might be considered similar to Mr.[Newt] Gingrich’s approach to making blockallocations to states to administer rather thanindividual allocations by item by the governmentand supervision.

487

Kenneth F. Vernon

So this would create problems for themin the future and perhaps even create lessopportunity for their activities. They wouldhave to watch this carefully so they couldproperly gauge their future activities. [Taperecorder turned off]

One of the few field trips that Ipersonally took was during the fall of 1957 – no,‘67 – when the Vietnam War was going on at itsheight. We were instituting a new ChiefEngineer and a new Director of CapitalDevelopment Finance into the Foreign AidProgram in Vietnam, and the Vietnam Bureauasked me to accompany the group, and theywould assess the program [in] which the AidProgram was involved.

Visits Vietnam to reviewAID programs there

The previous Capital DevelopmentFinance Officer and Chief Engineer out inSaigon was one of my old associates fromReclamation and had been my Deputy in mytenure as Chief, Public Works in Karachi. Buthe was suffering from considerable stress andstrain of having the problems of the Vietnamprogram, and so it was felt that he ought to bereturned to the United States for rest andrecreation. So if he wanted to retire, he wouldbe permitted to retire. So we were installing asort of a new administration there.

While I was there, we traveled thecountry by plane and auto all the way from theDMZ in the north to the Delta in the south,examining not only water developmentprograms, [but also] electric power programs,[and] railroad programs. There was an effort torestore the railroad from Saigon north. All theactivities, the usual and unusual activities thatthe Foreign Aid Program was involved in inVietnam. I found there a number of my oldassociates from Reclamation there involved in

488


various aspects of water developments and so onand engineering developments in Vietnam.

On my return, one of myrecommendations and report, my report andrecommendations to the Administrator was thatit seemed to me that the situation in Saigon wasstabilizing and that one of the things thatVietnam would need to do would be to improvetheir electric power, to restore and improve theirelectric power distribution system, generationand distribution system, because it would beimportant in the economic recovery of thecountry. This was just prior to the unfortunateoccurrence of the Tet Offensive.

Wanted to restore andimprove Vietnam’selectric power system

In discussing this with the regionalbureau, I had sent my Electric Power Engineerout there [to Vietnam] to survey the situation,since he had experience through our REA [RuralElectrification Administration] Developments inthe United States and local power distributions,to survey the situation and come up with a planthat might be carried out as the stabilization ofthe country occurred. Fortunately, he returnedprior to the Tet Offensive, so he was not exposedto the situation. He was developing such a planin combination with the people of the VietnamBureau. Unfortunately, the Tet Offensiveoccurred, and this put things of localdevelopments back for many years, if ever.

I think that pretty well covers the sort ofactivities that I was engaged in as Director ofEngineering. It had some senses ofaccomplishment, because I was able toaccomplish some degree of better coordinationamong the efforts of the various bureaus. I wasable to establish some better externalrelationships with the Agency and thecommercial community. But again, to mepersonally, having a long lifetime of experience

489

Kenneth F. Vernon

in detailed project operations and actualdirection of operations, it was somewhat lesssatisfying than that particular activity. Butagain, it had its rewards.

Because of the then-deteriorating healthof my wife, I requested in 1970, I went to theAdministrator and said that, since my tenure as aForeign Service officer had been extended anumber of times and had required a number ofspecial dispensations to cover eight years inWashington and to go on any further wouldrequire I don’t know what kind of specialdispensation, and I did not want to return to thefield because of my wife’s deteriorating health, Ithought perhaps I should put in a request forresignation [retirement].

In 1970 began to movetoward retiring

Well Dr. Hannah36 at that time, who wasthe Administrator, had been the President of theState College of Michigan, not the University ofMichigan, but its parallel. I believe it’s the StateCollege of Michigan. He had been broadlyinvolved in the Foreign Aid Program, providingexpertise in the educational area. He wasapproaching seventy years of age. Hechallenged me and said, “Well, you’re arelatively young man (because I was only sixtyyears of age). “Why do you want to retire? You’ve got a wealth of experience that thisagency continues to need.”

I told him my problem, that thedeteriorating health of my wife and all. I feltthat since I dragged her around the world anumber of places, and in some difficult places,well I kind of owed it to her to have someenjoyment in our later years. Well, he persuadedme to take an extension of another year. Hesaid, “Well, take another year. We’ll talk aboutit again.” So I agreed to extend for another year.

490


Then in the spring of 1971, I went to thethen-Deputy Administrator and told him thesituation and said that I felt it really necessarythat I leave the agency, take my wife back toCalifornia where she could have some yearswith her family and so on, and that I would liketo be permitted to submit a request forresignation to the Administrator. Well, heagreed, but he said, “Also, in that process, inyour letter of resignation, indicate that youmight be available for consulting assignments,that this agency could draw upon you forconsulting assignments, so that he could directthe Personnel Department or whomever to makearrangements for you to be a consultant on awhen-employed basis, WAE [when actuallyemployed] basis, at a rate commensurate withyour existing salary arrangements," which I setup [in] the appropriate documentation, sent it upthrough him to the Administrator, which theAdministrator approved and sent on toPersonnel. So I retired as of, I believe, May31st, 1971, after some thirty-seven years offederal employment.

