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F A C U L T Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y U N I V E R S I T Y O F O X F O R D

PHILOSOPHY LECTURES PROSPECTUS

TRINITY TERM 2014

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The Philosophy Centre is found at the Radcliffe Humanities Building, on Woodstock Road, which is also the site of the Philosophy and Theology Faculties Library. NOTES:

- CL before a paper number means the lecture is a Core Lecture for the Honour Schools paper with that number.

- The normal timeslot of an event is one hour. That is, for W. 11, the event is booked in the room on Wednesdays from 11 to 12. Where the class or lecture has a different timeslot, the start time and end time will be given.

- Unless otherwise specified, the lectures and classes are given for all of weeks 1 to 8.

- Lectures and classes begin at five minutes past the hour, and end five minutes before. (E.g: a lecture listed as M. 10 will start on Mondays at 10.05am, and finish at 10.55am.)

- Students registered on Philosophy courses, and Faculty members, will need their

University card to enter the Philosophy Centre at Radcliffe Humanities. Visitors should use the intercom on the front door to ask for access.

- There are several rooms used as lecture/class spaces at Radcliffe Humanities. The main rooms are: the Ryle Room (1st floor), the Lecture Room (2nd floor), and the Seminar Room (3rd floor). Other rooms sometimes used are the Colin Matthew Room (ground floor) and Meeting Room 4 (3rd floor).

- There is lift and stair access to all floors. A list of rooms is found by the stairwell and lift on each floor.

- Schools refers to the Examination Schools (75 81 High Street), one of the main lecturing facilities in the University. If you visit the Schools for a lecture or class, please be sure to check the electronic notice boards in the lobby, which will tell you which room the lecture/class is in.

- Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this Prospectus is accurate at the start of term, but sometimes errors persist. If you think you have found a mistake, please contact James Knight (james.knight@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

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Lectures for the First Public Examination Students preparing for their First Public Examination (Prelims or Mods) should attend the following lectures this term: Mathematics and Philosophy: Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic Physics and Philosophy: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence Literae Humaniores: Euthyphro and Meno, if taking this as the philosophy option for Mods

Plato: Euthyphro and Meno Prof Lindsay Judson W. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Intended audience: Primarily intended for Classics Mods students who are doing the Plato special subject. Brief description: This is the first half of a course of 16 lectures, primarily for Classics Mods students offering these dialogues as their philosophy option; there will be 8 further lectures in Michaelmas Term. I shall pay particular attention to introducing philosophical concepts, analysing arguments, and explaining how to read Platonic dialogues. The lectures will begin with an introduction to Socrates and Plato; in particular, I shall say something about why Plato wrote dialogues and how we should approach them. I shall then look at the Euthyphro, exploring the two dialogues it contains the one between Socrates and Euthyphro and the one between Plato and his readers. In weeks 7-8 and in the Michaelmas Term lectures I shall look at the Meno: topics discussed will include definition and the Socratic fallacy; the view that everyone always desires what is good; the paradox of enquiry and Platos response to it; hypotheses, knowledge, and true belief. Handouts and bibliography are available in the Philosophy section of Weblearn (also accessible via my web-page). The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

Prof Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Dr Dennis Lehmkuhl W. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures will consist of an introduction to the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke and the topics in metaphysics and physics covered in it. It will also discuss the views on space and motion by other thinkers of the seventeenth century, like Galileo, Descartes, and Newton.

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Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic

Dr Jeff Russell T. 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) What are the natural numbers? How can we know what they are like? What is their relationship to the physical world? Frege gave striking answers to these questions. Understanding how he defends them will take us on a tour through central issues in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and logic. These lectures are primarily for those taking Maths & Philosophy prelims. (But others are welcome.) For more details, see http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0399/frege.syllabus.pdf.

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Lectures for the Honour Schools Lectures listed in this section are core lectures for the papers in the Honour Schools: that is, these are lectures intended especially for students taking those papers at Finals. Questions set in Finals papers usually take the content of core lectures into account. Students should also refer to the section Other Lectures, following. Lectures listed there are not official core lectures, but nonetheless often cover topics of relevance to the Finals papers. The Other Lectures listings this term are open to all, but might particularly interest students taking 102 Knowledge and Reality; 103 Ethics; 104 Philosophy of Mind; 108 Philosophy of Logic and Language; and/or 118 The Later Wittgenstein.

101 Early Modern Philosophy: Locke Dr Paul Lodge T. 10 (not on in week 3), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) An general introduction to the John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Topics to be covered: The project of the Essay. The attack on innateness. The theory of ideas (including his views on abstract ideas). Primary and secondary qualities. Substance and essence. Personal identity. The theory of knowledge. 101 Early Modern Philosophy: Hume Dr Peter Kail W. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) These lectures are for paper 101, Early Modern Philosophy, and offer an overview of the set text, Book I Humes Treatise of Human Nature. I shall follow the major contours of the Humes masterpiece, introduce its main themes, discuss its coherence and Humes overall aims. The topics covered include naturalism and scepticism, causal inference and the so-called problem of induction, causal powers and realism, the external world, the self and Humes dissatisfaction with his account it. For an introduction to the work, see Peter Kail David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature in John Shand (ed.) The Central Works of Philosophy Vol. 2, Acumen Press (2005). Students should use either the Oxford Student edition (ed. Norton or Norton) or the older, but still acceptable, Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (again Oxford University Press).

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108 The Philosophy of Logic and Language Dr Josh Parsons M. 10, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

109 Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Criticism Dr James Grant M. 12, Exeter College (Saskatchewan Room)

These lectures are intended primarily for undergraduates taking the Aesthetics 109 paper for finals, though they are open to anyone wishing to attend. The schedule of lectures is as follows: 1. Platos Philosophy of Art. 2. Aristotles Poetics. 3. Hume and the Standard of Taste. 4. Kants Critique of Judgement: Lecture 1. 5. Kants Critique of Judgement: Lecture 2. 6. Pictorial Representation. 7. Metaphor. 8. Defining Art.

111 Medieval Philosophy: Duns Scotus, Ockham Prof Cecilia Trifogli T. W. 11 (weeks 1, 2, 4, 5), All Souls College (weeks 1, 2: Seminar

Room 3; weeks 4, 5: Bursars Study)

I will present the following topics: Sessions 1-3: Scotus on Common Natures and the Principle of Individuation. Sessions 4-5: Ockham on Universals. Session 6: Ockham on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition. Sessions 7-8: Scotus and Ockham on the Existence of God.

