overview of the virginia tech tragedy and implications for

Overview of the Virginia Tech Tragedy and Implications for Campus Safety

The IACLEA Blueprint for Safer Campuses

IACLEA Special Review Task ForceApril 18, 2008

SUMMARYThis document is a synthesis of the reports written following the tragedy at Virginia Techand related recommendations for campus safety by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators

AUTHORSRaymond H. Thrower, Convener and President, International Association of CampusLaw Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), Gustavus Adolphus College

Steven J. Healy, Immediate Past President, IACLEA, Princeton University

Dr. Gary J. Margolis, Past General Chair, IACP University & College Police Section,University of Vermont

Michael Lynch, George Mason University

Dolores Stafford, Past President, IACLEA, The George Washington University

William Taylor, Chair, IACLEA Government Relations Committee, Past General Chair,IACP University & College Police Sector, Rice University

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IACLEA Analysis of the Virginia Tech Tragedy

Ross Abdallah AlameddineChristopher James "Jamie" BishopBrian BluhmRyan ClarkAustin CloydJocelyne Couture-NowakDaniel Perez CuevaKevin GranataMathew Gregory GwaltneyCaitlin HammarenJeremy Herbstritt

Rachael Elizabeth Hill Emily Jane HilscherJarrett LaneWaleed Mohammed ShaalanLeslie ShermanMaxine TurnerNicole WhiteMatt La PorteHenry J. LeeLiviu LibrescuG.V. Loganathan

Partahi LumbantoruanLauren McCainDaniel O'NeilJuan OrtizMinal PanchalErin PetersonMichael PohleJulia PrydeMary Karen Read Reema Samaha

This report is dedicated to those whose lives were taken on April 16, 2007 at Virginia Tech:

Table of Contents

Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................3

IACLEA’s Key Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................5

Emergency Planning and Critical Incident Response.........................................................................................................................................5

Empowering and Resourcing the Campus Public Safety Function ........................................................................................6

Prevention and Education Programs to Address Campus Safety Risks.........................................................................7

Ancillary Issues Related to the Virginia Tech Tragedy.......................................................................................................................................7

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8

Summary of 10 Key Findings Of Virginia Governor's Review Panel .............................9

Fatal Shootings on U.S. Campuses .......................................................................................................................................................10

IACLEA Position Statement - Concealed Carry Initiatives .............................................................12

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The impact of the rampage shootings at VirginiaTech on April 16, 2007 continues to be felt acrossthe country and the world. Clearly this incident,along with other active shooter incidents that haveoccurred since the Virginia Tech tragedy, has im-pacted our awareness of campus safety and security.A number of states, other governmental entities,and non-governmental organizations have convenedgroups to examine the lessons learned from thetragedy at Virginia Tech and other aspects of cam-pus safety. IACLEA applauds these on-going effortsand believes the national attention that is focusedon this issue presents an opportunity to initiate anational dialogue to strengthen campus publicsafety and enhance the protection of our estimated15 million students attending the nation’s 4,200 in-stitutions of higher education.

In August of 2007, in the wake of the Virginia Techtragedy, the International Association of CampusLaw Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) soughtto develop a set of recommendations for institutionsof higher education through a public safety lens.IACLEA President Raymond H. Thrower, Jr. con-vened a high-level task force to review the various re-ports and make recommendations to the IACLEABoard of Directors for a coordinated position onthe various issues raised by these reports and possi-ble further action by IACLEA and other entities.This Task Force includes the immediate past presi-dent of IACLEA and a former president; the chairof IACLEA’s U.S. Government Relations Commit-tee, two past chairs of the International Associationof Chiefs of Police University & College Police Sec-tion, and a representative from a Virginia publicuniversity. Several of the members of the reviewpanel also serve on the International Association ofChiefs of Police Review Panel convened by then-IACP President Joseph Carter.

While nothing could have prepared Virginia Techor any institution to deal with the loss of life ofApril 16, 2007, IACLEA would be remiss if it didn’tstudy and learn from the successes and failures ofthe response to the incident. This Blueprint ex-plores the key applicable findings and identifies IACLEA recommendations for institutions ofhigher education. The Blueprint is divided into 3major categories identified as foundations of cam-pus safety: Emergency Planning and Critical Inci-dent Response; Empowerment and Resources of theCampus Public Safety Function; and Preventionand Education Programs.

