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Sept/Oct 2014 Organ Blocks

***ORGAN BLOCKS***

***ORGAN BLOCKS***1AFF BLOCKS3A/T Conscription CP4A/T Saunders CP5A/T Labs CP7A/T Mechanization CP8A/T Mandated Choice CP9A/T Education CP11A/T Legalize Sales CP12A/T Econ DA15A/T Black Markets Good16A/T Biopower K16A/T Gift K16A/T Trust NC16A/T Culture NC16A/T Religion NC16A/T Polls NC16A/T Autonomy NC16A/T Deontology NC16A/T Oppression NC16A/T Skep NC16NEG BLOCKS16A/T Increased Organ Donations16A/T Xenotransplantation16A/T Autonomy Aff16A/T Oppression Aff16A/T Black Market Bad16A/T Econ Aff16A/T Majority Aff16A/T Dead bodies = worthless16A/T Spain16FRAMEWORK BLOCKS16A/T Util16A/T Deontology16Overview16A/T Practical Reason16A/T Korsgaard16A/T Vellman16A/T Universizability16A/T Rawls16A/T RTB16Overview16Theory16A/T Autonomy16A/T Oppression16A/T Spikes16A/T Time Skew (for neg)16A/T CX Checks16

AFF BLOCKSA/T Conscription CPConscription is definitionally affirmative ground; Conscription is a form of presumed consentMark Ammann; Research Associate/Project Manager, Health Law Institute, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta. Would Presuming Consent to Organ Donation Gain Us Anything But Trouble? Health Law Review; 2010 http://www.hli.ualberta.ca/HealthLawJournals/~/media/hli/Publications/HLR/18-2-2_Ammann.pdfThere are various types of presumed consent systems. A truly irrebuttable presumption of consent would be, in essence, conscription of organs. A hard presumed [the other] consent system allows donors to opt out (usually by registering a non-consent with a central registry), but, failing this, would allow no other factor to interfere with organ or tissue removal. Family vetoes would have no place in such a system. These systems exist more in theory than practice since, as I will discuss later, most systems, in practice, allow some (if not considerable) family involvement even if such involvement should be legally precluded. The more common soft presumed Health Law Review 18:2, 2010 17 consent systems will avoid retrieving organs if there is any objection to the procedure (like a familys refusal to allow the procedure). Indeed, soft presumed consent systems often look a great deal like Canadas express consent systems, since both often give the family a veto in practice.A/T Saunders CPNormative consent is inconsistent- there is no warrant for why taking organs when no consent is given is ok, but taking organs from those who opted out is bad.Michael Potts, Joseph L Verheijde, Mohamed Y Rady and David W Evans, August 2010, [Normative consent and presumed consent for organ donation: a critique, Journal of Medical Ethics, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25699716] SDIn addition to the foregoing difficulties with his arguments, Saunders merely assumes that organ donation is a good such that refusal of consent constitutes a moral failing, but if such refusal were a moral failing, what reasons would the author consider 'legitimate for refusal of consent? If organ donation is a prima facie moral obligation, then what higher principles suffice to override that duty? This points to a crucial flaw in Estlunds theory (and, by extension, Saunders application of Estlunds 'normative consent to organ donation). That flaw is the inability to say what separates the cases in which a refusal of consent seems binding from those in which it would appear not to be binding. For example, how can Saunders consistently support an 'opt-out system if refusing donation of organs is 'immoral? To be consistent, Saunders would have to uphold the position that organs should always be taken from eligible donors whether they are in favour of or opposed to organ donation. The consistency of Saunders position comes at the cost of supporting a conscription model. In the conscription model, every individual is mandated to donate organs.16 A societal obligation or duty to donate paves the way for a transition from presumed consent to conscription for organ donation.9 The state assumes full rights and ownership of an individual's body and organs. The conscription model achieves the ultimate goal of an almost 100% organ donation rate from medically eligible donors. A conscription policy treats human organs as property of the state and not as personal property. The state assumes that the rights of one's organs for donation are transferable resources from one individual to another. Then who decides what reasons are sufficient to override this duty to donate? The government? The transplant community?Slippery Slope- there is no limit to the states power if they can take our organs.Michael Potts, Joseph L Verheijde, Mohamed Y Rady and David W Evans, August 2010, [Normative consent and presumed consent for organ donation: a critique, Journal of Medical Ethics, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25699716] SDSaunders position is a recipe for totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is generally characterised by the coincidence of authoritarianism (ie. when ordinary citizens have no significant share in state decision-making) and ideology (ie. a pervasive scheme of values promulgated by institutional means to direct the most significant aspects of public and private life).17 Totalitarianism strives to regulate every aspect of public and private life when ever feasible. Appeals to 'what is good for the people remind one of Rousseaus 'general will,18 which, in practice, has been used to justify states forcing their wills on individuals in the name of 'the people. Therefore, if the state enforces organ donation 'for the public good despite the fact that there are questions about whether donors are dead, and without regard for individuals who have objections to organ donation, the state ignores the problems with organ transplantation to impose its own version of the good on the people. Such an expansion of government authority over individuals bodies is incompatible with democratic society.

A/T Labs CP

Timeframe perm Do the aff now while we scientifically advance the process of growing organs so that they will work later. Mechanical organs barely work now.