113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Husserl

Dr Joseph Schear W. 11, Christ Church (Lecture Room 1) These lectures offer an introduction to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, founder of the phenomenological tradition. The lectures aim at students reading Husserl for the Post-Kantian philosophy paper. Anyone, however, is welcome to attend. Texts to be discussed include Logical Investigations, Cartesian Meditations: an introduction to phenomenology, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, and The Crisis of the European Sciences. Passages from Husserls collected works will also occasionally be consulted. Husserl will be treated not as a historical curiosity, but rather as a philosopher whose interest lies in the truths he might help us discover.

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Week 1: What is phenomenology? Week 2: The critique of psychologism and the sources of logic Week 3: Intentionality (part I) Week 4: Intentionality (part II) Week 5: Knowledge Week 6: Object-Perception Week 7: Self-consciousness & Time-Consciousness Week 8: The Crisis of the European Sciences 113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

Dr Grahame Lock T. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) This series of lectures will first cover central topics in Sartre's philosophical writings. The main emphasis will be on the works Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness. We shall look at "where Sartre was coming from", especially at the tradition of phenomenology in Germany and France; then at the themes (among others) of freedom, bad faith, consciousness, self, other people, contingency, being "in-itself" and "for-itself" and nothingness. We shall next consider key themes and arguments in Merleau-Ponty, especially from his Phenomenology of Perception, including the concept of the body-subject, and his accounts of perception, space and time. We shall use the English translations, but acquaintance with the French originals, for those able to read them, might be interesting. The lectures are aimed in the first instance at those intending to offer Post-Kantian philosophy as a paper for Finals, but may be of interest to others, who are welcome to attend. They do not presuppose any previous knowledge of the authors, though advance familiarity with some of their ideas would of course be an advantage. 113 Post-Kantian Philosophy: Schopenhauer

Dr Manuel Dries now deferred to Michaelmas Term 2014 116 Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics

Prof David Charles M. 10 (weeks 1 to 4), Oriel College (Harris Lecture Room)

These lectures are intended for those taking paper 116 (or the Greats 132) for Finals, for graduate students offering work in Aristotle, and anyone else interested. They continue the series started in Hilary Term 2014.

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People attending should bring a copy of the Nicomachean Ethics (either in Greek or recommended translation). A further bibliography will be supplied for each of the major sections. There may be time for discussion/ questions at the end of each lecture. 117 Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein Dr James Studd F. 12 (weeks 1 to 3, 5), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) These are the core lectures for FHS Paper 117 on Frege, Russell and (the early) Wittgenstein's philosophies of logic, language and mathematics. They may also be of interest to students studying these authors or fields in other contexts. These lectures reprise the interrupted series of Hilary Term 2014. 119 Formal Logic: revision sessions Dr Alex Paseau Th. 2 4 (weeks 1, 2), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) Please contact Dr Paseau (alexander.paseau@philosophy.ox.ac.uk) if you are a student taking the Formal Logic for examination in Trinity 2014 and would like to attend the classes. 122 Philosophy of Mathematics (closing lecture) Dr Alex Paseau Th. 2 (week 3), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) A lecture on Structuralism in the Philosophy of Mathematics to complete the set of Michaelmas 2013 lectures.

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125 Philosophy of Cognitive Science I Prof Martin Davies and Dr Matthew Parrott W. 10 12 (weeks 2 to 8),

Experimental Psychology (Weiskrantz Room)

This course consists of the first eight of sixteen core lectures primarily intended for students taking Philosophy of Cognitive Science for examination in 2015. The second set of eight lectures, Philosophy of Cognitive Science II, which will build on this terms lectures, will be offered in Michaelmas Term 2014. Lectures will last for approximately one hour, with an additional hour available for informal discussion. Reading lists and PowerPoint presentations will be available on WebLearn. Topics to be covered include: Levels of description The language of thought and the computational theory of mind The modularity of mind Cognitive neuropsychology Connectionist models of cognitive processes Theory of mind Delusions Useful Background Reading: Crane, T. 2003: The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representations (Second Edition). London: Routledge. Stone, T. and Davies, M. 2012: Theoretical issues in cognitive psychology. In N. Braisby and A. Gellatly (eds), Cognitive Psychology (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 63979.

126 The Philosophy of the Environment Prof John Broome Th. 10 (not on in week 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) The course will cover aspects of the philosophy and economics of the environment. It will include these topics: Philosophical and economic foundations, Intergenerational ethics, Environmental ethics, Contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis, Discounting, Population.

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131 Plato: Sophist Dr Michail Peramatzis Th. 12 (weeks 1 to 6), Worcester College Intended audience: those offering this option for Lit Hum Finals, and graduates, especially those contemplating offering Plato for the BPhil or the MSt in Ancient Philosophy. The six lectures held in Trinity Term will examine the main claims and arguments developed in the Sophist: Platos method of division; the impossibility of saying what is not; the ontological excursus (Giants & Friends of the Forms); the Late Learners and the communion of kinds; identity and predication; the analysis of negative predication; reference, statement, and the analysis of false statement and false belief. There will be a discussion of the main interpretative and philosophical issues, as well as a presentation of the central scholarly debates. Text Platonis Opera, I, ed. by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan, Oxford (Clarendon Press) 1995. Translation, Commentaries, and Introductory Reading Cornford, F.M., Platos Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist Translated with a Running Commentary, London (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.) and New York (Harcourt, Brace, and Co.) 1935. Hand-outs, and further bibliographical suggestions will be given in the lectures.

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135 Latin Philosophy Dr Karen Nielsen W. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

This seminar offers an introduction to Stoic ethics with particular emphasis on its reception in Roman times. We will consider Ciceros On Moral Ends (De finibus bonorum et malorum), On Duties (De officiis) and Senecas De Constantia and De Vita Beata, as well as a selection from Senecas Moral Letters. We will examine the relationship between the thought of earlier Greek Stoics like Zeno of Citium, Aristo of Chios, Chrysippus, and Panaetius, and later Roman thought, as well as the legacy of Socrates and Aristotle to Stoic ethics. Topics include the final end (summum bonum), appropriation (oikeiosis) and moral progress, the extirpation of the passions, preferred and dispreferred indifferents, determinism and agency, Roman suicide, and natural law. We will attempt to understand the arguments behind the Stoics paradoxical-sounding claims in order to assess the plausibility of their positions. The seminar is intended for students taking paper 135 Latin Philosophy at finals, as well as for postgraduate students doing the MSt in Ancient Philosophy. Lecture materials, including suggested readings, will be posted on the Faculty of Philosophy weblearn site under Lectures, Trinity Term 2014. Week 1: The Final End: Virtue as the only good Week2: Oikeiosis: preferred indifferents, selective value, and living in accordance with nature. Week 3: Kataleptic impressions and the extirpation of the passions Week 4: Determinism and what is up to us. Week 5: Moral Progress: Duties and Perfect Duties Week 6: The four-persona theory; Decreta and Praecepta Week 7: Leaving the Banquet: Socrates, Cato, and Roman Suicide Week 8: Natural Law