Gun violence on university and college campuses isnot new. While Virginia Tech’s tragedy is by far thedeadliest in history for an institution of higher edu-cation, others have also been unfortunate. On Feb-ruary 8, 2008, a lone female student opened fire ina classroom at Louisiana Technical College in BatonRouge, Louisiana, killing two students before takingher own life. On February 14, 2008, a formerNorthern Illinois University graduate student en-tered a packed auditorium-style classroom on theNIU campus in DeKalb, opened fire and killed fivestudents before taking his own life. In September2006, Douglas Pennington killed himself and histwo sons during a visit to Shepherd University inShepherdstown, WV. In October 2002, Universityof Arizona Nursing College student Robert Floresmurdered three of his instructors on campus beforecommitting suicide. In January 2002, former Ap-palachian School of Law student Peter Odighizuwakilled the dean, a professor and a student, whilewounding three more, before being subdued byother students. In August 2000, University ofArkansas student James Easton Kelly shot and killedProfessor John Locke before taking his own life inan apparent murder-suicide. In August 1996, Freder-ick Martin Davidson, a graduate engineering stu-dent at San Diego State University shot and killedthree professors during his doctoral dissertation de-fense. In November 1991, University of Iowa gradu-ate student Gang Lu opened fire in two buildingsand killed five people, wounded two and then killedhimself. Finally, in August 1966, Charles Whitmanclimbed the clock tower on the University of Texas-Austin campus and killed sixteen people with asniper rifle while wounding thirty-one others. Uni-versities and colleges owe it to the victims and theirfamilies to understand these crimes and take appro-priate measures, when and where possible, to ensurethe safety of their communities.

As final reports have not been prepared followingsome of these incidents, this Blueprint does not ad-dress these implications. In preparing this docu-ment, the authors consulted and referenced thefollowing documents:

• Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007,Report of Review Panel, Presented to GovernorKaine, Commonwealth of Virginia, August 2007

• Investigation of April 16, 2007 Critical IncidentAt Virginia Tech Prepared by Office of the Inspec-tor General For Mental Health, Mental Retarda-tion & Substance Abuse Services, James W.Stewart, III. Report: # 140-07

INTRODUCTION

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• Presidential Internal Review, Working Group Re-port on the Interface Between Virginia Tech Coun-seling Services, Academic Affairs, Judicial Affairsand Legal Systems, Submitted to President CharlesSteger, August 12, 2007

• Oklahoma Campus Life and Safety and SecurityTask Force (CLASS) Final Report, January 15, 2008

• New Jersey Campus Security Task Force Report,Submitted to Governor Jon S. Corzine, October2007.

• Expecting the Unexpected - Lessons from the Vir-ginia Tech Tragedy, by American Association ofState Colleges & Universities

• The Report of the University of California CampusSecurity Task Force, University of California Officeof the President, January 2008

• Gubernatorial Task Force for University CampusSafety, Report on Findings and Recommendations,State of Florida, May 24, 2007

• Governor’s Task Force on Campus Safety, State ofWisconsin, November 15, 2007

• International Association of Campus Law Enforce-ment Administrators Special Review Task Force onVirginia Tech

• Missouri Campus Security Task Force, Report onFindings and Recommendations, August 21, 2007

• Association of American Universities August, 2007Survey on Safety on AAU Campuses after the Vir-ginia Tech Shootings

• Report of the Campus Safety Task Force Presentedto North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper

• National Association of Attorneys General, TaskForce on School and Campus Safety, Report & Rec-ommendations, September 2007

• Report to the President of the United States on Is-sues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy, June 13,2007

• The Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel Syn-opsis prepared by Charles F. Carletta, JD, Secretaryof the Institute and General Counsel, RensselaerPolytechnical Institute, October 2007

• Personal relationships and correspondence withChief Wendell Flinchum, Virginia Tech Police De-partment; Colonel Steven Flaherty, Virginia StatePolice; Chief Kimberly S. Crannis, Blacksburg (VA)Police Department

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While there are many recommendations that arisefrom these lessons learned for each of the disci-plines that bring to bear expertise, IACLEA hasidentified 20 specific recommendations. They rep-resent the Association’s priorities for the bettermentof campus safety and reinforce key goals and objec-tives in mitigating and responding to threats at insti-tutions of higher education. They are not designedto be all inclusive, but do represent emerging bestand promising practices which institutions shouldconsider now and implement when possible. Thefindings are outlined in the 3 major foundationalareas identified in the introduction.

