2 Marxist Analysis

KEY CONCEPTS

BASE CONCENTRATION CONGLOMERATION HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

INTEGRATION MARXISM MULTINATIONALISM PROFIT-MOTIVE SUPERSTRUCTURE

When the cult television classic My So-Cnlled Life premiered on ABC in the late summer of 1994, critics hailed it as " the first TV show to get adolescence righ!.'" The show followed the daily life of IS-year-old Angela Chase (Claire Da nes) and offered what many critics considered (1 poignant, realistic glimpse into the world of high school. However, the show faced a number of problems fro l11 the outset that resulted in its cancellation only 19 episodes later. On top of the fact that ABC executives time slotted Life against NBC's hi t Frieluis1 the show was primarily directed at a teen demographic and "co uld fe tch only a paltry $50,000 per comm ercial spot.'"

Despite a massive fan letter-writ ing campa ign dubbed Opera tio n Li fe Suppor t, the sho\\l succlim bed to the fina ncial demands of the ma rket before it even co mpleted its first season.

The brief r ise and ra il of /vI)' So-Coiled Life is an im portant reminder to all media

consumers abollt the power of the economy III shaping media content. Tho ugh the show was hugely popular among viewers and critics alike, the simple fact that it could not fetch top-dollar advertisi ng eventually led to its demise. In many ways this case study illustrates the critical perspective in media studies commonly referred to as t>,/larxist anal)'sis. ROllgh l}, speaking, Ma rxist media scholars look at the effects of ownership and economics on the production and distr ibution of media content. Books, films, and television shows do not just spontaneously occur: all are created as products to be bought and sold in " greater system of commodity exchange. Marxist scholars are interested in how th is notion of media content as "product" in turn shapes the W3)' it· looks and circula tes.

·-:ec:a Industnes

Vve begin this chapter with an overview of Marxist theory before turning our attention to contempora ry patterns of media ownership, with a particular focus on how industry moves toward increasing consolidati on and incorpo ration d iminish competition and encourage standardiza tion of the mass media. These effects are fully taken up in the latter half of the chapter, where we analyze how the capitalistic profit-motive inspires particular production methods that result in fm'-reaching social consequences.

Marxism: an Overview

Marxism is both a theory and a social and political movement rooted in the idea that "society is the history of class struggles." Its origins lie in the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who collaborated on The Gernlnll Ideology in 1845 (though it was not published until long after their deaths) and the Comlllunist Manifesto in 1848. Marx, who was born in Prussia in 1818, is the more well known of the two due, in part, to his single-authored works, including The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), Theories of SlIrpllls Vallie (1860), Capital ( 1867), A COlltributioll to the Critique of Political EeollolllY (1859), and Econo 111 ic and Philosophic Malluseripts of 1844, wh ich

was published posthumously ill 1930. The central premise of Marxism is that the mode of production in society (or underlying economic structure) determines the social relations of production (or class structure). This theory understands and makes

sense of the world through the perspective of historical materialism. Marx believed that the material world (i. e. natural phenomena and processes)

precedes human thought: that the external, concrete, material conditions of social ex istence determine or groul1d consciousness. In this way, Marxism is materialist, as opposed to idealist: a philosophy positing that ideas determine social existence. He also believed that the material conditions of societies change over time, and thus must be vie"wed in historical context. As J\1arx explains in the Preface to A COIl ­tribution to the Critique of Po/iti((l/ Ecollomy:

In the social production of their existence, men (sic] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appro­

priate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the genera l process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determ ines their consciousness.]

Marxism, then, holds that social consciollsness, as encoded in institutions such as culture (art and media ), religion, education, politics, and the jud icial system,

which Marx collectively referred to as the superst ructure, reflects o r mi rrors the material conditions of society, which he termed the eco nomic base. Ma rx's famous baSe/superstructu re model is sometimes represented in the following manner:

(social) supe rstructure

(economic ) base

For l\larx, the superstructure and the social institutions that comprise it operate in the realm of ideas or ideolog),. Thus, to understand the ruling ideas (dominant

ideology) in society, o ne needs to attend to the material mode of production 111

societ y. As ~Ia rx and Engels explain in The GeminI! Ideology:

The ideas of the ruling cia.)!) 'Ire in ever), epoch the ruling ide,ls: i.e. the claltS which is the ruling II/tHerinl force of a socicty is ilt the sa me timE' its ruling illfcl/C'ct llnl force. The cI<'Iss which has the means of material production at ils disposa l, consequently also controls the means of I11cnt<'ll production .... The ruling ideas are not hing marc than the ide'll expression of the dominant material relation.), the dominant material relations gr<lspcd as ideas. I

The mode of production within an)' society. acco rding 10 Ma rx, is characterized by two aspects: its "forces lor meansj of production" such as the land , natural

resources, and technology needed to produce material goods. and its "relations of production" such as labor practices and ownership (of property, company shares. or the ways goods are dist ributed), For ~Iarx, a society based on a cap italist mode of production is inherently exploitivc because it creates two classes, a work.jng o r proletariat class and a ruling class or bourgeoisie.

Since the bourgeoi ie owns and controls Ihe means of production in society, the on ly co mmodi ty that the proletariat has to sell is its labor. According to ~ I arx,

the ruling class explo its the econom ic value (i.e. labor) of the wo rki ng class to increase surpl us valu€' or profits. But the capi tal ist system in many cou ntri es has cha nged dramaticall y since ~ I arx developed his Labor Theory or Value, and the division of labor that produced such a harsh divide between the haves an d the have nots in the past has been replaced b)' a system that sustains a large middle class. the petty or petite bourgeoisie. of small business owners and white-collar workers (i.e. lawyers, doctors, professors. etc. ). Their ideological domination-and it is domination (e.g. the middle class still behaves in a manner that sustdi ns the ruling elite)-appears to be less grounded in their working conditions. This has

led most contempori.lry Marxist critics and scholars to reject rleterfl/;l1;st;c models, which they label "vulgar l\larxism," that see the superst ructure as having no auto­

nomy from the economic base. \Vhile J\ larx ist critics arc still in terested in who owns and controls the means of production in societ)" they also recognize that ideology can and does influence mnterial conditions. Thus, for them, the process is mllch more dinlectical than unidirectional , and it is this d ialecti c which they wish to unders tand.

Marxist AnalysIS 23

24 Media Industnes

Table 2. r Consumer spending on select media per person per year ($ In billions)

2000 2002 2004 2006

Publishing indust ry D';liiy newspapers 51.93 53.00 51.62 48.97 Books 85.84 87.64 89.67 91.27 1\ lagazines 47.54 46.86 46.88 47.59

Motion picture and sound recording Cinema 32.64 39.59 38.76 39. 11 Recorded music 61.0.j 52 .-17 49.39 .j5.77

Broadcast industry Cable and satellite television 189.45 124.30 255.36 282.92 Broadcast and satellite radio 0.07 1.15 4.68

New media Internet 49.47 85.84 113.48 138.83 Video games 17.89 32.34 32.94 36. 13

Source: us Census Bureau. The 2007 SrotisVcal Abstraa, table 1110. Numbers reflect actual values and have not been adjuSted for inflation.

The prevai ling id eology of capitalism is known as the profit-motive- the con­tinuolls desire to increase cap ital. Contemporary lVlarxist critics. man)' of whom adopt the label poLi lical economists, investigate both the prevailing patterns of media ownership and how the logic of capital. or profit-motive, influences medin busi­ness practices. There is good reason to do so, as the mass media arc big business. According to Ben Bagdikia n in The New "/lenin Nlol/opol)', US Americans were spend ­ing approximately 5800 billion a year on media products in 2002 ' II is especiall y interesting to note 1i01l' consumers divided their spend ing. The US Censlls Bureau estimates that revenue for just the broadcasting and telecommunications ind ustrr was over 485 billion in 2002. Add to that S246 billion in revenue for the publish­ing industry and another S78 billion for the motion-picture and sou nd-recording industries, and the picture slowly comes into foclls . Table 2. 1 summarizes prec isely where and how much money Americans have been spending on select med ia si nce 2000. To put these numbers into perspective, consider that in 2002 the average US household was spending more money on media (SI,782 ) Ihan on cloth ing, fool­wear, and other apparel products and services combined ($ 1,694).

