organizational rules and surveillance: propositions in comparative organizational analysis

Organizational Rules and Surveillance: Propositions in Comparative Organizational AnalysisAuthor(s): William A. RushingSource: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Mar., 1966), pp. 423-443Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of Management,Cornell UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391569 .

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William A. Rushing

Organizational Rules

and Surveillance:

Propositions in Comparative

Organizational Analysis

Two central complex organizational variables are surveillance and bureaucratic rules. Propositions concerning the relationships between these two variables, and between these two variables and performance level, organizational conflict, participant supply and demand, organizational size and structural differentiation are presented, and data from a variety of organizational studies which support the propositions are cited. It is argued that, since these variables are present in all types of organizations (e.g., they are not restricted to hospitals, uni- versities, or any other one type of organization), the propositions constitute a comparative framework for organizational analysis.'

William A. Rushing is associate professor of sociology at Washington State University.

SINCE Max Weber's writings on bureaucracy, complex organization has usually been defined by sociologists in terms of office hierarchy, specialization, formal rules, impersonality, and other familiar characteristics. It is frequently assumed that these attributes constitute a functionally interrelated whole; indeed, in Weber's ideal-type formulation this assumption is a necessary con-

'An expansion and elaboration of a paper read at the 1965 meetings of the American Sociological Association in Chicago, Illinois.



424 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY

sequence of the definition of bureaucracy. The concept "bureaucracy," then, is often used to refer to an ideal or pure state in which a configuration of attributes is present. Several criticisms have been made of this formulation, two of which are particularly relevant to this paper.

First, the characteristics which are included in the definition tend not to be considered as variables.2 Attention is focused on the definition of an ideal or pure state, rather than on the fact that organizations may vary in terms of certain variables. And partly as a consequence of this, attention is deflected away from the fundamental questions of the degree to which the various characteristics are related3 and the degree to which each is sep- arately related to nonbureaucratic variables. Since the definition assumes that the various components of bureaucracy are interrelated and, by implication, that nonbureaucratic variables exert a similar effect on each of the components, it has not encouraged the development of bureaucratic theory in the form of a series of interrelated propositions which are statements of relationship among a group of variables. In this paper, some initial efforts toward the construction of a series of propositions about bureaucratic organization are presented. Propositions deal with the relationship between two bureaucratic variables, formal rules and surveillance,4 and several other variables.

Rules include productivity norms and other objective means for evaluating participant performance, as well as explicit rules that prescribe specific performances. Surveillance refers to supervisory practices, that is, efforts to influence the performance of organizational participants through direct observation and face- to-face contact. Each is assumed to form a continuum, reflecting

2 For a recent statement and empirical analysis, see Richard A. Hall, The Con- cept of Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment, A merican Journal of Sociology, 69

(1963), 32-40. 3 Two studies show that some intercorrelations among bureaucratic variables are

quite low, and some are negative. See ibid., and Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Bureaucracy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study, American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), 791-795.

4Both, of course, are included in Weber's formulation. See Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, translators, From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University, 1959), pp. 196, 197.



ORGANIZATIONAL RULES AND SURVEILLANCE 425

varying degrees of participant autonomy. These variables constitute two major components of what is usually considered the formal control structure of organizations and they perform similar organizational functions: each restricts, regulates, and controls participant behavior. Nevertheless, the two are not always posi- tively associated. They are not always affected in the same way by the same variables; in fact, as will be suggested, there are circumstances in which the two may vary in opposite directions.

Since this study is concerned with organizational control, the analysis is related to the models of bureaucracy outlined by Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner, all of which revolve around the problem of organizational control. In both Merton and Gouldner the primary organizational control strategy is rule making, whereas for Selznick it is delegation.5 The conceptual analysis of organizational control presented here is different from these models, however.

The models of Merton, Gouldner, and Selznick are social-system models. Changes in one component of the organization are assumed to have ramifying consequences for the whole organizational system. Each model takes as its starting point, that is, as its major independent variable, organizational control strategies,6 from which a number of organizational consequences, anticipated and unanticipated, are expected to stem. The effect of rule making or delegation on other components of the organization are then traced out in detail, but the effects that different structural conditions may have on the level of control and different types of control strategies is given relatively little attention. More relevant to these models are the dysfunctional consequences of rule making or delegation, and how these consequences may in turn reinforce the need for control and, therefore, the existing level of organizational control. In these social system models, then, "vicious circles" and feedback loops among organizational processes are of primary interest.

Although the analysis in this paper deals to some degree with vicious circles (e.g., the relationship between rigid organizational

5 For a concise summary of these three theories, see James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958), pp. 36-47.

