overview airtraffic 1

7/31/2019 Overview Airtraffic 1

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Overview

On August 3, 1981, after 8 months of labor contract negotiation with FAA

failed to yield satisfactory terms, more than 12000 Air traffic controllers

represented by PATCO went on strike. Immedately Regan government declared

strike illeagal and ordered striking air traffic controllers to return to work with 48

hours or to be fired. Despite presidents order and courts injunction against using

any PATCO benefit fund for stke benefits, 12000 controllers chose to continue on

strike and were fired as a result.

In the first few weeks of strike, although FAA had implemented contingency

plans with supervisors and nonstriking personnel, supplemented by 370

controllers supplied by military, the air traffic were still reduced within 75% normal

level. The impact of strike were felt immediately by airline industry which saw

loss of $35 million a day. Total airline layoffs reached 1000 in 3 weeks and some

small airlines began to cease operation because of restrictions on flight. Cargo

carriers were concerned with cargo piling up. Hotel and motel industry estimated

their loss to be %10 to 15 million a day. The ripple effect on national economy

were anybodys guess. The los Angeles Times estimated the cost of strike

between one and six billion if it were to last more than 60 days. The Wall Street

Journal predicted that capacity and competition in airline industry would be

reduced and cost to the customer would be increased.

On political front, while there were some criticism of governments

inconsistency in handling the labor affair, many have pondered over the broader

implications of the actions by PATCO and the Federal Government. Public poll


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showed strong support for the Presidents decision, with 57% approval vs 30%

disapproval. Meanwhile, 63% people felt that the controllers must have had a

legitimate reason for sacrificing their jobs and 58% agreed that controllers

worked under undue stress.

FAAs task of rebuilding the system proved to be a difficult one. Under the

pressure to fill 5500 jobs within a year, the recruitment and training of new

controllers run into many problems. In the mean time, dismissed traffic controller

found it difficult to get a new job, not to mention the comparable pay or benifits.

Weeks after strike, FLRA decertified PATCO. In January 1982, President of

PATCO Rober Poli Resigned. It paved way for the FAA to negotiate with new

labor organization of air traffic controllers.

Problem Identification

During the strike, what grabed the headline were unions demands for

$10,000 across the borad pay raise, 32 hours work week and better retirement

packages. However, the fundamental issues were not just economic ones.

Newsweek noted that "controllers concede that their chief complaint is not money

but hours, working conditions, and a lack of recognition for the pressures they

face.[2]"

The final clash between PATCO, union for the air traffic controllers, and FAA

had brewed for more than a decade. Since 1968, the year it was formed, PATCO

had confronted FAA with various job actions: a two-day sick out in June of

1969; a three-day sick out in 1970; and a four-day slown donw in 1978. The FAA


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countered with firing of union leaders and a federal court issued order banning

PATCO from striking again.Although there confrontations did not resulted in theresolution of air traffic controllers main issues, i.e., inadequate equipments and

understaffing, PATCO had since become bigger and gained more influence.

While the way FAA dealt with these job actions and the demand of air traffic

controllers was a factor leading to final show down in 1981, the development of

legal environment throughout the period exerted its own forces. In addition,

political decisions from both union and goverment play a key role both before and

during the strike. But lets first examine the fundamental issues facing the air

traffic controllers and PATCO as a union of air traffic controllers.

The Pressures of PATCO

The need to have a voice in things affecting their life made PATCO

membership and job actions the choices of the air traffic controllers. The jobs of

air traffic controllers are extremely stressful due to their safety responsibility and

long working hours. However, there was lack of recognition for the pressure they

face and personal life they sacrifice. Adding to the grievance was the

authoritarian management style in the workplace. Thus, the air traffic controllers

felt a strong need to voice their complaints. With all the past job actions not

heeded and a renewed negotiation with FAA came to no fruition, it is not too

surprising that 95% controllers voted for a strike.

On the other side of the table, FAA as employer of air traffic controllers did

not seem to have done enough to alleviate the problem. They downplayed the


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stress associated with the job. They tended to view air traffic controllerss

complaints of working condition as PATCOs bargaining tactics for economic

benefit. Even when Dr. Robert Rose, professor of Boston University, turned his

research findings to FAA chief Loghorne Bond and suggested FAA to improve its

labor relations, Mr. Bond did not seem to be interested.