Patterns of Media Ownership

Adopting a hislorical malcrialist perspective, t>.larxist analysis of mass media begins by examining the means and relations of production under cOlllempornry capitalism, or what ~larxist critic Fredric Jameson calls "late" capitalism. Like all

economic systems, capitalism changes over time. The information-based service economy of the twentieth -first century is substan tially different than the industrial­based manufacturing economy of the nineteenth and twent ieth centuries. It is vita l, therefore, to consider hovv the media industry is organized and controlled today. Toward that end, th is section invest igates four current and deeply in te rtwin ed pat terns of media ownership: concentration, conglomeration, in tegration , <l!ld m ultinationalism.

C once I1tl'at io 11

T he ownership of mass media is more highly concentrated today than at any other time in history. Concentration reflects an organizational state in which th e own­ership and control of an entire industry, such as the mass media, is dominated by just a few companies. This is also sometimes referred to as an oligopoly, as opposed to a monopoly in which one company dominates an entire industry (e.g. Micro­soft's dom ination of the software industry). Oligopolies reduce competition by

making it all but impossible for small, independent, or sta rt-up companies to sur­vive in the rnarketplace. The big companies typically buy up the small companies or dr ive them out of business. Once an industry becomes highly concen trated, the few remaining companies function more like partners or a cartel than competitors.

They each control such a large piece of the industry pie that the other companies do not constitute a real threat. Such is the current state of mass media, which have go ne from being dominated by 20 companies just 20 years ago to bein g dominated by five today. Time \,Varner, Disney, Viacom, News Corporation, and Bertelsmann comprise the first tier of corporate media giants, or what Ben Bagdikian calls "the Big Five". !> ''''hereas these last two compan ies arc not US-based, their vast owner­ship of US media clearly qualiAes them for inclusion on this list. We should also note that as of December 31, 2005, Viacom Inc. split into two publicly traded comp<mies, Viacom <lnd CBS Corporatio n. Former CEO Sumner Redstone is the chairman of both companies and still controls 71 percent of the voting stock in each. Throughout this chapter, "Via com" refers to the new, post-200S Viacom unless specified othenvise.

Although there are certainly other large, profitable media corporations, such as General Electric, Sony, AT&T, Vivendi, Clear Channel, Gannett, and Knight-Ridder, they arc clearly second-ti er media companies whose percentage of the total media

profits pale in comparison to the Big Five. As a way of demonstrating the domina­tion of the Big Five, let us consider the scope and power of Time ' ,Varner, the largest

media company in the world . Time ' ,Varner became the largest media corporation in January 2000 following its merger with American Online, which combined their £ 163 billion and $120 billion respec ti ve net worths. Currently, Time ' ,Varner is com­

prised of seven major divisions - AOL, Time 'vVcuner C:lble, "Varner Bros. Enter­tainment, New Line Cinema, Time Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, ilnd Home Box Office - each of which owns dozens of brands and companies.

Marxist Analysis 25

:0 Media lndustnes

In 1006. \\'arner Home Video (a subsidiarr of\\'arnt'r Bros. Entertainment) ca r'· lured 18.3 percent, or nearly oIH.'Mhfth. of all US co nsumer spending on DVD~ .llll VHS. th e Illost of all}' ,tudio. As the largest maga?ille publisher ill both the U~ and UK and the thin.llargcst in ~Ie\ico, Timc Inc. - \,"i th its more than 130 m.lg.l­li nc titles - e;]rned 18...1 percent of the lotal advertising rc'"enues geller,Hed br dom!.?, · tic magi.1Li nes. Time \\'arner estim~ t('s tlMt 50 perfent of all Amcrican Jdults re.h .. :' .11 lei.l~t olle of their llli.1ga7in('~ t.'\"er~ · monlh. and th.lI more thall 100 of jl'l lllag..I · lines .Ire sold in th L' USA every minu te! Timc \\',Irner C "lble i~ (urren tly the "'l'( ­olld Itlrgest cable oper,lIor in the LTSA ... 1111..1 Turner Bro .. H.lci.I .... ting Sy ... tl'lll i ... the numhL one 1110hil(' provider of news (C~N ) . the number on(' 11('\\,S and in forl11 i.Hioll ... it t" online (Ct\:-.i.com) •• 111d number OIlC (.lble nt.'\'"~ nt.'lwork 111 unique \"ic'\"l' r~

(C:-J:-JIUS). Sillce 1001. Time Warner h.ts cleared m·er ,_I billion 011 home cilter­tainlllent, Iiccnsing. nnd merchandising excl Ll ~jv('I~1 from th e Lord (~r the l?illgs lril ­ogr. Timl' \V,lrner dominate ... 110t ol1l~ ' in profits. but ,11<;,0 in '\\"1I"d<;. In 2006, it

(ollectt'd .!Ii\ Acadellw "\"i.lrd~, including Best Pictllr~ for The [kparted dnd Be ... 1

An imatcd rCi.lIUre for Hnpp)' FCL't. three L\'atiol1al J\lag'.1Iine A\\" .. uds from tht." American Society of ~Iagazin(' Editors, three Golden L lobe A\\",lrJ .. , nyc Peahoth AWi.lrds for ~'\ccll enc(' ill broadCihting •• 1I1d 26 prime-timL' Fmlll}' A\\"~\rd .... Time \Varner is. to say the Ie~st, .1 (on ... idcrablc force wi th in the l11cdi.l indusln" hee Figure 2.1

Conglomeration

A second prev,lil ing ,llld closely r~LHcd p<lltern of I1lcdi,1 oW llership b. conglomera­tion . the corpor;.lte practice of 3c(ul11uiating Illultiple. though not necessaril\' media cOl11p .. lI1ks and busine ...... es through MJrtupS. l11erger~. buyouts, and ti.lkeO\crs.

\Vhercas concentration describe ... th~ m~di:l indllsl ry .1 ... .1 whole i.ll1d its increi.1Sing con~o li di.ltioll into the hcll1ds or fcwer and fe\\"er (orporations. conglomerat ion describes the particul;.Ir structu re of the corporal ion ... them~h-c;''''' Some .... ,holar ... resel"vc the term (onglolller~lle tn descrihc 1.lrge (orpor;.ltion .... \\"ho:)(' mcdla holdings reflect onl~' onc dimt'lhion or their o\"t~rilll corpori.lIe portfolio . .A corpol';""ioniike Gener"ll Electric, which manufacture ... hOI11(, elppliances .1I1d light bulbs but .llso owns NBC. the L:SA "'twork. Sci - Fi Channel , Ilra,",l, \lS:--:JlC, .mel l'ni'·c"",l Picture" "rrcr, c1 prime l'\<ll11plc. Such .. I distinction m,IY bt.' outd.tlt.'d. however, .Is Illcdia-on ly ((Hl ­

glomeratcs are among some of thl' mosl pm\erful corporations III thl..' ,,'orld. Thus, we regard eJch of the Big Fi\"c I11l~diJ ('orpor.uwns .. 1\ l.:ongioml·r,1tcs C'"CI1 though Ihe llli.liorit}, of their holdings arc restrictcd to ll1('di.l.

let LIS 1.lke .1 clOSL'1" look ilt hO\," .1 medi •• gianl likl~ the \\'<llt Di ... ncy COl11p.1I1), becomes a conglol1ll.'f<ltc. Like Ill,my ('onglol11eri.ltt.'s. thl' \\"<llt DIsney Compi.lIw h"ls r.lIher humble origin ... , hewing bct.'n stdfled ,IC, a .... 111,111 ,1Ililllation studio in 1923 b) brothers \\'alt and Rlly Disney. E.lrl\" SU((C~'" ill \V.llt Disn .... y Studio ... (originall)' Disney Brot hers Ca rtoo n Studio ) led to the f'ormi.llion of threc other compa nie ... in 1929, \\'alt Disney Fnterprises. Dbney ~ill1l Recording Company. and Likd Rei]I!)" .1Ild Inve ... lIllel1l Com pany. J"hese (omp'lIlic~ later l11t:'rged under the nilmc \\'alt Di"'llc~ Productions in 1938. In an errort to ex p,lJ1d its husine ....... Ihc com pany begtll1

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Table 2,2 Annua l I"evenues fat- the Walt Di s.ney Company ($ In milli ons)

2002 200J 2004

Media networks 9,733 10,941 11,778 Parks and resorts 6,.J65 6,412 7,750 Stud io entertainment 6,691 7,364 8,7 13

Consumer products 2,440 2,344 2,511

Total revenues 25,329 27,061 30,752

Source: The Walt Disney Company, 2006 Annual Report.