6 Ibid., p. 37.




control and the motivation to produce), the conceptual analysis of organizational control is essentially different. There is greater concern with identifying the various structural conditions that may cause variation in organizational demands for control, and the reasons why one control strategy rather than another may be a more likely organizational response to specified structural conditions, than there is with analyzing the various consequences of these strategies. Rules and surveillance are, then, conceptualized primarily as dependent variables. The independent variables include participant performance level, organizational conflict, participant supply and demand, organizational size, and structural differentiation.

Although these variables are social-structural, the basic framework is social-psychological. The reward-cost framework of George C. Homans, and of John W. Thibaut and Harold H. KelleyT provides the theoretical framework for each hypothesized relationship between social-structural conditions and organizational strategies of control. The reward-cost model is viewed as a variable which intervenes between structural variables and organizational control strategies. Rewards are generally defined as valued states of affairs, while costs refer to valued states of affairs which are forgone in the performance of a particular activity. Hence an activity, e.g., a particular control strategy, may yield high reward, but be undesirable because other values are forgone; consequently, an alternative strategy with a more desirable reward- cost balance may be chosen instead. Despite the use of this psychological model, however, the variables in most of the propositions are social-structural ones. The general orienting frame of references may be expressed as follows: Variation in conditions of social structure, acting upon the reward-cost balance of indi- viduals in organizations, causes levels of attempted organizational control and types of control strategies to vary.

Since the analysis deals with variables like rules, surveillance, organizational conflict, and structural differentiation, which char- acterize all complex organizations to some degree, the proposi-

7 See George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961); also John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John W. Wiley, 1959).




tions cut across specific types of organizations, such as hospitals, government agencies, prisons, or industrial firms. Hence, they constitute a framework for comparative research on rules and surveillance in organizations.8 Unfortunately, however, all propositions are not supported by research in all types of organizations. And, as is often the case in a paper such as this, all propositions are not equally supported, although no contradiction of them has been found in the literature. Some propositions have been pre- viously stated by other authors (e.g., Proposition V), but appar- ently they have not been explicitly formulated within the reward- cost framework of this paper; no one has looked at the same set of variables in quite the same way. Finally, since the analysis is limited to only a selected list of variables, the reader should note

8 Etzioni has also developed a comparative organizational framework which pivots on the problem of organizational control; cf. Amatai Etzioni, A Comparative Anal- ysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1962). Foremost among the differences between Etzioni's framework and the present one is the different classifications of types of control. Etzioni deals with three: coercion, remuneration, and normative control; whereas the present framework deals with rules and surveillance. Although there appears to be some overlap between surveillance and rules and Etzioni's categories of coercion and normative control, especially surveillance and coercion, the overlap is not complete. Surveillance, for example, is a broader term than coercion, since it may refer to the close supervision of industrial workers, or even professional workers, as well as the inmates of prisons and jails. And since normative control includes strategies such as compliments, shame, praise, and friendship, it is considerably broader than rules. The two schemes contain somewhat different though not contradictory sets of categories of organizational control strategies. The rules-surveillance distinction is an important one, however, and it is argued that systematic relationships between it and designated structural conditions can be shown to exist.

Two other differences might be noted. In Etzioni's scheme, the major deter- minant of organizational control strategies is the degree of participant involvement (e.g., alienative involvement is usually associated with coercive control). While involvement is important (see especially Proposition 9; see also Proposition 3), there are also important structural variables that are determinative of, and not merely correlated with, the degree and types of organizational control strategies.

Second, it appears that in Etzioni's framework, involvement may be a dependent variable, an independent variable, or interdependent with organizational control structures (see ibid., pp. 12-14). In the present framework psychological variables can only be intervening variables. The reward-cost model is relevant to the analysis of organizational control only insofar as it provides a conceptual link between social-structural conditions and control strategies.




that each proposition is accompanied with the qualification, "all other things being equal."

PARTICIPANT PERFORMANCE LEVEL When the level of participant performance is high in an or-

ganization, persons who are in managerial positions are rewarded, but when performance levels are low, such persons incur costs.9 Bureaucratic rules may then be imposed in an effort to reduce these costs. Gouldner notes, for example, that in response to workers' low productivity, management demanded strict adherence to rules and regulations governing punch-in time, absentee- ism, and use of company property.'0 Blau finds, too, that when subordinates fail to attain adequate work quotas, formal methods for evaluating work performance are introduced." And Argyris concludes that in order "to combat reduced productivity" many managers resort to "careful definition" as well as closer inspection of employees' performance.'2

Proposition 1. Use of formal rules to control behavior will be greater when organizational participants fail to attain minimum performance levels than when they attain these levels.

Thus if compliance is not voluntary, formal rules may be introduced. Rules and formal regulations may, if they are accepted by those to whom they apply, become functional substitutes for participant motivation and voluntary performance.'3 Organiza- tions, and areas within the same organization, where performance levels are considered too low are also places where many elaborate formal rules are also likely to be found.