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Other Lectures (suitable for all audiences) The 2014 John Locke Lectures: Anger and Forgiveness

Prof Martha Nussbaum (Chicago) W. 5 7 (weeks 2 to 6), Magdalen College (Grove Auditorium)

The Faculty of Philosophy is very pleased to welcome Prof Nussbaum as the 2014 John Locke Lecturer. As well as the lecture series, two seminars will be given, with details to be publicized shortly; a manuscript by Prof Nussbaum, covering the lecture topic, will be made available on Weblearn. Lecture 1: Furies into Eumenides Anger is not just ubiquitous, it is also popular even among philosophers. Many people think it is impossible to care sufficiently for justice without anger at injustice. Many also believe that it is impossible for individuals to vindicate their own self-respect adequately without anger. These lectures will argue that anger is conceptually confused and normatively pernicious. It is neither normatively appropriate nor productive in either the personal or the political life. The first lecture introduces the core ideas, using as a metaphor the end of Aeschylus Oresteia, in which goddesses of retribution are transformed into guardians of social welfare. It also introduces a sub-argument concerning forgiveness: rather than being the normatively benign alternative to anger that many people believe it to be, forgiveness (at least as standardly defined) all too often proves a covert form of anger, extracting humiliation as a condition of forgoing angry attitudes. Lecture 2: Anger: Down-ranking, Weakness, Payback This lecture (a very short form of the chapter 2 available on the website) analyzes the cognitive content of anger, starting from, but not totally agreeing with, Aristotles definition. With the help of an example, I argue that anger is almost always normatively flawed in one of two ways. Either it wrongly supposes that punishing the aggressor could make good a past damage an idea of cosmic balance with deep roots in the human psyche but nonsensical or, in the case where the angry person focuses exclusively on offense to relative status, it may possibly make sense (a relative lowering of the offender does effect a relative raising of the victim), but the exclusive focus on status is normatively problematic. Although anger may still be useful as a signal, a motivation, and/or a deterrent, its flaws compromise even this instrumental role. I then discuss a concept that I call the Transition: a constructive segue from backward-looking anger to constructive thought about the future. And I identify one species of anger that I do consider normatively unproblematic, which I call Transition-Anger. I also discuss the connection between anger and a displaced sense of helplessness, and examine a possible role for empathy in extricating oneself from the trap of anger.

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Lecture 3: Anger in the Personal Realm It is commonly thought that people who have been wronged by intimates ought to be angry, because they owe it to their self-respect so to react. This lecture (a very short form of chapter 4 on the website) contests that claim, discussing anger between intimate partners and anger between adult children and their parents (but focusing on the latter for reasons of time). I end with a discussion of self-anger. In all cases I pursue my sub-theme of forgiveness, arguing that generosity, and not the extraction of apologies, Is what we need. Lecture 4: The Political Realm: Everyday Justice Many people think that the institutions of the legal system ought to embody the spirit of (justified) anger, and they defend a picture of criminal punishment along these lines. In keeping with the forward-looking and constructive attitude I have defended previously, I criticized criminal law retributivism and defend a Millean (not exactly Benthamite) form of welfarism, looking at the implications of these ideas for several specific aspects of the criminal justice system (victim impact statements, shame-based penalties, juvenile justice conferencing, mercy at the sentencing phase). I insist, however, that the ex post focus of the criminal justice system is actually a narrow part of the task of a good society in dealing with crime. Forward-looking strategies should focus above all on education, health care, nutrition, and inclusion in the political process. (This lecture is a short form of chapter 6 on the website.) Lecture 5: The Political Realm: Revolutionary Justice When there is great injustice, it is very tempting to think that righteous anger is the best response, and even a necessary response. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the three most successful revolutionary freedom movements in the past century have been conducted in a spirit of non-anger (distinct from, though sometimes joined to, non-violence): Gandhis independence movement, Martin Luther King, Jr.s role in the U. S. civil rights movement, and Nelson Mandelas freedom movement in South Africa. Studying the thought and practice of these three leaders, I argue that non-anger is both normatively and practically superior to anger. (This lecture is a short form of chapter 7 from the website.)

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The 2014 Isaiah Berlin Lectures: After Certainty: A History of our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions Prof Robert Pasnau (Colorado) T. 5 7 (weeks 3 to 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

The Faculty is very pleased to welcome the 2014 Isaiah Berlin Lecturer, Prof Pasnau. Between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modernity, our conception of knowledge underwent a series of dramatic transformations, changing the way we think about philosophy, science, perception, and reality. With the decline of Aristotelianism came radically new perspectives on the prospects for certainty, our grasp of underlying causes, and the reliability of the senses. These transformations were in fact so central to our changing worldview in the seventeenth century that that might plausibly be thought to define the beginnings of the modern era. Ranging over the whole history of philosophy, but focusing especially on the transition from the later Middle Ages into the seventeenth century, these lectures will trace the rise of a new way of thinking about our cognitive aspirations and achievements. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

Dr Jan Westerhoff M. 2 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures give an introduction to some of the most important systematic issues in ancient Indian Philosophy. No knowledge of Indian languages is presupposed. 1. Particulars, universals, and non-existent objects: Nyya-Vaieika ontology. 2. Do persons exist? The ancient Indian controversy about the existence of an tman. 3. Is there a nature of the world? Madhyamaka's radical anti-foundationalism. 4. Does matter exist? The Yogcra denial of the external world.