2005

13,207

9,023

7,587

2,127

31,944

2006

14,638

9,925

7,529

2,193

34,285

designing its them e parks in 1952 and formed Bu en<1 Vist"l Distribu tion to distribute

Disney's feature films 2 years late r. But \IValt Disney Productions did not become

The "Valt Disne)' Company until February of 1986, by wh ich time it also included

the Disney Channel and a new film label, Touchstone Pictures. Under the leader­

ship of ivlichael Eisner, the co mpany conducted a ser ies o f key acquisitions in the

1990s, including independent film distributor Miramax in 1993 <md perhaps more

im portantly Capital Cities/ABC, a S 19 billion transaction, in 1996 .: During the 19905,

it also es tablished Hyperion , a book-publishing division. By decade's end, the "Valt Disney Company had grown into a global empire vvith powerful interests in all fou r

of the mass media industries.

In 2004, Disney narrowly escaped a hostile takeover attempt by Com cast, an even t

that contributed to Michael Eisner's replacement as CEO by Bob Iger the follow­

ing yea r. Shortly after Iger assumed the reins, Disney acquired Pixar Anima tion

Stud ios in a transi.1Ction worth $7.4 billion. "Disney's performance during fger 's first

year," reports the company's website, "was stella r, with record revenues, record cash

flow and record net earnings for fiscal yea r 2006 ."1< Presently, Disney is organized

in to four major business segments: studio entertainmen t (\·VaIt Disney Pictures, Touchstone Pictures, Miramax Films, Buena Vista Home Enterta inmen t, L}lric

Street Records, Hollywood Records ), parks and resorts (Disneyland, Walt Disney

"Vorld , Disney Cruise Line, and Disney Club Vacation resorts ), consumer products

(Disney Toys, Hyperion Books, The Bab)' Einstein Company, DisneyStore.com), and media networks (ABC Television Network, the Disney Channel, ESPN Inc., BlIena

Vista \tVorldwide Television, and the \IVal t Disney Tnternet Group ). As Table 2.2 indic­

ates, since its mod est beginnings, the \IValt Disney Company has grown into a very

profitable media conglomerate.

Integration

Med ia conglomerates are by definition integrated . Integration is an ownership pat­

te rn ill which the subsidiary comp<1l1ies or branches within a corpo ra tion are

st rategical!y interrelated. Corpo rations can be integrated vertically, horizontally, or

Mall<ist Analysis 29

Media Industnes

both. \lerticnl illtegmtiol1 describes a corporation that owns and controls va rious

aspects of production nnd distribution withill a single media industry. Vertical integration can significantly increase the profits associated \\lith a media product by allowi ng the "parent " corpora tion to oversee all stages of its development,

everything from production and marketing to distribution and exh ibition. A

media conglomerate thai owns record copyrights, record labels, sOllnd production companies, and record clubs or stores would possess strong ver tical integration in the music industry, for instance, and thus profit at each of these stages. The filmed entert<linment division at Viacom offers a concrete example of vertical integration. ]n 1972, Paramount Pictures produced the Oscar-wi nning film The Godfmller, which grossed $134 miLlion in the USA by 1973. But domestic box office receipts are far from the end of the story. Toda)l, Paramount Home Entertainment markets and distributes the film on DVD, \Vorldwide Television Distribution negotiates its broadcast on TV, and Famous Music li censes the use of its soundt rack. A!l of these companies are part of the Paramou nt Pictures Corporation, a wholly owned sub­

sidiary of Viacol11 . The popular, conspiracy-driven TV drama, Ti,e X-Files ( 1993-2002), provides a

secon d example of the benefi ts of vertical integration. The Fox Broadcasting Company produced the show, which then ai red in first-run production on the Fox network. In addition to the profits generated by its initial airing. Twentieth

Television, a division of Fox Television, syndicated three ro unds of reruns on local Fox affiliates and other stations, collecting an additional 535 million a year. Meanwhile, FX, one of Fox's numerous cable networks, also aired the show in rerun,

generating 569 million more in annual profits. In total , Fox's yearly profits from The X-Files, after subtracting production costs of course, exceeded $ ]80 million dollars,") a rather impress ive figure when one considers it was only one television show from one company owned by Rupert Murdoch's Aust ralian-based media

co nglomerate News Corporation. Horizoll!n! illtegmtioll describes an ownership pattern in which a corporation dom­

inates one stage in the production process (or at the same level in the va lue chain). This typically takes olle of two forms. Some firms ach ieve horizontal integration through ownersh ip of multiple outlets in one medium, thereby reducing competi­tion. A com pany like News Corpo rat ion, which owns 35 Fox television stations, several of which are in the same markets, for instance, would be considered hori­zonta ll y integrated. If a co mpany controlled all or nearly all the radio stations, TV stations, or newspapers within a market, Ihen it would have a hori zontalll1ollopol), in that market. 10 As we will see in Chapter 4, the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which eliminated or relaxed many ownership restrictions in the USA, has increased this form of integration. Another way for a co rporat ion to ach ieve horizontal integ­ration is to own and control companies across the various media industries, but typicall), at the sa me level of production, distribution, or exhibition . 11 This corpor­ate structure is somet.imes referred to alternatively as cross-Illeriin oll'llersliip. Like verti cal integration, ho rizontal integration can have tremendous finan cial bene­fits, nam ely by enhnllcing synergy, a concep t we ,viii explore shortly. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, all of the Big Five media conglomerates are horizontally integrat ed .

Time Warner

( RlCh.lrd P.tr~on .. , CEOI

Disney (Bob Iger,

lIO>

Viacom

( Phi lippe D,I II 111.1 11.

CLlII

Prin t media

\\'arner Bonk'l, DC Comic:-o, Pl'OPIt-, Time, Sport:; lIIu~1rt"l'd.

III St.l'h-

Hyperion Book~. Disnl1'er, /tIllC. FOII/ifl' PC

Simon &. ~dlll'ller (until Ihe :-oplil with CBS nil Decel11b~r 31. ~005 )

Film and sound

\\ .Irner Brothers

~ludil1:-o. '\ew Line (inc:'Ill.I, AII.lIltie R(,(Nlh, Eit'klm

"'.llt Oi"n~\' Pictures, Buell.l \ 'i'l I.I. Dimen:.inl1 FiIJll~, ~liralllax,

!Oud, .. luIIl'

P.Ir.111l0UIlI Pictures,

!)rt'.ll1l\\'ork') Sludi()~,

,\IT\ films, Famous ,\ I mil.:

Broadcast media

l.:'>1N. IIBO, TBS. T\,'T. Cinema". Lll'loon ;\l't\\ork

ABC, \&1 .• the l-ii,wl'r <:1l.ml11.'I, F! Ellll'rt.linllll' llt.

FSP1\', liktillll'

Clll11t'lh Lenlr.d. ~II\" \ HI , !ln, :'\il.:kt'lodeon , ~pik('

T\', (',\ 11. 1\ Lmd,

Marxist AnalysIs 31

New media

AOt, :--:t.~hC;;lPI."

~ I.IpQW .. '!>l,

CompuS~n

Oi ... nl'\' ~I()hilt:,

I:SP1\',lO!1l, ABC.(oll1.

Gn.colll,

\ lovie .... (orn

lH I \1. Atom

En tert.lin Illl'n l, ~ho(b\.l\"\~.

\lire. R,IIl.'~l\" .md ( B:' (u ntil .::!O()SI Prole'l .. ()r .... (ulll.