9 An assumption here is that persons in managerial positions value high productivity. In some instances this may not be completely true, as, for example, in the indulgency pattern described by Alvin W. Gouldner in Patterns of Industrial Bu- reaucracy (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954). For instances where this assumption is not valid, Propositions 1 and 2 do not hold.

10Ibid., pp. 60, 67-68. 11 Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago,

1955), p. 35; see also p. 34, where Blau states that a new formal method of control (statistical records) was "intended to facilitate the exercise of administrative control."

12 Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 130. 13 Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs,

N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 62.




Such use of bureaucratic rules is not restricted to the actions of higher officials or to superior's actions against subordinates. Rush- ing shows that members of ancillary (i.e., subordinate) psychiatric professions try to impose formal referral procedures in response to psychiatrists' failure to send them what they consider a sufficient number of patient referrals.'4

Closer surveillance of recalcitrant participants may also be employed. For example, in the eighteenth century Prussian bureaucracy, where it is said that superiors believed "no official could be trusted any further than the keen eyes of his superiors could reach," an extensive and elaborate system of surveillance (including a spy system) was devised.'5 Studies of mental hospitals show that those patients who are unable or unwilling to main- tain adequate levels of functioning are closely watched, while patients who function at higher performance levels are freer to move about.'6 Closer surveillance was management's initial re- action in Gouldner's study,'7 as it was in Rushing's study of the psychiatric professions.'8

Proposition 2. Surveillance will be greater when organizational participants fail to attain minimum performance levels than when they attain these levels.

Rules and surveillance do not always achieve the results de- sired, however. Stringent behavior controls, because of the costs to participants, may result in reduced participant motivation and productivity, the condition that may have brought about more stringent controls. Indeed, observations indicate that both close surveillance and bureaucratic rules may intensify apathy and de-

14William A. Rushing, The Psychiatric Professions: Power, Conflict and Adap- tion in a Psychiatric Hospital Staff (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1964), pp. 38-43, 75-76.

15 See Walter L. Dorn, The Prussian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century, I, Political Science Quarterly, 66 (1931), 403-423; quoted material is from The Prus- sian Bureaucracy in the Eighteenth Century, II, Policital Science Quarterly, 67

(1932), 94. 16 See, for example, Ivan Belknap, Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), esp. pp. 163-170. 17 Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 87-88; see also p. 159. 18 Rushing, op. cit., pp. 33-39, 60-76.




crease motivation and productivity levels.'9 Group relations may thus be caught in a "vicious circle": Group A imposes rules on Group B or engages in closer surveillance because of B's low productivity, only to find B's level of productivity decreasing even further.

Proposition 3. The greater the use of formal rules and direct surveillance, the greater the tendency for participants to lower their production.

This does not mean, however, that productivity will, in fact,. always be lower; the tendency to restrict output and and the actual restriction of output are not the same thing. It would seem that if the tendency is there, however, high performance levels become more dependent upon surveillance. Thus, a consequence of bureaucratic rules may be the continuation of surveillance, or even its intensification,19a since the tendency to perform at low productivity levels may be reinforced when stringent rules are introduced. Surveillance becomes necessary because the rule sender and rule receiver fail to agree.

Proposition 4. After rules have been introduced, surveillance will be greater when the rule receiver and rule maker are not in consensus than when they are in consensus.

Stanton Wheeler finds, for example, that prisoners who exhibit less consensus with staff on norms are those most likely to be closely watched (kept in close custody).20

COSTS OF SURVEILLANCE Surveillance may bring about compliance (i.e., higher produc-

tivity), but it may be very costly, e.g., it will require time and effort, or the expense of hiring others to do the job. In an effort to retain high production levels with fewer surveillance costs,

19 On the effect of close surveillance, see Robert L. Kahn and Daniel Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in Dorwin Cart- wright and Alvin Zander, (eds.), Group Dynamics (2nd ed., Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960), pp. 560-561. See also James C. Worthy, Organizational Struc- ture and Employee Morale, American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 175. On similar effects of formal rules, see Argyris, op. cit., ch. -v, esp. p. 162; Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 176-178; also, Rushing, op. cit., pp. 153-155, 248-251.

19a See Gouldner, op. cit., p. 178. 2o Stanton Wheeler, Socialization in Correctional Communities, American Soci-

ological Review, 26 (1961), 701.




surveillance may be replaced with rules. This appears to have been involved in Gouldner's description of management's use of bureaucratic rules,2' Rushing's analysis of the development of formal rules,22 and Blau's description of the supervisor's use of formal methods to control subordinates.23

Proposition 5. The greater the costs of surveillance, the greater the use of formal rules.24

If Proposition 5 is true, conditions that consistently increase surveillance costs should be directly related to the use of formal rules, but inversely related to surveillance. The physical distance between organizational members, particularly superiors and their subordinates, is one such condition.

Proposition 6. The greater the physical distance between superiors and subordinates, the less the use of surveillance and the greater the use of formal rules.