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Freges Philosophy of Mathematics

Prof Matthias Schirn (LMU Munich) M. 4.30 6.30 (week 3); Th. 11 1 (weeks 3, 4); M. 11 1 (weeks 4 and 5), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room except M. week 3 Ryle Room, and M. week 4 Seminar Room)

Lecture 1: Logical abstraction and logical objects. In this lecture, I shall critically discuss some issues related to Freges notion of logical object and his paradigms of second-order abstraction principles: Humes Principle and especially Axiom V. The main focus is on the problem of referential indeterminacy of numerical terms and especially of course-of-values terms. Lecture 2: Freges logicism. This lecture is devoted to a critical discussion of special issues of Freges logicist programme as outlined in Grundlagen: his attempts to define cardinal number; the analyticity of Humes Principle from a Fregean and a neo-Fregean view; abstraction by recarving or reconceptualization critically examined. Lecture 3: Second-order abstraction before and after Russells Paradox. In this lecture, I analyse further aspects of Freges paradigms of second-order abstraction. The issues dealt with include self-evidence and epistemic (non-)triviality with particular emphasis on Axiom V, Freges attitude towards Axiom V before and after Russells discovery of the contradiction, as well as the possible role and the status of Humes Principle in the face of Russells paradox. In the central part, I pursue a double aim: (a) to shed new light on the connection between Freges way of introducing the primitive functions of his logical system and the requisite self-evidence of his axioms in whose expression the name of such a function occurs; (b) to examine the conflict between the requirements of self-evidence and real knowledge arising inevitably and invariably from Fregean abstraction principles, if they are singled out as axioms of a theory T. Along the way, I discuss an important, but a somewhat obscure passage in Freges letter to Russell of 28th July 1902 in which Frege hints at the difficulties connected with Axiom V and abstraction in general. The discussion includes a critical assessment of Richard Hecks interpretation. In the concluding part, I make a number of critical remarks on Freges reaction to Russells paradox in the period 1902-1906. Lecture 4: Grundgesetze, 26-32 and Freges proof of referentiality. In 31, Frege attempts to prove, by appealing to his criteria of referentiality (29), that every well-formed expression of his formal language has a reference. To this end, he confines himself to demonstrating that every primitive function-name of his concept-script is referential, apparently relying on the assumption that the application of the formation rules of the system insertion and gap formation preserves the property of being referential. I shall discuss a number of problematic aspects of Freges procedure some of which were passed over in silence in the literature. This requires in the first place a careful analysis of both his formation rules and his criteria of referentiality.

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Lecture 5: Freges philosophy of geometry. The last lecture is roughly in five sections. I begin with introductory remarks. In the second section, I cast a glance at Freges early views on geometry and arithmetic, while in the third I comment on the relationship between Freges and Kants views of geometrical knowledge. In the fourth section, I examine, in a critical way, Freges remarks on space, spatial intuition, and geometrical axioms in a key passage of Grundlagen (26). I conclude with critical remarks on the topic Frege and non-Euclidean geometry and a short overall assessment of Freges philosophy of geometry.

Aspects of Identity Dr Stephen Williams, M. 11 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

In these classes, I shall examine the absoluteness, necessity and determinacy of identity; I shall begin with a discussion of the general properties of identity. Special Topics in Applied Ethics

Mr Jonathan Pugh and Mr Owen Schaefer W. 2 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

These lectures are aimed at students intending to take the Ethics paper. In these four lectures we will analyse the differences between deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theory approaches to ethics through the consideration of concrete debates in applied ethics. (Articles are available online via SOLO) There will be time after each lecture for further discussion. Lecture 1: Abortion: The abortion debate is most commonly framed in terms of the rights and interests of competing parties, which might be weighed in either a consequentialist or deontic manner. We shall consider some of the problems of analysing the problem of abortion in this way. We shall also discuss a virtue ethics approach to the topic that deemphasizes the centrality of rights-talk in favour of analysing the appropriate traits or attitudes to possess in this context. Suggested readings (core in bold):

- Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Chapters 4 & 6 - Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1,

No. 1 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 47-66. - Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, Oxford

Review 5, 5-15, reprinted in her Virtues and Vices, Oxford University Press, 2002 [available online via SOLO]

- Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 223-246.

- Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Apr., 1989), pp. 183-202.

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- Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, 1977, [particularly chapters 3, 6, and 9-11].

Lecture 2: Euthanasia: Consequentialist and deontological frameworks provide substantially different analysis concerning the relevance of the distinctions between killing and letting die, as well as intending and merely foreseeing death. Beyond theoretical interest, we will explore how such differing analyses are crucial to the ethics of euthanasia. Suggested readings (core in bold):

- Singer, Peter: Practical Ethics, Ch 7. - James Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia" The New England Journal of

Medicine, Vol. 292, January 9, 1975, pp. 78-80. - Dan Brock,1993, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, Hastings Center Report, 22/2: 10-22. - Philippa Foot, "Killing and Letting Die," Moral Dilemmas, chapter 5. - J. David Velleman, Against the Right to Die, The Journal of Medicine and

Philosophy, 1992. - Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Penguin, 1977, [particularly

chapters 6-8 and 14-15] Lecture 3: Poverty: The Singerian perspective on strong duties to the global poor perhaps best fits into a consequentialist framework. Yet, the form of the argument is structured so as to be amenable to other frameworks as well. We will examine the extent to which non-consequentialists may be able to avoid the demanding force of the argument for strong duties to the global poor. Suggested readings (core in bold):

- Singer, Peter (1972). Famine, Affluence and Morality. Philosophy and Public

Affairs 1(3): 229-243. - Pogge, Thomas (2005). Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. Ethics and

International Affairs 19(1): 55-83. - Sen, Amartya (1993). Capability and Well-Being. In The Quality of life, ed. by

Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Clarendon Press. - Miller, Richard W. (2004). Beneficence, Duty and Distance. Philosophy and Public

Affairs 32(4). Lecture 4: Enhancement: Making improvements to humanity through novel interventions such as pharmaceuticals, genetic manipulation or neurosurgery is naturally attractive to consequentialists, who aim at generating the best possible state of affairs. But we will discuss how this attempt to maximize peoples abilities may be in tension with a more accepting attitude towards our given nature that some argue is a virtue.

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Suggested readings (core in bold)

- Bostrom, Nick and Toby Ord (2006). The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics. Ethics 116(4): 656-679.

- Savulescu, Julian (2001). Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 15 (5-6): 413-426.

- Herissone-Kelly, Peter (2012). Habermas, Human Agency and Human Genetic Enhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21: 200-210

o See also Habermas, Jurgen (2003). The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Hauskeller, Michael (2011). Human Enhancement and the Giftedness of Life. Philosophical Papers 40(1): 55-79.

o See also Sandel, Michael (2004). The Case Against Perfection. Cambridge and London: Belknap Press.