Peer pressure was also a factor contributing the strike. Air traffic controllers

were young, strong and sociable. The nature of their work has given them

opportunities to socialize among themself. In such a self-contained group, it was

not difficult for PATCO to recruit memebers and pressure them to support the job

actions.

The change in leadership of PATCO in 1980 was perhaps main driver to the

strike. Replacing John Laymen as PATCO president, Rober Poli had different

philosophy in managing union affair. In Polis own word, he was more militant

than his predecessor. His militant approach was evidenced by his ruling out of all

future slow downs and establishment of strike force to help organize and lead the

union[2]. He even went on saying, The only illegal strike is an unsuccessful

one., despite the fact that federal law prohibit strikes by public service

employees.

Public unions grew rapidly in 1960s and 1970s. By 1980, 43.4% of public

employees were unionized. Although PATCO was among the most influential

public unions, during the strike there were no strong actions from other unions to

show the support. One reason was simply that other unions feared of being


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charged with violation of law. Another was the lack of solidarity within labor union

leaders.

External Forces

To understand the course of actions taken by PATCO and how it ended up

with an unsuccessful strike, we also need to look at external forces at work. First

of all, PATCO must work within the legal framework governing public employees

union Unlike employees in private sector, government employees are not

protected by National Labor Relation Act. This had put air traffic controllers in

vulnerable position when it came to conflict with FAA. Even the Federal Labor

Relations Act enacted in 1979, which aimed to give public union some collective

bargaining power, prohibited public employees from bargaining over job related

issues. As such, when facing labor dispute, it was logical for air traffic controllers

to turn to PATCO and support the job actions.

This same legal framework gave FAA a strong hand in dealing with PATCO.

While it is debatable whether FAA was unfaithful in negotiating with PATCO, the

fact that FAA had had an "incredibly detailed" legal strategy to deal with a

possible strike undermines FAA's credibility. This point can be further illustrated

by the ruling of Distric Court in Denver on crimnal indictments against local

PATCO leaders. As the judge concluded : The selection of targets under these

circumstances culminating in an ultimate hit list containing many top level unicon

representatives is instinct with invidious motivations ....


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In commenting on the decertification of PATCO by FLRA after strike, William

Ford, Democrat, chair of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service,

said: ... We have a combination of ferderal laws that provide no meaningful

remedy for this kind of labor impasse, an impasse that adversely affects not only

the economy, but the safety of the public and the defense of the nation.

Secondly, political decisions of both PATCO and then Regan Administrations

help to explain the outcome of strike and, to a lesser degree, the onset of strike.

In 1980, The PATCO was one of only four AFLCIO affiliates to endorse the

Ronald Regan as presidential candidate. In light of Republicans well known anti-

union stance, PATCOs endorsement can only be explained by Ronald Regans

letter to Robert Poli in which he denounced the state of air traffic control system

and pledged that my Administration will work very closely with you to bring about

a spirit of cooperation between the Presedent and the air traffic controllers.... By

the same token, it is possible that PATCO migh have expected the Regan

Administration to respond to the strike in an amicable way.

On the contrary, Reagan Administration took a tough stand. The government

had not only fired striking controllers who did not returned to work within 48

hours, but aslo banned them from any federal employment for the next three

years. Reagan believed that the strike imperil public safety. But why not settle

with union before the strike? Some obsevers believe that federal budget reigned

over the demand of PATCO. In a time of recession, Ronald Reagans doctrine

was that government was the problem not the solution.


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Finaly, technology played a key role. It is interesting how technology had

impacted the air traffic controllers, their jobs and eventually the handling of strike.

In the early days, it was the obsolete equipments that concerned the air traffic

controllers. They complained that little or no automation had been introduced,

and near misses were common occurrence. However, technology advancement

in later days had rendered air traffic controllers increasingly obsolete. By the

spring of 1979, FAAs personnel analysis had shown overstaffing of air traffic

controller. Most importantly, faced with confrontational PATCO, FAA clearly saw

automation a means of eliminating skilled controller. In her article, The

Pressures of PATCO: Strikes and Stress in the 1980s, Rebecca Pels argued

that Only when the strike made it absolutely necessary did the FAA invest

substantially in new technology after spending considerable effort on ensuring

such equipment would mean less reliance on controllers' work. Indeed, on

August 7, 1981 (the fifth day of the PATCO strike), the Wall Street Journal

reported that the FAA hopes to install, at a cost of $2.8 billion, computers which

will alert pilots directly in case of problem and instruct them automaticaally on

changing course.