Herbert Kaufman's description of the organization of the United States Forest Service suggests the validity of this hypothesis. There are 792 widely scattered ranger districts, each managed by a Ranger, so that no more than three or four inspections by representatives from Washington are possible each year. Conse- quently, numerous formal rules, such as federal statutes, Presi- dential proclamations and executive orders, and a 3,000 page Forest Service Manual prescribe the Ranger's behavior in detail. Kaufman writes of the Manual: "It is difficult to think of any- thing likely to happen on a Ranger district that will not fall fairly unequivocally into one or another of the hundreds of categories in this Manual."25

Difficulties in maintaining surveillance over several scattered units and the replacement of surveillance with rules are also shown

21 Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 87, 159-160. 22 Rushing, op. cit., pp. 40-42, 239. 23Blau, op. cit., p. 35. Truman, on the basis of his analysis of decentralization

in the Department of Agriculture, notes that when activities are standardized (explicitly specified in rules), "they require little day-to-day supervision from Wash- ington." Cf. David Bicknell Truman, Administrative Decentralization (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1940), p. 83.

24 This proposition may be derived directly from Thibaut and Kelley's analysis of surveillance and rules; op. cit., pp. 130-135.

25 Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1960), p. 95.




in Gouldner's description of the practices employed by a safety engineer to assure that different plants engage in proper safety practices.26 In addition to the costs of time and effort, which increase with physical distance between superior and subordinate, the fewer and shorter personal contacts cause communication failures to increase.27 Rules may be employed in an effort to prevent such costs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT There are two general types of organizational conflict: (1)

conflict between the organization and an outside agent and (2) conflict between groups within the organization.

More stringent adherence to organizational regulations is a probable internal response to outside threats. Merton's analysis of the "ritualism" of bureaucrats28 is consistent with this hypothesis. Because of conflict with clients, participants may defend their action and attempt to prevent further conflict by adhering rigidly to organizational rules. Clients may take their complaints to higher officials, who become concerned that clients be treated im- partially, so that an even greater adherence to existing rules may be emphasized. Participants may become even more rigid in their relations with clients. Thus, increased rigidity may be an attempt to prevent the costs of the hostility of clients and the wrath of superiors.29 In general, therefore, as an organization undergoes threat from the outside it will become increasingly rigid. As pro- tection from the threatening agent, new rules may be promulgated and old ones rigidly enforced.30

26 Gouldner refers to the function of rules under such conditions as the "remote control" function of rules; op. cit., p. 167.

27 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 71. 28 Robert K. Merton, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, Social Forces, 23

(1940), 560-568. 29 See Blau's discussion of participants who rigidly adhere to organizational rules,

op. cit., p. 187. This discussion follows quite closely James G. March and Herbert A. Simon's analysis of Merton's Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in their Organizations, op. cit., pp. 38-41.

30 No claim is made that organizational rigidity is the only response to conflict with an outside agent. As Philip Selznick shows in TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California, 1949), organizations may become more flexible in the face of threat and absorb the threatening agent. An organization may also




Proposition 7. Demands for precise conformity to organizational rules will be greater during periods of conflict between the organization and an outside agent than during periods of harmony.

Internal conflict may also result in added measures of control. Although there are conflicting relationships that may be termi- nated by the withdrawal of one party,31 here only those relationships are considered in which parties are bound to the relationship, either through force or mutual dependence.

Proposition 8. To the extent that neither party withdraws, formal rules will be more extensive when internal organizational conflict exists than when harmony prevails. This proposition is based on the rationale that conflict will ordinarily produce ex- cessive costs for both parties,32 and that agreed-upon rules will eliminate or reduce such costs.

Research in industrial organizations supports this proposition. Melville Dalton observes that "dysfunctional relations" between two departments in an industrial organization precipitated the process of "delimiting human behavior . .. by means of elaborate regulatory techniques."33 Clark Kerr's analysis of union-management relationships indicates that conflict and the threat of its eruption in strikes or lock-outs are forces which produce labor- management agreements.34 He further argues that important

become more innovative rather than rigid in its response to conflict. All that Proposition 7 says is that organizational rigidity will be greater during periods of conflict than it will be under conditions of harmony. While no attempt is made here to explain why organizations sometimes become more flexible during periods of conflict, it would seem that cooptation would depend, as a minimum condition, upon whether it was possible to absorb the threatening agent. A client cannot usually be absorbed into the organization, nor can a legislative body be taken into a department of the executive government. Conflicts with such agents are likely, therefore, to generate forces which encourage rigid adherence to organizational rules, which under more harmonious circumstances may be relaxed.

31 This possibility reveals a crucial limitation to the generalization that "Con- flict relations do not represent a breakdown in regulated conduct but rather a shift in the governing norms and expectations." Cf. Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, The Analysis of Social Conflict-Toward an Overview and Synthesis, Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 219.