Retired in 1971 with 37years of Federal service

Storey: Did you actually do any consulting with them?

Vernon: Not a great deal. I wasn’t really anxious to dovery much consulting, because I felt that I wason-call, and if they wanted me, fine. But still, ifI really wanted to work, I should have stayedwith the Agency. But they called on me a fewtimes. I would go into the Washington officeand discuss particular problems.

One of the other arrangements we madewas the overseas – one of the more interestingassignments that I had as a consultant was theOverseas Private Investment Corporation whichwas set up as an adjunct to the AID agency, andso a contract was entered into similar to the oneI had with AID.

Worked with OverseasPrivate InvestmentCorporation to try toprotect contracts fromchanges bygovernments

491

Kenneth F. Vernon

One of the interesting problems theycontacted me about was, contractors .would getinto difficulties in foreign countries because ofthe changes, rapid changes of government of, letus say, an unconstitutional change ofgovernment, and therefore all of thearrangements with previous governments wouldbe in jeopardy and oftentimes would result in thesequestering of funds that had been previouslyearned by the contractor and even thesequestering of equipment that might be ownedby that contractor and therefore put them inserious financial jeopardy.

When I had been Director ofEngineering, such a problem had developed inPeru. Our Inter-American Bureau had asked meto participate in attempting to solve that problemof a couple of American contractors who were inserious financial trouble because a newgovernment in Peru had sequestered not onlytheir financing, but their equipment. So it was avery difficult problem, and at one time theythought maybe I should go to Peru and helpsolve the problem, but a former diplomat wasfinally assigned that assignment. But I assistedthe engineer in the Latin American Bureau toprovide him staff assistance and help to conductsome of the studies which could underlie hisapproach to the Peruvian government.

So the OPIC, this new organization,O-P-I-C [Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation], asked me to participate in a studyin which they wanted to see if an insuranceprogram could be set up whereby thesecontractors could contribute to an insurance fundwhich might give them some protection againstthis expropriation of equipment or sequesteringof funds or whatever situation might develop. So I worked with them several weeks on thatprogram, in which we did develop such a

492


program and which was put into effect.

One of the interesting aspects of that[consultation assignment], where my experiencewas of importance, was how to evaluate thevalue of the contractors’ construction equipment. I indicated that through my experience I knewthat when contractors were in such difficultiesand [they] would evaluate their equipment, [veryhighly] although they may have depreciated thevalue of that equipment many times for purposesof Internal Revenue reports, they wouldprobably evaluate it at a very high residual value[for insurance purposes], even though its literalbook value [for Internal Revenue purposes] hadbeen reduced many times to more than zero. SoI said, “One of the elements you should put intoyour program is to insist that a contractor, whenhe’s setting up his indemnity values, he wouldhave to submit several reports that he hadsubmitted to the IRS on his depreciation valuesof the equipment.”

That really drew some concern amongthe contracting community, but they understoodwhat our problem was, that there was no freelunch anywhere. We would attempt to evaluatetheir sequestered earnings to their full value, ofcourse, but that their equipment could not be putin as an overly inflated value, because usually inevaluating a contractor, you took into accountwhat equipment he had and what equipment hehad available and what equipment of his existingplant would be imported to the country and towhat new equipment that he might purchase. Sohe’d have a mixture of old plant and new plant. So this [there] had to be established as anoverriding value in the ultimate insurance to bebought.

Then I also, with the OPIC, reviewed anumber of industrial plants that they were

493

Kenneth F. Vernon

considering being involved in. But it was, Ithink that existed, Since I departed fromWashington and moved back to California in thesummer of 1972, that consulting assignment wasterminated, and I didn’t receive any moreassignments from them.

Moved back to Californiain 1972

Later, through one of my associationswith a contracting organization when I wasDirector of Engineering, a consulting firm inBaltimore, Lyons Associates, L-Y-O-N-S, wasinvolved in activities associated with theMekong Committee, M-E-K-O-N-G, MekongCommittee out in Southeast Asia. I believe itwas financed through United Nations. I’m notquite sure its parentage, but I believe it wassome element of the United Nations.

Prior to the Vietnam War, a gentlemannamed Mr. Sessions, S-E-S-S-I-O-N-S, had inthe Eisenhower Administration been appointedAmbassador to either Thailand or Cambodia orperhaps even Vietnam. I’m not quite sure justexactly where he had been an ambassador, buthe had been in that area. Being an engineerhimself and owning the Sessions EngineeringCompany in Chicago, he got interested in thedevelopment of the Mekong River.

Under consideration was a possible damknown as the Pa Mong, capital P-A, capitalM-O-N-G.