TURN The people with artificial organs will get deadly symptomsPlague Inc., 5/5/14, Plague Inc. Artificial Organs Scenario: Virus Mega-Brutal (3 Biohazards) Guide & Walkthrough, http://icspicy.blogspot.com/2014/05/plague-inc-artificial-organs-scenario.htmlBeating [In] the Artificial Organs scenario with the Virus plague is somewhat difficult because of the Virus' nature that [can] causes it to uncontrollably mutate symptoms. I've done several trial and error games in order to accomplish this guide. As you may already know, we need to finish this plague in brutal/mega-brutal difficulty to attain a 3 gold biohazards for the scenario. To do just that we'll need to finish with a 5 out 5 biohazard score at the end of the game. At first try, you might come to a conclusion that accomplishing a 5 out 5 biohazard score for this plague is impossible. I thought that too. Because of the random mutations, you've probably faced problems such as countries [are] closing their point-of-entries too soon. In the Artificial Organs scenario, you are faced with people who have all replaced their organs with artificial ones. What happens in this scenario is lethality is significantly reduced because of organ replacements but don't fret there is actually [face] a symptom to counter this, Insanity. Insanity makes people rip out their artificial organs making it artificial organs a non-factor anymore. In this guide we'll let the virus freely mutate as it wishes. At the start, we'll be focused on spreading the infection as quickly as possible. Don't worry if your Virus mutates [into] a lethal symptom at the start, we actually want that to happen. Just continue to evolve symptoms, abilities, and transmissions I tell you to and you'll see that beating this plague is actually pretty easy. 2.) Start in China then continue to evolve the following symptoms: Haemophilia Nausea Vomiting Rash Sweating Coughing Pneumonia Sneezing 5.) At this point we'll be going back to evolving symptoms. Some of these symptoms might have already mutated, if that's the case then just skip them. If you can't see these symptoms on your tree, you'll have to evolve lower tier symptoms first. I'll include the best path to these symptoms to help you out. Insanity (Insomnia-Paranoia-Seizures) Necrosis (Rash-Sweating-Skin Lesions) Coma (Cysts-Hyper Sensitivity-Paralysis) Total Organ Failure (this is immediately unlocked by evolving Coma) Hemorrhagic Shock (you'll see this upon evolving Necrosis) Internal Hemorrhaging (below Hemorrhagic Shock) Systemic Infection (below Coma, on the right side)

A/T Mechanization CP

Timeframe perm Do the aff now while we scientifically advance the process of making mechanical organs so that it will work later. Mechanical organs barely work now.

TURN The people with artificial organs will get deadly symptomsPlague Inc., 5/5/14, Plague Inc. Artificial Organs Scenario: Virus Mega-Brutal (3 Biohazards) Guide & Walkthrough, http://icspicy.blogspot.com/2014/05/plague-inc-artificial-organs-scenario.htmlBeating [In] the Artificial Organs scenario with the Virus plague is somewhat difficult because of the Virus' nature that [can] causes it to uncontrollably mutate symptoms. I've done several trial and error games in order to accomplish this guide. As you may already know, we need to finish this plague in brutal/mega-brutal difficulty to attain a 3 gold biohazards for the scenario. To do just that we'll need to finish with a 5 out 5 biohazard score at the end of the game. At first try, you might come to a conclusion that accomplishing a 5 out 5 biohazard score for this plague is impossible. I thought that too. Because of the random mutations, you've probably faced problems such as countries [are] closing their point-of-entries too soon. In the Artificial Organs scenario, you are faced with people who have all replaced their organs with artificial ones. What happens in this scenario is lethality is significantly reduced because of organ replacements but don't fret there is actually [face] a symptom to counter this, Insanity. Insanity makes people rip out their artificial organs making it artificial organs a non-factor anymore. In this guide we'll let the virus freely mutate as it wishes. At the start, we'll be focused on spreading the infection as quickly as possible. Don't worry if your Virus mutates [into] a lethal symptom at the start, we actually want that to happen. Just continue to evolve symptoms, abilities, and transmissions I tell you to and you'll see that beating this plague is actually pretty easy. 2.) Start in China then continue to evolve the following symptoms: Haemophilia Nausea Vomiting Rash Sweating Coughing Pneumonia Sneezing 5.) At this point we'll be going back to evolving symptoms. Some of these symptoms might have already mutated, if that's the case then just skip them. If you can't see these symptoms on your tree, you'll have to evolve lower tier symptoms first. I'll include the best path to these symptoms to help you out. Insanity (Insomnia-Paranoia-Seizures) Necrosis (Rash-Sweating-Skin Lesions) Coma (Cysts-Hyper Sensitivity-Paralysis) Total Organ Failure (this is immediately unlocked by evolving Coma) Hemorrhagic Shock (you'll see this upon evolving Necrosis) Internal Hemorrhaging (below Hemorrhagic Shock) Systemic Infection (below Coma, on the right side)

A/T Mandated Choice CPMandatory choice decreases organ donations families decide to veto, empirical studies proveKessler and Roth 14By Judd B. Kessler, dept of econ @ UPenn, and Alvin E. Roth*, dept of econ @ Stanford, Getting More Organs for Transplantation American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2014, 104(5): 425430 [PDI]In ongoing work, we are investigating whether the effect of framing the organ donor registration question as a mandated choice increases registration rates over an opt-in frame where individuals check a box to register and leave it blank not to register. Results from an experimental study of actual organ donor decisions on the Massachusetts Organ and Tissue Donor Registry suggest that the mandated choice frame may not deliver an increase in registrations as promised (Kessler and Roth 2013). In addition, we find that mandated choice may have a negative effect on organ donation, even if it leaves organ donor registration unchanged. As discussed above, registrations are not the only way organs can become available for transplant; the organs of an unregistered deceased can be donated by surviving next of kin. In a hypothetical choice experiment we ask subjects to report whether they think next of kin should donate a deceaseds organs. We show subjects the decision screen the deceased saw (either a mandated choice frame or an opt in frame) and indicate the choice made by the deceased (either to join the registry or not to join the registry). Subjects are less likely to report that next of kin should donate the organs of an unregistered deceased if the deceased explicitly said no to registration in a mandated choice framed question than if the deceased simply chose not to opt in. This suggests that asking individuals to register under a mandated choice frame may make it harder to get permission for organ donation from the next of kin of those who remain unregistered. This is particularly important because the historical data in Massachusetts suggests that over half of the unregistered donors have their organs recovered after next of kin gives permission.