32See Thibaut and Kelley, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 33 Melville Dalton, Industrial Controls and Personal Relations, Social Forces, 23

(1955), 244. 34 Clark Kerr, Industrial Conflict and Its Mediation, American Journal of So-




cost-reducing functions are performed by these agreements. Be- cause the actions of each party are regulated by rules, there is a firmer basis for predicting the other's actions; so that the costs of uncertainty are removed and management and labor are able to avoid using strategies like strikes or lock-outs, which are so costly to them both. Thus, most disputes are eventually concluded and rules negotiated, because "aggressive conflict is so costly to both sides."35

Internal Conflict and Organizational Rigidity in Prisons Studies of prisons provide excellent examples of the relation-

ship between internal conflict and organizational rigidity. Re- search workers indicate that the inmate-staff relationship is ex- tremely conflictual: each party views the other with distrust and hate, the inmates want to escape but the staff must keep them in, and the inmate social code strongly opposes cooperation with prison staff.36 In consequence, inmate conduct is rigidly controlled by formal rules: Whom one may talk to and joke with, and when he may talk and joke, as well as whistle, sing, smoke, and urinate are organizationally defined.37 Since individual judg-

ciology, 60 (1954), esp. p. 232. Alvin W. Gouldner's description of the termination of a "wildcat strike" in Wildcat Strike (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch, 1954), esp. pp. 120-121, is consistent with Kerr's generalization, as are the analyses of Robert Dubin, Industrial Conflict and Social Welfare, Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 190, and 0. Kahn-Freund, Intergroup Conflict and Their Settlements, British Journal of Sociology, 5 (1954), 196-202.

35 Kerr, op. cit., 236. 36See Erving Goffman, Asylums (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1961),

esp. p. 7; and Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (Boston: The Christopher Publishing Co., 1940), pp. 151-152, 185-186. For a review of studies describing the life of prison inmates, see Gresham S. Sykes and Sheldon L. Messinger, The Inmate Social System, in Richard A. Cloward, et al., Theoretical Studies in Social Organiza- tion of the Prison (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), pp. 5-19; they conclude that prisoners "are united firmly in their opposition to the enemy out- group (prison officials)" p. 11. See also, Gresham Sykes, The Society of Captives (Princeton: Princeton University, 1958), esp. pp. 65-78; and Lloyd W. McCorkle and Richard Korn, Resocialization Within Walls, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 293 (1954), 88-98.

37See "Rules for Inmates," in Norman Johnson, Leonard Savitz, and Marvin E. Wolfgang (eds.), The Sociology of Punishment and Correction (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 87-91. The following rule illustrates the degree to which inmate behavior may be routinized in prisons. "At the ringing of the morning bell you




ment may lead to open conflict, it is curtailed.8 The detailed regulation of behavior is no less true for prison employees who have close contact with inmates.39

It is only with this system of enforced rules that the prison's continuous functioning in the face of mutual hostility is possible. Because the whereabouts and "movement-control"40 of inmates are assured, opportunities for overt expressions of hostility are limited and disruptive events such as fights, riots, and escapes are reduced. And since virtually all activities must either conform to or violate detailed and explicit rules, deviations and distur- bances are relatively easy to detect. Emergency reactions, which are themselves well planned and organized, quickly arise. It is thus the potentiality of latent conflict erupting into costly overt violence, rather than compulsiveness or some other personality trait of prison officials, that makes an elaborate system of enforced rules necessary.4' The costs of suppressed freedom and enforcing organizational rules are less than the costs of open conflict and violence.

must turn out, dress, make up your bed neatly, and be ready for marching out. At the signal, open the door, step out and close the same, without slamming, hold on until the bar is thrown, and remain standing with your hand upon the door until the count is made. In case of miscount, resume your place at the door until the count is correct." Clemmer, op. cit., p. 191.

38"In most prisons, the life of the inmate is controlled for him and he moves in obedience to numerous rules which leave him no chance for initiative or judg- ment." Ibid., p. 193.

39Donald R. Cressey, Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the Prison, Administrative Science Quarterly, 4 (1959), 7. Of course one of the major rules for the staff is to enforce all prison rules. In a speech to prison guards, for example, a prison administrator states: "You are here to enforce the rules of the institution. Every rule. You must enforce every rule. If we thought that one of these rules was not needed, we would throw it out. We go over them every now and then and decide whether they should be changed . . . So don't fail to enforce a rule, even if you think it is nonsense. It is there for a reason . . . if it's there, enforce it." Ibid., p. 6. Also, in custodial mental institutions it has been observed that books containing the institution's rules and regulations are distributed to new employees. See H. Warren Dunham and S. Kirson Weinberg, The Culture of the State Mental Hospital (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1960), p. 21.

40Lloyd W. McCorkle, "Guard-Inmate Relationships in Prisons," in Norman Johnson, Leonard Savitz, and Marvin Wolfgang, op. cit.