Set up study of Pa MongDam on the MekongRiver

Storey: All one word?

Vernon: No, it's two words, Pa Mong, the Pa Mong damsite. There were a couple of other dam sites inthe Mekong River basin, one of which had beenbuilt by the Japanese as a part of theirreparations for World War II.

So this Mekong Committee wanted to

494


establish a review of plans for the Mekong dam,Pa Mong Dam, and also they wanted to examinethe effect of certain tributaries and could they bedammed and developed, such as similar to theone that the Japanese had developed. So theLyons Associates in Baltimore, who was veryactive out through the Far East, being heavilyengaged with activities with the Corps ofEngineers, the military, and were already locatedin Bangkok, received this assignment, whichwas the headquarters of this Mekong Committeegroup.

One of the men who used to visit ouroffice regularly representing Lyons Associates,and we had employed Lyons Associates forsome of our activities, contacted me and askedme if I would be interested in being a part oftheir effort in undertaking this study. So itresulted that another man from A-I-D, who hadalso been previously been associated with theBureau of Reclamation, and myself were sentout to Bangkok to undertake this study. Myeffort was to be mainly to set up the study andestablish the degree to which we could carry itout and the success of available financing, andthe other gentleman was to complete the study,spend more time and complete the study andthen bring it back and follow up on thecompletion of the report. So I stayed out thereabout a month, setting up the study.

One of the interesting elements I ran intoin studying whether one of the varioustributaries, how it could be, if it could bediverted so that it would not put its flood into theMekong Reservoir, which could be brought intobelow the Pa Mong Reservoir, we ran into thequestion of the basis of the elevation surveysthat had been done by the various agencies thathad been involved in all the various studies thathad gone on out there.

495

Kenneth F. Vernon

We were provided with a series of aerialphoto maps, and right off the bat it became aquestion of whether the topographic mappingwhich had been reduced from aerial photographswas actually producing elevations on the groundor the top of the trees. The rain forest was someeighty to a hundred feet high. The relativeelevations became very important in terms ofwhat kind of diversionary structures we might[need] be able to create.

So after I got into this, we then asked fora meeting with the Mekong Committee and itsvarious elements to discuss this problem andwhat they thought they wanted to do about it. We demonstrated to them this difficulty, andthey would have to tell us what they wanted usto adopt as the datum which we could base ourconsiderations on.

Well, we were like a skunk at the party. We weren’t very welcome when we producedthat problem, because they didn’t know either. But, any rate, we had to have some kind of asolution. So a solution was adopted, and theytold us what datum we should base ourconsiderations on.

Before I left Bangkok, the study wasprogressing well. The head of the LyonsAssociate group seemed to be well satisfied withthe effort we were putting together and thedetails that we were developing and so on. Andso I left. I was there approximately a month, andthen my colleague was there possibly a month ortwo more. In his later studies, he made somechanges in some of the ideas that I had proposedbecause of later developments andimprovements in elevations and so on.

For instance, we were proposing – firstoff, we had a great paucity of data as to

496


development of floods, so I had to revert backinto some very general, worldwide formula tocover in very general terms what floods mightoccur over various geographic areas of theworld. So we had come up with certain basicconsiderations to develop that. Then theconsideration was, could we divert that riverover into [another basin] and prevent it fromentering the Pa Mong Reservoir and divert itdown to the reservoir that the Japanese dam hadcreated, which then what elements we mighthave to revise on the Japanese dam to be able tohandle this increased flow from this tributary wewere considering, or whether we would simplypass that water through and find another areawhich we could create a spillway through adivide and discharge it back into the MekongRiver below both the Pa Mong Dam and theJapanese dam. In a sense, we were creating atransbasin diversion similar to which the Bureauof Reclamation was involved in and in which Iwas involved in the Central Valley.

Storey: Now, this Mekong was in Vietnam?

Vernon: The Mekong River arose somewhere in theHimalayas. It may have arose in South China. It traveled through Burma, and particularly Laos,Cambodia, and Vietnam. I don’t know whetherit – I think it was a boundary to Thailand. AndCambodia had had a very interesting operationon the Mekong in which was the – no, I can’tthink of its name at the moment, but it was a sidediversion of the floods of the Mekong verysimilar to what the Iraq development used indiverting floods from the Tigris and theEuphrates Rivers.

Storey: But this dam site was in which country?

Vernon: I believe the dam site was in Laos, as I recall. Yes, the dam site was in Laos, because it created

497

Kenneth F. Vernon

a problem for us in our considerations. We firstthought that we would be able to visit Vientiane,whatever the capital of Laos was, but we learnedthen that we were not going to be able to, for onereason or another, we were not going to be ableto go to Laos and get any data from Laos. So wewould have to base our considerations fromwhat general information was available, but wecouldn’t develop any detailed information anddiscussions in Laos. So the dam site wasactually in Laos. Yeah.