Mandatory consent doesnt solve the problem some people will still neglect to explicitly decideDen Hartogh 11GOVERT DEN HARTOGH, EMERITUS PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, Can Consent be Presumed? Journal of Applied Philosophy,Vol. 28, No. 3, 2011 [PDI]Legal systems regulating the procurement of post-mortal organs for transplantation are usually classified into opt-in and opt-out systems. Systems of both types purport to respect the decision of the deceased person, whether his decision is to donate or to refuse donation, or to hand over the decision to his relatives (or to some other person). The basic difference between these systems of organ procurement concerns what they take to be the default: what will happen when the deceased has not made any decision at all. In pure opt-in systems the default is that no removal of organs will take place, in opt-out systems that it will take place. In the systems commonly known as opt-in systems, however, the actual default is that the decision will be made by the family of the deceased; hence a threefold classification would be more accurate than the present one Theoretically we could have a no-default system, in which the law requires every citizen to make an explicit decision. But people will need some time to make a decision, and during that time they may tragically die and leave organs suitable for transplantation. And there will always be some people who fail to decide, whatever the sanctions attached to such failure. Hence even so-called mandatory choice systems will as a matter of fact have to identify a default.In the Netherlands, mandated choice only got 41% response most people dont care or cant decideDen Hartogh 11GOVERT DEN HARTOGH, EMERITUS PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, Can Consent be Presumed? Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2011 [PDI]However, it is unclear whether such polls really show what they are supposed to show. Take for example the case of the Netherlands, where the polling results are at the same high level.16 At the introduction of a Donor Register in 1998 all Dutch citizens were asked to declare whether they want to be a donor, object to being one, or leave the decision to their relatives or to a named person. Since 1998 everyone is asked to make this choice on reaching the age of 18. But only 41% of the population have actually registered a choice, and only 56% of those (23% of the population) have registered as donors.17 Even more revealing may be the fact that in opinion surveys up to 45% of the people interviewed say they have registered as donors. We dont know to what extent this misrepresentation is intentional or not. It may be paying homage to the socially desirable, but it may also largely be wishful thinking. Why do 59% fail to register? Many people are not sufficiently interested in the issue to spend time on making up their minds; in particular, they dont want to be confronted with their own mortality. A much larger number of people are unable to make up their minds. Yes, they are in favour of transplantation medicine because of the extent to which it improves patients chances of survival and their welfare. But this rather abstract general attitude is counterbalanced by a number of doubts concerning their own individual cases: the burden for the relatives, some mistrust of doctors, the wish to leave the dead body intact for some time, and more or less vague religious objections. Interestingly these doubts tend to be expressed, not as beliefs to which one clearly subscribes, but only as feelings.1

A/T Education CPEmpirics prove. Education initiatives have no impact.

Mark S. Nadel 13, Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity To Motivate Organ Donations, 2-25-2013, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=yjhpleEfforts to increase donor consent rates have also long included attempts to educate the public, and over the last decade public service announcements promoting organ donation in the United States have used about half a billion dollars in free television time. In addition, special organ donation programs have been initiated by the American Medical Association (AMA), HHS, the American Society of Transplant Surgeons (ASTS), and UNOS. HHS, for example, is prjomoting major public education initiatives. Unfortunately, evidence from the substantial national educational campaigns in the United States, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia, and England indicates that none have significantly increased organ donation rates. Then again, it could be that the primary impact of such programs is offsetting the negative impact of the chilling, fictional media broadcasts noted above.

Prefer my evidence because its a longitudinal Meta studies from across countries and examples from specific cases. A/T Legalize Sales CPLegalizing organ sales cheats the poor the market offers little money for botched surgeries which dont help them at all because of lost work time and healthBadhwar 14Neera K. Badhwar, Kidneys, Commerce, and Communities (Forthcoming in Commerce and Community, ed. Rob Garnett, Lenore Ealy, Paul Lewis Routledge, July 2014) [PDI]

Kidney markets, both black and legal, face special problems in India, thanks to a generalized distrust and lack of mutual goodwill between the various classes: the well-off often prey on the not-so-well-off, the not-so-well-off on the poor, and the poor on the very poor. Sometimes, as Katherine Boo documents in her book on an Indian slum, the very poor also prey on each other (2012). 17 The vast socio-economic differences between the various strata of society, and the struggle for existence on the margins by the poor, serve as a barrier both to the development of a sense of community, and to a strong rule of law. And the absence or weakness of a sense of community and the rule of law serves as a barrier to a genuinely free, non-exploitative market in kidneys. The result, all too often, are involuntary or exploitative exchanges. Poor people are promised huge sums of money that dwindle to a fraction of the original sum after the surgery, or fail to materialize at all (Goyal et al. 2002; Jha 2004; Taylor 2006). 18 Even when they are not cheated, they are offered paltry sums (between $1,000 and $2,000) for their kidneys, and often undergo badly-performed nephrectomies, with little or no post-operative medical care forthcoming. This, in turn, often leads to an inability to work, leaving them worse off financially as well. In short, the poor are treated as a collection of spare parts (Scheper-Hughes 2002), 19 mere means to the ends of others. Some studies although not all - have reported that the vast majority of vendors in India, Pakistan, Egypt, and the Philippines regret their decision to sell their kidneys on account of worsening health and, consequently, worsening financial condition (Goyal et al. 2002). 20 For their part, desperate to earn some money, vendors sometimes deliberately hide their problems from doctors (or doctors from patients) and pass on their infections to kidney recipients.21 Thus, kidney markets in India are often involuntary, and even when they are not involuntary, they are often exploitative of kidney vendors in taking unfair advantage of their desperation (Feinberg 1988: 178 ff.). In short, exchanges in kidney black markets in India, like exchanges in drug black markets, are often predatory.22 Kidney black markets in India also often have adverse third party effects, such as husbands coercing wives to sell their kidneys, or money-lenders pressuring their debtors to sell their own or their wives kidneys to pay off their debt, or insisting on their kidneys as collateral before making a loan (Satz 2010). 23 Extreme poverty, lack of community bonds, and the demand for kidneys together suffice for these third party effects. Yet selling a kidney is sometimes the better alternative: if it werent for their kidneys, it might be their children that poor people had to sell.24

