outline
DESCRIPTION
Can we sufficiently protect the SPS and its extraction lines against damage in a multi-cycling and high intensity beam context?. Outline. The purpose The current solutions The proposals Wrapping up. Equipment # N. Interlock. Equipments. Kicker System. Equipments. Equipment # 3. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
1
Can we sufficiently protect Can we sufficiently protect the SPS and its extraction lines the SPS and its extraction lines
against damage against damage in a multi-cycling and high intensity in a multi-cycling and high intensity
beam context?beam context?
2
The purpose
The current solutions
The proposals
Wrapping up
OutlineOutline
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 3
Why a Beam Interlock system?Why a Beam Interlock system?
Equipment #N
Interlock
EquipmentsEquipmentsEquipment #3
Equipment #2
Equipment #1
KickerSystem
Transmits the result as:
- Dump Request
- Injection Permit
- Extraction Enable
Collects status or
default signals
Performs a summation of all signals
As one of the systems involved in the machine protection,
the Interlock system has to:
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 4
which mission?which mission?
For the SPS Ring● Dump the Beam if unsafe situation● Stop Injection
For the Extraction Lines● Enable extraction if everything OK● Request a beam dump if not enabled
Equipment #N
InterlockEquipments
Operators
EquipmentsEquipment #3Equipment #2
Equipment #1
KickerSystem
Post-MortemAlarm system
Timing
Transmits the output signal
and also:● Transmit an Alarm● Alert Cycle Beam Manager● Inform Operator● Allow Post-Mortem Analysis
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 5
Hw or Sw Interlock ?Hw or Sw Interlock ?
Equipment #N
InterlockEquipments
Operators
EquipmentsEquipment #3Equipment #2
Equipment #1
KickerSystem
Post-MortemAlarm system
Timing
Hardware Interlock:● for critical elements● for fast response
Software Interlock:● as a second line of defense● for lower R-T constraints● for non standard elements (magnets in MD,…)
Performs a summation of all signals
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 6
Which sources ?Which sources ?
Equipment #N
InterlockEquipments
Operators
EquipmentsEquipment #3Equipment #2
Equipment #1
KickerSystem
Post-MortemAlarm system
Timing
Interlock signal categories:● State Interlocks
Power Converter ON/OFF Vacuum valves IN/OUT etc…
● Setting Interlocks Magnet current out of tolerance window Beam loss > defined threshold Beam position > specified limit etc….
Collects
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 7
Features?Features?
Main characteristics: should be Reliable should be Available should be Real-Time should be “Flexible” should be helpful for operators
What about high intensity beam operation?
And what about fast multi-cycling changes?
Equipment #N
InterlockEquipments
Operators
EquipmentsEquipment #3Equipment #2
Equipment #1
KickerSystem
Post-MortemAlarm system
Timing
8
The purpose
The existing solutions
The proposals
Wrapping up
22ndnd part part
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 9
Present Hw Interlock: Clients & Layout Present Hw Interlock: Clients & Layout
BA1crate 3
BA1crate 1
BA1crate 2
SSIS
EmergencyBeamDump
PCR reset
Beam Dump Kicker
Trigger
InjectionInhibit
Injection Kicker
Standby
Extraction Kicker
CPShardwired
ExtractionInhibit
Disable
Vacuum
Main P.S.& Sextupoles
MPS fast chain
BD Internal fault
BD no trigger
Energy Tracking
Totem
Collimator tests
Beam Tracking
Beam Position
Beam losses 1
Beam losses 2
Beam losses 6
R.F.
Beam losses ring+ BCT
BA6crate 4
Sum BA6
SSIS
Septum Fault
TT60 P.S.
…
Kdsba1 watchdog
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 10
Present Hw Interlock: is it suitable for the future?Present Hw Interlock: is it suitable for the future?
