outline - collective bargaining in troubled times (w0229075)

8/8/2019 Outline - Collective Bargaining in Troubled Times (W0229075)

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WISCONSIN CITY MANAGERS ASSOCIATION

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TROUBLED TIMES:

COMMENTS FROM A GREY FOX

Dean R. Dietrich, Esq.

Ruder Ware, L.L.S.C.

500 First Street, P.O. Box 8050

Wausau, WI 54402-8050

715.845.4336

[email protected]

Wausau O ffice:

500 First Stre et, Suite 8000

Wausau, WI 54403

715.845.4336

Eau Claire Office:

402 Graham Avenue

Eau Claire, WI 54701

715.834.3425

www.ruderware.com


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I. CRITERIA UNDER THE BARGAINING LAW.

A. Statutory language:

111.70(4)(cm)7

7. Factor given greatest weight. In making any decision under thearbitration procedures authorized by this paragraph, the arbitrator orarbitration panel shall consider and shall give the greatest weight to anystate law or directive lawfully issued by a state legislative oradministrative officer, body or agency which places limitations onexpenditures that may be made or revenues that may be collected by amunicipal employer. The arbitrator or arbitration panel shall give anaccounting of the consideration of this factor in the arbitrators or panels

decision.

7g. Factor given greater weight. In making any decision under

the arbitration procedures authorized by this paragraph, the

arbitrator or arbitration panel shall consider and shall give greater

weight to economic conditions in the jurisdiction of the municipal

employer than to any of the factors specified in subd. 7r.

7r. Other factors considered. In making any decision under thearbitration procedures authorized by this paragraph, the arbitrator orarbitration panel shall also give weight to the following factors:

a. The lawful authority of the municipal employer.

b. Stipulations of the parties.

c. The interests and welfare of the public and the financialability of the unit of government to meet the costs of anyproposed settlement.

d. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employmentof the municipal employees involved in the arbitration

proceedings with the wages, hours and conditions ofemployment of other employees performing similarservices.


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e. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions ofemployment of the municipal employees involved in thearbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and

conditions of employment of other employees generally inpublic employment in the same community and incomparable communities.

f. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions ofemployment of the municipal employees involved in thearbitration proceedings with the wages, hours andconditions of employment of other employees in privateemployment in the same community and in comparablecommunities.

g. The average consumer prices for goods and services,commonly known as the cost of living.

h. The overall compensation presently received by themunicipal employees, including direct wage compensation,vacation, holidays and excused time, insurance andpensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, thecontinuity and stability of employment, and all otherbenefits received.

i. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the

pendency of the arbitration proceedings.

j. Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which arenormally or traditionally taken into consideration in thedetermination of wages, hours and conditions ofemployment through voluntary collective bargaining,mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise betweenthe parties, in the public service or in private employment.

II. WHAT HAVE ARBITRATORS SAID ABOUT LOCAL ECONOMIC

CONDITIONS?

A. It is clear that an interest and welfare of the public argument can justify a lowfinal offer under two sets of circumstances:

1. Where the economic circumstances of the employer can be shown to bedifferent than its comparables.


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2. Where none of the primary comparables are settled and the low offercomes closest to the settlements reached in an expanded comparablegroup.

B. Some arbitrators have not given much weight to local economic conditions.

1. It is undisputed that Forest County is an economically poor county. It ischaracterized by sparse population, a narrow tax base, low wages, higherunemployment, and low per capita income. Historically, departmentemployees have been the lowest paid among comparable counties. Whilethe County has not claimed a lack of ability to pay per se, it has arguedthat its final offer is more consistent with what its county residents canafford to pay....Under the Employers final offer, the gap between salariesfor Forest County deputies and deputies in comparable counties would

further widen. The arbitrator is cognizant of the economic constraintsfacing the County but is persuaded that the final offer of the Association isthe more reasonable of the two. Arbitrator Kay Hutchinson, ForestCounty (Sheriffs Department), Dec. No. 27786-A, 4/18/94.

2. The County, through a series of exhibits not described in this decision,has demonstrated clearly that Forest County is poor economically inrelationship both to the comparable counties and to counties in the State.As such, it is in the interest and welfare of the public to minimize the costof the new Agreement...the Unions final offer is selected. ArbitratorEdward Krinsky, Forest County Highway Department, Dec. No. 26025-A,

1/5/90.

3. This Mediator/Arbitrator would add as he has previously stated thateconomic data is diminished in value to some degree unless the Employercan show some specific adverse impact on the community. There is alsogood reason to be cautious of economic data when summarized innewspaper or magazine reports. Such data is often a broad andoversimplified assessment of larger macro-economic tendencies.Arbitrator Gil Vernon, Kimberly Area School District, Dec. No. 29882,4/20/83.

4. With regard to the condition of the local economy, the Arbitrator findsthat it remains strong, despite the dire predictions and uncertaintyexpressed by District witnesses. If there are to be massive layoffs as aresult of the acquisition of the mill by Georgia-Pacific, as of date of thehearing, those have not come to pass. Accordingly, the Arbitratorconcludes that the record evidence does not support the negative view ofthe Nekoosa economy which is a basic assumption which underlies theDistricts final offer.


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Even if such a downturn were to occur, the evidence reflects that theeconomy of the paper industry in this area of the state is strong. If the

community wishes to retain residents should a downturn occur as a resultof the acquisition of GNN by Georgia-Pacific, it would do well tomaintain the quality of its school district. That would serve as astabilizing factor to encourage residents to remain and perhaps encourageothers to move to Nekoosa. In light of the condition of the economy as itis frozen as of the date of the hearing in this mater, the Arbitratorconcludes that this factor provides some support to the selection of theAssociation final offer for inclusion in a successor agreement. ArbitratorSherwood Malamud, Nekoosa School District, Dec. No. 26611-A, 6/4/91.

C. Some Arbitrators have given much consideration to local economic conditions. It

seems the more drastic the situation is, the more weight they place on economicconditions.

1. In this proceeding, the Employer has not only made general assertionsabout taxpayer difficulties in funding wage increases, particularly theAssociations package, it has documented these difficulties in farms,declining milk and corn prices, and percentage of county residentsemployed in farming, forestry, and fishing and as laborers as a comparablebasis. While the County does not use this evidence to make an inability topay argument, it persuasively argues that there is a real difficulty to paythe higher costs of the Associations package. Arbitrator June Miller

Weisberger, Buffalo County (Sheriffs Department), Dec. No. 27523-A,6/21/93.