These sales are coerciveBadhwar 14Neera K. Badhwar, Kidneys, Commerce, and Communities (Forthcoming in Commerce and Community, ed. Rob Garnett, Lenore Ealy, Paul Lewis Routledge, July 2014) [PDI]

However, the claim that all exchanges free of force and fraud are equally voluntary and equally just rests on very narrow conceptions of voluntariness and justice, conceptions that reflect neither everyday thinking about, nor philosophical analysis of, either notion. Consider, for example, a desperately poor but healthy woman whose family is on the brink of starvation because of a drought. Her circumstances have reduced her options to only bad ones. Hence, when she agrees to sell her kidney in exchange for $100 or a large sack of rice from a well-off man (a payment actually deemed sufficient by a nephrologist in Manila), her choice is made under duress.27 It is not coerced, but it has a feature in common with coerced choices: it is made unwillingly, in response to unusually constrained external circumstances and an unreasonable offer far below the usual market price. Her action is neither involuntary nor fully voluntary, but mixed, done only to avoid something even worse (Aristotle 1999). 28 Likewise, when her well-off buyer drives, as we say, a hard bargain, he doesnt coerce her, but his action has a feature in common with coercion: it exploits her vulnerability to gain a hugely disproportionate advantage for himself. Like coercion (and fraud), an exploitative exchange shows scant regard for the vulnerable person. This last might invite the reply that since the exchange in question both respects the kidney vendors rights and saves her life, it can hardly be described as showing scant regard for her. Nothing Ive said so far shows that a non-coercive, mutually advantageous exchange can be exploitative. The kidney-for-a-sack-of-rice deal will enable the kidney seller and her family to survive for a month instead of, say, only five days. The claim that an exchange must be harmful to one party to count as exploitative has been disputed. For example, Feinberg argues that exploitation can occur without harming the exploitee's interests and despite the exploitee's fully voluntary consent to the exploitative behavior. (op. cit. 17679). But whether or not harm is necessary for exploitation, in the case at hand the harsh terms of the exchange do make it harmful to the kidney vendor in the long run. For a nephrectomy on a woman about to go on a starvation diet is all but guaranteed to kill her. The kidney recipient saves the desperate womans life at time t1 at the cost of depriving her of her health and perhaps even life at time t2. Compared to the baseline of no-exchange (and certain death from starvation in five days), she is better off. This is reason enough not to ban kidney sales. As Alan Wertheimer argues, however, the no-exchange baseline is not the only relevant baseline in evaluating an exchange (Wertheimer 1996; Wertheimer, Zwolinski, 2013). 29 Evaluating the justice of an exchange requires comparing it to the baseline of a just exchange, an exchange that does not take advantage of either partys vulnerability to harm her. And by this baseline, the woman is worse off. The womans situation is akin to that of a man dying of thirst in a desert, and the buyers to that of a well-stocked, well-off tourist who agrees to give the dying man water in return for all his property after they reach home. Every philosophical theory of ethics joins commonsense morality in condemning such a deal as unconscionable, and the common law agrees by refusing to uphold it if the thirsty man reneges on it. For an almost costless rescue such as this ought to be done without demanding anything in return (even though, as most of us believe, it ought not to be legally compulsory). Any well-off tourist with water to spare ought to give the thirsty man some water just because the thirsty man is a human being like himself who has been rendered helpless by circumstance. Likewise, any well-off buyer of a kidney ought to give the desperate woman the price she would have commanded had she not been desperate, and ought to do so just because the kidney seller is a human being like himself rendered helpless by circumstance. The tourist and the kidney buyer would see this for themselves if they asked themselves that most familiar of questions: How would you like it if someone did this to you? In both the desert and the kidney exchanges, the well-off parties save the desperate individuals from imminent death in exchange for long-term advantage to themselves and long-term grievous harm, perhaps even death, for the desperate individuals. In so doing, they treat the desperate individuals as mere means to their ends, resources to be sucked dry and left to their fate. Their actions and attitudes say, in effect, that the life and well-being of these individuals are of no moment after they have served the interests of the better-off parties. Thus, they both degrade the vulnerable individuals and harm them. The snapshot view of exchanges typical of economics obscures these facts because it omits the details that make them visible. Like force and fraud, benefiting ourselves by imposing a grave cost on others just because we can violates Kants humanity principle, the principle that says that people are ends in themselves, not mere means to our ends. And violating this principle is unjust, because it fails to give people their due.30Presumed consent solves black marketsdemand for organs is reduced legally.Glaser 5, (Sheri R. Glaser, J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law, "Formula to stop the illegal organ trade: presumed consent laws and mandatory reporting requirements for doctors." Human Rights Br. 12 (2005): 20-46, digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=hrbrief) [PDI]

Presumed consent, when the state strictly follows it, is the best- practice method of legally obtaining organs. In countries with presumed consent laws, there is a higher procurement rate for organs than in countries without these laws. Many argue that if the demand for organs were met legally, then people would have less incentive to illegally obtain organs and the black market would eventually diminish. On a more basic level, if there were more organs available for transplant, then more peoples lives would be saved. In addition, presumed consent leads to improvements in tis- sue matching between donor organs and recipients, and it allows surgeons to be more particular about which organs are selected. Furthermore, these laws allow for more careful application of brain-death criteria because the increased supply of donor organs diminishes incentive to obtain organs through inappropriate means. For example, there have been cases in Russia and Argentina where organs were removed from comatose patients who were pre- maturely declared brain-dead. Presumed consent also ensures that organs are fresher because it eliminates the doctors need to con- tact the deceaseds next of kin, thus shortening the time between death and determination of consent. Lastly, the decision as to whether or not to donate organs is not made during the grieving period immediately following someones death.