411n this connection, Gresham Sykes states: "The proliferation of prison regulations and the officials' emphasis on internal discipline is often attributed to in-




Relation Between Organizational Conflict and Surveillance Surveillance will usually create higher costs than the use of

rules for both the persons engaged in surveillance and the persons who are the objects of it. For the latter, rigid rules are, of course, to some degree punishing and depriving in that they cur- tail one's freedom of movement, even if they are the product of negotiation, for formal negotiations always involve unsought duties and obligations as well as rights and privileges. But such costs are usually less than the costs of being kept under surveillance. For then one's freedom of movement is more severely restricted, one must constantly monitor his behavior, and there is the implication that one is considered untrustworthy or incom- petent. For the party who must exert control, not only is surveillance usually more costly than rules, but conditions of conflict generate additional surveillance costs. Since surveillance ne- cessitates face-to-face contact, one is exposed to the aggressive and hostile response of supervisees. Thus, since negotiated rules are a more attractive alternative than surveillance for both parties, they are more likely to be the organizational response to conflict. And when surveillance is the initial response, there is a tendency for negotiated settlements to arise, as predicted by Proposition 5. Rules, even if supported by a system of "spot checks," are more attractive than a system of continuous checks.

Not all organizational rules are negotiated, however; and in the above discussion, parties have something to negotiate, some kind of reward to exchange; but all organizational relationships are not based on exchange. Criminals, for example, do not enter prison to seek reward from prison officials, but because they are forced to; nor are most prison rules negotiated. Under these circumstances, only constant surveillance can assure compliance. In relationships based on coercion, then, rules themselves are insuf- ficient to elicit compliance.

Proposition 9 (a corollary to Proposition 4). In relationships

stitutional inertia of the bureaucratic mind. This viewpoint overlooks the potential danger which may lie in the most innocent appearing action when large groups of criminals are confined for long periods of time under conditions of deprivation." (Italics supplied.) The Corruption of Authority and Rehabilitation, Social Forces,

34 (1956), 257.




based on coercion, surveillance will be greater than in relationships based on exchange.

This is not to say, however, that surveillance in these relationships is not accompanied by high costs. Surveillance will always entail the costs of time, effort, and foregoing more attractive alternative activities (including doing nothing). Consequently, the costs of assuring conformity to existing rules may be very high. This is particularly true when organizational rules become ex- cessive in number, as is the case in prisons, where almost constant surveillance of inmates is necessary. In order to reduce surveillance costs, therefore, the staff may relax one rule, in exchange for the inmates' voluntary compliance with another rule.42

PARTICIPANT SUPPLY AND DEMAND Although formal rules may perform important cost-reducing

functions, behavioral constraints are always to some degree depriving to those whose behavior is being constrained. This is true for rigid rules and close surveillance alike. Increases in participant dissatisfaction increase the tendency for participants to look for more attractive employment alternatives outside the organization. The likelihood of participants leaving the organization will therefore vary in direct proportion to the number of existing employment alternatives they perceive, which in turn will vary with the number of employment alternatives that actually exist. When alternatives increase, the organization, in order to prevent the costs of high participant turnover, must increase participant satisfaction.43 And satisfaction increases when organizational behavior controls are relaxed.

Proposition 10. The larger the number of participants' extra- organizational employment opportunities, the weaker the formal

42 Ibid., and McCorkle, op. cit., esp. p. 110. Melville Dalton has observed a similar phenomenon, an "unofficial exchange structure," between management and union officials in industry. Melville Dalton, Unofficial Union-Management Relationships, American Sociological Review, 15 (1950), 611-619, and "Cooperative Evasions by Labor and Management," in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), -Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1961), pp. 267-284.

4 For a number of propositions concerning the participant's satisfaction, per- ception of extra-organizational employment alternatives, and his decision to remain in or leave the organization, see March and Simon, op. cit.




control of participant conduct, either through direct surveillance or formal rules.

This may be called the participant demand proposition: the greater the external demand, the less the formal control. This proposition is particularly applicable to Morris Janowitz's description of the relationship of the soldier to the military bureaucracy. Since it is now easier for members of the military to transfer their technical skills to civilian occupations, their employment alternatives have increased considerably. In an effort to encourage professional military careers and to lower the costs of large turn- overs, the military has tried to make military life more attractive, as, for example, relaxing repressive military-bureaucratic controls.44 Consequently, "A return to [stringent] organizational control . . . can be achieved only at a high cost."45

The supply of potential participants to which the organization has access will have a similar effect. When the organization's potential supply of participants is limited, the participants' autonomy within the organization increases and control structures are weakened. This is clear in Lipset's description of the Saskatche- wan socialist government. Although cabinet ministers wanted to remove from office civil servants who opposed the government's policies, they were too dependent upon the technically trained subordinates to terminate their services. Because the supply of qualified persons was limited, the government had to tolerate opposition to its policies, as well as the actual deflection of them.46 The cost of the civil servants' withdrawal from the government would have been greater than the cost of their opposition to government policy.