2. Vernon Countys low per capita income, the sharp rise in taxdelinquency, and the sharp drop in 1982 farm income all point in thedirection of a moderate wage increase such as the County is proposing.Arbitrator Gordon Haferbecker, Vernon County (Courthouse and SocialServices Unit), Dec. No. 19843-A, 11/19/82.

3. The evidence establishes that the District has one of the lowest equalizedvaluation in the Conference as well as in the geographic area, with an

equalized valuation of $34.9 million. It is compromised primarily offarms and agriculturally dependent businesses, and its residents are subjectto the problems generally facing the agricultural community. Theevidence indicates this District simply does not have the same financialresources that other districts in the Conference enjoy. This is undoubtedlya factor which has contributed to the Districts relative standing in the areaof salaries within the Conference. Arbitrator Neil Gundermann, TaylorSchool District, Dec. No. 22927-A, 4/4/86.


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4. Arbitrator concludes that information regarding economic conditions areslightly below average when compared to economic conditions in counties

in agreeable comparable grouping and concludes that economic conditionsmerit only some consideration, but not determinative consideration, underthe greater weight factor. Arbitrator considers dramatic increase inhealth insurance premiums and notes that rise in premiums is so great thatit overshadows the impact of the proposed wage increases. ArbitratorJune Weisberger, Forest County (Courthouse Employees Association),Dec. No. 58796, 10/28/01.

III. EVIDENCE ON LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS MUST BE PUT INTO

EVIDENCE. WHAT IS AVAILABLE TO PROVE LOCAL ECONOMIC

CONDITIONS FOR A MUNICIPALITY?

A. Overall economy.

1. Report of economic conditions and economic forecast.

2. Welfare statistics - growth or % of claims.

3. County census statistics.

4. Consumer Price Index.

5. Farm commodities.

B. Local income picture.

1. Chamber materials on local business.

2. Real estate sales and new home construction.

3. Percent of industry and residential and farm property vs. business propertyin the area.

4. Growth in sales industry and new stores opening.

5. Volume of sales from local sales industry - counties with .5% sales taxhave statistics on amount of sales in county and income generated.

C. Employment picture.

1. Employment statistics.


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2. Private sector settlements from local businesses.

D. Property values.

1. Increases/decreases in equalized valuation.

2. Number of home foreclosures and defaults on loans.

3. Tax delinquencies and increase in amount of delinquencies.

E. Local businesses.

1. Business growth in communities.

2. Business closings and businesses leaving the area.

3. Layoffs in local business from UC office or newspapers.

4. Business closings - state would have statistics on this.

5. Stock and market success of businesses located in communities.

IV. USING THE GREATEST WEIGHT CRITERIA.

A. Arbitrators have been reluctant to apply the greatest weight criteria to limit orcontrol the arbitrators review of final offers to that single issue. Arbitrators havesuggested that the greatest weight criteria is a form of an ability to paystandard which requires the arbitrator to consider the impact of laws which restricta local government units finances. Arbitrators have also held that all factorsmust be considered in every case, thus the greatest weight factor does not havean absolute veto over lesser factors without regard to the evidence supportingthose lesser factors.

B. Arbitrator decisions applying the greatest weight factor.

1. There have been very few decisions that have turned directly on thegreatest weight factor. In many cases, the arbitrator has held that theemployer has not provided sufficient data to support a finding that thegreatest weight factor affects the outcome of the decision.


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2. Arbitrators have held:

For the greatest weight factor to become operable, the limits

must be specifically shown by the affected government unit. Torely merely on representations, without any evidence of the limitand the affect that cost of the offers, would have on the limit wouldrequire the arbitrator to do nothing more than guess. . . .Arbitrator Kessler, Marathon County (Courthouse),Dec. No. 29513-A (8/99).

3. Arbitrators have tried to create additional standards under the greatestweight criteria, such as:

This arbitrator believes greatest weight factor as related to

revenue limitations was meant to have the arbitrator, in individualcases and in appropriate circumstances, take into the account thefinancial and budgetary influence, impact, and pressures that cometo bear under legislative revenue limitations. Arbitrator Vernon,Tomahawk School District, Dec. No. 30024-A (2001).

4. Arbitrators have also struggled with what type of data is necessary tosupport the greatest weight factor:

The statistics presented by both parties regarding the districts fiscalplight are numbing. There is not end of data from which both parties can

argue the merits of their assertions that the State imposed revenue capsand resultant budgetary constraints support selection of their final offer.When pouring over the seemingly endless financial measuring sticks ofthe districts financial help, one can easily understand the frustration thatparents, students, taxpayers, employees, and board members mustexperience in attempting to sort it all out when trying to decide what is theright course to take regarding any particular issue that impacts the districtfinancially

But, I also believe that an employers final offer does not automaticallycarry the day if it can be shown that adoption of the unions offer would

exasperate an already difficult fiscal and budgetary situation brought on bythe State imposed expenditure limitations and revenue controls. It is butonly one factor to be considered among the many legislatively establishedcriteria to be utilized by arbitrators when deciding which final offer toselect that seems clear from the legislative directive to arbitrators thatthey must give an accounting of his/her/their consideration of this factor incoming to a decision as to which parties final offer to select. Arbitrator


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Yaeger, Whitewater School District (Support Staff), Dec. No. 30741-A(9/04).

V. DECISIONS APPLYING THE GREATER WEIGHT FACTOR.

A. Two circumstances seem to arise where local economic conditions will likely beconsidered:

1. Where the economic circumstances of the employer can be shown to besubstantially different than its comparables.

2. Where none of the primary comparables are settled and the low offercomes closest to the settlements reached in an expanded comparablegroup.

B. Arbitrators have struggled with the presentation and value of data on localeconomic conditions, such as:

This Mediator/Arbitrator would add as he has previously stated thateconomic data is diminished in value to some degree unless the Employercan show some specific adverse impact on the community. There is alsogood reason to be cautious of economic data when summarized innewspaper or magazine reports. Such data is often a broad and oversimplified assessment of larger macro-economic tendencies. ArbitratorVernon, Kimberly Area School District, Dec. No. 29882 (4/83).