Could be used for short term but has to be replaced anyway
Simple and robust system● Basic AND logic of all signals anyone could cause a beam dump● Every signal could be set in remote mode (therefore maskable by the operator) ● Inhibits the injection when a circulating beam has been dumped● Installed in only one place (next to the beam dump itself) therefore every client needs its own cable to BA1 …
Machine timing independent● Any timing/cycle dependence is handled by the clients
Managed for the time being by AB/BT and installed in the 80s Cannot be extended anymore
we are running out of spare parts…
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 11
Extraction
Present Software Interlock systemPresent Software Interlock system
Written in the 90s, the SPS Software Interlock System is composed of 4 parts (SSIS hardware, Kernel, Accelerator Equipment Monitor, and User interface)
and interacts with several other systems
PS Operation
Stop Ejection
Alarm system
DumpRequest
EmergencyBeam Dump(Hw Interlock)
Injection
A.E.M.
User Interface
SSIS Kernel
SSIShardware
Equipment #NEquipmentsEquipmentsEquipment #3
Equipment #2Equipment #1
SPS EquipmentSPS Equipment
SPS Equipment
SPS Mode
PCR operators
Console switches
By-pass switch
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 12
Present Software Interlock ChannelsPresent Software Interlock Channels
The watched equipments, sub-systems or elements are : ● Main Power Supplies error● STOPPER MOVING● DUMP INTLK DISABLED● RADIATION BB4/5 or TI8/TT41● Operator request● Switching AUXPS / ROCS reload● MD PODH in 4 should be off● GEF'S EXT.N RELOAD● W.Extr. (or N.Extr.) Bumper in bad state● HIGH ENERGY STORAGE● HIGH INTENSITY ON NORTH TARGET● EDF CRITICAL PERIOD● WOBBLE FAULT NORTH● Injection Interlock Disabled● E A UNSAFE● SETTING UP SEM OFFSET TABLE● SPS VACUUM INTLK. CHAIN BROKEN● HIGH INTENSITY/HALO ON WEST TARGET● W ZS in bad state● MBBT 6202 OUT OF TOLERANCE● QBM in 6 ON - should be off● Beam loss ring● N ZS in bad state● TED TT40 ● TED TI8● TBSE TT41● TBSE 80243 in bad state or position fault● WOBSU N/alarm system communication problems● EXTRACTION INHIBIT CHANNEL DISABLED● BI-BTV RING or BI-BTV TRANSFER could be IN● Extr. Sextupole OFF
● ZS GIRDERS in beam● SCHOTTKY PU in beam● TIDV water fault.● TED First Turn in beam● TED TT60 or TED TT20 in bad state● ACCESS CHAIN broken● BHZ 377 in bad state● COLLIMATORS 1 in bad position or COLLIMATORS STEP 4 in beam● COLLIMAT & SCRAP 5 in bad position● SCRAPER 5 ENABLED● TT10 MAGNETS in bad state● West MST/MSE or North MST/MSE in bad state● TT60 MAGNET or TT20 MAGNET in bad state● P0 Line TAX closed or P0 Line BEND error● EAST BUMPERS in bad state● COLDEX LSS4● MDVW in 5 in bad state● STOPPER TT20 or STOPPER north IN with TED OUT● East EXT. GIRDER LSS4 in beam● MBSG 410 OUT OF TOLERANCE● TT40 MAGNETS or TT41 MAGNETS or TI8 MAGNETS IN BAD STATE● EAST MSE IN BAD STATE● TT40 TOO LOW (or TOO HIGH) INTENSITY● VACUUM PLATES IN 5 IN BEAM● MDHW / QSE in 5 in bad state● MKE MAGNETS LSS4 OVER-TEMP● 1 or 2 TBSE in with TED TT40 out
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 13
Present Sw Interlock system: Present Sw Interlock system: Does it fit the purpose?Does it fit the purpose?
Does not fulfil fast cycle changes andmust be upgraded (or remade) for the future
Features● Reliable system
● Connected to the Hardware Interlock but could be by-passed by an operator
● Operators can disable any individual interlock channel as well
● Does not provide any safeguards against forgotten masks! (except message on Alarm screen)
● Quite slow response time with polling rate fixed to 20 sec
● Uses “old” SL-Equip procedure for Equipment access
● Difficult to analyse after a fault and access to logged data
Machine timing independent● Does not react to cycle changes● The operators modify the settings via the SPS Mode
14
The purpose
The existing solutions
The proposals
Wrapping up
3rd part3rd part
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 15
target
LSS6 Fast
Extraction
LSS2 Slow
Extraction
LSS4 Fast
Extraction
one for the SPS Ring and one for the 3 Extraction Lines.