Proposition 11. The smaller the supply of potential organizational participants outside the organization, the fewer the formal controls over participants within the organization.

This may be called the participant supply proposition. Since

44Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Rus- sell Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 89 and The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 50.

45 Janowitz, op. cit., p. 87. " Seymour M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California,

1950).




participant demand increases and supply decreases when participant skill and ability rise, organizations employing highly skilled and technically trained participants must be careful not to inhibit participant autonomy;47 otherwise, they risk losing participants to organizations with less restrictive control structures.

Proposition 12 (corollary to Propositions 10 and 11). An increase in the organizational skill structure will be accompanied by a decrease in the use of formal rules and surveillance to control conduct.48

SIZE AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION In small organizations, control is rather easily achieved through

informal face-to-face relationships. Surveillance and evaluation procedures are often by-products of contact between superiors and subordinates which the dictates of day-to-day work make necessary. Such procedures are casual and informal, and special structures such as formal supervisory positions and formally stated

47 Physicians in state mental hospitals are few and hospital administrators accordingly give them much autonomy. See Thomas J. Scheff, Control over Policy by Attendants in a Mental Hospital, Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2 (1961), 97.

48 Relationships in Propositions 10 and 11 are, of course, independent of the participant's skill. A strong demand for or a scarce supply of any group of participants, regardless of their skill, will probably result in increased participant autonomy and freedom from rigid behavioral controls. For example, Dunham and Weinberg observe that the power of hospital attendants, a relatively unskilled group, to obtain concessions from the administration increased during periods when the supply of potential attendants was limited (i.e., during periods of low unem- ployment). A nurse in commenting on the attendants' power to violate rules during a period in which the supply of attendants was low, stated: "I tell you it is just beyond me as to what to do . . . It's hard to get attendants and if you don't accede to their demands, they will quit." (Italics supplied.) Dunham and Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

The effect of the organizational skill structure in relaxing organizational control has been noted for some time. The usual explanation advanced for this, however, is that the reduction in organizational control is necessary because of the internalized work ethic of the professionally trained, their desire for autonomy, and the difficulty of evaluating the work performance of persons who are engaged in complex tasks which require high-level skills. Thisis no doubt true. The argu- ment here, however, is that supply and demand conditions also vary with the organizational skill structure and that these conditions exert an effect on organizational control that is analytically independent of the internalization of work standards and ethics, etc.




rules are unnecessary.49 Since little extra effort and time are required, and because supervisees are not formally confronted with being observed and evaluated, costs to both supervisors and supervisees are minimal.

With an increase in organizational size and the "span of control," however, the frequency and intensity of contact between superiors and subordinates in day-to-day activities decrease. If supervisors are to continue their constant informal surveillance, additional time and effort must be invested in organizational affairs. A less costly alternative may be available, however, if formal surveillance procedures and rules standardizing participant conduct are instituted.

Proposition 13. With an increase in organizational size, formal surveillance and formal rules will increase relative to informal surveillance.

One description of the historical growth of hospitals supports this hypothesis.50 When hospitals were small and many hospital jobs relatively simple, it was through the direct supervision of directors of nursing and hospital administrators that control and coordination of most activities were assured. With increased size and job complexity, however, this practice became too costly,," so that the formalization of relationships with rules and regulations took place.52 Formal channels of communication and procedures replaced face-to-face contact and direct supervisory control, and their importance in resolving communication and coordination increased accordingly.53

As an organization grows, formal surveillance structures may

49 The housebuilding industry, where even the largest firms are relatively small and organized in terms of "small work crews under foremen who perform supervision as an added duty," and where "Few, if any, special organizational techniques are used," exemplifies this type of supervision. See Sherman J. Maisel, House- building in Transition (Berkeley: University of California, 1953), quoted material from pp. 155 and 100.

50 Temple Burling, Edith M. Lentz, and Robert N. Wilson, The Give and Take in Hospitals (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1956), esp. pp. 318-321.

51Ibid., p. 319. 52Ibid., p. 320. 58 However, in modern hospitals face-to-face discussion remains an important

means of interprofessional and interdepartmental communication, and has become institutionalized in many hospitals in the form of "'team meetings." Also, team




take the form of full-time supervisory positions, the incumbents of which are employed with the sole purpose of supervising and evaluating participant conduct; or a formal system of periodic checks may be involved. In both cases, supervisees as well as the organization incur additional costs. Formal surveillance may sug- gest to supervisees that their competence is being questioned; it may also entail additional efforts toward monitoring their own behavior. Such costs may account for the observed relationships between organization size and participant dissatisfaction with supervision.54 In any case, adding supervisory positions entails additional costs for the organization. The anticipation of such costs may deter further organizational growth. 55

Note that Proposition 13 merely states that with an increase in size, both formal surveillance and formal rules will increase relative to informal surveillance. The relative difference between formal surveillance and formal rules with increasing organizational size is not mentioned. It is suggested, however, that since formal rules are less costly than formal surveillance, with increasing organizational growth, they will increasingly replace surveillance structures.