Emergency Planning and Critical Incident Response

1) All colleges and universities should conduct athreat and vulnerability assessment as part of the in-stitutional risk management strategy. The assess-ment should consider the full spectrum of threats(i.e., natural, criminal, terrorist, accidental, etc.) forthe campus. The results of this assessment shouldguide the institution’s application of protectivemeasures and emergency planning assumptions.The assessment will necessarily be unique given thespecific characteristics of individual campuses.

2) Institutions should use an array of means andmethods to disseminate information to the campuscommunity during emergencies. A campus emer-gency, mass notification system and plan must in-clude multiple means of sharing information,including high-technology (i.e., mass notificationsystem) and low-technology (flyers, loud speakers)solutions. Institutions selecting systems should en-sure their systems meet these minimum criteria:

a. Multi-Point Communication: The service shouldenable the campus to notify the entire campuscommunity via multiple channels. The systemshould be capable of reaching its audiencethrough multiple points of contact, such as voicemessages, e-mail, and text messaging/SMS.

b. Capacity: The system vendor should have suffi-cient, demonstrated capacity to deliver all mes-sages quickly and reliably.

c. Security and Redundancy: If the institution usesa third-party vendor, access to private student andemployee data must be limited only to authorizedpersonnel. The system must have redundant ca-pabilities in all the power interconnects.

d. 24/7 Client Care: A contract with a third partyvendor should include training, customer service,and technical support.

e. Experience: The vendor should have significantexperience delivering calls at institutions of vari-ous sizes across the country.

f. Assessment: The service should have reporting ca-pabilities that allow the institution to monitor,manage and measure the system’s effectiveness.

Campus public safety officials as well as other appro-priate administrators should have the authority andcapability to send emergency messages from on/offcampus and from anywhere around the world.

Campus administrators should consider the followcriteria before sending emergency messages: 1) themessage should be timely; 2) the information mustbe accurate; and 3) the notice must be useful to therecipients. Recipients of emergency messagesshould be urged to inform others.

3) Institutions should use the National IncidentManagement System (NIMS) as the framework tomanage emergencies and should have a decision-making process and structure to facilitate interac-tion among institutional leadership, institutionalresources and local first responders.

4) Institutions should develop succinct emergencyresponse plans that allow for a coordinated, organ-ized response to critical incidents while avoidingcomplexity and obfuscation. The plan should com-ply with the National Incident Management Systemand the Incident Command System per HomelandSecurity Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Ideally,such plans will specify levels of an emergency andthe general responsibilities of the emergency re-sponse and policy groups at each level. Appendicesmay include incident action plans for specific criti-cal incidents (i.e., snow storms, bomb threats or vio-lent crime). Institutions should conduct annualtraining for the emergency operations and policygroup, and include campus service providers in ad-dition to public safety first responders.

5) Universities and colleges should work with theirlocal government partners to improve plans for mu-tual aid in all areas of emergency planning and criti-cal incident response, including that of victimservices. The IACLEA “Guide to StrengtheningCommunications between Campus Public SafetyDepartments and Federal-State-Local Emergency

IACLEA’S KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

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Response Agencies” contains model policies andpractices for developing and nurturing these important relationships. The Guide is available onthe IACLEA web site at: http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/WMDCPT/cprc/aboutcprc.cfm

6) Institutions should consider providing First Re-sponder or EMT training to a sufficient number ofcampus public safety officers to ensure there is thecapacity on the campus to provide potential life-sav-ing treatment to injured persons at the scene of acritical incident in the event that EMT's from out-side agencies face delays or otherwise cannot get tothe scene in a timely manner. First Responder train-ing generally refers to a 40-hour course of trainingand the EMT course typically consists of 120 hoursof training in providing pre-hospital care for med-ical emergencies.