C. Arbitrators have also struggled with how you apply the greater weight factor, suchas:

This factor is tied in with the traditional factors and does not stand aloneas does the greatest weight factor, which must be considered separatelyand given weight above all else. The greater weight factor should beconsidered along with the other factors but is given greater weight. Thetype of data necessary to provide an informed opinion might includeemployment and household incomes, the ranking of the community amongother similar communities, and the relative quality of life information.

Arbitrator Schiavoni, Columbia County (Highway), Dec. No. 28983-A(9/97).

D. Some unions have used the greater weight criteria to support their final offershowing that the employer is in good economic conditions or good economicclimate. Some arbitrators have rejected this theory:


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The Associations argument is based on the assumption that if theeconomic conditions are good, this favors the more expensive of theoffers. This logic is flawed. Good economic conditions means that the

financial situation is such that a more costly offer may be accepted, that itwill not be automatically excluded because the economy cannot afford it.While bad economic conditions would foreclose consideration of anexpensive benefit, good economic conditions allows the analysis tocontinue. Arbitrator Engmann, North Central VTAE District (Teachers),Dec. No. 29303-B (9/98).

VI. NEGOTIATING OVER HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS.

A. Cost sharing.

1. Flat dollar amount employer/employee contribution.

a. Actual premium stated in contract.

b. Stated amount above or below premium.

2. Percentage contribution.

Often employers support premium payment shifting proposals as intendedto control health care costs. At least one arbitrator has expressly rejectedthe argument reasoning that other factors are primarily responsible for the

increase in health care costs. School District of Random Lake, Dec. No.26390-A, Stern, (10/90).

3. Increase over X%.

a. Reopener/side letter.

b. Trigger cost sharing.

4. Reduction of salary schedule to finance payment of premium increases.

5. Section 125 Plans.

B. Cost containment.

1. Deductibles.

a. Up front.


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b. Major medical.

c. Prescription drug.

2. Coverages.

a. Prescription drug.

b. Psychiatric -- 30-day mandate.

c. Experimental treatment.

3. Change of carrier/self-funding.

Unions lack of a proposal to provide the District with the flexibility tochange insurance carriers, while the employer pays 100% of thepremiums, is unreasonable. Beecher Dunbar Pembine S.D.,Dec. No. 26421-A, Malamud (1/91).

4. Cost containment options.

a. Comprehensive (co-pay) plan.

b. Routine preventive procedures -- cost sharing.

c. Pre-existing conditions clause.

d. Preadmission review/certification.

e. Second opinions.

f. Outpatient procedure/surgery.

g. Short-stay maternity.

h. Weekday admission.


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5. Arbitration decisions.

a. Cost Containment.

Cost containment achieved by saving $40/month premium cost bychanging to WPS Care Share program. Green County (SheriffsDept.), Dec. No. 26605-A, Kerkman (4/91).

5% employee contribution legitimate based on Districts desire toachieve some form of health insurance cost containment anduniform policy among internals. Ladysmith S.D. (NonprofessionalStaff), Dec. No. 26897-A, Yaffe (11/91).

Structuring a cost sharing scheme which recognizes out-of-pocket

expenses heightens awareness as to the magnitude of the healthinsurance problem and its importance in negotiations. Kiel AreaS.D., Dec. No. 26549, Vernon (1/91).

Implementation of managed health care plan, small employeecontribution and increased deductible for drugs justified --supported by internals and generally adopted elsewhere. City ofJanesville, Dec. No. 26965-A, Stern (12/91).

b. Qualitative Differences Between Plans.

An employees compensation is best measured by what he/shereceives, not by what the employer pays. Smaller level ofemployer contribution does not make the Unions case withoutevidence regarding qualitative differences between plans. DaneCounty (Sheriffs Dept.), Dec. No. 44775, Richard Tyson (1/92).

C. Criteria for change.

1. Arbitrator Criteria, as summarized by Arbitrator Gil Vernon in ElkhartLake-Glenbeulah S.D., Dec. No. 26491-A (1990):

Standard 1 -- Demonstrated need for the change.

Standard 2 -- Degree to which the proposal reasonably addresses theneed.

Standard 3 -- Support among the comparables.

Standard 4 -- Nature of the quid pro quo.


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2. Adequate Quid Pro Quo.

6% wage offer not adequate quid pro quo in catch-up situation. City ofViroqua (Police Dept.), Dec. No. 26974-A, Zeidler (2/92).

1% higher wage offer for unit than wages to unorganized employeesconsidered adequate quid pro quo. Village of West Salem (Police Dept.),Dec. No. 26975-A, David Johnson (2/92)

Superior wage increase made up for potential loss of earnings incurred bypaying cost of increased deductible. Green County (Sheriffs Dept.),Dec. No. 26605-A, Kerkman (4/91)

The quid - employees pay 5% of health insurance premiums. Thequo - employer offered $175 per employee per year more than the unionand it included improvements overall to the salary schedule. Arbitratoragreed with the union that this was lacking and rendered the employersproposal unreasonable. However, he found that the unions intransigencein making any movement on health insurance was unjustified and on thebalance more unreasonable than the employers proposal. Kiel AreaSchool District, supra.

3. Need For Quid Pro Quo.

Where change is de minimis and party requesting change has met burdenof proof, a trade-off is not always necessary. Brown County (MentalHealth Center), Dec. No. 45310, Rose Marie Baron (12/91)

Quid pro quo not mandatory where employer proposed changing dollaramount for health insurance (previously at 100%) to amount that wouldresult in a less than 100% payment. Albany School District, No Dec. No.,Martin Wagner (1/91)

4. Failure to Demonstrate Need for the Change.

In a case pitting a union proposal to substitute 100% payment of premiumsfor dollar caps, against an employer proposal to limit employer premiumpayments for traditional health insurance coverage to 105% of the highestHMO premiums, the arbitrator found that neither party demonstrated aneed to change the status quo. The arbitrator introduced an additionalconsideration: proof that the party had attempted to make its change overa long period of time, only to be frustrated by the other partysintransigence. He selected the employers proposal, noting it preserved


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control of its health insurance cost increases, a policy accomplished by theprior contract language, albeit much more modestly. City of St. FrancisPolice Department, Dec. No. 26577-A, Edward Krinsky, (5/91).

5. Demonstration of Need for the Change.

Arbitrator Vernon found that the employer established its need for healthinsurance modifications with evidence that the premiums increased 76%in two years and 222% in five years, taking the district from the leastexpensive premiums to the second most expensive among thecomparables. Kiel Area School District, supra.