Proposition 14. As an organization grows, rules and regulations will increasingly replace direct surveillance as methods ot organizational control.50

meetings no doubt perform an informal surveillance function, providing medical personnel an opportunity to evaluate medical "ancillary" personnel, for example.

54 Sergio Talacchi, Organizational Size, Individual Attitude and Behavior: An Empirical Study, Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 (1960), 398-420.

55This is one reason why housebuilding firms may refuse to expand their opera- tions. See Maisel, op. cit., pp. 64, 131.

56Studies show that the proportion of organizational personnel who are in supervisory and managerial positions does decline as organizational size increases. See Mason Haire, "Biological Models and Empirical Histories of the Growth of Orga- nizations," in Mason Haire (ed.), Modern Organization Theory (New York: John Wiley, 1959), pp. 293-297; Bernard P. Indik, The Relationship Between Organiza- tion Size and Supervision Ratio, Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 (1964), 301- 312; and Jean Draper and George B. Strother, Testing a Model for Organiza- tional Growth, Human Organization, 22 (1963), 192. If Proposition 14 is true, however, a positive relationship between organizational size and reliance on rules would be expected. There is some indirect evidence that this may be so. See William A. Rushing, Organizational Size, Rules, and Surveillance, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2 (1966).




The importance of eliciting standardized behavior in large organizations in the absence of direct surveillance has been noted by Peter Blau.57

It is difficult to generalize about the effects of size unless the effects of structural differentiation and organizational complexity are also considered. Increases in size are usually accompanied by new jobs and specialties, or completely new units, such as additional plants. A greater variety of specialties and units will lead to additional problems of conflict, communication, and coordination too numerous for face-to-face contacts to resolve. Conse- quently, basic changes in the pattern of formal organization may be required.

Proposition 15. As an organization undergoes increasing structural differentiation, rules and regulations will increasingly replace direct surveillance as methods of organizational control.

Thus, to the extent that increases in size and structural differentiation are related, the costs of conflict and coordination are compounded, and the relationship between increased size and formal rules should be particularly strong. In cases where size and structural differentiation are not associated, results predicted in Propositions 14 and 15 might not occur. While a positive cor- relation between the two variables is usually assumed, the extent to which this is actually true has only begun to be investigated.58

CONCLUSION In most sociological approaches to complex organization, the

problem of formulating and testing hypotheses that are comparative in scope has been largely ignored. This has been due largely to two trends which have marked the history of organizational

57 In Blau's evaluation of the function of statistical records in facilitating or-

ganizational control of participant conduct in the absence of direct surveillance, he

concludes: "This function of strengthening uniform administrative control is

especially important for a large organization, where the top administrator is ex-

pected to exercise control over thousands of operating officials dispersed over a

wide area and many hierarchical levels removed. from his position." Dynamics of

Bureaucracy, op. cit., p. 39. 58 See Richard H. Hall, J. Eugene Haas, and Norman J. Johnson, "Organizational

Size and Organizational Structure." (Paper read at the 1965 meeting of the American

Sociological Association, Chicago, Ill.)




analysis in sociology. At the conceptual level, because of the influence of Weber's ideal-type conceptualization, in which complex organization is defined as a functionally interrelated complex of bureaucratic characteristics, the treatment of organizational characteristics as variables has not been emphasized. Partly as a consequence of this, there are in the organizational literature few systematic propositional statements that deal with questions concerning the degree to which various bureaucratic variables are in fact associated, or the degree to which nonbureaucratic variables (such as participant supply and demand) and bureaucratic variables are associated.

Prevailing research strategy in organizational research has not facilitated the comparative study of organizations either, since most sociological studies of complex organizations have been case studies. Although the comparative analysis of organizations is a more -formidable task than the comparison of categories of in- dividuals with the use of survey techniques, it is this kind of approach that must be pursued before empirically verified propositions about organizations can be attained. Two recent requests for comparative analyses of complex organizations indicate that such an approach has not been common.59

In this paper an attempt has been made to formulate a series of propositions that is comparative in scope. The propositions deal with the relationship between surveillance and organizational rules, and with the relationship between these two variables and variables such as size, physical distance, participant supply and demand, and organizational conflict. Since these variables cut across specific types of organizations, the propositions should be equally valid for organizations of all types. The ultimate validity of each proposition must, of course, await comparative empirical research to test the propositions in question.

59Blau and Scott, op. cit.; Etzioni, op. cit.



organizational rules and surveillance: propositions in comparative organizational analysis

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