Key Themes in Metaethics Mr Yuuki Ohta W. 3 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) General course description This is a set of introductory lectures covering four major themes in metaethics: reasons and practical reasoning; character and virtues; objectivity, fact and value; the place of moral philosophy in human life. The goal in each lecture is to present some of the central issues that define each of the four themes, focusing on the basic conceptual machinery and argumentative manoeuvres some key players in the debate have deployed to make their opening moves. The goal of the course as a whole is to equip the audience with the knowledge and understanding of the terrain needed to engage with more advanced discussions in many areas of contemporary practical philosophy. The course assumes no prior knowledge of the works of the philosophers it discusses, or of metaethics in general. For each of the four lectures, I have given a Target reading. In each case this reading is a locus classicus for the theme of the corresponding lecture. Lecture 1: Reasons and practical reasoning One central question moral philosophy addresses is: What ought one morally to do? This question in effect asks what moral reasons one has. But we may want to step back and ask: What is a reason for action? How are such reasons and desire related? How are such reasons articulated in practical reasoning? I shall raise these questions by way of discussing Bernard Williamss influential work on internalism about reasons, highlighting some of its striking insights, and assessing just how devastating these might be for the traditional project of moral enquiry.

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Target reading: Bernard Williams, Internal and external reasons. Lecture 2: Character and virtues Consequentialism and deontology are traditionally considered as two major types of moral theories. Very roughly, the former attempts to answer the question what one ought morally to do in terms of the (expected) goodness of the consequences of actions, and the latter, in terms of the rightness (conformity to duty from the respect for the law) of the intention behind actions. But are these the only, or even very good, ways of addressing ethical questions? This lecture introduces virtue ethics by examining the ethical relevance of the notion of personal character, and raises the question whether virtue ethics is a tertium quid in moral theorising. Target reading: G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy. Lecture 3: Objectivity, fact and value The objectivity of moral reasons has been variously questioned. But it is a great question just what it is for such reasons to be objective. For instance, if moral reasons essentially depended in some way on some peculiar features of ones perspective, would such reasons be incapable of being objective? The idea that there are different kinds of objectivity, some of them essentially perspectival, greatly complicates a number of metaethical issues, some of which I shall discuss in this lecture. In particular, I shall discuss the ways in which any simplistic dichotomies as between fact and value, is and ought, the natural and the non-natural, are problematical. Target reading: John McDowell, Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World. Lecture 4: The place of moral philosophy in human life This lecture is an attempt at once to synthesise and apply the discussions of the previous lectures, by way of addressing the question: What is the meaning of life? Put in terms of the foregoing lectures, the question might be taken to ask: What reasons are there for being any kind of human person with a character? This question is accompanied by two other closely related ones: What kind of objectivity could any answer to this question possibly enjoy? And, Does this question even make sense? I shall try to clarify the nature of these questions, before suggesting some lines of possible engagement. Target reading: David Wiggins, Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life.

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Key Themes in Wittgensteins Later Philosophy Mr Ben Sorgiovanni M. 3 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) These four lectures are intended primarily for students taking paper 118, The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, but may also be of interest to those taking paper 117, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Topics to be covered are as follows:

Week 1: The Augustinean picture of language

This lecture will unpack what Wittgenstein describes at the opening of Philosophical Investigations as the Augustinean picture of language and consider his principal objections to it. It will also consider how best to interpret the slogan meaning is use within the context of those objections.

Week 2: Grammar and grammatical propositions According to Wittgenstein, the proper mode for philosophical inquiry is not metaphysical but grammatical. Essence, he remarks is expressed in grammar Grammar tells what kind of object anything is (PI 371-3). This lecture will clarify Wittgensteins conception of grammar and grammatical propositions. Week 3: Rules, rule-following and intentionality The rule-following considerations constitute, in many ways, the philosophical core of Investigations. The aim of this lecture will be to introduce these considerations and consider how best to interpret them. The implications for intentional phenomena considered more generally will also be discussed.

Week 4: Privacy and language In spite of the attention it has received in the literature, there remains marked disagreement among commentators over how exactly to interpret Wittgensteins argument (or arguments) against the possibility of a private language. According to some, Wittgensteins denial relies on a form of verificationism or a sceptical point about memory. According to others, it is claims about the essentially public nature of naming and ostensive definition which are central. The aim of this lecture will be to consider these competing interpretations and their relative strengths and weaknesses.

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Key Issues in current Philosophy of Mind Mr Peter Forrest F. 11 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) The guiding idea behind these lectures is that phenomenal consciousness and intentionality (or mental representation) are best studied together, as essentially a single, unified whole. For years these two key topics were treated as basically non-overlapping phenomena. However, the last fifteen years has seen a flourishing of exciting work in philosophy of mind that argues for a deep and essential connection between consciousness and representation. It is on this work that the lectures will focus. Lecture 1 (2 May) - The Reach of Consciousness: Cognitive Phenomenology Are intentional states such as thoughts conscious? Is there something distinctive it is like to think? Can we answer these questions simply by introspecting? If not, what might this tell us about the notion of phenomenology, i.e. what-it-is-like-ness? Lecture 2 (9 May)- The Reach of Representation: Phenomenal Intentionality Are sensory experiences essentially representational? If so, (a) what implications does this have for philosophical attempts to naturalize mental content and (b) does this make the hard problem of consciousness harder, or easier? Lecture 3 (16 May) Explaining Consciousness via Representation 1: Representationalism The next two lectures look at attempts to answer (b) above by claiming the hard problem becomes easier when we tie consciousness to representation. First, we look at representationalism via (i) a motivation: the transparency of experience; and (ii) a problematic consequence: phenomenal externalism. Lecture 4 (23 May) Explaining Consciousness via Representation 2: Phenomenal Concepts The final lecture looks at a second attempt to use representation (in this case, our concepts of conscious experiences) to explain consciousness in a naturalistic framework. The three questions here: (i) what are phenomenal concepts, (ii) does conscious experience require phenomenal concepts, and (iii) how might they shed light on the epistemic gap between our scientific theories of the physical world and consciousness?

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Graduate Classes Graduate classes are, except where otherwise indicated, intended for the Facultys BPhil and MSt students. Other students may attend, and are welcome, provided they first seek and obtain the permission of the class-giver(s). With the more popular graduate classes, attendance by those outside of the BPhil and MSt can cause the teaching rooms to become overcrowded. In such circumstances, BPhil and MSt students, for whom these classes are intended, must take priority. Those not on the BPhil or MSt will be expected, if asked by the class-giver(s), to leave the class for the benefit of the intended audience.