Empowering and Resourcing the Campus Public Safety Function

7) The campus public safety executive must reportdirectly to the senior operations officer with institu-tional decision-making authority. The campus pub-lic safety director or chief of police should be part ofthe emergency operations team developing emer-gency response and recovery plans. Additionally,the campus public safety executive should have di-rect access to the most senior decision makers dur-ing an emergency.

8) Institutions should regularly review physical secu-rity infrastructure, including locking mechanismson all doors, to ensure optimal safety of faculty,staff, students, visitors and guests.

9) The nature of the emergency should direct whatand how campus authorities communicate with thecampus and under what timeframe. See earlier rec-ommendations on timely warning process. Universi-ties and colleges must comply with the Clery Act,which requires timely public warnings of imminentdanger. Institutions must have a policy that de-scribes their timely warning practice and in that pol-icy, they should develop an individual definition of"timely" in relation to available technology, availablecommunication systems, and nature of the crisis.

10) Interoperable communications is an absolutemust for effective critical incident response. Inter-operable communication systems allow two or moreresponding agencies, even those using disparatecommunications systems, to exchange informationdirectly. With interoperability, on-scene personnel

can quickly access each other to coordinate neededrescue and emergency activities. The Public SafetyWireless Network program (a joint initiative of theU.S. departments of Justice and the Treasury) hasidentified the following as two important types ofinteroperability:

i) Day-to-day interoperability covers routine publicsafety operations, such as a building fire that re-quires backup from a neighboring fire depart-ment, or when a vehicle chase crosses betweentowns.

ii) Mutual aid interoperability supports a joint andimmediate response to catastrophic accidents,large-scale incidents, and natural disasters. It sup-ports tactical communications in response to air-plane crashes, bombings, forest fires,earthquakes, hurricanes, and similar events thatoccur without warning.

11) Each state should pass enabling legislation thatallows their colleges and universities the choice toemploy a sworn police agency in lieu of or in addition to non-sworn security professionals.

12) Campus public safety agencies should exploreaccreditation through the Commission on Accredi-tation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the International Association of Campus LawEnforcement Administrators (IACLEA).

13) If the institution employs a full-service, swornlaw enforcement agency, then the officers shouldhave access to a range of use of force options includ-ing lethal (firearms) and less-than-lethal (impacttools, chemical, and electronic control devices). Inshort, sworn officers should be armed. Campuspublic safety personnel who are provided any defen-sive weapon should be trained to the standards re-quired for public-sector law enforcement personnelwithin the political sub-division. Campus law en-forcement or security personnel provided withweapons should meet the standards established for use of those weapons as determined by the state in which the community is located. Clear policystatements should be implemented establishingsuch weapons as defensive weapons. NOTE: IACLEA has a long-established PositionStatement that supports this recommendation.

14) Campus public safety authorities must clearlyunderstand their authority in addressing involun-tary hospitalization procedures for members of thecommunity they interact with who suffer from acutemental health disorders.

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15) The complex nature of law enforcement de-mands knowledge, skill, training, and experience.Judgments frequently required are beyond the train-ing, preparation, responsibility, or authority of pri-vate citizens. Personnel who do not have thenecessary judgment resulting from the acquisitionof this knowledge and skill acquired through law en-forcement training should not be assigned to func-tions which may require them to question, detain,or restrain the movements of citizens.

Prevention and Education Programs to Address Campus Safety Risks

16) Institutions should implement a processwhereby all members of the community upon appli-cation (admissions and employment) are askedwhether or not they have been charged or convictedof a crime and all related details. Institutions shouldconduct criminal record checks for their students,faculty and staff as appropriate.

17) Institutions of higher education should have abehavioral threat assessment team that includes rep-resentatives from law enforcement, human re-sources, student and academic affairs, legal counsel,and mental health functions. Specifically, campuspublic safety should be included on the team.

18) Institutions should employ a comprehensiveprogram to end violence against women crimes oncampus. These crimes include stalking, sexual as-sault and relationship violence and, in addition toself-defense for women, require prevention trainingfocused specifically on men and key campus con-stituencies. These areas include Athletics, StudentAffairs, Judicial Affairs, Academic Support, andResidential Life. The institution should establishprotocols and procedures that support a woman’sdecision to not participate in a criminal or judicialproceeding, but which allow the institution to takeaction against the accused independent of a crimi-nal investigation. Campus public safety should betrained to conduct these investigations and in-quiries.