Bertelsmann

I Reinh.1rd \\01111, CEOI

News Corp

( Rupert .\Iurdoch. CUl)

R.1I1dulll Ilom.c, Douhk'dd\". B.1I1t.un. rodnr's Tr,l\'('J (;uidt''1

H.lrperLollirh, ZUl1lil'1'\ .HI, '/"\.

Guide, SCII' )'I1fA P(I~I,

Tile Till/L's (L' K

M ult inationalislll

BI\I(I \lu'Iic, Columbia.

:\ri'lI.I, l:pic, RCA, Ji\(,

Record ..

Blut' Sk\ Studiu~, Fox

Sc.1n:hlig,llI , 20lh Cenlury r o.\, i\lySpaCl..' Rt'l:ord'l

Rl I I dt'\"i,illil (,l'fI11.lIw l, ~16 ( h.lth;(' ), I -in,~ (U K )

lOX, .\1\. i"\('t\,'nrk

"I V, 1\ Nt.'I\\'(lrk", IlSklB I L'KI

\ fo ur th p.lttcrn of contem pora ry I11cdi.l ownership is multiJlationali s111 , or:l COI'­pO l'atl' presence in rnuhiplc count ric:" .l!lowing for the production .1I1d dblribu­lion of I11cdi<.1 product!'! 011 .1 glob.ll '1e.lle. \llIltin~1tionalisl11 should not b~ (onfu:,ed \\"ith glob'lli/alion, ho\\'e\'c.:,r, As \\·c ~.l\\. in Chapter 1, globalization i'l.1 cO lnple;.. set of economic i.lnd political pnh.'l'~~l.'.s, .1Ild. whil.: globalization m .. 1\" b.: (olltributing 10 the rise of multinatiollal (orpor.uiolls, it cannot be reduced to thi .'t ()wn~rship trend. ;o..lultinational media congloI1lCTi.lh:S, or TNCs (short for trJn::.n.uioll.ll cor­por .. uiolls) i.l~ thry .Irc '1omclil11es called. do not simply (re )distributc.l \ti.ltic, pre­Pi.lCki.lged product dc\"C·iopl.'d in ont' local\;' tn v;.nious coulltries around the globe, nor do they completely rc-il1\~n t the proverbial wheel each time. NatiollJI diffcr­t'nce~ ill regulator), pol icie:, .1~ \Veil J~ (uhllr.11 v,llues means th.1t "I NCs often parl­Iler with national media cOlllp'1I1ie~ to prod lice and dist ribu te med ia lh.l t will be '1l1cccssful in thal cOlill try or region. In sOl11e case~, the "foreign" co mpan ies owned lw TNCs are former locol or independent mcdi,\ that the), have si mply bo ugh t ou!.

I larmonix

An,lIo '\lobile , l-urOPl'\ leJding mobile pro\idcr)

Dir~(II'\'.

,\hSp.llt',

Photobuckel. l ;rab,(ol11

32 Media Industries

For most media co nglomerates, international markets represent potential profits that arc just too tempting to resist.

The German ~based Berteisma nJl , which is made lip of six divisions, RTL Group, Random House, Gunter + Jahr, MBG, Arvada. and Direct Group, provides an excel­lent example of a powerfuil11ui tin ationaimcdia conglomerate. Consider the scope of Bertelsmann's broadcasting production and dist ri bution company, RTL Grou p, the largest in Europe.

RTL Group's content production arm, Frell1<lntle ?vlediil produces 1110re thall 10,000 hours of programming every year. In 22 countries, FrcmJlltle Media crea tes and pro­duces ;1 ra nge of :lward-winning programmes including primctime drama, serial drama, entertainment, factual and comedy. With programming rights in about 150

coun tries, FremaIHlc l\ ledia is also the largest independent TV dist ribution compan}' outs ide the United States.l~

Like RTL Group, Bertelsmann's book publishing division, Random House - the world's la rgest general-i nterest book publ isher - is a global compa ny that prides itself on being decent ralized.

The publisher presents ,1 broad spectrum of editorial voices supplied by more than 100 publishing imprints in 16 countries. Th ese include historic publishing houses such as Doubleday and Alfred A. Knopf (USAI; Ebury and Transworld (U K); Plaza & Janes (Spain ); Sudamcricana (Argentina ) and Goldmann (Germany ). Random House

empowers each of its publishers with autonomy and independence from outside inter­ference, thus ensuring the greatest diversity for its publishing. D

Bertelsmann's global reach in the book-publishing industry is mirrored by News Corporation's massive newspaper empire, Time ' ,Varner's domination in the magazine industry, Viacom's NlTV networks, which reach over 496 million house­holds in 162 countries, and Disney's worldwide resorts. theme parks, and toy­merchandizing capability. As an examination of contemporaf)' ownership patterns reveals, the media industry in the USA is overwhelmingly concentrated among fivc full y in tegrated, multinational conglomerates.

Strategies of Profit Maximization

As we h .. we just seen, ownership and control of the mass media is driven by a profit­Illotive. But ownership alone does not guarantee financial success. Thus, the few multinational conglomerates that dominate the media industr~1 utilizt' a seric~ of strategies to maximize profits. 'Ve are using the term s/mtcgy here ill a very specific Wil)' consistent \\~th the French sociologist tviicheJ de Certc<lu. For de Certei.llI, strateg­ic!'. are the exclusive domain of the "strong" or subjects of will and power. "A stnlt­cg}/," he writes, "assumes a place tll<lt can be circumscribed as proper (propre ) and

thus serve as the basis for generati ng relations with an exterior distinct from it (com­petitors, adversaries, "c1ienteleSt" " targets," o r "objects" of resea rch ) ."1~ de Certc<1u

co nt rasts st rategies with tac tics, wh ich he defi nes as the everyday practices used b), the "weak" to resist domination ( tactics will be explored in Chapter II ). T he dis­tinction between strategies and tac tics hinges on ownership; anI), those who have a "place" to stockpile their winnings can carry out stra tegies. The six main strate­gies of profit maximization in the media industry today include cross-development, advertis ing, spectacle, the logic of safety, joint ventures, and niche marketing.

CI'oss-development

The first key strategy of media conglomerates is cross -development, or the involve­ment of multi p le subsidiary compa nies in the development, production, and dis­tribution of a media brand for the purpose of "exploiting it for all the profi t possib l e."l~

Cross-development, which med ia executives commonly refer to as synergy, is made possible because of horizon tal in tegration. Since each of the Big Five engages in cross-development regularl y, the examples are vir tually endless. Time \'Varner, wh ich owns DC Comics and publishes over 900 comic book titles , for instance, fre­quently has " DC Comics' characters appear in comic book live-action and animated series , direct-ta -video releases, collectors' books, online entertainment, licensing <lJ1d marketing deals, consumer products, graphic novels and feature films.""' Characters such as Superman and Batman, who started out as comic book heroes,

have both repeatedly found their W<l}1 onto the big screen in feature films produced and distributed by \'Varner Bros. Ente rtainment. The television series SII/{/ llville. which also taps the Superman mythology. is produced by \,Varner Bros. Television and airs

on the "'Varner Bros. network. Similarly, the Academy Awa rd-winning 1989 film BntllInIl , wh ich grossed a record-setting (at the time) 540,489,746 during its open­ing weekend, was released in conjunction with two albums. li The first was Pri nce's Bnt/II01! soundtrack on \Varner Brothers Reco rds, which debuted at number one on the Billboard 200 charts and went multi-plati num, selling 11 million copies world­wide. The second album, also released on \Varner Bros. Records, featured the ori­ginal score composed by Danny Elfman.