Then, from time to time, Lyons wouldrefer to me for consideration, while I was livingin California, RFPs they were receiving. I’dreview them and offer suggestions and write areport to them, which they could crank into theirconsiderations for their response to the requestfor proposals.

Reviewed RFPs forcontracts

I remember one interesting one Ireceived was a proposal in one of the islands ofHawaii. It was in an area on this island whichhad a lot of pineapple and other developments. One side of the island had . . .

END SIDE 1, TAPE 2. APRIL 28, 1995.BEGIN SIDE 2, TAPE 2. APRIL 28, 1995.

Vernon: This was a proposal to see if there could be somekind of a transbasin diversion set up which wecould trap water in a reservoir or reservoirs onthe wet side of the island and divert the waterover into the dry side of the island.

My first reaction to the financing whichwas indicated to be available for this feasibilitystudy was of great concern to me, and I sent thisback in my report to Lyons, that because now wewere [not] dealing with not the continentalUnited States but an entity of the United States,a state of the United States, [so] the full force

498


effect of the all the Environmental ProtectionAgency laws and regulations would be in fullforce and effect, and that such a feasibility studywould also have to take [into account] and givegrave consideration to environmental effects ofany project development, which often entailedthe examination of two or three differentalternatives in your project development report,which is very expensive.

Likewise, the financing that wasindicated was not adequate to include any damsite drilling investigations. because It was wellknown that because the Hawaiian Islands wereof volcanic origin and they had many tubes andtunnels and various levels of openings thatleaked water, such as we ran into in theColumbia Basin and in the Snake River Basinwith the various levels of the lava layers in thatNorthwest area, that any feasibility report wouldat least require some dam site drilling toevaluate whether you did have a dam site. Sothat I voiced grave concern about the adequacyof the indicated financing, the problems thatwould have to be addressed of the environmentalelements, and the inadequacy of any dam siteinvestigations.

So my basic recommendation was thatthey approach making a response to the Requestfor Proposals very carefully. Then later Ireceived a Request for Proposal. I don’t knowwhether that project ever proceeded beyond thatpoint.

Later, I received another Request forProposal to review which dealt with a rathercomprehensive development in Ceylon. And,since I had visited Ceylon, both for R&R and asan official, I was somewhat familiar with theproblems in Ceylon, primarily when I was in theNear East South Asia Bureau and in Pakistan. I

499

Kenneth F. Vernon

sensed that this Request for Proposals wasdirected more toward an adequate [a] responsefrom Dutch agencies, who had a greatbackground in Indonesia and in that particulararea of the Indian Ocean. and that It hadapparently been developed by the Ceylonesegovernment, which was now called Sri Lanka,had been developed more aimed at the generalexpertise of the Dutch agencies, and that LyonsAssociates might have difficulty finding theexpertise in their organization to adequatelyrespond to that RFP and that they wouldundoubtedly have to go outside of theirorganization to provide the necessary expertise,and I would question whether that expertisewould be found within the United States, eventhough the closest thing we had to it would bepeople experienced in our Southern states wherethere was rice cultivation was and the heavyflooding was exercised [occurred].

Again, I recommended a carefulapproach to any response they might make. Idid, however, make some suggestions as to howthey might respond to it and what agencies Ithought in the United States might provide themas close to the expertise that seemed to beindicated. I don’t know whether Lyonsresponded to that RFP, but I do know that the SriLanka government did undertake some of theelements of that development, I think financedprimarily through either the World Bank or eventhe United Nations.

So that was the basic extent of myconsulting career, although I did have a fewminor consultancies while I was in still withAID. While I was in Baghdad, I was sent overto Jordan. It had recently established adevelopment organization similar to the IraqDevelopment Board. It was trying to establishwhat elements might be required and how it

500


would approach the program of thedevelopments in Jordan, of the Jordan River inJordan.

So I spent a couple of weeks over thereconsulting with the various elements of ourmission in Jordan and the various elements ofthe Jordanian government, meeting with thePrime Minister of Jordan and meeting with theChairman of this new Development Board whichthey had established and meeting with the headof another agency, which would be operating inparallel with this new development board, calledthe Central Water Authority, in which my oldcolleague, Mr. Oliver Folsom, from Reclamationdays, had been sent by the then Foreign AidAgency in the United States to be head of theCentral Water Authority, similar to my beinghead of the First Technical Section in theDevelopment Board in Iraq.

So I prepared a report back to this newDirector of the Development Board, outliningwhat I thought might be the elements of hisorganization and where he might seek assistanceoutside of Jordan to support their activities andcautioning him that he should maintain acontinuous relationship with his activities andstrengthening the agencies of government, suchas we did in Iraq, so that his agency would notbecome involved in hoping to establish itself inthe future of operating days, but ultimatelyrevert their programs and projects into feeding itback into the various elements of governments,which would have better legislation to cover thecontinuing activities.