Technology aside, the high unemployment rate at the time also made it easy

for FAA to find permanent replacement for the dismissed striker. Almost from the

firt day of the strike, the FAA was flooded with job applicants.(Air Traffic

Controllers, by Ber A.Spector, HBS)

Analysis from Human Resource Perspective


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Symptoms and Causes

The case of air traffic controllers revealed many human resources problems.

First, safety and health protection was not on FAAs top agenda. The working

condition of air traffic controllers was stressful. This was manifested by the fact

the 89% of controllers forced to retire early because of medical disability. Dr.

Robert Rose conducted survey show that hypertension and considerable drinking

off-hours were common among air traffic controllers. Despite these finding, FAA

were indifference and made no improvement to the situation. Second, there was

lack of recognition of controller's safety responsibility. Controllers often felt they

were ultimately responsible for the safety of aircraft, but they could not exercise

control neither management nor pilots listened to them. This coupled with

FAA's autocratic management style had led to low morale and resentment. Third,

the training, promotion and reward system was not adequate. Management

training was eliminated because the budget cut. Promotions were based more on

individual relationship than performance or managerial skills. As a result,

supervisors' management style tend to be authoritarian and impersonal. The lack

of due human resources development process caused resentment between

controllers and their supervisors. The sentiment of controllers were reflected in

Rober Polis words :

First of all, controllers resent the fact that supervisors get paid

the money they do because theyre a [civial servce] grade

higher but dont work the airplanes. Thats ridiculous. They

get that for filling out schedules and sitting down there. They


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dont really provide supervision. Theres no need for it. They

have too many supervisiors in areas where they could double

the number of controllers the person superson supervises....

The FAA always fills those [supervisory] positions, but doesnt

fill the controller positions.

The negotiation between FAA and PATCO exposed other human resources

problems. One question was related to good-faith bargaining in the process.

There was suspicion that FAA had no real intention to negotiate. As discussed in

previous paragraph, the pursuit of legal punishment on union leaders for their

pro-strike behaviors was challenged for its motivation by US district court.

Moreover, while negotiation was underway, FAA continued to push for

computerization which would automate air traffic control system, a move viewed

by PATCO as a threat to their jobs. On PATCO side, its demand for $10,000

increase in wage was outrageous in pulic eye. It might have been viewed as

surface bargaining thus sent a reaffirming message to FAA that a strike was

pending. Yet in fact, as many aftermath interviews of controllers had revealed,

the controllers main issues were not about money but were about their voiceless

and powerless role in job related matters[2]. It was a failure in PATCO for inability

to articulate the real demand of air traffic controller and to win public support.

HR Policies and Procedures

FAA did have a policy and procedure for employee recruiting and training

program. Job candidates were required to be 18 to 30 years old, be a high school


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graduate, have three years work experience in any jobs, pass aptitude and

physical tests. The job requirements for air traffic controllers may be unique.

However, FAA might want to consider more about workforce diversity. Its

employees profole showed that 50% of FAAs employees had military

background, while only 15% were women.

New employees would participate in a 17-week intensive training. After that

they would receive on-the-job training for 2 to 4 years until reaching full

performance level. It was a time-consuming and costly process. It was not

difficult to foresee that FAA would run into problems when it scrambled to fill

positions of striking controllers.

Compensation Policy

Air traffic controllers were given same sick leave, vacation days, and work

week as all federal employees: 40 work hours per week; 19-26 vacation days; 13

paid sick leave days per year. Among western countries, the US ranked the

longest in work hours while the shortest in vacations days and sick leave days.

The air controller may retire at half pay at the age of 50 if they have worked for

20 years, at any age if they have worked 25 years. By contrast most other federal

employees must be 55 with 30 years service, or 60 with 20 years service. By

1881, the pay range for FAA controllers was $20,447 to $49,229. The average

salary for a fully qualified controller is $33000. But the maximum pay for a

controller was $50112.50, which was pay cap for all federal civil service

employees. The pay grades were comparable with Petroleum Engineer, with the


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most experienced controllers paid one grade higher at GS-14. While not

comparable with pilots who could make up to 115,000, air traffic controllers were

among the well-paid federal employees.