A/T Econ DAIncreased organ donation helps the economysaves millions in healthcare costs.Gundle 4, (Kenneth Gundle, BA Stanford University, Presumed Consent for Organ Donation: Perspectives of Health Policy Specialists, Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal, (2004) Spring, pp. 28-32, http://web.stanford.edu/group/journal/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Gundle_SocSci_2004.pdf) [PDI]

Higher rates of organ donation not only result in saved lives, but frequently in saved financial resources. Spain esti- mates that its 10,000 renal transplants save approximately $207 million every year (Lopez-Navidad et al., 2002). Compared to dialysis, transplanting a kidney is beneficial both in quality of life for the patient and in money spent. In the United States, there are currently over 50,000 people on the waiting list for kidney transplants, which potentially represents a large savings in healthcare expenditures.PC is Cheap Sheri R. Glaser, Trial Attorney with the United States Department of Justice. [Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors, American University]NMSFinancially, presumed consent lowers costs on the part of the government. For example, in the United States, with a federally funded dialysis program, the cost of a kidney transplant, taking into account the cost per year after the transplant for further medical care, is less than the yearly cost of dialysis. One could reasonably argue that, as kidney transplant become even more commonplace, the cost will continue to fall. If a nation has a system of presumed consent and has more organs available for transplants, then that nation will presumably be performing more transplants and will have fewer patients on dialysis, thus lowering government costs.

A/T Black Markets Good

Organ donation on the black market decreases the livelihoods of the donors: post-surgery conditions destroy working capabilitiesERICA TEAGARDEN; Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws; North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation; 2005; https://www.law.unc.edu/components/handlers/document.ashx?category=24&subcategory=52&cid=712;snEmpirical evidence, however, weakens this theoretical argument. When asked about their health and economic condition, Filipinos who had sold their kidneys complained of pains and disabilities for which they could not afford medical treatment.37 They were also further in debt. Before the surgery, many had worked at loading ships on the docks. After the surgery, they were no longer able to do heavy lifting or had been fired due to the stigma associated with infirmity. Decisions to sell a kidney appear to have less to do with raising cash toward some current or future goal than with paying off a high interest debt to local moneylenders. 38 It has even been suggested that once a region is reputed to be a source for kidneys, brokers intensify their search for sellers there; creditors then become more aggressive in calling in debts, and relatives of patients become still more reluctant to donate a kidney when they can buy one. 39 Some ethicists have concluded that this freedom of contract is really a false liberty. 40 The choice to sell a kidney in an urban slum of Calcutta or in a Brazilian favela, or a Philippine shantytown is often anything but a free and autonomous one. 4TURN: Organs from the black market cause health risks to the recipients for two reasonsSheri R. Glaser; a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law; Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors; 2004; http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/2glaser.pdfThe recipient may experience health problems as well because [1] organs procured on the black market often do not meet the quality standards that the recipients home country requires. [2]Donors also may inadvertently impose health risks on recipients if they conceal adverse information about their health to ensure they are not ruled out as a potential candidate for donation, relinquishing their receipt of any subsequent payment.Organ trafficking leads to the exploitation of the impoverishedSheri R. Glaser; Sheri R. Glaser is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law; Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors; 2004; http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/2glaser.pdfTrafficking in organs is a crime that occurs in two broad categories. First, there are cases where traffickers force or deceive the victims into giving up an organ, as happened with Makbubas family. Second, there are cases where victims formally or informally agree to sell an organ and are cheated because they are not paid for the organ or are paid less than the promised price. A/T Biopower K1. Biopolitical policies carried out by a democratic state means you have no impactDickinson 4 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148)In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the disciplinary society and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of liberty, just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.2. Lifting biopolitical constraints necessarily creates new ones. The illusion that we can be free from biopower makes the impact worse.Shapiro 7 (Steve, , April 22, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, PMK

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.3. PERMthey provide no way to replace status quo power systems which means we have to work within them. Perm solves best

Isin & Wood 99 (Engin F., Dr. Canada Research Chair in Citizenship Studies, Patricia K., Senior Manager for Federal Regulatory Affairs at Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Citizenship and Identity, pg. 15)

Although Stuart Hall agrees that the concept is rife with theoretical difficulties, he provides two convincing arguments for its continued use. First, he suggests that a critique should not simply aim to displace a concept which it critiques. Unlike those forms of critique which aim to supplant inadequate concepts with truer ones, or which aspire to the production of positive knowledge, the deconstructive approach puts key concepts under erasure. This indicates that they are no longer serviceablegood to think within their originary and unreconstructed form. But since they have not been superseded dialectically, and there are no other, entirely different concepts with which to replace them, there is nothing to do but to continue to think with them (S. Hill, 1996: 1). Hall refers to this as thinking at the limit or as thinking in the internal. Identity is such a concept, operating under critical but stable conditions, in the interval between reversal and emergence, which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all (2). Thus, we would continue to use the concept although in a reflexive and critical fashion, more attuned to open up possibilities with it, rather than ascribing certainties to it.4. Policy analysis is the best way to challenge powerTaft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor of Speech CMU, Southern Communication Journal, Vol. 60, Issue 3, Spring)The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

A/T Gift KPerm - do both. Personal solidarity is important but only in conjunction with realistic federal action. Listening AND acting is key - doesnt cause harmful power relations.