Two types of Hw Interlock must be considered:
In both cases, the LHC Beam Interlock platform (i.e. BIC) will be used.
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 16
Process duration time= ~20 µs max (from User signal to Beam Dump trigger)
fixed frequency via 2 optical fibres: if one loop open Beam Dump
● Reliable with full redundant system (from User request to B-D activation)
● Flexible (Masking possible)
but secure (Safe Beam Flag condition)
● Software for live monitoring
and for post-mortem analysis
BIC
DumpBA1
BA2
BA3 BA4
BA5
BA6
BIC
BIC BIC
BIC
BIC
Inj.
6 distributed controllers (BIC)+
2 Beam Permit loops(for redundancy)
~30 input signals are foreseen
Global estimated cost : ~250kCHF
Proposal for SPS Ring Interlock Proposal for SPS Ring Interlock
The layout would be identical to LHC Beam Interlock System:
LHC
As the LHC Interlock:
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 17
““Flexible” with SBFFlexible” with SBF
The SAFE BEAM FLAG is a distributed information to allow some flexibility while maintaining safety.
In general, Beam operation is permitted when all User Systems are OK. But masking should be possible if the beam is “safe” and cannot result in
damaging equipment => concept of MASKABLE / NOT MASKABLE partition with the SBF condition.
The NOT MASKABLE signal will be NEVER ignored. The partition (MASKABLE / NOT MASKABLE) is permanently defined by hardware and is remotely
readable from the Supervision.
For the SPS: the SBF could be derived from the beam intensity. It will be generated and distributed by a dedicated (and reliable) system.
IF SBF = TRUE● if a masked signal is present: it will be ignored and the beam operation will continue.
IF TRUE → FALSE● Masking is no longer taken into account● if a masked signal is present: the beam will be dumped.
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 18
Proposal for Extraction lines InterlockProposal for Extraction lines Interlock
(final) layout of LSS4 as an example:
some “slave” BICs assigned to interlock zones
( TT40, CNGS line, TI8…)
Interlock logic still independent of cycle changes
One “master” BIC:• Receives all summary signals and generates the Extraction Enable signal
• Provokes a Beam Dump trigger if Extraction is not enabled or “disappears” (slow extractions, kicker misfiring)
• For efficient operation: a beam dependent logic could be applied in case of failure in either TT41 (CNGS beam) or in TI8 (LHC beam)
Master/slave architecture using the same hardware units (BIC):
SPS
TT40
TT41
LSS4
Extraction Elements
LHC Inj.
TI8 / TT41
Switch
Ti 8 upstream
Ti 8
downstream
BICBIC
BICBICBICBIC BICBIC BICBIC BICBIC
LHCBeam Permit
LH
C
Extraction Enable
SBF
Beam Type?
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 19
Already used in LSS4Already used in LSS4
ROCS
BPM
VAC
MKE
etc… Patchingmodules
Coremodules
CPU + CTRPModules
VME crate with LynxOS
UTC
via SPS Timing
Control Network
Application
ExtractionEnable
BLM
User Interfaces
Successful participation in TT40 & TI8 tests performed in Autumn 2004!
User Interface
Opticalmodule to Extraction
Kicker
Simplified layout of the installed material:
20
The purpose
The existing solutions
The proposals
Summing up
4th part4th part
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 21
To sum up: To sum up: (1/3)(1/3)
Yes, if we:- continue to deploy the Extraction Interlock in the 3 Extraction lines. - install a new Hardware Interlock for the Ring. Because:
● It fulfils SPS requirements● Full redundant system designed for LHC (:= 200*SPS stored energy)
● Masking allowed with Safe Beam Flag condition● Already existing Hw solution with its Monitoring software
but:
● Missing Budget● Lack of Manpower● Required time for: Production, tests, Installation, SBF
implementation, and finally Commissioning
Difficult to do it before next start-up
Can we sufficiently protect… …in a high intensity beam context?