That was well received, and I alsorecommended in my report sources of expertisewhere they might go to get sources for expertiseto man the original requirements of theirmanning requirements, such as the Bureau of

501

Kenneth F. Vernon

Reclamation and agencies in the U.S., agenciesaround the world where they might seek. Irecommended strongly for their waterdevelopment that they seek expertise from theBureau of Reclamation.

Then also, I was involved in verygenerally through the FAO37 in Rome [in] whatwas called their Mediterranean Regional Project,which was an examination of irrigation practicesaround through the Mediterranean region andorganizations which managed irrigationdevelopments around the region. They weretrying to establish some kind of a generaloverview which might govern the United Nationagencies in their agricultural approaches todevelopments in the Mediterranean region. Thatwas only of a very general nature, and I did notsubmit a formal report. I simply was involved ina number of consultations and meetings and didnot submit a formal report.

So that pretty much covers my activitiesin the consulting area.

Storey: Why don’t you briefly tell me about whereyou’ve lived after retiring.

Vernon: Well, as I’ve indicated, in my earlier years myfamily had moved to California. My wife’sfamily were Californians. We started our careerin California, and then started moving about. Soafter deciding to terminate my governmentcareer, I said, “Well, I think we ought to go backto California, because that’s where we comefrom. While we do like living in Washington,really, because it’s a very interesting place tolive and we had a beautiful house and all the restof it, your health is not the strongest. So let’s goback where you’ll be a little happier and be closeto your family.”

Moved back to Californiaafter retirement

502


So we moved to Castro Valley,California, which was a bedroom communityacross the bay from San Francisco. It wasimmediately adjacent to the city of San Leandro. So we purchased a home up on one of themountaintops of the bay area in the east bayhills. We located there in the fall of 1972, andenjoyed life in California. This is where Iconducted some of my consulting operations thatI indicated.

Then in 1986, in the spring of 1986,while we were visiting my wife’s sister in thecity of Turlock, my wife suffered a heart attack,from which she never really recovered. And so Iindicated to her I thought that for her protectionwe ought to move to southern California to becloser to my son, our oldest son, who was nowworking for McDonnell, the aircraft company,McDonnell Douglas, in Long Beach, so in casesomething should happen to me, get knocked offon the way to the store or whatever, because wewere living in a relatively isolated location onthe top of one of these mountaintops and she nolonger was able to drive, and nobody deliveredanything anymore, that we ought to move tosouthern California.

She was not very happy about such asuggestion, but she finally agreed. We had sucha lovely home there that the first people that sawit made a satisfactory offer to purchase it. Sowhereas we thought we might have time to finda relocation area in southern California at ourleisure, we were literally forced out the door tofind a place to live in southern California.

So we did make a satisfactory salesarrangement on that house in northernCalifornia, and we bought into a mobile homepark in the city of Brea, California. Now,mobile home parks in southern California are

503

Kenneth F. Vernon

quite upscale.

Storey: Or at least some of them are. (laughter)

Vernon: Some of them are. Some of them are. Some ofthem are upscale. It so happens that NormaZimmer, who was Lawrence Welk’s champagnelady, together with her husband, had developed aseries of upscale mobile home parks in OrangeCounty. My daughter-in-law’s mother hadmoved into one of the mobile home parks. I waswell impressed with what was available, and so Isuggested that we find at least initial settlementin one of those mobile home parks. We found asatisfactory mobile home in the latest of theLake Parks, because they all had a lake and theywere labeled Lake Parks. So we found asatisfactory, lovely mobile home in Lake Park,Brea.

We had the proceeds of our house upnorth. I was able to purchase the house outrightand move directly in. So we moved directly intothat house, although my wife was nevercompletely satisfied with living in the mobilehome park. It was nice. So I said, “Okay, we’lllook around. Now we’re settled, we can decidewhat to do permanently.” And because we hadso much furniture out of the house from upnorth, I had to rent storage facilities in one of thelocal storage facilities for much of our overflowfurniture.

So we continued to look around at homesavailable on the market. This was at the verypeak of the Orange County real estate market. Afor-sale sign would go up one day and comedown the next day, and they’d have three back-up contracts on it, offers for purchase.

Unfortunately, while we were living atthe mobile home park, my wife had begun to

504


suffer from blackouts. One morning she wastaking her shower, and I had gone downtown torun an errand. When I had come back, I foundshe had fallen in the shower and had suffered aninjury to her foot. I didn’t know the extent of it,but she wasn’t able to stand. So I called for theparamedics and an ambulance, in which we tookher to the local hospital. They found that shehad broken the bones in the arch of her foot,because as she fell, she doubled it under her footand had broken it. So she couldn’t stand on it. But they fit her up with a cast and all the rest ofit. And this was more reason why she didn’t likeliving in the mobile home park. She said, “thesepeople are all too old.” (laughter) For us, thatis, even though we were well retired by thistime.

She was a real going machine. So I said,“Okay, that’s all right. We’ll continue to look.”