Branwen Gruffydd Jones, International Relations at University of Aberdeen, 2005 [Third World Quarterly 26.6]The poor know that they are poor, and can describe their daily suffering, but they will not necessarily be able to provide a fully adequate account of the causes of their poverty. This is especially so in the era of global capitalism, when conditions of local poverty in Africa and elsewhere are rooted in and reproduced by social relations which are globally extended. It is the intransitivity of social relations which makes objectivity and social scientific inquiry necessary, and normative commitments insufficient in the production of critical social inquiry. In the context of unequal power relations and oppressive social orders, the best way to be critical in terms of intellectual inquiry and scholarship (which is necessarily conducted from a site of relative privilege), is to try to identify, theorise and explain the causes or production of specific social conditions and processes such as poverty, with a view to the possibility of progressive, ultimately transformative social change. Conclusion: towards a global political economy of poverty in Africa The institutionalised division of labour which structured the emergence of academic disciplines in the 20th century led to an absence of poverty from the concerns of International Relations, and an absence of theorising the international from the discipline of Development Studies. This, together with the tacit commitment to empiricism underlying the mainstream of both disciplines, reproduces in academic knowledge the internalism underlying popular and institutional portrayals of global poverty. As a result neither International Relations nor Development Studies has adequately emphasised or theorised the global production and reproduction of local poverty in Africa. There is some hope that these flaws will be remedied, given the increasing attention to studying international relations and globalisation from below in recent critical scholarship. However, methodologically, current critical approaches in IR and Development Studies are disabled by their abandonment of objectivity and a commitment to explanation. The incomplete critique of positivism which prevails in critical IR has emphasized the social nature of knowledge, in relation to power, at the expense of the content of knowledge and of ontology. Solidarity with the oppressed is important, and it is necessary to reject the false confidence and certainties of unreflexive positivism and to acknowledge the global relations of unequal power which affect the production of knowledge as well as the production of poverty. But if critical scholarship can do nothing more than listen to the voices of the poor and celebrate their agency, it has little to offer.44 Rather than lingering in moral anxiety and discomfort,45 which forever delays taking the (bolder?) step of actually trying to explain the world in order to change it, we need to develop a causal explanation of the global political economy of poverty and oppression. Permdo the alt in other instancesPermdo the aff and recognize that presumed consent isnt a form of gift giving, but rather a mandatory practice for those who dont opt outTurn: We give assistance in the name of justice, not a gift to helpless victims. This gives the receiver the power over the federal government.Benedikt Korf, Geography at the University of Liverpool, 2007 [Geoforum 38 (2007) 366378]

Normatively, entitlements can also be grounded in a framework of justice using a Rawlsian kind of thought experiment, which forces the privileged to think themselves as the non-privileged, the (potential) recipient. Corbridge has summarised this Rawlsian intuition as follows (1998, p. 37): there are good reasons for attending to their needs and rights as fellow human beings in a manner that will make calls upon our resources and entitlements. From this perspective, the moral or ethical dimension of generosity in giving to those in need partly collapses, at least from a normative standpoint. Caring about the entitlements of fellow human beings is something different than caring for and acting benevolently on (behalf of) vulnerable victims. Taking this normative perspective may also place us in a better position to rethink the practicalities of aiding, understood more as joint, shared engagement than as an ethical act of benevolence. Such relational ethics on equal footing gives dignity to those who receive. They do not receive a gift, but an entitlement a claim which is independent of the generosity and thus the virtuous acts of the donor. Alt fails and turn it calls for an impossibly utopian social system free of hierarchys andinequality in current politics. This is not only impossible but necessitates destroying anyone who would stand in the way of this utopia. Douzinas 2007 [Costas Douzinas, professor of law and Dean of Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Birkbeck College Human Rights and Empire: The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism pp.86-88]

Finally, we have the evil inhuman, the irrational, cruel, brutal, disgusting Other. This is the other of the unconscious. As Slavoj Zizek puts it, there is a kind of passive exposure to an overwhelming Otherness, which is the very basis of being human [the inhuman] is marked by a terrifying excess which, although it negates what we understand as humanity is inherent to being human. We have called this abysmal other that lurks in the psyche and settles the ego various names: God or Satan, barbarian or foreigner, in psychoanalysis death drive or the Real. Individually and socially we are hostages to this irreducible untamable otherness. Becoming human is possible only against this impenetrable inhuman background. Split into two, according to a simple moral calculus, this Other has both a tormenting and a tormented part, both radical evil and radical passivity. He represents our narcissistic self in its infant (civilization as potential, possibility or risk), civilization in its cradle; but also what is most frightening and horrific in us, the death drive, the evil persona that lurks in our midst. We present the Other as radically different, precisely because he is what we both love and hate about ourselves, the childhood and the beast of humanity. The racial connotations of this hierarchy are not far from the surface. A similar residue, a nonlinked thing beyond control and constitutive fault line haunts community and its law. The original separation from other people and societies, the break that lies at the foundation of the modern nation-state cannot be fully represented or managed but keeps coming back as social sickness and personal malady. The unnamable other returns in xenophobia and racism, in hatred and discrimination and remains intractable to politics. Politics becomes a politics of forgetting, a forgetting of past injustices and current symptoms, a considered strategy that tries to ban what questions the legitimacy of institutions by turning the threatening imponderable powers into memory and myth or into celebration of fictitious unity. Psychoanalysis reminds us that lack and desire leads to symptoms, often violent and repetitive, the cause of which is forgotten because it never entered consciousness. One could claim that the perennial and perennially failing quest for justice is the result of these symptoms a trace that signifies a past trauma or a future union, always deferred and different. Justice is the name of social desire for unity and wholeness and the series of symptoms created by the lack of this foundational and unattainable condition. Injustice, on the other hand, is the way through which people construct this sense of lack, incompleteness or disorder, the name given to the symptoms of social exclusion, domination or oppression. This approach could help us understand the psychic and social investment in human rights campaigns. The absolute and inhuman otherness that lurks in us leads to repression, cruelty, and returns in symptoms. We call evil the effects of what we are unable to control in our psychic or social selves, the uncanny fears and symptoms the inhuman part of humanity causes. Absolute evil begins with the attempt to tame this untamable, to dismiss the inhuman in the human in order to master humanity completely. We try to silence the terror of the inhuman thing within us by turning it into a question of morality, into evil and obscenity and displacing it into the savage and suffering others. The victims we try to rescue are stand-ins for our own malady. We hope to become whole, to integrate our conscious, rational self and domesticate our unconscious, traumatic, affective part by projecting into those upon whom we export our pathetic and atrocious traits. To become fully human, to become whole, our inhuman part is wholly projected onto the other. The internal divide becomes a symmetrical external separation as humanity is neatly split into two: barbarian and kinsman, victim and rescuer, the (evil) inhuman and the (moral) human. The legal category of crimes against humanity expresses well this split. It is humanity that commits atrocities against itself, it is humanity that acts inhumanely, in denial of its dependency on the inhuman other that lurks within us, As Jean-Francois Lyotard put it, the Holocaust was the completion of the dream to exterminate those people (the Jews, the gypsies), war is the inability to recognize difference as something constitutive of identity, but rather view differences as inferior and thus juxtaposing our inhumane Other on the others whose differences we want to exterminate, who in their otherness bear witness to the absolute other. The rights of the other are about speaking new, the immemorial power of the other and our inability to announce it.