We propose an intermediate solution for 2006 (and not beyond): by setting up the new system for the SPS ring (in // with the existing one) and by connecting the clients step by step.
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 22
Yes! as the new Hardware Interlock is still independent of the cycle changes:
● Interlock process should stay simple (and then reliable)● The Cycle/Beam changes are managed by the Clients
Yes, if Software Interlock is able to process the cycle changes: via an upgrade of the existing SSIS ?
But, it will require extensive testing to make sure
the changes will not affect the software stability! Wasted time?
Can we sufficiently protect… in a multi-cycling mode context?
To sum up: To sum up: (2/3)(2/3)
or via a new study? Invest in a new software interlocks forthe LHC era one single coherent system thatwill take care of the SPS ring and transfer lines too. Need time & resources: a 2 man-year activity?
We propose minimal changes (only if absolutely necessary) to present SSIS for the start-up of 2006.
In parallel, we’ll be working on a new LHC era software interlock system, which should phase out SSIS. First deliverable around mid 2006.
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 23
To sum up: To sum up: (3/3)(3/3)
On the Equipments side, the interlock parameters must be reconsidered and carefully selected :
● Decide on a connection to Hw Interlock or to Sw Interlock● Set the correct values for Setting Interlocks● Define the right multi-cycling settings● Perform the corresponding tests● Could be useful to implement a kind of “Interlock Reference Manager”?
To store all the interlock references in a defined place To get an history of reference values changes To permit (or not) the modification of defined thresholds:
Modify a threshold (in a wrong way) is equivalent to masking!
Interlock and Kicker systems are designed to be highly reliable. But the machine protection relies as well on the Interlock sources (i.e. the Equipments)
We have to profit from both Hw & Sw Interlock systems replacement by a review of all involved elements:Jorg, Rossano, Rüdiger and myself are ready to participate to this task…
Support and willingness are welcome!
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 24
Thank you for your Thank you for your attentionattention
Acknowledgements to Etienne Carlier, Katarina Sigerud, Claude Despas & Benjamin Todd
And a special thanks to Jorg Wenninger, Rossano Giachino & Rüdiger Schmidt
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 25
AnnexesAnnexes
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 26
target
LSS6 Fast
Extraction
LSS2 Slow
Extraction
LSS4 Fast
Extraction
are using the same LHC Beam Interlock solution (i.e. BIC)
● Circulating beam is less difficult to protect (thanks to beam losses for ex.)
● “Static” process in latch mode:
● Same architecture as LHC
is proposed with distributed
controllers around the ring
linked by beam permit
loops.
“long” period
● Fast Extraction is more tricky:
one shot process!
● Dynamic process (transparent mode):
● Master/slave architecture is proposed for each Extraction Line. A first version has participated in TT40/TI8 tests in Autumn 2004.
some mS
the SPS the SPS RingRing interlock & the (3) interlock & the (3) Extraction LinesExtraction Lines interlock systems interlock systems
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 27
Site Interlock signal New? Comment
BA1 BL Ring Sextant 1 (y)
BA1 BLD LSS1 + TT10 Fast beam losses LSS1 / injection
BA1 Ring Vacuum Existing and unique SPS signal has to be segmented in: TT10,Ring, TT40, TT41,…
BA1 Main Power Supplies (MPS)
BA1 MPS Fast Chain Fast transients on 18 kV
BA1 TT10 PC surveillance Y Possible future PC surveillance for TT10
BA1 Beam Dump Internal Fault
BA1 Beam Dump Energy Tracking
BA1 Beam Dump no trigger
BA1 Beam Dump beam tracking
BA1 Software interlock system Input signal from software interlock system
BA1 Beam Position > 30 mm Existing beam position interlock
BA2 BL Ring Sextant 2 (y)
BA2 BLD LSS2 + TT20 Fast beam losses LSS2 / extraction
BA2 Extraction Interlock System LSS2 Y SCIC beam dump request
BA3 BL Ring Sextant 3 (y)
BA3 RF
BA3 Software interlock system Input signal from software interlock system
BA3 BCT (ramp losses) Y
BA3 BCT (beam structure) Y Quality interlock from FBCT
BA3 Beam Position Y New beam position interlock
BA4 BL Ring Sextant 4 (y)
BA4 BLD LSS4 + TT40 Fast beam losses LSS4 / extraction
BA4 Extraction Interlock System LSS4 Y SCIC beam dump request
BA4 Extraction kicker mode Y Interlock set when the kicker is in LOCAL mode.