The Constant Life: Stoic Ethics in the Roman Period Dr Karen M. Nielsen W. 11, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) This seminar offers an introduction to Stoic ethics with particular emphasis on its reception in Roman times. We will consider Ciceros On Moral Ends (De finibus bonorum et malorum), On Duties (De officiis) and Senecas De Constantia and De Vita Beata, as well as a selection from Senecas Moral Letters. We will examine the relationship between the thought of earlier Greek Stoics like Zeno of Citium, Aristo of Chios, Chrysippus, and Panaetius, and later Roman thought, as well as the legacy of Socrates and Aristotle to Stoic ethics. Topics include the final end (summum bonum), appropriation (oikeiosis) and moral progress, the extirpation of the passions, preferred and dispreferred indifferents, determinism and agency, Roman suicide, and natural law. We will attempt to understand the arguments behind the Stoics paradoxical-sounding claims in order to assess the plausibility of their positions. The seminar is intended for students taking paper 135 Latin Philosophy at finals, as well as for postgraduate students doing the MSt in Ancient Philosophy. Lecture materials, including suggested readings, will be posted on the Faculty of Philosophy weblearn site under Lectures, Trinity Term 2014. Week 1: The Final End: Virtue as the only good Week2: Oikeiosis: preferred indifferents, selective value, and living in accordance with nature. Week 3: Kataleptic impressions and the extirpation of the passions Week 4: Determinism and what is up to us. Week 5: Moral Progress: Duties and Perfect Duties Week 6: The four-persona theory; Decreta and Praecepta Week 7: Leaving the Banquet: Socrates, Cato, and Roman Suicide Week 8: Natural Law

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De Anima Prof Christopher Shields T. 9 11 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) In this seminar we will read and discuss the whole of Aristotles De Anima from beginning to end, using a new translation and commentary. No knowledge of Greek is required, but those with Greek will be encouraged to review the translation as we proceed. The focus of the discussion, however, will be the philosophical content of the work. The commentary is written for Greekless readers with a philosophical interest in Aristotle. The author will be keen to know where, with this audience in mind, the commentary succeeds and where it falls short, so that final revisions may be effected before the work goes to the Press at the end of the term. Week One: Introduction and DA i Week Two: DA ii 1-5 Week Three: DA ii 6-iii 3 Week Four: DA iii 4-12 Each week we will target three or four central issues for discussion. Those wishing to take part may receive the manuscript by contacting Christopher Shields (Christopher.Shields@lmh.ox.ac.uk). Metaphysics

Prof John Hawthorne and Prof Tim Williamson T. 11 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Week 1, April 29 Williamson, based on Modal Logic as Metaphysics, chapter 1 Week 2, May 6 Hawthorne on gunk Week 3, May 13 Hawthorne on naturalness Week 4, May 20 Williamson, based on Modal Logic as Metaphysics, chapter 5 Week 5, May 27 Hawthorne on semantic plasticity Week 6, June 3 Hawthorne on counterfactuals Week 7, June 10 Williamson, based on Modal Logic as Metaphysics, chapter 6 Week 8, June 17 Williamson, based on Modal Logic as Metaphysics, chapter 8.4

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Philosophy of Cognitive Science Prof Martin Davies and Dr Philipp Koralus F. 10.30 12.30, Radcliffe Humanities

(Ryle Room)

This class is intended primarily for BPhil students, but others are welcome to attend. Each week, we shall begin with one or two BPhil students giving brief presentations. We shall cover topics in philosophy of cognitive science, including (provisionally, and not necessarily in this order): Neuroimaging Attention Bounded rationality Systematicity Tacit knowledge The scientific study of consciousness Theory of mind Delusions Readings for each topic will be available on WebLearn, in the Seminar Resources folder for TT14. Philosophy of Mathematics

Dr Dan Isaacson F. 11 1, Radcliffe Humanities (Meeting Room 4 except week 6: Colin Matthew Room)

This class is for B.Phil. and M.St. students in Philosophy, but D.Phil. students, and any others, including undergraduates, students from other faculties, and visitors, interested in philosophy of mathematics, are welcome to attend, and to participate in discussion. In each two-hour session, I will give a lecture for the first hour or so, and the second hour will be for discussion. Philosophy graduate students are very welcome to give a short presentation, say 10 to 15 minutes, during the second hour of any session, on any topic covered in the class. We will consider the following questions: What is the nature of mathematics? What do we study when we study mathematics? In lectures 1 to 4, I will expound and reject a number of attempted answers to these questions; in lectures 5 to 8 I will argue for what I hold to be the most promising approach, in terms of the role of axiomatization of the branches of mathematics. An axiomatization of a branch of mathematics must be consistent, and must, in some sense, determine the intended structure for that branch to within isomorphism, i.e. it must be categorical. The nature of categoricity turns on the contrast between first and second-order logic, as it came to be understood in the period between 1915 and 1931. I shall expound this development, and explore what it tells us about the nature of mathematics.

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The topics for each week are as follows: (1) Mathematics as the study of particular abstract objects (Platonism), including logicism (Frege and Russell), and set theoretic foundationalism. (2) Mathematics as the manipulation of symbols (nominalism): the formalists who Frege was against, Wittgenstein, Nelson Goodman, Haskell Curry. (3) Mathematics as part of empirical science (Mill); mathematics as analytic while science is synthetic (Carnap); Quine vs Mill, Quine vs Carnap; Field vs Quine (Carnap is nearly right; the rest are all wrong). (4) Mathematics as the study of mental constructs: Kant, Poincar, Brouwer (Intuitionism). (5) Mathematics as the study of structures given by axioms: Dedekinds axiomatizations of the real numbers and of the natural numbers; consistency and categoricity of these axiomatizations.. (6) The Lwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and the Completeness and Compactness Theorems for first-order logic as showing that no axiomatization of an infinite structure in a first-order language can be categorical; Gdels First Incompleteness Theorem as showing that there is no complete formalization of second-order logical consequence. (7) The Henkin Completeness Theorem for second-order logic andformalization of the proofs of second-order categoricity as showing that categoricity theorems can be interpreted in Henkin models, and hence that there are non-standard models of second-order categorical theories; what then is the significance of second-order categoricity? (8) Zermelos proof of the categoricity of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (1930); does this show that Cantors continuum problem has a determinate answer, despite being undecidable by any known first-order axioms of set theory?