A/T Trust NC Non UniqueCohen 92 (Carl Cohen,[Professor in the School of Medicine, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan], The Case for Presumed Consent to Transplant Human Organs After Death, October 5 1992)There is no good pragmatic foundation for these objections and speculations. The feeling of revulsion and antipathy against medical professionals are extravagant and increased by your thoughts into what is called anticipatory speculative condemnation.Those who have negative feelings towards the removal of organs from cadavers will most definitely not agree with this sort of organ transplantation and will in turn hate the idea of presumed consent. Under any system, there can be misconduct of dead bodies. Watching a person dying is wrong especially when they could have been saved, but wasnt.

A/T Culture NCOpting out solvesJennifer Dolling, 2009, Research Counsel at Dalhousie University. [Opting in to an Opt-Out System: Presumed Consent as a Valid Policy Choice for Ontarios Cadaveric Organ Shortage University of Toronto]NMSNevertheless, pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 632 Canada has a commitment and obligation to respect diversity and individual rights633 and as such, any attempt to increase the cadaveric organ donation rate must be careful to respect diverse opinions.634 Indeed, it has been shown that ethnic and religious minorities are less likely to consent to organ donation. A 2001 Health Canada poll reported that those whose religion was non-Christian, those whose ethnic background was either non-European or European other than French or British, and those born outside Canada were more likely to be undecided with respect to organ donation.635 Non-Christians older than sixty-five were most likely to have decided not to donate.636 One can argue however that exempting specific groups from presumed consent legislation would not be the answer, as this would presume that all people of a particular group adhered to all tenets of their faith or culture. In any event, presumed consent as a default rule might assist some people to realize their wish to donate despite external social or religious pressures to do otherwise.637 Moreover, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine whether a deceased belonged to a particular exempted group at the time of their death. As such, the diversity of Ontarios population could be respected by ensuring that all people understood the concept of presumed consent, were aware of the choice to opt out, and that the means for doing so took into account the provinces diverse population.Most cultures and religions promote organ donationJennifer Dolling, 2009, Research Counsel at Dalhousie University. [Opting in to an Opt-Out System: Presumed Consent as a Valid Policy Choice for Ontarios Cadaveric Organ Shortage University of Toronto]NMSIt can be argued that presumed consent legislation would not respect Ontarios diverse population. Certainly, (q)uestions concerning the boundary between life and death have cultural roots in many societies,622 and Bowman and Richard note that the space between life and death is socially, culturally and politically constructed, and is fluid and open to dispute.623 Many Canadian Aboriginal people in particular are very uncomfortable with the concept of organ donation,624 while other Ontarians may also be hesitant about organ donation as they do not know whether their religion prohibits it. The Citizens Panel found that religion strongly influences many Ontarians decisions whether or not to donate,625 with even those who do not consider themselves to be very religious turning to their faith to make an ethical and moral judgment with respect to donation.626 The Citizens Panel reviewed the official attitudes of religious groups in Ontario and found that while officially, all major world religions permitted organ donation,627 many Ontarians stated that their faith leader had spoken against it.628 However, in their survey the Citizens Panel found that of those respondents who were unfamiliar with organ donation, only 3% stated that it might be against their religious beliefs, indicating that religion is not a significant barrier to organ donation in Ontario.629 As such, given the fact that all major religions either affirmatively encourage or passively approve of organ donation,630 and the low percentage of Ontarians who feel that their religion presents a barrier to donation, religious concerns need not preclude the adoption of presumed consent.631

A/T Religion NC

Presumed consent is supported by all major religions: Abouna, 2008(G. M. Abouna, College of Medicine-Drexel University, 2008, Organ Shortage Crisis: Problems and Possible Solutions, Transplantation Proceedings, 40, 34-38, p. 36)

According to the concept of presumed consent, anyone can be an organ donor after his or her death unless the individual had documented objection during his or her lifetime and permission of family members is not required. Most major religions, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, accept [the] this important concept [of presumed consent]. When we established a transplant program in Kuwait in 1979, the Islamic Fatwa (Decree) Committee that approved organ transplantation from living and deceased donors as a way of saving the life of other humans stated that: You do not have to ask permission of the family to transplant organs from the dead, since human organs belong to God and not to the family. In countries that have accepted the concept of presumed consent, such as Spain, there is the highest number of organs from deceased donors (DD). In Spain the number of deceased donors per year is 34/million population, whereas in the US it is 24/million, Canada 8/million, Sweden 15/million, Saudi Arabia 5/million, and Turkey 2.5/million. Another way to enhance this concept is to encourage all citizens to carry a donor card.