19) Faculty, staff and students should be trained onhow to respond to various emergencies and aboutthe notification systems that will be used. This train-ing should be delivered through a number of deliv-ery options, such as in-person presentations (i.e.,residential life programming; orientation sessionsfor students and employees); Internet-based delivery;and documents.

20) Campus public safety should develop collabora-tive, supportive relationships with victim advocacyservices in order to respond directly and immedi-ately to the needs of victims of crime.

Ancillary Issues Related to the Virginia TechTragedy

Concealed Carry of Firearms on Campuses

IACLEA does not support the carry and conceal-ment of weapons on a college campus, with the ex-ception of sworn police officers in the conduct oftheir professional duties. (Please see Position State-ment on pages 12 of this report).

Implementation of Security Technology

Security technology, such as automated card accesssystems, intrusion detection systems, and securitycameras, can serve as force multipliers on a collegeor university campus. In fact, some systems, such asautomated access control, have become the industrystandard on campuses around the country. Cam-puses should continue to implement proven securitytechnology in an attempt to enhance safety on cam-pus. Some systems, such as security cameras, haveproven valuable in specific circumstances and havenot only increased the community’s sense of secu-rity, but have also aided in the apprehension ofcriminals. As with any system, policy, or practice,IACLEA recommends that the campus evaluate ex-isting literature and research to ensure there isample evidence of the system’s effectiveness prior toimplementation.

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While the tragedy at Virginia Tech is on a scale never before experienced at an institution of higher education, the circumstances that led Seung-Hui Cho to com-mit the crime he did are all too common. Unmanaged mental health issues; easyaccess to firearms; a lack of communication among campus direct service providers;and erroneous interpretation of federal law with specific focus on FERPA andHIPPA all coalesced into the perfect storm at Virginia Tech in April 2007.

IACLEA wants to recognize the professionalism and well coordinated response ofthe Virginia Tech Police, Virginia State Police, Blacksburg Police, and the variousEmergency Medical Services that responded to the call of duty on April 16, 2007.Their heroism in the face of extreme danger speaks to the highest commitment ofpublic safety, specifically campus public safety. Long after the spotlights dim andthe news reports silence, the men and women who rushed into Norris Hall to gunfire and screams will continue to replay those images in their minds. Their hero-ism and dedication will not soon be forgotten. The International Association ofCampus Law Enforcement Administrators recognizes its responsibility to the fallenstudents, faculty and staff, and the first responders who ended Cho’s rampage. Tothis end, this report serves to prevent such tragedies through careful analysis andwell-crafted recommendations that address prevention, physical security, and re-sponse capacity.

Securing the safety of our campuses is an iterative process that requires an institutional and personal commitment from every member of our educational communities.

Let these recommendations strengthen that resolve.

CONCLUSION

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1. Cho exhibited signs of mental health problemsduring his childhood. In 1999, after the Columbineshootings, Cho’s middle school teachers observedsuicidal and homicidal ideations in his writings andrecommended psychiatric counseling, which he re-ceived.

2. During Cho's junior year at Virginia Tech, nu-merous incidents occurred that were clear warningsof mental instability. Although various individualsand departments within the University knew abouteach of these incidents, the University did not inter-vene effectively. No one knew all the informationand no one connected all the dots.

3. University officials in the office of Judicial Af-fairs, Cook Counseling Center, university police,the Dean of Students, and others explained theirfailures to communicate with one another or withCho’s parents by noting their belief that such com-munications are prohibited by the federal laws gov-erning the privacy of health and education records.In reality, federal laws and their state counterpartsafford ample leeway to share information in poten-tially dangerous situations.

4. Cho purchased two guns in violation of federallaw. The fact that in 2005 Cho had been judged tobe a danger to himself and ordered to outpatienttreatment made him ineligible to purchase a gununder federal law.

5. On April 16, 2007, the Virginia Tech and Blacks-burg police departments responded quickly to thereport of shootings at West Ambler Johnston resi-dence hall, as did the Virginia Tech and Blacksburgrescue squads. Their responses were well coordi-nated.