D. Comparables on insurance issues.

1. Other internal units.

Uniformity of contributions among internal units. Menomonee Falls S.D.,Dec. No. 26916-A, Anderson (12/91); City of Rice Lake (Elec. Utility),Dec. No. 26888-A, Krinsky (11/91); City of Rice Lake (Police),Dec. No. 26836-A, Gundermann (10/91); Marshfield Electric & WaterUtility, Dec. No. 43598, Krinsky (8/91).

2. Other external units.

3. Other area public sector employees.

VII. PERMISSIVE AND MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING.

A. A mandatory subject of bargaining is distinguished from a permissive subject ofbargaining if the topic primarily or fundamentally relates to wages, hours andconditions of employment, which is known as the primary relation test. [Cityof Brookfield, 11489-B, 11500-B, 2/27/79, Wisconsin Supreme Court]

B. The applicable standard for determining whether a particular decision is amandatory subject of collective bargaining is the primary relationship standard.The question is whether a particular decision is primarily related to the wages,

hours and conditions of employment of the employees, or whether it is primarilyrelated to the formulation or management of public policy. Where thegovernmental or policy dimensions of a decision predominate, the matter isproperly reserved to decision by the representatives of the people. The test canonly be applied on a case-by-case basis, and is not susceptible to broad andsweeping rules that apply across the board to all situations. [Racine UnifiedSchool District, 12055-B, 11/30/77, Wisconsin Supreme Court]


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C. Implicit in a finding that a subject is a nonmandatory or permissive subject ofbargaining is the conclusion that the employer may act without obtaining the prioragreement of the union. To hold otherwise would be to reduce the distinction

between mandatory and permissive subjects to a nullity. This is not to say that anemployer may take unilateral action which has an impact violative of an existingcollective bargaining agreement. [Racine Unified School District, 13696-C,13876-B, 4/4/78, Fleischli]

D. A holding that, by once agreeing to a proposal which is a permissive subject ofbargaining the employer forever waives its right to contend that the subject ispermissive, would deter collective bargaining settlements. An employer would bereluctant to agree upon a permissive subject under such a rule. It is moreconsistent with the purposes of MERA to encourage employers to consideragreeing on permissive subjects where doing so would be helpful in settling a

labor dispute. Accordingly, the employer was not barred from arguing thatcertain disputed items were permissive subjects of bargaining even though itpreviously had incorporated said subjects into collective bargaining agreements.[City of Wauwatosa, 15917, 11/9/77, WERC]

E. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has interpreted s. 111.70(1)(d) as setting forth aprimary related standard. The standard requires the WERC in the first instanceand a court on review thereafter to determine whether proposals are primarilyrelated to wages, hours and conditions of employment, to educational policy andschool management and operation, to management and direction of the schoolsystem or to formulation or management of public policy. The court has

construed primarily to mean fundamentally, basically, or essentially.This primarily related standard is a balancing test which recognizes that themunicipal employer, the employees, and the public have significant interests atstake and that their competing interests should be weighed to determine whether aproposed subject for bargaining should be characterized as mandatory. If theemployees legitimate interest in wages, hours and conditions of employmentoutweighs the employers concerns about the restriction of managementprerogatives or public policy, the proposal is a mandatory subject of bargaining.In contrast, where the management and direction of the school, system orformulation of public policy predominates, the matter is not a mandatory subjectof bargaining. In such cases, the professional association may be heard at the

bargaining table if the parties agree to bargain or may be heard along with otherconcerned groups and individuals in the public forum. [West Bend Joint SchoolDistrict (sub nom. West Bend Education Association v. WERC), 18512, 11/13/84,Wisconsin Supreme Court)

F. The WERC in declaratory ruling proceedings under s. 111.70(4)(b) and s.111.70(4)(cm)6.g., Wis. Stats., is required to decide whether a proposal made innegotiations by either party is a mandatory, permissive or prohibited subject of


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bargaining. When making that determination, the Commission looks to thelanguage of the proposal itself. If the proposal is ambiguous and may beconstrued to primarily relate to the formulation or management of public policy, it

will be found to be permissive even if the proponent of the proposal asserts thatno such permissive interpretation was intended. [Nicolet High School District,19386, 1/12/82, WERC, Slavney concurred in ruling]


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Arbitrators have recognized the importance of maintaining an internal settlement pattern

among bargaining units negotiating with a single employer, especially when dealing with

fringe benefits like health insurance.

Arbitrator Kessler in Columbia County Health Care, Dec. No. 28960-A (8/97) noted:

A revision in a fringe benefit that has been agreed to by a substantial majority ofthe bargaining units in a county or municipality should not be ignored in theremaining units just because a minority of the bargaining units or a singlebargaining unit, will not accept it. Good public policy does not permitgovernment to be whipsawed by the multiple bargaining units over a single itemwhich the great majority of the units have accepted. When that occurs, impositionof the disputed item may be appropriate even without quid pro quo. Particularlyin the administration of health insurance benefits, a government should be treating

all of its employees the same.

Arbitrator Stern, in City of Oshkosh, Decision No. 15258-A (4/77), dealing with that cityspolice unit and the Citys proposal for a uniform contribution toward health insurance wrote:

Where an employer has persuaded the other groups of employees with which itbargains to adopt a uniform contribution toward health insurance, a finalremaining group should not be able to use the power of the Arbitrator to achieve aresult in bargaining that differs from that achieved by other groups unless there isa good reason for such a different.

That view was also recognized by Arbitrator Friess in Pierce County Sheriffs, Decision No.28187-A, (4/95), where he wrote:

I think the County has an extremely strong (perhaps classic) case for the arbitratorto place controlling weight on the internal settlement pattern. The fact that fourout of the six organized units settled (and 5 of 7 county employee groups) withthe exact same offer as being put forth here to this unit is extremely important.Given that the other hold out unit is represented by the same union is also animportant factor. The negative impact on the future bargaining environment of anarbitration award that goes against voluntary settlement pattern cannot be overstressed.

Arbitrator Raymond McAlpin held in City of Oshkosh, Dec. No. 28284 & 28285 (11/2/97):

This Arbitrator has found in other interest arbitrations that where there areseparate bargaining units, those bargaining units do have the right to bargain forterms and conditions which would take into account their unique status anddifferent job duties and responsibilities. This is particularly true when comparingpolice and fire units with other City employees. However, in the area of health

APPENDIX A


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insurance, with the significant costs demonstrated and with the burdens of healthcare falling upon employer and employee, it seems to this Arbitrator that it isappropriate for the Employer to seek out consistency among its represented

employees and indeed all of its employees. Therefore, the internal comparablesare an important consideration, and they do favor the Employer.