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Philosophical Logic Dr James Studd M. 10 12, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) This class is primarily intended for BPhil and MSt students and will comprise a topic-based introduction to issues in philosophical logic, broadly construed. Others are welcome. BPhil and MSt attendees will be expected to give at least one presentation, which may either be an introduction to the week's readings or his or her own research on an agreed topic in philosophical logic. Readings for week 1: 1. Logic: Is second-order logic logic? Boolos 'To Be is to be a Value of a Variable (or to be Some Values of Some Variables)'. Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), 43049. Resnik: 'Second-order Logic Still Wild'. Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 7587. Provisional Schedule for weeks 28: 2. Plurals: is there irreducibly plural quantification and reference? 3. Modality: what is the correct logic of metaphysical modality? 4. Quantifiers: can we quantify over absolutely everything? 5. Modality and Quantifiers: does everything exist necessarily? 6. Conditionals: what are the truth and belief-conditions for conditionals? 7. Consequence: what characterizes logical consequence? 8. Truth: how truth-like can a predicate be? Anselms Proofs Prof Brian Leftow Th. 3 5, Oriel College (MacGregor Room) This class provides an in-depth analysis of Anselm's three (yes, three) "ontological" arguments for God's existence and the full range of objections to them. The first 2 or 3 sessions will be historical, providing the background in Anselm's metaphysics needed to see what the arguments actually are. Thereafter the focus shifts to analysis and debate. I will argue that the arguments are a lot better than you think they are.

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Reasoning

Prof John Broome Th. 11 1 (weeks 1 to 4), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) This course will consist of just four seminars, one in each of the first four weeks of term. It continues the course on Normativity, rationality and reasoning taught by Felix Pinkert and me during Hilary Term. It will be based on the last five chapter of my book Rationality Through Reasoning. I shall put the readings on the seminars page on Weblearn. Week 1, 1 May: Higher order reasoning Read: Rationality Through Reasoning, chapter 12. Christine Korsgaard, The activity of reason, Proceedings and Addresses of the American

Philosophical Association, 83 (2009), pp. 2343. Week 2, 8 May: First order reasoning Read: Rationality Through Reasoning, chapter 13. Paul Boghossian, What is inference?, Philosophical Studies, DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9903-

x. Week 3, 15 May: Practical reasoning Read: Rationality Through Reasoning, chapter 14. Nicholas Smith, Freges judgement stroke and the conception of logic as the study of

inference not consequence, Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), pp. 63965. Week 4, 22 May: Explicit reasoning and enkratic reasoning Read: Rationality Through Reasoning, chapters 15 and 16. Bernard Williams, Internal and external reasons, in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University

Press, 1981, pp. 10113.

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Aesthetics Dr James Grant and Dr Andrew Huddleston Th. 4.30 6.30 (weeks 2, 4-6), Exeter College

Each session will consist of a presentation by an invited guest speaker on an article or chapter to be read by seminar participants in advance as a prelude to a discussion. Unpublished papers will be made available in due course. Week 2 (Saskatchewan Room, Exeter College)

Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago) Tragic and Comic Festivals: Shaping Compassion, Transcending Disgust, chapter 9 of her Political Emotions (Harvard, 2013)

Week 4 (Quarrell Room, Exeter College)

Aaron Meskin (University of Leeds) Aesthetic Communication and Aesthetic Adjectives

Week 5 (Stapeldon Room, Exeter College)

Angela Breitenbach (Kings College, Cambridge) Aesthetics in Science

Week 6 (Saskatchewan Room, Exeter College)

Christopher Peacocke (University College London and Columbia University) Music: The Perception of Relational Properties and their Aesthetic Significance

The Philosophy of Music Prof Alison Denham M. 2 4 (weeks 3 to 6), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) These seminars are suitable for B.Phil. and M.St. students, but they are open to anyone interested in the philosophy of music. Optional reading for each class is listed below and will be posted on Weblearn. The authors will take part in the seminars on some occasions. Students with no prior background in the topic may contact Prof Denham for recommendations. We will address questions in the philosophy of music that intersect with wider issues in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and music cognition. Among these are: the perception of sound and sounds as music, holism in music cognition, music as embodied cognition, the experience of emotion in music and musical expression. Week 3 (12th May): Introduction: Experiencing Sounds as Music Optional reading: Chs 1- 3 of Music in the Moment, Jerrold Levinson; The Future of Tonality, Alison Denham Week 4 (19th May): Are Musical Sounds Acousmatic? Optional reading: Against an Acousmatic View of Music, Julian Bacharach.

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Week 5 (26th May): Perceiving Musical Significance Optional reading, The Perception of Musical Significance, C. Peacocke and/or TBA, Paul Boghossian. Week 6 (2nd June): Musical Feeling Optional reading: A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity, Tom Cochrane Richard Price and Modern Moral Philosophy

Prof Roger Crisp and Prof Terence Irwin T. 2 4 except week 2: W. 2 4, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

These seminars will concern the ethics and political philosophy of Richard Price (1723-91). Price is the most important of the British rationalist moral philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries. He develops the meta-ethical and normative views of Cudworth, Clarke, and Butler, and criticizes the sentimentalism of Hutcheson and Hume. He presents his criticism of sentimentalism in the context of a broader criticism of empiricist epistemology. His normative views present a sharp critique of utilitarianism and a defence of pluralism about basic principles. In all these ways Prices views anticipate many of the disputes in 20th century meta-ethics and normative ethics. We will discuss Prices major work the Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (ed. D.D. Raphael [OUP]). We will try both to situate Price among his predecessors and contemporaries (especially Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume) and to explore his relevance for later moral philosophy (especially Moore, Ross, Prichard, and Broad).

We shall also consider other works of Price, especially his political theory, including Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. We may have time to discuss the debate between Price and Burke on the French Revolution. Topics will include: 1) Introduction: Price and his Aims; 2) Metaethics: Objections to Sentimentalism; 3) Metaethics: Intuition and Fitness; 4) Motivation and Self-interest; 5) Virtue and Heads of Virtue; 6) Utilitarianism and Objections; 7) God; 8) Liberty. Suggestions for further reading will be available. Anyone wishing to offer a presentation should contact the convenors a.s.a.p. Oxford graduate students in Philosophy are encouraged to offer presentations; priority will be given to BPhil students. A presentation should take no more than 20 minutes. The topic should be arranged with one of the convenors in advance. Please consult the Weblearn site for this class before the first meeting, for further details and reading for the first meeting.

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Regular Faculty Seminars Please note that the Faculty weekly events mailing covers talks for many of the seminars, often providing abstracts, and other details not known when this Prospectus is produced.

Moral Philosophy Seminar Dr Edward Harcourt and Dr Guy Kahane (Conveners) M. 4.30 6.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) These seminars take place every week in term time throughout the year, on Mondays from 4.30 to 6.30 in the Lecture Room at the Philosophy Centre, Radcliffe Humanities, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6GG. All philosophers are welcome to attend, and also to join the speaker for drinks after the talk, and later for dinner.