6. The Virginia Tech police may have erred in pre-maturely concluding that their initial lead in thedouble homicide was a good one, or at least in con-veying that impression to university officials whilecontinuing their investigation. They did not takesufficient action to deal with what might happen ifthe initial lead proved erroneous. The police re-ported to the university emergency Policy Groupthat the "person of interest" probably was no longeron campus.

7. The VTPD erred in not requesting that the PolicyGroup issue a campus-wide notification that twopersons had been killed and that all students andstaff should be cautious and alert. Senior university

administrators, acting as the emergency PolicyGroup, failed to issue an all-campus notificationabout the WAJ killings until almost 2 hours hadelapsed. University practice may have conflictedwith written policies.

8. The presence of large numbers of police at WAJled to a rapid response to the first 9-1-1 call thatshooting had begun at Norris Hall. The police re-sponse at Norris Hall was prompt and effective, aswas triage and evacuation of the wounded. Evacua-tion of others in the building could have been im-plemented with more care.

9. State systems for rapidly deploying trained profes-sional staff to help families get information, crisisintervention, and referrals to a wide range of re-sources did not work.

10. The university established a family assistancecenter at The Inn at Virginia Tech, but it fell shortin helping families and others for two reasons: lackof leadership and lack of coordination among serv-ice providers. University volunteers stepped in butwere not trained or able to answer many questionsand guide families to the resources they needed.

The report contains more than 70 recommenda-tions directed to colleges, universities, mentalhealth providers, law enforcement officials, emer-gency service providers, lawmakers, and other pub-lic officials in Virginia and elsewhere.

The other reports reviewed for this Blueprintechoed the major findings outlined in the Virginia report. Where recommendations differed,IACLEA Task Force members reviewed those pointsand found common themes that, when extrapo-lated, are presented in the IACLEA report.

Other tangential issues have arisen as a result of the tragedy. For example, there is a nationalmovement in more than a dozen states calling forconcealed weapons carry laws on college and university campuses. The State of Oklahoma re-cently considered legislation to allow the concealedcarry of firearms on college campuses. The IACLEA position regarding this issue is contained at the endof this report.

SUMMARY OF 10 KEY FINDINGS OF THE VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA GOVERNOR

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Aug. 1, 1966

Charles Whitman points a rifle from the observa-tion deck of the University of Texas in Austin andbegins shooting in a homicidal rampage that goeson for 96 minutes. Sixteen are killed and 31 arewounded.

May 4, 1970

Four students were killed and nine wounded by Na-tional Guard troops called in to quell anti-warprotests on the campus of Kent State University inKent, Ohio.

Nov. 1, 1991

Gang Lu, 28, a graduate student in physics fromChina, reportedly upset because he was passed overfor an academic honor, opens fire in two buildingson the University of Iowa campus. Five Universityof Iowa employees are killed, including four mem-bers of the physics department. Two other peopleare wounded. The student fatally shoots himself.

Jan. 26, 1995

Former law student Wendell Williamson shoots twomen to death and injures a police officer in ChapelHill, NC.

Aug. 15, 1996

Frederick Martin Davidson, 36, a graduate engineering student at San Diego State, is defending his thesis before a faculty committeewhen he pulls out a handgun and kills three professors.

June 28, 2000

Medical resident Dr. Jian Chen kills his supervisor and then himself in his supervisor’s of-fice at the University of Washington in Seattle. Fac-ulty say Chen, 42, was upset he’d be forced toreturn to China because of academic shortcomings.

Aug. 28, 2000

James Easton Kelly, 36, a University of Arkansasgraduate student recently dropped from a doctoralprogram after a decade of study and John Locke, 67,the English professor overseeing his coursework, areshot to death in an apparent murder-suicide.

Jan. 16, 2002

Graduate student Peter Odighizuwa, 42, recentlydismissed from Virginia's Appalachian School ofLaw, returns to campus and kills the dean, a profes-sor and a student before being tackled by students.The attack also wounds three female students.