In Green County (Highway), Dec. No. 26979-A (03/92), Arbitrator Zel Rice wrote:

The internal comparables are a very important consideration for an arbitrator toconsider in matters such as this. Wage increases should be quite similar for all ofan Employers bargaining units in the absence of some unusual circumstance.Uniform fringe benefits for all bargaining units are equally important in theabsence of some unique circumstances. The Employers agreements with all ofits other bargaining units include the new insurance plan with the same

deductibles that the Employer has agreed on with the Union. All of the otherbargaining units have agreed to contribute 10 percent of the health insurancepremium. Each of them has received a wage increase of 4.25 percent the firstyear of the agreement and 6 percent the second year of the agreement as a quidpro quo for accepting the new insurance plan with deductibles. The evidencediscloses no unique circumstance that would justify departing from that pattern ofwage increases and contributions towards the health insurance premium.

Arbitrator James Stern held in Wisconsin Rapids Water & Electric, Dec. No. 46223 (11/92):

The arbitrator agrees that internal comparables are usually given more weight

than external comparables when evaluating arguments about health insurancebenefits, deductibles and sharing of the premium. As the Employer points out inits reply brief, this arbitrator has given great weight to the internal comparables inhis decisions in the Kenosha Unified School District Decision No. 26768-A(8/6/91) and the City of Janesville police Decision No. 269656-A (12/91).

Arbitrator Stern also wrote in City of Janesville, Dec. No. 26965-A (12/91):

This arbitrator has the impression that most arbitrators, when faced with thischoice of relying primarily on internal rather than external comparables indetermining which position on fringe benefits is correct, have chose to rely on

internal comparisons. In the situation where the last group to settle has held out inorder to avoid a contractual change or settlement pattern agreed to by all othergroups in a particular city, arbitrators have been reluctant to issue arbitrationawards which break negotiated patterns.


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As stated by Arbitrator Sherwood Malamud in Marinette County (Sheriffs Department),Dec. No. 22910-A, (4/86):

The internal comparability factor, the settlements achieved by one employer withthe remainder of its employees, is a factor frequently considered under this catch-all criterion. Whether this factor is considered under this criterion or under thecomparability criterion, it is always given great weight. The Associationcomplains that it had no input into the settlements reached between this Employerand its other bargaining units. The imposition of such settlements upon thisbargaining unit, the Association argues, will only serve to frustrate the collectivebargaining process.

The Association ignores the reason for arbitral recognition of other internalsettlements where those settlements establish a pattern of agreement. Where an

employer and the representatives of its various collective bargaining units reachagreement at the same percentage increase and fringe benefit package, suchpattern of settlement reflects the collective decision of many individuals. . . .

An award which runs contrary to that pattern, can and most often is mostdestructive to the collective bargaining process. An interest award which iscontrary to a pattern of settlement, would only prevent the achievement of anyconsensus on what is an appropriate pattern of settlement. No employee groupwill want to settle first, at the risk of finding that it has settled too low. TheEmployer may be reluctant to put forward its best offer, out of fear that an interestaward will only increase its best offer, and thereby force the Employer to accept a

more expensive pattern of settlement.

There are circumstances, even in the fact of a pattern of agreement, whereby acollective bargaining unit may persuade a neutral to break the pattern.However, it is necessary for the unit advocating a break in the pattern, todemonstrate by convincing evidence that there is some factor, need orconsideration which is unique to that unit which is so compelling that it justifiesthe breaking of the pattern.

In Sauk County (Highway Department), Dec. No. 26359-B (11/90), Arbitrator Gil Vernon statedin this regard:

The other factor that got substantial attention was the internal comparisons.Certainly, when one employer bargains with several different unions, equityconcerns arise about treating these different groups fairly relative to each other.For this reason, arbitrators give weight to internal comparisons. . . .


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In Marinette County (Social Services), Dec. No. 22574-A (9/85), Arbitrator Jay Grenig similarlystated:

In addition, arbitrators have given great weight to settlements between anemployer and its other bargaining units. See Brown County, Dec. No. 20455-B(Michelstetter, 1983); Manitowoc County, Dec. No. 19942-B (Weisberger, 1983);Milwaukee County, Dec. No. 20562-B (Fleischli, 1983); City of Brookfield, Dec.No. 19573-B (Rice, 1982); City of Oconto, Dec. No. 19800-B (Monfils, 1982).

The frustration of a unions being locked into an established pattern of settlementis understandable, but, in the absence of compelling circumstances, latesettlements above a pattern established earlier penalize employees involved involuntary negotiations. This is destructive of the collective bargaining system anddiscourages voluntary settlements:

In Dane County (Sheriffs Dept.), Dec. No. 25576-B (2/89), Arbitrator Daniel Nielsen addressedthe issue of the importance of adhering to internal patterns of settlements. He stated:

The policy favoring adherence to established patterns of settlement is rooted indeclared public policy of encouraging voluntary settlement through theprocedures of collective bargaining. Failure to honor an existing pattern willundercut voluntary collective bargaining, since it tells other units that they shouldhave taken their chances in arbitration, rather than settling on terms that, whileless than ideal, were consistent with other internal settlements. Moreover, the useof arbitration to secure superior benefits or conditions of employment will

inevitably have an adverse effect on the morale of other workers. Placing asideconsiderations of how an inconsistent result in this case might affect otherworkers, the internal pattern should be favored since it is more likely torealistically reflect the outcome of successful negotiations. In most cases, anemployer which has adopted a firm position in favor of uniformity will notabandon that position for the sake of settlement with one hold-out unit.