Increasingly, the summer blockbuster lies at the heart of cross-promotiona l efforts. In fact, big-budget fi lms often only ge t made today if they can demonstrate strong cross-promotional potential. Typicall}', this means a film that will appeal to i.1 wide audience and can be marketed to children through toy li nes and the fnst­food industry. Wh ile perhaps no media conglomerate has perfected this formu la better tha n Disney, one of the best examples comes from MeA /Universal. \IVe nre speaking, of course, about the 1993 mega hit jllm5sic Pnrk. Created b)' Steven Spielberg and based on the lVlichacl Crichton book by the same name, jurt1ssic Pork cost Universal Studios a whopping $56 million to produce. '·' So, MeA /Universal could not take an)' cha nces and undertook a $65 million licensing and promotional campaign, which involved making deals with over 100 companies from Kenner and Kellogg's to SEGA

MalJ<ist Analysis 33

34 Media industl-ies

and Ocean Software to market 1,000 products. ll;l The marketing hype paid off and jllrassic Park cleared a record $50 million its first weekend, eclipsed $100 million in 9 days, and eventually grossed over $350 mi!!ion in the USA and Canada . But as Thomas Schatz notes, "It's overseas box-office performance was even stronger, and together with its huge success on video cassette [distributed by l\ilCA/ Universal

Home Video 1, pay-cable, and other ancillary markets pushed the film's revenues to we!! over a billion dollars." 2l! The film's international success was due in part to

screenings of the film's trailer in Japan through Panasonic, a companr owned by iVla tsushita Electric Industr ial Co. and the parent corporation of MCA/Universal. Nor did the profits end with the film. In 1996, a year after the Canadian media conglomerate Seagrams purchased MCA/Universal from Matsushita, Jurassic Park - The Ride opened at Un i vers~ll Studios Holly\vood, boosting attendance at the park by 40 percent compared with the previous year.

Advertising

Advertising, the practice of pitching products or services to consumers, has long been a staple of the media industry. Since their creation, US newspapers and maga­zines have been subsid ized in large part by advertisements, wh ile the broadcast

media generate nearly all of their revenue frol11 advert ising. On July I, 1941, CBS launched the first TV sched ule \-vith 15 hours of weekly programming, including two IS-m inute news programs Nlonday through Friday. That same day, \t\' NBT (later NBC ) aired the first television commercial (for Bulova watches ) during a Dodgers/

Phillies game. By 1949, advertisers were spend in g $ l2 tllLllion a year on television advertising alone, a number that jumped to $128 million in just two short years.1l

In the mid-1960s, a typical 30-second ad spot during a national prime-time TV series cost abollt $20,000-525,000. =2 Today, that same spot costs an}'wbere from $lOO,OOO to $420,000, depending on the show's ratings." But the cost of these spots pale in comparison to those for special events like the Super Bowl. During the 1999 Super Bowl, for instance, advertisers paid $1.6 million on average for a 30-second spot; with the Fox network selling 58 minutes of ad time, one game generated about $93 million in advertising reveIlue. l4

Over time, the cost of producing network television has increased, so the 1V indus­try has constantly had to devise new ways of increasing ad revenue. One of the c<uliest solutions was to shorten the length of the ad spots themselves. In 1965, every network te levision commercial was a full 60 seconds in length, but] 0 years later only 6 percent were a minute long. By cutting ad spots in half to 30 seconds, net­works were able to double the nu m ber of ads they cou ld sell. But the price was not cut in half. So, two 30-second ads cost more than one GO-second spot had . Ad spots have continued to get shorter and many spots today are on ly IS seconds in Iength. 25 Meanwhile, the total amount of advertising time has steadily grown, while the length of network shows has been trimmed. In \999, the typical "I-hou r" show had been cut to 44 minutes, and the average "half-hour" show had been shortened

to 21 l11inutes. ~h This J11eanS that roughly 30 percent of all TV time is taken lip by

commercials. Vlith the advent of new technologies sLlch as the VCR i:lI1d remote

control that allowed for commercial "zapping," advertisers complained that they

were not getting what thC)' paid for, namely conSLlmer eyeballs.

So, television adapted yet again, first, by reducing the length of the commercial

break between two programs or sometimes eliminati ng it altogether as a way of preventing viewers from leaving to take a bathroom break between shows. [n

addition to creating more, shorter commercial breaks, the networks began to se ll

product placeme1lts. Instead of characters in television using or wearing generic pro ­

ducts, networks began to charge companies to promote their products by highlight­

ing labels and name brands, or simply having characters mention a brand. Films,

which until recently djd not have commercials, had pioneered the in - text ad much earli er with famous product placements sLlch as Coca-Cola in Blnne Rlil/lICr and

Reese's Pieces in E. I: The EXlrtJ -Terrestrin/. Toda)', if you can make OLlt a brand in

television or film, then chances are it's a paid advertisement. Disney, however, has

taken product placement to a whole new level. Rather than promoting brands within

its m edia, the media itself is the brand being adver tised . Children's television pro­

grams such as the animated series, A1y Friends rigger alld Pooh, on the Disney Channel

function as one long advertisement for the Winnie-the- Pooh brand and related mer­

chandise. Recent Disney fil ms such as Toy Story and Cars (both from Pixar) and

The Chrol7icles ofNarnia and Pirates of the Caribbenll all work sim ilarly to sell every­

thing from T-shirts and sleeping bags to furniture and baby food. Nor is Disney

shy about is use or media to sell Disney-related merchandi se. According to th eir

2006 Allllllal Report:

The Disney Fairies franchise, launched in lOOS, is already captivating girls around the wodd with sllccessful new best-sell ing books like R(IIli ill the A4enll(lid L(lgool1 and Dislley Fairies magazines in Europe. Coming up, audiences will hear Tinker Bell speak fo r the very first time in Tillker Belt, the movie from DisneyToon Studios, which will bring to life the amazing world of Disney Fairies in computer-<lI1im<ltion and will be supported with a broad consumer products line at major retailers around the world.

Celebrating its 15th Sei.1SOn on-air in 2007, Power R(lngers ranks as a Top 3 action brand in to ys , while Cars was the 1110st successful film merchandise program since The Lioll Killg. Pirates of the Cflribbe(/!/ was also successful and DC P [Disney Consumer Products] will now leverage the film as a year round franchise. \"lith great entertainment and original content frolll Buena Vista Games (BVG ), like the highly antic ipated Spectrobes, DCP can now reach bo)'s of all ages.27

Adver tising in the media is so pervasive that one media scholar, Dallas Smythe,

argues that the only commodity really sold in the media today is aud iences. Mass­

media audiences are sold to advertisers and advertisers expect to get what they are

paying for. So, the media industry has developed increasingly clever ways to pack­

.1ge LIS (see Niche marketing, below ) for quick and easy delivery to their prImary

customers: the advertisers.

Mary ist Analysis 35

36 Media Industries

Spectacle

OriginJlly published in France in 1967, Guy Debo rd 's The Society of the spectncle is reg3 rded as one of the most important works of political and cultu ral theory in modern ity. In its opening pages, Debord explains:

Understood in it s totali ty, the spectacle is both the o utcome and the goal of the

do minant mode of production. It is not som ething added to the real world- no t a

decorative element, so to speak. On the contrar)', it is [he very heart of societ)I's real unrea li ty. In all it s specific man ifes tat ions-news or propaganda, <1d verti sing or th e

;lew;)1 consumption of ente rtainmen t- the spectacle epitomizes the preva iling mode

of socia l life. It is the om nipresent celebra tion of a cho ice nlrendy JIInrie in the sphere

of product ion, and the conSllmmate result of that cho ice.cs

Fo r Debo rd , our whole society has become little marc than spectacle- mere ex hi ­bit ion and display. Through the endless reproduct ion of shocki ng images, be they of sex or violence, and glitzy promotions, the media collapses news into entertainment and entertainmen t into life. The production of a hype r~ sen s l1ti o nal world through spectacle ensures tha t viewers wi ll attend to media. After all , its depi ction of li fe is more dramat ic and interesting tha n life itself. Consider ga llgsta rap's creation of what Debord calls a "rea l unreal ity," in wh ich multi -mi ll ion dollar artists who drive luxury Hutomobiles, cover themselves in bling, and work for transnational media conglomerates rap aboLlt gang violence, growing LI p in th e hood, and stickin' it to "the man." \,Vhi le all of these are very real social phenomena, ga ngsta rap glamo r­izes them, pimps them as commodities, as lifestyles, th <1t can be attained and li ved at the level o f style and appearance. Life imitates art, which imitates nothing at all.