BA5 BL Ring Sextant 5 (y)
BA6 BL Ring Sextant 6 (y)
BA6 BLD LSS6 + TT60 Fast beam losses LSS6 / extraction
BA6 Extraction Interlock System LSS6 Y SCIC beam dump request
BA6 Extraction kicker mode Y Interlock set when the kicker is in LOCAL mode.
Expected input signals to the SPS beam interlock system:
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 28
Supervision for BIC-TT40 Supervision for BIC-TT40 (Top Screen)(Top Screen)
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 29
Power Converter SurveillancePower Converter Surveillance
• The currents are checked within a defined window against a reference VALUE (with a certain tolerance).
• Reference value and tolerance : • Depend on cycle/beam type.• Are loaded independently of the usual functions.
Courtesy of Jorg Wenninger
For the fast extractions, a fast power converter surveillance is now provided:
The slow extractions will also profit from it !
In the SPS there is presently no hardware surveillance of PC currents.
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 30
Timing interface for Interlock?Timing interface for Interlock?
With Multi-cycling and fast cycle changes: Obviously, Sw Interlock has to deal with cycle changes. In return, Interlock must inform the CBCM in order to stop the corresponding beam production. On the other hand, the Hw Interlock process should remain independent of timing. Cycle changes must be handled by the clients (power converter, instrumentation, kickers,…) for their interlock signal activation.
Nevertheless, what to do for the TT41/TI8 selection? Danger to have a beam through a wrong extraction channel => The extraction interlock system should apply the correct conditions. But how to know the beam type?
via the Machine Timing? or via a Energy Meter? or both for redundancy?
TT41
Extraction Elements
Ti 8 upstream
BICBIC
BICBICBICBIC BICBIC BICBIC BICBIC
Beam Type
What is the source to set the TT41/TI8 Switch’s position?
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 31
Redundancy
BeamPermitLoops
USER_PERMITSignal
m
Tr
2
Switch Rcv
Tr Switch Rcv
OpticalInterfaceModule
BICIBICIBICIBICIBICIBICIBICIUserInterface
1
3
4
16
COREModule
(for Beam 1)
Loop A (Beam 1)
Loop B (Beam 1)
Loop A (Beam 1)
Loop B (Beam 1)
16
MatrixB
MatrixA
2Patching and Interface
Modulesfor Beam 1
Redundant link
for each User Interface
Two Matrixes in //
Two Loops
Beam
Interlock
Controller
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 32
Safe Beam Flag for LHC Safe Beam Flag for LHC
For the LHC, SBF will be generated in IR4 by a dedicated system. Derived from LHC energy and from beam intensity:
● Energy value coming from the ultra reliable energy tracking system● Intensity of beam 1 and beam 2 measured by the BCTs
Threshold value should normally be fixedMust be possible to set it to different value after receiving authorisation (to be defined) and new value must be logged.
If ( Ibeam1 · Energy ) < Threshold1 then SFB1 = PRESENT else SFB1 = NOT PRESENTIf ( Ibeam2 · Energy ) < Threshold2 then SFB2 = PRESENT else SFB2 = NOT PRESENT
14 Jan. 2005 - B.Puccio Session 3 / PS & SPS Days 33
Interface with LBDSInterface with LBDS (example with Beam1) (example with Beam1)
BIC-R6BIC-L6BIC-L5 BIC-R5 BIC-L7 BIC-R7
Dumping SystemBeam 1
other BICs: L4, R4, L3, R3, L2, R2, L1, R1, R8, L8
10 MHzstop
10 MHz
USER_PERMITsignals
USER_PERMITsignals
USER_PERMITsignals
USER_PERMITsignals
USER_PERMITsignals
USER_PERMITsignals
Loop B1
Loop A1
USER_PERMITsignals
stop
Same interface for Beam2…