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Arbitration Decisions on Health Insurance Changes

Kenosha County (Correction Officers), Dec. No. 30797-A, (Weisberger):

As for the important changes in health insurance proposed by the County, its final

offer is designed to bring this units health insurance in line with those of theCountys other bargaining units and is intended to address the national issue ofrapidly rising health care costs which are adversely affecting private and publicsector employers and employees alike. In an effort to reduce somewhat theimpact of escalating health insurance increases on the Countys budget, theCounty has proposed that this bargaining unit change to the health and dentalinsurance plan in Local 990s current collective bargaining agreement coveringProfessionals (Social Workers). As a quid pro quo, the County has committeditself to a 3.5% increase in wages at the end of this contract, 12/31/04, as well asan additions 48 hour payment to each bargaining unit member prior to 12/31/04.It should be noted that this proposed plan, like the current plan covering this

bargaining unit, does not require any direct employee contribution to health carepremiums. When it is in effect, the new plan establishes or increases employeeco-pays for hospital use, physician office visits, and prescription drugs.According to County testimony and exhibits, the new plan still provides agenerous overall benefit package when compared with benefit packages of anumber of Wisconsin counties and has been voluntarily adopted by the Countysother bargaining units. In this era of rapidly escalating health care costs which isproducing a spreading crises throughout our nation, it is not unreasonable toexpect that all County employees, including members of this bargaining unit,absorb some of the increases for their health care, It is also not unreasonable thatthe County wishes its employees be covered by a health plan that promotes

turning patients into knowledgeable and cost-conscious consumers of health careservices. Whether this consumerism approach will become a significant key tocontrolling future health care costs is yet to be determined by steps taken in thisdirection hold out some promise.

Accordingly, based primarily upon the pattern already established within theCounty for health care plans for its other bargaining units, if health care were theonly unresolved issue between the parties, the Arbitrator believes the Countysfinal offer is more reasonable. In light of rapidly rising costs for health careservices and prescription drugs, the Countys effort to enlist assistance from all itsemployees to help control this large - and rapidly escalating County budget itemis a common route now taken by many public as well as private sector employerswho continue to provide the bulk of funding for these key job benefits,. (Giventhe costs involved, it is no longer appropriate to consider this benefit a fringebenefit.) Given the very high cost of health care, particularly in SoutheasternWisconsin, the County would be remiss if it failed to explore seriously ways tocontain at least some of its rapidly rising health care expenditures.

APPENDIX B


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City of Marshfield (Clerical/Technical), Dec. No. 30726-A, (Yaeger):

Unlike the Union activity proposal, the issue that is determinative of which finaloffer is selected turns on the sufficiency of the quid pro quo for the insurance planchanges. Arbitrator Torosian discussed the question of what constitutes a

sufficient quid pro quo in Oconto Unified School District, Dec. No. 30295-A(10/02):

. . . There is no set answer as to what constitutes a sufficient quid pro quo.It is, in the opinion of the arbitrator, directly related, inversely, to the needfor the change. Thus, the quid pro quo need not be of equivalent value orgenerate an equivalent cost savings as the change sought. Generally,greater the need, lesser the quid pro quo.

Other arbitrators have also addressed the issue of the sufficiency of the quid proquo being offered for proposed changes in the health insurance plan provided for

in the parties collective bargaining agreement. These arbitrators have engaged inan analysis of the adequacy and reasonableness of the proffered quid pro quo andnot surprisingly have found it to be adequate and reasonable in one circumstanceand yet not so in another. Their conclusions are clearly based upon the uniquefacts of each case and thus no general rule regarding what constitutes a sufficientquid pro quo has emerged. Thus, the analysis in this case will necessarily bedriven by the unique circumstances surrounding this bargain.

The Union has argued that the Citys methodology used in calculating the valueof its proposed wage adjustment and PEHP plan quid pro quo is flawed. Whileclearly other methodologies could have been employed by the City in deriving its

quid pro quo for the insurance plan changes it proposed, and the undersignedagrees there are flaws in the methodology utilized, bottom line four of six otherCity bargaining units voluntarily accept the Citys proposal based upon theutilization of same methodology. (3) (footnote omitted) Additionally, the Citysfinal offer was selected by Arbitrator Dichter in the DPW bargaining unitarbitration involving this same Union. The undersigned believes that internalcomparability in matters of a fringe benefit as significant as health insuranceshould, aside from the greatest weight and greater weight factors, receiveparamount consideration.


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Unified Community Services of Grant & Iowa Counties (Professional and Nonprofessionals),Dec. No. 30621-A, (Petrie):

(1) The dramatic, ongoing, and frequently double digit escalation in the costof public and private health care costs is far exceeding both the rate of inflation

and/or what might reasonably have been anticipated by the parties when they hadoriginally negotiated employer payment of the full cost of individual and/orfamily health insurance premiums. Accordingly the situation represents asignificant and continuing mutual problem, and it clearly meets the first of thereferenced status quo prerequisites.

(2) It is next noted that one of the various possible approaches to theescalating costs of employee health insurance is the adoption of a reasonable levelof employee contribution to health insurance premiums, the only approach to theunderlying problem before the undersigned in these proceedings.44 In thisconnection it is also noted that seven of the twelve intraindustry comparables have

higher percentages of employee contribution to health care costs than proposed bythe Employer, with Adams, Columbia, Green and Sauk Counties having 90%employer premium contributions for both single and family coverage, and withGrant, LaFayette and Vernon Counties having 85%, 90% and 80% employerpremium contributions, respectively, for family coverage. On these bases, theundersigned has concluded that the Employer proposed expanded application of a5% employee contribution toward health insurance premiums reasonablyaddresses the underlying problem, and it thus meets the second of the referencedstatus quo prerequisites.

(3) In next addressing the quid pro quo requirement, it is noted that the

District is not proposing the elimination or major modification of a recentlynegotiated and/or stable benefit. The Employer is quite correct in noting thatvarious Wisconsin interest arbitrators, including the undersigned, have recognizedescalating health insurance costs as an ongoing, continuing and mutual problem,have distinguished proposed changes in this area from other types of proposedstatus quo changes, and have required relatively little, if any, quid pro quos insupport of reasonable proposed changes to control these costs.

(a) In the case at hand no apparent quid pro quo has been advanced insupport of the Employer proposed change: there is no evidence that the modestagreed-upon changes in sick leave payouts for retirees, vacation benefits, andWRS contributions were related to the Employers health insurance proposal; andabsolutely no basis exists for crediting the Employers argument that wageincreases under the prior agreement had prospectively provided the Union with aquid pro quo in the case at hand.

44 It is inappropriate to attach any weight to the Unions argument that the Employers increasing cost of insurancepremium could have been significantly ameliorated by the contract negotiations between Grant County and LocalUnion 3377-A in 2003, covering another bargaining unit.


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(b) If the insurance premium payment dispute had been the onlyimpasse item before the undersigned in these proceedings, a persuasive argumentcould perhaps have been made that little or no quid pro quo was required tojustify selection of the Employers final offer. The Arbitrator is, however,required to select the final offer of either party, in toto, including the 2003 wage

increase proposals discussed above.