The power of spectacle to create a rea l unreality was d riven home for one of this book's authors one ni ght wh ile tLlned to the loca l Fox affiliate in Denver, Colorado. He had been watching The Sil1lPS0l15 or some other hyper-real Fox show, but became hypnotized by a sta tion promo that ran dur ing nearly every commercial break. He kept hearing, in a local anchor's t~lm iliar vo ice, the words: "Ron has a nuciear bomb buried ill his back ya rd. There arc bombs buried all over Colorado. Find out where tonight at II." This so-call ed "news" wanted him to bel ieve that digging a hole to plant a tree in his backyard could potentially cause a nuclea r holocaust. The promo was designed to elici t one response (as ide from soiling oneself ): fear. Now, as a media critic, he knew he was being m<1l1ipulated, scared into watching the news. But desp ite such reflex ivity, not to mention the fact that he never watches Fox news, the id ea was so outrageous, so spectacular that he stayed tuned over 2 hou rs wai ting for the news. The story, which did not run until 38 minutes in to the news program, was about a few missile sil os in a remote part of Colorado than had been built in the 1960s du ri ng the Cold War. Whil e the silos sti ll housed interco ntinen­tal ba llistic missiles, th ey were, of co urse, LInder the constant protection of the US mili tary. 111 retrospect, the author realizes it must have been a particularly slow news day. \Vith nothing "real" to pro mote - 110 reason fo r him to stay lip and watch the

news - the station relied on spectacle. the realer-than-real. to ensure that he would anyway. And the news is 110t alone. Increasingl y, OLlr whole media environment is sta rting to look like an episode of the ferry Sprillger SIlO IV.

Logic of safety

The most fundam ental rule of the profit-motive is "nothing succeeds like success." So, when a concept o r formu la meets with (financial ) success, media conglomer­

ates exploit it again and again. Sin ce this pract ice is rooted in risk avoidance, it is known as the logic of safety. j\/led ia conglomerates are typica lly reluctant to try any­thing original, innovative, or edgy. The cost of trying someth ing new only to sec it fa il is simpl y not wo rth the risk. Instead, the big media conglomerates have per­

fected the art o f imitation , which co mes in three basic flavors: sequels, remakes, and spin-offs. Ivfovies are especially cos tly to make. In 2002 , the average cost to pro­d uce a Hollywood feature fi lm was 558.8 million, and it cost another $30.6 mill ion to ma rket it. ~9 If a studio is going to inves t that kind of money upfront, then they wan t a guara ntee of success, o r a t least as close to a guarantee as they can get. Thus, when a film like Rush HOI/I', produced by New Line Cinema (Time \,Varner) in 1998,

grosses Sl41million at the box-o ffice (USA only) and another SS4 million in video rentals, you can bet there is go ing to be a sequel, regardless of whether or not the first fi lm was any good . And when the sequel, RlIsh HOll r 2 (200 I), grosses $226 million in domestic box-office receipts, ecl ipsing the original, it will be a trilogy (a t least! ). RlIsh HOl/r 3 was released du ring summer 2007.

The first Rllsh HOllr was itself already a rehash of a tired Hollywood formula, the buddy-cop film. So metim es fi lm production co mpanies recycle not onl y the generic formula , but the story and characters <-1S well in the form of a remake. Paramount's 200 1 Val/iI/a Sky, for instance, is a remake of the 1997 Spanish film

Alire los Ojos. A few more well-known remakes include Killg KOllg ( 1933/2005 ), The Mnllcllllrinn Callrlirlnte ( 1962/2004 ), Freaky Frirloy ( 1976/2003 ), and Psycho (19601 1998). Filmscroll.com reports that rcmakes are on the risc, increasing from 2S in 2002 to 44 in 2006:10 Nor are remakes limited to the film industry. Remakes in the music industry are almost as numerous as th e ar tists themselves. A few examples include *NSYNC's remake of "Just Got Paid" (Johnny Kem p), No Doubt's remake of "Hatefu l" (The Clash), Puff-Daddy's remake of "Break My Stride" (Matthew Wilder), Nirvana's remake of "The l'vlan Who Sold The World" (David Bowie), Nine

Inch Nails' remake of "Dead Souls" (joy Div ision), and Limp Bizkit's remake of " Faith" (George Michael ).

Although television also produces remakes - it's especially well known for adapting successfu l British shows like Tile Office, Pop Iriol (becoming AlIleriwlI Irlol), and \ "ho \ \f(1I1ts to be a /vlil/iollflire? - the 1110re common strategy is what sociologist Todd Gitli n calls "recombinancy." Television is a parti cula rl y formulaic med ia. Not only can audiences co unt on popular genres sllch as the game show, drama, situation comedy, and reali ty TV, but the), can also count on sub-gen res with very

MarXist AnalYSIS 37

· - Media Industnes

specific tra its. Prime time would simply not be complete wi thout a medical drama , crime drama, legal drama, and police d rama, for instance. In many instances, when a show is nearing the end of its run, produce rs will simply create a sp in -off that focuses on a popu la r or ('v('n secondary character from the original. All ill the F{l/llily sp un off The leffersoll s, Mnr)' T),ler iVloore sp un off LOll Cmlll, Hnpp)' On)" spun off L,wem 6 .. Shirley, and Dallas spun o ff Kllots Lnllrfillg to name just a few. More recently. ,,,hen a show has been particu larl}' successful, produce rs simply spun-off additional versions of the same thing, as has happened with CSJ and L(Ilv (Jlln Orner.

Bu t regardless of whether it's movie sequels, music remakes. or television spin-ofts, they all share the logic of sa fety. Indeed, when " innovation" docs emerge in th e media industry, it is typica ll y because a sm all , independent producer has "bro ken the rules." \Vhen this occurs, the "emergent rul es" are quickl y co-opted and en d­

lessly reproduced by the large conglomerates, or the smaller company is simply bo ught­ou t. This is precisely what ha ppened a t t\ liramax. After the unlikely success of controversial films like sex, lies, (lIId t/irieo fape ( 1989 L Tie N1e Up! Tie AtJe DolV"! ( 1990), and The Cr)'illg Cnllle ( 1992), Disney acquired iVliramax in 1993. Releas ing future films slleh as PIlip Fielioll ( 1994) under the Miramax label allowed Disney to branch into 1110re risqu e film mak ing wi thout endangering its wholesome, fam­ily image.

Joint ventures

Given the high costs of television, so und, and film production , media conglomer­ates often undertake join t ventures to rcduce fi nan cial risks. By splitting the costs of a new venture, nei ther corporation has to bear the full financial burden sho uld the venture fail. "The dominant five med ia conglo merates," noted Bagdikian ill 2004, "have a to tal of 141 joint ventures , which makes them business partners wi th each other."}1 Prior to the late 1980s, a 24- hour all-comcdy cable network had never been

tr ied in the USA. So, it was ha rdl y a surprise when Time \Varner's The Co medy Channel merged with Viacom's HA! to for m Comedy Central in 1991. For 12 years, bo th companies retai ned SO percen l" ownershi p in the network. As it turns out, Co medy Cenlral wen t o n to become a huge success and when Via com even tually purchased T ime \t\'a rner's share in 2003, it cost them SI.2 billion. Another reason med ia conglomerates mar joi n forces is to ex pand their control in one particular industr y. [n 2004, for instance, BMG Entertain ment (a Bertelsmann company) joined forces with Sony Music Entertainment (a So n)' compa ny) to form Sony BMG Music Entertainmen t and, thereby, join EM I, Universnl, and vVarner as one ofthe Big FOllr

reco rd companies. According to the Bertel smann website:

Sony BI\.IG l\l usic Entcrtainment Ii:)] ajoint venture between Bertelsmann ilnd Sony.