Apr 28 David Brink (UCSD) 'Responsibility, Incompetence, and Psychopathy'

May 5 Axel Honneth (Frankfurt/Columbia) 'The Idea of Social Freedom. On the Intellectual Roots of Socialism' (joint meeting with post-Kantian seminar)

May 12 Michael Otsuka (LSE)

May 19 Paul Bloomfield (Connecticut)

May 26 Julia Driver (Washington University, St. Louis)

Jun 2 Krister Bykvist (Stockholm)

Jun 9 Kieran Setiya (Pittsburgh)

Jun 16 Richard Holton (Cambridge)

Philosophy of Mathematics Research Seminar Dr Volker Halbach, Dr Dan Isaacson, Dr James Studd (Conveners) M. 4.30 6.30

(odd weeks), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) Week 1, 28 Apr: Timothy Williamson (Oxford), Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology Week 3, 12 May: Matthias Schirn (Munich), Freges Logical Abstraction and Logical Objects Week 5, 26 May: Carlo Nicolai (Oxford), "Notes on Typed Truth and Consistency Assertions" Week 7, 9 June: Brendan Larvor (Hertfordshire), The Logic of Informal Proofs

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Post-Kantian Philosophy Seminar Dr Manuel Dries and Dr Joseph Schear M. 4.30 6.30 (week 2); T. 5 7

(weeks 4, 6, 8), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) The Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar is a seminar series devoted to the study and discussion of post-Kantian European philosophy, welcoming speakers from within Oxford and elsewhere to present work in a workshop format. Colleagues and graduate students with an interest in this tradition are very welcome to take part. 5 May Prof Axel Honneth (joint with Moral Philosophy seminar) 20 May Prof Paul Katsafanas (Boston) Nietzsche on the Unconscious 3 June TBC 17 June Mr Rob Watt (Oxford) Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies Seminar and Reading Group

Dr Anna Marmodoro, Dr Tamer Nawar, Dr Brian Prince, Dr David Yates W. 4.30 6.30, Corpus Christi College

Please visit the projects website at: http://www.power-structuralism.ox.ac.uk. Work in Progress in Ancient Philosophy

Prof David Charles and Prof Terence Irwin Th. 5 7, Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room)

Please visit http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/lectures/workshop_in_ancient_philosophy.

Philosophy of Physics Research Seminar Dr Dennis Lehmkuhl (Convener) Th. 4.30 6.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) Please see the website at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ppox/general/seminar.html for more details. Titles of talks will appear in due course. Interested parties are encouraged to sign up to the Seminars mailing list if they have not already done so (contact admin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk with your details).

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Theoretical Philosophy Work in Progress Seminar

Mr Martin Pickup (Convener) F. 1 3 (weeks vary consult website), Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room)

Seminar website: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~twip/. This seminar, open to faculty and graduate students, provides a forum for faculty members (at Oxford or visiting) to discuss their current work in progress in theoretical philosophy, broadly construed. The seminar aims to facilitate contact and cooperation within the large group of philosophers in Oxford working in these areas, and to familiarise graduate students with the range of work being done in the faculty. Work to be discussed is linked from the TWiP website in advance (typically a week before the seminar). Each seminar begins with a short presentation of the main ideas of the work under discussion by its author. Anyone with an interest in the topic of the paper under discussion is encouraged to attend even if they havent managed to read the paper in advance. Discussion is fairly informal, and as befits a work in progress seminar, the focus is on constructive and useful feedback. Philosophy of Mind Work in Progress Dr Matthew Parrott (Convener) F. 1.15 3 (weeks 3, 5, 7) Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) For more information, please contact the organizer (matthew.parrott@philosophy.ox.ac.uk).

The Jowett Society / Philosophical Society

Various conveners F. 3.30 5.30, Radcliffe Humanities (Lecture Room) The Jowett Society and the Philosophical Society at Oxford University provide a forum for discussion of philosophical issues for all members of the Faculty of Philosophy. The Jowett Society dates back to the 19th century and was named in honour of Benjamin Jowett, master of Balliol College. Previous speakers include Russell, Wittgenstein, and Davidson. http://jowettsociety.wordpress.com/

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Other Events DPhil Seminar Various conveners W. 12.30 2 (even weeks), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) Week 2: Sarah Lane Smith Title and respondent TBC Week 4: Alexander Kaiserman Normative Causation respondent TBC Week 6: Daniel Deasy How to be a Moving Spotlighter respondent Josh Parsons Week 8: Jeremy Goodman Knowledge and vagueness respondent TBC For any questions, please contact one of the conveners (Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi, Andy Yu, Kevin Busch). Applied Ethics Discussion Group Prof Julian Savulescu W. 2 4 (weeks 3, 4, 6, 7), Radcliffe Humanities (Ryle Room) The Applied Ethics Graduate Discussion Group provides the opportunity for ethics graduate students to meet and discuss their thesis plans and research, to share ideas to solve any problems they are encountering, and to receive feedback and constructive criticism on their work to date. Professor Savulescu will lead the group, and any graduate with research interests in applied ethics is warmly invited to attend. This group is not limited to Philosophy applied ethics graduates but is open to any graduate from any faculty (e.g. theology, history, politics, etc) whose thesis has an applied and ethical dimension. Please email miriam.wood@philosophy.ox.ac.uk to receive papers or to present a paper. Philosophy of Criticism

Dr James Grant and Dr Andrew Klevan T. 5 7 (weeks 2, 5) Radcliffe Humanities (Colin Matthew Room)

The aim of this seminar series is to consider philosophical and methodological questions relevant to criticism of the arts, including literature, music, film (and other audio-visual forms), fine art, architecture, and design. We will be looking principally, though not exclusively, at questions of value and evaluation. The seminars will normally involve a presentation by an invited guest speaker on an article or chapter to be read by seminar participants in advance as a prelude to a discussion.

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The sessions in Trinity Term are as follows:

Week 2 (Colin Matthew Room): Paul Crowther (National University of Ireland, Galway), Justifying Canonic Value.

The reading is available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/44.4.361

Week 5 (Colin Matthew Room): Berys Gaut (University of St Andrews), Creativity, Culture and Tradition.

The reading will be made available in due course.

Philosophy of Criticism is a part of the Comparative Criticism and Translation research programme, based jointly at The Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities and St. Annes College, and supported also by the John Fell OUP Research Fund.