(c) On the above bases, a question remains as to whether theEmployer, under all of the circumstances of the case, has fully justified itsproposed change in the status quo ante.

Whitewater Unified School District, Dec. No. 30740-A, (Yaeger):

School Board and Unions are caught in the jaws of a vise -- the outrageouslyrapidly rising health insurance costs and the State imposed revenue caps. But, itis not only Wisconsin that is experiencing this continuing escalation of health

insurance premiums, it is a national phenomenon. As one who regularly readsportions of several large daily newspapers from around the country, I noted aweek has not gone by in the past year without an story about a companydiscontinuing health insurance coverage for its employees and/or retirees, therebyadding to the already staggering millions of Americans without health insurancecoverage. Many of the articles written about the escalating costs of healthinsurance attribute almost half of the cost to paying for prescription medicines.These events are forcing individuals in Wisconsin and around the country toreduce their standard of living in order to pay these ever rapidly rising premiumcosts and/or go without medical insurance. This crisis of rising health insurancecosts cannot be solved at the bargaining table. The most that can be achieved in

bargaining is the parties can strive to find balanced and reasonable strategies tocope with the crisis and soften its impact on them.

In Wisconsin, the situation is exacerbated by the outmoded means of financingpublic education that pits homeowners and their frustration with continualescalating property taxes against school districts struggling to provide a qualityeducation for their students under the burden of an ever increasing number oflegislative initiatives requiring that they do more with less. In the undersignedsopinion, the imposition of revenue caps is testament to the fact that the schooldistrict financing system in this state is broken. The wages and fringe benefits ofthe secretaries, cooks, custodians and clerical assistants in school districtsthroughout Wisconsin have not brought on this financing crisis. And, I am notoptimistic that the crisis will be resolved short of near collapse of our statespublic education system. In the mean time, local school boards and employeeUnions are pitted against each other in ever more difficult times. One trying tocontinue to provide a quality education to its students with evermore shrinkingrecourses and increasing mandates, and the other striving to prevent the erosion oftheir members wages and benefits and ultimately their standard of living. And,there are individuals like the undersigned increasingly thrust into the inevitable


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task of being arbiter of which is the most reasonable of unreasonable choices.While arbitrators nay have become adept wordsmiths in applying the statutorycriteria to explain a particular outcome, it can at times, nonetheless, be a dauntingand overwhelming task. The task is no less daunting for the parties.

2009 Ruder Ware, L.L.S.C. Accurate reproduction with acknowledgment granted. All rights reserved.This document provides information of a general nature regarding legislative or other legal developments. None of the information contained hereinis intended as legal advice or opinion relative to specific matters, facts, situations, or issues, and additional facts and information or future

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Volume 41 / Issue 6 September 25, 2009

Wisconsin School Employment and Labor Law

REVIEWDistrict wins support staff interest arbitration, achieves change in health insurancebenefit language

The parties in this case were unable to voluntarily reach a settlement for their 2006-2009contract term, and the Union petitioned for interest arbitration. The parties final offers were asfollows.

District

a) All items shall remain in the 2003-2006 Agreement between the Rice Lake AreaSchool District and Local 3286, Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,except as follows.

b) Revision of the first paragraph of ARTICLE 18 HEALTH INSURANCE,Section 18.01, to read as follows;

The Board agrees to pay 95% of the cost of the family coverage and 100% ofsingle coverage under the Districts standard medical/hospitalization insuranceprogram for eligible full-time employees.Effective July 1, 2008, the Boardagrees to pay up to $1,378.63 per month toward the cost of family coverage and

$483.73 per month toward the cost of single coverage under the Districtsstandard medical/hospitalization insurance plan.

c) Revision of APPENDIX A to provide as follows:

Revise all wage rates 3.0% effective July 1, 2006; an additional 3% effectiveJuly 1, 2007; and an additional 3.5% effective July 1, 2008.


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Union

All items shall remain in the 2003-2006 Agreement between the parties except asfollows:

1. APPENDIX A

Revise all wage rates 3% effective 7/1/06; an additional 3% effective 7/1/07; andan additional 3% effective 7/1/08.

As the District proposed a change to the status quo health insurance benefit andlanguage, the primary issue, according to the arbitrator, was whether the Districts finaloffer satisfied a quid pro quo analysis. The arbitrator summarized the application of thequid pro quo analysis as follows. When a party proposes to modify or eliminate apreviously negotiated right or benefit, the party must prove that (1) a significant andunanticipated problem exists; (2) the proposed change will reasonably correct or address

the problem; and, (3) the party has offered an appropriate quid pro quo for the proposedchange. However, according to the arbitrator, proposals that would modify the status quoto address or resolve a mutual problem, may require either none or substantially reducedquid pro quos, depending on individual case-by-case determinations. To further describethis aspect of the quid pro quo analysis, the arbitrator quoted from one of his earlierinterest arbitration decisions, when he stated:

Wisconsin interest arbitrators operate as extensions of the contract negotiationsprocess and they normally require the proponent of elimination or substantialchange in a previously negotiated policy or benefit to advance a quid pro quoequivalent to that which would have evolved in the give and take of conventional

bargaining. An exception to this requirement may exist where the costs or thesubstance of a long standing policy or benefit have substantially changed over anextended period of time, where they no longer reflect the conditions present whenthey were negotiated, and where the proposed change is directed towardcorrection of a mutual problem which was neither anticipated nor previouslybargained about by the parties.

With respect to this analysis, the Union argued that (a) the District did not provethat a significant and unanticipated problem exists because it had sufficient financialability to continue to provide the status quo health insurance benefit, and (b) even if thestatus quo health insurance benefit presented a problem, the Districts final offer did notinclude an adequate quid pro quo for the change. According to the Union, the Districtsproposed health insurance change would more negatively affect its unit members thanthe higher paid teachers and other units within the district.

In support of its final offer, the Union also argued that the health insurancebenefits of the external comparables justified the retention of the status quo benefits.


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Upon review, the arbitrator rejected the Unions arguments. First, the arbitratorheld that the need to change status quo benefits need not be based upon the Districtsability or inability to continue to pay for the increasingly expensive health insurancepremiums. Instead, the arbitrator recognized that the rapidly escalating costs ofemployee health insurance is a very significant problem, and stated that the Union was

not prevented from reasonably responding to the issue before the District became unableto pay for such premiums. In finding that the rising health insurance premium costsrepresented a significant problem, the arbitrator also held that the Districts final offerreasonably addressed the problem.