Shortly after that, the real estate personwith whom we were working called us and saidshe had found a house which she thought metour requirements and we should immediatelycome see it and see if we were interested. So weleft that afternoon and picked our real estateperson up, and we came over and looked at thisresidence you now are living [sitting] in.

Storey: Sitting in, anyway. (laughter)

Vernon: Sitting in. Sitting in, that is, visiting orwhatever. And decided that it met ourrequirements. And fortunately, it was close toour son’s house, so I felt secure that my wifecould get support from them in case somethingshould happen to me. And so we purchased thishouse.

Storey: When was that?

505

Kenneth F. Vernon

Vernon: Pardon me?

Storey: When was that?

Vernon: We made the deal – this was very interesting. We made the deal in October of 1987. Since theprevious owner was retiring from his activeinsurance business and he was building a housein Arizona, which he thought wouldn’t beavailable until after the first of the year, we setup a closure of escrow. I said, “Well I’ll giveyou ninety days. We’re in no hurry. We’resettled over there. We’re in no great hurry torush. So we’ll set up a closure of ninety days,closure of escrow in ninety days. This will giveyou a chance to get your things organized.”

So we set up a date of closure for ninetydays – let’s say, January 20th. I said, “It willalso take me some time, because in my offer I’veindicated I’m willing to make a sizeable cashpayment. I’ve also talked to a mortgagingorganization, and I know the extent to which Ican obtain mortgaging financing. So I have afinancial plan that can be worked out, but it willtake its usual times to work this out. So theninety day works out adequately for me.”

Well, apparently somewhere along theline one of his friends must have talked to himand said, “Hey, wait a minute. You know,there’s going to be a change in the IRS lawscome January 1, and that if at all possible, youought to move up that closure date beforeDecember 31st, because then you will gainconsiderable benefit in your taxation position,because you are going to get an exceedinglybeneficial reward out of the sale of your house,as it had been purchased many years before at amuch lower price.” He was going to reap a goodprofit, such as I had done up in Castro Valley.

506


Well I said, “Sir, this is going to give mea problem. It’s going to take me a little time toarrange the financing, as I had indicated.”

Oh, yes, and in his proposal to me hesaid, “My house won’t be ready in Arizona, sowhat I propose to do is, if you can do it, we’llclose the escrow in December, and then you rentthe house back to me.”

And I responded, “No way am I going toget into the business of renting a house to you,because in today’s world a renter, as long as he’swilling to pay his rent, you never can get himout. My wife wants to get out of the mobilehome park, and I want you out of that house. If Ibuy it, I’m going to be able to move into it.”

So I wrote an amendment to the salescontract in which I said, among other things,there was to be no rent-back provision, that if hecould not vacate the premises by December 31st,I would assess a liquidated damage award of$200 a day for every day he stayed beyondDecember 31st. And I would make every effortto make financing available to complete the sale. If this was agreeable to him, I would make everyeffort to make the financing available to closethe escrow before December 31st.”

Well this gave him to sweat. Butsomebody told him, “Look, you’re going tomake enough money. If you have to go and renta hotel, you can live in a hotel for a while whileyour house is being completed in Tempe,Arizona," or wherever it was in Arizona. Iwasn’t sure exactly when his house was to becompleted, and I also had picked up a feelingthat his wife was not completely happy aboutmoving to Arizona and leaving all of her friendsin California. So that's why I did not want anyrent-back provision.

507

Kenneth F. Vernon

At any rate, he did accept it, with muchgrunting and groaning. We happened to comeby the house – oh, yes. One reason why we'dagreed on the January 20th date was he said thathis wife would like to hold Christmas with thefamily here in this house. Well, that was okaywith us. So we kept track of them to see howwell they were doing. Through the assistance ofmy bank, I was able to get wire transfers ofmoney. I had invested a number of funds in tax-free bonds and that sort of thing, and so I wasable to get those converted to cash and so on. But it was going to take right up to the end ofDecember to get all those funds transferred intomy account so I could make the cash payments.

So we kept track of what they weredoing, and we noted that on the night ofDecember 31st, they were still packing out andthe moving vans were still here. I don’t know,the morning of January 1st, they were gone. They were right down to the wire in getting out.

Storey: So you moved in . . .

Vernon: As I indicated, we were in no great rush to movein, but I didn’t want to get at that rent-backprovision. So there were certain things I wantedto do in the house. There were certain roomsthat needed renovation. My wife wanted certainadditions made to the laundry room and so onand so on. So we were in no great rush. We didall those things.

Then we decided that – and we had putour mobile home up for sale in the park. Inmaking the deal here on this house, I had notmade the purchase of this house contingent onthe sale of the mobile home. In the generalmovement of people in today’s world, a sale isusually contingent on the sale of some otherproperty. But I said, “No, this is a completely

508


clean deal, because I own that outright, and Idon’t need that money to make this deal.”

We then took our time in getting thishouse into the shape we wanted it and ultimatelymoved in on March 20th.

Storey: In 19 . . .