May 17, 2001

Donald Cowan, 55, fatally shoots assistant musicprofessor James Holloway at a dorm at PacificLutheran University in Parkland, Washington, thenturns the gun on himself. He leaves a 16-page sui-cide note expressing anger at a colleague of Hol-loway’s whom he dated briefly as a teenager.

Oct. 28, 2002

Failing University of Arizona Nursing College stu-dent and Gulf War veteran Robert Flores, 40, walksinto an instructor's office and fatally shoots her. Afew minutes later, armed with five guns, he entersone of his nursing classrooms and kills two more ofhis instructors before fatally shooting himself.

U.S. College and University Fatal Shootings

Source: Media reports

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May 9, 2003

A 62-year-old man with two handguns and a bullet-proof vest fires hundreds of rounds during a seven-hour shooting spree and standoff at a Case WesternReserve University building in Cleveland. One stu-dent is killed and two others are wounded.Biswanath Halder, who authorities say was upset be-cause he believed a student hacked into his web site,is later sentenced to life in prison.

Sept. 2, 2006

Douglas W. Pennington, 49, kills himself and histwo sons, Logan P. Pennington, 26, and BenjaminM. Pennington, 24, during a visit to the campus ofShepherd University in Shepherdstown, W.Va.

April 2, 2007

University of Washington researcher RebeccaGriego, 26, is shot to death in her office by a formerboyfriend who then turned the gun on himself.

April 16, 2007

Seung Hui Cho kills 32 people and injures at least24 others in a dorm and a classroom at VirginiaTech in Blacksburg, Va. The gunman then kills him-self by gunshot.

Sept. 21, 2007

Two students are wounded at a late-night shootingat a campus dining hall at Delaware State Universityin Dover. Shalita Middleton, 17, dies Oct. 23 fromher injuries. A student is charged in the shooting.

Oct. 1, 2007

University of Memphis football player Taylor Brad-ford, 21, is fatally shot on campus in a botched rob-bery. Four men are later charged in the slaying,including one student.

Dec. 13, 2007

Two Ph.D. students from India are found shot todeath in a home invasion at an apartment on thecampus of Louisiana State University in BatonRouge.

Feb. 8, 2008

Latina Williams, 23, opens fire during an emergency medical technology class at LouisianaTechnical College in Baton Rouge, killing KarsheikaGraves and Taneshia Butler. She then kills herself.

Feb. 14, 2008

Steven Kazmierczak, a former graduate student atNorthern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois,opens fire in a lecture hall, killing five students andwounding 15 others. He then commits suicide.

U.S. College and University Fatal Shootings

Source: Media reports

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IACLEA Position StatementConcealed Weapon Carry Proposals

IACLEA Board of Directors

March 2008

The International Association of Campus Law En-forcement Administrators, Inc., (IACLEA) hasbeen asked by its Members to react to legislative ini-tiatives in some states that would allow students tocarry concealed weapons on college and universitycampuses.

IACLEA’s Board of Directors believes “concealedcarry” initiatives do not make campuses safer.There is no credible evidence to suggest that thepresence of students carrying concealed weaponswould reduce violence on college campuses. In fact,we are concerned that concealed carry laws havethe potential to dramatically increase violence oncollege and university campuses that our Membersare empowered to protect.

In an article published in The Christian ScienceMonitor, Jon Vernick, the co-director of the JohnsHopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research inBaltimore, MD, was quoted as stating that “the bestscience that we have says concealed carry laws donot save lives, as the proponents contend.”

Among the concerns with concealed carry laws orpolicies are: the potential for accidental dischargeor misuse of firearms at on-campus or off-campusparties where large numbers of students are gath-ered or at student gatherings where alcohol ordrugs are being consumed, as well as the potentialfor guns to be used as a means to settle disputes be-tween or among students. There is also a real con-cern that campus police officers responding to asituation involving an active shooter may not beable to distinguish between the shooter and otherswith firearms.

We urge public policy makers to proceed with ex-treme caution in dealing with proposals to allowcollege students to carry concealed weapons oncampus. IACLEA is committed to working withpublic policy makers on reasonable solutions to en-hance campus public safety. We are working withother campus public safety stakeholders to provideand promote campus crime prevention trainingprograms, as well as to develop strategies and pro-grams to enhance emergency preparedness.

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