Second, the arbitrator actually chastised the Union for its argument that theDistricts proposed quid pro quo was not adequate. According to the arbitrator,

If the Union felt that the Employer proposed change in group health insurance hada disproportionate impact upon those in the bargaining unit, it might haveconsidered proposing a higher quid pro quo at the bargaining table, and its failure

to do so detracts from the persuasiveness of its current arguments. Instead,however, it apparently chose to resist any modification in the employee healthinsurance program and to actually propose a lower wage increase in the third yearof the agreement than proposed by the Employer!

In summary, the arbitrator concluded this section of his analysis by stating that therising health insurance premium costs created a significant and unanticipated problem,the Districts proposed changes addressed the problem, and the Districts proposed quidpro quo was clearly the more reasonable of the two proposed third year wage increasescontained in the final offers of the parties.

Finally, in addressing the Unions argument that the external comparablessupported its proposal to retain the status quo health insurance benefits, the arbitratorstated that, while external comparisons may be the more common or important arbitralcriterion in wage disputes, internal comparables are traditionally the more importantcriterion in health insurance disputes. Therefore, because a significant majority of theDistricts union-represented employees already agreed to the proposed health insurancechange, the arbitrator found that the Union arguments based upon external comparableshealth insurance benefits were simply less than persuasive.

The arbitrator found that the greatest and greater weight factors did notsignificantly weigh in favor of either partys final offer, and after considering all otherstatutory criterion, he held that the Districts final offer was more reasonable and selectedit for inclusion in the parties agreement.

Source:Rice Lake Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 66201 (Petrie, 2009).


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Volume 41 / Issue 8 November 13, 2009

Wisconsin School Employment and Labor Law

REVIEWAnother district successfully changes health insurance benefit though interest arbitration

As is so often the case recently, the parties to this interest arbitration were unable to reachagreement as to the District-provided health insurance benefits or as to the appropriate wageincreases in light of those health insurance benefits for the school years of 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. The parties final offers were as follows:

Union:

1. Increase wage rates by $.32 per hour in 2008-09 and by $.53 per hour in 2009-10

for aides, secretary, cooks and custodians.2. Increase wage rates by $.64 per route in 2008-09 and by $1.06 per route in 2009-10 for bus drivers.

3. Establish extra trip hourly rate for 2008-09 at $11.13 and $11.66 for 2009-10 forbus drivers.

4. Effective July 1, 2009, switch health insurance plans from WEA Trust Point ofService to WEA Trust Preferred.

District:

1. Increase hourly wage rates by $.75 per cell in 2008-09 and by $.50 per cell in

2009-10 for aides, secretary, cooks, custodians, and bus driver extra trips.2. Increase wage rates by $1.13 per route in 2008-09 and by $.75 per route in 2009-10 for bus drivers.

3. Effective July 1, 2009, switch health insurance plans from WEA Trust Point ofService to a similar Point of Service plan provided by Dean Health System.

With a difference of $61,974 in costs over the two-year agreement, the parties eachadvanced several arguments is support of its offer.


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Citing the fact that the District had a fund balance of 17% of its overall operating budget,received $245,000 in federal stimulus funds, passed the two-year $500,000 referendum, andreceived more revenue under the school finance laws than all but two districts in the comparablegroup, the Union argued that the District could meet the costs of its final offer and that theinterests and welfare of the public were better served by its smaller proposed wage increases,

especially in light of its proposed change to a less expensive health plan. According to the Union,the Districts [proposed wage] increase is not warranted because the support staff is already atthe high end of the comparability pool in salaries.

Finally, the Union concluded its arguments by highlighting perceived deficiencies inquality of service and benefits that would be provided under the Dean health plan proposed bythe District and by arguing that its proposed wage increase was justified by its proposal to switchto a less expensive WEA health plan in the second year.

The arbitrator began his analysis by addressing whether the statutory greatest andgreater weight criteria were applicable to this interest arbitration. According to the arbitrator:

None of the applicable language I have seen, however, expressly addresses thequestion of proceedings which are pending as of the date the changes go into effect, andas noted above, the parties dispute whether existing law favors retroactive application ofsuch changed provisions or not. An arbitrators reading of such a purely legal questionwould be entitled to no deference [by a reviewing court]. For purposes of clarity,however, I will apply an assumption that the cited changes were in effect, including withrespect to pending proceedings, as of publication of the budget bill, and apply the newlanguage accordingly.

Within this framework, the arbitrator next addressed the parties health insurance

proposals. The arbitrator noted the difference in cost between the health insurance proposals wasespecially significant because the aggregate cost of providing fringe benefits to these employeesactually exceeded the employees wages on a per-employee basis. Therefore, because theDistricts proposed plan was comparable as to quality, coverage and out-of pocket costs to theemployees, while being significantly less expensive to the District, the arbitrator favored theDistricts health insurance proposal.

In addressing the parties wage proposals, the arbitrator first noted that, although theDistrict received a boost by the stimulus funds and passed referendum, there was no guaranteethat those sources of revenue were anything but one-time benefits to the District. With theunrelenting upward march of the health insurance costs and highly adequate wages theDistricts offer would continue to provide unit members, the arbitrator concluded that theAssociations expectation that wages should be further augmented [under its proposal] becauseof its modest move toward a slightly less expensive health insurance plan, under all of thesecircumstances, is not reasonable.

In concluding his statutory analysis, the arbitrator found that the economic savingsproduced by switching health insurance carriers under the Districts final offer made it preferredunder the interests and welfare of the public criteria. As to the external comparables criteria,


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the arbitrator held that, although the Districts existing health insurance benefit was not the mostcostly, its financial adversity, comparable proposed health insurance plan and large wage quidpro quo were more favorable under this criterion, and the overall compensation criterion,especially in light of the Unions unjustified wage proposal.

Finally, the arbitrator found that, while the changes during the pendency of theproceedings factor favored the Union, those changes were not enough to make a difference.Because the District suffered severe financial conditions on an ongoing basis, yet offered a lessexpensive, comparable health insurance benefit while also providing a generous wage quid proquo, the arbitrator held that the Districts final offer was more reasonable under the statutorycriteria.

Source:Iowa-Grant Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 32684-A (2009) (Honeyman, Arb.)

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