Major Players

Rober Poli, as PATCO president, had important yet controvertial role in

PATCO strike. His militant style was no doubt a crucial factor in PATCOs labor

strategy. He reached the top of PATCO after a policy dispute centered around

the complaint that former PATCO president John Leyden had not been militant

enough in his negotiations with the Government[7]. However, his own negotiation

tactics proved to be ill-advised and failed to win public support. Some labor

stragists blame the failure of strike on his naive thinking and ill-preparation for

Regan Administraions harsh response.

Ronald Reagan, while being called union buster and lier by some, was

hailed by many others as being a decisive and strong president [4]. It seemed

majority of people supported the his tough stand on PATCO strike. An expert in

public emplyee labor relations for Columbia University commented that Regans

handling of the strike would show all government employers how they could

seize control of labor relations instead of merely reacting to union demands.

The impact of Reagans handling of 1981 PATCO went even beyond public

sector. In his recent article Echos of a broken strike on Washintonpost.com [5],

Charles J. Walen wrote : In the immediate aftermath of the PATCO strike, many

observers reported that Reagan's action marked a turning point in U.S. labor


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relation. History has shown this assessment was right on the mark. If it is true

that the strike is labor's "only true weapon," as some unionists suggest, then

practically the entire movement has been disarmed.

Drew Lewis, Regans Secretary of Transportation, was the chief negotiator

for the government. He seemed to be firm and skillful in dealing PATCO strike.

He showed strong support for Reagans decision.

Alternatives and Solutions

Privatization as An Alternative

Privatization of air traffic control system was a viable solution to the problem.

There were already private owned air control systeim in Belgium, Netherlands,

Luxembourg, and Germany. At a time when the nation was in recession and

Regan himself felt that government was too big, it make sense to seek out

privatization of some federal civil service. The then AFL-CIOs president Lane

Kirland saw Regan Administrations handling of strike as inconsistent policy. He

said:

The air traffic control system is purely a subsidized service the

government is providing for the private airline industry. Under the

Regan doctrine of getting the government off peoples backs, youd

think they might try to turn the whole thing over to the industry to run

instead of using the might and majesty of the government to suppress

a strike.


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performance appraisal and proper recognition will boost morale. Management

coaching and training will change the style and improve employee-management

relationship. More importantly, FAA shoud have done something different in

managing labor relations. Instead of wielding the political power backed by law,

Administration and FAA should listened more carefully to the grievance of air

traffic controllers and worked with union to come up with solutions. One way to

handle this is establishing a grievance procedure, including internal and external

monitoring system.

The ultimate goal was to recognize and respect basic human rights. It is

strong recommended to set up a centralized human resources management

organization in FAA to lead efforts in identifying human rights issues, educating

employees and management in idetification of thes issues, and working to

develop framework guidance on how to deal with these issues.

Labor Strategy

From PATCOs pespective, it was an important lesson the it did not have

well-thought-out strategy. Instead of immediately staging on strike, PATCO

could have launched a corporate campaign to exert pressure on FAA and to

gain support from other unions. Also, Polis negotiation stressing the monetary

terms did not exactly reflect air traffic controllers main concern, i.e. stressful

working conditions, autocratic management styles, and the lack of workplace

voice. There should have been better communication between union leaders and

its members so that everybody knew what they set out to do. Furthermore, Poli


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and union negotiation team could have come up with their counter offer when

FAAs final over were not accepted by union members. Doing so would possibly

avoid a strike. Finally, engaging in a strike under the circumstances was a

vialation of law after all. It would be prudent to do a thorough assessment of pro

and cons of a strike. In the hindsight, Regans tough respone on PATCOs strike

were not have surprised anyone. The political miscalculation and infexibility of

bargaining stragety had caused air traffic controllers jobs and decertification of

PATCO. Within the context of law, PATCO better choice might be to seek thirty

party arbitration to solve issues related to working condition[6].


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Reference

1. Air Traffic Controller, by Bert A. Spector, HBS

2. The Pressure of PATCO: Strikes and Stress in the 1980s, by Rebecca Pels

URL: http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH37/Pels.html

3. A Framework for Human Resource Mangement, by Gary Dessler

4. In honor of Regan, by Brian Trumbore

URL: http://www.aporrea.org/dameletra.php?docid=1560

5. Echos of Broken Strike, by Charles J. Walen, Washingtonpost.com

6. Topic 15: The Federal Government

http://www.mtsu.edu/~cbaum/451topic15.doc.

7. Man in The News: Militant Controller Chief: Robert Edmond Poli, by

Jonathan Fuerbringer, The New York Times.

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