With legendary labels such as Arista. Columbia Records, Epic Record. Jive, and RCA

Records, Sony BI\IG 's vast ca ta log includes some of the most important recordings

in his tory and spans gen res ranging from hiphop. countr}', and classical, ll) gospel ,

pop and rock. The com pdn ~I '::. (O]"e (OmpCll' IlCr is di~covcring <lnd developing

arti sts, and bringing their mu~ic to audiences worldwide through a va ri ety of prod­

ucts and distribution channels. Sony JUd G is home to local artists and international

superstars, including Beyollct\ Justin Timberlake, Christina Aguilera, The Fray. Dido,

Carrie U nderwood, Alicia " t'Y!) ,lIld Bob D}'ian. The compan r is headquartered in New

Yo rk and is owned in eqlwl parts by Bertelsmann AG and the Sony Corp0l"<lIion of Al1lerica:;~

The merger also repo rtedly allowed the compan ies to cut up to 2.000 jobs, sll ving Sony BJ\IG nearly 5350 million a yea r. Such cooperation is not unusual, especially when one considers that the majo r med ia conglomerates have illterlocki/lg riirecl­

omtes. Each of the media conglomerates is overseen by a board of directors and often an individual will si t on multiple boards, making them interlocked. The people deciding what is good for o ne media co nglomerate, then, are likely to be some of the same people deciding what is good for anothe r. The result is joint ve nturcs.

Niche rna l'ket in9

A sixth and final strategy of profit maximi zation employed by media conglomcr­ates is Iliche mnrketillg, or the targeting of a specific segment of the public that shares particular but known demographic t raits. Niche marketing is commonly cha rac­terized as IlnlTOIVcnslilig to distinguish it from bronrlcasting, a model that targeted a large, anonymous, and undifferentiated audience. The finan cial benefit of niche

marketing is twofold. First. if a media corporation can deliver a niche aud ience that is highly sought after, then it can charge a premium for advertisi ng. Say, for instance) a retail business sells skateboards and the business knows from Pllst expe­rience that the vast majorit y of its customers are ages 12-22 and skewed slightly toward males. The Fox network cou ld charge this business mll ch more for <l 30-

second advertising spot than say CBS, where 54 percent of its prirne-time vicwe rs are over 50. -'.' Even highl y rated program s like CBS's 60 t\llilllltes are probably not

a good place to adverti se skateboards. Similarly. NBC, which boasts the largest per­centage of viewers who earn over $75,000 a )'ear, would be the most logical place to advertise luxury automobiles. In the past, advertising ra tes were closely tied to audience share. But in this model, many viewers may not have been part of the tar­get demographic an advertiscr wished to reach. As media corporations increasingly target narrower audiences, they can charge much more for adver tisi ng.

A second adva nillge of niche ma rket ing is that it allows media corporat io ns to attract and rCclch previously untapped markets. As the tastes of sOmE" viewers and listeners run counter to popular tastes, these audiences were largel)1 disi nteres ted in the messages propaga ted by the old broadcast model. Thanks to new media tech­nologies such as the internet and sa tellite) however, highly specia li zed con tent can now be delivered to even th e most remote places. Historically, the size of a town dictated how many rlldio stations it h,.ld , and therefore how diversified the choice

M d l-Xist Ana lysIs 39

40 Media Industnes

of formats was. A smaUer market might only receive three rad io stations sllch as hits, rock, and coull try. Xlvi radio, by con trast, feat ures 69 different music channels ill addition to its news, ta lk, sports, and en terta in ment programming, and is cWHiI ­

abl e anywhere. Al though the mllsic on XM rCldio is currently commercial-free, this will likel y cha nge. \"'he11 new media are introduced into the marketplace, they fre­quently court customers with the promise of 11tt1e or no advertising. But after build­ing a cllstomer base, media moguls generally let advertisers in. Cable television, which started out largel y commercial-free, is now satura ted with advertising.

Consequences of Ownersllip Patterns and Profit Maximization

In any capi talist society, the patterns and st ra tegies discussed in this chap ter may not seem surprising or abnormal. \Ve arc, of cou rse, socialized from birth to see capita lism not as olle possible economic system, but as the 0111)' economic system. In such a context, the desire to acclImulate wealth appears to be intrinsic and instinct­ive rather than constructed and learned. But when culture is transformed into nature (i.e. made to seem natural ), \\Ie do not stop to question il. \f\'e do not ask, why does it m"1tter that the media industry is highly concentrated? Or what difference does it make th"1t the major media conglomerates operate ,-lccording to a logic of sa fety? The remainder of this chapter begins with a rem inder that late capital ism is only one structural (i.e. economic ) possibility and that the patterns of ownership and st rategies of profit maximization that emerge in relation to it have signi ficant social and political consequences that affect our lives. Three implications in particular war­rant our attention: the reduction of diversity, the restriction of democratic ideal s, and the spread of cultura l imperialism.

Reduces divet'sity

Co ncentration, which severely restricts competition , integration, which leads to the development of some projects and not others, and the logic of safety, which dras­tically limits crc<1tiviry, coLlectively result in the homogenization of media. Despite the plethora of med ia outlets and the apparent ar ray of choices today, med ia prod ­Llcts such as mLLsic, te levision, Cll1d film are overwhelmingly similar in form and content. The uniformity of media has long been recognized b)1 media scholars Jnd can be traced back to the Frallkfllrt School, an institute for soc iJl research estab­lished in vVeimar, Germany in 1923. The Frankfurt tradition found its \\lay to the USA in the 1930s when German scholars immigrated there following the rise of National Socialism in Germany. Influenced by Marxism, scholars such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer saw the mass media and popular

cu lt ure as rigid, fo rmu laic, highly standard ized, and cliched. They argued tha t med ia's unendi ng sa meness had a pacifying effect on audiences, elim inati ng the possi bility for critical thought , and th ereby produci ng Ollr very consciollsness. Though the Frankfurt School has been critiqued for promoting the idea of filise COI1:5Cioll:5IIess, the belief that the masses are duped into bli nd ly accep ting the pre­vai ling ideology. their criticisms of standardization are not entirely witho ut" merit.

\Vh ile examples of standardizat ion can be fo und in any of the media industries, the music industry and especiall)' pop mllsic provides a compelling example. In 1941 , Adorno argued that popular Illllsic was successful because it was simultan­eously standard ized (i.e. it was all the sa llle and therefore requi red no thought or effo rt to enjoy) and pseudo-individ ualized (i.e. it was cloa ked in false appearance of un iq ueness). Explai ned Adorno:

The necessa ry correlate of 11111.'i ica l s\;'Indardizalioll is pseudo-individualization. By pscudo -i ndividua l iz~ltion we mean endowing culturnl mass productio n with the ha lo

of free choice or open ma rket on the basi!> of standardiz,Hion itst.'lf. Stnndard iza tiol1 of song hilS keeps the customers in linc by doing their listening fo r them, as it were.

Pseudo-individualization, for its part. keeps them in line by making them fo rget that what they listen 10 is alrcad}' listened to for them, or "pre-digested. ,, '~

If Adorno's crit ique sounds overly harsh, allow us to ci te an example. In 1997, three brothers from Tulsa, Oklahoma, known collectively as Hanson , became a pop sensat ion with their song. "MtvINIBop," which quickly rocketed to number one. Featuring sc intillating lyrics such as " In an mmm bop they' re gone. In an 111111111

bop they're not there/Un til you loose your hair. But you don't ca re," l\IMMBop appeared with 12 other songs (four more of which were hits) on the album Nlirlrlle of NO h/here, which has sold over 10 million cop ies worldwide. Hanson, along wi th the near-endless itera tion of boy bands and pop queens like Britney Spea rs, Chris tina Aguilera, and Avri l Lavigne, would suggest that musical inn ovation and diversity arc no t only atypical, but also un necessary for success.

Restricts democl'acy

A second social consequence of ownership patterns and profit-maximization strategies in the media ind ustry is the decline of democratic ideals. Democracy is premised on the no tio n of ega litarianism, the free and open exchange of ideas, and the participation of diverse publics.

But until the rela tivel}' recent developmen t and sp read of new media, it was virtually impossible for ordinary citizens to share their ideas and opinio ns with large) remote audiences. Thus, an i}' those who owned and controlled the means of product ion tl'u l)' hnd a "public" voice. Even as access is grad unll ), becoming mo re democratic thro ugh personal and political blogs, for instance, the major media

MarXIst AnalYSIS 4 I

42 Media Industnes

co nglomerates continue to function as powerful gntekeepers. Gatekeeping is a filtering p ractice that determines what makes it into the media and what does not. lvled ia such as radio, television, and film remain almost entirely inaccessible to ordinary citizens. And even more democratic media platforms such as YouTube, ~ l ySpace, and Facebook are being bought up by the majo r conglomerates. Often, what starts out as creative, independent art is later co-opted for co rporate profit.