Vernon: In 1988. Then one of the first things we did wascall in landscapers to re-landscape the yard anddo a number of other things which needed repairin the house, because they knew they were goingto move, and I knew I was going to have toinvest maybe $20,000 in the house to get it up towhat we wanted, because these people had let itkind of slide.

They got out at just the right time. Thefirst day I turned full pressure on the watersystem, the hot water heater blew up. We foundthe next summer that the air-conditioner hadlong since passed its life. The air coming out ofthe air vents was warmer than the ambienttemperature outside because of the heat underthe roof, etc.. So I had to replace that, etc. etc. So he got out at the right time and pocketed anice profit. We bought a comfortable house. Itwell met our needs.

So that’s the life and times of one KenVernon.

Storey: Well, I appreciate it. Once again, are youwilling for researchers to use the tapes andtranscripts from this interview in doingresearch?

Vernon: Yeah. Of course, I’m happy to it. I hopewhatever people review this record find out thatthe life and times of an engineer and his familyare not all peaches and cream, nor is the life and

509

Kenneth F. Vernon

times of a government employee, feeding at thepublic trough, all that it’s touted to be by thegeneral public.

Storey: People who don’t understand.

Vernon: I might make one summary statement, I think,that future reviewers might make in reviewingmy career. It’s been a very interesting careerand very fulfilling one, really. I was exposed toa number of various elements of government andgovernment activities, and I’m truly thankful forthe opportunity that the government gave me tohelp the development of people around both theUnited States and the world in the developmentof their resources and better their livingconditions.

Storey: Okay. Good.

Vernon: Thank you, Mr. Storey.

Storey: Well, thank you. I really appreciate it.

END SIDE 2, TAPE 2. APRIL 28, 1995.END OF INTERVIEWS.

510


1.Note that information in parentheses, ( ), is actually on the tape. Information in brackets, [], has been added to the tape either by the editor to clarify meaning or at the request of theinterviewee in order to correct, enlarge, or clarify the interview as it was originally spoken. Words have sometimes been struck out by editor or interviewee in order to clarify meaningor eliminate repetition.

2.. The Key System was established in 1902 as the San Francisco, Oakland, and San JoseRailway. It had several legal names, but in 1936, it became the "Key System." The KeySystem crossed from Oakland to San Francisco on the bridge and was abandoned in 1958.

3. Bernard Alfred Etcheverry (1881-1954), except for two years, served at theUniversity of California-Berkeley from 1902 until 1951. He was Professor of Irrigation andDrainage when he retired as well as chairman of his department.

4. Mr. Vernon’s correction is accurate. Reclamation built Parker Dam in the period1934-1938 while it built Davis Dam in the 1940s.

5. Bernard (Barney) P. Bellport subsequently served as Director, Office of Design andConstruction from February 1963 until April of 1972. This position also officially carriedthe title of “Chief Engineer” until April of 1972, but subsequent persons in this position werestill known popularly in Reclamation as the “Chief Engineer.”

6.This canal later came to be known as the Peripheral Canal and was quite controversial.

7. Said on tape as “Region Five,” regions will be referred to throughout this transcriptby Roman Numerals – the standard reference at Reclamation.

8. Eugene Donald Millikin, a Republican, represented Colorado in the U. S. Senate fromDecember 20, 1941, to January 3, 1957. Joseph Christopher O’Mahoney, a Democrat,represented Wyoming in the U. S. Senate from January 1, 1934, to January 3, 1953.

9. Walker Young served as Chief Engineer from 1945 to 1948. Charles E. Carey wasthe first regional director in Region II from 1943 to 1947.

10. North Dakota State University.

11. Editor’s note – From 1937 to 1939 J. D. Ross, formerly Superintendent of SeattleCity Light, served as the first administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration. He wassucceeded by Dr. Paul J. Raver in 1939.

Endnotes

511

Kenneth F. Vernon

12. Note that this is not chronologically strictly accurate. As early as 1925, the River andHarbor Act of March 3 authorized and directed the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and theFederal Power Commission to jointly prepare cost estimates for comprehensive surveys of allnavigable streams and their tributaries where hydroelectric power appears practical. In aletter report (House Document 308) of April 7, 1926, Corps developed detailed costestimates. The result was the 308 Reports of the Corps. This set the stage for multipurposedams through its focus on river basins and both hydropower and navigation. The surveyswere written into law in 1927 and 1928. The great floods on the Mississippi occurred in1927.

13. The correct spelling of the name is Fred G. Aandahl.

14. James Edward Murray was born in Ontario, Canada, in 1876, naturalized as a UnitedStates citizen in 1900, and served in the U. S. Senate from November 7, 1934, to January 3,1961. He died March 23, 1961, in Butte, Montana, where he had practiced law.

15. Julius A. Krug served as Secretary of the Interior from March 18, 1946, untilDecember 1, 1949.

16. Oscar L. Chapman served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior and Undersecretary ofthe Interior from 1933-1949. He served as Secretary of the Interior from December 1, 1949,until January 20, 1953.