Religion flows affAmber Rithalia et al 9, research fellow,1 Catriona McDaid, research fellow,corresponding author1 Sara Suekarran, research fellow,1 Lindsey Myers, information specialist,1 and Amanda Sowden, deputy director [Impact of presumed consent for organ donation on donation rates: a systematic review, published online Jan 14, 2009, NCBI] //AG

The only religion investigated was Catholicism, which is probably a reflection of the countries included in the models. It has been suggested that Catholicism may be associated with favourable attitudes towards organ donation as the religion officially recognises organ transplantation as a service of life. It was a significant positive predictor of donation rates in one study and of importance in some sections of the regression model in another,w11 but not in a study that specifically included only Western Catholic and Protestant countries.w6 The differences may be partly explained by different samples of included countries. For example, only one study included Latin American and South American countries.w11Opting out solvesJennifer Dolling, 2009, Research Counsel at Dalhousie University. [Opting in to an Opt-Out System: Presumed Consent as a Valid Policy Choice for Ontarios Cadaveric Organ Shortage University of Toronto]NMSNevertheless, pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 632 Canada has a commitment and obligation to respect diversity and individual rights633 and as such, any attempt to increase the cadaveric organ donation rate must be careful to respect diverse opinions.634 Indeed, it has been shown that ethnic and religious minorities are less likely to consent to organ donation. A 2001 Health Canada poll reported that those whose religion was non-Christian, those whose ethnic background was either non-European or European other than French or British, and those born outside Canada were more likely to be undecided with respect to organ donation.635 Non-Christians older than sixty-five were most likely to have decided not to donate.636 One can argue however that exempting specific groups from presumed consent legislation would not be the answer, as this would presume that all people of a particular group adhered to all tenets of their faith or culture. In any event, presumed consent as a default rule might assist some people to realize their wish to donate despite external social or religious pressures to do otherwise.637 Moreover, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine whether a deceased belonged to a particular exempted group at the time of their death. As such, the diversity of Ontarios population could be respected by ensuring that all people understood the concept of presumed consent, were aware of the choice to opt out, and that the means for doing so took into account the provinces diverse population.Religions promote organ donationJennifer Dolling, 2009, Research Counsel at Dalhousie University. [Opting in to an Opt-Out System: Presumed Consent as a Valid Policy Choice for Ontarios Cadaveric Organ Shortage University of Toronto]NMSIt can be argued that presumed consent legislation would not respect Ontarios diverse population. Certainly, (q)uestions concerning the boundary between life and death have cultural roots in many societies,622 and Bowman and Richard note that the space between life and death is socially, culturally and politically constructed, and is fluid and open to dispute.623 Many Canadian Aboriginal people in particular are very uncomfortable with the concept of organ donation,624 while other Ontarians may also be hesitant about organ donation as they do not know whether their religion prohibits it. The Citizens Panel found that religion strongly influences many Ontarians decisions whether or not to donate,625 with even those who do not consider themselves to be very religious turning to their faith to make an ethical and moral judgment with respect to donation.626 The Citizens Panel reviewed the official attitudes of religious groups in Ontario and found that while officially, all major world religions permitted organ donation,627 many Ontarians stated that their faith leader had spoken against it.628 However, in their survey the Citizens Panel found that of those respondents who were unfamiliar with organ donation, only 3% stated that it might be against their religious beliefs, indicating that religion is not a significant barrier to organ donation in Ontario.629 As such, given the fact that all major religions either affirmatively encourage or passively approve of organ donation,630 and the low percentage of Ontarians who feel that their religion presents a barrier to donation, religious concerns need not preclude the adoption of presumed consent.631

A/T Polls NC

UK affirmsBBC 07Most back opt-out organ donation 18 October 2007 [PDI]A large majority of the population support the idea of presumed consent for organ donation, survey findings have suggested. Two-thirds of more than 2,000 people surveyed by the British Medical Association said the UK should move to an opt-out system. At present organs can only be taken from people who have actively chosen to be donors, and carry donor cards. Every year hundreds of people die because of a shortage of donor organs.

Polls show people want to donate organsU.S.D.H. 12 Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration Healthcare Systems Bureau Division of Transplantation [National Survey of Organ Donation Attitudes and Behaviors, 2012] //AG

Figure 1 shows that general support for organ donation was strong and sustained for nearly the last 20 years, with 94.9 percent in 2012 supporting or strongly supporting organ donation.

MethodologyU.S.D.H. 12 Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration Healthcare Systems Bureau Division of Transplantation [National Survey of Organ Donation Attitudes and Behaviors, 2012] //AG

A household-based telephone survey (including both landline and cellphones) was conducted between July and September 2012. The respondent universe consisted of all U.S. adults (aged 18 and older) and interviewers used a five plus five call design (up to five telephone calls were made to establish a human contact in the sampled household plus up to another five calls were made to complete the interview with the designated respondent) for sampled households. Interviewers completed 3,369 total interviews including 1,252 interviews with the American general adult population (inclusive of all race/ethnicity groups) and an additional 2,117 interviews with four minority groups (African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans). The number of additional interviews conducted for the minority groups were as follows: African-Americans (547), Hispanics (518), Asians (515), and Native Americans (537). Interviewers conducted the interviews in English and Spanish based on respondent preference. The study had an overall response rate of 22 percent across all sample types (see below). This response rate was in the range of observed response rates for Random Digit Dialing (RDD) studies following a similar design. To ensure that the response rate did not imply non-response bias, the researchers conducted a non-response analysis. This analysis showed no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents. Full details are in Appendix B.

All data in the report were analyzed using the data analysis software program SPSS Survey Reporter. Comparisons between demographic groups and between years were computed at a 95 percent confidence ratio. All statistically referenced differences were statistically significant at the p