By controlling what is included in (a nd thus excluded from ) both news and enter­tainment media, the major med ia conglomerates zdso exercise an ngellnn-setfillg func­tion. Agenda-setting refers to the power o f the media to influence what peop le are concern ed with or care about. By covcring so me news stories and not others, or by treating some scenarios, thcmes, and issues in entertainment media and not oth­ers, the media greatly influence whnt the public regn rds as important. The idea of agcnda-setting asserts that media do not influcnce IVI/(/t audiences think, so Illllch

as they intluence what audiences th ink aUollt. Typically, agenda-setting is discussed in relation primarily to the news media. But enterta inment med ia also exercise an agenda-setting function. The sheer prevalence of cop shows and crime dramas ensures that violence will be viewed as a serio us soc ial concern, while the absence of envir­onmental dramas has the oppos ite effect. Sex and violence are seen as social con­ce rns, in part, beca use there is so much sex and violence in the media. tVlennwhilc, the ongoing genocide in Darfur is of lit tle concern to many US Americans because it receives little to no attention in the media.

[n addition to gatekeeping and agen da-setting, the major media conglomerates exercise an important jimnillg function. Framing describes the viewpoint o r per­spective thell is employed by the ncws and entertainment media when coverin g social and political issues. Just as the lens o f a cam era frames its subject, media framcs crea te particular windows th ro ugh which audiences view issues. The news media's repeated framing of political issues around a conservative/ liberal or left!right

b innrism, for instance, greatly limits the scope of public debate by ma rginalizing non-centrist or alternative perspect ives. During political campaigns, third-party ca n­d idates are rarely taken seriously b)' the media. The naming and hence framing of th ird-party candidates as "on the fringe" works to ensure that they will remai n there. Similarly, as we wi ll see in the next chapter, when the news med ia frame a public

tragedy such as a shooting as th e random act of a madman, it obscures the under­lying social cond ition s that may hnve con tributed to the tragedy, thereby severely undercutting the possibility of changing o r improvlllg those conditions. In short, the gatekeeping (filtering), age ndo:t -setting (focusing ), and framing (s tructuring ) functions of the major media co nglo m erates consistently undermine democratic principles and ideals.

Fuels cul tUl·a l impel'ialism

A third consequence of contem po rary ownership patterns and profit-maximization strategies many observers Wilrn is clIltllml imperialislIl. Cultural imperialism describes

the exporting of US val ues and ideologies around the globe, lIsually to the detri­ment af local culture and national sovereignt}'. \Vhile local culture certainl ), inflects upon and influences the media prod ucts sllch as television, film. and music im­ported from predomina ntly US-cen tered media conglomcrates, the cul tural im­perialism hypothesis is rooted in the idcn of unequal flow. This idea holds that while cultural beliefs and values are flowing in both di rect ions the inwa rd !low is so much greater than the outward flow that over tim e it causes cultural erosion in poorer coun tries with Jess-developed media industr ies. In some cases, exposure to outside cultural values can have de\'asta ting effects 011 local cultures. There was a sign ifica nt rise in infant deaths in a number of countries in Afr ica, for ins tance, when mothers swi tched from breast-feeding to bottle-feeding arter seeing it repeated ly featured in European and US television programs and advertising. The m ixing of infant for mula with unsa nitary ,vater in this particu lar region resulted in an epidemicl

:'

Furthermore. given th e financial resources behind the Big Five, it is often diffi cu lt for independent, local production compa nies to compete with mu lt inational con­glomerates. The increasing concentration of highly integrated mcdia companies along with the drive to make profi t is clea rly nol without significan t social conseq uences.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the effects of ownersh ip pattern s and profit-motive on the creation and ci rculation of media texts. Though largely masked by their sheer complexity in contem po rary society, the means of production ultimately determine the shape and content of media in a lvlarxist framework. Formed through m ult iple

mergers and buyouts, the fi ve major conglomerations that dominate the media indus­try look to max imize profit whenever possible, leading to a strange combi nation of standard izat io n and spectaculari zation in media content as a result of the hegem ­on ic logic of safety. At th e same time, the industry's increasing abi li ty to cross­promote and advertise med ia conten t drives this fa irl}, unifo rm product to almost every co rner of the Earth. The widespread cul tural influence, in turn, res tricts demo­cracy, red uces co ntent diversi ty, and increases the cu ltural capi tal of the coun tries that p roduce the majority of med ia today.

If, while reading this chapter, you felt so mewhat overwhelmed or depressed at the utter control of the in dust ry presented in th e Ma rxis t perspective) you are not alone. Marxist cr itique is cer ta inly an importan t contribution to media studi es, and indeed one of the oldest, but it is not complete in its ability to understand hmv the med ia industry functions. As we will sec in the next two chapters, other fac­tors like co nventio ns and government regulations also help shape media content.

Media industries represent a special kind of contemporary business, in that thc), are often in the service of both profit and .Ht, and a strictl y econom ic analysis will

always be p<lrti<ll in its ability to explain the inner workings of these increasingly visible companies .

Marxist Analys is 43

44 Media Industries

MEDIA LAB I: DOING MARXIST ANALYSIS

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this lab IS to utilize Marxist principles to analyze the media. Specifically. students will Investi­

gate how patterns of ownership and the profrt-motlve shape the content and form of select magazines.

ACTIVITY

Divide class Into small groups of 4 5 students each.

Supply each group wrth a Time Warner publicat ion such as People, /n Style, Sports Illustrated,

Emerrolnment Weekly. or Time. Ask students to (ecord their answers to the following questions.

I How. if at all. are the ownership patterns of concentration. conglomeration. Integration. and multl­

nationalism reflected In the magazine? 2 Give three specific examples of cross-promotion in t he magazine. Hint: use Figul-e 2.1 from thiS

chapter. 3 What role does advertiSing play In the magazine? How IS It Incorporated? Gte thr-ee specific examples.

4 How does the style. design. and layout of the magazine l-efiect a profit-motive? Cite six speCific

examples. Please include discussion of spectacle and the logic of safety.

SUGGESTED READING

Bagdikian, B.H . Thl! Nell' Medin JHoll opoiy. Boston : Beacon Press, 200-1.

Barnou\\,. E. C01lglollleffltl!5 (lmi the Medin. New York: New Press, 1997. C ro teau, D. rind Hoynes, W. Tile BI/silless of Merlin: Corpornle Medin nl/(! The PI/Vlic Illterest,

2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2006.

Gandy, Jr, D.H. The Pol itical Economy Approach : a C ritical Challenge. 101lmn! oj Medin Ecollolllies 1992; 5: 23--12.

Garnllil111, N. Cl1pi/(/fislII mlf! CO llll1l1lllimtioll: Gloval ClIlrllre (wd the £COIIOlilirs of tIlJomln/ioll . Newbu l")' Park, CA : S,lge Pub lic;t tions, 1990.

Garnhal11, N. Con tributions to a Political Econo111Y of ~lass-(oml11l1l1iciltion. In lVledil1, Cuilllre (Illd Societ),: a Critica! Reader, R. Collins, J. Curran , N. Garnham, P. Scanne ll ,

P. Schcsingcr, <111d C. Sparks (eds ), pp. 9-32. Ncwbury Park, CA: Sage Publicntions,

1986. Gold ing, P. and iVlurdock , G. Culture, Communicat ions, and Poli tical EconolllY. In Mn:,s

Media nllrl SocieTY, J. Curran [md M. Gurevitch (cds), pp. 15-32. Ncw York: Edward Arnold,

1991.

He rman, E. and Cho msky, N. MmllJ/aC1l1rillg COllsellt: The Polili((/l ECOIIOIII), oj the 1VJnss AJedin. New York: Pan theon , 1988.

I-i orkhcimcr, J\J. and Adorno, T.\V. Dinleelie of Elllightelllllellt. Translated by J. Cumming.

New York: Cont inuum, 2001.