17. This should be “bureaus” rather than “agencies.” This is common terminology, evenin the Federal Government, but the Department of the Interior is an “agency” while all theother major subdivisions of Interior are “bureaus.”

18. Senator Kenneth Spicer Wherry (1892-1951) ®) from Nebraska served in the Senatefrom January 3, 1943, until his death on November 29, 1951.

19. Joseph Christopher O’Mahoney (1884-1962) (D) from Wyoming served in the Senatefrom December 31, 1933, to January 3, 1953, and again November 29, 1954, to January 3,1061.

20. Congressman Wesley Abner D’Ewart (1889-1973) (R) from Montana served in theHouse of Representatives from June 5, 1945, to January 3, 1955.

21. Francis Higbee Case (1896-1962) (R) from South Dakota served in the House ofRepresentatives from January 3, 1937, until January 3, 1951 and in the Senate from January3, 1951, until his death on June 22, 1962.

22. William Lemke (1878-1950) from North Dakota served in the house ofRepresentatives March 4, 1933, to January 3, 1941, and January 3, 1943, to his death on May

512


30, 1950. He was the Union Party candidate for President in 1936.

23. Lieutenant General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., was the Chief of Engineers March 17,1953 to September 30, 1956. Born in 1897, he died in 1964. He came from a militaryfamily, graduated from Westpoint in 1918, served in the Pacific in World War II afterserving as district engineer in Vicksburg from 1939-1942. He served as senior engineer forthe nation's air forces in 1946-48, and he was Missouri River Division Engineer in 1949-51. In 1951 he became the Commanding General of the 6th Armored Division and Fort LeonardWood. 1952-3 he served in Europe. He then became Chief of Engineers.

24. This reference is to American earthmoving equipment manufacturer, R. G.LeTourneau, Inc. Robert Gilmour LeTourneau created his first electric controlled scraper inStockton, California. The company gained strength in the late 1920s and expanded tobecome R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., with four factories in the USA and one in Australia. In 1953R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., sold its earthmoving business to Westinghouse which created theLeTourneau-Westinghouse Company. R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., continued to manufacturelarge machinery, oil drilling platforms, and other activities until absorbed by the MarathonManufacturing Company in 1970. R. G. LeTourneau died in 1969.

25. André Coyne designed Malpassat Dam, which failed in 1959 due to the geology inone of its abutments. The dam was filling for the first time when it failed.

26. On July 14, 1958, a military coup led by Gen. Abd al-Kareem Qasim overthrew themonarchy in Iraq. King Faisal II, who had reigned from 1953 - 1958, the crown prince, andNuri al-Said were executed. This was the Iraqi “Revolution” of 1958 which overthrew theHashemite monarchy.

27. Note that Mr. Vernon confused the placement of the vowels in the name of this town. The correct spelling is M-O-S-U-L (ed.). While Mosul gained prominence in the 8th century,settlement in the immediate area is as old as the ancient site of Nineveh on the east bank ofthe Tigris, the capital of the ancient Assyrian Empire from 705 to 612 BC..

28. As earlier referenced, on July 14, 1958, a military coup led by Gen. Abd al-KareemQasim overthrew the monarchy in Iraq.

29. The current spelling of this river’s name is Karnafuli with an alternate spelling ofKarnaphuli. (ed.)

30. Roger Revelle, 1909-1991, was an geologist who worked at Scripps Institute ofOceanography in La Jolla, California, as an oceanographer. He was one of the earliestpersons to become concerned about increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

513

Kenneth F. Vernon

31. This was originally spelled out as B-I-E-R-C-H but was corrected in the transcriptsby the interviewee.

32. Public Law 480 is a government program designed to use surplus United Statescommodities to aid developing countries through several components including the Food forProgress and the Food for Peace programs. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of theU. S. Department of Agriculture provides commodities to countries in need of foodassistance. The U. S. Agency for International Development is also involved in the program. This initiative was passed by the 83rd congress in 1954 and provides U.S. governmentfinancing of sales of U.S. agricultural products to developing countries on specific creditterms.

33. Officially the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, passed on August 4, 1939. 53 Stat.1187.

34. The Latin legal term pro tanto means "so far, to that extent." It also carries theconnotation of an installment, good enough as far as it goes, but not final.

35. The principle in this firm was Constantinos Doxiades (1913–75), a Greek urbanplanner, designer, and consultant on settlements. Doxiades held official and academicpositions in town planning and housing in Greece. He designed many projects in Greece aswell as projects in Pakistan and Philadelphia.

36. John A. Hannah (1902-1991) served as president of Michigan State University 1941-1969. Upon retirement he accepted the position of administrator of the U. S. Agency forInternational Development in 1969.

37. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

oral history interviews - bureau of reclamation · 2015. 7. 1. · suggested citation: vernon,...

Documents